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An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations
Adam Smith
Introduction and Plan of the Work
THE annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and 
conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate 
produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations.
    According therefore as this produce, or what is purchased with it, bears a greater or smaller proportion 
to the number of those who are to consume it, the nation will be better or worse supplied with all the 
necessaries and conveniences for which it has occasion.
    But this proportion must in every nation be regulated by two different circumstances; first, by the skill, 
dexterity, and judgment with which its labour is generally applied; and, secondly, by the proportion 
between the number of those who are employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so 
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employed. Whatever be the soil, climate, or extent of territory of any particular nation, the abundance or 
scantiness of its annual supply must, in that particular situation, depend upon those two circumstances.
    The abundance or scantiness of this supply, too, seems to depend more upon the former of those two 
circumstances than upon the latter. Among the savage nations of hunters and fishers, every individual 
who is able to work, is more or less employed in useful labour, and endeavours to provide, as well as he 
can, the necessaries and conveniences of life, for himself, or such of his family or tribe as are either too 
old, or too young, or too infirm to go a hunting and fishing. Such nations, however, are so miserably 
poor that, from mere want, they are frequently reduced, or, at least, think themselves reduced, to the 
necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their infants, their old people, 
and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be devoured by wild beasts. 
Among civilised and thriving nations, on the contrary, though a great number of people do not labour at 
all, many of whom consume the produce of ten times, frequently of a hundred times more labour than the 
greater part of those who work; yet the produce of the whole labour of the society is so great that all are 
often abundantly supplied, and a workman, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and 
industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of life than it is possible for 
any savage to acquire.
    The causes of this improvement, in the productive powers of labour, and the order, according to which 
its produce is naturally distributed among the different ranks and conditions of men in the society, make 
the subject of the first book of this Inquiry. 
    Whatever be the actual state of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which labour is applied in any 
nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must depend, during the continuance of that 
state, upon the proportion between the number of those who are annually employed in useful labour, and 
that of those who are not so employed. The number of useful and productive labourers, it will hereafter 
appear, is everywhere in proportion to the quantity of capital stock which is employed in setting them to 
work, and to the particular way in which it is so employed. The second book, therefore, treats of the 
nature of capital stock, of the manner in which it is gradually accumulated, and of the different quantities 
of labour which it puts into motion, according to the different ways in which it is employed. 
    Nations tolerably well advanced as to skill, dexterity, and judgment, in the application of labour, have 
followed very different plans in the general conduct or direction of it; those plans have not all been 
equally favourable to the greatness of its produce. The policy of some nations has given extraordinary 
encouragement to the industry of the country; that of others to the industry of towns. Scarce any nation 
has dealt equally and impartially with every sort of industry. Since the downfall of the Roman empire, 
the policy of Europe has been more favourable to arts, manufactures, and commerce, the industry of 
towns, than to agriculture, the industry of the country. The circumstances which seem to have introduced 
and established this policy are explained in the third book. 
    Though those different plans were, perhaps, first introduced by the private interests and prejudices of 
particular orders of men, without any regard to, or foresight of, their consequences upon the general 
welfare of the society; yet they have given occasion to very different theories of political economy; of 
which some magnify the importance of that industry which is carried on in towns, others of that which is 
carried on in the country. Those theories have had a considerable influence, not only upon the opinions 
of men of learning, but upon the public conduct of princes and sovereign states. I have endeavoured, in 
the fourth book, to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, those different theories, and the principal 
effects which they have produced in different ages and nations. 
    To explain in what has consisted the revenue of the great body of the people, or what has been the 
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nature of those funds which, in different ages and nations, have supplied their annual consumption, is the 
object of these four first books. The fifth and last book treats of the revenue of the sovereign, or 
commonwealth. In this book I have endeavoured to show, first, what are the necessary expenses of the 
sovereign, or commonwealth; which of those expenses ought to be defrayed by the general contribution 
of the whole society; and which of them by that of some particular part only, or of some particular 
members of it: secondly, what are the different methods in which the whole society may be made to 
contribute towards defraying the expenses incumbent on the whole society, and what are the principal 
advantages and inconveniences of each of those methods: and, thirdly and lastly, what are the reasons 
and causes which have induced almost all modern governments to mortgage some part of this revenue, 
or to contract debts, and what have been the effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual 
produce of the land and labour of the society.
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An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations
Adam Smith
BOOK ONE
Of the Causes of Improvement in the Productive Powers of Labour, and of 
the Order according to Which its Produce is Naturally Distributed among 
the Different Ranks of the People.
CHAPTER I
Of the Division of Labour
THE greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater 
part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or 
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applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.
    
    The effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will be 
more easily understood by considering in what manner it operates in some 
particular manufactures. It is commonly supposed to be carried furthest in some 
very trifling ones; not perhaps that it really is carried further in them than in 
others of more importance: but in those trifling manufactures which are destined 
to supply the small wants of but a small number of people, the whole number of 
workmen must necessarily be small; and those employed in every different 
branch of the work can often be collected into the same workhouse, and placed 
at once under the view of the spectator. In those great manufactures, on the 
contrary, which are destined to supply the great wants of the great body of the 
people, every different branch of the work employs so great a number of 
workmen that it is impossible to collect them all into the same workhouse. We 
can seldom see more, at one time, than those employed in one single branch. 
Though in such manufactures, therefore, the work may really be divided into a 
much greater number of parts than in those of a more trifling nature, the division 
is not near so obvious, and has accordingly been much less observed. 
    To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling manufacture; but one in 
which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the 
pin-maker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of 
labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor acquainted with the use of the 
machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour 
has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, 
make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in 
which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar 
trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are 
likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third 
cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving, the head; to 
make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar 
business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into 
the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided 
into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all 
performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes 
perform two or three of them. I have seen a small manufactory of this kind 
where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently 
performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and 
therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they 
could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of 
pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling 
size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-
eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-
eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred 
pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and 
without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they 
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certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a 
day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four 
thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at present capable of performing, 
in consequence of a proper division and combination of their different 
operations. 
    In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the division of labour are 
similar to what they are in this very trifling one; though, in many of them, the 
labour can neither be so much subdivided, nor reduced to so great a simplicity of 
operation. The division of labour, however, so far as it can be introduced, 
occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of 
labour. The separation of different trades and employments from one another 
seems to have taken place in consequence of this advantage. This separation, 
too, is generally called furthest in those countries which enjoy the highest degree 
of industry and improvement; what is the work of one man in a rude state of 
society being generally that of several in an improved one. In every improved 
society, the farmer is generally nothing but a farmer; the manufacturer, nothing 
but a manufacturer. The labour, too, which is necessary to produce any one 
complete manufacture is almost always divided among a great number of hands. 
How many different trades are employed in each branch of the linen and 
woollen manufactures from the growers of the flax and the wool, to the 
bleachers and smoothers of the linen, or to the dyers and dressers of the cloth! 
The nature of agriculture, indeed, does not admit of so many subdivisions of 
labour, nor of so complete a separation of one business from another, as 
manufactures. It is impossible to separate so entirely the business of the grazier 
from that of the corn-farmer as the trade of the carpenter is commonly separated 
from that of the smith. The spinner is almost always a distinct person from the 
weaver; but the ploughman, the harrower, the sower of the seed, and the reaper 
of the corn, are often the same. The occasions for those different sorts of labour 
returning with the different seasons of the year, it is impossible that one man 
should be constantly employed in any one of them. This impossibility of making 
so complete and entire a separation of all the different branches of labour 
employed in agriculture is perhaps the reason why the improvement of the 
productive powers of labour in this art does not always keep pace with their 
improvement in manufactures. The most opulent nations, indeed, generally excel 
all their neighbours in agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are 
commonly more distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in the 
former. Their lands are in general better cultivated, and having more labour and 
expense bestowed upon them, produce more in proportion to the extent and 
natural fertility of the ground. But this superiority of produce is seldom much 
more than in proportion to the superiority of labour and expense. In agriculture, 
the labour of the rich country is not always much more productive than that of 
the poor; or, at least, it is never so much more productive as it commonly is in 
manufactures. The corn of the rich country, therefore, will not always, in the 
same degree of goodness, come cheaper to market than that of the poor. The 
corn of Poland, in the same degree of goodness, is as cheap as that of France, 
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notwithstanding the superior opulence and improvement of the latter country. 
The corn of France is, in the corn provinces, fully as good, and in most years 
nearly about the same price with the corn of England, though, in opulence and 
improvement, France is perhaps inferior to England. The corn-lands of England, 
however, are better cultivated than those of France, and the corn-lands of France 
are said to be much better cultivated than those of Poland. But though the poor 
country, notwithstanding the inferiority of its cultivation, can, in some measure, 
rival the rich in the cheapness and goodness of its corn, it can pretend to no such 
competition in its manufactures; at least if those manufactures suit the soil, 
climate, and situation of the rich country. The silks of France are better and 
cheaper than those of England, because the silk manufacture, at least under the 
present high duties upon the importation of raw silk, does not so well suit the 
climate of England as that of France. But the hardware and the coarse woollens 
of England are beyond all comparison superior to those of France, and much 
cheaper too in the same degree of goodness. In Poland there are said to be scarce 
any manufactures of any kind, a few of those coarser household manufactures 
excepted, without which no country can well subsist. 
    This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the 
division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is 
owing to three different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every 
particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost 
in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a 
great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one 
man to do the work of many. 
    First, the improvement of the dexterity of the workman necessarily increases 
the quantity of the work he can perform; and the division of labour, by reducing 
every man's business to some one simple operation, and by making this 
operation the sole employment of his life, necessarily increased very much 
dexterity of the workman. A common smith, who, though accustomed to handle 
the hammer, has never been used to make nails, if upon some particular occasion 
he is obliged to attempt it, will scarce, I am assured, be able to make above two 
or three hundred nails in a day, and those too very bad ones. A smith who has 
been accustomed to make nails, but whose sole or principal business has not 
been that of a nailer, can seldom with his utmost diligence make more than eight 
hundred or a thousand nails in a day. I have seen several boys under twenty 
years of age who had never exercised any other trade but that of making nails, 
and who, when they exerted themselves, could make, each of them, upwards of 
two thousand three hundred nails in a day. The making of a nail, however, is by 
no means one of the simplest operations. The same person blows the bellows, 
stirs or mends the fire as there is occasion, heats the iron, and forges every part 
of the nail: in forging the head too he is obliged to change his tools. The 
different operations into which the making of a pin, or of a metal button, is 
subdivided, are all of them much more simple, and the dexterity of the person, of 
whose life it has been the sole business to perform them, is usually much 
greater. The rapidity with which some of the operations of those manufacturers 
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are performed, exceeds what the human hand could, by those who had never 
seen them, be supposed capable of acquiring. 
    Secondly, the advantage which is gained by saving the time commonly lost in 
passing from one sort of work to another is much greater than we should at first 
view be apt to imagine it. It is impossible to pass very quickly from one kind of 
work to another that is carried on in a different place and with quite different 
tools. A country weaver, who cultivates a small farm, must lose a good deal of 
time in passing from his loom to the field, and from the field to his loom. When 
the two trades can be carried on in the same workhouse, the loss of time is no 
doubt much less. It is even in this case, however, very considerable. A man 
commonly saunters a little in turning his hand from one sort of employment to 
another. When he first begins the new work he is seldom very keen and hearty; 
his mind, as they say, does not go to it, and for some time he rather trifles than 
applies to good purpose. The habit of sauntering and of indolent careless 
application, which is naturally, or rather necessarily acquired by every country 
workman who is obliged to change his work and his tools every half hour, and to 
apply his hand in twenty different ways almost every day of his life, renders him 
almost always slothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application even 
on the most pressing occasions. Independent, therefore, of his deficiency in 
point of dexterity, this cause alone must always reduce considerably the quantity 
of work which he is capable of performing. 
    Thirdly, and lastly, everybody must be sensible how much labour is facilitated 
and abridged by the application of proper machinery. It is unnecessary to give 
any example. I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those 
machines by which labour is so much facilitated and abridged seems to have 
been originally owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to 
discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object when the whole 
attention of their minds is directed towards that single object than when it is 
dissipated among a great variety of things. But in consequence of the division of 
labour, the whole of every man's attention comes naturally to be directed 
towards some one very simple object. It is naturally to be expected, therefore, 
that some one or other of those who are employed in each particular branch of 
labour should soon find out easier and readier methods of performing their own 
particular work, wherever the nature of it admits of such improvement. A great 
part of the machines made use of in those manufactures in which labour is most 
subdivided, were originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being 
each of them employed in some very simple operation, naturally turned their 
thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of performing it. 
Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures must frequently 
have been shown very pretty machines, which were the inventions of such 
workmen in order to facilitate and quicken their particular part of the work. In 
the first fire-engines, a boy was constantly employed to open and shut 
alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as 
the piston either ascended or descended. One of those boys, who loved to play 
with his companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of the 
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valve which opened this communication to another part of the machine, the 
valve would open and shut without his assistance, and leave him at liberty to 
divert himself with his playfellows. One of the greatest improvements that has 
been made upon this machine, since it was first invented, was in this manner the 
discovery of a boy who wanted to save his own labour. 
    All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the 
inventions of those who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements 
have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make 
them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are 
called philosophers or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do anything, 
but to observe everything; and who, upon that account, are often capable of 
combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects. In the 
progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other 
employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of 
citizens. Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great number 
of different branches, each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or 
class of philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well 
as in every other business, improves dexterity, and saves time. Each individual 
becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done upon the 
whole, and the quantity of science is considerably increased by it. 
    It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in 
consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed 
society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the 
people. Every workman has a great quantity of his own work to dispose of 
beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every other workman being 
exactly in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great quantity of his 
own goods for a great quantity, or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of 
a great quantity of theirs. He supplies them abundantly with what they have 
occasion for, and they accommodate him as amply with what he has occasion 
for, and a general plenty diffuses itself through all the different ranks of the 
society. 
    Observe the accommodation of the most common artificer or day-labourer in 
a civilised and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of people 
of whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been employed in 
procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation. The woollen coat, 
for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may 
appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The 
shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the 
scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must 
all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production. 
How many merchants and carriers, besides, must have been employed in 
transporting the materials from some of those workmen to others who often live 
in a very distant part of the country! How much commerce and navigation in 
particular, how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-makers, must have 
been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made use of by the 
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dyer, which often come from the remotest corners of the world! What a variety 
of labour, too, is necessary in order to produce the tools of the meanest of those 
workmen! To say nothing of such complicated machines as the ship of the 
sailor, the mill of the fuller, or even the loom of the weaver, let us consider only 
what a variety of labour is requisite in order to form that very simple machine, 
the shears with which the shepherd clips the wool. The miner, the builder of the 
furnace for smelting the ore, the seller of the timber, the burner of the charcoal 
to be made use of in the smelting-house, the brickmaker, the brick-layer, the 
workmen who attend the furnace, the mill-wright, the forger, the smith, must all 
of them join their different arts in order to produce them. Were we to examine, 
in the same manner, all the different parts of his dress and household furniture, 
the coarse linen shirt which he wears next his skin, the shoes which cover his 
feet, the bed which he lies on, and all the different parts which compose it, the 
kitchen-grate at which he prepares his victuals, the coals which he makes use of 
for that purpose, dug from the bowels of the earth, and brought to him perhaps 
by a long sea and a long land carriage, all the other utensils of his kitchen, all the 
furniture of his table, the knives and forks, the earthen or pewter plates upon 
which he serves up and divides his victuals, the different hands employed in 
preparing his bread and his beer, the glass window which lets in the heat and the 
light, and keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the knowledge and art 
requisite for preparing that beautiful and happy invention, without which these 
northern parts of the world could scarce have afforded a very comfortable 
habitation, together with the tools of all the different workmen employed in 
producing those different conveniences; if we examine, I say, all these things, 
and consider what a variety of labour is employed about each of them, we shall 
be sensible that, without the assistance and co-operation of many thousands, the 
very meanest person in a civilised country could not be provided, even 
according to what we very falsely imagine the easy and simple manner in which 
he is commonly accommodated. Compared, indeed, with the more extravagant 
luxury of the great, his accommodation must no doubt appear extremely simple 
and easy; and yet it may be true, perhaps, that the accommodation of a European 
prince does not always so much exceed that of an industrious and frugal peasant 
as the accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an African king, the 
absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages. 
CHAPTER II
Of the Principle which gives occasion to the Division of Labour
THIS division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not 
originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that 
general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very 
slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which 
has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and 
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exchange one thing for another. 
    Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature of 
which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it 
be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs 
not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in 
no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species 
of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes 
the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his 
companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her 
towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the 
accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular 
time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone 
for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and 
natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this 
for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of 
another animal, it has no other means of persuasion but to gain the favour of 
those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel 
endeavours by a thousand attractions to engage the attention of its master who is 
at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts 
with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act 
according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention 
to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every 
occasion. In civilised society he stands at all times in need of the cooperation 
and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to 
gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals each 
individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its 
natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man 
has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him 
to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he 
can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own 
advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a 
bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you 
shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in 
this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good 
offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody 
but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-
citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-
disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. 
But though this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life 
which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he 
has occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in 
the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. 
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With the money which one man gives him he purchases food. The old clothes 
which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which suit 
him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy 
either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion. 
    As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase that we obtain from one another 
the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is 
this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of 
labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a particular person makes bows and 
arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He 
frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison with his companions; and he 
finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he 
himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, 
therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he 
becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of 
their little huts or movable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to 
his neighbours, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with 
venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this 
employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a 
third becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser of hides or skins, 
the principal part of the nothing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able 
to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over 
and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's 
labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a 
particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or 
genius he may possess for that particular species of business. 
    The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than 
we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men 
of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions 
so much the cause as the effect of the division of labour. The difference between 
the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street 
porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, 
custom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or 
eight years of their existence, they were perhaps very much alike, and neither 
their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About 
that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. 
The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by 
degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce 
any resemblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, 
every man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of 
life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the 
same work to do, and there could have been no such difference of employment 
as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents. 
    As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents, so remarkable 
among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which renders 
that difference useful. Many tribes of animals acknowledged to be all of the 
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same species derive from nature a much more remarkable distinction of genius, 
than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place among 
men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different 
from a street porter, as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a 
spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's dog. Those different tribes of animals, 
however, though all of the same species, are of scarce any use to one another. 
The strength of the mastiff is not, in the least, supported either by the swiftness 
of the greyhound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the 
shepherd's dog. The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want of 
the power or disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a 
common stock, and do not in the least contribute to the better accommodation 
ind conveniency of the species. Each animal is still obliged to support and 
defend itself, separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage 
from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. 
Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one 
another; the different produces of their respective talents, by the general 
disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a 
common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of 
other men's talents he has occasion for. 
CHAPTER III
That the Division of Labour is limited by the Extent of the Market
AS it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so 
the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, 
in other words, by the extent of the market. When the market is very small, no 
person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one 
employment, for want of the power to exchange all that surplus part of the 
produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for 
such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he has occasion for. 
    There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be 
carried on nowhere but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find 
employment and subsistence in no other place. A village is by much too narrow 
a sphere for him; even an ordinary market town is scarce large enough to afford 
him constant occupation. In the lone houses and very small villages which are 
scattered about in so desert a country as the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer 
must be butcher, baker and brewer for his own family. In such situations we can 
scarce expect to find even a smith, a carpenter, or a mason, within less than 
twenty miles of another of the same trade. The scattered families that live at 
eight or ten miles distance from the nearest of them must learn to perform 
themselves a great number of little pieces of work, for which, in more populous 
countries, they would call in the assistance of those workmen. Country workmen 
are almost everywhere obliged to apply themselves to all the different branches 
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of industry that have so much affinity to one another as to be employed about 
the same sort of materials. A country carpenter deals in every sort of work that is 
made of wood: a country smith in every sort of work that is made of iron. The 
former is not only a carpenter, but a joiner, a cabinet-maker, and even a carver in 
wood, as well as a wheel-wright, a plough-wright, a cart and waggon maker. The 
employments of the latter are still more various. It is impossible there should be 
such a trade as even that of a nailer in the remote and inland parts of the 
Highlands of Scotland. Such a workman at the rate of a thousand nails a day, 
and three hundred working days in the year, will make three hundred thousand 
nails in the year. But in such a situation it would be impossible to dispose of one 
thousand, that is, of one day's work in the year. 
    As by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every 
sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the sea-
coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind 
naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself, and it is frequently not till a 
long time after that those improvements extend themselves to the inland parts of 
the country. A broad-wheeled waggon, attended by two men, and drawn by eight 
horses, in about six weeks' time carries and brings back between London and 
Edinburgh near four ton weight of goods. In about the same time a ship 
navigated by six or eight men, and sailing between the ports of London and 
Leith, frequently carries and brings back two hundred ton weight of goods. Six 
or eight men, therefore, by the help of water-carriage, can carry and bring back 
in the same time the same quantity of goods between London and Edinburgh, as 
fifty broad-wheeled waggons, attended by a hundred men, and drawn by four 
hundred horses. Upon two hundred tons of goods, therefore, carried by the 
cheapest land-carriage from London to Edinburgh, there must be charged the 
maintenance of a hundred men for three weeks, and both the maintenance, and, 
what is nearly equal to the maintenance, the wear and tear of four hundred 
horses as well as of fifty great waggons. Whereas, upon the same quantity of 
goods carried by water, there is to be charged only the maintenance of six or 
eight men, and the wear and tear of a ship of two hundred tons burden, together 
with the value of the superior risk, or the difference of the insurance between 
land and water-carriage. Were there no other communication between those two 
places, therefore, but by land-carriage, as no goods could be transported from 
the one to the other, except such whose price was very considerable in 
proportion to their weight, they could carry on but a small part of that commerce 
which at present subsists between them, and consequently could give but a small 
part of that encouragement which they at present mutually afford to each other's 
industry. There could be little or no commerce of any kind between the distant 
parts of the world. What goods could bear the expense of land-carriage between 
London and Calcutta? Or if there were any so precious as to be able to support 
this expense, with what safety could they be transported through the territories 
of so many barbarous nations? Those two cities, however, at present carry on a 
very considerable commerce with each other, and by mutually affording a 
market, give a good deal of encouragement to each other's industry. 
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    Since such, therefore, are the advantages of water-carriage, it is natural that 
the first improvements of art and industry should be made where this 
conveniency opens the whole world for a market to the produce of every sort of 
labour, and that they should always be much later in extending themselves into 
the inland parts of the country. The inland parts of the country can for a long 
time have no other market for the greater part of their goods, but the country 
which lies round about them, and separates them from the sea-coast, and the 
great navigable rivers. The extent of their market, therefore, must for a long time 
be in proportion to the riches and populousness of that country, and 
consequently their improvement must always be posterior to the improvement of 
that country. In our North American colonies the plantations have constantly 
followed either the sea-coast or the banks of the navigable rivers, and have 
scarce anywhere extended themselves to any considerable distance from both. 
    The nations that, according to the best authenticated history, appear to have 
been first civilised, were those that dwelt round the coast of the Mediterranean 
Sea. That sea, by far the greatest inlet that is known in the world, having no 
tides, nor consequently any waves except such as are caused by the wind only, 
was, by the smoothness of its surface, as well as by the multitude of its islands, 
and the proximity of its neighbouring shores, extremely favourable to the infant 
navigation of the world; when, from their ignorance of the compass, men were 
afraid to quit the view of the coast, and from the imperfection of the art of 
shipbuilding, to abandon themselves to the boisterous waves of the ocean. To 
pass beyond the pillars of Hercules, that is, to sail out of the Straits of Gibraltar, 
was, in the ancient world, long considered as a most wonderful and dangerous 
exploit of navigation. It was late before even the Phoenicians and Carthaginians, 
the most skilful navigators and ship-builders of those old times, attempted it, and 
they were for a long time the only nations that did attempt it. 
    Of all the countries on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, Egypt seems to 
have been the first in which either agriculture or manufactures were cultivated 
and improved to any considerable degree. Upper Egypt extends itself nowhere 
above a few miles from the Nile, and in Lower Egypt that great river breaks 
itself into many different canals, which, with the assistance of a little art, seem to 
have afforded a communication by water-carriage, not only between all the great 
towns, but between all the considerable villages, and even to many farmhouses 
in the country; nearly in the same manner as the Rhine and the Maas do in 
Holland at present. The extent and easiness of this inland navigation was 
probably one of the principal causes of the early improvement of Egypt. 
    The improvements in agriculture and manufactures seem likewise to have 
been of very great antiquity in the provinces of Bengal, in the East Indies, and in 
some of the eastern provinces of China; though the great extent of this antiquity 
is not authenticated by any histories of whose authority we, in this part of the 
world, are well assured. In Bengal the Ganges and several other great rivers 
form a great number of navigable canals in the same manner as the Nile does in 
Egypt. In the Eastern provinces of China too, several great rivers form, by their 
different branches, a multitude of canals, and by communicating with one 
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another afford an inland navigation much more extensive than that either of the 
Nile or the Ganges, or perhaps than both of them put together. It is remarkable 
that neither the ancient Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor the Chinese, encouraged 
foreign commerce, but seem all to have derived their great opulence from this 
inland navigation. 
    All the inland parts of Africa, and all that part of Asia which lies any 
considerable way north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, the ancient Scythia, the 
modern Tartary and Siberia, seem in all ages of the world to have been in the 
same barbarous and uncivilised state in which we find them at present. The Sea 
of Tartary is the frozen ocean which admits of no navigation, and though some 
of the greatest rivers in the world run through that country, they are at too great a 
distance from one another to carry commerce and communication through the 
greater part of it. There are in Africa none of those great inlets, such as the 
Baltic and Adriatic seas in Europe, the Mediterranean and Euxine seas in both 
Europe and Asia, and the gulfs of Arabia, Persia, India, Bengal, and Siam, in 
Asia, to carry maritime commerce into the interior parts of that great continent: 
and the great rivers of Africa are at too great a distance from one another to give 
occasion to any considerable inland navigation. The commerce besides which 
any nation can carry on by means of a river which does not break itself into any 
great number of branches or canals, and which runs into another territory before 
it reaches the sea, can never be very considerable; because it is always in the 
power of the nations who possess that other territory to obstruct the 
communication between the upper country and the sea. The navigation of the 
Danube is of very little use to the different states of Bavaria, Austria and 
Hungary, in comparison of what it would be if any of them possessed the whole 
of its course till it falls into the Black Sea. 
CHAPTER IV
Of the Origin and Use of Money
WHEN the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a 
very small part of a man's wants which the produce of his own labour can 
supply. He supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part 
of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, 
for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he has occasion for. Every 
man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the 
society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society. 
    But when the division of labour first began to take place, this power of 
exchanging must frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed in 
its operations. One man, we shall suppose, has more of a certain commodity 
than he himself has occasion for, while another has less. The former 
consequently would be glad to dispose of, and the latter to purchase, a part of 
this superfluity. But if this latter should chance to have nothing that the former 
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stands in need of, no exchange can be made between them. The butcher has 
more meat in his shop than he himself can consume, and the brewer and the 
baker would each of them be willing to purchase a part of it. But they have 
nothing to offer in exchange, except the different productions of their respective 
trades, and the butcher is already provided with all the bread and beer which he 
has immediate occasion for. No exchange can, in this case, be made between 
them. He cannot be their merchant, nor they his customers; and they are all of 
them thus mutually less serviceable to one another. In order to avoid the 
inconveniency of such situations, every prudent man in every period of society, 
after the first establishment of the division of labour, must naturally have 
endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a manner as to have at alltimes by 
him, besides the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of some 
one commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to 
refuse in exchange for the produce of their industry. 
    Many different commodities, it is probable, were successively both thought of 
and employed for this purpose. In the rude ages of society, cattle are said to have 
been the common instrument of commerce; and, though they must have been a 
most inconvenient one, yet in old times we find things were frequently valued 
according to the number of cattle which had been given in exchange for them. 
The armour of Diomede, says Homer, cost only nine oxen; but that of Glaucus 
cost an hundred oxen. Salt is said to be the common instrument of commerce 
and exchanges in Abyssinia; a species of shells in some parts of the coast of 
India; dried cod at Newfoundland; tobacco in Virginia; sugar in some of our 
West India colonies; hides or dressed leather in some other countries; and there 
is at this day a village in Scotland where it is not uncommon, I am told, for a 
workman to carry nails instead of money to the baker's shop or the alehouse. 
    In all countries, however, men seem at last to have been determined by 
irresistible reasons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals above 
every other commodity. Metals can not only be kept with as little loss as any 
other commodity, scarce anything being less perishable than they are, but they 
can likewise, without any loss, be divided into any number of parts, as by fusion 
those parts can easily be reunited again; a quality which no other equally durable 
commodities possess, and which more than any other quality renders them fit to 
be the instruments of commerce and circulation. The man who wanted to buy 
salt, for example, and had nothing but cattle to give in exchange for it, must 
have been obliged to buy salt to the value of a whole ox, or a whole sheep at a 
time. He could seldom buy less than this, because what he was to give for it 
could seldom be divided without loss; and if he had a mind to buy more, he 
must, for the same reasons, have been obliged to buy double or triple the 
quantity, the value, to wit, of two or three oxen, or of two or three sheep. If, on 
the contrary, instead of sheep or oxen, he had metals to give in exchange for it, 
he could easily proportion the quantity of the metal to the precise quantity of the 
commodity which he had immediate occasion for. 
    Different metals have been made use of by different nations for this purpose. 
Iron was the common instrument of commerce among the ancient Spartans; 
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copper among the ancient Romans; and gold and silver among all rich and 
commercial nations. 
    Those metals seem originally to have been made use of for this purpose in 
rude bars, without any stamp or coinage. Thus we are told by Pliny, upon the 
authority of Timaeus, an ancient historian, that, till the time of Servius Tullius, 
the Romans had no coined money, but made use of unstamped bars of copper, to 
purchase whatever they had occasion for. These bars, therefore, performed at 
this time the function of money. 
    The use of metals in this rude state was attended with two very considerable 
inconveniencies; first, with the trouble of weighing; and, secondly, with that of 
assaying them. In the precious metals, where a small difference in the quantity 
makes a great difference in the value, even the business of weighing, with proper 
exactness, requires at least very accurate weights and scales. The weighing of 
gold in particular is an operation of some nicety. In the coarser metals, indeed, 
where a small error would be of little consequence, less accuracy would, no 
doubt, be necessary. Yet we should find it excessively troublesome, if every 
time a poor man had occasion either to buy or sell a farthing's worth of goods, he 
was obliged to weigh the farthing. The operation of assaying is still more 
difficult, still more tedious, and, unless a part of the metal is fairly melted in the 
crucible, with proper dissolvents, any conclusion that can be drawn from it, is 
extremely uncertain. Before the institution of coined money, however, unless 
they went through this tedious and difficult operation, people must always have 
been liable to the grossest frauds and impositions, and instead of a pound weight 
of pure silver, or pure copper, might receive in exchange for their goods an 
adulterated composition of the coarsest and cheapest materials, which had, 
however, in their outward appearance, been made to resemble those metals. To 
prevent such abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and thereby to encourage all sorts 
of industry and commerce, it has been found necessary, in all countries that have 
made any considerable advances towards improvement, to affix a public stamp 
upon certain quantities of such particular metals as were in those countries 
commonly made use of to purchase goods. Hence the origin of coined money, 
and of those public offices called mints; institutions exactly of the same nature 
with those of the aulnagers and stamp-masters of woolen and linen cloth. All of 
them are equally meant to ascertain, by means of a public stamp, the quantity 
and uniform goodness of those different commodities when brought to market. 
    The first public stamps of this kind that were affixed to the current metals, 
seem in many cases to have been intended to ascertain, what it was both most 
difficult and most important to ascertain, the goodness or fineness of the metal, 
and to have resembled the sterling mark which is at present affixed to plate and 
bars of silver, or the Spanish mark which is sometimes affixed to ingots of gold, 
and which being struck only upon one side of the piece, and not covering the 
whole surface, ascertains the fineness, but not the weight of the metal. Abraham 
weighs to Ephron the four hundred shekels of silver which he had agreed to pay 
for the field of Machpelah. They are said, however, to be the current money of 
the merchant, and yet are received by weight and not by tale, in the same manner 
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as ingots of gold and bars of silver are at present. The revenues of the ancient 
Saxon kings of England are said to have been paid, not in money but in kind, 
that is, in victuals and provisions of all sorts. William the Conqueror introduced 
the custom of paying them in money. This money, however, was, for a long 
time, received at the exchequer, by weight and not by tale. 
    The inconveniency and difficulty of weighing those metals with exactness 
gave occasion to the institution of coins, of which the stamp, covering entirely 
both sides of the piece and sometimes the edges too, was supposed to ascertain 
not only the fineness, but the weight of the metal. Such coins, therefore, were 
received by tale as at present, without the trouble of weighing. 
    The denominations of those coins seem originally to have expressed the 
weight or quantity of metal contained in them. In the time of Servius Tullius, 
who first coined money at Rome, the Roman as or pondo contained a Roman 
pound of good copper. It was divided in the same manner as our Troyes pound, 
into twelve ounces, each of which contained a real ounce of good copper. The 
English pound sterling, in the time of Edward I, contained a pound, Tower 
weight, of silver, of a known fineness. The Tower pound seems to have been 
something more than the Roman pound, and something less than the Troyes 
pound. This last was not introduced into the mint of England till the 18th of 
Henry VIII. The French livre contained in the time of Charlemagne a pound, 
Troyes weight, of silver of a known fineness. The fair of Troyes in Champaign 
was at that time frequented by all the nations of Europe, and the weights and 
measures of so famous a market were generally known and esteemed. The Scots 
money pound contained, from the time of Alexander the First to that of Robert 
Bruce, a pound of silver of the same weight and fineness with the English pound 
sterling. English, French, and Scots pennies, too, contained all of them originally 
a real pennyweight of silver, the twentieth part of an ounce, and the two-
hundred-and-fortieth part of a pound. The shilling too seems originally to have 
been the denomination of a weight. When wheat is at twelve shillings the 
quarter, says an ancient statute of Henry III, then wastel bread of a farthing shall 
weigh eleven shillings and four pence. The proportion, however, between the 
shilling and either the penny on the one hand, or the pound on the other, seems 
not to have been so constant and uniform as that between the penny and the 
pound. During the first race of the kings of France, the French sou or shilling 
appears upon different occasions to have contained five, twelve, twenty, and 
forty pennies. Among the ancient Saxons a shilling appears at one time to have 
contained only five pennies, and it is not improbable that it may have been as 
variable among them as among their neighbours, the ancient Franks. From the 
time of Charlemagne among the French, and from that of William the Conqueror 
among the English, the proportion between the pound, the shilling, and the 
penny, seems to have been uniformly the same as at present, though the value of 
each has been very different. For in every country of the world, I believe, the 
avarice and injustice of princes and sovereign states, abusing the confidence of 
their subjects, have by degrees diminished the real quantity of metal, which had 
been originally contained in their coins. The Roman as, in the latter ages of the 
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Republic, was reduced to the twenty-fourth part of its original value, and, 
instead of weighing a pound, came to weigh only half an ounce. The English 
pound and penny contain at present about a third only; the Scots pound and 
penny about a thirty-sixth; and the French pound and penny about a sixty-sixth 
part of their original value. By means of those operations the princes and 
sovereign states which performed them were enabled, in appearance, to pay their 
debts and to fulfil their engagements with a smaller quantity of silver than would 
otherwise have been requisite. It was indeed in appearance only; for their 
creditors were really defrauded of a part of what was due to them. All other 
debtors in the state were allowed the same privilege, and might pay with the 
same nominal sum of the new and debased coin whatever they had borrowed in 
the old. Such operations, therefore, have always proved favourable to the debtor, 
and ruinous to the creditor, and have sometimes produced a greater and more 
universal revolution in the fortunes of private persons, than could have been 
occasioned by a very great public calamity. 
    It is in this manner that money has become in all civilised nations the 
universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all 
kinds are bought and sold, or exchanged for one another. 
    What are the rules which men naturally observe in exchanging them either for 
money or for one another, I shall now proceed to examine. These rules 
determine what may be called the relative or exchangeable value of goods. 
    The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and 
sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the 
power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. 
The one may be called "value in use"; the other, "value in exchange." The things 
which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in 
exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange 
have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but 
it will purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. 
A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great 
quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it. 
    In order to investigate the principles which regulate the exchangeable value of 
commodities, I shall endeavour to show: 
    First, what is the real measure of this exchangeable value; or, wherein consists 
the real price of all commodities. 
    Secondly, what are the different parts of which this real price is composed or 
made up. 
    And, lastly, what are the different circumstances which sometimes raise some 
or all of these different parts of price above, and sometimes sink them below 
their natural or ordinary rate; or, what are the causes which sometimes hinder 
the market price, that is, the actual price of commodities, from coinciding 
exactly with what may be called their natural price. 
    I shall endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, those three 
subjects in the three following chapters, for which I must very earnestly entreat 
both the patience and attention of the reader: his patience in order to examine a 
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detail which may perhaps in some places appear unnecessarily tedious; and his 
attention in order to understand what may, perhaps, after the fullest explication 
which I am capable of giving of it, appear still in some degree obscure. I am 
always willing to run some hazard of being tedious in order to be sure that I am 
perspicuous; and after taking the utmost pains that I can to be perspicuous, some 
obscurity may still appear to remain upon a subject in its own nature extremely 
abstracted. 
CHAPTER V
Of the Real and Nominal Price of Commodities, or their Price in Labour, and 
their Price in Money
EVERY man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to 
enjoy the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life. But after 
the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part 
of these with which a man's own labour can supply him. The far greater part of 
them he must derive from the labour of other people, and he must be rich or poor 
according to the quantity of that labour which he can command, or which he can 
afford to purchase. The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who 
possesses it, and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it 
for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to 
purchase or command. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the 
exchangeable value of all commodities. 
    The real price of everything, what everything really costs to the man who 
wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What everything is 
really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or 
exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to 
himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What is bought with money 
or with goods is purchased by labour as much as what we acquire by the toil of 
our own body. That money or those goods indeed save us this toil. They contain 
the value of a certain quantity of labour which we exchange for what is 
supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labour was the 
first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by 
gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally 
purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it 
for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it 
can enable them to purchase or command. 
    Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or 
succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any 
political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the 
means of acquiring both, but the mere possession of that fortune does not 
necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession immediately 
and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing; a certain command over 
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all the labour, or over all the produce of labour, which is then in the market. His 
fortune is greater or less, precisely in proportion to the extent of this power; or to 
the quantity either of other men's labour, or, what is the same thing, of the 
produce of other men's labour, which it enables him to purchase or command. 
The exchangeable value of everything must always be precisely equal to the 
extent of this power which it conveys to its owner. 
    But though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all 
commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is of 
difficult to ascertain the proportion between two different quantities of labour. 
The time spent in two different sorts of work will not always alone determine 
this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and of ingenuity 
exercised, must likewise be taken into account. There may be more labour in an 
hour's hard work than in two hours' easy business; or in an hour's application to 
a trade which it cost ten years' labour to learn, than in a month's industry at an 
ordinary and obvious employment. But it is not easy to find any accurate 
measure either of hardship or ingenuity. In exchanging, indeed, the different 
productions of different sorts of labour for one another, some allowance is 
commonly made for both. It is adjusted, however, not by any accurate measure, 
but by the higgling and bargaining of the market, according to that sort of rough 
equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business of 
common life. 
    Every commodity, besides, is more frequently exchanged for, and thereby 
compared with, other commodities than with labour. It is more natural, 
therefore, to estimate its exchangeable value by the quantity of some other 
commodity than by that of the labour which it can purchase. The greater part of 
people, too, understand better what is meant by a quantity of a particular 
commodity than by a quantity of labour. The one is a plain palpable object; the 
other an abstract notion, which, though it can be made sufficiently intelligible, is 
not altogether so natural and obvious. 
    But when barter ceases, and money has become the common instrument of 
commerce, every particular commodity is more frequently exchanged for money 
than for any other commodity. The butcher seldom carries his beef or his mutton 
to the baker, or the brewer, in order to exchange them for bread or for beer; but 
he carries them to the market, where he exchanges them for money, and 
afterwards exchanges that money for bread and for beer. The quantity of money 
which he gets for them regulates, too, the quantity of bread and beer which he 
can afterwards purchase. It is more natural and obvious to him, therefore, to 
estimate their value by the quantity of money, the commodity for which he 
immediately exchanges them, than by that of bread and beer, the commodities 
for which he can exchange them only by the intervention of another commodity; 
and rather to say that his butcher's meat is worth threepence or fourpence a 
pound, than that it is worth three or four pounds of bread, or three or four quarts 
of small beer. Hence it comes to pass that the exchangeable value of every 
commodity is more frequently estimated by the quantity of money, than by the 
quantity either of labour or of any other commodity which can be had in 
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exchange for it. 
    Gold and silver, however, like every other commodity, vary in their value, are 
sometimes cheaper and sometimes dearer, sometimes of easier and sometimes of 
more difficult purchase. The quantity of labour which any particular quantity of 
them can purchase or command, or the quantity of other goods which it will 
exchange for, depends always upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines 
which happen to be known about the time when such exchanges are made. The 
discovery of the abundant mines of America reduced, in the sixteenth century, 
the value of gold and silver in Europe to about a third of what it had been before. 
As it costs less labour to bring those metals from the mine to the market, so 
when they were brought thither they could purchase or command less labour; 
and this revolution in their value, though perhaps the greatest, is by no means 
the only one of which history gives some account. But as a measure of quantity, 
such as the natural foot, fathom, or handful, which is continually varying in its 
own quantity, can never be an accurate measure of the quantity of other things; 
so a commodity which is itself continually varying in its own value, can never 
be an accurate measure of the value of other commodities. Equal quantities of 
labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the labourer. 
In his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits; in the ordinary degree of his 
skill and dexterity, he must always laydown the same portion of his ease, his 
liberty, and his happiness. The price which he pays must always be the same, 
whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of 
these, indeed, it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller 
quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchases 
them. At all times and places that is dear which it is difficult to come at, or 
which it costs much labour to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, 
or with very little labour. Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own 
value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all 
commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their 
real price; money is their nominal price only. 
    But though equal quantities of labour are always of equal value to the 
labourer, yet to the person who employs him they appear sometimes to be of 
greater and sometimes of smaller value. He purchases them sometimes with a 
greater and sometimes with a smaller quantity of goods, and to him the price of 
labour seems to vary like that of all other things. It appears to him dear in the 
one case, and cheap in the other. In reality, however, it is the goods which are 
cheap in the one case, and dear in the other. 
    In this popular sense, therefore, labour, like commodities, may be said to have 
a real and a nominal price. Its real price may be said to consist in the quantity of 
the necessaries and conveniences of life which are given for it; its nominal price, 
in the quantity of money. The labourer is rich or poor, is well or ill rewarded, in 
proportion to the real, not to the nominal price of his labour. 
    The distinction between the real and the nominal price of commodities and 
labour is not a matter of mere speculation, but may sometimes be of 
considerable use in practice. The same real price is always of the same value; 
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but on account of the variations in the value of gold and silver, the same nominal 
price is sometimes of very different values. When a landed estate, therefore, is 
sold with a reservation of a perpetual rent, if it is intended that this rent should 
always be of the same value, it is of importance to the family in whose favour it 
is reserved that it should not consist in a particular sum of money. Its value 
would in this case be liable to variations of two different kinds; first, to those 
which arise from the different quantities of gold and silver which are contained 
at different times in coin of the same denomination; and, secondly, to those 
which arise from the different values of equal quantities of gold and silver at 
different times. 
    Princes and sovereign states have frequently fancied that they had a temporary 
interest to diminish the quantity of pure metal contained in their coins; but they 
seldom have fancied that they had any to augment it. The quantity of metal 
contained in the coins, I believe of all nations, has, accordingly, been almost 
continually diminishing, and hardly ever augmenting. Such variations, therefore, 
tend almost always to diminish the value of a money rent. 
    The discovery of the mines of America diminished the value of gold and 
silver in Europe. This diminution, it is commonly supposed, though I apprehend 
without any certain proof, is still going on gradually, and is likely to continue to 
do so for a long time. Upon this supposition, therefore, such variations are more 
likely to diminish than to augment the value of a money rent, even though it 
should be stipulated to be paid, not in such a quantity of coined money of such a 
denomination (in so many pounds sterling, for example), but in so many ounces 
either of pure silver, or of silver of a certain standard. 
    The rents which have been reserved in corn have preserved their value much 
better than those which have been reserved in money, even where the 
denomination of the coin has not been altered. By the 18th of Elizabeth it was 
enacted that a third of the rent of all college leases should be reserved in corn, to 
be paid, either in kind, or according to the current prices at the nearest public 
market. The money arising from this corn rent, though originally but a third of 
the whole, is in the present times, according to Dr. Blackstone, commonly near 
double of what arises from the other two-thirds. The old money rents of colleges 
must, according to this account, have sunk almost to a fourth part of their 
ancient value; or are worth little more than a fourth part of the corn which they 
were formerly worth. But since the reign of Philip and Mary the denomination 
of the English coin has undergone little or no alteration, and the same number of 
pounds, shillings and pence have contained very nearly the same quantity of 
pure silver. This degradation, therefore, in the value of the money rents of 
colleges, has arisen altogether from the degradation in the value of silver. 
    When the degradation in the value of silver is combined with the diminution 
of the quantity of it contained in the coin of the same denomination, the loss is 
frequently still greater. In Scotland, where the denomination of the coin has 
undergone much greater alterations than it ever did in England, and in France, 
where it has undergone still greater than it ever did in Scotland, some ancient 
rents, originally of considerable value, have in this manner been reduced almost 
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to nothing. 
    Equal quantities of labour will at distant times be purchased more nearly with 
equal quantities of corn, the subsistence of the labourer, than with equal 
quantities of gold and silver, or perhaps of any other commodity. Equal 
quantities of corn, therefore, will, at distant times, be more nearly of the same 
real value, or enable the possessor to purchase or command more nearly the 
same quantity of the labour of other people. They will do this, I say, more nearly 
than equal quantities of almost any other commodity; for even equal quantities 
of corn will not do it exactly. The subsistence of the labourer, or the real price of 
labour, as I shall endeavour to show hereafter, is very different upon different 
occasions; more liberal in a society advancing to opulence than in one that is 
standing still; and in one that is standing still than in one that is going 
backwards. Every other commodity, however, will at any particular time 
purchase a greater or smaller quantity of labour in proportion to the quantity of 
subsistence which it can purchase at that time. A rent therefore reserved in corn 
is liable only to the variations in the quantity of labour which a certain quantity 
of corn can purchase. But a rent reserved in any other commodity is liable not 
only to the variations in the quantity of labour which any particular quantity of 
corn can purchase, but to the variations in the quantity of corn which can be 
purchased by any particular quantity of that commodity. 
    Though the real value of a corn rent, it is to be observed, however, varies 
much less from century to century than that of a money rent, it varies much 
more from year to year. The money price of labour, as I shall endeavour to show 
hereafter, does not fluctuate from year to year with the money price of corn, but 
seems to be everywhere accommodated, not to the temporary or occasional, but 
to the average or ordinary price of that necessary of life. The average or ordinary 
price of corn again is regulated, as I shall likewise endeavour to show hereafter, 
by the value of silver, by the richness or barrenness of the mines which supply 
the market with that metal, or by the quantity of labour which must be 
employed, and consequently of corn which must be consumed, in order to bring 
any particular quantity of silver from the mine to the market. But the value of 
silver, though it sometimes varies greatly from century to century, seldom varies 
much from year to year, but frequently continues the same, or very nearly the 
same, for half a century or a century together. The ordinary or average money 
price of corn, therefore, may, during so long a period, continue the same or very 
nearly the same too, and along with it the money price of labour, provided, at 
least, the society continues, in other respects, in the same or nearly in the same 
condition. In the meantime the temporary and occasional price of corn may 
frequently be double, one year, of what it had been the year before, or fluctuate, 
for example, from five and twenty to fifty shillings the quarter. But when corn is 
at the latter price, not only the nominal, but the real value of a corn rent will be 
double of what it is when at the former, or will command double the quantity 
either of labour or of the greater part of other commodities; the money price of 
labour, and along with it that of most other things, continuing the same during 
all these fluctuations. 
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    Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well as the 
only accurate measure of value, or the only standard by which we can compare 
the values of different commodities at all times, and at all places. We cannot 
estimate, it is allowed, the real value of different commodities from century to 
century by the quantities of silver which were given for them. We cannot 
estimate it from year to year by the quantities of corn. By the quantities of 
labour we can, with the greatest accuracy, estimate it both from century to 
century and from year to year. From century to century, corn is a better measure 
than silver, because, from century to century, equal quantities of corn will 
command the same quantity of labour more nearly than equal quantities of 
silver. From year to year, on the contrary, silver is a better measure than corn, 
because equal quantities of it will more nearly command the same quantity of 
labour. 
    But though in establishing perpetual rents, or even in letting very long leases, 
it may be of use to distinguish between real and nominal price; it is of none in 
buying and selling, the more common and ordinary transactions of human life. 
    At the same time and place the real and the nominal price of all commodities 
are exactly in proportion to one another. The more or less money you get for any 
commodity, in the London market for example, the more or less labour it will at 
that time and place enable you to purchase or command. At the same time and 
place, therefore, money is the exact measure of the real exchangeable value of 
all commodities. It is so, however, at the same time and place only. 
    Though at distant places, there is no regular proportion between the real and 
the money price of commodities, yet the merchant who carries goods from the 
one to the other has nothing to consider but their money price, or the difference 
between the quantity of silver for which he buys them, and that for which he is 
likely to sell them. Half an ounce of silver at Canton in China may command a 
greater quantity both of labour and of the necessaries and conveniences of life 
than an ounce at London. A commodity, therefore, which sells for half an ounce 
of silver at Canton may there be really dearer, of more real importance to the 
man who possesses it there, than a commodity which sells for an ounce at 
London is to the man who possesses it at London. If a London merchant, 
however, can buy at Canton for half an ounce of silver, a commodity which he 
can afterwards sell at London for an ounce, he gains a hundred per cent by the 
bargain, just as much as if an ounce of silver was at London exactly of the same 
value as at Canton. It is of no importance to him that half an ounce of silver at 
Canton would have given him the command of more labour and of a greater 
quantity of the necessaries and conveniences of life than an ounce can do at 
London. An ounce at London will always give him the command of double the 
quantity of all these which half an ounce could have done there, and this is 
precisely what he wants. 
    As it is the nominal or money price of goods, therefore, which finally 
determines the prudence or imprudence of all purchases and sales, and thereby 
regulates almost the whole business of common life in which price is concerned, 
we cannot wonder that it should have been so much more attended to than the 
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real price. 
    In such a work as this, however, it may sometimes be of use to compare the 
different real values of a particular commodity at different times and places, or 
the different degrees of power over the labour of other people which it may, 
upon different occasions, have given to those who possessed it. We must in this 
case compare, not so much the different quantities of silver for which it was 
commonly sold, as the different quantities of labour which those different 
quantities of silver could have purchased. But the current prices of labour at 
distant times and places can scarce ever be known with any degree of exactness. 
Those of corn, though they have in few places been regularly recorded, are in 
general better known and have been more frequently taken notice of by 
historians and other writers. We must generally, therefore, content ourselves 
with them, not as being always exactly in the same proportion as the current 
prices of labour, but as being the nearest approximation which can commonly be 
had to that proportion. I shall hereafter have occasion to make several 
comparisons of this kind. 
    In the progress of industry, commercial nations have found it convenient to 
coin several different metals into money; gold for larger payments, silver for 
purchases of moderate value, and copper, or some other coarse metal, for those 
of still smaller consideration. They have always, however, considered one of 
those metals as more peculiarly the measure of value than any of the other two; 
and this preference seems generally to have been given to the metal which they 
happened first to make use of as the instrument of commerce. Having once 
begun to use it as their standard, which they must have done when they had no 
other money, they have generally continued to do so even when the necessity 
was not the same. 
    The Romans are said to have had nothing but copper money till within five 
years before the first Punic war, when they first began to coin silver. Copper, 
therefore, appears to have continued always the measure of value in that 
republic. At Rome all accounts appear to have been kept, and the value of all 
estates to have been computed either in asses or in sestertii. The as was always 
the denomination of a copper coin. The word sestertius signifies two asses and a 
half. Though the sestertius, therefore, was originally a silver coin, its value was 
estimated in copper. At Rome, one who owed a great deal of money was said to 
have a great deal of other people's copper. 
    The northern nations who established themselves upon the ruins of the Roman 
empire, seem to have had silver money from the first beginning of their 
settlements, and not to have known either gold or copper coins for several ages 
thereafter. There were silver coins in England in the time of the Saxons; but 
there was little gold coined till the time of Edward III nor any copper till that of 
James I of Great Britain. In England, therefore, and for the same reason, I 
believe, in all other modern nations of Europe, all accounts are kept, and the 
value of all goods and of all estates is generally computed in silver: and when 
we mean to express the amount of a person's fortune, we seldom mention the 
number of guineas, but the number of pounds sterling which we suppose would 
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be given for it. 
    Originally, in all countries, I believe, a legal tender of payment could be made 
only in the coin of that metal, which was peculiarly considered as the standard or 
measure of value. In England, gold was not considered as a legal tender for a 
long time after it was coined into money. The proportion between the values of 
gold and silver money was not fixed by any public law or proclamation; but was 
left to be settled by the market. If a debtor offered payment in gold, the creditor 
might either reject such payment altogether, or accept of it at such a valuation of 
the gold as he and his debtor could agree upon. Copper is not at present a legal 
tender except in the change of the smaller silver coins. In this state of things the 
distinction between the metal which was the standard, and that which was not 
the standard, was something more than a nominal distinction. 
    In process of time, and as people became gradually more familiar with the use 
of the different metals in coin, and consequently better acquainted with the 
proportion between their respective values, it has in most countries, I believe, 
been found convenient to ascertain this proportion, and to declare by a public 
law that a guinea, for example, of such a weight and fineness, should exchange 
for one-and-twenty shillings, or be a legal tender for a debt of that amount. In 
this state of things, and during the continuance of any one regulated proportion 
of this kind, the distinction between the metal which is the standard, and that 
which is not the standard, becomes little more than a nominal distinction. 
    In consequence of any change, however, in this regulated proportion, this 
distinction becomes, or at least seems to become, something more than nominal 
again. If the regulated value of a guinea, for example, was either reduced to 
twenty, or raised to two-and-twenty shillings, all accounts being kept and almost 
all obligations for debt being expressed in silver money, the greater part of 
payments could in either case be made with the same quantity of silver money as 
before; but would require very different quantities of gold money; a greater in 
the one case, and a smaller in the other. Silver would appear to be more 
invariable in its value than gold. Silver would appear to measure the value of 
gold, and gold would not appear to measure the value of silver. The value of 
gold would seem to depend upon the quantity of silver which it would exchange 
for; and the value of silver would not seem to depend upon the quantity of gold 
which it would exchange for. This difference, however, would be altogether 
owing to the custom of keeping accounts, and of expressing the amount of all 
great and small sums rather in silver than in gold money. One of Mr. 
Drummond's notes for five-and-twenty or fifty guineas would, after an alteration 
of this kind, be still payable with five-and-twenty or fifty guineas in the same 
manner as before. It would, after such an alteration, be payable with the same 
quantity of gold as before, but with very different quantities of silver. In the 
payment of such a note, gold would appear to be more invariable in its value 
than silver. Gold would appear to measure the value of silver, and silver would 
not appear to measure the value of gold. If the custom of keeping accounts, and 
of expressing promissory notes and other obligations for money in this manner, 
should ever become general, gold, and not silver, would be considered as the 
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metal which was peculiarly the standard or measure of value. 
    In reality, during the continuance of any one regulated proportion between the 
respective values of the different metals in coin, the value of the most precious 
metal regulates the value of the whole coin. Twelve copper pence contain half a 
pound, avoirdupois, of copper, of not the best quality, which, before it is coined, 
is seldom worth sevenpence in silver. But as by the regulation twelve such pence 
are ordered to exchange for a shilling, they are in the market considered as worth 
a shilling, and a shilling can at any time be had for them. Even before the late 
reformation of the gold coin of Great Britain, the gold, that part of it at least 
which circulated in London and its neighbourhood, was in general less degraded 
below its standard weight than the greater part of the silver. One-and-twenty 
worn and defaced shillings, however, were considered as equivalent to a guinea, 
which perhaps, indeed, was worn and defaced too, but seldom so much so. The 
late regulations have brought the gold coin as near perhaps to its standard weight 
as it is possible to bring the current coin of any nation; and the order, to receive 
no gold at the public offices but by weight, is likely to preserve it so, as long as 
that order is enforced. The silver coin still continues in the same worn and 
degraded state as before the reformation of the gold coin. In the market, 
however, one-and-twenty shillings of this degraded silver coin are still 
considered as worth a guinea of this excellent gold coin. 
    The reformation of the gold coin has evidently raised the value of the silver 
coin which can be exchanged for it. 
    In the English mint a pound weight of gold is coined into forty-four guineas 
and a half, which, at one-and-twenty shillings the guinea, is equal to forty-six 
pounds fourteen shillings and sixpence. An ounce of such gold coin, therefore, is 
worth L3 17s. 10 1/2d. in silver. In England no duty or seignorage is paid upon 
the coinage, and he who carries a pound weight or an ounce weight of standard 
gold bullion to the mint, gets back a pound weight or an ounce weight of gold in 
coin, without any deduction. Three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence 
halfpenny an ounce, therefore, is said to be the mint price of gold in England, or 
the quantity of gold coin which the mint gives in return for standard gold 
bullion. 
    Before the reformation of the gold coin, the price of standard gold bullion in 
the market had for many years been upwards of L3 18s. sometimes L3 19s. and 
very frequently L4 an ounce; that sum, it is probable, in the worn and degraded 
gold coin, seldom containing more than an ounce of standard gold. Since the 
reformation of the gold coin, the market price of standard gold bullion seldom 
exceeds L3 17s. 7d. an ounce. Before the reformation of the gold coin, the 
market price was always more or less above the mint price. Since that 
reformation, the market price has been constantly below the mint price. But that 
market price is the same whether it is paid in gold or in silver coin. The late 
reformation of the gold coin, therefore, has raised not only the value of the gold 
coin, but likewise that of the silver coin in proportion to gold bullion, and 
probably, too, in proportion to all other commodities; through the price of the 
greater part of other commodities being influenced by so many other causes, the 
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rise in the value either of gold or silver coin in proportion to them may not be so 
distinct and sensible. 
    In the English mint a pound weight of standard silver bullion is coined into 
sixty-two shillings, containing, in the same manner, a pound weight of standard 
silver. Five shillings and twopence an ounce, therefore, is said to be the mint 
price of silver in England, or the quantity of silver coin which the mint gives in 
return for standard silver bullion. Before the reformation of the gold coin, the 
market price of standard silver bullion was, upon different occasions, five 
shillings and fourpence, five shillings and fivepence, five shillings and sixpence, 
five shillings and sevenpence, and very often five shillings and eightpence an 
ounce. Five shillings and sevenpence, however, seems to have been the most 
common price. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the market price of 
standard silver bullion has fallen occasionally to five shillings and threepence, 
five shillings and fourpence, and five shillings and fivepence an ounce, which 
last price it has scarce ever exceeded. Though the market price of silver bullion 
has fallen considerably since the reformation of the gold coin, it has not fallen so 
low as the mint price. 
    In the proportion between the different metals in the English coin, as copper is 
rated very much above its real value, so silver is rated somewhat below it. In the 
market of Europe, in the French coin and in the Dutch coin, an ounce of fine 
gold exchanges for about fourteen ounces of fine silver. In the English coin, it 
exchanges for about fifteen ounces, that is, for more silver than it is worth 
according to the common estimation of Europe. But as the price of copper in 
bars is not, even in England, raised by the high price of copper in English coin, 
so the price of silver in bullion is not sunk by the low rate of silver in English 
coin. Silver in bullion still preserves its proper proportion to gold; for the same 
reason that copper in bars preserves its proper proportion to silver. 
    Upon the reformation of the silver coin in the reign of William III the price of 
silver bullion still continued to be somewhat above the mint price. Mr. Locke 
imputed this high price to the permission of exporting silver bullion, and to the 
prohibition of exporting silver coin. This permission of exporting, he said, 
rendered the demand for silver bullion greater than the demand for silver coin. 
But the number of people who want silver coin for the common uses of buying 
and selling at home, is surely much greater than that of those who want silver 
bullion either for the use of exportation or for any other use. There subsists at 
present a like permission of exporting gold bullion, and a like prohibition of 
exporting gold coin: and yet the price of gold bullion has fallen below the mint 
price. But in the English coin silver was then, in the same manner as now, under-
rated in proportion to gold, and the gold coin (which at that time too was not 
supposed to require any reformation) regulated then, as well as now, the real 
value of the whole coin. As the reformation of the silver coin did not then reduce 
the price of silver bullion to the mint price, it is not very probable that a like 
reformation will do so now. 
    Were the silver coin brought back as near to its standard weight as the gold, a 
guinea, it is probable, would, according to the present proportion, exchange for 
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more silver in coin than it would purchase in bullion. The silver coin containing 
its full standard weight, there would in this case be a profit in melting it down, in 
order, first, to sell the bullion for gold coin, and afterwards to exchange this gold 
coin for silver coin to be melted down in the same manner. Some alteration in 
the present proportion seems to be the only method of preventing this 
inconveniency. 
    The inconveniency perhaps would be less if silver was rated in the coin as 
much above its proper proportion to gold as it is at present rated below it; 
provided it was at the same time enacted that silver should not be a legal tender 
for more than the change of a guinea, in the same manner as copper is not a legal 
tender for more than the change of a shilling. No creditor could in this case be 
cheated in consequence of the high valuation of silver in coin; as no creditor can 
at present be cheated in consequence of the high valuation of copper. The 
bankers only would suffer by this regulation. When a run comes upon them they 
sometimes endeavour to gain time by paying in sixpences, and they would be 
precluded by this regulation from this discreditable method of evading 
immediate payment. They would be obliged in consequence to keep at all times 
in their coffers a greater quantity of cash than at present; and though this might 
no doubt be a considerable inconveniency to them, it would at the same time be 
a considerable security to their creditors. 
    Three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence halfpenny (the mint price of 
gold) certainly does not contain, even in our present excellent gold coin, more 
than an ounce of standard gold, and it may be thought, therefore, should not 
purchase more standard bullion. But gold in coin is more convenient than gold 
in bullion, and though, in England, the coinage is free, yet the gold which is 
carried in bullion to the mint can seldom be returned in coin to the owner till 
after a delay of several weeks. In the present hurry of the mint, it could not be 
returned till after a delay of several months. This delay is equivalent to a small 
duty, and renders gold in coin somewhat more valuable than an equal quantity of 
gold in bullion. If in the English coin silver was rated according to it proper 
proportion to gold, the price of silver bullion would probably fall below the mint 
price even without any reformation of the silver coin; the value even of the 
present worn and defaced silver coin being regulated by the value of the 
excellent gold coin for which it can be changed. 
    A small seignorage or duty upon the coinage of both gold and silver would 
probably increase still more the superiority of those metals in coin above an 
equal quantity of either of them in bullion. The coinage would in this case 
increase the value of the metal coined in proportion to the extent of this small 
duty; for the same reason that the fashion increases the value of plate in 
proportion to the price of that fashion. The superiority of coin above bullion 
would prevent the melting down of the coin, and would discourage its 
exportation. If upon any public exigency it should become necessary to export 
the coin, the greater part of it would soon return again of its own accord. Abroad 
it could sell only for its weight in bullion. At home it would buy more than that 
weight. There would be a profit, therefore, in bringing it home again. In France a 
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seignorage of about eight per cent is imposed upon the coinage, and the French 
coin, when exported, is said to return home again of its own accord. 
    The occasional fluctuations in the market price of gold and silver bullion arise 
from the same causes as the like fluctuations in that of all other commodities. 
The frequent loss of those metals from various accidents by sea and by land, the 
continual waste of them in gilding and plating, in lace and embroidery, in the 
wear and tear of coin, and in that of plate; require, in all countries which possess 
no mines of their own, a continual importation, in order to repair this loss and 
this waste. The merchant importers, like all other merchants, we may believe, 
endeavour, as well as they can, to suit their occasional importations to what, 
they judge, is likely to be the immediate demand. With all their attention, 
however, they sometimes overdo the business, and sometimes underdo it. When 
they import more bullion than is wanted, rather than incur the risk and trouble of 
exporting it again, they are sometimes willing to sell a part of it for something 
less than the ordinary or average price. When, on the other hand, they import 
less than is wanted, they get something more than this price. But when, under all 
those occasional fluctuations, the market price either of gold or silver bullion 
continues for several years together steadily and constantly, either more or less 
above, or more or less below the mint price, we may be assured that this steady 
and constant, either superiority or inferiority of price, is the effect of something 
in the state of the coin, which, at that time, renders a certain quantity of coin 
either of more value or of less value than the precise quantity of bullion which it 
ought to contain. The constancy and steadiness of the effect supposes a 
proportionable constancy and steadiness in the cause. 
    The money of any particular country is, at any particular time and place, more 
or less an accurate measure of value according as the current coin is more or less 
exactly agreeable to its standard, or contains more or less exactly the precise 
quantity of pure gold or pure silver which it ought to contain. If in England, for 
example, forty-four guineas and a half contained exactly a pound weight of 
standard gold, or eleven ounces of fine gold and one ounce of alloy, the gold 
coin of England would be as accurate a measure of the actual value of goods at 
any particular time and place as the nature of the thing would admit. But if, by 
rubbing and wearing, forty-four guineas and a half generally contain less than a 
pound weight of standard gold; the diminution, however, being greater in some 
pieces than in others; the measure of value comes to be liable to the same sort of 
uncertainty to which all other weights and measures are commonly exposed. As 
it rarely happens that these are exactly agreeable to their standard, the merchant 
adjusts the price of his goods, as well as he can, not to what those weights and 
measures ought to be, but to what, upon an average, he finds by experience they 
actually are. In consequence of a like disorder in the coin, the price of goods 
comes, in the same manner, to be adjusted, not to the quantity of pure gold or 
silver which the corn ought to contain, but to that which, upon an average, it is 
found by experience, it actually does contain. 
    By the money-price of goods, it is to be observed, I understand always the 
quantity of pure gold or silver for which they are sold, without any regard to the 
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denomination of the coin. Six shillings and eightpence, for example, in the time 
of Edward I, I consider as the same money-price with a pound sterling in the 
present times; because it contained, as nearly as we can judge, the same quantity 
of pure silver. 
CHAPTER VI
Of the Component Parts of the Price of Commodities
IN that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of 
stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of 
labour necessary for acquiring different objects seems to be the only 
circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another. If 
among a nation of hunters, for example, it usually costs twice the labour to kill a 
beaver which it does to kill a deer, one beaver should naturally exchange for or 
be worth two deer. It is natural that what is usually the produce of two days' or 
two hours' labour, should be worth double of what is usually the produce of one 
day's or one hour's labour. 
    If the one species of labour should be more severe than the other, some 
allowance will naturally be made for this superior hardship; and the produce of 
one hour's labour in the one way may frequently exchange for that of two hours' 
labour in the other. 
    Or if the one species of labour requires an uncommon degree of dexterity and 
ingenuity, the esteem which men have for such talents will naturally give a value 
to their produce, superior to what would be due to the time employed about it. 
Such talents can seldom be acquired but in consequence of long application, and 
the superior value of their produce may frequently be no more than a reasonable 
compensation for the time and labour which must be spent in acquiring them. In 
the advanced state of society, allowances of this kind, for superior hardship and 
superior skill, are commonly made in the wages of labour; and something of the 
same kind must probably have taken place in its earliest and rudest period. 
    In this state of things, the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer; 
and the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or producing any 
commodity is the only circumstance which can regulate the quantity exchange 
for which it ought commonly to purchase, command, or exchange for. 
    As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of 
them will naturally employ it in setting to work industrious people, whom they 
will supply with materials and subsistence, in order to make a profit by the sale 
of their work, or by what their labour adds to the value of the materials. In 
exchanging the complete manufacture either for money, for labour, or for other 
goods, over and above what may be sufficient to pay the price of the materials, 
and the wages of the workmen, something must be given for the profits of the 
undertaker of the work who hazards his stock in this adventure. The value which 
the workmen add to the materials, therefore, resolves itself in this ease into two 
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parts, of which the one pays their wages, the other the profits of their employer 
upon the whole stock of materials and wages which he advanced. He could have 
no interest to employ them, unless he expected from the sale of their work 
something more than what was sufficient to replace his stock to him; and he 
could have no interest to employ a great stock rather than a small one, unless his 
profits were to bear some proportion to the extent of his stock. 
    The profits of stock, it may perhaps be thought are only a different name for 
the wages of a particular sort of labour, the labour of inspection and direction. 
They are, however, altogether different, are regulated by quite different 
principles, and bear no proportion to the quantity, the hardship, or the ingenuity 
of this supposed labour of inspection and direction. They are regulated 
altogether by the value of the stock employed, and are greater or smaller in 
proportion to the extent of this stock. Let us suppose, for example, that in some 
particular place, where the common annual profits of manufacturing stock are 
ten per cent, there are two different manufactures, in each of which twenty 
workmen are employed at the rate of fifteen pounds a year each, or at the 
expense of three hundred a year in each manufactory. Let us suppose, too, that 
the coarse materials annually wrought up in the one cost only seven hundred 
pounds, while the finer materials in the other cost seven thousand. The capital 
annually employed in the one will in this case amount only to one thousand 
pounds; whereas that employed in the other will amount to seven thousand three 
hundred pounds. At the rate of ten per cent, therefore, the undertaker of the one 
will expect a yearly profit of about one hundred pounds only; while that of the 
other will expect about seven hundred and thirty pounds. But though their profits 
are so very different, their labour of inspection and direction may be either 
altogether or very nearly the same. In many great works almost the whole labour 
of this kind is committed to some principal clerk. His wages properly express 
the value of this labour of inspection and direction. Though in settling them 
some regard is had commonly, not only to his labour and skill, but to the trust 
which is reposed in him, yet they never bear any regular proportion to the capital 
of which he oversees the management; and the owner of this capital, though he 
is thus discharged of almost all labour, still expects that his profits should bear a 
regular proportion to his capital. In the price of commodities, therefore, the 
profits of stock constitute a component part altogether different from the wages 
of labour, and regulated by quite different principles. 
    In this state of things, the whole produce of labour does not always belong to 
the labourer. He must in most cases share it with the owner of the stock which 
employs him. Neither is the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring 
or producing any commodity, the only circumstance which can regulate the 
quantity which it ought commonly to purchase, command, or exchange for. An 
additional quantity, it is evident, must be due for the profits of the stock which 
advanced the wages and furnished the materials of that labour. 
    As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the 
landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand 
a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, 
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and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the 
labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an 
additional price fixed upon them. He must then pay for the licence to gather 
them; and must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour either 
collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of 
this portion, constitutes the rent of land, and in the price of the greater part of 
commodities makes a third component part. 
    The real value of all the different component parts of price, it must be 
observed, is measured by the quantity of labour which they can, each of them, 
purchase or command. Labour measures the value not only of that part of price 
which resolves itself into labour, but of that which resolves itself into rent, and 
of that which resolves itself into profit. 
    In every society the price of every commodity finally resolves itself into some 
one or other, or all of those three parts; and in every improved society, all the 
three enter more or less, as component parts, into the price of the far greater part 
of commodities. 
    In the price of corn, for example, one part pays the rent of the landlord, 
another pays the wages or maintenance of the labourers and labouring cattle 
employed in producing it, and the third pays the profit of the farmer. These three 
parts seem either immediately or ultimately to make up the whole price of corn. 
A fourth part, it may perhaps be thought, is necessary for replacing the stock of 
the farmer, or for compensating the wear and tear of his labouring cattle, and 
other instruments of husbandry. But it must be considered that the price of any 
instrument of husbandry, such as a labouring horse, is itself made up of the same 
three parts; the rent of the land upon which he is reared, the labour of tending 
and rearing him, and the profits of the farmer who advances both the rent of this 
land, and the wages of this labour. Though the price of the corn, therefore, may 
pay the price as well as the maintenance of the horse, the whole price still 
resolves itself either immediately or ultimately into the same three parts of rent, 
labour, and profit. 
    In the price of flour or meal, we must add to the price of the corn, the profits 
of the miller, and the wages of his servants; in the price of bread, the profits of 
the baker, and the wages of his servants; and in the price of both, the labour of 
transporting the corn from the house of the farmer to that of the miller, and from 
that of the miner to that of the baker, together with the profits of those who 
advance the wages of that labour. 
    The price of flax resolves itself into the same three parts as that of corn. In the 
price of linen we must add to this price the wages of the flaxdresser, of the 
spinner, of the weaver, of the bleacher, etc., together with the profits of their 
respective employers. 
    As any particular commodity comes to be more manufactured, that part of the 
price which resolves itself into wages and profit comes to be greater in 
proportion to that which resolves itself into rent. In the progress of the 
manufacture, not only the number of profits increase, but every subsequent 
profit is greater than the foregoing; because the capital from which it is derived 
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must always be greater. The capital which employs the weavers, for example, 
must be greater than that which employs the spinners; because it not only 
replaces that capital with its profits, but pays, besides, the wages of the weavers; 
and the profits must always bear some proportion to the capital. 
    In the most improved societies, however, there are always a few commodities 
of which the price resolves itself into two parts only, the wages of labour, and 
the profits of stock; and a still smaller number, in which it consists altogether in 
the wages of labour. In the price of sea-fish, for example, one part pays the 
labour of the fishermen, and the other the profits of the capital employed in the 
fishery. Rent very seldom makes any part of it, though it does sometimes, as I 
shall show hereafter. It is otherwise, at least through the greater part of Europe, 
in river fisheries. A salmon fishery pays a rent, and rent, though it cannot well 
be called the rent of land, makes a part of the price of a salmon as well as wages 
and profit. In some parts of Scotland a few poor people make a trade of 
gathering, along the sea-shore, those little variegated stones commonly known 
by the name of Scotch Pebbles. The price which is paid to them by the stone-
cutter is altogether the wages of their labour; neither rent nor profit make any 
part of it. 
    But the whole price of any commodity must still finally resolve itself into 
some one or other, or all of those three parts; as whatever part of it remains after 
paying the rent of the land, and the price of the whole labour employed in 
raising, manufacturing, and bringing it to market, must necessarily be profit to 
somebody. 
    As the price or exchangeable value of every particular commodity, taken 
separately, resolves itself into some one or other or all of those three parts; so 
that of all the commodities which compose the whole annual produce of the 
labour of every country, taken complexly, must resolve itself into the same three 
parts, and be parcelled out among different inhabitants of the country, either as 
the wages of their labour, the profits of their stock, or the rent of their land. The 
whole of what is annually either collected or produced by the labour of every 
society, or what comes to the same thing, the whole price of it, is in this manner 
originally distributed among some of its different members. Wages, profit, and 
rent, are the three original sources of all revenue as well as of all exchangeable 
value. All other revenue is ultimately derived from some one or other of these. 
    Whoever derives his revenue from a fund which is his own, must draw it 
either from his labour, from his stock, or from his land. The revenue derived 
from labour is called wages. That derived from stock, by the person who 
manages or employes it, is called profit. That derived from it by the person who 
does not employ it himself, but lends it to another, is called the interest or the 
use of money. It is the compensation which the borrower pays to the lender, for 
the profit which he has an opportunity of making by the use of the money. Part 
of that profit naturally belongs to the borrower, who runs the risk and takes the 
trouble of employing it; and part to the lender, who affords him the opportunity 
of making this profit. The interest of money is always a derivative revenue, 
which, if it is not paid from the profit which is made by the use of the money, 
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must be paid from some other source of revenue, unless perhaps the borrower is 
a spendthrift, who contracts a second debt in order to pay the interest of the first. 
The revenue which proceeds altogether from land, is called rent, and belongs to 
the landlord. The revenue of the farmer is derived partly from his labour, and 
partly from his stock. To him, land is only the instrument which enables him to 
earn the wages of this labour, and to make the profits of this stock. All taxes, and 
an the revenue which is founded upon them, all salaries, pensions, and annuities 
of every kind, are ultimately derived from some one or other of those three 
original sources of revenue, and are paid either immediately or mediately from 
the wages of labour, the profits of stock, or the rent of land. 
    When those three different sorts of revenue belong to different persons, they 
are readily distinguished; but when they belong to the same they are sometimes 
confounded with one another, at least in common language. 
    A gentleman who farms a part of his own estate, after paying the expense of 
cultivation, should gain both the rent of the landlord and the profit of the farmer. 
He is apt to denominate, however, his whole gain, profit, and thus confounds 
rent with profit, at least in common language. The greater part of our North 
American and West Indian planters are in this situation. They farm, the greater 
part of them, their own estates, and accordingly we seldom hear of the rent of a 
plantation, but frequently of its profit. 
    Common farmers seldom employ any overseer to direct the general operations 
of the farm. They generally, too, work a good deal with their own hands, as 
ploughmen, harrowers, etc. What remains of the crop after paying the rent, 
therefore, should not only replace to them their stock employed in cultivation, 
together with its ordinary profits, but pay them the wages which are due to them, 
both as labourers and overseers. Whatever remains, however, after paying the 
rent and keeping up the stock, is called profit. But wages evidently make a part 
of it. The farmer, by saving these wages, must necessarily gain them. Wages, 
therefore, are in this case confounded with profit. 
    An independent manufacturer, who has stock enough both to purchase 
materials, and to maintain himself till he can carry his work to market, should 
gain both the wages of a journeyman who works under a master, and the profit 
which that master makes by the sale of the journeyman's work. His whole gains, 
however, are commonly called profit, and wages are, in this case too, 
confounded with profit. 
    A gardener who cultivates his own garden with his own hands, unites in his 
own person the three different characters of landlord, farmer, and labourer. His 
produce, therefore, should pay him the rent of the first, the profit of the second, 
and the wages of the third. The whole, however, is commonly considered as the 
earnings of his labour. Both rent and profit are, in this case, confounded with 
wages. 
    As in a civilised country there are but few commodities of which the 
exchangeable value arises from labour only, rent and profit contributing largely 
to that of the far greater part of them, so the annual produce of its labour will 
always be sufficient to purchase or command a much greater quantity of labour 
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than what employed in raising, preparing, and bringing that produce to market. 
If the society were annually to employ all the labour which it can annually 
purchase, as the quantity of labour would increase greatly every year, so the 
produce of every succeeding year would be of vastly greater value than that of 
the foregoing. But there is no country in which the whole annual produce is 
employed in maintaining the industrious. The idle everywhere consume a great 
part of it; and according to the different proportions in which it is annually 
divided between those two different orders of people, its ordinary or average 
value must either annually increase, or diminish, or continue the same from one 
year to anther. 
CHAPTER VII Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodities
THERE is in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate both of 
wages and profit in every different employment of labour and stock. This rate is 
naturally regulated, as I shall show hereafter, partly by the general circumstances 
of the society, their riches or poverty, their advancing, stationary, or declining 
condition; and partly by the particular nature of each employment. 
    There is likewise in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average 
rate of rent, which is regulated too, as I shall show hereafter, partly by the 
general circumstances of the society or neighbourhood in which the land is 
situated, and partly by the natural or improved fertility of the land. 
    These ordinary or average rates may be called the natural rates of wages, 
profit, and rent, at the time and place in which they commonly prevail. 
    When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is 
sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of 
the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market, according to 
their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural 
price. 
    The commodity is then sold precisely for what it is worth, or for what it really 
costs the person who brings it to market; for though in common language what 
is called the prime cost of any commodity does not comprehend the profit of the 
person who is to sell it again, yet if he sell it at a price which does not allow him 
the ordinary rate of profit in his neighbourhood, he is evidently a loser by the 
trade; since by employing his stock in some other way he might have made that 
profit. His profit, besides, is his revenue, the proper fund of his subsistence. As, 
while he is preparing and bringing the goods to market, he advances to his 
workmen their wages, or their subsistence; so he advances to himself, in the 
same manner, his own subsistence, which is generally suitable to the profit 
which he may reasonably expect from the sale of his goods. Unless they yield 
him this profit, therefore, they do not repay him what they may very properly be 
said to have really cost him. 
    Though the price, therefore, which leaves him this profit is not always the 
lowest at which a dealer may sometimes sell his goods, it is the lowest at which 
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he is likely to sell them for any considerable time; at least where there is perfect 
liberty, or where he may change his trade as often as he pleases. 
    The actual price at which any commodity is commonly sold is called its 
market price. It may either be above, or below, or exactly the same with its 
natural price. 
    The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion 
between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of 
those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or the whole 
value of the rent, labour, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it 
thither. Such people may be called the effectual demanders, and their demand 
the effectual demand; since it may be sufficient to effectuate the bringing of the 
commodity to market. It is different from the absolute demand. A very poor man 
may be said in some sense to have a demand for a coach and six; he might like 
to have it; but his demand is not an effectual demand, as the commodity can 
never be brought to market in order to satisfy it. 
    When the quantity of any commodity which is brought to market falls short of 
the effectual demand, all those who are willing to pay the whole value of the 
rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither, cannot be 
supplied with the quantity which they want. Rather than want it altogether, some 
of them will be willing to give more. A competition will immediately begin 
among them, and the market price will rise more or less above the natural price, 
according as either the greatness of the deficiency, or the wealth and wanton 
luxury of the competitors, happen to animate more or less the eagerness of the 
competition. Among competitors of equal wealth and luxury the same deficiency 
will generally occasion a more or less eager competition, according as the 
acquisition of the commodity happens to be of more or less importance to them. 
Hence the exorbitant price of the necessaries of life during the blockade of a 
town or in a famine. 
    When the quantity brought to market exceeds the effectual demand, it cannot 
be all sold to those who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages, 
and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Some part must be 
sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the low price which they give for it 
must reduce the price of the whole. The market price will sink more or less 
below the natural price, according as the greatness of the excess increases more 
or less the competition of the sellers, or according as it happens to be more or 
less important to them to get immediately rid of the commodity. The same 
excess in the importation of perishable, will occasion a much greater 
competition than in that of durable commodities; in the importation of oranges, 
for example, than in that of old iron. 
    When the quantity brought to market is just sufficient to supply the effectual 
demand, and no more, the market price naturally comes to be either exactly, or 
as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. The whole 
quantity upon hand can be disposed of for this price, and cannot be disposed of 
for more. The competition of the different dealers obliges them all to accept of 
this price, but does not oblige them to accept of less. 
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    The quantity of every commodity brought to market naturally suits itself to 
the effectual demand. It is the interest of all those who employ their land, labour, 
or stock, in bringing any commodity to market, that the quantity never should 
exceed the effectual demand; and it is the interest of all other people that it never 
should fall short of that demand. 
    If at any time it exceeds the effectual demand, some of the component parts of 
its price must be paid below their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of the 
landlords will immediately prompt them to withdraw a part of their land; and if 
it is wages or profit, the interest of the labourers in the one case, and of their 
employers in the other, will prompt them to withdraw a part of their labour or 
stock from this employment. The quantity brought to market will soon be no 
more than sufficient to supply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its 
price will rise to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price. 
    If, on the contrary, the quantity brought to market should at any time fall short 
of the effectual demand, some of the component parts of its price must rise 
above their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of all other landlords will 
naturally prompt them to prepare more land for the raising of this commodity; if 
it is wages or profit, the interest of all other labourers and dealers will soon 
prompt them to employ more labour and stock in preparing and bringing it to 
market. The quantity brought thither will soon be sufficient to supply the 
effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will soon sink to their 
natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price. 
    The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the 
prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may 
sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them 
down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder 
them from settling in this centre of repose and continuance, they are constantly 
tending towards it. 
    The whole quantity of industry annually employed in order to bring any 
commodity to market naturally suits itself in this manner to the effectual 
demand. It naturally aims at bringing always that precise quantity thither which 
may be sufficient to supply, and no more than supply, that demand. 
    But in some employments the same quantity of industry will in different years 
produce very different quantities of commodities; while in others it will produce 
always the same, or very nearly the same. The same number of labourers in 
husbandry will, in different years, produce very different quantities of corn, 
wine, oil, hops, etc. But the same number of spinners and weavers will every 
year produce the same or very nearly the same quantity of linen and woollen 
cloth. It is only the average produce of the one species of industry which can be 
suited in any respect to the effectual demand; and as its actual produce is 
frequently much greater and frequently much less than its average produce, the 
quantity of the commodities brought to market will sometimes exceed a good 
deal, and sometimes fall short a good deal, of the effectual demand. Even though 
that demand therefore should continue always the same, their market price will 
be liable to great fluctuations, will sometimes fall a good deal below, and 
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sometimes rise a good deal above their natural price. In the other species of 
industry, the produce of equal quantities of labour being always the same, or 
very nearly the same, it can be more exactly suited to the effectual demand. 
While that demand continues the same, therefore, the market price of the 
commodities is likely to do so too, and to be either altogether, or as nearly as can 
be judged of, the same with the natural price. That the price of linen and woolen 
cloth is liable neither to such frequent nor to such great variations as the price of 
corn, every man's experience will inform him. The price of the one species of 
commodities varies only with the variations in the demand: that of the other 
varies, not only with the variations in the demand, but with the much greater and 
more frequent variations in the quantity of what is brought to market in order to 
supply that demand. 
    The occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of any 
commodity fall chiefly upon those parts of its price which resolve themselves 
into wages and profit. That part which resolves itself into rent is less affected by 
them. A rent certain in money is not in the least affected by them either in its 
rate or in its value. A rent which consists either in a certain proportion or in a 
certain quantity of the rude produce, is no doubt affected in its yearly value by 
all the occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of that rude 
produce; but it is seldom affected by them in its yearly rate. In settling the terms 
of the lease, the landlord and farmer endeavour, according to their best 
judgment, to adjust that rate, not to the temporary and occasional, but to the 
average and ordinary price of the produce. 
    Such fluctuations affect both the value and the rate either of wages or of 
profit, according as the market happens to be either overstocked or understocked 
with commodities or with labour; with work done, or with work to be done. A 
public mourning raises the price of black cloth (with which the market is almost 
always understocked upon such occasions), and augments the profits of the 
merchants who possess any considerable quantity of it. It has no effect upon the 
wages of the weavers. The market is understocked with commodities, not with 
labour; with work done, not with work to be done. It raises the wages of 
journeymen tailors. The market is here understocked with labour. There is an 
effectual demand for more labour, for more work to be done than can be had. It 
sinks the price of coloured silks and cloths, and thereby reduces the profits of the 
merchants who have any considerable quantity of them upon hand. It sinks, too, 
the wages of the workmen employed in preparing such commodities, for which 
all demand is stopped for six months, perhaps for a twelvemonth. The market is 
here over-stocked both with commodities and with labour. 
    But though the market price of every particular commodity is in this manner 
continually gravitating, if one may say so, towards the natural price, yet 
sometimes particular accidents, sometimes natural causes, and sometimes 
particular regulations of police, may, in many commodities, keep up the market 
price, for a long time together, a good deal above the natural price. 
    When by an increase in the effectual demand, the market price of some 
particular commodity happens to rise a good deal above the natural price, those 
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who employ their stocks in supplying that market are generally careful to 
conceal this change. If it was commonly known, their great profit would tempt 
so many new rivals to employ their stocks in the same way that, the effectual 
demand being fully supplied, the market price would soon be reduced to the 
natural price, and perhaps for some time even below it. If the market is at a great 
distance from the residence of those who supply it, they may sometimes be able 
to keep the secret for several years together, and may so long enjoy their 
extraordinary profits without any new rivals. Secrets of this kind, however, it 
must be acknowledged, can seldom be long kept; and the extraordinary profit 
can last very little longer than they are kept. 
    Secrets in manufactures are capable of being longer kept than secrets in trade. 
A dyer who has found the means of producing a particular colour with materials 
which cost only half the price of those commonly made use of, may, with good 
management, enjoy the advantage of his discovery as long as he lives, and even 
leave it as a legacy to his posterity. His extraordinary gains arise from the high 
price which is paid for his private labour. They properly consist in the high 
wages of that labour. But as they are repeated upon every part of his stock, and 
as their whole amount bears, upon that account, a regular proportion to it, they 
are commonly considered as extraordinary profits of stock. 
    Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effects of particular 
accidents, of which, however, the operation may sometimes last for many years 
together. 
    Some natural productions require such a singularity of soil and situation that 
all the land in a great country, which is fit for producing them, may not be 
sufficient to supply the effectual demand. The whole quantity brought to market, 
therefore, may be disposed of to those who are willing to give more than what is 
sufficient to pay the rent of the land which produced them, together with the 
wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock which were employed in 
preparing and bringing them to market, according to their natural rates. Such 
commodities may continue for whole centuries together to be sold at this high 
price; and that part of it which resolves itself into the rent of land is in this case 
the part which is generally paid above its natural rate. The rent of the land which 
affords such singular and esteemed productions, like the rent of some vineyards 
in France of a peculiarly happy soil and situation, bears no regular proportion to 
the rent of other equally fertile and equally well-cultivated land in its 
neighbourhood. The wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed in 
bringing such commodities to market, on the contrary, are seldom out of their 
natural proportion to those of the other employments of labour and stock in their 
neighbourhood. 
    Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effect of natural 
causes which may hinder the effectual demand from ever being fully supplied, 
and which may continue, therefore, to operate for ever. 
    A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the 
same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping 
the market constantly understocked, by never fully supplying the effectual 
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demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their 
emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural 
rate. 
    The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. 
The natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest 
which can be taken, not upon every occasion, indeed, but for any considerable 
time together. The one is upon every occasion the highest which can be 
squeezed out of the buyers, or which, it is supposed, they will consent to give: 
the other is the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the 
same time continue their business. 
    The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship, and all 
those laws which restrain, in particular employments, the competition to a 
smaller number than might otherwise go into them, have the same tendency, 
though in a less degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may 
frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes of employments, keep up the 
market price of particular commodities above the natural price, and maintain 
both the wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed about them 
somewhat above their natural rate. 
    Such enhancements of the market price may last as long as the regulations of 
police which give occasion to them. 
    The market price of any particular commodity, though it may continue long 
above, can seldom continue long below its natural price. Whatever part of it was 
paid below the natural rate, the persons whose interest it affected would 
immediately feel the loss, and would immediately withdraw either so much land, 
or so much labour, or so much stock, from being employed about it, that the 
quantity brought to market would soon be no more than sufficient to supply the 
effectual demand. Its market price, therefore, would soon rise to the natural 
price. This at least would be the case where there was perfect liberty. 
    The same statutes of apprenticeship and other corporation laws indeed, which, 
when a manufacture is in prosperity, enable the workman to raise his wages a 
good deal above their natural rate, sometimes oblige him, when it decays, to let 
them down a good deal below it. As in the one case they exclude many people 
from his employment, so in the other they exclude him from many 
employments. The effect of such regulations, however, is not near so durable in 
sinking the workman's wages below, as in raising them above their natural rate. 
Their operation in the one way may endure for many centuries, but in the other it 
can last no longer than the lives of some of the workmen who were bred to the 
business in the time of its prosperity. When they are gone, the number of those 
who are afterwards educated to the trade will naturally suit itself to the effectual 
demand. The police must be as violent as that of Indostan or ancient Egypt 
(where every man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the occupation 
of his father, and was supposed to commit the most horrid sacrilege if he 
changed it for another), which can in any particular employment, and for several 
generations together, sink either the wages of labour or the profits of stock 
below their natural rate. 
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    This is all that I think necessary to be observed at present concerning the 
deviations, whether occasional or permanent, of the market price of 
commodities from the natural price. 
    The natural price itself varies with the natural rate of each of its component 
parts, of wages, profit, and rent; and in every society this rate varies according to 
their circumstances, according to their riches or poverty, their advancing, 
stationary, or declining condition. I shall, in the four following chapters, 
endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, the causes of those 
different variations. 
    First, I shall endeavour to explain what are the circumstances which naturally 
determine the rate of wages, and in what manner those circumstances are 
affected by the riches or poverty, by the advancing, stationary, or declining state 
of the society. 
    Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what are the circumstances which 
naturally determine the rate of profit, and in what manner, too, those 
circumstances are affected by the like variations in the state of the society. 
    Though pecuniary wages and profit are very different in the different 
employments of labour and stock; yet a certain proportion seems commonly to 
take place between both the pecuniary wages in all the different employments of 
labour, and the pecuniary profits in all the different employments of stock. This 
proportion, it will appear hereafter, depends partly upon the nature of the 
different employments, and partly upon the different laws and policy of the 
society in which they are carried on. But though in many respects dependent 
upon the laws and policy, this proportion seems to be little affected by the riches 
or poverty of that society; by its advancing, stationary, or declining condition; 
but to remain the same or very nearly the same in all those different states. I 
shall, in the third place, endeavour to explain all the different circumstances 
which regulate this proportion. 
    In the fourth and last place, I shall endeavour to show what are the 
circumstances which regulate the rent of land, and which either raise or lower 
the real price of all the different substances which it produces. 
CHAPTER VIII
Of the Wages of Labour
THE produce of labour constitutes the natural recompense or wages of labour. 
    In that original state of things, which precedes both the appropriation of land 
and the accumulation of stock, the whole produce of labour belongs to the 
labourer. He has neither landlord nor master to share with him. 
    Had this state continued, the wages of labour would have augmented with all 
those improvements in its productive powers to which the division of labour 
gives occasion. All things would gradually have become cheaper. They would 
have been produced by a smaller quantity of labour; and as the commodities 
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produced by equal quantities of labour would naturally in this state of things be 
exchanged for one another, they would have been purchased likewise with the 
produce of a smaller quantity. 
    But though all things would have become cheaper in reality, in appearance 
many things might have become dearer than before, or have been exchanged for 
a greater quantity of other goods. Let us suppose, for example, that in the greater 
part of employments the productive powers of labour had been improved to ten 
fold, or that a day's labour could produce ten times the quantity of work which it 
had done originally; but that in a particular employment they had been 
improved, only to double, or that a day's labour could produce only twice the 
quantity of work which it had done before. In exchanging the produce of a day's 
labour in the greater part of employments for that of a day's labour in this 
particular one, ten times the original quantity of work in them would purchase 
only twice the original quantity in it. Any particular quantity in it, therefore, a 
pound weight, for example, would appear to be five times dearer than before. In 
reality, however, it would be twice as cheap. Though it required five times the 
quantity of other goods to purchase it, it would require only half the quantity of 
labour either to purchase or to produce it. The acquisition, therefore, would be 
twice as easy as before. 
    But this original state of things, in which the labourer enjoyed the whole 
produce of his own labour, could not last beyond the first introduction of the 
appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock. It was at an end, therefore, 
long before the most considerable improvements were made in the productive 
powers of labour, and it would be to no purpose to trace further what might have 
been its effects upon the recompense or wages of labour. 
    As soon as land becomes private property, the landlord demands a share of 
almost all the produce which the labourer can either raise, or collect from it. His 
rent makes the first deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed 
upon land. 
    It seldom happens that the person who tills the ground has wherewithal to 
maintain himself till he reaps the harvest. His maintenance is generally advanced 
to him from the stock of a master, the farmer who employs him, and who would 
have no interest to employ him, unless he was to share in the produce of his 
labour, or unless his stock was to be replaced to him with a profit. This profit, 
makes a second deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed 
upon land. 
    The produce of almost all other labour is liable to the like deduction of profit. 
In all arts and manufactures the greater part of the workmen stand in need of a 
master to advance them the materials of their work, and their wages and 
maintenance till it be completed. He shares in the produce of their labour, or in 
the value which it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed; and in this 
share consists his profit. 
    It sometimes happens, indeed, that a single independent workman has stock 
sufficient both to purchase the materials of his work, and to maintain himself till 
it be completed. He is both master and workman, and enjoys the whole produce 
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of his own labour, or the whole value which it adds to the materials upon which 
it is bestowed. It includes what are usually two distinct revenues, belonging to 
two distinct persons, the profits of stock, and the wages of labour. 
    Such cases, however, are not very frequent, and in every part of Europe, 
twenty workmen serve under a master for one that is independent; and the wages 
of labour are everywhere understood to be, what they usually are, when the 
labourer is one person, and the owner of the stock which employs him another. 
    What are the common wages of labour, depends everywhere upon the contract 
usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the 
same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as 
possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order 
to lower the wages of labour. 
    It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all 
ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a 
compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine 
much more easily; and the law, besides, authorizes, or at least does not prohibit 
their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of 
parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against 
combining to raise it. In all such disputes the masters can hold out much longer. 
A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, a merchant, though they did not 
employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks 
which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few 
could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long 
run the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but 
the necessity is not so immediate. 
    We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though 
frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that 
masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are 
always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, 
not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this 
combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a 
master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this 
combination, because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things, 
which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into particular 
combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always 
conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and 
when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though 
severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. Such 
combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive 
combination of the workmen; who sometimes too, without any provocation of 
this kind, combine of their own accord to raise the price of their labour. Their 
usual pretences are, sometimes the high price of provisions; sometimes the great 
profit which their masters make by their work. But whether their combinations 
be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard of. In order to bring 
the point to a speedy decision, they have always recourse to the loudest clamour, 
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and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, 
and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either 
starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their 
demands. The masters upon these occasions are just as clamorous upon the other 
side, and never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil magistrate, and 
the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much 
severity against the combinations of servants, labourers, and journeymen. The 
workmen, accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of 
those tumultuous combinations, which, partly from the interposition of the civil 
magistrate, partly from the necessity superior steadiness of the masters, partly 
from the necessity which the greater part of the workmen are under of 
submitting for the sake of present subsistence, generally end in nothing, but the 
punishment or ruin of the ringleaders. 
    But though in disputes with their workmen, masters must generally have the 
advantage, there is, however, a certain rate below which it seems impossible to 
reduce, for any considerable time, the ordinary wages even of the lowest species 
of labour. 
    A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at least be sufficient 
to maintain him. They must even upon most occasions be somewhat more; 
otherwise it would be impossible for him to bring up a family, and the race of 
such workmen could not last beyond the first generation. Mr. Cantillon seems, 
upon this account, to suppose that the lowest species of common labourers must 
everywhere earn at least double their own maintenance, in order that one with 
another they may be enabled to bring up two children; the labour of the wife, on 
account of her necessary attendance on the children, being supposed no more 
than sufficient to provide for herself. But one half the children born, it is 
computed, die before the age of manhood. The poorest labourers, therefore, 
according to this account, must, one with another, attempt to rear at least four 
children, in order that two may have an equal chance of living to that age. But 
the necessary maintenance of four children, it is supposed, may be nearly equal 
to that of one man. The labour of an able-bodied slave, the same author adds, is 
computed to be worth double his maintenance; and that of the meanest labourer, 
he thinks, cannot be worth less than that of an ablebodied slave. Thus far at least 
seems certain, that, in order to bring up a family, the labour of the husband and 
wife together must, even in the lowest species of common labour, be able to earn 
something more than what is precisely necessary for their own maintenance; but 
in what proportion, whether in that above mentioned, or in any other, I shall not 
take upon me to determine. 
    There are certain circumstances, however, which sometimes give the 
labourers an advantage, and enable them to raise their wages considerably above 
this rate; evidently the lowest which is consistent with common humanity. 
    When in any country the demand for those who live by wages, labourers, 
journeymen, servants of every kind, is continually increasing; when every year 
furnishes employment for a greater number than had been employed the year 
before, the workmen have no occasion to combine in order to raise their wages. 
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The scarcity of hands occasions a competition among masters, who bid against 
one another, in order to get workmen, and thus voluntarily break through the 
natural combination of masters not to raise wages. 
    The demand for those who live by wages, it is evident, cannot increase but in 
proportion to the increase of the funds which are destined for the payment of 
wages. These funds are of two kinds; first, revenue which is over and above 
what is necessary for the maintenance; and, secondly, the stock which is over 
and above what is necessary for the employment of their masters. 
    When the landlord, annuitant, or monied man, has a greater revenue than what 
he judges sufficient to maintain his own family, he employs either the whole or a 
part of the surplus in maintaining one or more menial servants. Increase this 
surplus, and he will naturally increase the number of those servants. 
    When an independent workman, such as a weaver or shoemaker, has got more 
stock than what is sufficient to purchase the materials of his own work, and to 
maintain himself till he can dispose of it, he naturally employs one or more 
journeymen with the surplus, in order to make a profit by their work. Increase 
this surplus, and he will naturally increase the number of his journeymen. 
    The demand for those who live by wages, therefore, necessarily increases 
with the increase of the revenue and stock of every country, and cannot possibly 
increase without it. The increase of revenue and stock is the increase of national 
wealth. The demand for those who live by wages, therefore, naturally increases 
with the increase of national wealth, and cannot possibly increase without it. 
    It is not the actual greatness of national wealth, but its continual increase, 
which occasions a rise in the wages of labour. It is not, accordingly, in the 
richest countries, but in the most thriving, or in those which are growing rich the 
fastest, that the wages of labour are highest. England is certainly, in the present 
times, a much richer country than any part of North America. The wages of 
labour, however, are much higher in North America than in any part of England. 
In the province of New York, common labourers earn three shillings and 
sixpence currency, equal to two shillings sterling, a day; ship carpenters, ten 
shillings and sixpence currency, with a pint of rum worth sixpence sterling, 
equal in all to six shillings and sixpence sterling; house carpenters and 
bricklayers, eight shillings currency, equal to four shillings and sixpence 
sterling; journeymen tailors, five shillings currency, equal to about two shillings 
and tenpence sterling. These prices are all above the London price; and wages 
are said to be as high in the other colonies as in New York. The price of 
provisions is everywhere in North America much lower than in England. A 
dearth has never been known there. In the worst seasons they have always had a 
sufficiency for themselves, though less for exportation. If the money price of 
labour, therefore, be higher than it is anywhere in the mother country, its real 
price, the real command of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which it 
conveys to the labourer must be higher in a still greater proportion. 
    But though North America is not yet so rich as England, it is much more 
thriving, and advancing with much greater rapidity to the further acquisition of 
riches. The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase of 
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the number of its inhabitants. In Great Britain, and most other European 
countries, they are not supposed to double in less than five hundred years. In the 
British colonies in North America, it has been found that they double in twenty 
or five-and-twenty years. Nor in the present times is this increase principally 
owing to the continual importation of new inhabitants, but to the great 
multiplication of the species. Those who live to old age, it is said, frequently see 
there from fifty to a hundred, and sometimes many more, descendants from their 
own body. Labour is there so well rewarded that a numerous family of children, 
instead of being a burthen, is a source of opulence and prosperity to the parents. 
The labour of each child, before it can leave their house, is computed to be 
worth a hundred pounds clear gain to them. A young widow with four or five 
young children, who, among the middling or inferior ranks of people in Europe, 
would have so little chance for a second husband, is there frequently courted as a 
sort of fortune. The value of children is the greatest of all encouragements to 
marriage. We cannot, therefore, wonder that the people in North America should 
generally marry very young. Notwithstanding the great increase occasioned by 
such early marriages, there is a continual complaint of the scarcity of hands in 
North America. The demand for labourers, the funds destined for maintaining 
them, increase, it seems, still faster than they can find labourers to employ. 
    Though the wealth of a country should be very great, yet if it has been long 
stationary, we must not expect to find the wages of labour very high in it. The 
funds destined for the payment of wages, the revenue and stock of its 
inhabitants, may be of the greatest extent; but if they have continued for several 
centuries of the same, or very nearly of the same extent, the number of labourers 
employed every year could easily supply, and even more than supply, the 
number wanted the following year. There could seldom be any scarcity of hands, 
nor could the masters be obliged to bid against one another in order to get them. 
The hands, on the contrary, would, in this case, naturally multiply beyond their 
employment. There would be a constant scarcity of employment, and the 
labourers would be obliged to bid against one another in order to get it. If in 
such a country the wages of labour had ever been more than sufficient to 
maintain the labourer, and to enable him to bring up a family, the competition of 
the labourers and the interest of the masters would soon reduce them to this 
lowest rate which is consistent with common humanity. China has been long one 
of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, 
and most populous countries in world. It seems, however, to have been long 
stationary. Marco Polo, who visited it more than five hundred years ago, 
describes its cultivation, industry, and populousness, almost in the same terms in 
which they are described by travellers in the present times. It had perhaps, even 
long before his time, acquired that full complement of riches which the nature of 
its laws and institutions permits it to acquire. The accounts of all travellers, 
inconsistent in many other respects, agree in the low wages of labour, and in the 
difficulty which a labourer finds in bringing up a family in China. If by digging 
the ground a whole day he can get what will purchase a small quantity of rice in 
the evening, he is contented. The condition of artificers is, if possible, still 
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worse. Instead of waiting indolently in their workhouses, for the calls of their 
customers, as in Europe, they are continually running about the streets with the 
tools of their respective trades, offering their service, and as it were begging 
employment. The poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far surpasses 
that of the most beggarly nations in Europe. In the neighbourhood of Canton 
many hundred, it is commonly said, many thousand families have no habitation 
on the land, but live constantly in little fishing boats upon the rivers and canals. 
The subsistence which they find there is so scanty that they are eager to fish up 
the nastiest garbage thrown overboard from any European ship. Any carrion, the 
carcase of a dead dog or cat, for example, though half putrid and stinking, is as 
welcome to them as the most wholesome food to the people of other countries. 
Marriage is encouraged in China, not by the profitableness of children, but by 
the liberty of destroying them. In all great towns several are every night exposed 
in the street, or drowned like puppies in the water. The performance of this 
horrid office is even said to be the avowed business by which some people earn 
their subsistence. 
    China, however, though it may perhaps stand still, does not seem to go 
backwards. Its towns are nowhere deserted by their inhabitants. The lands which 
had once been cultivated are nowhere neglected. The same or very nearly the 
same annual labour must therefore continue to be performed, and the funds 
destined for maintaining it must not, consequently, be sensibly diminished. The 
lowest class of labourers, therefore, notwithstanding their scanty subsistence, 
must some way or another make shift to continue their race so far as to keep up 
their usual numbers. 
    But it would be otherwise in a country where the funds destined for the 
maintenance of labour were sensibly decaying. Every year the demand for 
servants and labourers would, in all the different classes of employments, be less 
than it had been the year before. Many who had been bred in the superior 
classes, not being able to find employment in their own business, would be glad 
to seek it in the lowest. The lowest class being not only overstocked with its own 
workmen, but with the overflowings of all the other classes, the competition for 
employment would be so great in it, as to reduce the wages of labour to the most 
miserable and scanty subsistence of the labourer. Many would not be able to 
find employment even upon these hard terms, but would either starve, or be 
driven to seek a subsistence either by begging, or by the perpetration perhaps of 
the greatest enormities. Want, famine, and mortality would immediately prevail 
in that class, and from thence extend themselves to all the superior classes, till 
the number of inhabitants in the country was reduced to what could easily be 
maintained by the revenue and stock which remained in it, and which had 
escaped either the tyranny or calamity which had destroyed the rest. This 
perhaps is nearly the present state of Bengal, and of some other of the English 
settlements in the East Indies. In a fertile country which had before been much 
depopulated, where subsistence, consequently, should not be very difficult, and 
where, notwithstanding, three or four hundred thousand people die of hunger in 
one year, we may be assured that the funds destined for the maintenance of the 
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labouring poor are fast decaying. The difference between the genius of the 
British constitution which protects and governs North America, and that of the 
mercantile company which oppresses and domineers in the East Indies, cannot 
perhaps be better illustrated than by the different state of those countries. 
    The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the necessary effect, so it is the 
natural symptom of increasing national wealth. The scanty maintenance of the 
labouring poor, on the other hand, is the natural symptom that things are at a 
stand, and their starving condition that they are going fast backwards. 
    In Great Britain the wages of labour seem, in the present times, to be 
evidently more than what is precisely necessary to enable the labourer to bring 
up a family. In order to satisfy ourselves upon this point it will not be necessary 
to enter into any tedious or doubtful calculation of what may be the lowest sum 
upon which it is possible to do this. There are many plain symptoms that the 
wages of labour are nowhere in this country regulated by this lowest rate which 
is consistent with common humanity. 
    First, in almost every part of Great Britain there is a distinction, even in the 
lowest species of labour, between summer and winter wages. Summer wages are 
always highest. But on account of the extraordinary expense of fuel, the 
maintenance of a family is most expensive in winter. Wages, therefore, being 
highest when this expense is lowest, it seems evident that they are not regulated 
by what is necessary for this expense; but by the quantity and supposed value of 
the work. A labourer, it may be said indeed, ought to save part of his summer 
wages in order to defray his winter expense; and that through the whole year 
they do not exceed what is necessary to maintain his family through the whole 
year. A slave, however, or one absolutely dependent on us for immediate 
subsistence, would not be treated in this manner. His daily subsistence would be 
proportioned to his daily necessities. 
    Secondly, the wages of labour do not in Great Britain fluctuate with the price 
of provisions. These vary everywhere from year to year, frequently from month 
to month. But in many places the money price of labour remains uniformly the 
same sometimes for half a century together. If in these places, therefore, the 
labouring poor can maintain their families in dear years, they must be at their 
ease in times of moderate plenty, and in affluence in those of extraordinary 
cheapness. The high price of provisions during these ten years past has not in 
many parts of the kingdom been accompanied with any sensible rise in the 
money price of labour. It has, indeed, in some, owing probably more to the 
increase of the demand for labour than to that of the price of provisions. 
    Thirdly, as the price of provisions varies more from year to year than the 
wages of labour, so, on the other hand, the wages of labour vary more from 
place to place than the price of provisions. The prices of bread and butcher's 
meat are generally the same or very nearly the same through the greater part of 
the United Kingdom. These and most other things which are sold by retail, the 
way in which the labouring poor buy all things, are generally fully as cheap or 
cheaper in great towns than in the remoter parts of the country, for reasons 
which I shall have occasion to explain hereafter. But the wages of labour in a 
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great town and its neighbourhood are frequently a fourth or a fifth part, twenty 
or five-and-twenty per cent higher than at a few miles distance. Eighteenpence a 
day may be reckoned the common price of labour in London and its 
neighbourhood. At a few miles distance it falls to fourteen and fifteenpence. 
Tenpence may be reckoned its price in Edinburgh and its neighbourhood. At a 
few miles distance it falls to eightpence, the usual price of common labour 
through the greater part of the low country of Scotland, where it varies a good 
deal less than in England. Such a difference of prices, which it seems is not 
always sufficient to transport a man from one parish to another, would 
necessarily occasion so great a transportation of the most bulky commodities, 
not only from one parish to another, but from one end of the kingdom, almost 
from one end of the world to the other, as would soon reduce them more nearly 
to a level. After all that has been said of the levity and inconstancy of human 
nature, it appears evidently from experience that a man is of all sorts of luggage 
the most difficult to be transported. If the labouring poor, therefore, can maintain 
their families in those parts of the kingdom where the price of labour is lowest, 
they must be in affluence where it is highest. 
    Fourthly, the variations in the price of labour not only do not correspond 
either in place or time with those in the price of provisions, but they are 
frequently quite opposite. 
    Grain, the food of the common people, is dearer in Scotland than in England, 
whence Scotland receives almost every year very large supplies. But English 
corn must be sold dearer in Scotland, the country to which it is brought, than in 
England, the country from which it comes; and in proportion to its quality it 
cannot be sold dearer in Scotland than the Scotch corn that comes to the same 
market in competition with it. The quality of grain depends chiefly upon the 
quantity of flour or meal which it yields at the mill, and in this respect English 
grain is so much superior to the Scotch that, though often dearer in appearance, 
or in proportion to the measure of its bulk, it is generally cheaper in reality, or in 
proportion to its quality, or even to the measure of its weight. The price of 
labour, on the contrary, is dearer in England than in Scotland. If the labouring 
poor, therefore, can maintain their families in the one part of the United 
Kingdom, they must be in affluence in the other. Oatmeal indeed supplies the 
common people in Scotland with the greatest and the best part of their food, 
which is in general much inferior to that of their neighbours of the same rank in 
England. This difference, however, in the mode of their subsistence is not the 
cause, but the effect of the difference in their wages; though, by a strange 
misapprehension, I have frequently heard it represented as the cause. It is not 
because one man keeps a coach while his neighbour walks afoot that the one is 
rich and the other poor; but because the one is rich he keeps a coach, and 
because the other is poor he walks afoot. 
    During the course of the last century, taking one year with another, grain was 
dearer in both parts of the United Kingdom than during that of the present. This 
is a matter of fact which cannot now admit of any reasonable doubt; and the 
proof of it is, if possible, still more decisive with regard to Scotland than with 
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regard to England. It is in Scotland supported by the evidence of the public fiars, 
annual valuations made upon oath, according to the actual state of the markets, 
of all the different sorts of grain in every different county of Scotland. If such 
direct proof could require any collateral evidence to confirm it, I would observe 
that this has likewise been the case in France, and probably in most other parts 
of Europe. With regard to France there is the clearest proof. But though it is 
certain that in both parts of the United Kingdom grain was somewhat dearer in 
the last century than in the present, it is equally certain that labour was much 
cheaper. If the labouring poor, therefore, could bring up their families then, they 
must be much more at their ease now. In the last century, the most usual day-
wages of common labour through the greater part of Scotland were sixpence in 
summer and fivepence in winter. Three shillings a week, the same price very 
nearly, still continues to be paid in some parts of the Highlands and Western 
Islands. Through the greater part of the low country the most usual wages of 
common labour are now eightpence a day; tenpence, sometimes a shilling about 
Edinburgh, in the counties which border upon England, probably on account of 
that neighbourhood, and in a few other places where there has lately been a 
considerable rise in the demand for labour, about Glasgow, Carron, Ayrshire, 
etc. In England the improvements of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce 
began much earlier than in Scotland. The demand for labour, and consequently 
its price, must necessarily have increased with those improvements. In the last 
century, accordingly, as well as in the present, the wages of labour were higher 
in England than in Scotland. They have risen, too, considerably since that time, 
though, on account of the greater variety of wages paid there in different places, 
it is more difficult to ascertain how much. In 1614, the pay of a foot soldier was 
the same as in the present times, eightpence a day. When it was first established 
it would naturally be regulated by the usual wages of common labourers, the 
rank of people from which foot soldiers are commonly drawn. Lord Chief 
Justice Hales, who wrote in the time of Charles II, computes the necessary 
expense of a labourer's family, consisting of six persons, the father and mother, 
two children able to do something, and two not able, at ten shillings a week, or 
twenty-six pounds a year. If they cannot earn this by their labour, they must 
make it up, he supposes, either by begging or stealing. He appears to have 
inquired very carefully into this subject. In 1688, Mr. Gregory King, whose skill 
in political arithmetic is so much extolled by Doctor Davenant, computed the 
ordinary income of labourers and out-servants to be fifteen pounds a year to a 
family, which he supposed to consist, one with another, of three and a half 
persons. His calculation, therefore, though different in appearance, corresponds 
very nearly at bottom with that of Judge Hales. Both suppose the weekly 
expense of such families to be about twenty pence a head. Both the pecuniary 
income and expense of such families have increased considerably since that time 
through the greater part of the kingdom; in some places more, and in some less; 
though perhaps scarce anywhere so much as some exaggerated accounts of the 
present wages of labour have lately represented them to the public. The price of 
labour, it must be observed, cannot be ascertained very accurately anywhere, 
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different prices being often paid at the same place and for the same sort of 
labour, not only according to the different abilities of the workmen, but 
according to the easiness or hardness of the masters. Where wages are not 
regulated by law, all that we can pretend to determine is what are the most usual; 
and experience seems to show that law can never regulate them properly, though 
it has often pretended to do so. 
    The real recompense of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries and 
conveniences of life which it can procure to the labourer, has, during the course 
of the present century, increased perhaps in a still greater proportion than its 
money price. Not only grain has become somewhat cheaper, but many other 
things from which the industrious poor derive an agreeable and wholesome 
variety of food have become a great deal cheaper. Potatoes, for example, do not 
at present, through the greater part of the kingdom, cost half the price which 
they used to do thirty or forty years ago. The same thing may be said of turnips, 
carrots, cabbages; things which were formerly never raised but by the spade, but 
which are now commonly raised by the plough. All sort of garden stuff, too, has 
become cheaper. The greater part of the apples and even of the onions consumed 
in Great Britain were in the last century imported from Flanders. The great 
improvements in the coarser manufactures of both linen and woollen cloth 
furnish the labourers with cheaper and better clothing; and those in the 
manufactures of the coarser metals, with cheaper and better instruments of trade, 
as well as with many agreeable and convenient pieces of household furniture. 
Soap, salt, candles, leather, and fermented liquors have, indeed, become a good 
deal dearer; chiefly from the taxes which have been laid upon them. The 
quantity of these, however, which the labouring poor are under any necessity of 
consuming, is so very small, that the increase in their price does not compensate 
the diminution in that of so many other things. The common complaint that 
luxury extends itself even to the lowest ranks of the people, and that the 
labouring poor will not now be contented with the same food, clothing, and 
lodging which satisfied them in former times, may convince us that it is not the 
money price of labour only, but its real recompense, which has augmented. 
    Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people to 
be regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency to the society? The answer 
seems at first sight abundantly plain. Servants, labourers, and workmen of 
different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society. But 
what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an 
inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of 
which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but 
equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the 
people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be 
themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged. 
    Poverty, though it no doubt discourages, does not always prevent marriage. It 
seems even to be favourable to generation. A half-starved Highland woman 
frequently bears more than twenty children, while a pampered fine lady is often 
incapable of bearing any, and is generally exhausted by two or three. 
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Barrenness, so frequent among women of fashion, is very rare among those of 
inferior station. Luxury in the fair sex, while it inflames perhaps the passion for 
enjoyment, seems always to weaken, and frequently to destroy altogether, the 
powers of generation. 
    But poverty, though it does not prevent the generation, is extremely 
unfavourable to the rearing of children. The tender plant is produced, but in so 
cold a soil and so severe a climate, soon withers and dies. It is not uncommon, I 
have been frequently told, in the Highlands of Scotland for a mother who has 
borne twenty children not to have two alive. Several officers of great experience 
have assured me, that so far from recruiting their regiment, they have never been 
able to supply it with drums and fifes from all the soldiers' children that were 
born in it. A greater number of fine children, however, is seldom seen anywhere 
than about a barrack of soldiers. Very few of them, it seems, arrive at the age of 
thirteen or fourteen. In some places one half the children born die before they 
are four years of age; in many places before they are seven; and in almost all 
places before they are nine or ten. This great mortality, however, will 
everywhere be found chiefly among the children of the common people, who 
cannot afford to tend them with the same care as those of better station. Though 
their marriages are generally more fruitful than those of people of fashion, a 
smaller proportion of their children arrive at maturity. In foundling hospitals, 
and among the children brought up by parish charities, the mortality is still 
greater than among those of the common people. 
    Every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of 
their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it. But in civilised 
society it is only among the inferior ranks of people that the scantiness of 
subsistence can set limits to the further multiplication of the human species; and 
it can do so in no other way than by destroying a great part of the children which 
their fruitful marriages produce. 
    The liberal reward of labour, by enabling them to provide better for their 
children, and consequently to bring up a greater number, naturally tends to 
widen and extend those limits. It deserves to be remarked, too, that it necessarily 
does this as nearly as possible in the proportion which the demand for labour 
requires. If this demand is continually increasing, the reward of labour must 
necessarily encourage in such a manner the marriage and multiplication of 
labourers, as may enable them to supply that continually increasing demand by a 
continually increasing population. If the reward should at any time be less than 
what was requisite for this purpose, the deficiency of hands would soon raise it; 
and if it should at any time be more, their excessive multiplication would soon 
lower it to this necessary rate. The market would be so much understocked with 
labour in the one case, and so much overstocked in the other, as would soon 
force back its price to that proper rate which the circumstances of the society 
required. It is in this manner that the demand for men, like that for any other 
commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men; quickens it when it 
goes on too slowly, and stops it when it advances too fast. It is this demand 
which regulates and determines the state of propagation in all the different 
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countries of the world, in North America, in Europe, and in China; which 
renders it rapidly progressive in the first, slow and gradual in the second, and 
altogether stationary in the last. 
    The wear and tear of a slave, it has been said, is at the expense of his master; 
but that of a free servant is at his own expense. The wear and tear of the latter, 
however, is, in reality, as much at the expense of his master as that of the 
former. The wages paid to journeymen and servants of every kind must be such 
as may enable them, one with another, to continue the race of journeymen and 
servants, according as the increasing, diminishing, or stationary demand of the 
society may happen to require. But though the wear and tear of a free servant be 
equally at the expense of his master, it generally costs him much less than that of 
a slave. The fund destined for replacing or repairing, if I may say so, the wear 
and tear of the slave, is commonly managed by a negligent master or careless 
overseer. That destined for performing the same office with regard to the free 
man, is managed by the free man himself. The disorders which generally prevail 
in the economy of the rich, naturally introduce themselves into the management 
of the former: the strict frugality and parsimonious attention of the poor as 
naturally establish themselves in that of the latter. Under such different 
management, the same purpose must require very different degrees of expense 
to execute it. It appears, accordingly, from the experience of all ages and 
nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than 
that performed by slaves. It is found to do so even at Boston, New York, and 
Philadelphia, where the wages of common labour are so very high. 
    The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the effect of increasing wealth, 
so it is the cause of increasing population. To complain of it is to lament over the 
necessary effect and cause of the greatest public prosperity. 
    It deserves to be remarked, perhaps, that it is in the progressive state, while 
the society is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it has 
acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the labouring poor, 
of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest and the most 
comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable in the declining state. The 
progressive state is in reality the cheerful and the hearty state to all the different 
orders of the society. The stationary is dull; the declining, melancholy. 
    The liberal reward of labour, as it encourages the propagation, so it increases 
the industry of the common people. The wages of labour are the encouragement 
of industry, which, like every other human quality, improves in proportion to the 
encouragement it receives. A plentiful subsistence increases the bodily strength 
of the labourer, and the comfortable hope of bettering his condition, and of 
ending his days perhaps in ease and plenty, animates him to exert that strength to 
the utmost. Where wages are high, accordingly, we shall always find the 
workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious than where they are low: in 
England, for example, than in Scotland; in the neighbourhood of great towns 
than in remote country places. Some workmen, indeed, when they can earn in 
four days what will maintain them through the week, will be idle the other three. 
This, however, is by no means the case with the greater part. Workmen, on the 
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contrary, when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork 
themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years. A carpenter 
in London, and in some other places, is not supposed to last in his utmost vigour 
above eight years. Something of the same kind happens in many other trades, in 
which the workmen are paid by the piece, as they generally are in manufactures, 
and even in country labour, wherever wages are higher than ordinary. Almost 
every class of artificers is subject to some peculiar infirmity occasioned by 
excessive application to their peculiar species of work. Ramuzzini, an eminent 
Italian physician, has written a particular book concerning such diseases. We do 
not reckon our soldiers the most industrious set of people among us. Yet when 
soldiers have been employed in some particular sorts of work, and liberally paid 
by the piece, their officers have frequently been obliged to stipulate with the 
undertaker, that they should not be allowed to earn above a certain sum every 
day, according to the rate at which they were paid. Till this stipulation was 
made, mutual emulation and the desire of greater gain frequently prompted them 
to overwork themselves, and to hurt their health by excessive labour. Excessive 
application during four days of the week is frequently the real cause of the 
idleness of the other three, so much and so loudly complained of. Great labour, 
either of mind or body, continued for several days together, is in most men 
naturally followed by a great desire of relaxation, which, if not restrained by 
force or by some strong necessity, is almost irresistible. It is the call of nature, 
which requires to be relieved by some indulgence, sometimes of ease only, but 
sometimes, too, of dissipation and diversion. If it is not complied with, the 
consequences are often dangerous, and sometimes fatal, and such as almost 
always, sooner or later, brings on the peculiar infirmity of the trade. If masters 
would always listen to the dictates of reason and humanity, they have frequently 
occasion rather to moderate than to animate the application of many of their 
workmen. It will be found, I believe, in every sort of trade, that the man who 
works so moderately as to be able to work constantly not only preserves his 
health the longest, but, in the course of the year, executes the greatest quantity of 
work. 
    In cheap years, it is pretended, workmen are generally more idle, and in dear 
ones more industrious than ordinary. A plentiful subsistence, therefore, it has 
been concluded, relaxes, and a scanty one quickens their industry. That a little 
more plenty than ordinary may render some workmen idle, cannot well be 
doubted; but that it should have this effect upon the greater part, or that men in 
general should work better when they are ill fed than when they are well fed, 
when they are disheartened than when they are in good spirits, when they are 
frequently sick than when they are generally in good health, seems not very 
probable. Years of dearth, it is to be observed, are generally among the common 
people years of sickness and mortality, which cannot fail to diminish the 
produce of their industry. 
    In years of plenty, servants frequently leave their masters, and trust their 
subsistence to what they can make by their own industry. But the same 
cheapness of provisions, by increasing the fund which is destined for the 
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maintenance of servants, encourages masters, farmers especially, to employ a 
greater number. Farmers upon such occasions expect more profit from their corn 
by maintaining a few more labouring servants than by selling it at a low price in 
the market. The demand for servants increases, while the number of those who 
offer to supply that demand diminishes. The price of labour, therefore, 
frequently rises in cheap years. 
    In years of scarcity, the difficulty and uncertainty of subsistence make all such 
people eager to return to service. But the high price of provisions, by 
diminishing the funds destined for the maintenance of servants, disposes masters 
rather to diminish than to increase the number of those they have. In dear years, 
too, poor independent workmen frequently consume the little stocks with which 
they had used to supply themselves with the materials of their work, and are 
obliged to become journeymen for subsistence. More people want employment 
than can easily get it; many are willing to take it upon lower terms than ordinary, 
and the wages of both servants and journeymen frequently sink in dear years. 
    Masters of all sorts, therefore, frequently make better bargains with their 
servants in dear than in cheap years, and find them more humble and dependent 
in the former than in the latter. They naturally, therefore, commend the former 
as more favourable to industry. Landlords and farmers, besides, two of the 
largest classes of masters, have another reason for being pleased with dear years. 
The rents of the one and the profits of the other depend very much upon the 
price of provisions. Nothing can be more absurd, however, than to imagine that 
men in general should work less when they work for themselves, than when they 
work for other people. A poor independent workman will generally be more 
industrious than even a journeyman who works by the piece. The one enjoys the 
whole produce of his own industry; the other shares it with his master. The one, 
in his separate independent state, is less liable to the temptations of bad 
company, which in large manufactories so frequently ruin the morals of the 
other. The superiority of the independent workman over those servants who are 
hired by the month or by the year, and whose wages and maintenance are the 
same whether they do much or do little, is likely to be still greater. Cheap years 
tend to increase the proportion of independent workmen to journeymen and 
servants of all kinds, and dear years to diminish it. 
    A French author of great knowledge and ingenuity, Mr. Messance, receiver of 
the taillies in the election of St. Etienne, endeavours to show that the poor do 
more work in cheap than in dear years, by comparing the quantity and value of 
the goods made upon those different occasions in three different manufactures; 
one of coarse woollens carried on at Elbeuf; one of linen, and another of silk, 
both which extend through the whole generality of Rouen. It appears from his 
account, which is copied from the registers of the public offices, that the 
quantity and value of the goods made in all those three manufactures has 
generally been greater in cheap than in dear years; and that it has always been 
greatest in the cheapest, and least in the dearest years. All the three seem to be 
stationary manufactures, or which, though their produce may vary somewhat 
from year to year, are upon the whole neither going backwards nor forwards. 
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    The manufacture of linen in Scotland, and that of coarse woollens in the West 
Riding of Yorkshire, are growing manufactures, of which the produce is 
generally, though with some variations, increasing both in quantity and value. 
Upon examining, however, the accounts which have been published of their 
annual produce, I have not been able to observe that its variations have had any 
sensible connection with the dearness or cheapness of the seasons. In 1740, a 
year of great scarcity, both manufactures, indeed, appear to have declined very 
considerably. But in 1756, another year of great scarcity, the Scotch 
manufacture made more than ordinary advances. The Yorkshire manufacture, 
indeed, declined, and its produce did not rise to what it had been in 1755 till 
1766, after the repeal of the American Stamp Act. In that and the following year 
it greatly exceeded what it had ever been before, and it has continued to advance 
ever since. 
    The produce of all great manufactures for distant sale must necessarily 
depend, not so much upon the dearness or cheapness of the seasons in the 
countries where they are carried on as upon the circumstances which affect the 
demand in the countries where they are consumed; upon peace or war, upon the 
prosperity or declension of other rival manufactures, and upon the good or bad 
humour of their principal customers. A great part of the extraordinary work, 
besides, which is probably done in cheap years, never enters the public registers 
of manufactures. The men servants who leave their masters become independent 
labourers. The women return to their parents, and commonly spin in order to 
make clothes for themselves and their families. Even the independent workmen 
do not always work for public sale, but are employed by some of their 
neighbours in manufactures for family use. The produce of their labour, 
therefore, frequently makes no figure in those public registers of which the 
records are sometimes published with so much parade, and from which our 
merchants and manufacturers would often vainly pretend to announce the 
prosperity or declension of the greatest empires. 
    Though the variations in the price of labour not only do not always 
correspond with those in the price of provisions, but are frequently quite 
opposite, we must not, upon this account, imagine that the price of provisions 
has no influence upon that of labour. The money price of labour is necessarily 
regulated by two circumstances; the demand for labour, and the price of the 
necessaries and conveniences of life. The demand for labour, according as it 
happens to be increasing, stationary, or declining, or to require an increasing, 
stationary, or declining population, determines the quantity of the necessaries 
and conveniencies of life which must be given to the labourer; and the money 
price of labour is determined by what is requisite for purchasing this quantity. 
Though the money price of labour, therefore, is sometimes high where the price 
of provisions is low, it would be still higher, the demand continuing the same, if 
the price of provisions was high. 
    It is because the demand for labour increases in years of sudden and 
extraordinary plenty, and diminishes in those of sudden and extraordinary 
scarcity, that the money price of labour sometimes rises in the one and sinks in 
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the other. 
    In a year of sudden and extraordinary plenty, there are funds in the hands of 
many of the employers of industry sufficient to maintain and employ a greater 
number of industrious people than had been employed the year before; and this 
extraordinary number cannot always be had. Those masters, therefore, who want 
more workmen bid against one another, in order to get them, which sometimes 
raises both the real and the money price of their labour. 
    The contrary of this happens in a year of sudden and extraordinary scarcity. 
The funds destined for employing industry are less than they had been the year 
before. A considerable number of people are thrown out of employment, who 
bid against one another, in order to get it, which sometimes lowers both the real 
and the money price of labour. In 1740, a year of extraordinary scarcity, many 
people were willing to work for bare subsistence. In the succeeding years of 
plenty, it was more difficult to get labourers and servants. 
    The scarcity of a dear year, by diminishing the demand for labour, tends to 
lower its price, as the high price of provisions tends to raise it. The plenty of a 
cheap year, on the contrary, by increasing the demand, tends to raise the price of 
labour, as the cheapness of provisions tends to lower it. In the ordinary 
variations of the price of provisions those two opposite causes seem to 
counterbalance one another, which is probably in part the reason why the wages 
of labour are everywhere so much more steady and permanent than the price of 
provisions. 
    The increase in the wages of labour necessarily increases the price of many 
commodities, by increasing that part of it which resolves itself into wages, and 
so far tends to diminish their consumption both at home and abroad. The same 
cause, however, which raises the wages of labour, the increase of stock, tends to 
increase its productive powers, and to make a smaller quantity of labour produce 
a greater quantity of work. The owner of the stock which employs a great 
number of labourers, necessarily endeavours, for his own advantage, to make 
such a proper division and distribution of employment that they may be enabled 
to produce the greatest quantity of work possible. For the same reason, he 
endeavours to supply them with the best machinery which either he or they can 
think of. What takes place among the labourers in a particular workhouse takes 
place, for the same reason, among those of a great society. The greater their 
number, the more they naturally divide themselves into different classes and 
subdivisions of employment. More heads are occupied in inventing the most 
proper machinery for executing the work of each, and it is, therefore, more 
likely to be invented. There are many commodities, therefore, which, in 
consequence of these improvements, come to be produced by so much less 
labour than before that the increase of its price is more than compensated by the 
diminution of its quantity. 
CHAPTER IX
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Of the Profits of Stock
THE rise and fall in the profits of stock depend upon the same causes with the 
rise and fall in the wages of labour, the increasing or declining state of the 
wealth of the society; but those causes affect the one and the other very 
differently. 
    The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower profit. When the 
stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the same trade, their mutual 
competition naturally tends to lower its profit; and when there is a like increase 
of stock in all the different trades carried on in the same society, the same 
competition must produce the same effect in them all. 
    It is not easy, it has already been observed, to ascertain what are the average 
wages of labour even in a particular place, and at a particular time. We can, even 
in this case, seldom determine more than what are the most usual wages. But 
even this can seldom be done with regard to the profits of stock. Profit is so very 
fluctuating that the person who carries on a particular trade cannot always tell 
you himself what is the average of his annual profit. It is affected not only by 
every variation of price in the commodities which he deals in, but by the good or 
bad fortune both of his rivals and of his customers, and by a thousand other 
accidents to which goods when carried either by sea or by land, or even when 
stored in a warehouse, are liable. It varies, therefore, not only from year to year, 
but from day to day, and almost from hour to hour. To ascertain what is the 
average profit of all the different trades carried on in a great kingdom must be 
much more difficult; and to judge of what it may have been formerly, or in 
remote periods of time, with any degree of precision, must be altogether 
impossible. 
    But though it may be impossible to determine, with any degree of precision, 
what are or were the average profits of stock, either in the present or in ancient 
times, some notion may be formed of them from the interest of money. It may be 
laid down as a maxim, that wherever a great deal can be made by the use of 
money, a great deal will commonly be given for the use of it; and that wherever 
little can be made by it, less will commonly be given for it. According, 
therefore, as the usual market rate of interest varies in any country, we may be 
assured that the ordinary profits of stock must vary with it, must sink as it sinks, 
and rise as it rises. The progress of interest, therefore, may lead us to form some 
notion of the progress of profit. 
    By the 37th of Henry VIII all interest above ten per cent was declared 
unlawful. More, it seems, had sometimes been taken before that. In the reign of 
Edward VI religious zeal prohibited all interest. This prohibition, however, like 
all others of the same kind, is said to have produced no effect, and probably 
rather increased than diminished the evil of usury. The statute of Henry VIII was 
revived by the 13th of Elizabeth, c. 8, and ten per cent continued to be the legal 
rate of interest till the 21st of James I, when it was restricted to eight per cent. It 
was reduced to six per cent soon after the Restoration, and by the 12th of Queen 
Anne to five per cent. All these different statutory regulations seem to have been 
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made with great propriety. They seem to have followed and not to have gone 
before the market rate of interest, or the rate at which people of good credit 
usually borrowed. Since the time of Queen Anne, five per cent seems to have 
been rather above than below the market rate. Before the late war, the 
government borrowed at three per cent; and people of good credit in the capital, 
and in many other parts of the kingdom, at three and a half, four, and four and a 
half per cent. 
    Since the time of Henry VIII the wealth and revenue of the country have been 
continually advancing, and, in the course of their progress, their pace seems 
rather to have been gradually accelerated than retarded. They seem not only to 
have been going on, but to have been going on faster and faster. The wages of 
labour have been continually increasing during the same period, and in the 
greater part of the different branches of trade and manufactures the profits of 
stock have been diminishing. 
    It generally requires a greater stock to carry on any sort of trade in a great 
town than in a country village. The great stocks employed in every branch of 
trade, and the number of rich competitors, generally reduce the rate of profit in 
the former below what it is in the latter But the wages of labour are generally 
higher in a great town than in a country village. In a thriving town the people 
who have great stocks to employ frequently cannot get the number of workmen 
they want, and therefore bid against one another in order to get as many as they 
can, which raises the wages of labour, and lowers the profits of stock. In the 
remote parts of the country there is frequently not stock sufficient to employ all 
the people, who therefore bid against one another in order to get employment, 
which lowers the wages of labour and raises the profits of stock. 
    In Scotland, though the legal rate of interest is the same as in England, the 
market rate is rather higher. People of the best credit there seldom borrow under 
five per cent. Even private bankers in Edinburgh give four per cent upon their 
promissory notes, of which payment either in whole or in part may be demanded 
at pleasure. Private bankers in London give no interest for the money which is 
deposited with them. There are few trades which cannot be carried on with a 
smaller stock in Scotland than in England. The common rate of profit, therefore, 
must be somewhat greater. The wages of labour, it has already been observed, 
are lower in Scotland than in England. The country, too, is not only much 
poorer, but the steps by which it advances to a better condition, for it is evidently 
advancing, seem to be much slower and more tardy. 
    The legal rate of interest in France has not, during the course of the present 
century, been always regulated by the market rate. In 1720 interest was reduced 
from the twentieth to the fiftieth penny, or from five to two per cent. In 1724 it 
was raised to the thirtieth penny, or to 3 1/3 per cent. In 1725 it was again raised 
to the twentieth penny, or to five per cent. In 1766, during the administration of 
Mr. Laverdy, it was reduced to the twenty-fifth penny, or to four per cent. The 
Abbe Terray raised it afterwards to the old rate of five per cent. The supposed 
purpose of many of those violent reductions of interest was to prepare the way 
for reducing that of the public debts; a purpose which has sometimes been 
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executed. France is perhaps in the present times not so rich a country as 
England; and though the legal rate of interest has in France frequently been 
lower than in England, the market rate has generally been higher; for there, as in 
other countries, they have several very safe and easy methods of evading the 
law. The profits of trade, I have been assured by British merchants who had 
traded in both countries, are higher in France than in England; and it is no doubt 
upon this account that many British subjects choose rather to employ their 
capitals in a country where trade is in disgrace, than in one where it is highly 
respected. The wages of labour are lower in France than in England. When you 
go from Scotland to England, the difference which you may remark between the 
dress and countenance of the common people in the one country and in the other 
sufficiently indicates the difference in their condition. The contrast is still 
greater when you return from France. France, though no doubt a richer country 
than Scotland, seems not to be going forward so fast. It is a common and even a 
popular opinion in the country that it is going backwards; an opinion which, 
apprehend, is ill founded even with regard to France, but which nobody can 
possibly entertain with regard to Scotland, who sees the country now, and who 
saw it twenty or thirty years ago. 
    The province of Holland, on the other hand, in proportion to the extent of its 
territory and the number of its people, is a richer country than England. The 
government there borrows at two per cent, and private people of good credit at 
three. The wages of labour are said to be higher in Holland than in England, and 
the Dutch, it is well known, trade upon lower profits than any people in Europe. 
The trade of Holland, it has been pretended by some people, is decaying, and it 
may perhaps be true some particular branches of it are so. But these symptoms 
seem to indicate sufficiently that there is no general decay. When profit 
diminishes, merchants are very apt to complain that trade decays; though the 
diminution of profit is the natural effect of its prosperity, or of a greater stock 
being employed in it than before. During the late war the Dutch gained the 
whole carrying trade of France, of which they still retain a very large share. The 
great property which they possess both in the French and English funds, about 
forty millions, it is said, in the latter (in which I suspect, however, there is a 
considerable exaggeration); the great sums which they lend to private people in 
countries where the rate of interest is higher than in their own, are circumstances 
which no doubt demonstrate the redundancy of their stock, or that it has 
increased beyond what they can employ with tolerable profit in the proper 
business of their own country: but they do not demonstrate that that has 
decreased. As the capital of a private man, though acquired by a particular trade, 
may increase beyond what he can employ in it, and yet that trade continue to 
increase too; so may likewise the capital of a great nation. 
    In our North American and West Indian colonies, not only the wages of 
labour, but the interest of money, and consequently the profits of stock, are 
higher than in England. In the different colonies both the legal and the market 
rate of interest run from six to eight per cent. High wages of labour and high 
profits of stock, however, are things, perhaps, which scarce ever go together, 
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except in the peculiar circumstances of new colonies. A new colony must always 
for some time be more understocked in proportion to the extent of its territory, 
and more underpeopled in proportion to the extent of its stock, than the greater 
part of other countries. They have more land than they have stock to cultivate. 
What they have, therefore, is applied to the cultivation only of what is most 
fertile and most favourably situated, the land near the sea shore, and along the 
banks of navigable rivers. Such land, too, is frequently purchased at a price 
below the value even of its natural produce. Stock employed in the purchase and 
improvement of such lands must yield a very large profit, and consequently 
afford to pay a very large interest. Its rapid accumulation in so profitable an 
employment enables the planter to increase the number of his hands faster than 
he can find them in a new settlement. Those whom he can find, therefore, are 
very liberally rewarded. As the colony increases, the profits of stock gradually 
diminish. When the most fertile and best situated lands have been all occupied, 
less profit can be made by the cultivation of what is inferior both in soil and 
situation, and less interest can be afforded for the stock which is so employed. In 
the greater part of our colonies, accordingly, both the legal and the market rate 
of interest have been considerably reduced during the course of the present 
century. As riches, improvement, and population have increased, interest has 
declined. The wages of labour do not sink with the profits of stock. The demand 
for labour increases with the increase of stock whatever be its profits; and after 
these are diminished, stock may not only continue to increase, but to increase 
much faster than before. It is with industrious nations who are advancing in the 
acquisition of riches as with industrious individuals. A great stock, though with 
small profits, generally increases faster than a small stock with great profits. 
Money, says the proverb, makes money. When you have got a little, it is often 
easy to get more. The great difficulty is to get that little. The connection between 
the increase of stock and that of industry, or of the demand for useful labour, has 
partly been explained already, but will be explained more fully hereafter in 
treating of the accumulation of stock. 
    The acquisition of new territory, or of new branches of trade, may sometimes 
raise the profits of stock, and with them the interest of money, even in a country 
which is fast advancing in the acquisition of riches. The stock of the country not 
being sufficient for the whole accession of business, which such acquisitions 
present to the different people among whom it is divided, is applied to those 
particular branches only which afford the greatest profit. Part of what had before 
been employed in other trades is necessarily withdrawn from them, and turned 
into some of the new and more profitable ones. In all those old trades, therefore, 
the competition comes to be less than before. The market comes to be less fully 
supplied with many different sorts of goods. Their price necessarily rises more 
or less, and yields a greater profit to those who deal in them, who can, therefore, 
afford to borrow at a higher interest. For some time after the conclusion of the 
late war, not only private people of the best credit, but some of the greatest 
companies in London, commonly borrowed at five per cent, who before that had 
not been used to pay more than four, and four and a half per cent. The great 
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accession both of territory and trade, by our acquisitions in North America and 
the West Indies, will sufficiently account for this, without supposing any 
diminution in the capital stock of the society. So great an accession of new 
business to be carried on by the old stock must necessarily have diminished the 
quantity employed in a great number of particular branches, in which the 
competition being less, the profits must have been greater. I shall hereafter have 
occasion to mention the reasons which dispose me to believe that the capital 
stock of Great Britain was not diminished even by the enormous expense of the 
late war. 
    The diminution of the capital stock of the society, or of the funds destined for 
the maintenance of industry, however, as it lowers the wages of labour, so it 
raises the profits of stock, and consequently the interest of money. By the wages 
of labour being lowered, the owners of what stock remains in the society can 
bring their goods at less expense to market than before, and less stock being 
employed in supplying the market than before, they can sell them dearer. Their 
goods cost them less, and they get more for them. Their profits, therefore, being 
augmented at both ends, can well afford a large interest. The great fortunes so 
suddenly and so easily acquired in Bengal and the other British settlements in 
the East Indies may satisfy us that, as the wages of labour are very low, so the 
profits of stock are very high in those ruined countries. The interest of money is 
proportionably so. In Bengal, money is frequently lent to the farmers at forty, 
fifty, and sixty per cent and the succeeding crop is mortgaged for the payment. 
As the profits which can afford such an interest must eat up almost the whole 
rent of the landlord, so such enormous usury must in its turn eat up the greater 
part of those profits. Before the fall of the Roman republic, a usury of the same 
kind seems to have been common in the provinces, under the ruinous 
administration of their proconsuls. The virtuous Brutus lent money in Cyprus at 
eight-and-forty per cent as we learn from the letters of Cicero. 
    In a country which had acquired that full complement of riches which the 
nature of its soil and climate, and its situation with respect to other countries, 
allowed it to acquire; which could, therefore, advance no further, and which was 
not going backwards, both the wages of labour and the profits of stock would 
probably be very low. In a country fully peopled in proportion to what either its 
territory could maintain or its stock employ, the competition for employment 
would necessarily be so great as to reduce the wages of labour to what was 
barely sufficient to keep up the number of labourers, and, the country being 
already fully peopled, that number could never be augmented. In a country fully 
stocked in proportion to all the business it had to transact, as great a quantity of 
stock would be employed in every particular branch as the nature and extent of 
the trade would admit. The competition, therefore, would everywhere be as 
great, and consequently the ordinary profit as low as possible. 
    But perhaps no country has ever yet arrived at this degree of opulence. China 
seems to have been long stationary, and had probably long ago acquired that full 
complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its laws and 
institutions. But this complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws 
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and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate, and situation might admit of. A 
country which neglects or despises foreign commerce, and which admits the 
vessels of foreign nations into one or two of its ports only, cannot transact the 
same quantity of business which it might do with different laws and institutions. 
In a country too, where, though the rich or the owners of large capitals enjoy a 
good deal of security, the poor or the owners of small capitals enjoy scarce any, 
but are liable, under the pretence of justice, to be pillaged and plundered at any 
time by the inferior mandarins, the quantity of stock employed in all the 
different branches of business transacted within it can never be equal to what the 
nature and extent of that business might admit. In every different branch, the 
oppression of the poor must establish the monopoly of the rich, who, by 
engrossing the whole trade to themselves, will be able to make very large 
profits. Twelve per cent accordingly is said to be the common interest of money 
in China, and the ordinary profits of stock must be sufficient to afford this large 
interest. 
    A defect in the law may sometimes raise the rate of interest considerably 
above what the condition of the country, as to wealth or poverty, would require. 
When the law does not enforce the performance of contracts, it puts all 
borrowers nearly upon the same footing with bankrupts or people of doubtful 
credit in better regulated countries. The uncertainty of recovering his money 
makes the lender exact the same usurious interest which is usually required from 
bankrupts. Among the barbarous nations who overran the western provinces of 
the Roman empire, the performance of contracts was left for many ages to the 
faith of the contracting parties. The courts of justice of their kings seldom 
intermeddled in it. The high rate of interest which took place in those ancient 
times may perhaps be partly accounted for from this cause. 
    When the law prohibits interest altogether, it does not prevent it. Many people 
must borrow, and nobody will lend without such a consideration for the use of 
their money as is suitable not only to what can be made by the use of it, but to 
the difficulty and danger of evading the law. The high rate of interest among all 
Mahometan nations is accounted for by Mr. Montesquieu, not from their 
poverty, but partly from this, and partly from the difficulty of recovering the 
money. 
    The lowest ordinary rate of profit must always be something more than what 
is sufficient to compensate the occasional losses to which every employment of 
stock is exposed. It is this surplus only which is neat or clear profit. What is 
called gross profit comprehends frequently, not only this surplus, but what is 
retained for compensating such extraordinary losses. The interest which the 
borrower can afford to pay is in proportion to the clear profit only. 
    The lowest ordinary rate of interest must, in the same manner, be something 
more than sufficient to compensate the occasional losses to which lending, even 
with tolerable prudence, is exposed. Were it not more, charity or friendship 
could be the only motive for lending. 
    In a country which had acquired its full complement of riches, where in every 
particular branch of business there was the greatest quantity of stock that could 
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be employed in it, as the ordinary rate of clear profit would be very small, so the 
usual market rate of interest which could be afforded out of it would be so low 
as to render it impossible for any but the very wealthiest people to live upon the 
interest of their money. All people of small or middling fortunes would be 
obliged to superintend themselves the employment of their own stocks. It would 
be necessary that almost every man should be a man of business, or engage in 
some sort of trade. The province of Holland seems to be approaching near to this 
state. It is there unfashionable not to be a man of business. Necessity makes it 
usual for almost every man to be so, and custom everywhere regulates fashion. 
As it is ridiculous not to dress, so is it, in some measure, not to be employed, 
like other people. As a man of a civil profession seems awkward in a camp or a 
garrison, and is even in some danger of being despised there, so does an idle 
man among men of business. 
    The highest ordinary rate of profit may be such as, in the price of the greater 
part of commodities, eats up the whole of what should go to the rent of the land, 
and leaves only what is sufficient to pay the labour of preparing and bringing 
them to market, according to the lowest rate at which labour can anywhere be 
paid, the bare subsistence of the labourer. The workman must always have been 
fed in some way or other while he was about the work; but the landlord may not 
always have been paid. The profits of the trade which the servants of the East 
India Company carry on in Bengal may not perhaps be very far from this rate. 
    The proportion which the usual market rate of interest ought to bear to the 
ordinary rate of clear profit, necessarily varies as profit rises or falls. Double 
interest is in Great Britain reckoned what the merchants call a good, moderate, 
reasonable profit; terms which I apprehend mean no more than a common and 
usual profit. In a country where the ordinary rate of clear profit is eight or ten 
per cent, it may be reasonable that one half of it should go to interest, wherever 
business is carried on with borrowed money. The stock is at the risk of the 
borrower, who, as it were, insures it to the lender; and four or five per cent may, 
in the greater part of trades, be both a sufficient profit upon the risk of this 
insurance, and a sufficient recompense for the trouble of employing the stock. 
But the proportion between interest and clear profit might not be the same in 
countries where the ordinary rate of profit was either a good deal lower, or a 
good deal higher. If it were a good deal lower, one half of it perhaps could not 
be afforded for interest; and more might be afforded if it were a good deal 
higher. 
    In countries which are fast advancing to riches, the low rate of profit may, in 
the price of many commodities, compensate the high wages of labour, and 
enable those countries to sell as cheap as their less thriving neighbours, among 
whom the wages of labour may be lower. 
    In reality high profits tend much more to raise the price of work than high 
wages. If in the linen manufacture, for example, the wages of the different 
working people, the flax-dressers, the spinners, the weavers, etc., should, all of 
them, be advanced twopence a day; it would be necessary to heighten the price 
of a piece of linen only by a number of twopences equal to the number of people 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth1.html (64 of 189)4/11/2005 9:44:43 AM
The Wealth of Nations
that had been employed about it, multiplied by the number of days during which 
they had been so employed. That part of the price of the commodity which 
resolved itself into wages would, through all the different stages of the 
manufacture, rise only in arithmetical proportion to this rise of wages. But if the 
profits of all the different employers of those working people should be raised 
five per cent, that part of the price of the commodity which resolved itself into 
profit would, through all the different stages of the manufacture, rise in 
geometrical proportion to this rise of profit. The employer of the flaxdressers 
would in selling his flax require an additional five per cent upon the whole value 
of the materials and wages which he advanced to his workmen. The employer of 
the spinners would require an additional five per cent both upon the advanced 
price of the flax and upon the wages of the spinners. And the employer of the 
weavers would require a like five per cent both upon the advanced price of the 
linen yarn and upon the wages of the weavers. In raising the price of 
commodities the rise of wages operates in the same manner as simple interest 
does in the accumulation of debt. The rise of profit operates like compound 
interest. Our merchants and master-manufacturers complain much of the bad 
effects of high wages in raising the price, and thereby lessening the sale of their 
goods both at home and abroad. They say nothing concerning the bad effects of 
high profits. They are silent with regard to the pernicious effects of their own 
gains. They complain only of those of other people. 
CHAPTER X
Of Wages and Profit in the different Employments of Labour and Stock
THE whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of 
labour and stock must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal or 
continually tending to equality. If in the same neighbourhood, there was any 
employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many 
people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the 
other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments. 
This at least would be the case in a society where things were left to follow their 
natural course, where there was perfect liberty, and where every man was 
perfectly free both to choose what occupation he thought proper, and to change 
it as often as he thought proper. Every man's interest would prompt him to seek 
the advantageous, and to shun the disadvantageous employment. 
    Pecuniary wages and profit, indeed, are everywhere in Europe extremely 
different according to the different employments of labour and stock. But this 
difference arises partly from certain circumstances in the employments 
themselves, which, either really, or at least in the imaginations of men, make up 
for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in others; and 
partly from the policy of Europe, which nowhere leaves things at perfect liberty. 
    The particular consideration of those circumstances and of that policy will 
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divide this chapter into two parts. 
PART 1
Inequalities arising from the Nature of the Employments themselves
THE five following are the principal circumstances which, so far as I have been 
able to observe, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employments, and 
counterbalance a great one in others: first, the agreeableness or disagreeableness 
of the employments themselves; secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the 
difficulty and expense of learning them; thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of 
employment in them; fourthly, the small or great trust which must be reposed in 
those who exercise them; and, fifthly, the probability or improbability of success 
in them. 
    First, the wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or 
dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness of the employment. Thus in 
most places, take the year round, a journeyman tailor earns less than a 
journeyman weaver. His work is much easier. A journeyman weaver earns less 
than a journeyman smith. His work is not always easier, but it is much cleanlier. 
A journeyman blacksmith, though an artificer, seldom earns so much in twelve 
hours as a collier, who is only a labourer, does in eight. His work is not quite so 
dirty, is less dangerous, and is carried on in daylight, and above ground. Honour 
makes a great part of the reward of all honourable professions. In point of 
pecuniary gain, all things considered, they are generally under-recompensed, as I 
shall endeavour to show by and by. Disgrace has the contrary effect. The trade 
of a butcher is a brutal and an odious business; but it is in most places more 
profitable than the greater part of common trades. The most detestable of all 
employments, that of public executioner, is, in proportion to the quantity of 
work done, better paid than any common trade whatever. 
    Hunting and fishing, the most important employments of mankind in the rude 
state of society, become in its advanced state their most agreeable amusements, 
and they pursue for pleasure what they once followed from necessity. In the 
advanced state of society, therefore, they are all very poor people who follow as 
a trade what other people pursue as a pastime. Fishermen have been so since the 
time of Theocritus. A poacher is everywhere a very poor man in Great Britain. 
In countries where the rigour of the law suffers no poachers, the licensed hunter 
is not in a much better condition. The natural taste for those employments makes 
more people follow them than can live comfortably by them, and the produce of 
their labour, in proportion to its quantity, comes always too cheap to market to 
afford anything but the most scanty subsistence to the labourers. 
    Disagreeableness and disgrace affect the profits of stock in the same manner 
as the wages of labour. The keeper of an inn or tavern, who is never master of 
his own house, and who is exposed to the brutality of every drunkard, exercises 
neither a very agreeable nor a very creditable business. But there is scarce any 
common trade in which a small stock yields so great a profit. 
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    Secondly, the wages of labour vary with the easiness and cheapness, or the 
difficulty and expense of learning the business. 
    When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be 
performed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the capital 
laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man educated at the expense 
of much labour and time to any of those employments which require 
extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive 
machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and 
above the usual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense 
of his education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. 
It must do this, too, in a reasonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain 
duration of human life, in the same manner as to the more certain duration of the 
machine. 
    The difference between the wages of skilled labour and those of common 
labour is founded upon this principle. 
    The policy of Europe considers the labour of all mechanics, artificers, and 
manufacturers, as skilled labour; and that of all country labourers as common 
labour. It seems to suppose that of the former to be of a more nice and delicate 
nature than that of the latter. It is so perhaps in some cases; but in the greater 
part is it quite otherwise, as I shall endeavour to show by and by. The laws and 
customs of Europe, therefore, in order to qualify any person for exercising the 
one species of labour, impose the necessity of an apprenticeship, though with 
different degrees of rigour in different places. They leave the other free and open 
to everybody. During the continuance of the apprenticeship, the whole labour of 
the apprentice belongs to his master. In the meantime he must, in many cases, be 
maintained by his parents or relations, and in almost all cases must be clothed by 
them. Some money, too, is commonly given to the master for teaching him his 
trade. They who cannot give money give time, or become bound for more than 
the usual number of years; a consideration which, though it is not always 
advantageous to the master, on account of the usual idleness of apprentices, is 
always disadvantageous to the apprentice. In country labour, on the contrary, the 
labourer, while he is employed about the easier, learns the more difficult parts of 
his business, and his own labour maintains him through all the different stages 
of his employment. It is reasonable, therefore, that in Europe the wages of 
mechanics, artificers, and manufacturers, should be somewhat higher than those 
of common labourers. They are so accordingly, and their superior gains make 
them in most places be considered as a superior rank of people. This superiority, 
however, is generally very small; the daily or weekly earnings of journeymen in 
the more common sorts of manufactures, such as those of plain linen and 
woollen cloth, computed at an average, are, in most places, very little more than 
the day wages of common labourers. Their employment, indeed, is more steady 
and uniform, and the superiority of their earnings, taking the whole year 
together, may be somewhat greater. It seems evidently, however, to be no 
greater than what is sufficient to compensate the superior expense of their 
education. 
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    Education in the ingenious arts and in the liberal professions is still more 
tedious and expensive. The pecuniary recompense, therefore, of painters and 
sculptors, of lawyers and physicians, ought to be much more liberal; and it is so 
accordingly. 
    The profits of stock seem to be very little affected by the easiness or difficulty 
of learning the trade in which it is employed. All the different ways in which 
stock is commonly employed in great towns seem, in reality, to be almost 
equally easy and equally difficult to learn. One branch either of foreign or 
domestic trade cannot well be a much more intricate business than another. 
    Thirdly, the wages of labour in different occupations vary with the constancy 
or inconstancy of employment. 
    Employment is much more constant in some trades than in others. In the 
greater part of manufacturers, a journeyman may be pretty sure of employment 
almost every day in the year that he is able to work. A mason or bricklayer, on 
the contrary, can work neither in hard frost nor in foul weather, and his 
employment at all other times depends upon the occasional calls of his 
customers. He is liable, in consequence, to be frequently without any. What he 
earns, therefore, while he is employed, must not only maintain him while he is 
idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious and desponding 
moments which the thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes 
occasion. Where the computed earnings of the greater part of manufacturers, 
accordingly, are nearly upon a level with the day wages of common labourers, 
those of masons and bricklayers are generally from one half more to double 
those wages. Where common labourers earn four and five shillings a week, 
masons and bricklayers frequently earn seven and eight; where the former earn 
six, the latter often earn nine and ten; and where the former earn nine and ten, as 
in London, the latter commonly earn fifteen and eighteen. No species of skilled 
labour, however, seems more easy to learn than that of masons and bricklayers. 
Chairmen in London, during the summer season, are said sometimes to be 
employed as bricklayers. The high wages of those workmen, therefore, are not 
so much the recompense of their skill, as the compensation for the inconstancy 
of their employment. 
    A house carpenter seems to exercise rather a nicer and more ingenious trade 
than a mason. In most places, however, for it is not universally so, his day-
wages are somewhat lower. His employment, though it depends much, does not 
depend so entirely upon the occasional calls of his customers; and it is not liable 
to be interrupted by the weather. 
    When the trades which generally afford constant employment happen in a 
particular place not to do so, the wages of the workmen always rise a good deal 
above their ordinary proportion to those of common labour. In London almost 
all journeymen artificers are liable to be called upon and dismissed by their 
masters from day to day, and from week to week, in the same manner as day-
labourers in other places. The lowest order of artificers, journeymen tailors, 
accordingly, earn there half a crown a-day, though eighteenpence may be 
reckoned the wages of common labour. In small towns and country villages, the 
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wages of journeymen tailors frequently scarce equal those of common labour; 
but in London they are often many weeks without employment, particularly 
during the summer. 
    When the inconstancy of employment is combined with the hardship, 
disagreeableness and dirtiness of the work, it sometimes raises the wages of the 
most common labour above those of the most skilful artificers. A collier 
working by the piece is supposed, at Newcastle, to earn commonly about double, 
and in many parts of Scotland about three times the wages of common labour. 
His high wages arise altogether from the hardship, disagreeableness, and 
dirtiness of his work. His employment may, upon most occasions, be as constant 
as he pleases. The coal-heavers in London exercise a trade which in hardship, 
dirtiness, and disagreeableness, almost equals that of colliers; and from the 
unavoidable irregularity in the arrivals of coal-ships, the employment of the 
greater part of them is necessarily very inconstant. If colliers, therefore, 
commonly earn double and triple the wages of common labour, it ought not to 
seem unreasonable that coal-heavers should sometimes earn four and five times 
those wages. In the inquiry made into their condition a few years ago, it was 
found that at the rate at which they were then paid, they could earn from six to 
ten shillings a day. Six shillings are about four times the wages of common 
labour in London, and in every particular trade the lowest common earnings may 
always be considered as those of the far greater number. How extravagant 
soever those earnings may appear, if they were more than sufficient to 
compensate all the disagreeable circumstances of the business, there would soon 
be so great a number of competitors as, in a trade which has no exclusive 
privilege, would quickly reduce them to a lower rate. 
    The constancy or inconstancy of employment cannot affect the ordinary 
profits of stock in any particular trade. Whether the stock is or is not constantly 
employed depends. not upon the trade, but the trader. 
    Fourthly, the wages of labour vary accordingly to the small or great trust 
which must be reposed in the workmen. 
    The wages of goldsmiths and jewellers are everywhere superior to those of 
many other workmen, not only of equal, but of much superior ingenuity, on 
account of the precious materials with which they are intrusted. 
    We trust our health to the physician: our fortune and sometimes our life and 
reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be 
reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their reward must be such, 
therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which so important a trust 
requires. The long time and the great expense which must be laid out in their 
education, when combined with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still 
further the price of their labour. 
    When a person employs only his own stock in trade, there is no trust; and the 
credit which he may get from other people depends, not upon the nature of his 
trade, but upon their opinion of his fortune, probity, and prudence. The different 
rates of profit, therefore, in the different branches of trade, cannot arise from the 
different degrees of trust reposed in the traders. 
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    Fifthly, the wages of labour in different. employments vary according to the 
probability or improbability of success in them. 
    The probability that any particular person shall ever be qualified for the 
employment to which he is educated is very different in different occupations. In 
the greater part of mechanic trades, success is almost certain; but very uncertain 
in the liberal professions. Put your son apprentice to a shoemaker, there is little 
doubt of his learning to make a pair of shoes; but send him to study the law, it is 
at least twenty to one if ever he makes such proficiency as will enable him to 
live by the business. In a perfectly fair lottery, those who draw the prizes ought 
to gain all that is lost by those who draw the blanks. In a profession where 
twenty fail for one that succeeds, that one ought to gain all that should have been 
gained by the unsuccessful twenty. The counsellor-at-law who, perhaps, at near 
forty years of age, begins to make something by his profession, ought to receive 
the retribution, not only of his own so tedious and expensive education, but that 
of more than twenty others who are never likely to make anything by it. How 
extravagant soever the fees of counsellors-at-law may sometimes appear, their 
real retribution is never equal to this. Compute in any particular place what is 
likely to be annually gained, and what is likely to be annually spent, by all the 
different workmen in any common trade, such as that of shoemakers or weavers, 
and you will find that the former sum will generally exceed the latter. But make 
the same computation with regard to all the counsellors and students of law, in 
all the different inns of court, and you will find that their annual gains bear but a 
very small proportion to their annual expense, even though you rate the former 
as high, and the latter as low, as can well be done. The lottery of the law, 
therefore, is very far from being a perfectly fair lottery; and that, as well as many 
other liberal and honourable professions, are, in point of pecuniary gain, 
evidently under-recompensed. 
    Those professions keep their level, however, with other occupations, and, 
notwithstanding these discouragements, all the most generous and liberal spirits 
are eager to crowd into them. Two different causes contribute to recommend 
them. First, the desire of the reputation which attends upon superior excellence 
in any of them; and, secondly, the natural confidence which every man has more 
or less, not only in his own abilities, but in his own good fortune. 
    To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, is the most 
decisive mark of what is called genius or superior talents. The public admiration 
which attends upon such distinguished abilities makes always a part of their 
reward; a greater or smaller in proportion as it is higher or lower in degree. It 
makes a considerable part of that reward in the profession of physic; a still 
greater perhaps in that of law; in poetry and philosophy it makes almost the 
whole. 
    There are some very agreeable and beautiful talents of which the possession 
commands a certain sort of admiration; but of which the exercise for the sake of 
gain is considered, whether from reason or prejudice, as a sort of public 
prostitution. The pecuniary recompense, therefore, of those who exercise them 
in this manner must be sufficient, not only to pay for the time, labour, and 
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expense of acquiring the talents, but for the discredit which attends the 
employment of them as the means of subsistence. The exorbitant rewards of 
players, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc., are founded upon those two 
principles; the rarity and beauty of the talents, and the discredit of employing 
them in this manner. It seems absurd at first sight that we should despise their 
persons and yet reward their talents with the most profuse liberality. While we 
do the one, however, we must of necessity do the other. Should the public 
opinion or prejudice ever alter with regard to such occupations, their pecuniary 
recompense would quickly diminish. More people would apply to them, and the 
competition would quickly reduce the price of their labour. Such talents, though 
far from being common, are by no means so rare as is imagined. Many people 
possess them in great perfection, who disdain to make this use of them; and 
many more are capable of acquiring them, if anything could be made honourably 
by them. 
    The overweening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own 
abilities is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all 
ages. Their absurd presumption in their own good fortune has been less taken 
notice of. It is, however, if possible, still more universal. There is no man living 
who, when in tolerable health and spirits, has not some share of it. The chance of 
gain is by every man more or less overvalued, and the chance of loss is by most 
men undervalued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, 
valued more than it is worth. 
    That the chance of gain is naturally overvalued, we may learn from the 
universal success of lotteries. The world neither ever saw, nor ever will see, a 
perfectly fair lottery; or one in which the whole gain compensated the whole 
loss; because the undertaker could make nothing by it. In the state lotteries the 
tickets are really not worth the price which is paid by the original subscribers, 
and yet commonly sell in the market for twenty, thirty, and sometimes forty per 
cent advance. The vain hope of gaining some of the great prizes is the sole cause 
of this demand. The soberest people scarce look upon it as a folly to pay a small 
sum for the chance of gaining ten or twenty thousand pounds; though they know 
that even that small sum is perhaps twenty or thirty per cent more than the 
chance is worth. In a lottery in which no prize exceeded twenty pounds, though 
in other respects it approached much nearer to a perfectly fair one than the 
common state lotteries, there would not be the same demand for tickets. In order 
to have a better chance for some of the great prizes, some people purchase 
several tickets, and others, small share in a still greater number. There is not, 
however, a more certain proposition in mathematics than that the more tickets 
you adventure upon, the more likely you are to be a loser. Adventure upon all 
the tickets in the lottery, and you lose for certain; and the greater the number of 
your tickets the nearer you approach to this certainty. 
    That the chance of loss is frequently undervalued, and scarce ever valued 
more than it is worth, we may learn from a very moderate profit of insurers. In 
order to make insurance, either from fire or sea-risk, a trade at all, the common 
premium must be sufficient to compensate the common losses, to pay the 
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expense of management, and to afford such a profit as might have been drawn 
from an equal capital employed in any common trade. The person who pays no 
more than this evidently pays no more than the real value of the risk, or the 
lowest price at which he can reasonably expect to insure it. But though many 
people have made a little money by insurance, very few have made a great 
fortune; and from this consideration alone, it seems evident enough that the 
ordinary balance of profit and loss is not more advantageous in this than in other 
common trades by which so many people make fortunes. Moderate, however, as 
the premium of insurance commonly is, many people despise the risk too much 
to care to pay it. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, nineteen houses in 
twenty, or rather perhaps ninety-nine in a hundred, are not insured from fire. Sea 
risk is more alarming to the greater part of people, and the proportion of ships 
insured to those not insured is much greater. Many fail, however, at all seasons, 
and even in time of war, without any insurance. This may sometimes perhaps be 
done without any imprudence. When a great company, or even a great merchant, 
has twenty or thirty ships at sea, they may, as it were, insure one another. The 
premium saved upon them all may more than compensate such losses as they are 
likely to meet with in the common course of chances. The neglect of insurance 
upon shipping, however, in the same manner as upon houses, is, in most cases, 
the effect of no such nice calculation, but of mere thoughtless rashness and 
presumptuous contempt of the risk. 
    The contempt of risk and the presumptuous hope of success are in no period 
of life more active than at the age at which young people choose their 
professions. How little the fear of misfortune is then capable of balancing the 
hope of good luck appears still more evidently in the readiness of the common 
People to enlist as soldiers, or to go to sea, than in the eagerness of those of 
better fashion to enter into what are called the liberal professions. 
    What a common soldier may lose is obvious enough. Without regarding the 
danger, however, young volunteers never enlist so readily as at the beginning of 
a new war; and though they have scarce any chance of preferment, they figure to 
themselves, in their youthful fancies, a thousand occasions of acquiring honour 
and distinction which never occur. These romantic hopes make the whole price 
of their blood. Their pay is less than that of common labourers, and in actual 
service their fatigues are much greater. 
    The lottery of the sea is not altogether so disadvantageous as that of the army. 
The son of a creditable labourer or artificer may frequently go to sea with his 
father's consent; but if he enlists as a soldier, it is always without it. Other people 
see some chance of his making something by the one trade: nobody but himself 
sees any of his making anything by the other. The great admiral is less the object 
of public admiration than the great general, and the highest success in the sea 
service promises a less brilliant fortune and reputation than equal success in the 
land. The same difference runs through all the inferior degrees of preferment in 
both. By the rules of precedency a captain in the navy ranks with a colonel in the 
army; but he does not rank with him in the common estimation. As the great 
prizes in the lottery are less, the smaller ones must be more numerous. Common 
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sailors, therefore, more frequently get some fortune and preferment than 
common soldiers; and the hope of those prizes is what principally recommends 
the trade. Though their skill and dexterity are much superior to that of almost 
any artificers, and though their whole life is one continual scene of hardship and 
danger, yet for all this dexterity and skill, for all those hardships and dangers, 
while they remain in the condition of common sailors, they receive scarce any 
other recompense but the pleasure of exercising the one and of surmounting the 
other. Their wages are not greater than those of common labourers at the port 
which regulates the rate of seamen's wages. As they are continually going from 
port to port, the monthly pay of those who sail from all the different ports of 
Great Britain is more nearly upon a level than that of any other workmen in 
those different places; and the rate of the port to and from which the greatest 
number sail, that is the port of London, regulates that of all the rest. At London 
the wages of the greater part of the different classes of workmen are about 
double those of the same classes at Edinburgh. But the sailors who sail from the 
port of London seldom earn above three or four shillings a month more than 
those who sail from the port of Leith, and the difference is frequently not so 
great. In time of peace, and in the merchant service, the London price is from a 
guinea to about seven-and-twenty shillings the calendar month. A common 
labourer in London, at the rate of nine or ten shillings a week, may earn in the 
calendar month from forty to five-and-forty shillings. The sailor, indeed, over 
and above his pay, is supplied with provisions. Their value, however, may not 
perhaps always exceed the difference between his pay and that of the common 
labourer; and though it sometimes should, the excess will not be clear gain to the 
sailor, because he cannot share it with his wife and family, whom he must 
maintain out of his wages at home. 
    The dangers and hairbreadth escapes of a life of adventures, instead of 
disheartening young people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them. A 
tender mother, among the inferior ranks of people, is of afraid to send her son to 
school at a seaport town, lest the sight of the ships and the conversation and 
adventures of the sailors should entice him to go to sea. The distant prospect of 
hazards, from which we can hope to extricate ourselves by courage and address, 
is not disagreeable to us, and does not raise the wages of labour in any 
employment. It is otherwise with those in which courage and address can be of 
no avail. In trades which are known to be very unwholesome, the wages of 
labour are always remarkably high. Unwholesomeness is a species of 
disagreeableness, and its effects upon the wages of labour are to be ranked under 
that general head. 
    In all the different employments of stock, the ordinary rate of profit varies 
more or less with the certainty or uncertainty of the returns. These are in general 
less uncertain in the inland than in the foreign trade, and in some branches of 
foreign trade than in others; in the trade to North America, for example, than in 
that to Jamaica. The ordinary rate of profit always rises more or less with the 
risk. It does not, however, seem to rise in proportion to it, or so as to compensate 
it completely. Bankruptcies are most frequent in the most hazardous trades. The 
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most hazardous of all trades, that of a smuggler, though when the adventure 
succeeds it is likewise the most profitable, is the infallible road to bankruptcy. 
The presumptuous hope of success seems to act here as upon all other occasions, 
and to entice so many adventurers into those hazardous trades, that their 
competition reduces their profit below what is sufficient to compensate the risk. 
To compensate it completely, the common returns ought, over and above the 
ordinary profits of stock, not only to make up for all occasional losses, but to 
afford a surplus profit to the adventurers of the same nature with the profit of 
insurers. But if the common returns were sufficient for all this, bankruptcies 
would not be more frequent in these than in other trades. 
    Of the five circumstances, therefore, which vary the wages of labour, two 
only affect the profits of stock; the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the 
business, and the risk or security with which it is attended. In point of 
agreeableness, there is little or no difference in the far greater part of the 
different employments of stock; but a great deal in those of labour; and the 
ordinary profit of stock, though it rises with the risk, does not always seem to 
rise in proportion to it. It should follow from all this, that, in the same society or 
neighbourhood, the average and ordinary rates of profit in the different 
employments of stock should be more nearly upon a level than the pecuniary 
wages of the different sorts of labour. They are so accordingly. The difference 
between the earnings of a common labourer and those of a well employed 
lawyer or physician, is evidently much greater than that between the ordinary 
profits in any two different branches of trade. The apparent difference, besides, 
in the profits of different trades, is generally a deception arising from our not 
always distinguishing what ought to be considered as wages, from what ought to 
be considered as profit. 
    Apothecaries' profit is become a bye-word, denoting something uncommonly 
extravagant. This great apparent profit, however, is frequently no more than the 
reasonable wages of labour. The skill of an apothecary is a much nicer and more 
delicate matter than that of any artificer whatever; and the trust which is reposed 
in him is of much greater importance. He is the physician of the poor in all 
cases, and of the rich when the distress or danger is not very great. His reward, 
therefore, ought to be suitable to his skill and his trust, and it arises generally 
from the price at which he sells his drugs. But the whole drugs which the best 
employed apothecary, in a large market town, will sell in a year, may not 
perhaps cost him above thirty or forty pounds. Though he should sell them, 
therefore, for three or four hundred, or at a thousand per cent profit, this may 
frequently be no more than the reasonable wages of his labour charged, in the 
only way in which he can charge them, upon the price of his drugs. The greater 
part of the apparent profit is real wages disguised in the garb of profit. 
    In a small seaport town, a little grocer will make forty or fifty per cent upon a 
stock of a single hundred pounds, while a considerable wholesale merchant in 
the same place will scarce make eight or ten per cent upon a stock of ten 
thousand. The trade of the grocer may be necessary for the conveniency of the 
inhabitants, and the narrowness of the market may not admit the employment of 
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a larger capital in the business. The man, however, must not only live by his 
trade, but live by it suitably to the qualifications which it requires. Besides 
possessing a little capital, he must be able to read, write, and account, and must 
be a tolerable judge too of, perhaps, fifty or sixty different sorts of goods, their 
prices, qualities, and the markets where they are to be had cheapest. He must 
have all the knowledge, in short, that is necessary for a great merchant, which 
nothing hinders him from becoming but the want of a sufficient capital. Thirty 
or forty pounds a year cannot be considered as too great a recompense for the 
labour of a person so Accomplished. Deduct this from the seemingly great 
profits of his capital, and little more will remain, perhaps, than the ordinary 
profits of stock. The greater part of the apparent profit is, in this case too, real 
wages. 
    The difference between the apparent profit of the retail and that of the 
wholesale trade, is much less in the capital than in small towns and country 
villages. Where ten thousand pounds can be employed in the grocery trade, the 
wages of the grocer's labour make but a very trifling addition to the real profits 
of so great a stock. The apparent profits of the wealthy retailer, therefore, are 
there more nearly upon a level with those of the wholesale merchant. It is upon 
this account that goods sold by retail are generally as cheap and frequently much 
cheaper in the capital than in small towns and country villages. Grocery goods, 
for example, are generally much cheaper; bread and butcher's meat frequently as 
cheap. It costs no more to bring grocery goods to the great town than to the 
country village; but it costs a great deal more to bring corn and cattle, as the 
greater part of them must be brought from a much greater distance. The prime 
cost of grocery goods, therefore, being the same in both places, they are 
cheapest where the least profit is charged upon them. The prime cost of bread 
and butcher's meat is greater in the great town than in the country village; and 
though the profit is less, therefore, they are not always cheaper there, but often 
equally cheap. In such articles as bread and butcher's meat, the same cause, 
which diminishes apparent profit, increases prime cost. The extent of the market, 
by giving employment to greater stocks, diminishes apparent profit; but by 
requiring supplies from a greater distance, it increases prime cost. This 
diminution of the one and increase of the other seem, in most cases, nearly to 
counterbalance one another, which is probably the reason that, though the prices 
of corn and cattle are commonly very different in different parts of the kingdom, 
those of bread and butcher's meat are generally very nearly the same through the 
greater part of it. 
    Though the profits of stock both in the wholesale and retail trade are generally 
less in the capital than in small towns and country villages, yet great fortunes are 
frequently acquired from small beginnings in the former, and scarce ever in the 
latter. In small towns and country villages, on account of the narrowness of the 
market, trade cannot always be extended as stock extends. In such places, 
therefore, though the rate of a particular person's profits may be very high, the 
sum or amount of them can never be very great, nor consequently that of his 
annual accumulation. In great towns, on the contrary, trade can be extended as 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth1.html (75 of 189)4/11/2005 9:44:44 AM
The Wealth of Nations
stock increases, and the credit of a frugal and thriving man increases much faster 
than his stock. His trade is extended in proportion to the amount of both, and the 
sum or amount of his profits is in proportion to the extent of his trade, and his 
annual accumulation in proportion to the amount of his profits. It seldom 
happens, however, that great fortunes are made even in great towns by any one 
regular, established, and well-known branch of business, but in consequence of a 
long life of industry, frugality, and attention. Sudden fortunes, indeed, are 
sometimes made in such places by what is called the trade of speculation. The 
speculative merchant exercises no one regular, established, or well-known 
branch of business. He is a corn merchant this year, and a wine merchant the 
next, and a sugar, tobacco, or tea merchant the year after. He enters into every 
trade when he foresees that it is likely to be more than commonly profitable, and 
he quits it when he foresees that its profits are likely to return to the level of 
other trades. His profits and losses, therefore, can bear no regular proportion to 
those of any one established and well-known branch of business. A bold 
adventurer may sometimes acquire a considerable fortune by two or three 
successful speculations; but is just as likely to lose one by two or three 
unsuccessful ones. This trade can be carried on nowhere but in great towns. It is 
only in places of the most extensive commerce and correspondence that the 
intelligence requisite for it can be had. 
    The five circumstances above mentioned, though they occasion considerable 
inequalities in the wages of labour and profits of stock, occasion none in the 
whole of the advantages and disadvantages, real or imaginary, of the different 
employments of either. The nature of those circumstances is such that they make 
up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in others. 
    In order, however, that this equality may take place in the whole of their 
advantages or disadvantages, three things are requisite even where there is the 
most perfect freedom. First, the employments must be well known and long 
established in the neighbourhood; secondly, they must be in their ordinary, or 
what may be called their natural state; and, thirdly, they must be the sole or 
principal employments of those who occupy them. 
    First, this equality can take place only in those employments which are well 
known, and have been long established in the neighbourhood. 
    Where all other circumstances are equal, wages are generally higher in new 
than in old trades. When a projector attempts to establish a new manufacture, he 
must at first entice his workmen from other employments by higher wages than 
they can either earn in their own trades, or than the nature of his work would 
otherwise require, and a considerable time must pass away before he can venture 
to reduce them to the common level. Manufactures for which the demand arises 
altogether from fashion and fancy are continually changing, and seldom last 
long enough to be considered as old established manufactures. Those, on the 
contrary, for which the demand arises chiefly from use or necessity, are less 
liable to change, and the same form or fabric may continue in demand for whole 
centuries together. The wages of labour, therefore, are likely to be higher in 
manufactures of the former than in those of the latter kind. Birmingham deals 
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chiefly in manufactures of the former kind; Sheffield in those of the latter; and 
the wages of labour in those two different places are said to be suitable to this 
difference in the nature of their manufactures. 
    The establishment of any new manufacture, of any new branch of commerce, 
or of any new practice in agriculture, is always a speculation, from which the 
projector promises himself extraordinary profits. These profits sometimes are 
very great, and sometimes, more frequently, perhaps, they are quite otherwise; 
but in general they bear no regular proportion to those of other old trades in the 
neighbourhood. If the project succeeds, they are commonly at first very high. 
When the trade or practice becomes thoroughly established and well known, the 
competition reduces them to the level of other trades. 
    Secondly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the different employments of labour and stock, can take place only in the 
ordinary, or what may be called the natural state of those employments. 
    The demand for almost every different species of labour is sometimes greater 
and sometimes less than usual. In the one case the advantages of the 
employment rise above, in the other they fall below the common level. The 
demand for country labour is greater at hay-time and harvest than during the 
greater part of the year; and wages rise with the demand. In time of war, when 
forty or fifty thousand sailors are forced from the merchant service into that of 
the king, the demand for sailors to merchant ships necessarily rises with their 
scarcity, and their wages upon such occasions commonly rise from a guinea and 
seven-and-twenty shillings, to forty shillings and three pounds a month. In a 
decaying manufacture, on the contrary, many workmen, rather than quit their old 
trade, are contented with smaller wages than would otherwise be suitable to the 
nature of their employment. 
    The profits of stock vary with the price of the commodities in which it is 
employed. As the price of any commodity rises above the ordinary or average 
rate, the profits of at least some part of the stock that is employed in bringing it 
to market, rise above their proper level, and as it falls they sink below it. All 
commodities are more or less liable to variations of price, but some are much 
more so than others. In all commodities which are produced by human industry, 
the quantity of industry annually employed is necessarily regulated by the 
annual demand, in such a manner that the average annual produce may, as nearly 
as possible, be equal to the average annual consumption. In some employments, 
it has already been observed, the same quantity of industry will always produce 
the same, or very nearly the same quantity of commodities. In the linen or 
woollen manufactures, for example, the same number of hands will annually 
work up very nearly the same quantity of linen and woollen cloth. The variations 
in the market price of such commodities, therefore, can arise only from some 
accidental variation in the demand. A public mourning raises the price of black 
cloth. But as the demand for most sorts of plain linen and woollen cloth is pretty 
uniform, so is likewise the price. But there are other employments in which the 
same quantity of industry will not always produce the same quantity of 
commodities. The same quantity of industry, for example, will, in different 
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years, produce very different quantities of corn, wine, hops, sugar, tobacco, etc. 
The price of such commodities, therefore, varies not only with the variations of 
demand, but with the much greater and more frequent variations of quantity, and 
is consequently extremely fluctuating. But the profit of some of the dealers must 
necessarily fluctuate with the price of the commodities. The operations of the 
speculative merchant are principally employed about such commodities. He 
endeavours to buy them up when he foresees that their price is likely to rise, and 
to sell them when it is likely to fall. 
    Thirdly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different employments of labour and stock can take only in such as are the sole 
or principal employments of those who occupy them. 
    When a person derives his subsistence from one employment, which does not 
occupy the greater part of his time, in the intervals of his leisure he is often 
willing to work as another for less wages than would otherwise suit the nature of 
the employment. 
    There still subsists in many parts of Scotland a set of people called Cotters or 
Cottagers, though they were more frequent some years ago than they are now. 
They are a sort of outservants of the landlords and farmers. The usual reward 
which they receive from their masters is a house, a small garden for pot-herbs, 
as much grass as will feed a cow, and, perhaps, an acre or two of bad arable 
land. When their master has occasion for their labour, he gives them, besides, 
two pecks of oatmeal a week, worth about sixteenpence sterling. During a great 
part of the year he has little or no occasion for their labour, and the cultivation of 
their own little possession is not sufficient to occupy the time which is left at 
their own disposal. When such occupiers were more numerous than they are at 
present, they are said to have been willing to give their spare time for a very 
small recompense to anybody, and to have wrought for less wages than other 
labourers. In ancient times they seem to have been common all over Europe. In 
countries ill cultivated and worse inhabited, the greater part of landlords and 
farmers could not otherwise provide themselves with the extraordinary number 
of hands which country labour requires at certain season. The daily or weekly 
recompense which such labourers occasionally received from their masters was 
evidently not the whole price of their labour. Their small tenement made a 
considerable part of it. This daily or weekly recompense, however, seems to 
have been considered as the whole of it, by many writers who have collected the 
prices of labour and provisions in ancient times, and who have taken pleasures 
in representing both as wonderfully low. 
    The produce of such labour comes frequently cheaper to market than would 
otherwise suitable to its nature. Stockings in many parts of Scotland are knit 
much cheaper than they can anywhere be wrought upon the loom. They are the 
work of servants and labourers, who derive the principal part of their subsistence 
from some other employment. More than a thousand pair of Shetland stockings 
are annually imported into Leith, of which the price is from fivepence to 
sevenpence a pair. At Lerwick, the small capital of the Shetland Islands, 
tenpence a day, I have been assured, is a common price of common labour. In 
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the same islands they knit worsted stockings to the value of a guinea a pair and 
upwards. 
    The spinning of linen yarn is carried on in Scotland nearly in the same way as 
the knitting of stockings by servants, who are chiefly hired for other purposes. 
They earn but a very scanty subsistence, who endeavour to get their whole 
livelihood by either of those trades. In most parts of Scotland she is a good 
spinner who can earn twentypence a week. 
    In opulent countries the market is generally so extensive that any one trade is 
sufficient to employ the whole labour and stock of those who occupy it. 
Instances of people's living by one employment, and at the same time deriving 
some little advantage from another, occur chiefly in poor countries. The 
following instance, however, of something of the same kind is to be found in the 
capital of a very rich one. There is no city in Europe, I believe, in which house-
rent is dearer than in London, and yet I know no capital in which a furnished 
apartment can be hired as cheap. Lodging is not only much cheaper in London 
than in Paris; it is much cheaper than in Edinburgh of the same degree of 
goodness; and what may seem extraordinary, the dearness of house-rent is the 
cause of the cheapness of lodging. The dearness of house-rent in London arises 
not only from those causes which render it dear in all great capitals, the dearness 
of labour, the dearness of all the materials of building, which must generally be 
brought from a great distance, and above all the dearness of ground-rent, every 
landlord acting the part the part of a monopolist, and frequently exacting a 
higher rent for a single acre of bad land in a town than can be had for a hundred 
of the best in the country; but it arises in part from the peculiar manners and 
customs of the people, which oblige every master of a family to hire a whole 
house from top to bottom. A dwelling-house in England means everything that is 
contained under the same roof. In France, Scotland, and many other parts of 
Europe, it frequently means no more than a single story. A tradesman in London 
is obliged to hire a whole house in that part of the town where his customers 
live. His shop is upon the ground-floor, and he and his family sleep in the garret; 
and he endeavours to pay a part of his house-rent by letting the two middle 
stories to lodgers. He expects to maintain his family by his trade, and not by his 
lodgers. Whereas, at Paris and Edinburgh, the people who let lodgings have 
commonly no other means of subsistence and the price of the lodging must pay, 
not only the rent of the house, but the whole expense of the family. 
PART 2
Inequalities by the Policy of Europe
SUCH are the inequalities in the whole of advantages and disadvantages of the 
different employments of labour and stock, which the defect of any of the three 
requisites above mentioned must occasion, even where there is the most perfect 
liberty. But the policy of Europe, by not leaving things at perfect liberty, 
occasions other inequalities of much greater importance. 
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    It does this chiefly in the three following ways. First, by restraining the 
competition in some employments to a smaller number than would otherwise be 
disposed to enter into them; secondly, by increasing it in others beyond what it 
naturally would be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the free circulation of labour and 
stock, both from employment to employment and from place to place. 
    First, the policy of Europe occasions a very important inequality in the whole 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and 
stock, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number 
than might otherwise be disposed to enter into them. 
    The exclusive privileges of corporations are the principal means it makes use 
of for this purpose. 
    The exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade necessarily restrains the 
competition, in the town where it is established, to those who are free of the 
trade. To have served an apprenticeship in the town, under a master properly 
qualified, is commonly the necessary requisite for obtaining this freedom. The 
bye laws of the corporation regulate sometimes the number of apprentices which 
any master is allowed to have, and almost always the number of years which 
each apprentice is obliged to serve. The intention of both regulations is to 
restrain the competition to a much smaller number than might otherwise be 
disposed to enter into the trade. The limitation of the number of apprentices 
restrains it directly. A long term of apprenticeship restrains it more indirectly, 
but as effectually, by increasing the expense of education. 
    In Sheffield no master cutler can have more than one apprentice at a time, by 
a bye law of the corporation. In Norfolk and Norwich no master weaver can 
have more than two apprentices, under pain of forfeiting five pounds a month to 
the king. No master hatter can have more than two apprentices anywhere in 
England, or in the English plantations, under pain of forfeiting five pounds a 
month, half to the king and half to him who shall sue in any court of record. 
Both these regulations, though they have been confirmed by a public law of the 
kingdom, are evidently dictated by the same corporation spirit which enacted the 
bye-law of Sheffield. The silk weavers in London had scarce been incorporated 
a year when they enacted a bye-law restraining any master from having more 
than two apprentices at a time. It required a particular Act of Parliament to 
rescind this bye law. 
    Seven years seem anciently to have been, all over Europe, the usual term 
established for the duration of apprenticeships in the greater part of incorporated 
trades. All such incorporations were anciently called universities, which indeed 
is the proper Latin name for any incorporation whatever. The university of 
smiths, the university of tailors, etc., are expressions which we commonly meet 
with in the old charters of ancient towns. When those particular incorporations 
which are now peculiarly called universities were first established, the term of 
years which it was necessary to study, in order to obtain the degree of master of 
arts, appears evidently to have been copied from the terms of apprenticeship in 
common trades, of which the incorporations were much more ancient. As to 
have wrought seven years under a master properly qualified was necessary in 
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order to entitle any person to become a master, and to have himself apprenticed 
in a common trade; so to have studied seven years under a master properly 
qualified was necessary to entitle him to become a master, teacher, or doctor 
(words anciently synonymous) in the liberal arts, and to have scholars or 
apprentices (words likewise originally synonymous) to study under him. 
    By the 5th of Elizabeth, commonly called the Statute of Apprenticeship, it 
was enacted, that no person should for the future exercise any trade, craft, or 
mystery at that time exercised in England, unless he had previously served to it 
an apprenticeship of seven years at least; and what before had been the bye law 
of many particular corporations became in England the general and public law 
of all trades carried on in market towns. For though the words of the statute are 
very general, and seem plainly to include the whole kingdom, by interpretation 
its operation has been limited to market towns, it having been held that in 
country villages a person may exercise several different trades, though he has 
not served a seven years' apprenticeship to each, they being necessary for the 
conveniency of the inhabitants, and the number of people frequently not being 
sufficient to supply each with a particular set of hands. 
    By a strict interpretation of the words, too, the operation of this statute has 
been limited to those trades which were established in England before the 5th of 
Elizabeth, and has never been extended to such as have been introduced since 
that time. This limitation has given occasion to several distinctions which, 
considered as rules of police, appear as foolish as can well be imagined. It has 
been adjudged, for example, that a coachmaker can neither himself make nor 
employ journeymen to make his coach-wheels, but must buy them of a master 
wheel-wright; this latter trade having been exercised in England before the 5th 
of Elizabeth. But a wheelwright, though he has never served an apprenticeship 
to a coachmaker, may either himself make or employ journeyman to make 
coaches; the trade of a coachmaker not being within the statute, because not 
exercised in England at the time when it was made. The manufactures of 
Manchester, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton, are many of them, upon this 
account, not within the statute, not having been exercised in England before the 
5th of Elizabeth. 
    In France, the duration of apprenticeships is different in different towns and in 
different trades. In Paris, five years is the term required in a great number; but 
before any person can be qualified to exercise the trade as a master, he must, in 
many of them, serve five years more as a journeyman. During this latter term he 
is called the companion of his master, and the term itself is called his 
companionship. 
    In Scotland there is no general law which regulates universally the duration of 
apprenticeships. The term is different in different corporations. Where it is long, 
a part of it may generally be redeemed by paying a small fine. In most towns, 
too, a very small fine is sufficient to purchase the freedom of any corporation. 
The weavers of linen and hempen cloth, the principal manufactures of the 
country, as well as all other artificers subservient to them, wheel-makers, reel-
makers, etc., may exercise their trades in any town corporate without paying any 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth1.html (81 of 189)4/11/2005 9:44:44 AM
The Wealth of Nations
fine. In all towns corporate all persons are free to sell butcher's meat upon any 
lawful day of the week. Three years in Scotland is a common term of 
apprenticeship, even in some very nice trades; and in general I know of no 
country in Europe in which corporation laws are so little oppressive. 
    The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original 
foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The 
patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to 
hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity of his hands; and to 
hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks 
proper without injury to his neighbour is a plain violation of this most sacred 
property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the 
workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the 
one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from 
employing whom they think proper. To judge whether he is fit to be employed 
may surely be trusted to the discretion of the employers whose interest it so 
much concerns. The affected anxiety of the law-giver lest they should employ an 
improper person is evidently as impertinent as it is oppressive. 
    The institution of long apprenticeships can give no security that insufficient 
workmanship shall not frequently be exposed to public sale. When this is done it 
is generally the effect of fraud, and not of inability; and the longest 
apprenticeship can give no security against fraud. Quite different regulations are 
necessary to prevent this abuse. The sterling mark upon plate, and the stamps 
upon linen and woollen cloth, give the purchaser much greater security than any 
statute of apprenticeship. He generally looks at these, but never thinks it worth 
while to inquire whether the workman had served a seven years' apprenticeship. 
    The institution of long apprenticeships has no tendency to form a young 
people to industry. A journeyman who works by the piece is likely to be 
industrious, because he derives a benefit from every exertion of his industry. An 
apprentice is likely to be idle, and almost always is so, because he has no 
immediate interest to be otherwise. In the inferior employments, the sweets of 
labour consist altogether in the recompense of labour. They who are soonest in a 
condition to enjoy the sweets of it are likely soonest to conceive a relish for it, 
and to acquire the early habit of industry. A young man naturally conceives an 
aversion to labour when for a long time he receives no benefit from it. The boys 
who are put out apprentices from public charities are generally bound for more 
than the usual number of years, and they generally turn out very idle and 
worthless. 
    Apprenticeships were altogether unknown to the ancients. The reciprocal 
duties of master and apprentice make a considerable article in every modern 
code. The Roman law is perfectly silent with regard to them. I know no Greek or 
Latin word (I might venture, I believe, to assert that there is none) which 
expresses the idea we now annex to the word Apprentice, a servant bound to 
work at a particular trade for the benefit of a master, during a term of years, 
upon condition that the master shall teach him that trade. 
    Long apprenticeships are altogether unnecessary. The arts, which are much 
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superior to common trades, such as those of making clocks and watches, contain 
no such mystery as to require a long course of instruction. The first invention of 
such beautiful machines, indeed, and even that of some of the instruments 
employed in making them, must, no doubt, have been the work of deep thought 
and long time, and may justly be considered as among the happiest efforts of 
human ingenuity. But when both have been fairly invented and are well 
understood, to explain to any young man, in the completest manner, how to 
apply the instruments and how to construct the machines, cannot well require 
more than the lessons of a few weeks: perhaps those of a few days might be 
sufficient. In the common mechanic trades, those of a few days might certainly 
be sufficient. The dexterity of hand, indeed, even in common trades, cannot be 
acquired without much practice and experience. But a young man would 
practice with much more diligence and attention, if from the beginning he 
wrought as a journeyman, being paid in proportion to the little work which he 
could execute, and paying in his turn for the materials which he might 
sometimes spoil through awkwardness and inexperience. His education would 
generally in this way be more effectual, and always less tedious and expensive. 
The master, indeed, would be a loser. He would lose all the wages of the 
apprentice, which he now saves, for seven years together. In the end, perhaps, 
the apprentice himself would be a loser. In a trade so easily learnt he would have 
more competitors, and his wages, when he came to be a complete workman, 
would be much less than at present. The same increase of competition would 
reduce the profits of the masters as well as the wages of the workmen. The 
trades, the crafts, the mysteries, would all be losers. But the public would be a 
gainer, the work of all artificers coming in this way much cheaper to market. 
    It is to prevent this reduction of price, and consequently of wages and profit, 
by restraining that free competition which would most certainly occasion it, that 
all corporations, and the greater part of corporation laws, have been established. 
In order to erect a corporation, no other authority in ancient times was requisite 
in many parts of Europe, but that of the town corporate in which it was 
established. In England, indeed, a charter from the king was likewise necessary. 
But this prerogative of the crown seems to have been reserved rather for 
extorting money from the subject than for the defence of the common liberty 
against such oppressive monopolies. Upon paying a fine to the king, the charter 
seems generally to have been readily granted; and when any particular class of 
artificers or traders thought proper to act as a corporation without a charter, such 
adulterine guilds, as they were called, were not always disfranchised upon that 
account, but obliged to fine annually to the king for permission to exercise their 
usurped privileges. The immediate inspection of all corporations, and of the bye-
laws which they might think proper to enact for their own government, belonged 
to the town corporate in which they were established; and whatever discipline 
was exercised over them proceeded commonly, not from the king, but from the 
greater incorporation of which those subordinate ones were only parts or 
members. 
    The government of towns corporate was altogether in the hands of traders and 
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artificers, and it was the manifest interest of every particular class of them to 
prevent the market from being overstocked, as they commonly express it, with 
their own particular species of industry, which is in reality to keep it always 
understocked. Each class was eager to establish regulations proper for this 
purpose, and, provided it was allowed to do so, was willing to consent that every 
other class should do the same. In consequence of such regulations, indeed, each 
class was obliged to buy the goods they had occasion for from every other 
within the town, somewhat dearer than they otherwise might have done. But in 
recompense, they were enabled to sell their own just as much dearer; so that so 
far it was as broad as long, as they say; and in the dealings of the different 
classes within the town with one another, none of them were losers by these 
regulations. But in their dealings with the country they were all great gainers; 
and in these latter dealings consists the whole trade which supports and enriches 
every town. 
    Every town draws its whole subsistence, and all the materials of its industry, 
from the country. It pays for these chiefly in two ways: first, by sending back to 
the country a part of those materials wrought up and manufactured; in which 
case their price is augmented by the wages of the workmen, and the profits of 
their masters or immediate employers; secondly, by sending to it a part both of 
the rude and manufactured produce, either of other countries, or of distant parts 
of the same country, imported into the town; in which case, too, the original 
price of those goods is augmented by the wages of the carriers or sailors, and by 
the profits of the merchants who employ them. In what is gained upon the first 
of those two branches of commerce consists the advantage which the town 
makes by its manufactures; in what is gained upon the second, the advantage of 
its inland and foreign trade. The wages of the workmen, and the profits of their 
different employers, make up the whole of what is gained upon both. Whatever 
regulations, therefore, tend to increase those wages and profits beyond what they 
otherwise would be, tend to enable the town to purchase, with a smaller quantity 
of its labour, the produce of a greater quantity of the labour of the country. They 
give the traders and artificers in the town an advantage over the landlords, 
farmers, and labourers in the country, and break down that natural equality 
which would otherwise take place in the commerce which is carried on between 
them. The whole annual produce of the labour of the society is annually divided 
between those two different sets of people. By means of those regulations a 
greater share of it is given to the inhabitants of the town than would otherwise 
fall to them; and a less to those of the country. 
    The price which the town really pays for the provisions and materials 
annually imported into it is the quantity of manufactures and other goods 
annually exported from it. The dearer the latter are sold, the cheaper the former 
are bought. The industry of the town becomes more, and that of the country less 
advantageous. 
    That the industry which is carried on in towns is, everywhere in Europe, more 
advantageous than that which is carried on in the country, without entering into 
any very nice computations, we may satisfy ourselves by one very simple and 
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obvious observation. In every country of Europe we find, at least, a hundred 
people who have acquired great fortunes from small beginnings by trade and 
manufactures, the industry which properly belongs to towns, for one who has 
done so by that which properly belongs to the country, the raising of rude 
produce by the improvement and cultivation of land. Industry, therefore, must be 
better rewarded, the wages of labour and the profits of stock must evidently be 
greater in the one situation than in the other. But stock and labour naturally seek 
the most advantageous employment. They naturally, therefore, resort as much as 
they can to the town, and desert the country. 
    The inhabitants of a town, being collected into one place, can easily combine 
together. The most insignificant trades carried on in towns have accordingly, in 
some place or other, been incorporated, and even where they have never been 
incorporated, yet the corporation spirit, the jealousy of strangers, the aversion to 
take apprentices, or to communicate the secret of their trade, generally prevail in 
them, and often teach them, by voluntary associations and agreements, to 
prevent that free competition which they cannot prohibit by bye-laws. The trades 
which employ but a small number of hands run most easily into such 
combinations. Half a dozen wool-combers, perhaps, are necessary to keep a 
thousand spinners and weavers at work. By combining not to take apprentices 
they can not only engross the employment, but reduce the whole manufacture 
into a sort of slavery to themselves, and raise the price of their labour much 
above what is due to the nature of their work. 
    The inhabitants of the country, dispersed in distant places, cannot easily 
combine together. They have not only never been incorporated, but the 
corporation spirit never has prevailed among them. No apprenticeship has ever 
been thought necessary to qualify for husbandry, the great trade of the country. 
After what are called the fine arts, and the liberal professions, however, there is 
perhaps no trade which requires so great a variety of knowledge and experience. 
The innumerable volumes which have been written upon it in all languages may 
satisfy us that, among the wisest and most learned nations, it has never been 
regarded as a matter very easily understood. And from all those volumes we 
shall in vain attempt to collect that knowledge of its various and complicated 
operations, which is commonly possessed even by the common farmer; how 
contemptuously soever the very contemptible authors of some of them may 
sometimes affect to speak of him. There is scarce any common mechanic trade, 
on the contrary, of which all the operations may not be as completely and 
distinctly explained in a pamphlet of a very few pages, as it is possible for words 
illustrated by figures to explain them. In the history of the arts, now publishing 
by the French Academy of Sciences, several of them are actually explained in 
this manner. The direction of operations, besides, which must be varied with 
every change of the weather, as well as with many other accidents, requires 
much more judgment and discretion than that of those which are always the 
same or very nearly the same. 
    Not only the art of the farmer, the general direction of the operations of 
husbandry, but many inferior branches of country labour require much more 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth1.html (85 of 189)4/11/2005 9:44:44 AM
The Wealth of Nations
skin and experience than the greater part of mechanic trades. The man who 
works upon brass and iron, works with instruments and upon materials of which 
the temper is always the same, or very nearly the same. But the man who 
ploughs the ground with a team of horses or oxen, works with instruments of 
which the health, strength, and temper, are very different upon different 
occasions. The condition of the materials which he works upon, too, is as 
variable as that of the instruments which he works with, and both require to be 
managed with much judgment and discretion. The common ploughman, though 
generally regarded as the pattern of stupidity and ignorance, is seldom defective 
in this judgment and discretion. He is less accustomed, indeed, to social 
intercourse than the mechanic who lives in a town. His voice and language are 
more uncouth and more difficult to be understood by those who are not used to 
them. His understanding, however, being accustomed to consider a greater 
variety of objects, is generally much superior to that of the other, whose whole 
attention from morning till night is commonly occupied in performing one or 
two very simple operations. How much the lower ranks of people in the country 
are really superior to those of the town is well known to every man whom either 
business or curiosity has led to converse much with both. In China and Indostan 
accordingly both the rank and the wages of country labourers are said to be 
superior to those of the greater part of artificers and manufacturers. They would 
probably be so everywhere, if corporation laws and the corporation spirit did not 
prevent it. 
    The superiority which the industry of the towns has everywhere in Europe 
over that of the country is not altogether owing to corporations and corporation 
laws. It is supported by many other regulations. The high duties upon foreign 
manufactures and upon all goods imported by alien merchants, all tend to the 
same purpose. Corporation laws enable the inhabitants of towns to raise their 
prices, without fearing to be undersold by the free competition of their own 
countrymen. Those other regulations secure them equally against that of 
foreigners. The enhancement of price occasioned by both is everywhere finally 
paid by the landlords, farmers, and labourers of the country, who have seldom 
opposed the establishment of such monopolies. They have commonly neither 
inclination nor fitness to enter into combinations; and the clamour and sophistry 
of merchants and manufacturers easily persuade them that the private interest of 
a part, and of a subordinate part of the society, is the general interest of the 
whole. 
    In Great Britain the superiority of the industry of the towns over that of the 
country seems to have been greater formerly than in the present times. The 
wages of country labour approach nearer to those of manufacturing labour, and 
the profits of stock employed in agriculture to those of trading and 
manufacturing stock, than they are said to have done in the last century, or in the 
beginning of the present. This change may be regarded as the necessary, though 
very late consequence of the extraordinary encouragement given to the industry 
of the towns. The stock accumulated in them comes in time to be so great that it 
can no longer be employed with the ancient profit in that species of industry 
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which is peculiar to them. That industry has its limits like every other; and the 
increase of stock, by increasing the competition, necessarily reduces the profit. 
The lowering of profit in the town forces out stock to the country, where, by 
creating a new demand for country labour, it necessarily raises its wages. It then 
spreads itself, if I may say so, over the face of the land, and by being employed 
in agriculture is in part restored to the country, at the expense of which, in a 
great measure, it had originally been accumulated in the town. That everywhere 
in Europe the greatest improvements of the country have been owing to such 
overflowings of the stock originally accumulated in the towns, I shall endeavour 
to show hereafter; and at the same time to demonstrate that, though some 
countries have by this course attained to a considerable degree of opulence, it is 
in itself necessarily slow, uncertain, liable to be disturbed and interrupted by 
innumerable accidents, and in every respect contrary to the order of nature and 
of reason. The interests, prejudices, laws and customs, which have given 
occasion to it, I shall endeavour to explain as fully and distinctly as I can in the 
third and fourth books of this Inquiry. 
    People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in 
some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such 
meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent 
with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same 
trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate 
such assemblies, much less to render them necessary. 
    A regulation which obliges all those of the same trade in a particular town to 
enter their names and places of abode in a public register, facilitates such 
assemblies. It connects individuals who might never otherwise be known to one 
another, and gives every man of the trade a direction where to find every other 
man of it. 
    A regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves in order 
to provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them a 
common interest to manage, renders such assemblies necessary. 
    An incorporation not only renders them necessary, but makes the act of the 
majority binding upon the whole. In a free trade an effectual combination cannot 
be established but by the unanimous consent of every single trader, and it cannot 
last longer than every single trader continues of the same mind. The majority of 
a corporation can enact a bye-law with proper penalties, which will limit the 
competition more effectually and more durably than any voluntary combination 
whatever. 
    The pretence that corporations are necessary for the better government of the 
trade is without any foundation. The real and effectual discipline which is 
exercised over a workman is not that of his corporation, but that of his 
customers. It is the fear of losing their employment which restrains his frauds 
and corrects his negligence. An exclusive corporation necessarily weakens the 
force of this discipline. A particular set of workmen must then be employed, let 
them behave well or ill. It is upon this account that in many large incorporated 
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towns no tolerable workmen are to be found, even in some of the most necessary 
trades. If you would have your work tolerably executed, it must be done in the 
suburbs, where the workmen, having no exclusive privilege, have nothing but 
their character to depend upon, and you must then smuggle it into the town as 
well as you can. 
    It is in this manner that the policy of Europe, by restraining the competition in 
some employments to a smaller number than would otherwise be disposed to 
enter into them, occasions a very important inequality in the whole of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock. 
    Secondly, the policy of Europe, by increasing the competition in some 
employments beyond what it naturally would be, occasions another inequality of 
an opposite kind in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different employments of labour and stock. 
    It has been considered as of so much importance that a proper number of 
young people should be educated for certain professions, that sometimes the 
public and sometimes the piety of private founders have established many 
pensions, scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, etc., for this purpose, which draw 
many more people into those trades than could otherwise pretend to follow 
them. In all Christian countries, I believe, the education of the greater part of 
churchmen is paid for in this manner. Very few of them are educated altogether 
at their own expense. The long, tedious, and expensive education, therefore, of 
those who are, will not always procure them a suitable reward, the church being 
crowded with people who, in order to get employment, are willing to accept of a 
much smaller recompense than what such an education would otherwise have 
entitled them to; and in this manner the competition of the poor takes away the 
reward of the rich. It would be indecent, no doubt, to compare either a curate or 
a chaplain with a journeyman in any common trade. The pay of a curate or 
chaplain, however, may very properly be considered as of the same nature with 
the wages of a journeyman. They are, all three, paid for their work according to 
the contract which they may happen to make with their respective superiors. Till 
after the middle of the fourteenth century, five merks, containing about as much 
silver as ten pounds of our present money, was in England the usual pay of a 
curate or a stipendiary parish priest, as we find it regulated by the decrees of 
several different national councils. At the same period fourpence a day, 
containing the same quantity of silver as a shilling of our present money, was 
declared to be the pay of a master mason, and threepence a day, equal to 
ninepence of our present money, that of a journeyman mason. The wages of both 
these labourers, therefore, supposing them to have been constantly employed, 
were much superior to those of the curate. The wages of the master mason, 
supposing him to have been without employment one third of the year, would 
have fully equalled them. By the 12th of Queen Anne, c. 12, it is declared, "That 
whereas for want of sufficient maintenance and encouragement to curates, the 
cures have in several places been meanly supplied, the bishop is, therefore, 
empowered to appoint by writing under his band and seal a sufficient certain 
stipend or allowance, not exceeding fifty and not less than twenty pounds a 
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year." Forty pounds a year is reckoned at present very good pay for a curate, and 
notwithstanding this Act of Parliament there are many curacies under twenty 
pounds a year. There are journeymen shoemakers in London who earn forty 
pounds a year, and there is scarce an industrious workman of any kind in that 
metropolis who does not earn more than twenty. This last sum indeed does not 
exceed what is frequently earned by common labourers in many country 
parishes. Whenever the law has attempted to regulate the wages of workmen, it 
has always been rather to lower them than to raise them. But the law has upon 
many occasions attempted to raise the wages of curates, and for the dignity of 
the church, to oblige the rectors of parishes to give them more than the wretched 
maintenance which they themselves might be willing to accept of. And in both 
cases the law seems to have been equally ineffectual, and has never either been 
able to raise the wages of curates, or to sink those of labourers to the degree that 
was intended; because it has never been able to hinder either the one from being 
willing to accept of less than the legal allowance, on account of the indigence of 
their situation and the multitude of their competitors; or the other from receiving 
more, on account of the contrary competition of those who expected to derive 
either profit or pleasure from employing them. 
    The great benefices and other ecclesiastical dignities support the honour of the 
church, notwithstanding the mean circumstance of some of its inferior members. 
The respect paid to the profession, too, makes some compensation even to them 
for the meanness of their pecuniary recompense. In England, and in all Roman 
Catholic countries, the lottery of the church is in reality much more 
advantageous than is necessary. The example of the churches of Scotland, of 
Geneva, and of several other Protestant churches, may satisfy us that in so 
creditable a profession, in which education is so easily procured, the hopes of 
much more moderate benefices will draw a sufficient number of learned, decent, 
and respectable men into holy orders. 
    In professions in which there are no benefices, such as law and physic, if an 
equal proportion of people were educated at the public expense, the competition 
would soon be so great as to sink very much their pecuniary reward. It might 
then not be worth any man's while to educate his son to either of those 
professions at his own expense. They would be entirely abandoned to such as 
had been educated by those public charities, whose numbers and necessities 
would oblige them in general to content themselves with a very miserable 
recompense, to the entire degradation of the now respectable professions of law 
and physic. 
    That unprosperous race of men commonly called men of letters are pretty 
much in the situation which lawyers and physicians probably would be in upon 
the foregoing supposition. In every part of Europe the greater part of them have 
been educated for the church, but have been hindered by different reasons from 
entering into holy orders. They have generally, therefore, been educated at the 
public expense, and their numbers are everywhere so great as commonly to 
reduce the price of their labour to a very paltry recompense. 
    Before the invention of the art of printing, the only employment by which a 
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man of letters could make anything by his talents was that of a public or private 
teacher, or by communicating to other people the curious and useful knowledge 
which he had acquired himself: and this is still surely a more honourable, a more 
useful, and in general even a more profitable employment than that other of 
writing for a bookseller, to which the art of printing has given occasion. The 
time and study, the genius, knowledge, and application requisite to qualify an 
eminent teacher of the sciences, are at least equal to what is necessary for the 
greatest practitioners in law and physic. But the usual reward of the eminent 
teacher bears no proportion to that of the lawyer or physician; because the trade 
of the one is crowded with indigent people who have been brought up to it at the 
public expense; whereas those of the other two are encumbered with very few 
who have not been educated at their own. The usual recompense, however, of 
public and private teachers, small as it may appear, would undoubtedly be less 
than it is, if the competition of those yet more indigent men of letters who write 
for bread was not taken out of the market. Before the invention of the art of 
printing, a scholar and a beggar seem to have been terms very nearly 
synonymous. The different governors of the universities before that time appear 
to have often granted licences to their scholars to beg. 
    In ancient times, before any charities of this kind had been established for the 
education of indigent people to the learned professions, the rewards of eminent 
teachers appear to have been much more considerable. Isocrates, in what is 
called his discourse against the sophists, reproaches the teachers of his own 
times with inconsistency. "They make the most magnificent promises to their 
scholars," says he, "and undertake to teach them to be wise, to be happy, and to 
be just, and in return for so important a service they stipulate the paltry reward 
of four or five minae. They who teach wisdom," continues he, ought certainly to 
be wise themselves; but if any man were to sell such a bargain for such a price, 
he would be convicted of the most evident folly." He certainly does not mean 
here to exaggerate the reward, and we may be assured that it was not less than he 
represents it. Four minae were equal to thirteen pounds six shillings and 
eightpence: five minae to sixteen pounds thirteen shillings and fourpence. 
Something not less than the largest of those two sums, therefore, must at that 
time have been usually paid to the most eminent teachers at Athens. Isocrates 
himself demanded ten minae, or thirty-three pounds six shillings and eightpence, 
from each scholar. When he taught at Athens, he is said to have had a hundred 
scholars. I understand this to be the number whom he taught at one time, or who 
attended what we could call one course of lectures, a number which will not 
appear extraordinary from so great a city to so famous a teacher, who taught, 
too, what was at that time the most fashionable of all sciences, rhetoric. He must 
have made, therefore, by each course of lectures, a thousand minae, or L3333 6s. 
8d. A thousand minae, accordingly, is said by Plutarch in another place, to have 
been his Didactron, or usual price of teaching. Many other eminent teachers in 
those times appear to have acquired great fortunes. Gorgias made a present to 
the temple of Delphi of his own statue in solid gold. We must not, I presume, 
suppose that it was as large as the life. His way of living, as well as that of 
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Hippias and Protagoras, two other eminent teachers of those times, is 
represented by Plato as splendid even to ostentation. Plato himself is said to 
have lived with a good deal of magnificence. Aristotle, after having been tutor to 
Alexander, and most munificently rewarded, as it is universally agreed, both by 
him and his father Philip, thought it worth while, notwithstanding, to return to 
Athens, in order to resume the teaching of his school. Teachers of the sciences 
were probably in those times less common than they came to be in an age or two 
afterwards, when the competition had probably somewhat reduced both the price 
of their labour and the admiration for their persons. The most eminent of them, 
however, appear always to have enjoyed a degree of consideration much 
superior to any of the like profession in the present times. The Athenians sent 
Carneades the Academic, and Diogenes the Stoic, upon a solemn embassy to 
Rome; and though their city had then declined from its former grandeur, it was 
still an independent and considerable republic. Carneades, too, was a Babylonian 
by birth, and as there never was a people more jealous of admitting foreigners to 
public offices than the Athenians, their consideration for him must have been 
very great. 
    This inequality is upon the whole, perhaps, rather advantageous than hurtful 
to the public. It may somewhat degrade the profession of a public teacher; but 
the cheapness of literary education is surely an advantage which greatly 
overbalances this trifling inconveniency. The public, too, might derive still 
greater benefit from it, if the constitution of those schools and colleges, in which 
education is carried on, was more reasonable than it is at present through the 
greater part of Europe. 
    Thirdly, the policy of Europe, by obstructing the free circulation of labour and 
stock both from employment to employment, and from place to place, occasions 
in some cases a very incovenient inequality in the whole of the advantages and 
disadvantages of their different employments. 
    The Statute of Apprenticeship obstructs the free circulation of labour from 
one employment to another, even in the same place. The exclusive privileges of 
corporations obstruct it from one place to another, even in the same 
employment. 
    It frequently happens that while high wages are given to the workmen in one 
manufacture, those in another are obliged to content themselves with bare 
subsistence. The one is in an advancing state, and has, therefore, a continual 
demand for new bands: the other is in a declining state, and the superabundance 
of hands is continually increasing. Those two manufactures may sometimes be 
in the same town, and sometimes in the same neighbourhood, without being able 
to lend the least assistance to one another. The Statute of Apprenticeship may 
oppose it in the one case, and both that and an exclusive corporation in the other. 
In many different manufactures, however, the operations are so much alike, that 
the workmen could easily change trades with one another, if those absurd laws 
did not hinder them. The arts of weaving plain linen and plain silk, for example, 
are almost entirely the same. That of weaving plain woollen is somewhat 
different; but the difference is so insignificant that either a linen or a silk weaver 
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might become a tolerable work in a very few days. If any of those three capital 
manufactures, therefore, were decaying, the workmen might find a resource in 
one of the other two which was in a more prosperous condition; and their wages 
would neither rise too high in the thriving, nor sink too low in the decaying 
manufacture. The linen manufacture indeed is, in England, by a particular 
statute, open to everybody; but as it is not much cultivated through the greater 
part of the country, it can afford no general resource to the workmen of other 
decaying manufactures, who, wherever the Statute of Apprenticeship takes 
place, have no other choice but either to come upon the parish, or to work as 
common labourers, for which, by their habits, they are much worse qualified 
than for any sort of manufacture that bears any resemblance to their own. They 
generally, therefore, choose to come upon the parish. 
    Whatever obstructs the free circulation of labour from one employment to 
another obstructs that of stock likewise; the quantity of stock which can be 
employed in any branch of business depending very much upon that of the 
labour which can be employed in it. Corporation laws, however, give less 
obstruction to the free circulation of stock from one place to another than to that 
of labour. It is everywhere much easier for a wealthy merchant to obtain the 
privilege of trading in a town corporate, than for a poor artificer to obtain that of 
working in it. 
    The obstruction which corporation laws give to the free circulation of labour 
is common, I believe, to every part of Europe. That which is given to it by the 
Poor Laws is, so far as I know, peculiar to England. It consists in the difficulty 
which a poor man finds in obtaining a settlement, or even in being allowed to 
exercise his industry in any parish but that to which he belongs. It is the labour 
of artificers and manufacturers only of which the free circulation is obstructed 
by corporation laws. The difficulty of obtaining settlements obstructs even that 
of common labour. It may be worth while to give some account of the rise, 
progress, and present state of this disorder, the greatest perhaps of any in the 
police of England. 
    When by the destruction of monasteries the poor had been deprived of the 
charity of those religious houses, after some other ineffectual attempts for their 
relief, it was enacted by the 43rd of Elizabeth, c. 2, that every parish should be 
bound to provide for its own poor; and that overseers of the poor should be 
annually appointed, who, with the churchwardens, should raise by a parish rate 
competent sums for this purpose. 
    By this statute the necessity of providing for their own poor was 
indispensably imposed upon every parish. Who were to be considered as the 
poor of each parish became, therefore, a question of some importance. This 
question, after some variation, was at last determined by the 13th and 14th of 
Charles II when it was enacted, that forty days' undisturbed residence should 
gain any person a settlement in any parish; but that within that time it should be 
lawful for two justices of the peace, upon complaint made by the churchwardens 
or overseers of the poor, to remove any new inhabitant to the parish where he 
was last legally settled; unless he either rented a tenement of ten pounds a year, 
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or could give such security for the discharge of the parish where he was then 
living, as those justices should judge sufficient. 
    Some frauds, it is said, were committed in consequence of this statute; parish 
officers sometimes bribing their own poor to go clandestinely to another parish, 
and by keeping themselves concealed for forty days to gain a settlement there, to 
the discharge of that to which they properly belonged. It was enacted, therefore, 
by the 1st of James II that the forty days' undisturbed residence of any person 
necessary to gain a settlement should be accounted only from the time of his 
delivering notice in writing, of the place of his abode and the number of his 
family, to one of the churchwardens or overseers of the parish where he came to 
dwell. 
    But parish officers, it seems, were not always more honest with regard to their 
own, than they had been with regard to other parishes, and sometimes connived 
at such intrusions, receiving the notice, and taking no proper steps in 
consequence of it. As every person in a parish, therefore, was supposed to have 
an interest to prevent as much as possible their being burdened by such 
intruders, it was further enacted by the 3rd of William III that the forty days' 
residence should be accounted only from the publication of such notice in 
writing on Sunday in the church, immediately after divine service. 
    "After all," says Doctor Burn, "this kind of settlement, by continuing forty 
days after publication of notice in writing, is very seldom obtained; and the 
design of the acts is not so much for gaining of settlements, as for the avoiding 
of them, by persons coming into a parish clandestinely: for the giving of notice 
is only putting a force upon the parish to remove. But if a person's situation is 
such, that it is doubtful whether he is actually removable or not, he shall by 
giving of notice compel the parish either to allow him a settlement uncontested, 
by suffering him to continue forty days; or, by removing him, to try the right." 
    This statute, therefore, rendered it almost impracticable for a poor man to gain 
a new settlement in the old way, by forty days' inhabitancy. But that it might not 
appear to preclude altogether the common people of one parish from ever 
establishing themselves with security in another, it appointed four other ways by 
which a settlement might be gained without any notice delivered or published. 
The first was, by being taxed to parish rates and paying them; the second, by 
being elected into an annual parish office, and serving in it a year; the third, by 
serving an apprenticeship in the parish; the fourth, by being hired into service 
there for a year, and continuing in the same service during the whole of it. 
    Nobody can gain a settlement by either of the two first ways, but by the public 
deed of the whole parish, who are too well aware of the consequences to adopt 
any new-comer who has nothing but his labour to support him, either by taxing 
him to parish rates, or by electing him into a parish office. 
    No married man can well gain any settlement in either of the two last ways. 
An apprentice is scarce ever married; and it is expressly enacted that no married 
servant shall gain any settlement by being hired for a year. The principal effect 
of introducing settlement by service has been to put out in a great measure the 
old fashion of hiring for a year, which before had been so customary in England, 
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that even at this day, if no particular term is agreed upon, the law intends that 
every servant is hired for a year. But masters are not always willing to give their 
servants a settlement by hiring them in this manner; and servants are not always 
willing to be so hired, because, as every last settlement discharges all the 
foregoing, they might thereby lose their original settlement in the places of their 
nativity, the habitation of their parents and relations. 
    No independent workman, it is evident, whether labourer or artificer, is likely 
to gain any new settlement either by apprenticeship or by service. When such a 
person, therefore, carried his industry to a new parish, he was liable to be 
removed, how healthy and industrious soever, at the caprice of any 
churchwarden or overseer, unless he either rented a tenement of ten pounds a 
year, a thing impossible for one who has nothing but his labour to live by; or 
could give such security for the discharge of the parish as two justices of the 
peace should judge sufficient. What security they shall require, indeed, is left 
altogether to their discretion; but they cannot well require less than thirty 
pounds, it having been enacted that the purchase even of a freehold estate of less 
than thirty pounds' value shall not gain any person a settlement, as not being 
sufficient for the discharge of the parish. But this is a security which scarce any 
man who lives by labour can give; and much greater security is frequently 
demanded. 
    In order to restore in some measure that free circulation of labour which those 
different statutes had almost entirely taken away, the invention of certificates 
was fallen upon. By the 8th and 9th of William III it was enacted that if any 
person should bring a certificate from the parish where he was last legally 
settled, subscribed by the churchwardens and overseers of the poor, and allowed 
by two justices of the peace, that every other parish should be obliged to receive 
him; that he should not be removable merely upon account of his being likely to 
become chargeable, but only upon his becoming actually chargeable, and that 
then the parish which granted the certificate should be obliged to pay the 
expense both of his maintenance and of his removal. And in order to give the 
most perfect security to the parish where such certificated man should come to 
reside, it was further enacted by the same statute that he should gain no 
settlement there by any means whatever, except either by renting a tenement of 
ten pounds a year, or by serving upon his own account in an annual parish office 
for one whole year; and consequently neither by notice, nor by service, nor by 
apprenticeship, nor by paying parish rates. By the 12th of Queen Anne, too, stat. 
1, c. 18, it was further enacted that neither the servants nor apprentices of such 
certificated man should gain any settlement in the parish where he resided under 
such certificate. 
    How far this invention has restored that free circulation of labour which the 
preceding statutes had almost entirely taken away, we may learn from the 
following very judicious observation of Doctor Burn. "It is obvious," says he, 
"that there are divers good reasons for requiring certificates with persons coming 
to settle in any place; namely, that persons residing under them can gain no 
settlement, neither by apprenticeship, nor by service, nor by giving notice, nor 
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by paying parish rates; that they can settle neither apprentices nor servants; that 
if they become chargeable, it is certainly known whither to remove them, and 
the parish shall be paid for the removal, and for their maintenance in the 
meantime; and that if they fall sick, and cannot be removed, the parish which 
gave the certificate must maintain them: none of all which can be without a 
certificate. Which reasons will hold proportionably for parishes not granting 
certificates in ordinary cases; for it is far more than an equal chance, but that 
they will have the certificated persons again, and in a worse condition." The 
moral of this observation seems to be that certificates ought always to be 
required by the parish where any poor man comes to reside, and that they ought 
very seldom to be granted by that which he proposes to leave. "There is 
somewhat of hardship in this matter of certificates," says the same very 
intelligent author in his History of the Poor Laws, "by putting it in the power of 
a parish officer to imprison a man as it were for life; however inconvenient it 
may be for him to continue at that place where he has had the misfortune to 
acquire what is called a settlement, or whatever advantage he may propose to 
himself by living elsewhere." 
    Though a certificate carries along with it no testimonial of good behaviour, 
and certifies nothing but that the person belongs to the parish to which he really 
does belong, it is altogether discretionary in the parish officers either to grant or 
to refuse it. A mandamus was once moved for, says Doctor Burn, to compel the 
churchwardens and overseers to sign a certificate; but the court of King's Bench 
rejected the motion as a very strange attempt. 
    The very unequal price of labour which we frequently find in England in 
places at no great distance from one another is probably owing to the obstruction 
which the law of settlements gives to a poor man who would carry his industry 
from one parish to another without a certificate. A single man, indeed, who is 
healthy and industrious, may sometimes reside by sufferance without one; but a 
man with a wife and family who should attempt to do so would in most parishes 
be sure of being removed, and if the single man should afterwards marry, he 
would generally be removed likewise. The scarcity of hands in one parish, 
therefore, cannot always be relieved by their superabundance in another, as it is 
constantly in Scotland, and, I believe, in all other countries where there is no 
difficulty of settlement. In such countries, though wages may sometimes rise a 
little in the neighbourhood of a great town, or wherever else there is an 
extraordinary demand for labour, and sink gradually as the distance from such 
places increases, till they fall back to the common rate of the country; yet we 
never meet with those sudden and unaccountable differences in the wages of 
neighbouring places which we sometimes find in England, where it is often 
more difficult for a poor man to pass the artificial boundary of a parish than an 
arm of the sea or a ridge of high mountains, natural boundaries which sometimes 
separate very distinctly different rates of wages in other countries. 
    To remove a man who has committed no misdemeanour from the parish 
where he chooses to reside is an evident violation of natural liberty and justice. 
The common people of England, however, so jealous of their liberty, but like the 
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common people of most other countries never rightly understanding wherein it 
consists, have now for more than a century together suffered themselves to be 
exposed to this oppression without a remedy. Though men of reflection, too, 
have sometimes complained of the law of settlements as a public grievance; yet 
it has never been the object of any general popular clamour, such as that against 
general warrants, an abusive practice undoubtedly, but such a one as was not 
likely to occasion any general oppression. There is scarce a poor man in England 
of forty years of age, I will venture to say, who has not in some part of his life 
felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this illcontrived law of settlements. 
    I shall conclude this long chapter with observing that, though anciently it was 
usual to rate wages, first by general laws extending over the whole kingdom, and 
afterwards by particular orders of the justices of peace in every particular 
county, both these practices have now gone entirely into disuse. "By the 
experience of above four hundred years," says Doctor Burn, "it seems time to 
lay aside all endeavours to bring under strict regulations, what in its own nature 
seems incapable of minute limitation; for if all persons in the same kind of work 
were to receive equal wages, there would be no emulation, and no room left for 
industry or ingenuity." 
    Particular Acts of Parliament, however, still attempt sometimes to regulate 
wages in particular trades and in particular places. Thus the 8th of George III 
prohibits under heavy penalties all master tailors in London, and five miles 
round it, from giving, and their workmen from accepting, more than two 
shillings and sevenpence halfpenny a day, except in the case of a general 
mourning. Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between 
masters and their workmen, its counsellors are always the masters. When the 
regulation, therefore, is in favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable; 
but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of the masters. Thus the law which 
obliges the masters in several different trades to pay their workmen in money 
and not in goods is quite just and equitable. It imposes no real hardship upon the 
masters. It only obliges them to pay that value in money, which they pretended 
to pay, but did not always really pay, in goods. This law is in favour of the 
workmen: but the 8th of George III is in favour of the masters. When masters 
combine together in order to reduce the wages of their workmen, they 
commonly enter into a private bond or agreement not to give more than a certain 
wage under a certain penalty. Were the workmen to enter into a contrary 
combination of the same kind, not to accept of a certain wage under a certain 
penalty, the law would punish them very severely; and if it dealt impartially, it 
would treat the masters in the same manner. But the 8th of George III enforces 
by law that very regulation which masters sometimes attempt to establish by 
such combinations. The complaint of the workmen, that it puts the ablest and 
most industrious upon the same footing with an ordinary workman, seems 
perfectly well founded. 
    In ancient times, too, it was usual to attempt to regulate the profits of 
merchants and other dealers, by rating the price both of provisions and other 
goods. The assize of bread is, so far as I know, the only remnant of this ancient 
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usage. Where there is an exclusive corporation, it may perhaps be proper to 
regulate the price of the first necessary of life. But where there is none, the 
competition will regulate it much better than any assize. The method of fixing 
the assize of bread established by the 31st of George II could not be put in 
practice in Scotland, on account of a defect in the law; its execution depending 
upon the office of a clerk of the market, which does not exist there. This defect 
was not remedied till the 3rd of George III. The want of an assize occasioned no 
sensible inconveniency, and the establishment of one, in the few places where it 
has yet taken place, has produced no sensible advantage. In the greater part of 
the towns of Scotland, however, there is an incorporation of bakers who claim 
exclusive privileges, though they are not very strictly guarded. 
    The proportion between the different rates both of wages and profit in the 
different employments of labour and stock, seems not to be much affected, as 
has already been observed, by the riches or poverty, the advancing, stationary, or 
declining state of the society. Such revolutions in the public welfare, though 
they affect the general rates both of wages and profit, must in the end affect 
them equally in all different employments. The proportion between them, 
therefore, must remain the same, and cannot well be altered, at least for any 
considerable time, by any such revolutions. 
CHAPTER XI
Of the Rent of Land
RENT, considered as the price paid for the use of land, is naturally the highest 
which the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the land. In 
adjusting the terms of the lease, the landlord endeavours to leave him no greater 
share of the produce than what is sufficient to keep up the stock from which he 
furnishes the seed, pays the labour, and purchases and maintains the cattle and 
other instruments of husbandry, together with the ordinary profits of farming 
stock in the neighbourhood. This is evidently the smallest share with which the 
tenant can content himself without being a loser, and the landlord seldom means 
to leave him any more. Whatever part of the produce, or, what is the same thing, 
whatever part of its price is over and above this share, he naturally endeavours to 
reserve to himself as the rent of his land, which is evidently the highest the 
tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the land. Sometimes, 
indeed, the liberality, more frequently the ignorance, of the landlord, makes him 
accept of somewhat less than this portion; and sometimes too, though more 
rarely, the ignorance of the tenant makes him undertake to pay somewhat more, 
or to content himself with somewhat less than the ordinary profits of farming 
stock in the neighbourhood. This portion, however, may still be considered as 
the natural rent of land, or the rent for which it is naturally meant that land 
should for the most part be let. 
    The rent of land, it may be thought, is frequently no more than a reasonable 
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profit or interest for the stock laid out by the landlord upon its improvement. 
This, no doubt, may be partly the case upon some occasions; for it can scarce 
ever be more than partly the case. The landlord demands a rent even for 
unimproved land, and the supposed interest or profit upon the expense of 
improvement is generally an addition to this original rent. Those improvements, 
besides, are not always made by the stock of the landlord, but sometimes by that 
of the tenant. When the lease comes to be renewed, however, the landlord 
commonly demands the same augmentation of rent as if they had been all made 
by his own. 
    He sometimes demands rent for what is altogether incapable of human 
improvement. Kelp is a species of sea-weed, which, when burnt, yields an 
alkaline salt, useful for making glass, soap, and for several other purposes. It 
grows in several parts of Great Britain, particularly in Scotland, upon such rocks 
only as lie within the high water mark, which are twice every day covered with 
the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never augmented by human 
industry. The landlord, however, whose estate is bounded by a kelp shore of this 
kind, demands a rent for it as much as for his corn fields. 
    The sea in the neighbourhood of the islands of Shetland is more than 
commonly abundant in fish, which makes a great part of the subsistence of their 
inhabitants. But in order to profit by the produce of the water, they must have a 
habitation upon the neighbouring land. The rent of the landlord is in proportion, 
not to what the farmer can make by the land, but to what he can make both by 
the land and by the water. It is partly paid in sea-fish; and one of the very few 
instances in which rent makes a part of the price of that commodity is to be 
found in that country. 
    The rent of the land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the 
land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the 
landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can 
afford to take; but to what the farmer can afford to give. 
    Such parts only of the produce of land can commonly be brought to market of 
which the ordinary price is sufficient to replace the stock which must be 
employed in bringing them thither, together with its ordinary profits. If the 
ordinary price is more than this, the surplus part of it will naturally go to the rent 
of land. If it is not more, though the commodity may be brought to market, it can 
afford no rent to the landlord. Whether the price is or is not more depends upon 
the demand. 
    There are some parts of the produce of land for which the demand must 
always be such as to afford a greater price than what is sufficient to bring them 
to market; and there are others for which it either may or may not be such as to 
afford this greater price. The former must always afford a rent to the landlord. 
The latter sometimes may, and sometimes may not, according to different 
circumstances. 
    Rent, it is to be observed, therefore, enters into the composition of the price of 
commodities in a different way from wages and profit. High or low wages and 
profit are the causes of high or low price; high or low rent is the effect of it. It is 
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because high or low wages and profit must be paid, in order to bring a particular 
commodity to market, that its price is high or low. But it is because its price is 
high or low; a great deal more, or very little more, or no more, than what is 
sufficient to pay those wages and profit, that it affords a high rent, or a low rent, 
or no rent at all. 
    The particular consideration, first, of those parts of the produce of land which 
always afford some rent; secondly, of those which sometimes may and 
sometimes may not afford rent; and, thirdly, of the variations which, in the 
different periods of improvement, naturally take place in the relative value of 
those two different sorts of rude produce, when compared both with one another 
and with manufactured commodities, will divide this chapter into three parts. 
PART 1
Of the Produce of Land which always affords Rent
AS men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in proportion to the means of 
their subsistence, food is always, more or less, in demand. It can always 
purchase or command a greater or smaller quantity of labour, and somebody can 
always be found who is willing to do something in order to obtain it. The 
quantity of labour, indeed, which it can purchase is not always equal to what it 
could maintain, if managed in the most economical manner, on account of the 
high wages which are sometimes given to labour. But it can always purchase 
such a quantity of labour as it can maintain, according to the rate at which the 
sort of labour is commonly maintained in the neighbourhood. 
    But land, in almost any situation, produces a greater quantity of food than 
what is sufficient to maintain all the labour necessary for bringing it to market in 
the most liberal way in which that labour is ever maintained. The surplus, too, is 
always more than sufficient to replace the stock which employed that labour, 
together with its profits. Something, therefore, always remains for a rent to the 
landlord. 
    The most desert moors in Norway and Scotland produce some sort of pasture 
for cattle, of which the milk and the increase are always more than sufficient, 
not only to maintain all the labour necessary for tending them, and to pay the 
ordinary profit to the farmer or owner of the herd or flock; but to afford some 
small rent to the landlord. The rent increases in proportion to the goodness of the 
pasture. The same extent of ground not only maintains a greater number of 
cattle, but as they are brought within a smaller compass, less labour becomes 
requisite to tend them, and to collect their produce. The landlord gains both 
ways, by the increase of the produce and by the diminution of the labour which 
must be maintained out of it. 
    The rent of land not only varies with its fertility, whatever be its produce, but 
with its situation, whatever be its fertility. Land in the neighbourhood of a town 
gives a greater rent than land equally fertile in a distant part of the country. 
Though it may cost no more labour to cultivate the one than the other, it must 
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always cost more to bring the produce of the distant land to market. A greater 
quantity of labour, therefore, must be maintained out of it; and the surplus, from 
which are drawn both the profit of the farmer and the rent of the landlord, must 
be diminished. But in remote parts of the country the rate of profits, as has 
already been shown, is generally higher than in the neighbourhood of a large 
town. A smaller proportion of this diminished surplus, therefore, must belong to 
the landlord. 
    Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense of 
carriage, put the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a level with those 
in the neighbourhood of the town. They are upon that account the greatest of all 
improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote, which must always 
be the most extensive circle of the country. They are advantageous to the town, 
by breaking down the monopoly of the country in its neighbourhood. They are 
advantageous even to that part of the country. Though they introduce some rival 
commodities into the old market, they open many new markets to its produce. 
Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good management, which can never be 
universally established but in consequence of that free and universal competition 
which forces everybody to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defence. It is 
not more than fifty years ago that some of the counties in the neighbourhood of 
London petitioned the Parliament against the extension of the turnpike roads into 
the remoter counties. Those remoter counties, they pretended, from the 
cheapness of labour, would be able to sell their grass and corn cheaper in the 
London market than themselves, and would thereby reduce their rents, and ruin 
their cultivation. Their rents, however, have risen, and their cultivation has been 
improved since that time. 
    A cornfield of moderate fertility produces a much greater quantity of food for 
man than the best pasture of equal extent. Though its cultivation requires much 
more labour, yet the surplus which remains after replacing the seed and 
maintaining all that labour, is likewise much greater. If a pound of butcher's 
meat, therefore, was never supposed to be worth more than a pound of bread, 
this greater surplus would everywhere be of greater value, and constitute a 
greater fund both for the profit of the farmer and the rent of the landlord. It 
seems to have done so universally in the rude beginnings of agriculture. 
    But the relative values of those two different species of food, bread and 
butcher's meat, are very different in the different periods of agriculture. In its 
rude beginnings, the unimproved wilds, which then occupy the far greater part 
of the country, are all abandoned to cattle. There is more butcher's meat than 
bread, and bread, therefore, is the food for which there is the greatest 
competition, and which consequently brings the greatest price. At Buenos Ayres, 
we are told by Ulloa, four reals, one-and-twenty pence halfpenny sterling, was, 
forty or fifty years ago, the ordinary price of an ox, chosen from a herd of two or 
three hundred. He says nothing of the price of bread, probably because he found 
nothing remarkable about it. An ox there, he says, cost little more than the 
labour of catching him. But corn can nowhere be raised without a great deal of 
labour, and in a country which lies upon the river Plate, at that time the direct 
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road from Europe to the silver mines of Potosi, the money price of labour could 
not be very cheap. It is otherwise when cultivation is extended over the greater 
part of the country. There is then more bread than butcher's meat. The 
competition changes its direction, and the price of butcher's meat becomes 
greater than the price of bread. 
    By the extension besides of cultivation, the unimproved wilds become 
insufficient to supply the demand for butcher's meat. A great part of the 
cultivated lands must be employed in rearing and fattening cattle, of which the 
price, therefore, must be sufficient to pay, not only the labour necessary for 
tending them, but the rent which the landlord and the profit which the farmer 
could have drawn from such land employed in tillage. The cattle bred upon the 
most uncultivated moors, when brought to the same market, are, in proportion to 
their weight or goodness, sold at the same price as those which are reared upon 
the most improved land. The proprietors of those moors profit by it, and raise 
the rent of their land in proportion to the price of their cattle. It is not more than 
a century ago that in many parts of the highlands of Scotland, butcher's meat was 
as cheap or cheaper than even bread made of oatmeal. The union opened the 
market of England to the highland cattle. Their ordinary price is at present about 
three times greater than at the beginning of the century, and the rents of many 
highland estates have been tripled and quadrupled in the same time. In almost 
every part of Great Britain a pound of the best butcher's meat is, in the present 
times, generally worth more than two pounds of the best white bread; and in 
plentiful years it is sometimes worth three or four pounds. 
    It is thus that in the progress of improvement the rent and profit of 
unimproved pasture come to be regulated in some measure by the rent and profit 
of what is improved, and these again by the rent and profit of corn. Corn is an 
annual crop. Butcher's meat, a crop which requires four or five years to grow. As 
an acre of land, therefore, will produce a much smaller quantity of the one 
species of food than of the other, the inferiority of the quantity must be 
compensated by the superiority of the price. If it was more than compensated, 
more corn land would be turned into pasture; and if it was not compensated, part 
of what was in pasture would be brought back into corn. 
    This equality, however, between the rent and profit of grass and those of corn; 
of the land of which the immediate produce is food for cattle, and of that of 
which the immediate produce is food for men; must be understood to take place 
only through the greater part of the improved lands of a great country. In some 
particular local situations it is quite otherwise, and the rent and profit of grass 
are much superior to what can be made by corn. 
    Thus in the neighbourhood of a great town the demand for milk and for forage 
to horses frequently contribute, together with the high price of butcher's meat, to 
raise the value of grass above what may be called its natural proportion to that of 
corn. This local advantage, it is evident, cannot be communicated to the lands at 
a distance. 
    Particular circumstances have sometimes rendered some countries so 
populous that the whole territory, like the lands in the neighbourhood of a great 
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town, has not been sufficient to produce both the grass and the corn necessary 
for the subsistence of their inhabitants. Their lands, therefore, have been 
principally employed in the production of grass, the more bulky commodity, and 
which cannot be so easily brought from a great distance; and corn, the food of 
the great body of the people, has been chiefly imported from foreign countries. 
Holland is at present in this situation, and a considerable part of ancient Italy 
seems to have been so during the prosperity of the Romans. To feed well, old 
Cato said, as we are told by Cicero, was the first and most profitable thing in the 
management of a private estate; to feed tolerably well, the second; and to feed 
ill, the third. To plough, he ranked only in the fourth place of profit and 
advantage. Tillage, indeed, in that part of ancient Italy which lay in the 
neighbourhood of Rome, must have been very much discouraged by the 
distributions of corn which were frequently made to the people, either 
gratuitously, or at a very low price. This corn was brought from the conquered 
provinces, of which several, instead of taxes, were obliged to furnish a tenth part 
of their produce at a stated price, about sixpence a peck, to the republic. The low 
price at which this corn was distributed to the people must necessarily have sunk 
the price of what could be brought to the Roman market from Latium, or the 
ancient territory of Rome, and must have discouraged its cultivation in that 
country. 
    In an open country too, of which the principal produce is corn, a well-
enclosed piece of grass will frequently rent higher than any corn field in its 
neighbourhood. It is convenient for the maintenance of the cattle employed in 
the cultivation of the corn, and its high rent is, in this case, not so properly paid 
from the value of its own produce as from that of the corn lands which are 
cultivated by means of it. It is likely to fall, if ever the neighbouring lands are 
completely enclosed. The present high rent of enclosed land in Scotland seems 
owing to the scarcity of enclosure, and will probably last no longer than that 
scarcity. The advantage of enclosure is greater for pasture than for corn. It saves 
the labour of guarding the cattle, which feed better, too, when they are not liable 
to be disturbed by their keeper or his dog. 
    But where there is no local advantage of this kind, the rent and profit of corn, 
or whatever else is the common vegetable food or the people, must naturally 
regulate, upon the land which is fit for producing it, the rent and profit of 
pasture. 
    The use of the artificial grasses, of turnips, carrots, cabbages, and the other 
expedients which have been fallen upon to make an equal quantity of land feed a 
greater number of cattle than when in natural grass, should somewhat reduce, it 
might be expected, the superiority which, in an improved country, the price of 
butcher's meat naturally has over that of bread. It seems accordingly to have 
done so; and there is some reason for believing that, at least in the London 
market, the price of butcher's meat in proportion to the price of bread is a good 
deal lower in the present times than it was in the beginning of the last century. 
    In the appendix to the Life of Prince Henry, Doctor Birch has given us an 
account of the prices of butcher's meat as commonly paid by that prince. It is 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth1.html (102 of 189)4/11/2005 9:44:44 AM
The Wealth of Nations
there said that the four quarters of an ox weighing six hundred pounds usually 
cost him nine pounds ten shillings, or thereabouts; that is, thirty-one shillings 
and eightpence per hundred pounds weight. Prince Henry died on the 6th of 
November 1612, in the nineteenth year of his age. 
    In March 1764, there was a Parliamentary inquiry into the causes of the high 
price of provisions at that time. It was then, among other proof to the same 
purpose, given in evidence by a Virginia merchant, that in March 1763, he had 
victualled his ships for twenty-four or twenty-five shillings the hundredweight 
of beef, which he considered as the ordinary price; whereas, in that dear year, he 
had paid twenty-seven shillings for the same weight and sort. This high price in 
1764 is, however, four shillings and eightpence cheaper than the ordinary price 
paid by Prince Henry; and it is the best beef only, it must be observed, which is 
fit to be salted for those distant voyages. 
    The price paid by Prince Henry amounts to 3 3/4d. per pound weight of the 
whole carcase, coarse and choice pieces taken together; and at that rate the 
choice pieces could not have been sold by retail for less than 4 1/2d. or 5d. the 
pound. 
    In the Parliamentary inquiry in 1764, the witnesses stated the price of the 
choice pieces of the best beef to be to the consumer 4d. and 4 1/4d. the pound; 
and the coarse pieces in general to be from seven farthings to 2 1/2d. and this 
they said was in general one halfpenny dearer than the same sort of pieces had 
usually been sold in the month of March. But even this high price is still a good 
deal cheaper than what we can well suppose the ordinary retail price to have 
been the time of Prince Henry. 
    During the twelve first years of the last century, the average price of the best 
wheat at the Windsor market was L1 18s. 3 1/6d. the quarter of nine Winchester 
bushels. 
    But in the twelve years preceding 1764, including that year, the average price 
of the same measure of the best wheat at the same market was L2 1s. 9 1/2d. 
    In the twelve first years of the last century, therefore, wheat appears to have 
been a good deal cheaper, and butcher's meat a good deal dearer, than in the 
twelve years preceding 1764, including that year. 
    In all great countries the greater part of the cultivated lands are employed in 
producing either food for men or food for cattle. The rent and profit of these 
regulate the rent and profit of all other cultivated land. If any particular produce 
afforded less, the land would soon be turned into corn or pasture; and if any 
afforded more, some part of the lands in corn or pasture would soon be turned to 
that produce. 
    Those productions, indeed, which require either a greater original expense of 
improvement, or a greater annual expense of cultivation, in order to fit the land 
for them, appear commonly to afford, the one a greater rent, the other a greater 
profit than corn or pasture. This superiority, however, will seldom be found to 
amount to more than a reasonable interest or compensation for this superior 
expense. 
    In a hop garden, a fruit garden, a kitchen garden, both the rent of the landlord, 
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and the profit of the farmer, are generally greater than in a corn or grass field. 
But to bring the ground into this condition requires more expense. Hence a 
greater rent becomes due to the landlord. It requires, too, a more attentive and 
skilful management. Hence a greater profit becomes due to the farmer. The crop 
too, at least in the hop and fruit garden, is more precarious. Its price, therefore, 
besides compensating all occasional losses, must afford something like the profit 
of insurance. The circumstances of gardeners, generally mean, and always 
moderate, may satisfy us that their great ingenuity is not commonly over-
recompensed. Their delightful art is practised by so many rich people for 
amusement, that little advantage is to be made by those who practise it for profit; 
because the persons who should naturally be their best customers supply 
themselves with all their most precious productions. 
    The advantage which the landlord derives from such improvements seems at 
no time to have been greater than what was sufficient to compensate the original 
expense of making them. In the ancient husbandry, after the vineyard, a well-
watered kitchen garden seems to have been the part of the farm which was 
supposed to yield the most valuable produce. But Democritus, who wrote upon 
husbandry about two thousand years ago, and who was regarded by the ancients 
as one of the fathers of the art, thought they did not act wisely who enclosed a 
kitchen garden. The profit, he said, would not compensate the expense of a stone 
wall; and bricks (he meant, I suppose, bricks baked in the sun) mouldered with 
the rain, and the winter storm, and required continual repairs. Columella, who 
reports this judgment of Democritus, does not controvert it, but proposes a very 
frugal method of enclosing with a hedge of brambles and briars, which, he says, 
he had found by experience to be both a lasting and an impenetrable fence; but 
which, it seems, was not commonly known in the time of Democritus. Palladius 
adopts the opinion of Columella, which had before been recommended by 
Varro. In the judgment of those ancient improvers, the produce of a kitchen 
garden had, it seems, been little more than sufficient to pay the extraordinary 
culture and the expense of watering; for in countries so near the sun, it was 
thought proper, in those times as in the present, to have the command of a 
stream of water which could be conducted to every bed in the garden. Through 
the greater part of Europe a kitchen garden is not at present supposed to deserve 
a better enclosure than that recommended by Columella. In Great Britain, and 
some other northern countries, the finer fruits cannot be brought to perfection 
but by the assistance of a wall. Their price, therefore, in such countries must be 
sufficient to pay the expense of building and maintaining what they cannot be 
had without. The fruit-wall frequently surrounds the kitchen garden, which thus 
enjoys the benefit of an enclosure which its own produce could seldom pay for. 
    That the vineyard, when properly planted and brought to perfection, was the 
most valuable part of the farm, seems to have been an undoubted maxim in the 
ancient agriculture, as it is in the modern through all the wine countries. But 
whether it was advantageous to plant a new vineyard was a matter of dispute 
among the ancient Italian husbandmen, as we learn from Columella. He decides, 
like a true lover of all curious cultivation, in favour of the vineyard, and 
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endeavours to show, by a comparison of the profit and expense, that it was a 
most advantageous improvement. Such comparisons, however, between the 
profit and expense of new projects are commonly very fallacious, and in nothing 
more so than in agriculture. Had the gain actually made by such plantations been 
commonly as great as he imagined it might have been, there could have been no 
dispute about it. The same point is frequently at this day a matter of controversy 
in the wine countries. Their writers on agriculture, indeed, the lovers and 
promoters of high cultivation, seem generally disposed to decide with Columella 
in favour of the vineyard. In France the anxiety of the proprietors of the old 
vineyards to prevent the planting of any new ones, seems to favour their opinion, 
and to indicate a consciousness in those who must have the experience that this 
species of cultivation is at present in that country more profitable than any other. 
It seems at the same time, however, to indicate another opinion, that this 
superior profit can last no longer than the laws which at present restrain the free 
cultivation of the vine. In 1731, they obtained an order of council prohibiting 
both the planting of new vineyards and the renewal of those old ones, of which 
the cultivation had been interrupted for two years, without a particular 
permission from the king, to be granted only in consequence of an information 
from the intendant of the province, certifying that he had examined the land, and 
that it was incapable of any other culture. The pretence of this order was the 
scarcity of corn and pasture, and the superabundance of wine. But had this 
superabundance been real, it would, without any order of council, have 
effectually prevented the plantation of new vineyards, by reducing the profits of 
this species of cultivation below their natural proportion to those of corn and 
pasture. With regard to the supposed scarcity of corn, occasioned by the 
multiplication of vineyards, corn is nowhere in France more carefully cultivated 
than in the wine provinces, where the land is fit for producing it; as in Burgundy, 
Guienne, and the Upper Languedoc. The numerous hands employed in the one 
species of cultivation necessarily encourage the other, by affording a ready 
market for its produce. To diminish the number of those who are capable of 
paying for it is surely a most unpromising expedient for encouraging the 
cultivation of corn. It is like the policy which would promote agriculture by 
discouraging manufactures. 
    The rent and profit of those productions, therefore, which require either a 
greater original expense of improvement in order to fit the land for them, or a 
greater annual expense of cultivation, though often much superior to those of 
corn and pasture, yet when they do no more than compensate such extraordinary 
expense, are in reality regulated by the rent and profit of those common crops. 
    It sometimes happens, indeed, that the quantity of land, which can be fitted 
for some particular produce, is too small to supply the effectual demand. The 
whole produce can be disposed of to those who are willing to give somewhat 
more than what is sufficient to pay the whole rent, wages, and profit necessary 
for raising and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, or 
according to the rates at which they are paid in the greater part of other 
cultivated land. The surplus part of the price which remains after defraying the 
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whole expense of improvement and cultivation may commonly, in this case, and 
in this case only, bear no regular proportion to the like surplus in corn or pasture, 
but may exceed it in almost any degree; and the greater part of this excess 
naturally goes to the rent of the landlord. 
    The usual and natural proportion, for example, between the rent and profit of 
wine and those of corn and pasture must be understood to take place only with 
regard to those vineyards which produce nothing but good common wine, such 
as can be raised almost anywhere, upon any light, gravelly, or sandy soil, and 
which has nothing to recommend it but its strength and wholesomeness. It is 
with such vineyards only that the common land of the country can be brought 
into competition; for with those of a peculiar quality it is evident that it cannot. 
    The vine is more affected by the difference of soils than any other fruit tree. 
From some it derives a flavour which no culture or management can equal, it is 
supposed, upon any other. This flavour, real or imaginary, is sometimes peculiar 
to the produce of a few vineyards; sometimes it extends through the greater part 
of a small district, and sometimes through a considerable part of a large 
province. The whole quantity of such wines that is brought to market falls short 
of the effectual demand, or the demand of those who would be willing to pay the 
whole rent, profit, and wages, necessary for preparing and bringing them thither, 
according to the ordinary rate, or according to the rate at which they are paid in 
common vineyards. The whole quantity, therefore, can be disposed of to those 
who are willing to pay more, which necessarily raises the price above that of 
common wine. The difference is greater or less according as the fashionableness 
and scarcity of the wine render the competition of the buyers more or less eager. 
Whatever it be, the greater part of it goes to the rent of the landlord. For though 
such vineyards are in general more carefully cultivated than most others, the 
high price of the wine seems to be not so much the effect as the cause of this 
careful cultivation. In so valuable a produce the loss occasioned by negligence is 
so great as to force even the most careless to attention. A small part of this high 
price, therefore, is sufficient to pay the wages of the extraordinary labour 
bestowed upon their cultivation, and the profits of the extraordinary stock which 
puts that labour into motion. 
    The sugar colonies possessed by the European nations in the West Indies may 
be compared to those precious vineyards. Their whole produce falls short of the 
effectual demand of Europe, and can be disposed of to those who are willing to 
give more than what is sufficient to pay the whole rent, profit, and wages 
necessary for preparing and bringing it to market, according to the rate at which 
they are commonly paid by any other produce. In Cochin China the finest white 
sugar commonly sells for three piasters the quintal, about thirteen shillings and 
sixpence of our money, as we are told by Mr. Poivre, a very careful observer of 
the agriculture of that country. What is there called the quintal weighs from a 
hundred and fifty to two hundred Paris pounds, or a hundred and seventy-five 
Paris pounds at a medium, which reduces the price of the hundred-weight 
English to about eight shillings sterling, not a fourth part of what is commonly 
paid for the brown or muskavada sugars imported from our colonies, and not a 
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sixth part of what is paid for the finest white sugar. The greater part of the 
cultivated lands in Cochin China are employed in producing corn and rice, the 
food of the great body of the people. The respective prices of corn, rice, and 
sugar, are there probably in the natural proportion, or in that which naturally 
takes place in the different crops of the greater part of cultivated land, and which 
recompenses the landlord and farmer, as nearly as can be computed according to 
what is usually the original expense of improvement and the annual expense of 
cultivation. But in our sugar colonies the price of sugar bears no such proportion 
to that of the produce of a rice or corn field either in Europe or in America. It is 
commonly said that a sugar planter expects that the rum and molasses should 
defray the whole expense of his cultivation, and that his sugar should be all clear 
profit. If this be true, for I pretend not to affirm it, it is as if a corn farmer 
expected to defray the expense of his cultivation with the chaff and the straw, 
and that the grain should be all clear profit. We see frequently societies of 
merchants in London and other trading town's purchase waste lands in our sugar 
colonies, which they expect to improve and cultivate with profit by means of 
factors and agents, notwithstanding the great distance and the uncertain returns 
from the defective administration of justice in those countries. Nobody will 
attempt to improve and cultivate in the same manner the most fertile lands of 
Scotland, Ireland, or the corn provinces of North America, though from the more 
exact administration of justice in these countries more regular returns might be 
expected. 
    In Virginia and Maryland the cultivation of tobacco is preferred, as more 
profitable, to that of corn. Tobacco might be cultivated with advantage through 
the greater part of Europe; but in almost every part of Europe it has become a 
principal subject of taxation, and to collect a tax from every different farm in the 
country where this plant might happen to be cultivated would be more difficult, 
it has been supposed, than to levy one upon its importation at the custom-house. 
The cultivation of tobacco has upon this account been most absurdly prohibited 
through the greater part of Europe, which necessarily gives a sort of monopoly 
to the countries where it is allowed; and as Virginia and Maryland produce the 
greatest quantity of it, they share largely, though with some competitors, in the 
advantage of this monopoly. The cultivation of tobacco, however, seems not to 
be so advantageous as that of sugar. I have never even heard of any tobacco 
plantation that was improved and cultivated by the capital of merchants who 
resided in Great Britain, and our tobacco colonies send us home no such wealthy 
planters as we see frequently arrive from our sugar islands. Though from the 
preference given in those colonies to the cultivation of tobacco above that of 
corn, it would appear that the effectual demand of Europe for tobacco is not 
completely supplied, it probably is more nearly so than that for sugar; and 
though the present price of tobacco is probably more than sufficient to pay the 
whole rent, wages, and profit necessary for preparing and bring it to market, 
according to the rate at which they are commonly paid in corn land, it must not 
be so much more as the present price of sugar. Our tobacco planters, 
accordingly, have shown the same fear of the superabundance of tobacco which 
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the proprietors of the old vineyards in France have of the superabundance of 
wine. By act of assembly they have restrained its cultivation to six thousand 
plants, supposed to yield a thousand weight of tobacco, for every negro between 
sixteen and sixty years of age. Such a negro, over and above this quantity of 
tobacco, can manage, they reckon, four acres of Indian corn. To prevent the 
market from being overstocked, too, they have sometimes, in plentiful years, we 
are told by Dr. Douglas (I suspect he has been ill informed), burnt a certain 
quantity of tobacco for every negro, in the same manner as the Dutch are said to 
do of spices. If such violent methods are necessary to keep up the present price 
of tobacco, the superior advantage of its culture over that of corn, if it still has 
any, will not probably be of long continuance. 
    It is in this manner that the rent of the cultivated land, of which the produce is 
human food, regulates the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land. No 
particular produce can long afford less; because the land would immediately be 
turned to another use. And if any particular produce commonly affords more, it 
is because the quantity of land which can be fitted for it is too small to supply 
the effectual demand. 
    In Europe, corn is the principal produce of land which serves immediately for 
human food. Except in particular situations, therefore, the rent of corn land 
regulates in Europe that of all other cultivated land. Britain need envy neither 
the vineyards of France nor the olive plantations of Italy. Except in particular 
situations, the value of these is regulated by that of corn, in which the fertility of 
Britain is not much inferior to that of either of those two countries. 
    If in any country the common and favourite vegetable food of the people 
should be drawn from a plant of which the most common land, with the same or 
nearly the same culture, produced a much greater quantity than the most fertile 
does of corn, the rent of the landlord, or the surplus quantity of food which 
would remain to him, after paying the labour and replacing the stock of the 
farmer, together with its ordinary profits, would necessarily be much greater. 
Whatever was the rate at which labour was commonly maintained in that 
country, this greater surplus could always maintain a greater quantity of it, and 
consequently enable the landlord to purchase or command a greater quantity of 
it. The real value of his rent, his real power and authority, his command of the 
necessaries and conveniencies of life with which the labour of other people 
could supply him, would necessarily be much greater. 
    A rice field produces a much greater quantity of food than the most fertile 
corn field. Two crops in the year from thirty to sixty bushels each, are said to be 
the ordinary produce of an acre. Though its cultivation, therefore, requires more 
labour, a much greater surplus remains after maintaining all that labour. In those 
rice countries, therefore, where rice is the common and favourite vegetable food 
of the people, and where the cultivators are chiefly maintained with it, a greater 
share of this greater surplus should belong to the landlord than in corn countries. 
In Carolina, where the planters, as in other British colonies, are generally both 
farmers and landlords, and where rent consequently is confounded with profit, 
the cultivation of rice is found to be more profitable than that of corn, though 
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their fields produce only one crop in the year, and though, from the prevalence 
of the customs of Europe, rice is not there the common and favourite vegetable 
food of the people. 
    A good rice field is a bog at all seasons, and at one season a bog covered with 
water. It is unfit either for corn, or pasture, or vineyard, or, indeed, for any other 
vegetable produce that is very useful to men; and the lands which are fit for 
those purposes are not fit for rice. Even in the rice countries, therefore, the rent 
of rice lands cannot regulate the rent of the other cultivated land, which can 
never be turned to that produce. 
    The food produced by a field of potatoes is not inferior in quantity to that 
produced by a field of rice, and much superior to what is produced by a field of 
wheat. Twelve thousand weight of potatoes from an acre of land is not a greater 
produce than two thousand weight of wheat. The food or solid nourishment, 
indeed, which can be drawn from each of those two plants, is not altogether in 
proportion to their weight, on account of the watery nature of potatoes. 
Allowing, however, half the weight of this root to go to water, a very large 
allowance, such an acre of potatoes will still produce six thousand weight of 
solid nourishment, three times the quantity produced by the acre of wheat. An 
acre of potatoes is cultivated with less expense than an acre of wheat; the fallow, 
which generally precedes the sowing of wheat, more than compensating the 
hoeing and other extraordinary culture which is always given to potatoes. 
Should this root ever become in any part of Europe, like rice in some rice 
countries, the common and favourite vegetable food of the people, so as to 
occupy the same proportion of the lands in tillage which wheat and other sorts of 
grain for human food do at present, the same quantity of cultivated land would 
maintain a much greater number of people, and the labourers being generally fed 
with potatoes, a greater surplus would remain after replacing all the stock and 
maintaining all the labour employed in cultivation. A greater share of this 
surplus, too, would belong to the landlord. Population would increase, and rents 
would rise much beyond what they are at present. 
    The land which is fit for potatoes is fit for almost every other useful 
vegetable. If they occupied the same proportion of cultivated land which corn 
does at present, they would regulate, in the same manner, the rent of the greater 
part of other cultivated land. 
    In some parts of Lancashire it is pretended, I have been told, that bread of 
oatmeal is a heartier food for labouring people than wheaten bread, and I have 
frequently heard the same doctrine held in Scotland. I am, however, somewhat 
doubtful of the truth of it. The common people in Scotland, who are fed with 
oatmeal, are in general neither so strong, nor so handsome as the same rank of 
people in England who are fed with wheaten bread. They neither work so well, 
nor look so well; and as there is not the same difference between the people of 
fashion in the two countries, experience would seem to show that the food of the 
common people in Scotland is not so suitable to the human constitution as that 
of their neighbours of the same rank in England. But it seems to be otherwise 
with potatoes. The chairmen, porters, and coalheavers in London, and those 
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unfortunate women who live by prostitution, the strongest men and the most 
beautiful women perhaps in the British dominions, are said to be the greater part 
of them from the lowest rank of people in Ireland, who are generally fed with 
this root. No food can afford a more decisive proof of its nourishing quality, or 
of its being peculiarly suitable to the health of the human constitution. 
    It is difficult to preserve potatoes through the year, and impossible to store 
them like corn, for two or three years together. The fear of not being able to sell 
them before they rot discourages their cultivation, and is, perhaps, the chief 
obstacle to their ever becoming in any great country, like bread, the principal 
vegetable food of all the different ranks of the people. 
PART 2 
Of the Produce of Land which sometimes does, and sometimes does not, afford 
Rent
HUMAN food seems to be the only produce of land which always and 
necessarily affords some rent to the landlord. Other sorts of produce sometimes 
may and sometimes may not, according to different circumstances. 
    After food, clothing and lodging are the two great wants of mankind. 
    Land in its original rude state can afford the materials of clothing and lodging 
to a much greater number of people than it can feed. In its improved state it can 
sometimes feed a greater number of people than it can supply with those 
materials; at least in the way in which they require them, and are willing to pay 
for them. In the one state, therefore, there is always a superabundance of those 
materials, which are frequently, upon that account, of little or no value. In the 
other there is often a scarcity, which necessarily augments their value. In the one 
state a great part of them is thrown away as useless, and the price of what is used 
is considered as equal only to the labour and expense of fitting it for use, and 
can, therefore, afford no rent to the landlord. In the other they are all made use 
of, and there is frequently a demand for more than can be had. Somebody is 
always willing to give more for every part of them than what is sufficient to pay 
the expense of bringing them to market. Their price, therefore, can always afford 
some rent to the landlord. 
    The skins of the larger animals were the original materials of clothing. Among 
nations of hunters and shepherds, therefore, whose food consists chiefly in the 
flesh of those animals, every man, by providing himself with food, provides 
himself with the materials of more clothing than he can wear. If there was no 
foreign commerce, the greater part of them would be thrown away as things of 
no value. This was probably the case among the hunting nations of North 
America before their country was discovered by the Europeans, with whom they 
now exchange their surplus peltry for blankets, fire-arms, and brandy, which 
gives it some value. In the present commercial state of the known world, the 
most barbarous nations, I believe, among whom land property is established, 
have some foreign commerce of this kind, and find among their wealthier 
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neighbours such a demand for all the materials of clothing which their land 
produces, and which can neither be wrought up nor consumed at home, as raises 
their price above what it costs to send them to those wealthier neighbours. It 
affords, therefore, some rent to the landlord. When the greater part of the 
highland cattle were consumed on their own hills, the exportation of their hides 
made the most considerable article of the commerce of that country, and what 
they were exchanged for afforded some addition to the rent of the highland 
estates. The wool of England, which in old times could neither be consumed nor 
wrought up at home, found a market in the then wealthier and more industrious 
country of Flanders, and its price afforded something to the rent of the land 
which produced it. In countries not better cultivated than England was then, or 
than the highlands of Scotland are now, and which had no foreign commerce, 
the materials of clothing would evidently be so superabundant that a great part 
of them would be thrown away as useless, and no part could afford any rent to 
the landlord. 
    The materials of lodging cannot always be transported to so great a distance 
as those of clothing, and do not so readily become an object of foreign 
commerce. When they are superabundant in the country which produces them, it 
frequently happens, even in the present commercial state of the world, that they 
are of no value to the landlord. A good stone quarry in the neighbourhood of 
London would afford a considerable rent. In many parts of Scotland and Wales 
it affords none. Barren timber for building is of great value in a populous and 
well-cultivated country, and the land which produces it affords a considerable 
rent. But in many parts of North America the landlord would be much obliged to 
anybody who would carry away the greater part of his large trees. In some parts 
of the highlands of Scotland the bark is the only part of the wood which, for 
want of roads and water-carriage, can be sent to market. The timber is left to rot 
upon the ground. When the materials of lodging are so superabundant, the part 
made use of is worth only the labour and expense of fitting it for that use. It 
affords no rent to the landlord, who generally grants the use of it to whoever 
takes the trouble of asking it. The demand of wealthier nations, however, 
sometimes enables him to get a rent for it. The paving of the streets of London 
has enabled the owners of some barren rocks on the coast of Scotland to draw a 
rent from what never afforded any before. The woods of Norway and of the 
coasts of the Baltic find a market in many parts of Great Britain which they 
could not find at home, and thereby afford some rent to their proprietors. 
    Countries are populous not in proportion to the number of people whom their 
produce can clothe and lodge, but in proportion to that of those whom it can 
feed. When food is provided, it is easy to find the necessary clothing and 
lodging. But though these are at hand, it may often be difficult to find food. In 
some parts even of the British dominions what is called a house may be built by 
one day's labour of one man. The simplest species of clothing, the skins of 
animals, require somewhat more labour to dress and prepare them for use. They 
do not, however, require a great deal. Among savage and barbarous nations, a 
hundredth or little more than a hundredth part of the labour of the whole year 
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will be sufficient to provide them with such clothing and lodging as satisfy the 
greater part of the people. All the other ninety-nine parts are frequently no more 
than enough to provide them with food. 
    But when by the improvement and cultivation of land the labour of one family 
can provide food for two, the labour of half the society becomes sufficient to 
provide food for the whole. The other half, therefore, or at least the greater part 
of them, can be employed in providing other things, or in satisfying the other 
wants and fancies of mankind. Clothing and lodging, household furniture, and 
what is called Equipage, are the principal objects of the greater part of those 
wants and fancies. The rich man consumes no more food than his poor 
neighbour. In quality it may be very different, and to select and prepare it may 
require more labour and art; but in quantity it is very nearly the same. But 
compare the spacious palace and great wardrobe of the one with the hovel and 
the few rags of the other, and you will be sensible that the difference between 
their clothing, lodging, and household furniture is almost as great in quantity as 
it is in quality. The desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity 
of the human stomach; but the desire of the conveniences and ornaments of 
building, dress, equipage, and household furniture, seems to have no limit or 
certain boundary. Those, therefore, who have the command of more food than 
they themselves can consume, are always willing to exchange the surplus, or, 
what is the same thing, the price of it, for gratifications of this other kind. What 
is over and above satisfying the limited desire is given for the amusement of 
those desires which cannot be satisfied, but seem to be altogether endless. The 
poor, in order to obtain food, exert themselves to gratify those fancies of the 
rich, and to obtain it more certainly they vie with one another in the cheapness 
and perfection of their work. The number of workmen increases with the 
increasing quantity of food, or with the growing improvement and cultivation of 
the lands; and as the nature of their business admits of the utmost subdivisions 
of labour, the quantity of materials which they can work up increases in a much 
greater proportion than their numbers. Hence arises a demand for every sort of 
material which human invention can employ, either usefully or ornamentally, in 
building, dress, equipage, or household furniture; for the fossils and minerals 
contained in the bowels of the earth; the precious metals, and the precious 
stones. 
    Food is in this manner not only the original source of rent, but every other 
part of the produce of land which afterwards affords rent derives that part of its 
value from the improvement of the powers of labour in producing food by 
means of the improvement and cultivation of land. 
    Those other parts of the produce of land, however, which afterwards afford 
rent, do not afford it always. Even in improved and cultivated countries, the 
demand for them is not always such as to afford a greater price than what is 
sufficient to pay the labour, and replace, together with it ordinary profits, the 
stock which must be employed in bringing them to market. Whether it is or is 
not such depends upon different circumstances. 
    Whether a coal-mine, for example, can afford any rent depends partly upon its 
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fertility, and partly upon its situation. 
    A mine of any kind may be said to be either fertile or barren, according as the 
quantity of mineral which can be brought from it by a certain quantity of labour 
is greater or less than what can be brought by an equal quantity from the greater 
part of other mines of the same kind. 
    Some coal-mines advantageously situated cannot be wrought on account of 
their barrenness. The produce does not pay the expense. They can afford neither 
profit nor rent. 
    There are some of which the produce is barely sufficient to pay the labour, 
and replace, together with it ordinary profits, the stock employed in working 
them. They afford some profit to the undertaker of the work, but no rent to the 
landlord. They can be wrought advantageously by nobody but the landlord, who, 
being himself undertaker of the work, gets the ordinary profit of the capital 
which he employs in it. Many coal-mines in Scotland are wrought in this 
manner, and can be wrought in no other. The landlord will allow nobody else to 
work them without paying some rent, and nobody can afford to pay any. 
    Other coal-mines in the same country, sufficiently fertile, cannot be wrought 
on account of their situation. A quantity of mineral sufficient to defray the 
expense of working could be brought from the mine by the ordinary, or even less 
than the ordinary, quantity of labour; but in an inland country, thinly inhabited, 
and without either good roads or water-carriage, this quantity could not be sold. 
    Coals are a less agreeable fuel than wood: they are said, too, to be less 
wholesome. The expense of coals, therefore, at the place where they are 
consumed, must generally be somewhat less than that of wood. 
    The price of wood again varies with the state of agriculture, nearly in the 
same manner, and exactly for the same reason, as the price of cattle. In its rude 
beginnings the greater part of every country is covered with wood, which is then 
a mere encumberance of no value to the landlord, who would gladly give it to 
anybody for the cutting. As agriculture advances, the woods are partly cleared 
by the progress of tillage, and partly go to decay in consequence of the increased 
number of cattle. These, though they do not increase in the same proportion as 
corn, which is altogether the acquisition of human industry, yet multiply under 
the care and protection of men, who store up in the season of plenty what may 
maintain them in that of scarcity, who through the whole year furnish them with 
a greater quantity of food than uncultivated nature provides for them, and who 
by destroying and extirpating their enemies, secure them in the free enjoyment 
of all that she provides. Numerous herds of cattle, when allowed to wander 
through the woods, though they do not destroy the old trees, hinder any young 
ones from coming up so that in the course of a century or two the whole forest 
goes to ruin. The scarcity of wood then raises its price. It affords a good rent, 
and the landlord sometimes finds that he can scarce employ his best lands more 
advantageously than in growing barren timber, of which the greatness of the 
profit often compensates the lateness of the returns. This seems in the present 
times to be nearly the state of things in several parts of Great Britain, where the 
profit of planting is found to be equal to that of either corn or pasture. The 
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advantage which the landlord derives from planting can nowhere exceed, at least 
for any considerable time, the rent which these could afford him; and in an 
inland country which is highly cultivated, it will frequently not fall much short 
of this rent. Upon the sea-coast of a well improved country, indeed, if coals can 
conveniently be had for fuel, it may sometimes be cheaper to bring barren 
timber for building from less cultivated foreign countries than to raise it at 
home. In the new town of Edinburgh, built within these few years, there is not, 
perhaps, a single stick of Scotch timber. 
    Whatever may be the price of wood, if that of coals is such that the expense of 
a coal fire is nearly equal to that of a wood one, we may be assured that at that 
place, and in these circumstances, the price of coals is as high as it can be. It 
seems to be so in some of the inland parts of England, particularly in 
Oxfordshire, where it is usual, even in the fires of the common people, to mix 
coals and wood together, and where the difference in the expense of those two 
sorts of fuel cannot, therefore, be very great. 
    Coals, in the coal countries, are everywhere much below this highest price. If 
they were not, they could not bear the expense of a distant carriage, either by 
land or by water. A small quantity only could be sold, and the coal masters and 
coal proprietors find it more for their interest to sell a great quantity at a price 
somewhat above the lowest, than a small quantity at the highest. The most fertile 
coal-mine, too, regulates the price of coals at all the other mines in its 
neighbourhood. Both the proprietor and the undertaker of the work find, the one 
that he can get a greater rent, the other that he can get a greater profit, by 
somewhat underselling all their neighbours. Their neighbours are soon obliged 
to sell at the same price, though they cannot so well afford it, and though it 
always diminishes, and sometimes takes away altogether both their rent and 
their profit. Some works are abandoned altogether; others can afford no rent, and 
can be wrought only by the proprietor. 
    The lowest price at which coals can be sold for any considerable time is, like 
that of all other commodities, the price which is barely sufficient to replace, 
together with its ordinary profits, the stock which must be employed in bringing 
them to market. At as coal-mine for which the landlord can get no rent, but 
which he must either work himself or let it alone altogether, the price of coals 
must generally be nearly about this price. 
    Rent, even where coals afford one, has generally a smaller share in their 
prices than in that of most other parts of the rude produce of land. The rent of an 
estate above ground commonly amounts to what is supposed to be a third of the 
gross produce; and it is generally a rent certain and independent of the 
occasional variations in the crop. In coal-mines a fifth of the gross produce is a 
very great rent; a tenth the common rent, and it is seldom a rent certain, but 
depends upon the occasional variations in the produce. These are so great that, in 
a country where thirty years' purchase is considered as a moderate price for the 
property of a landed estate, ten years' purchase is regarded as a good price for 
that of a coal-mine. 
    The value of a coal-mine to the proprietor frequently depends as much upon 
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its situation as upon its fertility. That of a metallic mine depends more upon its 
fertility, and less upon its situation. The coarse, and still more the precious 
metals, when separated from the ore, are so valuable that they can generally bear 
the expense of a very long land, and of the most distant sea carriage. Their 
market is not confined to the countries in the neighbourhood of the mine, but 
extends to the whole world. The copper of Japan makes an article of commerce 
in Europe; the iron of Spain in that of Chili and Peru. The silver of Peru finds its 
way, not only to Europe, but from Europe to China. 
    The price of coals in Westmoreland or Shropshire can have little effect on 
their price at Newcastle; and their price in the Lionnois can have none at all. The 
productions of such distant coal-mines can never be brought into competition 
with one another. But the productions of the most distant metallic mines 
frequently may, and in fact commonly are. The price, therefore, of the coarse, 
and still more that of the precious metals, at the most fertile mines in the world, 
must necessarily more or less affect their price at every other in it. The price of 
copper in Japan must have some influence upon its price at the copper mines in 
Europe. The price of silver in Peru, or the quantity either of labour or of other 
goods which it will purchase there, must have some influence on its price, not 
only at the silver mines of Europe, but at those of China. After the discovery of 
the mines of Peru, the silver mines of Europe were, the greater part of them, 
abandoned. The value of was so much reduced that their produce could no 
longer pay the expense of working them, or replace, with a profit, the food, 
clothes, lodging, and other necessaries which were consumed in that operation. 
This was the case, too, with the mines of Cuba and St. Domingo, and even with 
the ancient mines of Peru, after the discovery of those of Potosi. 
    The price of every metal at every mine, therefore, being regulated in some 
measure by its price at the most fertile mine in the world that is actually 
wrought, it can at the greater part of mines do very little more than pay the 
expense of working, and can seldom afford a very high rent to the landlord. 
Rent, accordingly, seems at the greater part of mines to have but a small share in 
the price of the coarse, and a still smaller in that of the precious metals. Labour 
and profit make up the greater part of both. 
    A sixth part of the gross produce may be reckoned the average rent of the tin 
mines of Cornwall the most fertile that are known in the world, as we are told by 
the Reverend Mr. Borlace, vice-warden of the stannaries. Some, he says, afford 
more, and some do not afford so much. A sixth part of the gross produce is the 
rent, too, of several very fertile lead mines in Scotland. 
    In the silver mines of Peru, we are told by Frezier and Ulloa, the proprietor 
frequently exacts no other acknowledgment from the undertaker of the mine, but 
that he will grind the ore at his mill, paying him the ordinary multure or price of 
grinding. Till 1736, indeed, the tax of the King of Spain amounted to one-fifth of 
the standard silver, which till then might be considered as the real rent of the 
greater part of the silver mines of Peru, the richest which have been known in 
the world. If there had been no tax this fifth would naturally have belonged to 
the landlord, and many mines might have been wrought which could not then be 
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wrought, because they could not afford this tax. The tax of the Duke of Cornwall 
upon tin is supposed to amount to more than five per cent or one-twentieth part 
of the value, and whatever may be his proportion, it would naturally, too, belong 
to the proprietor of the mine, if tin was duty free. But if you add one-twentieth to 
one-sixth, you will find that the whole average rent of the tin mines of Cornwall 
was to the whole average rent of the silver mines of Peru as thirteen to twelve. 
But the silver mines of Peru are not now able to pay even this low rent, and the 
tax upon silver was, in 1736, reduced from one-fifth to one-tenth. Even this tax 
upon silver, too, gives more temptation to smuggling than the tax of one-
twentieth upon tin; and smuggling must be much easier in the precious than in 
the bulky commodity. The tax of the King of Spain accordingly is said to be 
very ill paid, and that of the Duke of Cornwall very well. Rent, therefore, it is 
probable, makes a greater part of the price of tin at the most fertile tin mines 
than it does of silver at the most fertile silver mines in the world. After replacing 
the stock employed in working those different mines, together with its ordinary 
profits, the residue which remains to the proprietor is greater, it seems, in the 
coarse than in the precious metal. 
    Neither are the profits of the undertakers of silver mines commonly very great 
in Peru. The same most respectable and well-informed authors acquaint us, that 
when any person undertakes to work a new mine in Peru, he is universally 
looked upon as a man destined to bankruptcy and ruin, and is upon that account 
shunned and avoided by everybody. Mining, it seems, is considered there in the 
same light as here, as a lottery, in which the prizes do not compensate the 
blanks, though the greatness of some tempts many adventurers to throw away 
their fortunes in such unprosperous projects. 
    As the sovereign, however, derives a considerable part of his revenue from 
the produce of silver mines, the law in Peru gives every possible encouragement 
to the discovery and working of new ones. Whoever discovers a new mine is 
entitled to measure off two hundred and forty-six feet in length, according to 
what he supposes to be the direction of the vein, and half as much in breadth. He 
becomes proprietor of this portion of the mine, and can work it without paying 
any acknowledgment to the landlord. The interest of the Duke of Cornwall has 
given occasion to a regulation nearly of the same kind in that ancient duchy. In 
waste and unenclosed lands any person who discovers a tin mine may mark its 
limits to a certain extent, which is called bounding a mine. The bounder 
becomes the real proprietor of the mine, and may either work it himself, or give 
it in lease to another, without the consent of the owner of the land, to whom, 
however, a very small acknowledgment must be paid upon working it. In both 
regulations the sacred rights of private property are sacrificed to the supposed 
interests of public revenue. 
    The same encouragement is given in Peru to the discovery and working of 
new gold mines; and in gold the king's tax amounts only to a twentieth part of 
the standard metal. It was once a fifth, and afterwards a tenth, as in silver; but it 
was found that the work could not bear even the lowest of these two taxes. If it 
is rare, however, say the same authors, Frezier and Ulloa, to find a person who 
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has made his fortune by a silver, it is still much rarer to find one who has done 
so by a gold mine. This twentieth part seems to be the whole rent which is paid 
by the greater part of the gold mines in Chili and Peru. Gold, too, is much more 
liable to be smuggled than even silver; not only on account of the superior value 
of the metal in proportion to its bulk, but on account of the peculiar way in 
which nature produces it. Silver is very seldom found virgin, but, like most other 
metals, is generally mineralized with some other body, from which it is 
impossible to separate it in such quantities as will pay for the expense, but by a 
very laborious and tedious operation, which cannot well be carried on but in 
workhouses erected for the purpose, and therefore exposed to the inspection of 
the king's officers. Gold, on the contrary, is almost always found virgin. It is 
sometimes found in pieces of some bulk; and even when mixed in small and 
almost insensible particles with sand, earth, and other extraneous bodies, it can 
be separated from them by a very short and simple operation, which can be 
carried on in any private house by anybody who is possessed of a small quantity 
of mercury. If the king's tax, therefore, is but ill paid upon silver, it is likely to be 
much worse paid upon gold; and rent, must make a much smaller part of the 
price of gold than even of that of silver. 
    The lowest price at which the precious metals can be sold, or the smallest 
quantity of other goods for which they can be exchanged during any 
considerable time, is regulated by the same principles which fix the lowest 
ordinary price of all other goods. The stock which must commonly be employed, 
the food, the clothes, and lodging which must commonly be consumed in 
bringing them from the mine to the market, determine it. It must at least be 
sufficient to replace that stock, with the ordinary profits. 
    Their highest price, however, seems not to be necessarily determined by 
anything but the actual scarcity or plenty of those metals themselves. It is not 
determined by that of any other commodity, in the same manner as the price of 
coals is by that of wood, beyond which no scarcity can ever raise it. Increase the 
scarcity of gold to a certain degree, and the smallest bit of it may become more 
precious than a diamond, and exchange for a greater quantity of other goods. 
    The demand for those metals arises partly from their utility and partly from 
their beauty. If you except iron, they are more useful than, perhaps, any other 
metal. As they are less liable to rust and impurity, they can more easily be kept 
clean, and the utensils either of the table or the kitchen are often upon that 
account more agreeable when made of them. A silver boiler is more cleanly than 
a lead, copper, or tin one; and the same quality would render a gold boiler still 
better than a silver one. Their principal merit, however, arises from their beauty, 
which renders them peculiarly fit for the ornaments of dress and furniture. No 
paint or dye can give so splendid a colour as gilding. The merit of their beauty is 
greatly enhanced by their scarcity. With the greater part of rich people, the chief 
enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which in their eye is never 
so complete as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence 
which nobody can possess but themselves. In their eyes the merit of an object 
which is in any degree either useful or beautiful is greatly enhanced by its 
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scarcity, or by the great labour which it requires to collect any considerable 
quantity of it, a labour which nobody can afford to pay but themselves. Such 
objects they are willing to purchase at a higher price than things much more 
beautiful and useful, but more common. These qualities of utility, beauty, and 
scarcity, are the original foundation of the high price of those metals, or of the 
great quantity of other goods for which they can everywhere be exchanged. This 
value was antecedent to and independent of their being employed as coin, and 
was the quality which fitted them for that employment. That employment, 
however, by occasioning a new demand, and by diminishing the quantity which 
could be employed in any other way, may have afterwards contributed to keep 
up or increase their value. 
    The demand for the precious stones arises altogether from their beauty. They 
are of no use but as ornaments; and the merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced 
by their scarcity, or by the difficulty and expense of getting them from the mine. 
Wages and profit accordingly make up, upon most occasions, almost the whole 
of their high price. Rent comes in but for a very small share; frequently for no 
share; and the most fertile mines only afford any considerable rent. When 
Tavernier, a jeweller, visited the diamond mines of Golconda and Visiapour, he 
was informed that the sovereign of the country, for whose benefit they were 
wrought, had ordered all of them to be shut up, except those which yield the 
largest and finest stones. The others, it seems, were to the proprietor not worth 
the working. 
    As the price both of the precious metals and of the precious stones is 
regulated all over the world by their price at the most fertile mine in it, the rent 
which a mine of either can afford to its proprietor is in proportion, not to its 
absolute, but to what may be called its relative fertility, or to its superiority over 
other mines of the same kind. If new mines were discovered as much superior to 
those of Potosi as they were superior to those Europe, the value of silver might 
be so much degraded as to render even the mines of Potosi not worth the 
working. Before the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, the most fertile mines 
in Europe may have afforded as great a rent to their proprietor as the richest 
mines in Peru do at present. Though the quantity of silver was much less, it 
might have exchanged for an equal quantity of other goods, and the proprietor's 
share might have enabled him to purchase or command an equal quantity either 
of labour or of commodities. The value both of the produce and of the rent, the 
real revenue which they afforded both to the public and to the proprietor, might 
have been the same. 
    The most abundant mines either of the precious metals or of the precious 
stones could add little to the wealth of the world. A produce of which the value 
is principally derived from its scarcity, is necessarily degraded by its abundance. 
A service of plate, and the other frivolous ornaments of dress and furniture, 
could be purchased for a smaller quantity of labour, or for a smaller quantity of 
commodities; and in this would consist the sole advantage which the world 
could derive from that abundance. 
    It is otherwise in estates above ground. The value both of their produce and of 
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their rent is in proportion to their absolute, and not to their relative fertility. The 
land which produces a certain quantity of food, clothes, and lodging, can always 
feed, clothe, and lodge a certain number of people; and whatever may be the 
proportion of the landlord, it will always give him a proportionable command of 
the labour of those people, and of the commodities with which that labour can 
supply him. The value of the most barren lands is not diminished by the 
neighbourhood of the most fertile. On the contrary, it is generally increased by 
it. The great number of people maintained by the fertile lands afford a market to 
many parts of the produce of the barren, which they could never have found 
among those whom their own produce could maintain. 
    Whatever increases the fertility of land in producing food increases not only 
the value of the lands upon which the improvement is bestowed, but contributes 
likewise to increase that of many other lands by creating a new demand for their 
produce. That abundance of food, of which, in consequence of the improvement 
of land, many people have the disposal beyond what they themselves can 
consume, is the great cause of the demand both for the precious metals and the 
precious stone, as well as for every other conveniency and ornament of dress, 
lodging, household furniture, and equipage. Food not only constitutes the 
principal part of the riches of the world, but it is the abundance of food which 
gives the principal part of their value to many other sorts of riches. The poor 
inhabitants of Cuba and St. Domingo, when they were first discovered by the 
Spaniards, used to wear little bits of gold as ornaments in their hair and other 
parts of their dress. They seemed to value them as we would do any little 
pebbles of somewhat more than ordinary beauty, and to consider them as just 
worth the picking up, but not worth the refusing to anybody who asked them. 
They gave them to their new guests at the first request, without seeming to think 
that they had made them any very valuable present. They were astonished to 
observe the rage of the Spaniards to obtain them; and had no notion that there 
could anywhere be a country in which many people had the disposal of so great 
a superfluity of food, so scanty always among themselves, that for a very small 
quantity of those glittering baubles they would willingly give as much as might 
maintain a whole family for many years. Could they have been made to 
understand this, the passion of the Spaniards would not have surprised them. 
PART 3 
Of the Variations in the Proportion between the respective Values of that Sort of 
Produce which always affords Rent, and of that which sometimes does and 
sometimes does not afford Rent
THE increasing abundance of food, in consequence of increasing improvement 
and cultivation, must necessarily increase the demand for every part of the 
produce of land which is not food, and which can be applied either to use or to 
ornament. In the whole progress of improvement, it might therefore be expected, 
there should be only one variation in the comparative values of those two 
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different sorts of produce. The value of that sort which sometimes does and 
sometimes does not afford rent, should constantly rise in proportion to that 
which always affords some rent. As art and industry advance, the materials of 
clothing and lodging, the useful fossils and minerals of the earth, the precious 
metals and the precious stones should gradually come to be more and more in 
demand, should gradually exchange for a greater and a greater quantity of food, 
or in other words, should gradually become dearer and dearer. This accordingly 
has been the case with most of these things upon most occasions, and would 
have been the case with all of them upon all occasions, if particular accidents 
had not upon some occasions increased the supply of some of them in a still 
greater proportion than the demand. 
    The value of a free-stone quarry, for example, will necessarily increase with 
the increasing improvement and population of the country round about it, 
especially if it should be the only one in the neighbourhood. But the value of a 
silver mine, even though there should not be another within a thousand miles of 
it, will not necessarily increase with the improvement of the country in which it 
is situated. The market for the produce of a freestone quarry can seldom extend 
more than a few miles round about it, and the demand must generally be in 
proportion to the improvement and population of that small district. But the 
market for the produce of a silver mine may extend over the whole known 
world. Unless the world in general, therefore, be advancing in improvement and 
population, the demand for silver might not be at all increased by the 
improvement even of a large country in the neighbourhood of the mine. Even 
though the world in general were improving, yet if, in the course of its 
improvement, new mines should be discovered, much more fertile than any 
which had been known before, though the demand for silver would necessarily 
increase, yet the supply might increase in so much a greater proportion that the 
real price of that metal might gradually fall; that is, any given quantity, a pound 
weight of it, for example, might gradually purchase or command a smaller and a 
smaller quantity of labour, or exchange for a smaller and a smaller quantity of 
corn, the principal part of the subsistence of the labourer. 
    The great market for silver is the commercial and civilised part of the world. 
    If by the general progress of improvement the demand of this market should 
increase, while at the same time the supply did not increase in the same 
proportion, the value of silver would gradually rise in proportion to that of corn. 
Any given quantity of silver would exchange for a greater and a greater quantity 
of corn; or, in other words, the average money price of corn would gradually 
become cheaper and cheaper. 
    If, on the contrary, the supply by some accident should increase for many 
years together in a greater proportion than the demand, that metal would 
gradually become cheaper and cheaper; or, in other words, the average money 
price of corn would, in spite of all improvements, gradually become dearer and 
dearer. 
    But if, on the other hand, the supply of the metal should increase nearly in the 
same proportion as the demand, it would continue to purchase or exchange for 
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nearly the same quantity of corn, and the average money price of corn would, in 
spite of all improvements, continue very nearly the same. 
    These three seem to exhaust all the possible combinations of events which can 
happen in the progress of improvement; and during the course of the four 
centuries preceding the present, if we may judge by what has happened both in 
France and Great Britain, each of those three different combinations seem to 
have taken place in the European market, and nearly in the same order, too, in 
which I have here set them down.
Digressions Concerning the Variations in the value of Silver
During the Last Four Centuries
FIRST PERIOD
In 1350, and for some time before, the average price of the quarter of wheat in 
England seems not to have been estimated lower than four ounces of silver, 
Tower weight, equal to about twenty shillings of our present money. From this 
price it seems to have fallen gradually to two ounces of silver, equal to about ten 
shillings of our present money, the price at which we find it estimated in the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, and at which it seems to have continued to be 
estimated till about 1570. 
    In 1350, being the 25th of Edward III, was enacted what is called The Statute 
of Labourers. In the preamble it complains much of the insolence of servants, 
who endeavoured to raise their wages upon their masters. It therefore ordains 
that all servants and labourers should for the future be contented with the same 
wages and liveries (liveries in those times signified not only clothes but 
provisions) which they had been accustomed to receive in the 20th year of the 
king, and the four preceding years; that upon this account their livery wheat 
should nowhere be estimated higher than tenpence a bushel, and that it should 
always be in the option of the master to deliver them either the wheat or the 
money. Tenpence a bushel, therefore, had, in the 25th of Edward III, been 
reckoned a very moderate price of wheat, since it required a particular statute to 
oblige servants to accept of it in exchange for their usual livery of provisions; 
and it had been reckoned a reasonable price ten years before that, or in the 16th 
year of the king, the term to which the statute refers. But in the 16th year of 
Edward III, tenpence contained about half an ounce of silver, Tower weight, and 
was nearly equal to half-a-crown of our present money. Four ounces of silver, 
Tower weight, therefore, equal to six shillings and eightpence of the money of 
those times, and to near twenty shillings of that of the present, must have been 
reckoned a moderate price for the quarter of eight bushels. 
    This statute is surely a better evidence of what was reckoned in those times a 
moderate price of grain than the prices of some particular years which have 
generally been recorded by historians and other writers on account of their 
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extraordinary dearness or cheapness, and from which, therefore, it is difficult to 
form any judgment concerning what may have been the ordinary price. There 
are, besides, other reasons for believing that in the beginning of the fourteenth 
century, and for some time before, the common price of wheat was not less than 
four ounces of silver the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion. 
    In 1309, Ralph de Born, prior of St. Augustine's, Canterbury, gave a feast 
upon his installation-day, of which William Thorn has preserved not only the 
bill of fare but the prices of many particulars. In that feast were consumed, first, 
fifty-three quarters of wheat, which cost nineteen pounds, or seven shillings and 
twopence a quarter, equal to about one-and-twenty shillings and sixpence of our 
present money; secondly, fifty-eight quarters of malt, which cost seventeen 
pounds ten shillings, or six shillings a quarter, equal to about eighteen shillings 
of our present money; thirdly, twenty quarters of oats, which cost four pounds, 
or four shillings a quarter, equal to about twelve shillings of our present money. 
The prices of malt and oats seem here to be higher than their ordinary proportion 
to the price of wheat. 
    These prices are not recorded on account of their extraordinary dearness or 
cheapness, but are mentioned accidentally as the prices actually paid for large 
quantities of grain consumed at a feast which was famous for its magnificence. 
    In 1262, being the 51st of Henry M, was revived an ancient statute called The 
Assize of Bread and Ale, which the king says in the preamble had been made in 
the times of his progenitors, sometime kings of England. It is probably, 
therefore, as old at least as the time of his grandfather Henry H, and may have 
been as old as the Conquest. It regulates the price of bread according as the 
prices of wheat may happen to be, from one shilling to twenty shillings the 
quarter of the money of those times. But statutes of this kind are generally 
presumed to provide with equal care for all deviations from the middle price, for 
those below it as well as for those above it. Ten shillings, therefore, containing 
six ounces of silver, Tower weight, and equal to about thirty shillings of our 
present money, must, upon this supposition, have been reckoned the middle 
price of the quarter of wheat when this statute was first enacted, and must have 
continued to be so in the 51st of Henry III. We cannot therefore be very wrong 
in supposing that the middle price was not less than one-third of the highest 
price at which this statute regulates the price of bread, or than six shillings and 
eightpence of the money of those times, containing four ounces of silver, Tower 
weight. 
    From these different facts, therefore, we seem to have some reason to 
conclude that, about the middle of the fourteenth century, and for a considerable 
time before, the average or ordinary price of the quarter of wheat was not 
supposed to be less than four ounces of silver, Tower weight. 
    From about the middle of the fourteenth to the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, what was reckoned the reasonable and moderate, that is the ordinary or 
average price of wheat, seems to have sunk gradually to about one-half of this 
price; so as at last to have fallen to about two ounces of silver, Tower weight, 
equal to about ten shillings of our present money. It continued to be estimated at 
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this price till about 1570. 
    In the household book of Henry, the fifth Earl of Northumberland, drawn up 
in 1512, there are two different estimations of wheat. In one of them it is 
computed at six shillings and eightpence the quarter, in the other at five shillings 
and eightpence only. In 1512, six shillings and eightpence contained only two 
ounces of silver, Tower weight, and were equal to about ten shillings of our 
present money. 
    From the 25th of Edward III to the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, during 
the space of more than two hundred years, six shillings and eightpence, it 
appears from several different statutes, had continued to be considered as what is 
called the moderate and reasonable, that is the ordinary or average price of 
wheat. The quantity of silver, however, contained in that nominal sum was, 
during the course of this period, continually diminishing, in consequence of 
some alterations which were made in the coin. But the increase of the value of 
silver had, it seems, so far compensated the diminution of the quantity of it 
contained in the same nominal sum that the legislature did not think it worth 
while to attend to this circumstance. 
    Thus in 1436 it was enacted that wheat might be exported without a licence 
when the price was so low as six shillings and eightpence; and in 1463 it was 
enacted that no wheat should be imported if the price was not above six shillings 
and eightpence the quarter. The legislature had imagined that when the price was 
so low there could be no inconveniency in exportation, but that when it rose 
higher it became prudent to allow importation. Six shillings and eightpence, 
therefore, containing about the same quantity of silver as thirteen shillings and 
fourpence of our present money (one third part less than the same nominal sum 
contained in the time of Edward III), had in those times been considered as what 
is called the moderate and reasonable price of wheat. 
    In 1554, by the 1st and 2nd of Philip and Mary; and in 1558, by the 1st of 
Elizabeth, the exportation of wheat was in the same manner prohibited, 
whenever the price of the quarter should exceed six shillings and eightpence, 
which did not then contain two pennyworth more silver than the same nominal 
sum does at present. But it had soon been found that to restrain the exportation 
of wheat till the price was so very low was, in reality, to prohibit it altogether. In 
1562, therefore, by the 5th of Elizabeth, the exportation of wheat was allowed 
from certain ports whenever the price of the quarter should not exceed ten 
shillings, containing nearly the same quantity of silver as the like nominal sum 
does at present. This price had at this time, therefore, been considered as what is 
called the moderate and reasonable price of wheat. It agrees nearly with the 
estimation of the Northumberland book in 1512. 
    That in France the average price of grain was, in the same manner, much 
lower in the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century than in 
the two centuries preceding has been observed both by Mr. Dupre de St. Maur, 
and by the elegant author of the Essay on the police of grain. Its price, during the 
same period, had probably sunk in the same manner through the greater part of 
Europe. 
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    This rise in the value of silver in proportion to that of corn, may either have 
been owing altogether to the increase of the demand for that metal, in 
consequence of increasing improvement and cultivation, the supply in the 
meantime continuing the same as before; or, the demand continuing the same as 
before, it may have been owing altogether to the gradual diminution of the 
supply; the greater part of the mines which were then known in the world being 
much exhausted, and consequently the expense of working them much 
increased; or it may have been owing partly to the other of those two 
circumstances. In the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth 
centuries, the greater part of Europe was approaching towards a more settled 
form of government than it had enjoyed for several ages before. The increase of 
security would naturally increase industry and improvement; and the demand for 
the precious metals, as well as for every other luxury and ornament, would 
naturally increase with the increase of riches. A greater annual produce would 
require a greater quantity of coin to circulate it; and a greater number of rich 
people would require a greater quantity of plate and other ornaments of silver. It 
is natural to suppose, too, that the greater part of the mines which then supplied 
the European market with silver might be a good deal exhausted, and have 
become more expensive in the working. They had been wrought many of them 
from the time of the Romans. 
    It has been the opinion, however, of the greater part of those who have written 
upon the price of commodities in ancient times that, from the Conquest, perhaps 
from the invasion of Julius Caesar till the discovery of the mines of America, the 
value of silver was continually diminishing. This opinion they seem to have 
been led into, partly by the observations which they had occasion to make upon 
the prices both of corn and of some other parts of the rude produce of land; and 
partly by the popular notion that as the quantity of silver naturally increases in 
every country with the increase of wealth, so its value diminishes as its quantity 
increases. 
    In their observations upon the prices of corn, three different circumstances 
seem frequently to have misled them. 
    First, in ancient times almost all rents were paid in kind; in a certain quantity 
of corn, cattle, poultry, etc. It sometimes happened, however, that the landlord 
would stipulate that he should be at liberty to demand of the tenant, either the 
annual payment in kind, or a certain sum of money instead of it. The price at 
which the payment in kind was in this manner exchanged for a certain sum of 
money is in Scotland called the conversion price. As the option is always in the 
landlord to take either the substance or the price, it is necessary for the safety of 
the tenant that the conversion price should rather be below than above the 
average market price. In many places, accordingly, it is not much above one-half 
of this price. Through the greater part of Scotland this custom still continues 
with regard to poultry, and in some places with regard to cattle. It might 
probably have continued to take place, too, with regard to corn, had not the 
institution of the public fiars put an end to it. These are annual valuations, 
according to the judgment of an assize, of the average price of all the different 
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sorts of grain, and of all the different qualities of each, according to the actual 
market price in every different county. This institution rendered it sufficiently 
safe for the tenant, and much more convenient for the landlord, to convert, as 
they call it, the corn rent, rather at what should happen to be the price of the fiars 
of each year, than at any certain fixed price. But the writers who have collected 
the prices of corn in ancient times seem frequently to have mistaken what is 
called in Scotland the conversion price for the actual market price. Fleetwood 
acknowledges, upon one occasion, that he had made this mistake. As he wrote 
his book, however, for a particular purpose, he does not think proper to make 
this acknowledgment till after transcribing this conversion price fifteen times. 
The price is eight shillings the quarter of wheat. This sum in 1423, the year at 
which he begins with it, contained the same quantity of silver as sixteen shillings 
of our present money. But in 1562, the year at which he ends with it, it contained 
no more than the same nominal sum does at present. 
    Secondly, they have been misled by the slovenly manner in which some 
ancient statutes of assize had been sometimes transcribed by lazy copiers; and 
sometimes perhaps actually composed by the legislature. 
    The ancient statutes of assize seem to have begun always with determining 
what ought to be the price of bread and ale when the price of wheat and barley 
were at the lowest, and to have proceeded gradually to determine what it ought 
to be, according as the prices of those two sorts of grain should gradually rise 
above this lowest price. But the transcribers of those statutes seem frequently to 
have thought it sufficient to copy the regulation as far as the three or four first 
and lowest prices, saving in this manner their own labour, and judging, I 
suppose, that this was enough to show what proportion ought to be observed in 
all higher prices. 
    Thus in the Assize of Bread and Ale, of the 51st of Henry III, the price of 
bread was regulated according to the different prices of wheat, from one shilling 
to twenty shillings the quarter, of the money of those times. But in the 
manuscripts from which all the different editions of the statutes, preceding that 
of Mr. Ruffhead, were printed, the copiers had never transcribed this regulation 
beyond the price of twelve shillings. Several writers, therefore, being misled by 
this faulty transcription, very naturally concluded that the middle price, or six 
shillings the quarter, equal to about eighteen shillings of our present money, was 
the ordinary or average price of wheat at that time. 
    In the Statute of Tumbrel and Pillory, enacted nearly about the same time, the 
price of ale is regulated according to every sixpence rise in the price of barley, 
from two shillings to four shillings the quarter. That four shillings, however, was 
not considered as the highest price to which barley might frequently rise in those 
times, and that these prices were only given as an example of the proportion 
which ought to be observed in all other prices, whether higher or lower, we may 
infer from the last words of the statute: et sic deinceps crescetur vel diminuetur 
per sex denarios. The expression is very slovenly, but the meaning is plain 
enough: "That the price of ale is in this manner to be increased or diminished 
according to every sixpence rise or fall in the price of barley." In the 
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composition of this statute the legislature itself seems to have been as negligent 
as the copiers were in the transcription of the others. 
    In an ancient manuscript of the Regiam Majestatem, an old Scotch law book, 
there is a statute of assize in which the price of bread is regulated according to 
all the different prices of wheat, from tenpence to three shillings the Scotch boll, 
equal to about half an English quarter. Three shillings Scotch, at the time when 
this assize is supposed to have been enacted were equal to about nine shillings 
sterling of our present money. Mr. Ruddiman seems to conclude from this, that 
three shillings was the highest price to which wheat ever rose in those times, and 
that tenpence, a shilling, or at most two shillings, were the ordinary prices. Upon 
consulting the manuscript, however, it appears evidently that all these prices are 
only set down as examples of the proportion which ought to be observed 
between the respective prices of wheat and bread. The last words of the statute 
are: reliqua judicabis secundum proescripta habendo respectum ad pretium 
bladi. "You shall judge of the remaining cases according to what is above 
written, having a respect to the price of corn." 
    Thirdly, they seem to have been misled, too, by the very low price at which 
wheat was sometimes sold in very ancient times; and to have imagined that as its 
lowest price was then much lower than in later times, its ordinary price must 
likewise have been much lower. They might have found, however, that in those 
ancient times its highest price was fully as much above, as its lowest price was 
below anything that had even been known in later times. Thus in 1270, 
Fleetwood gives us two prices of the quarter of wheat. The one is four pounds 
sixteen shillings of the money of those times, equal to fourteen pounds eight 
shillings of that of the present; the other is six pounds eight shillings, equal to 
nineteen pounds four shillings of our present money. No price can be found in 
the end of the fifteenth, or beginning of the sixteenth century, which approaches 
to the extravagance of these. The price of corn, though at all times liable to 
variation, varies most in those turbulent and disorderly societies, in which the 
interruption of all commerce and communication hinders the plenty of one part 
of the country from relieving the scarcity of another. In the disorderly state of 
England under the Plantagenets, who governed it from about the middle of the 
twelfth till towards the end of the fifteenth century, one district might be in 
plenty, while another at no great distance, by having its crop destroyed either by 
some accident of the seasons, or by the incursion of some neighbouring baron, 
might be suffering all the horrors of a famine; and yet if the lands of some 
hostile lord were interposed between them, the one might not be able to give the 
least assistance to the other. Under the vigorous administration of the Tudors, 
who governed England during the latter part of the fifteenth and through the 
whole of the sixteenth century, no baron was powerful enough to dare to disturb 
the public security. 
    The reader will find at the end of this chapter all the prices of wheat which 
have been collected by Fleetwood from 1202 to 1597, both inclusive, reduced to 
the money of the present times, and digested according to the order of time, into 
seven divisions of twelve years each. At the end of each division, too, he will 
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find the average price of the twelve years of which it consists. In that long 
period of time, Fleetwood has been able to collect the prices of no more than 
eighty years, so that four years are wanting to make out the last twelve years. I 
have added, therefore, from the accounts of Eton college, the prices of 1598, 
1599, 1600, and 1601. It is the only addition which I have made. The reader will 
see that from the beginning of the thirteenth till after the middle of the sixteenth 
century the average price of each twelve years grows gradually lower and lower; 
and that towards the end of the sixteenth century it begins to rise again. The 
prices, indeed, which Fleetwood has been able to collect, seem to have been 
those chiefly which were remarkable for extraordinary dearness or cheapness; 
and I do not pretend that any very certain conclusion can be drawn from them. 
So far, however, as they prove anything at all, they confirm the account which I 
have been endeavouring to give. Fleetwood himself, however, seems, with most 
other writers, to have believed that during all this period the value of silver, in 
consequence of its increasing abundance, was continually diminishing. The 
prices of corn which he himself has collected certainly do not agree with this 
opinion. They agree perfectly with that of Mr. Dupre de St. Maur, and with that 
which I have been endeavouring to explain. Bishop Fleetwood and Mr. Dupre de 
St. Maur are the two authors who seem to have collected, with the greatest 
diligence and fidelity, the prices of things in ancient times. It is somewhat 
curious that, though their opinions are so very different, their facts, so far as they 
relate to the price of corn at least, should coincide so very exactly. 
    It is not, however, so much from the low price of corn as from that of some 
other parts of the rude produce of land that the most judicious writers have 
inferred the great value of silver in those very ancient times. Corn, it has been 
said, being a sort of manufacture, was, in those rude ages, much dearer in 
proportion than the greater part of other commodities; it is meant, I suppose, 
than the greater part of unmanufactured commodities, such as cattle, poultry, 
game of all kinds, etc. That in those times of poverty and barbarism these were 
proportionably much cheaper than corn is undoubtedly true. But this cheapness 
was not the effect of the high value of silver, but of the low value of those 
commodities. It was not because silver would in such times purchase or 
represent a greater quantity of labour, but because such commodities would 
purchase or represent a much smaller quantity than in times of more opulence 
and improvement. Silver must certainly be cheaper in Spanish America than in 
Europe; in the country where it is produced than in the country to which it is 
brought, at the expense of a long carriage both by land and by sea, of a freight 
and an insurance. One-and-twenty pence halfpenny sterling, however, we are 
told by Ulloa, was, not many years ago, at Buenos Ayres, the price of an ox 
chosen from a herd of three or four hundred. Sixteen shillings sterling, we are 
told by Mr. Byron was the price of a good horse in the capital of Chili. In a 
country naturally fertile, but of which the far greater part is altogether 
uncultivated, cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, etc., as they can be acquired with 
a very small quantity of labour, so they will purchase or command but a very 
small quantity. The low money price for which they may be sold is no proof that 
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the real value of silver is there very high, but that the real value of those 
commodities is very low. 
    Labour, it must always be remembered, and not any particular commodity or 
set of commodities, is the real measure of the value both of silver and of all 
other commodities. 
    But in countries almost waste, or but thinly inhabited, cattle, poultry, game of 
all kinds, etc., as they are the spontaneous productions of nature, so she 
frequently produces them in much greater quantities than the consumption of the 
inhabitants requires. In such a state of things the supply commonly exceeds the 
demand. In different states of society, in different stages of improvement, 
therefore, such commodities will represent, or be equivalent to, very different 
quantities of labour. 
    In every state of society, in every stage of improvement, corn is the 
production of human industry. But the average produce of every sort of industry 
is always suited, more or less exactly, to the average consumption; the average 
supply to the average demand. In every different stage of improvement, besides, 
the raising of equal quantities of corn in the same soil and climate will, at an 
average, require nearly equal quantities of labour; or what comes to the same 
thing, the price of nearly equal quantities; the continual increase of the 
productive powers of labour in an improving state of cultivation being more or 
less counterbalanced by the continually increasing price of cattle, the principal 
instruments of agriculture. Upon all these accounts, therefore, we may rest 
assured that equal quantities of corn will, in every state of society, in every stage 
of improvement, more nearly represent, or be equivalent to, equal quantities of 
labour than equal quantities of any other part of the rude produce of land. Corn, 
accordingly, it has already been observed, is, in all the different stages of wealth 
and improvement, a more accurate measure of value than any other commodity 
or set of commodities. In all those different stages, therefore, we can judge 
better of the real value of silver by comparing it with corn than by comparing it 
with any other commodity or set of commodities. 
    Corn, besides, or whatever else is the common and favourite vegetable food 
of the people, constitutes, in every civilised country, the principal part of the 
subsistence of the labourer. In consequence of the extension of agriculture, the 
land of every country produces a much greater quantity of vegetable than of 
animal food, and the labourer everywhere lives chiefly upon the wholesome 
food that is cheapest and most abundant. Butcher's meat, except in the most 
thriving countries, or where labour is most highly rewarded, makes but an 
insignificant part of his subsistence; poultry makes a still smaller part of it, and 
game no part of it. In France, and even in Scotland, where labour is somewhat 
better rewarded than in France, the labouring poor seldom eat butcher's meat, 
except upon holidays, and other extraordinary occasions. The money price of 
labour, therefore, depends much more upon the average money price of corn, the 
subsistence of the labourer, than upon that of butcher's meat, or of any other part 
of the rude produce of land. The real value of gold and silver, therefore, the real 
quantity of labour which they can purchase or command, depends much more 
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upon the quantity of corn which they can purchase or command than upon that 
of butcher's meat, or any other part of the rude produce of land. 
    Such slight observations, however, upon the prices either of corn or of other 
commodities, would not probably have misled so many intelligent authors had 
they not been influenced, at the same time, by the popular notion, that as the 
quantity of silver naturally increases in every country with the increase of so its 
value diminishes as its quantity increases. This notion, however, seems to be 
altogether groundless. 
    The quantity of the precious metals may increase in any country from two 
different causes; either, first, from the increased abundance of the mines which 
supply it; or, secondly, from the increased wealth of the people, from the 
increased produce of their annual labour. The first of these causes is no doubt 
necessarily connected with the diminution of the value of the precious metals, 
but the second is not. 
    When more abundant mines are discovered, a greater quantity of the precious 
metals is brought to market, and the quantity of the necessaries and 
conveniencies of life for which they must be exchanged being the same as 
before, equal quantities of the metals must be exchanged for smaller quantities 
of commodities. So far, therefore, as the increase of the quantity of the precious 
metals in any country arises from the increased abundance of the mines, it is 
necessarily connected with some diminution of their value. 
    When, on the contrary, the wealth of any country increases, when the annual 
produce of its labour becomes gradually greater and greater, a greater quantity of 
coin becomes necessary in order to circulate a greater quantity of commodities; 
and the people, as they can afford it, as they have more commodities to give for 
it, will naturally purchase a greater and a greater quantity of plate. The quantity 
of their coin will increase from necessity; the quantity of their plate from vanity 
and ostentation, or from the same reason that the quantity of fine statues, 
pictures, and of every other luxury and curiosity, is likely to increase among 
them. But as statuaries and painters are not likely to be worse rewarded in times 
of wealth and prosperity than in times of poverty and depression, so gold and 
silver are not likely to be worse paid for. 
    The price of gold and silver, when the accidental discovery of more abundant 
mines does not keep it down, as it naturally rises with the wealth of every 
country, so, whatever be the state of the mines, it is at all times naturally higher 
in a rich than in a poor country. Gold and silver, like all other commodities, 
naturally seek the market where the best price is given for them, and the best 
price is commonly given for every thing in the country which can best afford it. 
Labour, it must be remembered, is the ultimate price which is paid for 
everything, and in countries where labour is equally well regarded, the money 
price of labour will be in proportion to that of the subsistence of the labourer. 
But gold and silver will naturally exchange for a greater quantity of subsistence 
in a rich than in a poor country, in a country which abounds with subsistence 
than in one which is but indifferently supplied with it. If the two countries are at 
a great distance, the difference may be very great; because though the metals 
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naturally fly from the worse to the better market, yet it may be difficult to 
transport them in such quantities as to bring their price nearly to a level in both. 
If the countries are near, the difference will be smaller, and may sometimes be 
scarce perceptible; because in this case the transportation will be easy. China is a 
much richer country than any part of Europe, and the difference between the 
price of subsistence in China and in Europe is very great. Rice in China is much 
cheaper than wheat is anywhere in Europe. England is a much richer country 
than Scotland; but the difference between the money-price of corn in those two 
countries is much smaller, and is but just perceptible. In proportion to the 
quantity or measure, Scotch corn generally appears to be a good deal cheaper 
than English; but in proportion to its quality, it is certainly somewhat dearer. 
Scotland receives almost every year very large supplies from England, and every 
commodity must commonly be somewhat dearer in the country to which it is 
brought than in that from which it comes. English corn, therefore, must be 
dearer in Scotland than in England, and yet in proportion to its quality, or to the 
quantity and goodness of the flour or meal which can be made from it, it cannot 
commonly be sold higher there than the Scotch corn which comes to market in 
competition with it. 
    The difference between the money price of labour in China and in Europe is 
still greater than that between the money price of subsistence; because the real 
recompense of labour is higher in Europe than in China, the greater part of 
Europe being in an improving state, while China seems to be standing still. The 
money price of labour is lower in Scotland than in England because the real 
recompense of labour is much lower; Scotland, though advancing to greater 
wealth, advancing much more slowly than England. The frequency of 
emigration from Scotland, and the rarity of it from England, sufficiently prove 
that the demand for labour is very different in the two countries. The proportion 
between the real recompense of labour in different countries, it must be 
remembered, is naturally regulated not by their actual wealth or poverty, but by 
their advancing, stationary, or declining condition. 
    Gold and silver, as they are naturally of the greatest value among the richest, 
so they are naturally of the least value among the poorest nations. Among 
savages, the poorest of all nations, they are of scarce any value. 
    In great towns corn is always dearer than in remote parts of the country. This, 
however, is the effect, not of the real cheapness of silver, but of the real dearness 
of corn. It does not cost less labour to bring silver to the great town than to the 
remote parts of the country; but it costs a great deal more to bring corn. 
    In some very rich and commercial countries, such as Holland and the territory 
of Genoa, corn is dear for the same reason that it is dear in great towns. They do 
not produce enough to maintain their inhabitants. They are rich in the industry 
and skill of their artificers and manufacturers; in every sort of machinery which 
can facilitate and abridge labour; in shipping, and in all the other instruments 
and means of carriage and commerce: but they are poor in corn, which, as it 
must be brought to them from distant countries, must, by an addition to its price, 
pay for the carriage from those countries. It does not cost less labour to bring 
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silver to Amsterdam than to Dantzic; but it costs a great deal more to bring corn. 
The real cost of silver must be nearly the same in both places; but that of corn 
must be very different. Diminish the real opulence either of Holland or of the 
territory of Genoa, while the number of their inhabitants remains the same: 
diminish their power of supplying themselves from distant countries; and the 
price of corn, instead of sinking with that diminution in the quantity of their 
silver, which must necessarily accompany this declension either as its cause or 
as its effect, will rise to the price of a famine. When we are in want of 
necessaries we must part with all superfluities, of which the value, as it rises in 
times of opulence and prosperity, so it sinks in times of poverty and distress. It is 
otherwise with necessaries. Their real price, the quantity of labour which they 
can purchase or command, rises in times of poverty and distress, and sinks in 
times of opulence and prosperity, which are always times of great abundance; 
for they could not otherwise be times of opulence and prosperity. Corn is a 
necessary, silver is only a superfluity. 
    Whatever, therefore, may have been the increase in the quantity of the 
precious metals, which, during the period between the middle of the fourteenth 
and that of the sixteenth century, arose from the increase of wealth and 
improvement, it could have no tendency to diminish their value either in Great 
Britain or in any other part of Europe. If those who have collected the prices of 
things in ancient times, therefore, had, during this period, no reason to infer the 
diminution of the value of silver, from any observations which they had made 
upon the prices either of corn or of other commodities, they had still less reason 
to infer it from any supposed increase of wealth and improvement. 
SECOND PERIOD
But how various soever may have been the opinions of the learned concerning 
the progress of the value of silver during this first period, they are unanimous 
concerning it during the second. 
    From about 1570 to about 1640, during a period of about seventy years, the 
variation in the proportion between the value of silver and that of corn held a 
quite opposite course. Silver sunk in its real value, or would exchange for a 
smaller quantity of labour than before; and corn rose in its nominal price, and 
instead of being commonly sold for about two ounces of silver the quarter, or 
about ten shillings of our present money, came to be sold for six and eight 
ounces of silver the quarter, or about thirty and forty shillings of our present 
money. 
    The discovery of the abundant mines of America seems to have been the sole 
cause of this diminution in the value of silver in proportion to that of corn. It is 
accounted for accordingly in the same manner by everybody; and there never 
has been any dispute either about the fact or about the cause of it. The greater 
part of Europe was, during this period, advancing in industry and improvement, 
and the demand for silver must consequently have been increasing. But the 
increase of the supply had, it seems, so far exceeded that of the demand, that the 
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value of that metal sunk considerably. The discovery of the mines of America, it 
is to be observed, does not seem to have had any very sensible effect upon the 
prices of things in England till after 1570; though even the mines of Potosi had 
been discovered more than twenty years before. 
    From 1595 to 1620, both inclusive, the average price of the quarter of nine 
bushels of the best wheat at Windsor market appears, from the accounts of Eton 
College, to have been L2 1s. 6 3/4d. From which sum, neglecting the fraction, 
and deducting a ninth, or 4s. 7 1\3d., the price of the quarter of eight bushels 
comes out to have been L1 16s. 10 2/3d. And from this sum, neglecting likewise 
the fraction, and deducting a ninth, or 4s. 1d., for the difference between the 
price of the best wheat and that of the middle wheat, the price of the middle 
wheat comes out to have been about L1 12s. 9d., or about six ounces and one-
third of an ounce of silver. 
    From 1621 to 1636, both inclusive, the average price of the same measure of 
the best wheat at the same market appears, from the same accounts, to have been 
L2 10s.; from which making the like deductions as in the foregoing case, the 
average price of the quarter of eight bushels of middle wheat comes out to have 
been L1 19s. 6d., or about seven ounces and two-thirds of an ounce of silver. 
THIRD PERIOD
Between 1630 and 1640, or about 1636, the effect of the discovery of the mines 
of America in reducing the value of silver appears to have been completed, and 
the value of that metal seems never to have sunk lower in proportion to that of 
corn than it was about that time. It seems to have risen somewhat in the course 
of the present century, and it had probably begun to do so even some time before 
the end of the last. 
    From 1637 to 1700, both inclusive, being the sixty-four last years of the last 
century, the average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat at 
Windsor market appears, from the same accounts, to have been L2 11s. O 1\3d., 
which is only 1s O 1\3d. dearer than it had been during the sixteen years before. 
But in the course of these sixty-four years there happened two events which 
must have produced a much greater scarcity of corn than what the course of the 
seasons would otherwise have occasioned, and which, therefore, without 
supposing any further reduction in the value of silver, will much more than 
account for this very small enhancement of price. 
    The first of these events was the civil war, which, by discouraging tillage and 
interrupting commerce, must have raised the price of corn much above what the 
course of the seasons would otherwise have occasioned. It must have had this 
effect more or less at all the different markets in the kingdom, but particularly at 
those in the neighbourhood of London, which require to be supplied from the 
greatest distance. In 1648, accordingly, the price of the best wheat at Windsor 
market appears, from the same accounts, to have been L4 5s., and in 1649 to 
have been L4 the quarter of nine bushels. The excess of those two years above 
L2 10s. (the average price of the sixteen years preceding 1637) is L3 5s.; which 
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divided among the sixty-four last years of the last century will alone very nearly 
account for that small enhancement of price which seems to have taken place in 
them. These, however, though the highest, are by no means the only high prices 
which seem to have been occasioned by the civil wars. 
    The second event was the bounty upon the exportation of corn granted in 
1688. The bounty, it has been thought by many people, by encouraging tillage, 
may, in a long course of years, have occasioned a greater abundance, and 
consequently a greater cheapness of corn in the home-market than what would 
otherwise have taken place there. How far the bounty could produce this effect 
at any time, I shall examine hereafter; I shall only observe at present that, 
between 1688 and 1700, it had not time to produce any such effect. During this 
short period its only effect must have been, by encouraging the exportation of 
the surplus produce of every year, and thereby hindering the abundance of one 
year from compensating the scarcity of another, to raise the price in the home-
market. The scarcity which prevailed in England from 1693 to 1699, both 
inclusive, though no doubt principally owing to the badness of the seasons, and, 
therefore, extending through a considerable part of Europe, must have been 
somewhat enhanced by the bounty. In 1699, accordingly, the further exportation 
of corn was prohibited for nine months. 
    There was a third event which occurred in the course of the same period, and 
which, though it could not occasion any scarcity of corn, nor, perhaps, any 
augmentation in the real quantity of silver which was usually paid for it, must 
necessarily have occasioned some augmentation in the nominal sum. This event 
was the great debasement of the silver coin, by clipping and wearing. This evil 
had begun in the reign of Charles II and had gone on continually increasing till 
1695; at which time, as we may learn from Mr. Lowndes, the current silver coin 
was, at an average, near five-and-twenty per cent below its standard value. But 
the nominal sum which constitutes the market price of every commodity is 
necessarily regulated, not so much by the quantity of silver, which, according to 
the standard, ought to be contained in it, as by that which, it is found by 
experience, actually is contained in it. This nominal sum, therefore, is 
necessarily higher when the coin is much debased by clipping and wearing than 
when near to its standard value. 
    In the course of the present century, the silver coin has not at any time been 
more below its standard weight than it is at present. But though very much 
defaced, its value has been kept up by that of the gold coin for which it is 
exchanged. For though before the late recoinage, the gold coin was a good deal 
defaced too, it was less so than the silver. In 1695, on the contrary, the value of 
the silver coin was not kept up by the gold coin; a guinea then commonly 
exchanging for thirty shillings of the worn and clipt silver. Before the late 
recoinage of the gold, the price of silver bullion was seldom higher than five 
shillings and sevenpence an ounce, which is but fivepence above the mint price. 
But in 1695, the common price of silver bullion was six shillings and fivepence 
an ounce, which is fifteenpence above the mint price. Even before the late 
recoinage of the gold, therefore, the coin, gold and silver together, when 
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compared with silver bullion, was not supposed to be more than eight per cent 
below its standard value. In 1695, on the contrary, it had been supposed to be 
near five-and-twenty per cent below that value. But in the beginning of the 
present century, that is, immediately after the great recoinage in King William's 
time. the greater part of the current silver coin must have been still nearer to its 
standard weight than it is at present. In the course of the present century, too, 
there has been no great public calamity, such as the civil war, which could either 
discourage tillage, or interrupt the interior commerce of the country. And though 
the bounty, which has taken place through the greater part of this century, must 
always raise the price of corn somewhat higher than it otherwise would be in the 
actual state of tillage; yet as, in the course of this century, the bounty has had 
full time to produce all the good effects commonly imputed to it, to encourage 
tillage, and thereby to increase the quantity of corn in the home market, it may, 
upon the principles of a system which I shall explain and examine hereafter, be 
supposed to have done something to lower the price of that commodity the one 
way, as well as to raise it the other. It is by many people supposed to have done 
more. In the sixty-four first years of the present century accordingly the average 
price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat at Windsor market appears, 
by the accounts of Eton College, to have been L2 os. 6 1/2d., which is about ten 
shillings and sixpence, or more than five-and-twenty per cent, cheaper than it 
had been during the sixty-four last years of the last century; and about 9s. 6d. 
cheaper than it had been during the sixteen years preceding 1636, when the 
discovery of the abundant mines of America may be supposed to have produced 
its full effect; and about one shilling cheaper than it had been in the twenty-six 
years preceding 1620, before that discovery can well be supposed to have 
produced its full effect. According to this account, the average price of middle 
wheat, during these sixty-four first years of the present century, comes out to 
have been about thirty-two shillings the quarter of eight bushels. 
    The value of silver, therefore, seems to have risen somewhat in proportion to 
that of corn during the course of the present century, and it had probably begun 
to do so even some time before the end of the last. 
    In 1687, the price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat at Windsor 
market was L1 5s. 2d. the lowest price at which it had ever been from 1595. 
    In 1688, Mr. Gregory King, a man famous for his knowledge in matters of 
this kind, estimated the average price of wheat in years of moderate plenty to be 
to the grower 3s. 6d. the bushel, or eight-and-twenty shillings the quarter. The 
grower's price I understand to be the same with what is sometimes called the 
contract price, or the price at which a farmer contracts for a certain number of 
years to deliver a certain quantity of corn to a dealer. As a contract of this kind 
saves the farmer the expense and trouble of marketing, the contract price is 
generally lower than what is supposed to be the average market price. Mr. King 
had judged eight-and-twenty shillings the quarter to be at that time the ordinary 
contract price in years of moderate plenty. Before the scarcity occasioned by the 
late extraordinary course of bad seasons, it was, I have been assured, the 
ordinary contract price in all common years. 
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    In 1688 was granted the Parliamentary bounty upon the exportation of corn. 
The country gentlemen, who then composed a still greater proportion of the 
legislature than they do at present, had felt that the money price of corn was 
falling. The bounty was an expedient to raise it artificially to the high price at 
which it had frequently been sold in the times of Charles I and III. It was to take 
place, therefore, till wheat was so high as forty-eight shillings the quarter, that is, 
twenty shillings, or five-sevenths dearer than Mr. King had in that very year 
estimated the grower's price to be in times of moderate plenty. If his calculations 
deserve any part of the reputation which they have obtained very universally, 
eight-and-forty shillings the quarter was a price which, without some such 
expedient as the bounty, could not at that time be expected, except in years of 
extraordinary scarcity. But the government of King William was not then fully 
settled. It was in no condition to refuse anything to the country gentlemen, from 
whom it was at that very time soliciting the first establishment of the annual 
land-tax. 
    The value of silver, therefore, in proportion to that of corn, had probably risen 
somewhat before the end of the last century; and it seems to have continued to 
do so during the course of the greater part of the present; though the necessary 
operation of the bounty must have hindered that rise from being so sensible as it 
otherwise would have been in the actual state of tillage. 
    In plentiful years the bounty, by occasioning an extraordinary exportation, 
necessarily raises the price of corn above what it otherwise would be in those 
years. To encourage tillage, by keeping up the price of corn even in the most 
plentiful years, was the avowed end of the institution. 
    In years of great scarcity, indeed, the bounty has generally been suspended. It 
must, however, have had some effect even upon the prices of many of those 
years. By the extraordinary exportation which it occasions in years of plenty, it 
must frequently hinder the plenty of one year from compensating the scarcity of 
another. 
    Both in years of plenty and in years of scarcity, therefore, the bounty raises 
the price of corn above what it naturally would be in the actual state of tillage. 
If, during the sixty-four first years of the present century, therefore, the average 
price has been lower than during the sixty-four last years of the last century, it 
must, in the same state of tillage, have been much more so, had it not been for 
this operation of the bounty. 
    But without the bounty, it may be said, the state of tillage would not have 
been the same. What may have been the effects of this institution upon the 
agriculture of the country, I shall endeavour to explain hereafter, when I come to 
treat particularly of bounties. I shall only observe at present that this rise in the 
value of silver, in proportion to that of corn, has not been peculiar to England. It 
has been observed to have taken place in France, during the same period, and 
nearly in the same proportion too, by three very faithful, diligent, and laborious 
collectors of the prices of corn, Mr. Dupre de St. Maur, Mr. Messance, and the 
author of the Essay on the police of grain. But in France, till 1764, the 
exportation of grain was by law prohibited; and it is somewhat difficult to 
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suppose that nearly the same diminution of price which took place in one 
country, notwithstanding this prohibition, should in another be owing to the 
extraordinary encouragement given to exportation. 
    It would be more proper, perhaps, to consider this variation in the average 
money price of corn as the effect rather of some gradual rise in the real value of 
silver in the European market than of any fall in the real average value of corn. 
Corn, it has already been observed, is at distant periods of time a more accurate 
measure of value than either silver, or perhaps any other commodity. When, 
after the discovery of the abundant mines of America, corn rose to three and four 
times its former money price, this change was universally ascribed, not to any 
rise in the real value of corn, but to a fall in the real value of silver. If during the 
sixty-four first years of the present century, therefore, the average money price 
of corn has fallen somewhat below what it had been during the greater part of 
the last century, we should in the same manner impute this change, not to any 
fall in the real value of corn, but to some rise in the real value of silver in the 
European market. 
    The high price of corn during these ten or twelve years past, indeed, has 
occasioned a suspicion that the real value of silver still continues to fall in the 
European market. This high price of corn, however, seems evidently to have 
been the effect of the extraordinary unfavourableness of the seasons, and ought 
therefore to be regarded, not as a permanent, but as a transitory and occasional 
event. The seasons for these ten or twelve years past have been unfavourable 
through the greater part of Europe; and the disorders of Poland have very much 
increased the scarcity in all those countries which, in dear years, used to be 
supplied from that market. So long a course of bad seasons, though not a very 
common event, is by no means a singular one; and whoever has inquired much 
into the history of the prices of corn in former times will be at no loss to 
recollect several other examples of the same kind. Ten years of extraordinary 
scarcity, besides, are not more wonderful than ten years of extraordinary plenty. 
The low price of corn from 1741 to 1750, both inclusive, may very well be set in 
opposition to its high price during these last eight or ten years. From 1741 to 
1750, the average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat at 
Windsor market, it appears from the accounts of Eton College, was only L1 13s. 
9 1/2d., which is nearly 6s. 3d. below the average price of the sixty-four first 
years of the present century. The average price of the quarter of eight bushels of 
middle wheat comes out, according to this account, to have been, during these 
ten years, only 51 6s. 8d. 
    Between 1741 and 1750, however, the bounty must have hindered the price of 
corn from falling so low in the home market as it naturally would have done. 
During these ten years the quantity of all sorts of grain exported, it appears from 
the custom-house books, amounted to no less than eight millions twenty-nine 
thousand one hundred and fifty-six quarters one bushel. The bounty paid for this 
amounted to L1,514,962 17s. 4 1/2d. In 1749 accordingly, Mr. Pelham, at that 
time Prime Minister, observed to the House of Commons that for the three years 
preceding a very extraordinary sum had been paid as bounty for the exportation 
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of corn. He had good reason to make this observation, and in the following year 
he might have had still better. In that single year the bounty paid amounted to no 
less than L324,176 10s. 6d. It is unnecessary to observe how much this forced 
exportation must have raised the price of corn above what it otherwise would 
have been in the home market. 
    At the end of the accounts annexed to this chapter the reader will find the 
particular account of those ten years separated from the rest. He will find there, 
too, the particular account of the preceding ten years, of which the average is 
likewise below, though not so much below, the general average of the sixty-four 
first years of the century. The year 1740, however, was a year of extraordinary 
scarcity. These twenty years preceding 1750 may very well be set in opposition 
to the twenty preceding 1770. As the former were a good deal below the general 
average of the century, notwithstanding the intervention of one or two dear 
years; so the latter have been a good deal above it, notwithstanding the 
intervention of one or two cheap ones, of 1759, for example. If the former have 
not been as much below the general average as the latter have been above it, we 
ought probably to impute it to the bounty. The change has evidently been too 
sudden to be ascribed to any change in the value of silver, which is always slow 
and gradual. The suddenness of the effect can be accounted for only by a cause 
which can operate suddenly, the accidental variation of the seasons. 
    The money price of labour in Great Britain has, indeed, risen during the 
course of the present century. This, however, seems to be the effect, not so much 
of any diminution in the value of silver in the European market, as of an increase 
in the demand for labour in Great Britain, arising from the great, and almost 
universal prosperity of the country. In France, a country not altogether so 
prosperous, the money price of labour has, since the middle of the last century, 
been observed to sink gradually with the average money price of corn. Both in 
the last century and in the present the day-wages of common labour are there 
said to have been pretty uniformly about the twentieth part of the average price 
of the septier of wheat, a measure which contains a little more than four 
Winchester bushels. In Great Britain the real recompense of labour, it has 
already been shown, the real quantities of the necessaries and conveniencies of 
life which are given to the labourer, has increased considerably during the 
course of the present century. The rise in its money price seems to have been the 
effect, not of any diminution of the value of silver in the general market of 
Europe, but of a rise in the real price of labour in the particular market of Great 
Britain, owing to the peculiarly happy circumstances of the country. 
    For some time after the first discovery of America, silver would continue to 
sell at its former, or not much below its former price. The profits of mining 
would for some time be very great, and much above their natural rate. Those 
who imported that metal into Europe, however, would soon find that the whole 
annual importation could not be disposed of at this high price. Silver would 
gradually exchange for a smaller and a smaller quantity of goods. Its price 
would sink gradually lower and lower till it fell to its natural price, or to what 
was just sufficient to pay, according to their natural rates, the wages of the 
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labour, the profits of the stock, and the rent of the land, which must be paid in 
order to bring it from the mine to the market. In the greater part of the silver 
mines of Peru, the tax of the King of Spain, amounting to a tenth of the gross 
produce, eats up, it has already been observed, the whole rent of the land. This 
tax was originally a half; it soon afterwards fell to a third, then to a fifth, and at 
last to a tenth, at which rate it still continues. In the greater part of the silver 
mines of Peru this, it seems, is all that remains after replacing the stock of the 
undertaker of the work, together with its ordinary profits; and it seems to be 
universally acknowledged that these profits, which were once very high, are now 
as low as they can well be, consistently with carrying on their works. 
    The tax of the King of Spain was reduced to a fifth part of the registered silver 
in 1504, one-and-forty years before 1545, the date of the discovery of the mines 
of Potosi. In the course of ninety years, or before 1636, these mines, the most 
fertile in all America, had time sufficient to produce their full effect, or to reduce 
the value of silver in the European market as low as it could well fall, while it 
continued to pay this tax to the King of Spain. Ninety years is time sufficient to 
reduce any commodity, of which there is no monopoly, to its natural price, or to 
the lowest price at which, while it pays a particular tax, it can continue to be sold 
for any considerable time together. 
    The price of silver in the European market might perhaps have fallen still 
lower, and it might have become necessary either to reduce the tax upon it, not 
only to one tenth, as in 1736, but to one twentieth, in the same manner as that 
upon gold, or to give up working the greater part of the American mines which 
are now wrought. The gradual increase of the demand for silver, or the gradual 
enlargement of the market for the produce of the silver mines of America, is 
probably the cause which has prevented this from happening, and which has not 
only kept up the value of silver in the European market, but has perhaps even 
raised it somewhat higher than it was about the middle of the last century. 
    Since the first discovery of America, the market for the produce of its silver 
mines has been growing gradually more and more extensive. 
    First, the market of Europe has become gradually more and more extensive. 
Since the discovery of America, the greater part of Europe has been much 
improved. England, Holland, France, and Germany; even Sweden, Denmark, 
and Russia, have all advanced considerably both in agriculture and in 
manufactures. Italy seems not to have gone backwards. The fall of Italy 
preceded the conquest of Peru. Since that time it seems rather to have recovered 
a little. Spain and Portugal, indeed, are supposed to have gone backwards. 
Portugal, however, is but a very small part of Europe, and the declension of 
Spain is not, perhaps, so great as is commonly imagined. In the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, Spain was a very poor country, even in comparison with 
France, which has been so much improved since that time. It was the well 
known remark of the Emperor Charles V, who had travelled so frequently 
through both countries, that everything abounded in France, but that everything 
was wanting in Spain. The increasing produce of the agriculture and 
manufactures of Europe must necessarily have required a gradual increase in the 
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quantity of silver coin to circulate it; and the increasing number of wealthy 
individuals must have required the like increase in the quantity of their plate and 
other ornaments of silver. 
    Secondly, America is itself a new market for the produce of its own silver 
mines; and as its advances in agriculture, industry, and population are much 
more rapid than those of the most thriving countries in Europe, its demand must 
increase much more rapidly. The English colonies are altogether a new market, 
which, partly for coin and partly for plate, requires a continually augmenting 
supply of silver through a great continent where there never was any demand 
before. The greater part, too, of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies are 
altogether new markets. New Granada, the Yucatan, Paraguay, and the Brazils 
were, before discovered by the Europeans, inhabited by savage nations who had 
neither arts nor agriculture. A considerable degree of both has now been 
introduced into all of them. Even Mexico and Peru, though they cannot be 
considered as altogether new markets, are certainly much more extensive ones 
than they ever were before. After all the wonderful tales which have been 
published concerning the splendid state of those countries in ancient times, 
whoever reads, with any degree of sober judgment, the history of their first 
discovery and conquest, will evidently discern that, in arts, agriculture, and 
commerce, their inhabitants were much more ignorant than the Tartars of the 
Ukraine are at present. Even the Peruvians, the more civilised nation of the two, 
though they made use of gold and silver as ornaments, had no coined money of 
any kind. Their whole commerce was carried on by barter, and there was 
accordingly scarce any division of labour among them. Those who cultivated the 
ground were obliged to build their own houses, to make their own household 
furniture, their own clothes, shoes, and instruments of agriculture. The few 
artificers among them are said to have been all maintained by the sovereign, the 
nobles, and the priests, and were probably their servants or slaves. All the 
ancient arts of Mexico and Peru have never furnished one single manufacture to 
Europe. The Spanish armies, though they scarce ever exceeded five hundred 
men, and frequently did not amount to half that number, found almost 
everywhere great difficulty in procuring subsistence. The famines which they 
are said to have occasioned almost wherever they went, in countries, too, which 
at the same time are represented as very populous and well cultivated, 
sufficiently demonstrate that the story of this populousness and high cultivation 
is in a great measure fabulous. The Spanish colonies are under a government in 
many respects less favourable to agriculture, improvement, and population than 
that of the English colonies. They seem, however, to be advancing in all these 
much more rapidly than any country in Europe. In a fertile soil and happy 
climate, the great abundance and cheapness of land, a circumstance common to 
all new colonies, is, it seems, so great an advantage as to compensate many 
defects in civil government. Frezier, who visited Peru in 1713, represents Lima 
as containing between twenty-five and twenty-eight thousand inhabitants. Ulloa, 
who resided in the same country between 1740 and 1746, represents it as 
containing more than fifty thousand. The difference in their accounts of the 
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populousness of several other principal towns in Chili and Peru is nearly the 
same; and as there seems to be no reason to doubt of the good information of 
either, it marks an increase which is scarce inferior to that of the English 
colonies. America, therefore, is a new market for the produce of its own silver 
mines, of which the demand must increase much more rapidly than that of the 
most thriving country in Europe. 
    Thirdly, the East Indies is another market for the produce of the silver mines 
of America, and a market which, from the time of the first discovery of those 
mines, has been continually taking off a greater and a greater quantity of silver. 
Since that time, the direct trade between America and the East Indies, which is 
carried on by means of the Acapulco ships, has been continually augmenting, 
and the indirect intercourse by the way of Europe has been augmenting in a still 
greater proportion. During the sixteenth century, the Portuguese were the only 
European nation who carried on any regular trade to the East Indies. In the last 
years of that century the Dutch begun to encroach upon this monopoly, and in a 
few years expelled them from their principal settlements in India. During the 
greater part of the last century those two nations divided the most considerable 
part of the East India trade between them; the trade of the Dutch continually 
augmenting in a still greater proportion than that of the Portuguese declined. The 
English and French carried on some trade with India in the last century, but it 
has been greatly augmented in the course of the present. The East India trade of 
the Swedes and Danes began in the course of the present century. Even the 
Muscovites now trade regularly with China by a sort of caravans which go 
overland through Siberia and Tartary to Pekin. The East India trade of all these 
nations, if we except that of the French, which the last war had well nigh 
annihilated, had been almost continually augmenting. The increasing 
consumption of East India goods in Europe is, it seems, so great as to afford a 
gradual increase of employment to them all. Tea, for example, was a drug very 
little used in Europe before the middle of the last century. At present the value 
of the tea annually imported by the English East India Company, for the use of 
their own countrymen, amounts to more than a million and a half a year; and 
even this is not enough; a great deal more being constantly smuggled into the 
country from the ports of Holland, from Gottenburgh in Sweden, and from the 
coast of France too, as long as the French East India Company was in prosperity. 
The consumption of the porcelain of China, of the spiceries of the Moluccas, of 
the piece goods of Bengal, and of innumerable other articles, has increased very 
nearly in a like proportion. The tonnage accordingly of all the European 
shipping employed in the East India trade, at any one time during the last 
century, was not, perhaps, much greater than that of the English East India 
Company before the late reduction of their shipping. 
    But in the East Indies, particularly in China and Indostan, the value of the 
precious metals, when the Europeans first began to trade to those countries, was 
much higher than in Europe; and it still continues to be so. In rice countries, 
which generally yield two, sometimes three crops in the year, each of them more 
plentiful than any common crop of corn, the abundance of food must be much 
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greater than in any corn country of equal extent. Such countries are accordingly 
much more populous. In them, too, the rich, having a greater superabundance of 
food to dispose of beyond what they themselves can consume, have the means 
of purchasing a much greater quantity of the labour of other people. The retinue 
of a grandee in China or Indostan accordingly is, by all accounts, much more 
numerous and splendid than that of the richest subjects in Europe. The same 
superabundance of food, of which they have the disposal, enables them to give a 
greater quantity of it for all those singular and rare productions which nature 
furnishes but in very small quantities; such as the precious metals and the 
precious stones, the great objects of the competition of the rich. Though the 
mines, therefore, which supplied the Indian market had been as abundant as 
those which supplied the European, such commodities would naturally exchange 
for a greater quantity of food in India than in Europe. But the mines which 
supplied the Indian market with the precious metals seem to have been a good 
deal less abundant, and those which supplied it with the precious stones a good 
deal more so, than the mines which supplied the European. The precious metals, 
therefore, would naturally exchange in India for somewhat a greater quantity of 
the precious stones, and for a much greater quantity of food than in Europe. The 
money price of diamonds, the greatest of all superfluities, would be somewhat 
lower, and that of food, the first of all necessaries, a great deal lower in the one 
country than in the other. But the real price of labour, the real quantity of the 
necessaries of life which is given to the labourer, it has already been observed, is 
lower both in China and Indostan, the two great markets of India, than it is 
through the greater part of Europe. The wages of the labourer will there purchase 
a smaller quantity of food; and as the money price of food is much lower in 
India than in Europe, the money price of labour is there lower upon a double 
account; upon account both of the small quantity of food which it will purchase, 
and of the low price of that food. But in countries of equal art and industry, the 
money price of the greater part of manufactures will be in proportion to the 
money price of labour; and in manufacturing art and industry, China and 
Indostan, though inferior, seem not to be much inferior to any part of Europe. 
The money price of the greater part of manufactures, therefore, will naturally be 
much lower in those great empires than it is anywhere in Europe. Through the 
greater part of Europe, too, the expense of land-carriage increases very much 
both the real and nominal price of most manufactures. It costs more labour, and 
therefore more money, to bring first the materials, and afterwards the complete 
manufacture to market. In China and Indostan the extent and variety of inland 
navigation save the greater part of this labour, and consequently of this money, 
and thereby reduce still lower both the real and the nominal price of the greater 
part of their manufactures. Upon all those accounts the precious metals axe a 
commodity which it always has been, and still continues to be, extremely 
advantageous to carry from Europe to India. There is scarce any commodity 
which brings a better price there; or which, in proportion to the quantity of 
labour and commodities which it costs in Europe, will purchase or command a 
greater quantity of labour and commodities in India. It is more advantageous, 
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too, to carry silver thither than gold; because in China, and the greater part of the 
other markets of India, the proportion between fine silver and fine gold is but as 
ten, or at most as twelve, to one; whereas in Europe it is as fourteen or fifteen to 
one. In China, and the greater part of the other markets of India, ten, or at most 
twelve, ounces of silver will purchase an ounce of gold; in Europe it requires 
from fourteen to fifteen ounces. In the cargoes, therefore, of the greater part of 
European ships which sail to India, silver has generally been one of the most 
valuable articles. It is the most valuable article in the Acapulco ships which sail 
to Manilla. The silver of the new continent seems in this manner to be one of the 
principal commodities by which the commerce between the two extremities of 
the old one is carried on, and it is by means of it, in a great measure, that those 
distant parts of the world are connected with one another. 
    In order to supply so very widely extended a market, the quantity of silver 
annually brought from the mines must not only be sufficient to support that 
continual increase both of coin and of plate which is required in all thriving 
countries; but to repair that continual waste and consumption of silver which 
takes place in all countries where that metal is used. 
    The continual consumption of the precious metals in coin by wearing, and in 
plate both by wearing and cleaning, is very sensible, and in commodities of 
which the use is so very widely extended, would alone require a very great 
annual supply. The consumption of those metals in some particular 
manufactures, though it may not perhaps be greater upon the whole than this 
gradual consumption, is, however, much more sensible, as it is much more rapid. 
In the manufactures of Birmingham alone the quantity of gold and silver 
annually employed in gilding and plating, and thereby disqualified from ever 
afterwards appearing in the shape of those metals, is said to amount to more than 
fifty thousand pounds sterling. We may from thence form some notion how 
great must be the annual consumption in all the different parts of the world 
either in manufactures of the same kind with those of Birmingham, or in laces, 
embroideries, gold and silver stuffs, the gilding of books, furniture, etc. A 
considerable quantity, too, must be annually lost in transporting those metals 
from one place to another both by sea and by land. In the greater part of the 
governments of Asia, besides, the almost universal custom of concealing 
treasures in the bowels of the earth, of which the knowledge frequently dies with 
the person who makes the concealment, must occasion the loss of a still greater 
quantity. 
    The quantity of gold and silver imported at both Cadiz and Lisbon (including 
not only what comes under register, but what may be supposed to be smuggled) 
amounts, according to the best accounts, to about six millions sterling a year. 
    According to Mr. Meggens the annual importation of the precious metals into 
Spain, at an average of six years, viz., from 1748 to 1753, both inclusive; and 
into Portugal, at an average of seven years, viz., from 1747 to 1753, both 
inclusive, amounted in silver to 1,101,107 pounds weight; and in gold to 29,940 
pounds weight. The silver, at sixty-two shillings the pound Troy, amounts to 
L3,413,431 10s. sterling. The gold, at forty-four guineas and a half the pound 
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Troy, amounts to L2,333,446 14s. sterling. Both together amount to L5,746,878 
4s. sterling. The account of what was imported under register he assures us is 
exact. He gives us the detail of the particular places from which the gold and 
silver were brought, and of the particular quantity of each metal, which, 
according to the register, each of them afforded. He makes an allowance, too, for 
the quantity of each metal which he supposes may have been smuggled. The 
great experience of this judicious merchant renders his opinion of considerable 
weight. 
    According to the eloquent and, sometimes, well-informed author of the 
Philosophical and Political History of the Establishment of the Europeans in the 
two Indies, the annual importation of registered gold and silver into Spain, at an 
average of eleven years, viz., from 1754 to 1764, both inclusive, amounted to 
13,984,185 3/4 piastres of ten reals. On account of what may have been 
smuggled, however, the whole annual importation, he supposes, may have 
amounted to seventeen millions of piastres, which, at 4s. 6d. the piastre, is equal 
to L3,825,000 sterling. He gives the detail, too, of the particular places from 
which the gold and silver were brought, and of the particular quantities of each 
metal which, according to the register, each of them afforded. He informs us, 
too, that if we were to judge of the quantity of gold annually imported from the 
Brazils into Lisbon by the amount of the tax paid to the King of Portugal, which 
it seems is one-fifth of the standard metal, we might value it at eighteen millions 
of cruzadoes, or forty-five millions of French livres, equal to about two millions 
sterling. On account of what may have been smuggled, however, we may safely, 
he says, add to the sum an eighth more, or L250,000 sterling, so that the whole 
will amount to L2,250,000 sterling. According to this account, therefore, the 
whole annual importation of the precious metals into both Spain and Portugal 
amounts to about L6,075,000 sterling. 
    Several other very well authenticated, though manuscript, accounts, I have 
been assured, agree in making this whole annual importation amount at an 
average to about six millions sterling; sometimes a little more, sometimes a little 
less. 
    The annual importation of the precious metals into Cadiz and Lisbon, indeed, 
is not equal to the whole annual produce of the mines of America. Some part is 
sent annually by the Acapulco ships to Manilla; some part is employed in the 
contraband trade which the Spanish colonies carry on with those of other 
European nations; and some part, no doubt remains in the country. The mines of 
America, besides, are by no means the only gold and silver mines in the world. 
They are, however, by far the most abundant. The produce of all the other mines 
which are known is insignificant, it is acknowledged, in comparison with theirs; 
and the far greater part of their produce, it is likewise acknowledged, is annually 
imported into Cadiz and Lisbon. But the consumption of Birmingham alone, at 
the rate of fifty thousand pounds a year, is equal to the hundred-and-twentieth 
part of this annual importation at the rate of six millions a year. The whole 
annual consumption of gold and silver, therefore, in all the different countries of 
the world where those metals are used, may perhaps be nearly equal to the whole 
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annual produce. The remainder may be no more than sufficient to supply the 
increasing demand of all thriving countries. It may even have fallen so far short 
of time demand as somewhat to raise the price of those metals in the European 
market. 
    The quantity of brass and iron annually brought from the mine to the market 
is out of all proportion greater than that of gold and silver. We do not, however, 
upon this account, imagine that those coarse metals are likely to multiply beyond 
the demand, or to become gradually cheaper and cheaper. Why should we 
imagine that the precious metals are likely to do so? The coarse metals, indeed, 
though harder, are put to much harder uses, and, as they are of less value, less 
care is employed in their preservation. The precious metals, however, are not 
necessarily immortal any more than they, but are liable, too, to be lost, wasted, 
and consumed in a great variety of ways. 
    The price of all metals, though liable to slow and gradual variations, varies 
less from year to year than that of almost any other part of the rude produce of 
land; and the price of the precious metals is even less liable to sudden variations 
than that of the coarse ones. The durableness of metals is the foundation of this 
extraordinary steadiness of price. The corn which was brought to market last 
year will be all or almost all consumed long before the end of this year. But 
some part of the iron which was brought from the mine two or three hundred 
years ago may be still in use, and perhaps some part of the gold which was 
brought from it two or three thousand years ago. The different masses of corn 
which in different years must supply the consumption of the world will always 
be nearly in proportion to the respective produce of those different years. But the 
proportion between the different masses of iron which may be in use in two 
different years will be very little affected by any accidental difference in the 
produce of the iron mines of those two years; and the proportion between the 
masses of gold will be still less affected by any such difference in the produce of 
the gold mines. Though the produce of the greater part of metallic mines, 
therefore, varies, perhaps, still more from year to year than that of the greater 
part of corn fields, those variations have not the same effect upon the price of 
the one species of commodities as upon that of the other. 
Variations in the Proportion between the Respective Values of Gold and 
Silver
Before the discovery of the mines of America, the value of fine gold to fine 
silver was regulated in the different mints of Europe between the proportions of 
one to ten and one to twelve; that is, an ounce of fine gold was supposed to be 
worth from ten to twelve ounces of fine silver. About the middle of the last 
century it came to be regulated, between the proportions of one to fourteen and 
one to fifteen; that is, an ounce of fine gold came to be supposed to be worth 
between fourteen and fifteen ounces of fine silver. Gold rose in its nominal 
value, or in the quantity of silver which was given for it. Both metals sunk in 
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their real value, or in the quantity of labour which they could purchase; but 
silver sunk more than gold. Though both the gold and silver mines of America 
exceeded in fertility all those which had ever been known before, the fertility of 
the silver mines had, it seems, been proportionably still greater than that of the 
gold ones. 
    The great quantities of silver carried annually from Europe to India have, in 
some of the English settlements, gradually reduced the value of that metal in 
proportion to gold. In the mint of Calcutta an ounce of fine gold is supposed to 
be worth fifteen ounces of fine silver, in the same manner as in Europe. It is in 
the mint perhaps rated too high for the value which it bears in the market of 
Bengal. In China, the proportion of gold to silver still continues as one to ten, or 
one to twelve. In Japan it is said to be as one to eight. 
    The proportion between the quantities of gold and silver annually imported 
into Europe, according to Mr. Meggens's account, is as one to twenty-two 
nearly; that is, for one ounce of gold there are imported a little more than twenty-
two ounces of silver. The great quantity of silver sent annually to the East Indies 
reduces, he supposes, the quantities of those metals which remain in Europe to 
the proportion of one to fourteen or fifteen, the proportion of their values. The 
proportion between their values, he seems to think, must necessarily be the same 
as that between their quantities, and would therefore be as one to twenty-two, 
were it not for this greater exportation of silver. 
    But the ordinary proportion between the respective values of two 
commodities is not necessarily the same as that between the quantities of them 
which are commonly in the market. The price of an ox, reckoned at ten guineas, 
is about threescore times the price of a lamb, reckoned at 3s. 6d. It would be 
absurd, however, to infer from thence that there are commonly in the market 
threescore lambs for one ox: and it would be just as absurd to infer, because an 
ounce of gold will commonly purchase from fourteen to fifteen ounces of silver, 
that there are commonly in the market only fourteen or fifteen ounces of silver 
for one ounce of gold. 
    The quantity of silver commonly in the market, it is probable is much greater 
in proportion to that of gold than the value of a certain quantity of gold is to that 
of an equal quantity of silver. The whole quantity of a cheap commodity brought 
to market is commonly not only greater, but of greater value, than the whole 
quantity of a dear one. The whole quantity of bread annually brought to market 
is not only greater, but of greater value than the whole quantity of butcher's 
meat; the whole quantity of butcher's meat, than the whole quantity of poultry; 
and the whole quantity of wild fowl. There are so many more purchasers for the 
cheap than for the dear commodity that not only a greater quantity of it, but a 
greater value, can commonly be disposed of. The whole quantity, therefore, of 
the cheap commodity must commonly be greater in proportion to the whole 
quantity of the dear one than the value of a certain quantity of the dear one is to 
the value of an equal quantity of the cheap one. When we compare the precious 
metals with one another, silver is a cheap and gold a dear commodity. We ought 
naturally to expect, therefore, that there should always be in the market not only 
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a greater quantity, but a greater value of silver than of gold. Let any man who 
has a little of both compare his own silver with his gold plate, and he will 
probably find that, not only the quantity, but the value of the former greatly 
exceeds that of the latter. Many people, besides, have a good deal of silver who 
have no gold plate, which, even with those who have it, is generally confined to 
watchcases, snuff-boxes, and such like trinkets, of which the whole amount is 
seldom of great value. In the British coin, indeed, the value of the gold 
preponderates greatly, but it is not so in that of all countries. In the coin of some 
countries the value of the two metals is nearly equal. In the Scotch coin, before 
the union with England, the gold preponderated very little, though it did 
somewhat, as it appears by the accounts of the mint. In the coin of many 
countries the silver preponderates. In France, the largest sums are commonly 
paid in that metal, and it is there difficult to get more gold than what is necessary 
to carry about in your pocket. The superior value, however, of the silver plate 
above that of the gold, which takes place in all countries, will much more than 
compensate the preponderancy of the gold coin above the silver, which takes 
place only in some countries. 
    Though, in one sense of the word, silver always has been, and probably 
always will be, much cheaper than gold; yet in another sense gold may, perhaps, 
in the present state of the Spanish market, be said to be somewhat cheaper than 
silver. A commodity may be said to be dear or cheap, not only according to the 
absolute greatness or smallness of its usual price, but according as that price is 
more or less above the lowest for which it is possible to bring it to market for 
any considerable time together. This lowest price is that which barely replaces, 
with a moderate profit, the stock which must be employed in bringing the 
commodity thither. It is the price which affords nothing to the landlord, of which 
rent makes not any component part, but which resolves itself altogether into 
wages and profit. But, in the present state of the Spanish market, gold is 
certainly somewhat nearer to this lowest price than silver. The tax of the King of 
Spain upon gold is only one-twentieth part of the standard metal, or five per 
cent; whereas his tax upon silver amounts to one-tenth part of it, or to ten per 
cent. In these taxes too, it has already been observed, consists the whole rent of 
the greater part of the gold and silver mines of Spanish America; and that upon 
gold is still worse paid than that upon silver. The profits of the undertakers of 
gold mines too, as they more rarely make a fortune, must, in general, be still 
more moderate than those of the undertakers of silver mines. The price of 
Spanish gold, therefore, as it affords both less rent and less profit, must, in the 
Spanish market, be somewhat nearer to the lowest price for which it is possible 
to bring it thither than the price of Spanish silver. When all expenses are 
computed, the whole quantity of the one metal, it would seem, cannot, in the 
Spanish market, be disposed of so advantageously as the whole quantity of the 
other. The tax, indeed, of the King of Portugal upon the gold of the Brazils is the 
same with the ancient tax of the King of Spain upon the silver of Mexico and 
Peru; or one-fifth part of the standard metal. It may, therefore, be uncertain 
whether to the general market of Europe the whole mass of American gold 
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comes at a price nearer to the lowest for which it is possible to bring it thither 
than the whole mass of American silver. 
    The price of diamonds and other precious stones may, perhaps, be still nearer 
to the lowest price at which it is possible to bring them to market than even the 
price of gold. 
    Though it is not very probable that any part of a tax, which is not only 
imposed upon one of the most proper subjects of taxation, a mere luxury and 
superfluity, but which affords so very important a revenue as the tax upon silver, 
will ever be given up as long as it is possible to pay it; yet the same impossibility 
of paying it, which in 1736 made it necessary to reduce it from one-fifth to one-
tenth, may in time make it necessary to reduce it still further; in the same 
manner as it made it necessary to reduce the tax upon gold to one-twentieth. 
That the silver mines of Spanish America, like all other mines, become 
gradually more expensive in the working, on account of the greater depths at 
which it is necessary to carry on the works, and of the greater expense of 
drawing out the water and of supplying them with fresh air at those depths, is 
acknowledged by everybody who has inquired into the state of those mines. 
    These causes, which are equivalent to a growing scarcity of silver (for a 
commodity may be said to grow scarcer when it becomes more difficult and 
expensive to collect a certain quantity of it) must, in time, produce one or other 
of the three following events. The increase of the expense must either, first, be 
compensated altogether by a proportionable increase in the price of the metal; 
or, secondly, it must be compensated altogether by a proportionable diminution 
of the tax upon silver; or, thirdly, it must be compensated partly by the one, and 
partly by the other of those two expedients. This third event is very possible. As 
gold rose in its price in proportion to silver, notwithstanding a great diminution 
of the tax upon gold, so silver might rise in its price in proportion to labour and 
commodities, notwithstanding an equal diminution of the tax upon silver. 
    Such successive reductions of the tax, however, though they may not prevent 
altogether, must certainly retard, more or less, the rise of the value of silver in 
the European market. In consequence of such reductions many mines may be 
wrought which could not be wrought before, because they could not afford to 
pay the old tax; and the quantity of silver annually brought to market must 
always be somewhat greater, and, therefore, the value of any given quantity 
somewhat less, than it otherwise would have been. In consequence of the 
reduction in 1736, the value of silver in the European market, though it may not 
at this day be lower than before that reduction, is, probably, at least ten per cent 
lower than it would have been had the Court of Spain continued to exact the old 
tax. 
    That, notwithstanding this reduction, the value of silver has, during the course 
of the present century, begun to rise somewhat in the European market, the facts 
and arguments which have been alleged above dispose me to believe, or more 
properly to suspect and conjecture; for the best opinion which I can form upon 
this subject scarce, perhaps, deserves the name of belief. The rise, indeed, 
supposing there has been any, has hitherto been so very small that after all that 
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has been said it may, perhaps, appear to many people uncertain, not only 
whether this event has actually taken place; but whether the contrary may not 
have taken place, or whether the value of the silver may not still continue to fall 
in the European market. 
    It must be observed, however, that whatever may be the supposed annual 
importation of gold and silver, there must be a certain period at which the annual 
consumption of those metals will be equal to that annual importation. Their 
consumption must increase as their mass increases, or rather in a much greater 
proportion. As their mass increases, their value diminishes. They are more used 
and less cared for, and their consumption consequently increases in a greater 
proportion than their mass. After a certain period, therefore, the annual 
consumption of those metals must, in this manner, become equal to their annual 
importation, provided that importation is not continually increasing; which, in 
the present times, is not supposed to be the case. 
    If, when the annual consumption has become equal to the annual importation, 
the annual importation should gradually diminish, the annual consumption may, 
for some time, exceed the annual importation. The mass of those metals may 
gradually and insensibly diminish, and their value gradually and insensibly rise, 
till the annual importation become again stationary, the annual consumption will 
gradually and insensibly accommodate itself to what that annual importation can 
maintain. 
Grounds of the suspicion that the Value of Silver Continues to Decrease 
The increase of the wealth of Europe, and the popular notion that, as the quantity 
of the precious metals naturally increases with the increase of wealth so their 
value diminishes as their quantity increases, may, perhaps, dispose many people 
to believe that their value still continues to fall in the European market; and the 
still gradually increasing price of many parts of the rude produce of land may 
confirm them still further in this opinion. 
    That that increase in the quantity of the precious metals, which arises in any 
country from the increase of wealth, has no tendency to diminish their value, I 
have endeavoured to show already. Gold and silver naturally resort to a rich 
country, for the same reason that all sorts of luxuries and curiosities resort to it; 
not because they are cheaper there than in poorer countries, but because they are 
dearer, or because a better price is given for them. It is the superiority of price 
which attracts them, and as soon as that superiority ceases, they necessarily 
cease to go thither. 
    If you except corn and such other vegetables as are raised altogether by 
human industry, that all other sorts of rude produce, cattle, poultry, game of all 
kinds, the useful fossils and minerals of the earth, etc., naturally grow dearer as 
the society advances in wealth and improvement, I have endeavoured to show 
already. Though such commodities, therefore, come to exchange for a greater 
quantity of silver than before, it will not from thence follow that silver has 
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become really cheaper, or will purchase less labour than before, but that such 
commodities have become really dearer, or will purchase more labour than 
before. It is not their nominal price only, but their real price which rises in the 
progress of improvement. The rise of their nominal price is the effect, not of any 
degradation of the value of silver, but of the rise in their real price. 
Different Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon Three Different 
Sorts of Rude Produce
These different sorts of rude produce may be divided into three classes. The first 
comprehends those which it is scarce in the power of human industry to multiply 
at all. The second, those which it can multiply in proportion to the demand. The 
third, those in which the efficacy of industry is either limited or uncertain. In the 
progress of wealth and improvement, the real price of the first may rise to any 
degree of extravagance, and seems not to be limited by any certain boundary. 
That of the second, though it may rise greatly, has, however, a certain boundary 
beyond which it cannot well pass for any considerable time together. That of the 
third, though its natural tendency is to rise in the progress of improvement, yet 
in the same degree of improvement it may sometimes happen even to fall, 
sometimes to continue the same, and sometimes to rise more or less, according 
as different accidents render the efforts of human industry, in multiplying this 
sort of rude produce, more or less successful. 
FIRST SORT
The first sort of rude produce of which the price rises in the progress of 
improvement is that which it is scarce in the power of human industry to 
multiply at all. It consists in those things which nature produces only in certain 
quantities, and which, being of a very perishable nature, it is impossible to 
accumulate together the produce of many different seasons. Such are the greater 
part of rare and singular birds and fishes, many different sorts of game, almost 
all wild-fowl, all birds of passage in particular, as well as many other things. 
When wealth and the luxury which accompanies it increase, the demand for 
these is likely to increase with them, and no effort of human industry may be 
able to increase the supply much beyond what it was before this increase of the 
demand. The quantity of such commodities, therefore, remaining the same, or 
nearly the same, while the competition to purchase them is continually 
increasing, their price may rise to any degree of extravagance, and seems not to 
be limited by any certain boundary. If woodcocks should become so fashionable 
as to sell for twenty guineas apiece, no effort of human industry could increase 
the number of those brought to market much beyond what it is at present. The 
high price paid by the Romans, in the time of their greatest grandeur, for rare 
birds and fishes, may in this manner easily be accounted for. These prices were 
not the effects of the low value of silver in those times, but of the high value of 
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such rarities and curiosities as human industry could not multiply at pleasure. 
The real value of silver was higher at Rome, for some time before and after the 
fall of the republic, than it is through the greater part of Europe at present. Three 
sestertii, equal to about sixpence sterling, was the price which the republic paid 
for the modius or peck of the tithe wheat of Sicily. This price, however, was 
probably below the average market price, the obligation to deliver their wheat at 
this rate being considered as a tax upon the Sicilian farmers. When the Romans, 
therefore, had occasion to order more corn than the tithe of wheat amounted to, 
they were bound by capitulation to pay for the surplus at the rate of four 
sestertii, or eightpence sterling, the peck; and this had probably been reckoned 
the moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average contract price of 
those times; it is equal to about one-and-twenty shillings the quarter. Eight-and-
twenty shillings the quarter was, before the late years of scarcity, the ordinary 
contract price of English wheat, which in quality is inferior to the Sicilian, and 
generally sells for a lower price in the European market. The value of silver, 
therefore, in those ancient times, must have been to its value in the present as 
three to four inversely; that is, three ounces of silver would then have purchased 
the same quantity of labour and commodities which four ounces will do at 
present. When we read in Pliny, therefore, that Seius bought a white nightingale, 
as a present for the Empress Agrippina, at a price of six thousand sestertii, equal 
to about fifty pounds of our present money; and that Asinius Celer purchased a 
surmullet at the price of eight thousand sestertii, equal to about sixty-six pounds 
thirteen shillings and fourpence of our present money, the extravagance of those 
prices, how much soever it may surprise us, is apt, notwithstanding, to appear to 
us about one-third less than it really was. Their real price, the quantity of labour 
and subsistence which was given away for them, was about one-third more than 
their nominal price is apt to express to us in the present times. Seius gave for the 
nightingale the command of a quantity of labour and subsistence equal to what 
L66 13s. 4d. would purchase in the present times; and Asinius Celer gave for the 
surmullet the command of a quantity equal to what L88 9 1/2d. would purchase. 
What occasioned the extravagance of those high prices was, not so much the 
abundance of silver as the abundance of labour and subsistence of which those 
Romans had the disposal beyond what was necessary for their own use. The 
quantity of silver of which they had the disposal was a good deal less than what 
the command of the same quantity of labour and subsistence would have 
procured to them in the present times. 
SECOND SORT
The second sort of rude procedure of which the price rises in the progress of 
improvement is that which human industry can multiply in proportion to the 
demand. It consists in those useful plants and animals which, in uncultivated 
countries, nature produces with such profuse abundance that they are of little or 
no value, and which, as cultivation advances are therefore forced to give place to 
some more profitable produce. During a long period in the progress of 
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improvement, the quantity of these is continually diminishing, while at the same 
time the demand for them is continually increasing. Their real value, therefore, 
the real quantity of labour which they will purchase or command, gradually 
rises, till at last it gets so high as to render them as profitable a produce as 
anything else which human industry can raise upon the most fertile and best 
cultivated land. When it has got so high it cannot well go higher. If it did, more 
land and more industry would soon be employed to increase their quantity. 
    When the price of cattle, for example, rises so high that it is as profitable to 
cultivate land in order to raise food for them as in order to raise food for man, it 
cannot well go higher. If it did, more corn land would soon be turned into 
pasture. The extension of tillage, by diminishing the quantity of wild pasture, 
diminishes the quantity of butcher's meat which the country naturally produces 
without labour or cultivation, and by increasing the number of those who have 
either corn, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of corn, to give in 
exchange for it, increases the demand. The price of butcher's meat, therefore, 
and consequently of cattle, must gradually rise till it gets so high that it becomes 
as profitable to employ the most fertile and best cultivated lands in raising food 
for them as in raising corn. But it must always be late in the progress of 
improvement before tillage can be so far extended as to raise the price of cattle 
to this height; and till it has got to this height, if the country is advancing at all, 
their price must be continually rising. There are, perhaps, some parts of Europe 
in which the price of cattle has not yet got to this height. It had not got to this 
height in any part of Scotland before the union. Had the Scotch cattle been 
always confined to the market of Scotland, in a country in which the quantity of 
land which can be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle is so 
great in proportion to what can be applied to other purposes, it is scarce possible, 
perhaps, that their price could ever have risen so high as to render it profitable to 
cultivate land for the sake of feeding them. In England, the price of cattle, it has 
already been observed, seems, in the neighbourhood of London, to have got to 
this height about the beginning of the last century; but it was much later 
probably before it got to it through the greater part of the remoter counties; in 
some of which, perhaps, it may scarce yet have got to it. Of all the different 
substances, however, which compose this second sort of rude produce, cattle is, 
perhaps, that of which the price, in the progress of improvement, first rises to 
this height. 
    Till the price of cattle, indeed, has got to this height, it seems scarce possible 
that the greater part, even of those lands which are capable of the highest 
cultivation, can be completely cultivated. In all farms too distant from any town 
to carry manure from it, that is, in the far greater part of those of every extensive 
country, the quantity of well-cultivated land must be in proportion to the 
quantity of manure which the farm itself produces; and this again must be in 
proportion to the stock of cattle which are maintained upon it. The land is 
manured either by pasturing the cattle upon it, or by feeding them in the stable, 
and from thence carrying out their dung to it. But unless the price of the cattle be 
sufficient to pay both the rent and profit of cultivated land, the farmer cannot 
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afford to pasture them upon it; and he can still less afford to feed them in the 
stable. It is with the produce of improved and cultivated land only that cattle can 
be fed in the stable; because to collect the scanty and scattered produce of waste 
and unimproved lands would require too much labour and be too expensive. If 
the price of cattle, therefore, is not sufficient to pay for the produce of improved 
and cultivated land, when they are allowed to pasture it, that price will be still 
less sufficient to pay for that produce when it must be collected with a good deal 
of additional labour, and brought into the stable to them. In these circumstances, 
therefore, no more cattle can, with profit, be fed in the stable than what are 
necessary for tillage. But these can never afford manure enough for keeping 
constantly in good condition all the lands which they are capable of cultivating. 
What they afford being insufficient for the whole farm will naturally be reserved 
for the lands to which it can be most advantageously or conveniently applied; 
the most fertile, or those, perhaps, in the neighbourhood of the farmyard. These, 
therefore, will be kept constantly in good condition and fit for tillage. The rest 
will, the greater part of them, be allowed to lie waste, producing scarce anything 
but some miserable pasture, just sufficient to keep alive a few straggling, half-
starved cattle; the farm, though much understocked in proportion to what would 
be necessary for its complete cultivation, being very frequently overstocked in 
proportion to its actual produce. A portion of this waste land, however, after 
having been pastured in this wretched manner for six or seven years together, 
may be ploughed up, when it will yield, perhaps, a poor crop or two of bad oats, 
or of some other coarse grain, and then, being entirely exhausted, it must be 
rested and pastured again as before and another portion ploughed up to be in the 
same manner exhausted and rested again in its turn. Such accordingly was the 
general system of management all over the low country of Scotland before the 
union. The lands which were kept constantly well manured and in good 
condition seldom exceeded a third or a fourth part of the whole farm, and 
sometimes did not amount to a fifth or a sixth part of it. The rest were never 
manured, but a certain portion of them was in its turn, notwithstanding, regularly 
cultivated and exhausted. Under this system of management, it is evident, even 
that part of the land of Scotland which is capable of good cultivation could 
produce but little in comparison of what it may be capable of producing. But 
how disadvantageous soever this system may appear, yet before the union the 
low price of cattle seems to have rendered it almost unavoidable. If, 
notwithstanding a great rise in their price, it still continues to prevail through a 
considerable part of the country, it is owing, in many places, no doubt, to 
ignorance and attachment to old customs, but in most places to the unavoidable 
obstructions which the natural course of things opposes to the immediate or 
speedy establishment of a better system: first, to the poverty of the tenants, to 
their not having yet had time to acquire a stock of cattle sufficient to cultivate 
their lands more completely, the same rise of price which would render it 
advantageous for them to maintain a greater stock rendering it more difficult for 
them to acquire it; and, secondly, to their not having yet had time to put their 
lands in condition to maintain this greater stock properly, supposing they were 
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capable of acquiring it. The increase of stock and the improvement of land are 
two events which must go hand in hand, and of which the one can nowhere 
much outrun the other. Without some increase of stock there can be scarce any 
improvement of land, but there can be no considerable increase of stock but in 
consequence of a considerable improvement of land; because otherwise the land 
could not maintain it. These natural obstructions to the establishment of a better 
system cannot be removed but by a long course of frugality and industry; and 
half a century or a century more, perhaps, must pass away before the old system, 
which is wearing out gradually, can be completely abolished through all the 
different parts of the country. Of all the commercial advantages, however, which 
Scotland has derived from the union with England, this rise in the price of cattle 
is, perhaps, the greatest. It has not only raised the value of all highland estates, 
but it has, perhaps, been the principal cause of the improvement of the low 
country. 
    In all new colonies the great quantity of waste land, which can for many years 
be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, soon renders them 
extremely abundant, and in everything great cheapness is the necessary 
consequence of great abundance. Though all the cattle of the European colonies 
in America were originally carried from Europe, they soon multiplied so much 
there, and became of so little value that even horses were allowed to run wild in 
the woods without any owner thinking it worth while to claim them. It must be a 
long time, after the first establishment of such colonies, before it can become 
profitable to feed cattle upon the produce of cultivated land. The same causes, 
therefore, the want of manure, and the disproportion between the stock 
employed in cultivation, and the land which it is destined to cultivate, are likely 
to introduce there a system of husbandry not unlike that which still continues to 
take place in so many parts of Scotland. Mr. Kalm, the Swedish traveller, when 
he gives an account of the husbandry of some of the English colonies in North 
America, as he found it in 1749, observes, accordingly, that he can with 
difficulty discover there the character of the English nation, so well skilled in all 
the different branches of agriculture. They make scarce any manure for their 
corn fields, he says; but when one piece of ground has been exhausted by 
continual cropping, they clear and cultivate another piece of fresh land; and 
when that is exhausted, proceed to the third. Their cattle are allowed to wander 
through the woods and other uncultivated grounds, where they are half-starved; 
having long ago extirpated almost all the annual grasses by cropping them too 
early in the spring, before they had time to form their flowers, or to shed their 
seeds. The annual grasses were, it seems, the best natural grasses in that part of 
North America; and when the Europeans first settled there, they used to grow 
very thick, and to rise three or four feet high. A piece of ground which, when he 
wrote, could not maintain one cow, would in former times, he was assured, have 
maintained four, each of which would have given four times the quantity of milk 
which that one was capable of giving. The poorness of the pasture had, in his 
opinion, occasioned the degradation of their cattle, which degenerated sensibly 
from one generation to another. They were probably not unlike that stunted 
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breed which was common all over Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and which 
is now so much mended through the greater part of the low country, not so much 
by a change of the breed, though that expedient has been employed in some 
places, as by a more plentiful method of feeding them. 
    Though it is late, therefore, in the progress of improvement before cattle can 
bring such a price as to render it profitable to cultivate land for the sake of 
feeding them; yet of all the different parts which compose this second sort of 
rude produce, they are perhaps the first which bring this price; because till they 
bring it, it seems impossible that improvement can be brought near even to that 
degree of perfection to which it has arrived in many parts of Europe. 
    As cattle are among the first, so perhaps venison is among the last parts of this 
sort of rude produce which bring this price. The price of venison in Great 
Britain, how extravagant soever it may appear, is not near sufficient to 
compensate the expense of a deer park, as is well known to all those who have 
had any experience in the feeding of deer. If it was otherwise, the feeding of 
deer would soon become an article of common farming, in the same manner as 
the feeding of those small birds called Turdi was among the ancient Romans. 
Varro and Columella assure us that it was a most profitable article. The fattening 
of ortolans, birds of passage which arrive lean in the country, is said to be so in 
some parts of France. If venison continues in fashion, and the wealth and luxury 
of Great Britain increase as they have done for some time past, its price may 
very probably rise still higher than it is at present. 
    Between that period in the progress of improvement which brings to its height 
the price of so necessary an article as cattle, and that which brings to it the price 
of such a superfluity as venison, there is a very long interval, in the course of 
which many other sorts of rude produce gradually arrive at their highest price, 
some sooner and some later, according to different circumstances. 
    Thus in every farm the offals of the barn and stables will maintain a certain 
number of poultry. These, as they are fed with what would otherwise be lost, are 
a mere save-all; and as they cost the farmer scarce anything, so he can afford to 
sell them for very little. Almost all that he gets is pure gain, and their price can 
scarce be so low as to discourage him from feeding this number. But in countries 
ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly inhabited, the poultry, which are thus 
raised without expense, are often fully sufficient to supply the whole demand. In 
this state of things, therefore, they are often as cheap as butcher's meat, or any 
other sort of animal food. But the whole quantity of poultry, which the farm in 
this manner produces without expense, must always be much smaller than the 
whole quantity of butcher's meat which is reared upon it; and in times of wealth 
and luxury what is rare, with only nearly equal merit, is always preferred to what 
is common. As wealth and luxury increase, therefore, in consequence of 
improvement and cultivation, the price of poultry gradually rises above that of 
butcher's meat, till at last it gets so high that it becomes profitable to cultivate 
land for the sake of feeding them. When it has got to this height it cannot well 
go higher. If it did, more land would soon be turned to this purpose. In several 
provinces of France, the feeding of poultry is considered as a very important 
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article in rural economy, and sufficiently profitable to encourage the farmer to 
raise a considerable quantity of Indian corn and buck-wheat for this purpose. A 
middling farmer will there sometimes have four hundred fowls in his yard. The 
feeding of poultry seems scarce yet to be generally considered as a matter of so 
much importance in England. They are certainly, however, dearer in England 
than in France, as England receives considerable supplies from France. In the 
progress of improvement, the period at which every particular sort of animal 
food is dearest must naturally be that which immediately precedes the general 
practice of cultivating land for the sake of raising it. For some time before this 
practice becomes general, the scarcity must necessarily raise the price. After it 
has become general, new methods of feeding are commonly fallen upon, which 
enable the farmer to raise upon the same quantity of ground a much greater 
quantity of that particular sort of animal food. The plenty not only obliges him to 
sell cheaper, but in consequence of these improvements he can afford to sell 
cheaper; for if he could not afford it, the plenty would not be of long 
continuance. It has been probably in this manner that the introduction of clover, 
turnips, carrots, cabbage, etc., has contributed to sink the common price of 
butcher's meat in the London market somewhat below what it was about the 
beginning of the last century. 
    The hog, that finds his food among ordure and greedily devours many things 
rejected by every other useful animal, is, like poultry, originally kept as a save-
all. As long as the number of such animals, which can thus be reared at little or 
no expense, is fully sufficient to supply the demand, this sort of butcher's meat 
comes to market at a much lower price than any other. But when the demand 
rises beyond what this quantity can supply, when it becomes necessary to raise 
food on purpose for feeding and fattening hogs, in the same manner as for 
feeding and fattening other cattle, the price necessarily rises, and becomes 
proportionably higher or lower than that of other butcher's meat, according as 
the nature of the country, and the state of its agriculture, happen to render the 
feeding of hogs more or less expensive than that of other cattle. In France, 
according to Mr. Buffon, the price of pork is nearly equal to that of beef. In most 
parts of Great Britain it is at present somewhat higher. 
    The great rise in the price of both hogs and poultry has in Great Britain been 
frequently imputed to the diminution of the number of cottagers and other small 
occupiers of land; an event which has in every part of Europe been the 
immediate forerunner of improvement and better cultivation, but which at the 
same time may have contributed to raise the price of those articles both 
somewhat sooner and somewhat faster than it would otherwise have risen. As 
the poorest family can often maintain a cat or a dog without any expense, so the 
poorest occupiers of land can commonly maintain a few poultry, or a sow and a 
few pigs, at very little. The little offals of their own table, their whey, skimmed 
milk, and buttermilk, supply those animals with a part of their food, and they 
find the rest in the neighbouring fields without doing any sensible damage to 
anybody. By diminishing the number of those small occupiers, therefore, the 
quantity of this sort of provisions, which is thus produced at little or no expense, 
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must certainly have been a good deal diminished, and their price must 
consequently have been raised both sooner and faster than it would otherwise 
have risen. Sooner or later, however, in the progress of improvement, it must at 
any rate have risen to the utmost height to which it is capable of rising; or to the 
price which pays the labour and expense of cultivating the land which furnishes 
them with food as well as these are paid upon the greater part of other cultivated 
land. 
    The business of the dairy, like the feeding of hogs and poultry, is originally 
carried on as a save-all. The cattle necessarily kept upon the farm produce more 
milk than either the rearing of their own young or the consumption of the 
farmer's family requires; and they produce most at one particular season. But of 
all the productions of land, milk is perhaps the most perishable. In the warm 
season, when it is most abundant, it will scarce keep four-and-twenty hours. The 
farmer, by making it into fresh butter, stores a small part of it for a week: by 
making it into salt butter, for a year: and by making it into cheese, he stores a 
much greater part of it for several years. Part of all these is reserved for the use 
of his own family. The rest goes to market, in order to find the best price which 
is to be had, and which can scarce be so low as to discourage him from sending 
thither whatever is over and above the use of his own family. If it is very low, 
indeed, he will be likely to manage his dairy in a very slovenly and dirty 
manner, and will scarce perhaps think it worth while to have a particular room or 
building on purpose for it, but will suffer the business to be carried on amidst the 
smoke, filth, and nastiness of his own kitchen; as was the case of almost all the 
farmers' dairies in Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and as is the case of many 
of them still. The same causes which gradually raise the price of butcher's meat, 
the increase of the demand, and, in consequence of the improvement of the 
country, the diminution of the quantity which can be fed at little or no expense, 
raise, in the same manner, that of the produce of the dairy, of which the price 
naturally connects with that of butcher's meat, or with the expense of feeding 
cattle. The increase of price pays for more labour, care, and cleanliness. The 
dairy becomes more worthy of the farmer's attention, and the quality of its 
produce gradually improves. The price at last gets so high that it becomes worth 
while to employ some of the most fertile and best cultivated lands in feeding 
cattle merely for the purpose of the dairy; and when it has got to this height, it 
cannot well go higher. If it did, more land would soon be turned to this purpose. 
It seems to have got to this height through the greater part of England, where 
much good land is commonly employed in this manner. If you except the 
neighbourhood of a few considerable towns, it seems not yet to have got to this 
height anywhere in Scotland, where common farmers seldom employ much 
good land in raising food for cattle merely for the purpose of the dairy. The price 
of the produce, though it has risen very considerably within these few years, is 
probably still too low to admit of it. The inferiority of the quality, indeed, 
compared with that of the produce of English dairies, is fully equal to that of the 
price. But this inferiority of quality is, perhaps, rather the effect of this lowness 
of price than the cause of it. Though the quality was much better, the greater part 
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of what is brought to market could not, I apprehend, in the present circumstances 
of the country, be disposed of at a much better price; and the present price, it is 
probable would not pay the expense of the land and labour necessary for 
producing a much better quality. Though the greater part of England, 
notwithstanding the superiority of price, the dairy is not reckoned a more 
profitable employment of land than the raising of corn, or the fattening of cattle, 
the two great objects of agriculture. Through the greater part of Scotland, 
therefore, it cannot yet be even so profitable. 
    The lands of no country, it is evident, can ever be completely cultivated and 
improved till once the price of every produce, which human industry is obliged 
to raise upon them, has got so high as to pay for the expense of complete 
improvement and cultivation. In order to do this, the price of each particular 
produce must be sufficient, first, to pay the rent of good corn land, as it is that 
which regulates the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land; and, 
secondly, to pay the labour and expense of the farmer as well as they are 
commonly paid upon good corn land; or, in other words, to replace with the 
ordinary profits the stock which he employs about it. This rise in the price of 
each particular produce must evidently be previous to the improvement and 
cultivation of the land which is destined for raising it. Gain is the end of all 
improvement, and nothing could deserve that name of which loss was to be the 
necessary consequence. But loss must be the necessary consequence of 
improving land for the sake of a produce of which the price could never bring 
back the expense. If the complete improvement and cultivation of the country 
be, as it most certainly is, the greatest of all public advantages, this rise in the 
price of all those different sorts of rude produce, instead of being considered as a 
public calamity, ought to be regarded as the necessary forerunner and attendant 
of the greatest of all public advantages. 
    This rise, too, in the nominal or money-price of all those different sorts of 
rude produce has been the effect, not of any degradation in the value of silver, 
but of a rise in their real price. They have become worth, not only a greater 
quantity of silver, but a greater quantity of labour and subsistence than before. 
As it costs a greater quantity of labour and subsistence to bring them to market, 
so when they are brought thither, they represent or are equivalent to a greater 
quantity. 
THIRD SORT
The third and last sort of rude produce, of which the price naturally rises in the 
progress of improvement, is that in which the efficacy of human industry, in 
augmenting the quantity, is either limited or uncertain. Though the real price of 
this sort of rude produce, therefore, naturally tends to rise in the progress of 
improvement, yet, according as different accidents happen to render the efforts 
of human industry more or less successful in augmenting the quantity, it may 
happen sometimes even to fall, sometimes to continue the same in very different 
periods of improvement, and sometimes to rise more or less in the same period. 
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    There are some sorts of rude produce which nature has rendered a kind of 
appendages to other sorts; so that the quantity of the one which any country can 
afford, is necessarily limited by that of the other. The quantity of wool or of raw 
hides, for example, which any country can afford is necessarily limited by the 
number of great and small cattle that are kept in it. The state of its improvement, 
and the nature of its agriculture, again necessarily determine this number. 
    The same causes which, in the progress of improvement, gradually raise the 
price of butcher's meat, should have the same effect, it may be thought, upon the 
prices of wool and raw hides, and raise them, too, nearly in the same proportion. 
It probably would be so if, in the rude beginnings of improvement, the market 
for the latter commodities was confined within as narrow bounds as that for the 
former. But the extent of their respective markets is commonly extremely 
different. 
    The market for butcher's meat is almost everywhere confined to the country 
which produces it. Ireland, and some part of British America indeed, carry on a 
considerable trade in salt provisions; but they are, I believe, the only countries in 
the commercial world which do so, or which export to other countries any 
considerable part of their butcher's meat. 
    The market for wool and raw hides, on the contrary, is in the rude beginnings 
of improvement very seldom confined to the country which produces them. 
They can easily be transported to distant countries, wool without any 
preparation, and raw hides with very little: and as they are the materials of many 
manufactures, the industry of other countries may occasion a demand for them, 
though that of the country which produces them might not occasion any. 
    In countries ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly inhabited, the price of the 
wool and the hide bears always a much greater proportion to that of the whole 
beast than in countries where, improvement and population being further 
advanced, there is more demand for butcher's meat. Mr. Hume observes that in 
the Saxon times the fleece was estimated at two-fifths of the value of the whole 
sheep, and that this was much above the proportion of its present estimation. In 
some provinces of Spain, I have been assured, the sheep is frequently killed 
merely for the sake of the fleece and the tallow. The carcase is often left to rot 
upon the ground, or to be devoured by beasts and birds of prey. If this 
sometimes happens even in Spain, it happens almost constantly in Chili, at 
Buenos Ayres, and in many other parts of Spanish America, where the horned 
cattle are almost constantly killed merely for the sake of the hide and the tallow. 
This, too, used to happen almost constantly in Hispaniola, while it was infested 
by the Buccaneers, and before the settlement, improvement, and populousness of 
the French plantations (which now extend round the coast of almost the whole 
western half of the island) had given some value to the cattle of the Spaniards, 
who still continue to possess, not only the eastern part of the coast, but the whole 
inland and mountainous part of the country. 
    Though in the progress of improvement and population the price of the whole 
beast necessarily rises, yet the price of the carcase is likely to be much more 
affected by this rise than that of the wool and the hide. The market for the 
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carcase, being in the rude state of society confined always to the country which 
produces it, must necessarily be extended in proportion to the improvement and 
population of that country. But the market for the wool and the hides even of a 
barbarous country often extending to the whole commercial world, it can very 
seldom be enlarged in the same proportion. The state of the whole commercial 
world can seldom be much affected by the improvement of any particular 
country; and the market for such commodities may remain the same or very 
nearly the same after such improvements as before. It should, however, in the 
natural course of things rather upon the whole be somewhat extended in 
consequence of them. If the manufactures, especially, of which those 
commodities are the materials should ever come to flourish in the country, the 
market, though it might not be much enlarged, would at least be brought much 
nearer to the place of growth than before; and the price of those materials might 
at least be increased by what had usually been the expense of transporting them 
to distant countries. Though it might not rise therefore in the same proportion as 
that of butcher's meat, it ought naturally to rise somewhat, and it ought certainly 
not to fall. 
    In England, however, notwithstanding the flourishing state of its woollen 
manufacture, the price of English wool has fallen very considerably since the 
time of Edward III. There are many authentic records which demonstrate that 
during the reign of that prince (towards the middle of the fourteenth century, or 
about 1339) what was reckoned the moderate and reasonable price of the tod, or 
twenty-eight pounds of English wool, was not less than ten shillings of the 
money of those times, containing at the rate of twentypence the ounce, six 
ounces of silver Tower weight, equal to about thirty shillings of our present 
money. In the present times, one-and-twenty shillings the tod may be reckoned a 
good price for very good English wool. The money-price of wool, therefore, in 
the time of Edward III, was to its money-price in the present times as ten to 
seven. The superiority of its real price was still greater. At the rate of six 
shillings and eightpence the quarter, ten shillings was in those ancient times the 
price of twelve bushels of wheat. At the rate of twenty-eight shillings the 
quarter, one-and-twenty shillings is in the present times the price of six bushels 
only. The proportion between the real prices of ancient and modern times, 
therefore, is as twelve to six, or as two to one. In those ancient times a tod of 
wool would have purchased twice the quantity of subsistence which it will 
purchase at present; and consequently twice the quantity of labour, if the real 
recompense of labour had been the same in both periods. 
    This degradation both in the real and nominal value of wool could never have 
happened in consequence of the natural course of things. It has accordingly been 
the effect of violence and artifice: first, of the absolute prohibition of exporting 
wool from England; secondly, of the permission of importing it from Spain duty 
free; thirdly, of the prohibition of exporting it from Ireland to any other country 
but England. In consequence of these regulations the market for English wool, 
instead of being somewhat extended in consequence of the improvement of 
England, has been confined to the home market, where the wool of several other 
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countries is allowed to come into competition with it, and where that of Ireland 
is forced into competition with it. As the woollen manufactures, too, of Ireland 
are fully as much discouraged as is consistent with justice and fair dealing, the 
Irish can work up but a small part of their own wool at home, and are, therefore, 
obliged to send a greater proportion of it to Great Britain, the only market they 
are allowed. 
    I have not been able to find any such authentic records concerning the price of 
raw hides in ancient times. Wool was commonly paid as a subsidy to the king, 
and its valuation in that subsidy ascertains, at least in some degree, what was its 
ordinary price. But this seems not to have been the case with raw hides. 
Fleetwood, however, from an account in 1425, between the prior of Burcester 
Oxford and one of his canons, gives us their price, at least as it was stated upon 
that particular occasion, viz., five ox hides at twelve shillings; five cow hides at 
seven shillings and threepence; thirty-six sheep skins of two years old at nine 
shillings; sixteen calves skins at two shillings. In 1425, twelve shillings 
contained about the same quantity of silver as four-and-twenty shillings of our 
present money. An ox hide, therefore, was in this account valued at the same 
quantity of silver as 4s. four-fifths of our present money. Its nominal price was a 
good deal lower than at present. But at the rate of six shillings and eightpence 
the quarter, twelve shillings would in those times have purchased fourteen 
bushels and four-fifths of a bushel of wheat, which, at three and sixpence the 
bushel, would in the present times cost 51s. 4d. An ox hide, therefore, would in 
those times have purchased as much corn as ten shillings and threepence would 
purchase at present. Its real value was equal to ten shillings and threepence of 
our present money. In those ancient times, when the cattle were half starved 
during the greater part of the winter, we cannot suppose that they were of a very 
large size. An ox hide which weighs four stone of sixteen pounds avoirdupois is 
not in the present times reckoned a bad one; and in those ancient times would 
probably have been reckoned a very good one. But at half-a-crown the stone, 
which at this moment (February 1773) I understand to be the common price, 
such a hide would at present cost only ten shillings. Though its nominal price, 
therefore, is higher in the present than it was in those ancient times, its real 
price, the real quantity of subsistence which it will purchase or command, is 
rather somewhat lower. The price of cow hides, as stated in the above account, is 
nearly in the common proportion to that of ox hides. That of sheep skins is a 
good deal above it. They had probably been sold with the wool. That of calves 
skins, on the contrary, is greatly below it. In countries where the price of cattle is 
very low, the calves, which are not intended to be reared in order to keep up the 
stock, are generally killed very young; as was the case in Scotland twenty or 
thirty years ago. It saves the milk, which their price would not pay for. Their 
skins, therefore, are commonly good for little. 
    The price of raw hides is a good deal lower at present than it was a few years 
ago, owing probably to the taking off the duty upon sealskins, and to the 
allowing, for a limited time, the importation of raw hides from Ireland and from 
the plantations duty free, which was done in 1769. Take the whole of the present 
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century at an average, their real price has probably been somewhat higher than it 
was in those ancient times. The nature of the commodity renders it not quite so 
proper for being transported to distant markets as wool. It suffers more by 
keeping. A salted hide is reckoned inferior to a fresh one, and sells for a lower 
price. This circumstance must necessarily have some tendency to sink the price 
of raw hides produced in a country which does not manufacture them, but is 
obliged to export them; and comparatively to raise that of those produced in a 
country which does manufacture them. It must have some tendency to sink their 
price in a barbarous, and to raise it in an improved and manufacturing country. It 
must have had some tendency, therefore, to sink it in ancient and to raise it in 
modern times. Our tanners, besides, have not been quite so successful as our 
clothiers in convincing the wisdom of the nation that the safety of the 
commonwealth depends upon the prosperity of their particular manufacture. 
They have accordingly been much less favoured. The exportation of raw hides 
has, indeed, been prohibited, and declared a nuisance; but their importation from 
foreign countries has been subjected to a duty; and though this duty has been 
taken off from those of Ireland and the plantations (for the limited time of five 
years only), yet Ireland has not been confined to the market of Great Britain for 
the sale of its surplus hides, or of those which are not manufactured at home. 
The hides of common cattle have but within these few years been put among the 
enumerated commodities which the plantations can send nowhere but to the 
mother country; neither has the commerce of Ireland been in this case oppressed 
hitherto in order to support the manufactures of Great Britain. 
    Whatever regulations tend to sink the price either of wool or of raw hides 
below what it naturally would be must, in an improved and cultivated country, 
have some tendency to raise the price of butcher's meat. The price both of the 
great and small cattle, which are fed on improved and cultivated land, must be 
sufficient to pay the rent which the landlord and the profit which the farmer has 
reason to expect from improved and cultivated land. If it is not, they will soon 
cease to feed them. Whatever part of this price, therefore, is not paid by the wool 
and the hide must be paid by the carcase. The less there is paid for the one, the 
more must be paid for the other. In what manner this price is to be divided upon 
the different parts of the beast is indifferent to the landlords and farmers, 
provided it is all paid to them. In an improved and cultivated country, therefore, 
their interest as landlords and farmers cannot be much affected by such 
regulations, though their interest as consumers may, by the rise in the price of 
provisions. It would be quite otherwise, however, in an unimproved and 
uncultivated country, where the greater part of the lands could be applied to no 
other purpose but the feeding of cattle, and where the wool and the hide made 
the principal part of the value of those cattle. Their interest as landlords and 
farmers would in this case be very deeply affected by such regulations, and their 
interest as consumers very little. The fall in the price of wool and the hide would 
not in this case raise the price of the carcase, because the greater part of the 
lands of the country being applicable to no other purpose but the feeding of 
cattle, the same number would still continue to be fed. The same quantity of 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth1.html (161 of 189)4/11/2005 9:44:44 AM
The Wealth of Nations
butcher's meat would still come to market. The demand for it would be no 
greater than before. Its price, therefore, would be the same as before. The whole 
price of cattle would fall, and along with it both the rent and the profit of all 
those lands of which cattle was the principal produce, that is, of the greater part 
of the lands of the country. The perpetual prohibition of the exportation of wool, 
which is commonly, but very falsely, ascribed to Edward III, would, in the then 
circumstances of the country, have been the most destructive regulation which 
could well have been thought of. It would not only have reduced the actual value 
of the greater part of the lands of the kingdom, but by reducing the price of the 
most important species of small cattle it would have retarded very much its 
subsequent improvement. 
    The wool of Scotland fell very considerably in its price in consequence of the 
union with England, by which it was excluded from the great market of Europe, 
and confined to the narrow one of Great Britain. The value of the greater part of 
the lands in the southern counties of Scotland, which are chiefly a sheep country, 
would have been very deeply affected by this event, had not the rise in the price 
of butcher's meat fully compensated the fall in the price of wool. 
    As the efficacy of human industry, in increasing the quantity either of wool or 
of raw hides, is limited, so far as it depends upon the produce of the country 
where it is exerted; so it is uncertain so far as it depends upon the produce of 
other countries. It so far depends, not so much upon the quantity which they 
produce, as upon that which they do not manufacture; and upon the restraints 
which they may or may not think proper to impose upon the exportation of this 
sort of rude produce. These circumstances, as they are altogether independent of 
domestic industry, so they necessarily render the efficacy of its efforts more or 
less uncertain. In multiplying this sort of rude produce, therefore, the efficacy of 
human industry is not only limited, but uncertain. 
    In multiplying another very important sort of rude produce, the quantity of 
fish that is brought to market, it is likewise both limited and uncertain. It is 
limited by the local situation of the country, by the proximity or distance of its 
different provinces from the sea, by the number of its lakes and rivers, and by 
what may be called the fertility or barrenness of those seas, lakes, and rivers, as 
to this sort of rude produce. As population increases, as the annual produce of 
the land and labour of the country grows greater and greater, there come to be 
more buyers of fish, and those buyers, too, have a greater quantity and variety of 
other goods, or, what is the same thing, the price of a greater quantity and 
variety of other goods to buy with. But it will generally be impossible to supply 
the great and extended market without employing a quantity of labour greater 
than in proportion to what had been requisite for supplying the narrow and 
confined one. A market which, from requiring only one thousand, comes to 
require annually ten thousand tons of fish, can seldom be supplied without 
employing more than ten times the quantity of labour which had before been 
sufficient to supply it. The fish must generally be fought for at a greater 
distance, larger vessels must be employed, and more expensive machinery of 
every kind made use of. The real price of this commodity, therefore, naturally 
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rises in the progress of improvement. It has accordingly done so, I believe, more 
or less in every country. 
    Though the success of a particular day's fishing may be a very uncertain 
matter, yet, the local situation of the country being supposed, the general 
efficacy of industry in bringing a certain quantity of fish to market, taking the 
course of a year, or of several years together, it may perhaps be thought is 
certain enough; and it no doubt is so. As it depends more, however, upon the 
local situation of the country than upon the state of its wealth and industry; as 
upon this account it may in different countries be the same in very different 
periods of improvement, and very different in the same period; its connection 
with the state of improvement is uncertain, and it is of this sort of uncertainty 
that I am here speaking. 
    In increasing the quantity of the different minerals and metals which are 
drawn from the bowels of the earth, that of the more precious ones particularly, 
the efficacy of human industry seems not to be limited, but to be altogether 
uncertain. 
    The quantity of the precious metals which is to be found in any country is not 
limited by anything in its local situation, such as the fertility or barrenness of its 
own mines. Those metals frequently abound in countries which possess no 
mines. Their quantity in every particular country seems to depend upon two 
different circumstances; first, upon its power of purchasing, upon the state of its 
industry, upon the annual produce of its land and labour, in consequence of 
which it can afford to employ a greater or a smaller quantity of labour and 
subsistence in bringing or purchasing such superfluities as gold and silver, either 
from its own mines or from those of other countries; and, secondly, upon the 
fertility or barrenness of the mines which may happen at any particular time to 
supply the commercial world with those metals. The quantity of those metals in 
the countries most remote from the mines must be more or less affected by this 
fertility or barrenness, on account of the easy and cheap transportation of those 
metals, of their small bulk and great value. Their quantity in China and Indostan 
must have been more or less affected by the abundance of the mines of America. 
    So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the former of 
those two circumstances (the power of purchasing), their real price, like that of 
all other luxuries and superfluities, is likely to rise with the wealth and 
improvement of the country, and to fall with its poverty and depression. 
Countries which have a great quantity of labour and subsistence to spare can 
afford to purchase any particular quantity of those metals at the expense of a 
greater quantity of labour and subsistence than countries which have less to 
spare. 
    So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the latter of 
those two circumstances (the fertility or barrenness of the mines which happen 
to supply the commercial world), their real price, the real quantity of labour and 
subsistence which they will purchase or exchange for, will, no doubt, sink more 
or less in proportion to the fertility, and rise in proportion to the barrenness of 
those mines. 
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    The fertility or barrenness of the mines, however, which may happen at any 
particular time to supply the commercial world, is a circumstance which, it is 
evident, may have no sort of connection with the state of industry in a particular 
country. It seems even to have no very necessary connection with that of the 
world in general. As arts and commerce, indeed, gradually spread themselves 
over a greater and a greater part of the earth, the search for new mines, being 
extended over a wider surface, may have somewhat a better chance for being 
successful than when confined within narrower bounds. The discovery of new 
mines, however, as the old ones come to be gradually exhausted, is a matter of 
the greatest uncertainty, and such as no human skill or industry can ensure. All 
indications, it is acknowledged, are doubtful, and the actual discovery and 
successful working of a new mine can alone ascertain the reality of its value, or 
even of its existence. In this search there seem to be no certain limits either to 
the possible success or to the possible disappointment of human industry. In the 
course of a century or two, it is possible that new mines may be discovered more 
fertile than any that have ever yet been known; and it is just equally possible the 
most fertile mine then known may be more barren than any that was wrought 
before the discovery of the mines of America. Whether the one or the other of 
those two events may happen to take place is of very little importance to the real 
wealth and prosperity of the world, to the real value of the annual produce of the 
land and labour of mankind. Its nominal value, the quantity of gold and silver by 
which this annual produce could be expressed or represented, would, no doubt, 
be very different; but its real value, the real quantity of labour which it could 
purchase or command, would be precisely the same. A shilling might in the one 
case represent no more labour than a penny does at present; and a penny in the 
other might represent as much as a shilling does now. But in the one case he 
who had a shilling in his pocket would be no richer than he who has a penny at 
present; and in the other he who had a penny would be just as rich as he who has 
a shilling now. The cheapness and abundance of gold and silver plate would be 
the sole advantage which the world could derive from the one event, and the 
dearness and scarcity of those trifling superfluities the only inconveniency it 
could suffer from the other. 
Conclusion of the Digression COncerning the Variations in the Value of 
Silver
The greater part of the writers who have collected the money prices of things in 
ancient times seem to have considered the low money-price of corn, and of 
goods in general, or, in other words, the high value of gold and silver, as a proof, 
not only of the scarcity of those metals, but of the poverty and barbarism of the 
country at the time when it took place. This notion is connected with the system 
of political economy which represents national wealth as consisting in the 
abundance, and national poverty in the scarcity of gold and silver; a system 
which I shall endeavour to explain and examine at great length in the fourth 
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book of this inquiry. I shall only observe at present that the high value of the 
precious metals can be no proof of the poverty or barbarism of any particular 
country at the time when it took place. It is a proof only of the barrenness of the 
mines which happened at that time to supply the commercial world. A poor 
country, as it cannot afford to buy more, so it can as little afford to pay dearer 
for gold and silver than a rich one; and the value of those metals, therefore, is 
not likely to be higher in the former than in the latter. In China, a country much 
richer than any part of Europe, the value of the precious metals is much higher 
than in any part of Europe. As the wealth of Europe, indeed, has increased 
greatly since the discovery of the mines of America, so the value of gold and 
silver has gradually diminished. This diminution of their value, however, has not 
been owing to the increase of the real wealth of Europe, of the annual produce of 
its land and labour, but to the accidental discovery of more abundant mines than 
any that were known before. The increase of the quantity of gold and silver in 
Europe, and the increase of its manufactures and agriculture, are two events 
which, though they have happened nearly about the same time, yet have arisen 
from very different causes, and have scarce any natural connection with one 
another. The one has arisen from a mere accident, in which neither prudence nor 
policy either had or could have any share. The other from the fall of the feudal 
system, and from the establishment of a government which afforded to industry 
the only encouragement which it requires, some tolerable security that it shall 
enjoy the fruits of its own labour. Poland, where the feudal system still continues 
to take place, is at this day as beggarly a country as it was before the discovery 
of America. The money price of corn, however, has risen; the real value of the 
precious metals has fallen in Poland, in the same manner as in other parts of 
Europe. Their quantity, therefore, must have increased there as in other places, 
and nearly in the same proportion to the annual produce of its land and labour. 
This increase of the quantity of those metals, however, has not, it seems, 
increased that annual produce, has neither improved the manufactures and 
agriculture of the country, nor mended the circumstances of its inhabitants. 
Spain and Portugal, the countries which possess the mines, are, after Poland, 
perhaps, the two most beggarly countries in Europe. The value of the precious 
metals, however, must be lower in Spain and Portugal than in any other part of 
Europe; as they come from those countries to all other parts of Europe, loaded, 
not only with a freight and an insurance, but with the expense of smuggling, 
their exportation being either prohibited, or subjected to a duty. In proportion to 
the annual produce of the land and labour, therefore, their quantity must be 
greater in those countries than in any other part of Europe. Those countries, 
however, are poorer than the greater part of Europe. Though the feudal system 
has been abolished in Spain and Portugal, it has not been succeeded by a much 
better. 
    As the low value of gold and silver, therefore, is no proof of the wealth and 
flourishing state of the country where it takes place; so neither is their high 
value, or the low money price either of goods in general, or of corn in particular, 
any proof of its poverty and barbarism. 
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    But though the low money price either of goods in general, or of corn in 
particular, be no proof of the poverty or barbarism of the times, the low money 
price of some particular sorts of goods, such as cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, 
etc., in proportion to that of corn, is a most decisive one. It clearly demonstrates, 
first, their great abundance in proportion to that of corn, and consequently the 
great extent of the land which they occupied in proportion to what was occupied 
by corn; and, secondly, the low value of this land in proportion to that of corn 
land, and consequently the uncultivated and unimproved state of the far greater 
part of the lands of the country. It clearly demonstrates that the stock and 
population of the country did not bear the same proportion to the extent of its 
territory which they commonly do in civilised countries, and that society was at 
that time, and in that country, but in its infancy. From the high or low money 
price either of goods in general, or of corn in particular, we can infer only that 
the mines which at that time happened to supply the commercial world with gold 
and silver were fertile or barren, not that the country was rich or poor. But from 
the high or low money price of some sorts of goods in proportion to that of 
others, we can infer, with a degree of probability that approaches almost to 
certainty, that it was rich or poor, that the greater part of its lands were improved 
or unimproved, and that it was either in a more or less barbarous state, or in a 
more or less civilised one. 
    Any rise in the money price of goods which proceeded altogether from the 
degradation of the value of silver would affect all sorts of goods equally, and 
raise their price universally a third, or a fourth, or a fifth part higher, according 
as silver happened to lose a third, or a fourth, or a fifth part of its former value. 
But the rise in the price of provisions, which has been the subject of so much 
reasoning and conversation, does not affect all sorts of provisions equally. 
Taking the course of the present century at an average, the price of corn, it is 
acknowledged, even by those who account for this rise by the degradation of the 
value of silver, has risen much less than that of some other sorts of provisions. 
The rise in the price of those other sorts of provisions, therefore, cannot be 
owing altogether to the degradation of the value of silver. Some other causes 
must be taken into the account, and those which have been above assigned will, 
perhaps, without having recourse to the supposed degradation of the value of 
silver, sufficiently explain this rise in those particular sorts of provisions of 
which the price has actually risen in proportion to that of corn. 
    As to the price of corn itself, it has, during the sixty-four first years of the 
present century, and before the late extraordinary course of bad seasons, been 
somewhat lower than it was during the sixty-four last years of the preceding 
century. This fact is attested, not only by the accounts of Windsor market, but by 
the public fiars of all the different counties of Scotland, and by the accounts of 
several different markets in France, which have been collected with great 
diligence and fidelity by Mr. Messance and by Mr. Dupre de St. Maur. The 
evidence is more complete than could well have been expected in a matter which 
is naturally so very difficult to be ascertained. 
    As to the high price of corn during these last ten or twelve years, it can be 
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sufficiently accounted for from the badness of the seasons, without supposing 
any degradation in the value of silver. The opinion, therefore, that silver is 
continually sinking in its value, seems not to be founded upon any good 
observations, either upon the prices of corn, or upon those of other provisions. 
    The same quantity of silver, it may, perhaps, be said, will in the present times, 
even according to the account which has been here given, purchase a much 
smaller quantity of several sorts of provisions than it would have done during 
some part of the last century; and to ascertain whether this change be owing to a 
rise in the value of those goods, or to a fall in the value of silver, is only to 
establish a vain and useless distinction, which can be of no sort of service to the 
man who has only a certain quantity of silver to go to market with, or a certain 
fixed revenue in money. I certainly do not pretend that the knowledge of this 
distinction will enable him to buy cheaper. It may not, however, upon that 
account be altogether useless. 
    It may be of some use to the public by affording an easy proof of the 
prosperous condition of the country. If the rise in the price of some sorts of 
provisions be owing altogether to a fall in the value of silver, it is owing to a 
circumstance from which nothing can be inferred but the fertility of the 
American mines. The real wealth of the country, the annual produce of its land 
and labour, may, notwithstanding this circumstance, be either gradually 
declining, as in Portugal and Poland; or gradually advancing, as in most other 
parts of Europe. But if this rise in the price of some sorts of provisions be owing 
to a rise in the real value of the land which produces them, to its increased 
fertility, or, in consequence of more extended improvement and good 
cultivation, to its having been rendered fit for producing corn; it is owing to a 
circumstance which indicates in the clearest manner the prosperous and 
advancing state of the country. The land constitutes by far the greatest, the most 
important, and the most durable part of the wealth of every extensive country. It 
may surely be of some use, or, at least, it may give some satisfaction to the 
public, to have so decisive a proof of the increasing value of by far the greatest, 
the most important, and the most durable part of its wealth. 
    It may, too, be of some use to the public in regulating the pecuniary reward of 
some of its inferior servants. If this rise in the price of some sorts of provisions 
be owing to a fall in the value of silver, their pecuniary reward, provided it was 
not too large before, ought certainly to be augmented in proportion to the extent 
of this fall. If it is not augmented, their real recompense will evidently be so 
much diminished. But if this rise of price is owing to the increased value, in 
consequence of the improved fertility of the land which produces such 
provisions, it becomes a much nicer matter to judge either in what proportion 
any pecuniary reward ought to be augmented, or whether it ought to be 
augmented at all. The extension of improvement and cultivation, as it 
necessarily raises more or less, in proportion to the price of corn, that of every 
sort of animal food, so it as necessarily lowers that of, I believe, every sort of 
vegetable food. It raises the price of animal food; because a great part of the land 
which produces it, being rendered fit for producing corn, must afford to the 
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landlord and farmer the rent and profit of corn-land. It lowers the price of 
vegetable food; because, by increasing the fertility of the land, it increases its 
abundance. The improvements of agriculture, too, introduce many sorts of 
vegetable food, which, requiring less land and not more labour than corn, come 
much cheaper to market. Such are potatoes and maize, or what is called Indian 
corn, the two most important improvements which the agriculture of Europe, 
perhaps, which Europe itself has received from the great extension of its 
commerce and navigation. Many sorts of vegetable food, besides, which in the 
rude state of agriculture are confined to the kitchen-garden, and raised only by 
the spade, come in its improved state to be introduced into common fields, and 
to be raised by the plough: such as turnips, carrots, cabbages, etc. If in the 
progress of improvement, therefore, the real price of one species of food 
necessarily rises, that of another as necessarily falls, and it becomes a matter of 
more nicety to judge how far the rise in the one may be compensated by the fall 
in the other. When the real price of butcher's meat has once got to its height 
(which, with regard to every sort, except, perhaps, that of hogs' flesh, it seems to 
have done through a great part of England more than a century ago), any rise 
which can afterwards happen in that of any other sort of animal food cannot 
much affect the circumstances of the inferior ranks of people. The circumstances 
of the poor through a great part of England cannot surely be so much distressed 
by any rise in the price of poultry, fish, wild-fowl, or venison, as they must be 
relieved by the fall in that of potatoes. 
    In the present season of scarcity the high price of corn no doubt distresses the 
poor. But in times of moderate plenty, when corn is at its ordinary or average 
price, the natural rise in the price of any other sort of rude produce cannot much 
affect them. They suffer more, perhaps, by the artificial rise which has been 
occasioned by taxes in the price of some manufactured commodities; as of salt, 
soap, leather, candles, malt, beer, and ale, etc. 
Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon the Real Price of 
Manufactures 
It is the natural effect of improvement, however, to diminish gradually the real 
price of almost all manufactures. That of the manufacturing workmanship 
diminishes, perhaps, in all of them without exception. In consequence of better 
machinery, of greater dexterity, and of a more proper division and distribution of 
work, all of which are the natural effects of improvement, a much smaller 
quantity of labour becomes requisite for executing any particular piece of work, 
and though, in consequence of the flourishing circumstances of the society, the 
real price of labour should rise very considerably, yet the great diminution of the 
quantity will generally much more than compensate the greatest rise which can 
happen in the price. 
    There are, indeed, a few manufactures in which the necessary rise in the real 
price of the rude materials will more than compensate all the advantages which 
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improvement can introduce into the execution of the work. In carpenters' and 
joiners' work, and in the coarser sort of cabinet work, the necessary rise in the 
real price of barren timber, in consequence of the improvement of land, will 
more than compensate all the advantages which can be derived from the best 
machinery, the greatest dexterity, and the most proper division and distribution 
of work. 
    But in all cases in which the real price of the rude materials either does not 
rise at all, or does not rise very much, that of the manufactured commodity sinks 
very considerably. 
    This diminution of price has, in the course of the present and preceding 
century, been most remarkable in those manufactures of which the materials are 
the coarser metals. A better movement of a watch, that about the middle of the 
last century could have been bought for twenty pounds, may now perhaps be had 
for twenty shillings. In the work of cutiers and locksmiths, in all the toys which 
are made of the coarser metals, and in all those goods which are commonly 
known by the name of Birmingham and Sheffield ware, there has been, during 
the same period, a very great reduction of price, though not altogether so great 
as in watch-work. It has, however, been sufficient to astonish the workmen of 
every other part of Europe, who in many cases acknowledge that they can 
produce no work of equal goodness for double, or even for triple the price. 
There are perhaps no manufactures in which the division of labour can be 
carried further, or in which the machinery employed admits of a greater variety 
of improvements, than those of which the materials are the coarser metals. 
    In the clothing manufacture there has, during the same period, been no such 
sensible reduction of price. The price of superfine cloth, I have been assured, on 
the contrary, has, within these five-and-twenty or thirty years, risen somewhat in 
proportion to its quality; owing, it was said, to a considerable rise in the price of 
the material, which consists altogether of Spanish wool. That of the Yorkshire 
cloth, which is made altogether of English wool, is said indeed, during the 
course of the present century, to have fallen a good deal in proportion to its 
quality. Quality, however, is so very disputable a matter that I look upon all 
information of this kind as somewhat uncertain. In the clothing manufacture, the 
division of labour is nearly the same now as it was a century ago, and the 
machinery employed is not very different. There may, however, have been some 
small improvements in both, which may have occasioned some reduction of 
price. 
    But the reduction will appear much more sensible and undeniable if we 
compare the price of this manufacture in the present times with what it was in a 
much remoter period, towards the end of the fifteenth century, when the labour 
was probably much less subdivided, and the machinery employed much more 
imperfect, than it is at present. 
    In 1487, being the 4th of Henry VII, it was enacted that "whosoever shall sell 
by retail a broad yard of the finest scarlet grained, or of other grained cloth of 
the finest making, above sixteen shillings, shall forfeit forty shillings for every 
yard so sold." Sixteen shillings, therefore, containing about the same quantity of 
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silver as four-and-twenty shillings of our present money, was, at that time, 
reckoned not an unreasonable price for a yard of the finest cloth; and as this is a 
sumptuary law, such cloth, it is probable, had usually been sold somewhat 
dearer. A guinea may be reckoned the highest price in the present times. Even 
though the quality of the cloths, therefore, should be supposed equal, and that of 
the present times is most probably much superior, yet, even upon this 
supposition, the money price of the finest cloth appears to have been 
considerably reduced since the end of the fifteenth century. But its real price has 
been much more reduced. Six shillings and eightpence was then, and long 
afterwards, reckoned the average price of a quarter of wheat. Sixteen shillings, 
therefore, was the price of two quarters and more than three bushels of wheat. 
Valuing a quarter of wheat in the present times at eight-and-twenty shillings, the 
real price of a yard of fine cloth must, in those times, have been equal to at least 
three pounds six shillings and sixpence of our present money. The man who 
bought it must have parted with the command of a quantity of labour and 
subsistence equal to what that sum would purchase in the present times. 
    The reduction in the real price of the coarse manufacture, though 
considerable, has not been so great as in that of the fine. 
    In 1643, being the 3rd of Edward IV, it was enacted that "no servant in 
husbandry, nor common labourer, nor servant to any artificer inhabiting out of a 
city or burgh shall use or wear in their clothing any cloth above two shillings the 
broad yard." In the 3rd of Edward IV, two shillings contained very nearly the 
same quantity of silver as four of our present money. But the Yorkshire cloth 
which is now sold at four shillings the yard is probably much superior to any 
that was then made for the wearing of the very poorest order of common 
servants. Even the money price of their clothing, therefore, may, in proportion to 
the quality, be somewhat cheaper in the present than it was in those ancient 
times. The real price is certainly a good deal cheaper. Tenpence was then 
reckoned what is called the moderate and reasonable price of a bushel of wheat. 
Two shillings, therefore, was the price of two bushels and near two pecks of 
wheat, which in the present times, at three shillings and sixpence the bushel, 
would be worth eight shillings and ninepence. For a yard of this cloth the poor 
servant must have parted with the power of purchasing a quantity of subsistence 
equal to what eight shillings and ninepence would purchase in the present times. 
This is a sumptuary law too, restraining the luxury and extravagance of the poor. 
Their clothing, therefore, had commonly been much more expensive. 
    The same order of people are, by the same law, prohibited from wearing hose, 
of which the price should exceed fourteenpence the pair, equal to about eight-
and-twentypence of our present money. But fourteenpence was in those times 
the price of a bushel and near two pecks of wheat, which, in the present times, at 
three and sixpence the bushel, would cost five shillings and threepence. We 
should in the present times consider this as a very high price for a pair of 
stockings, to a servant of the poorest and lowest order. He must, however, in 
those times have paid what was really equivalent to this price for them. 
    In the time of Edward IV the art of knitting stockings was probably not 
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known in any part of Europe. Their hose were made of common cloth, which 
may have been one of the causes of their dearness. The first person that wore 
stockings in England is said to have been Queen Elizabeth. She received them as 
a present from the Spanish ambassador. 
    Both in the coarse and in the fine woollen manufacture, the machinery 
employed was much more imperfect in those ancient than it is in the present 
times. It has since received three very capital improvements, besides, probably, 
many smaller ones of which it may be difficult to ascertain either the number or 
the importance. The three capital improvements are: first, the exchange of the 
rock and spindle for the spinning-wheel, which, with the same quantity of 
labour, will perform more than double the quantity of work. Secondly, the use of 
several very ingenious machines which facilitate and abridge in a still greater 
proportion the winding of the worsted and woollen yarn, or the proper 
arrangement of the warp and woof before they are put into the loom; an 
operation which, previous to the invention of those machines, must have been 
extremely tedious and troublesome. Thirdly, the employment of the fulling mill 
for thickening the cloth, instead of treading it in water. Neither wind nor water 
mills of any kind were known in England so early as the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, nor, so far as I know, in any other part of Europe north of the 
Alps. They had been introduced into Italy some time before. 
    The consideration of these circumstances may, perhaps, in some measure 
explain to us why the real price both of the coarse and of the fine manufacture 
was so much higher in those ancient than it is in the present times. It cost a 
greater quantity of labour to bring the goods to market. When they were brought 
thither, therefore, they must have purchased or exchanged for the price of a 
greater quantity. 
    The coarse manufacture probably was, in those ancient times, carried on in 
England, in the same manner as it always has been in countries where arts and 
manufactures are in their infancy. It was probably a household manufacture, in 
which every different part of the work was occasionally performed by all the 
different members of almost every private family; but so as to be their work only 
when they had nothing else to do, and not to be the principal business from 
which any of them derived the greater part of their subsistence. The work which 
is performed in this manner, it has already been observed, comes always much 
cheaper to market than that which is the principal or sole fund of the workman's 
subsistence. The fine manufacture, on the other hand, was not in those times 
carried on in England, but in the rich and commercial country of Flanders; and it 
was probably conducted then, in the same manner as now, by people who 
derived the whole, or the principal part of their subsistence from it. It was, 
besides, a foreign manufacture, and must have paid some duty, the ancient 
custom of tonnage and poundage at least, to the king. This duty, indeed, would 
not probably be very great. It was not then the policy of Europe to restrain, by 
high duties, the importation of foreign manufactures, but rather to encourage it, 
in order that merchants might be enabled to supply, at as easy a rate as possible, 
the great men with the conveniences and luxuries which they wanted, and which 
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the industry of their own country could not afford them. 
    The consideration of these circumstances may perhaps in some measure 
explain to us why, in those ancient times, the real price of the coarse 
manufacture was, in proportion to that of the fine, so much lower than in the 
present times. 
Conclusion of the Chapter
I shall conclude this very long chapter with observing that every improvement in 
the circumstances of the society tends either directly or indirectly to raise the 
real rent of land, to increase the real wealth of the landlord, his power of 
purchasing the labour, or the produce of the labour of other people. 
    The extension of improvement and cultivation tends to raise it directly. The 
landlord's share of the produce necessarily increases with the increase of the 
produce. 
    That rise in the real price of those parts of the rude produce of land, which is 
first the effect of extended improvement and cultivation, and afterwards the 
cause of their being still further extended, the rise in the price of cattle, for 
example, tends too to raise the rent of land directly, and in a still greater 
proportion. The real value of the landlord's share, his real command of the 
labour of other people, not only rises with the real value of the produce, but the 
proportion of his share to the whole produce rises with it. That produce, after the 
rise in its real price, requires no more labour to collect it than before. A smaller 
proportion of it will, therefore, be sufficient to replace, with the ordinary profit, 
the stock which employs that labour. A greater proportion of it must, 
consequently, belong to the landlord. 
    All those improvements in the productive powers of labour, which tend 
directly to reduce the real price of manufactures, tend indirectly to raise the real 
rent of land. The landlord exchanges that part of his rude produce, which is over 
and above his own consumption, or what comes to the same thing, the price of 
that part of it, for manufactured produce. Whatever reduces the real price of the 
latter, raises that of the former. An equal quantity of the former becomes thereby 
equivalent to a greater quantity of the latter; and the landlord is enabled to 
purchase a greater quantity of the conveniences, ornaments, or luxuries, which 
he has occasion for. 
    Every increase in the real wealth of the society, every increase in the quantity 
of useful labour employed within it, tends indirectly to raise the real rent of land. 
A certain proportion of this labour naturally goes to the land. A greater number 
of men and cattle are employed in its cultivation, the produce increases with the 
increase of the stock which is thus employed in raising it, and the rent increases 
with the produce. 
    The contrary circumstances, the neglect of cultivation and improvement, the 
fall in the real price of any part of the rude produce of land, the rise in the real 
price of manufactures from the decay of manufacturing art and industry, the 
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declension of the real wealth of the society, all tend, on the other hand, to lower 
the real rent of land, to reduce the real wealth of the landlord, to diminish his 
power of purchasing either the labour, or the produce of the labour of other 
people. 
    The whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country, or what 
comes to the same thing, the whole price of that annual produce, naturally 
divides itself, it has already been observed, into three parts; the rent of land, the 
wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and constitutes a revenue to three 
different orders of people; to those who live by rent, to those who live by wages, 
and to those who live by profit. These are the three great, original, and 
constituent orders of every civilised society, from whose revenue that of every 
other order is ultimately derived. 
    The interest of the first of those three great orders, it appears from what has 
been just now said, is strictly and inseparably connected with the general interest 
of the society. Whatever either promotes or obstructs the one, necessarily 
promotes or obstructs the other. When the public deliberates concerning any 
regulation of commerce or police, the proprietors of land never can mislead it, 
with a view to promote the interest of their own particular order; at least, if they 
have any tolerable knowledge of that interest. They are, indeed, too often 
defective in this tolerable knowledge. They are the only one of the three orders 
whose revenue costs them neither labour nor care, but comes to them, as it were, 
of its own accord, and independent of any plan or project of their own. That 
indolence, which is the natural effect of the ease and security of their situation, 
renders them too often, not only ignorant, but incapable of that application of 
mind which is necessary in order to foresee and understand the consequences of 
any public regulation. 
    The interest of the second order, that of those who live by wages, is as strictly 
connected with the interest of the society as that of the first. The wages of the 
labourer, it has already been shown, are never so high as when the demand for 
labour is continually rising, or when the quantity employed is every year 
increasing considerably. When this real wealth of the society becomes 
stationary, his wages are soon reduced to what is barely enough to enable him to 
bring up a family, or to continue the race of labourers. When the society 
declines, they fall even below this. The order of proprietors may, perhaps, gain 
more by the prosperity of the society than that of labourers: but there is no order 
that suffers so cruelly from its decline. But though the interest of the labourer is 
strictly connected with that of the society, he is incapable either of 
comprehending that interest or of understanding its connection with his own. His 
condition leaves him no time to receive the necessary information, and his 
education and habits are commonly such as to render him unfit to judge even 
though he was fully informed. In the public deliberations, therefore, his voice is 
little heard and less regarded, except upon some particular occasions, when his 
clamour is animated, set on and supported by his employers, not for his, but their 
own particular purposes. 
    His employers constitute the third order, that of those who live by profit. It is 
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the stock that is employed for the sake of profit which puts into motion the 
greater part of the useful labour of every society. The plans and projects of the 
employers of stock regulate and direct all the most important operations of 
labour, and profit is the end proposed by all those plans and projects. But the 
rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the prosperity and fall with 
the declension of the society. On the contrary, it is naturally low in rich and high 
in poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries which are going 
fastest to ruin. The interest of this third order, therefore, has not the same 
connection with the general interest of the society as that of the other two. 
Merchants and master manufacturers are, in this order, the two classes of people 
who commonly employ the largest capitals, and who by their wealth draw to 
themselves the greatest share of the public consideration. As during their whole 
lives they are engaged in plans and projects, they have frequently more 
acuteness of understanding than the greater part of country gentlemen. As their 
thoughts, however, are commonly exercised rather about the interest of their 
own particular branch of business, than about that of the society, their judgment, 
even when given with the greatest candour (which it has not been upon every 
occasion) is much more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those 
two objects than with regard to the latter. Their superiority over the country 
gentleman is not so much in their knowledge of the public interest, as in their 
having a better knowledge of their own interest than he has of his. It is by this 
superior knowledge of their own interest that they have frequently imposed upon 
his generosity, and persuaded him to give up both his own interest and that of 
the public, from a very simple but honest conviction that their interest, and not 
his, was the interest of the public. The interest of the dealers, however, in any 
particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in some respects different 
from, and even opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market and to 
narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the 
market may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; but to 
narrow the competition must always be against it, and can serve only to enable 
the dealers, by raising their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, 
for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens. The 
proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this 
order ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be 
adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the 
most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order 
of men whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who 
have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who 
accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it. 
TABLES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER 11, PART 3
           Price of the       Average of       The 
average Price
            Quarter of       the different       of 
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each Year in
Years         Wheat            Prices of           
Money of the
 XII        each Year        the same Year         
present Times
          L    s.    d.       L.    s.    d.       
L.    s.    d.
1202      -   12     -        -     -     -        
1    16     -
1205      -   12     -        -    13     5        
2     -     3
          -   13     4
          -   15     -
1223      -   12     -        -     -     -        
1    16     -
1237      -    3     4        -     -     -        
-    10     -
1243      -    2     -        -     -     -        
-     6     -
1244      -    2     -        -     -     -        
-     6     -
1246      -   16     -        -     -     -        
2     8     -
1247      -   13     4        -     -     -        
2     -     -
1257      1    4     -        -     -     -        
3    12     -
1258      1    -     -        -    17     -        
2    11     -
          -   15     -
          -   16     -
1270      4   16     -        5    12     -       
16    16     -
          6    8     -
1286      -    2     8        -     9     4        
1     8     -
          -   16     -
                                                 ---------------
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                                        Total    
L35     9     3
                                                 ---------------
                                Average Price     
L2    19     1 1/4
           Price of the       Average of       The 
average Price
            Quarter of       the different       of 
each Year in
Years         Wheat            Prices of           
Money of the
 XII        each Year        the same Year         
present Times
          L    s.    d.       L.    s.    d.       
L.    s.    d.
1287      -    3     4        -     -     -        
-    10     -
1288      -    -     8        -     3     - 1/4    
-     9     - 3/4
          -    1     -
          -    1     4
          -    1     6
          -    1     8
          -    2     -
          -    3     4
          -    9     4
1289      -   12     -        -    10     1 3/4    
1    10     4 1/2
          -    6     -
          -    2     -
          -   10     8
          1    -     -
1290      -   16     -        -     -     -        
2     8     -
1294      -   16     -        -     -     -        
2     8     -
1302      -    4     -        -     -     -        
-    12     -
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1309      -    7     2        -     -     -        
1     1     6
1315      1    -     -        -     -     -        
3     -     -
1316      1    -     -        1    10     6        
4    11     6
          1   10     -
          1   12     -
          2    -     -
1317      2    4     -        1    19     6        
5    18     6
          -   14     -
          2   13     -
          4    -     -
          -    6     8
1336      -    2     -        -     -     -        
-     6     -
1338      -    3     4        -     -     -        
-    10     -
                                                 ---------------
                                        Total    
L23     4    11 1/4
                                                 ---------------
                                Average Price     
L1    18     8
           Price of the       Average of       The 
average Price
            Quarter of       the different       of 
each Year in
Years         Wheat            Prices of           
Money of the
 XII        each Year        the same Year         
present Times
          L    s.    d.       L.    s.    d.       
L.    s.    d.
1339      -    9     -        -     -     -        
1     7     -
1349      -    2     -        -     -     -        
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-     5     2
1359      1    6     8        -     -     -        
3     2     2
1361      -    2     -        -     -     -        
-     4     8
1363      -   15     -        -     -     -        
1    15     -
1369      1    -     -        1     2     -        
2     9     4
          1    4     -
1379      -    4     -        -     -     -        
-     9     4
1387      -    2     -        -     -     -        
-     4     8
1390      -   13     4        -    14     5        
1    13     7
          -   14     -
          -   16     -
1401      -   16     -        -     -     -        
1    17     4
1407      -    4     4 3/4    -     3    10        
-     8    11
          -    3     4
1416      -   16     -        -     -     -        
1    12     -
                                                 ---------------
                                        Total    
L15     9     4
                                                 ---------------
                                Average Price     
L1     5     9 1/3
           Price of the       Average of       The 
average Price
            Quarter of       the different       of 
each Year in
Years         Wheat            Prices of           
Money of the
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 XII        each Year        the same Year         
present Times
          L    s.    d.       L.    s.    d.       
L.    s.    d.
1423      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-    16     -
1425      -    4     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
1434      1    6     8        -     -     -        
2    13     4
1435      -    5     4        -     -     -        
-    10     8
1439      1    -     -        1     3     4        
2     6     8
          1    6     8
1440      1    4     -        -     -     -        
2     8     -
1444      -    4     4        -     4     2        
-     8     4
          -    4     -
1445      -    4     6        -     -     -        
-     9     -
1447      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-    16     -
1448      -    6     8        -     -     -        
-    13     4
1449      -    5     -        -     -     -        
-    10     -
1452      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-    16     -
                                                 ---------------
                                        Total    
L12    15     4
                                                 ---------------
                                Average Price     
L1     1     3 1/2
           Price of the       Average of       The 
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average Price
            Quarter of       the different       of 
each Year in
Years         Wheat            Prices of           
Money of the
 XII        each Year        the same Year         
present Times
          L    s.    d.       L.    s.    d.       
L.    s.    d.
1453      -    5     4        -     -     -        
-    10     8
1455      -    1     2        -     -     -        
-     2     4
1457      -    7     8        -     -     -        
-    15     4
1459      -    5     -        -     -     -        
-    10     -
1460      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-    16     -
1463      -    2     -        -     1    10        
-     3     8
          -    1     8
1464      -    6     8        -     -     -        
-    10     -
1486      1    4     -        -     -     -        
1    17     -
1491      -   14     8        -     -     -        
1     2     -
1494      -    4     -        -     -     -        
-     6     -
1495      -    3     4        -     -     -        
-     5     -
1497      1    -     -        -     -     -        
1    11     -
                                                  --------------
                                        Total     
L8     9     -
                                                  --------------
                                Average Price      
-    14     1
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           Price of the       Average of       The 
average Price
            Quarter of       the different       of 
each Year in
Years         Wheat            Prices of           
Money of the
 XII        each Year        the same Year         
present Times
          L    s.    d.       L.    s.    d.       
L.    s.    d.
1499      -    4     -        -     -     -        
-     6     -
1504      -    5     8        -     -     -        
-     8     6
1521      1    -     -        -     -     -        
1    10     -
1551      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     2     -
1553      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
1554      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
1555      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
1556      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
1557      -    4     -        -    17     8 1/2    
-    17     8 1/2
          -    5     -
          -    8     -
          2   13     4
1558      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
1559      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
1560      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
                                                  --------------
                                        Total     
L6     0     2 1/2
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                                                  --------------
                                Average Price      
-    10     - 5/12
           Price of the       Average of       The 
average Price
            Quarter of       the different       of 
each Year in
Years         Wheat            Prices of           
Money of the
 XII        each Year        the same Year         
present Times
          L    s.    d.       L.    s.    d.       
L.    s.    d.
1561      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
1562      -    8     -        -     -     -        
-     8     -
1574      2   16     -        2     -     -        
2     -     -
          1    4     -
1587      3    4     -        -     -     -        
3     4     -
1594      2   16     -        -     -     -        
2    16     -
1595      2   13     -        -     -     -        
2    13     -
1596      4    -     -        -     -     -        
4     -     -
1597      5    4     -        4    12     -        
4    12     -
          4    -     -
1598      2   16     8        -     -     -        
2    16     8
1599      1   19     2        -     -     -        
1    19     2
1600      1   17     8        -     -     -        
1    17     8
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1601      1   14    10        -     -     -        
1    14    10
                                                 ---------------
                                        Total    
L28     9     4
                                                 ---------------
                                Average Price     
L2     7     5 1/3
   Prices of the Quarter of nine Bushels of the best 
or highest
  priced Wheat at Windsor Market, on Lady-day and 
Michaelmas, from
   1595 to 1764, both inclusive; the Price of each 
Year being the
     medium between the highest Prices of those Two 
Market Days.
   Years                            Years
                L.    s.    d.                   
L.    s.    d.
    1595   -    2     0     0        1621   -    1    
10     4
    1596   -    2     8     0        1622   -    2    
18     8
    1597   -    3     9     6        1623   -    2    
12     0
    1598   -    2    16     8        1624   -    
2     8     0
    1599   -    1    19     2        1625   -    2    
12     0
    1600   -    1    17     8        1626   -    
2     9     4
    1601   -    1    14    10        1627   -    1    
16     0
    1602   -    1     9     4        1628   -    
1     8     0
    1603   -    1    15     4        1629   -    
2     2     0
    1604   -    1    10     8        1630   -    2    
15     8
    1605   -    1    15    10        1631   -    
3     8     0
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    1606   -    1    13     0        1632   -    2    
13     4
    1607   -    1    16     8        1633   -    2    
18     0
    1608   -    2    16     8        1634   -    2    
16     0
    1609   -    2    10     0        1635   -    2    
16     0
    1610   -    1    15    10        1636   -    2    
16     8
    1611   -    1    18     8                   
--------------
    1612   -    2     2     4               16) 
40     0     0
    1613   -    2     8     8                   
--------------
    1614   -    2     1     8 1/2               L2    
10     0
    1615   -    1    18     8
    1616   -    2     0     4
    1617   -    2     8     8
    1618   -    2     6     8
    1619   -    1    15     4
    1620   -    1    10     4
               --------------
           26) 54     0     6 1/2
               --------------
               L2     1     6 9/12
                  Wheat per                        
Wheat per
   Years           quarter          Years           
quarter
                L.    s.    d.                   
L.    s.    d.
    1637   -    2    13     0     Brought over  79    
14    10
    1638   -    2    17     4        1671   -    
2     2     0
    1639   -    2     4    10        1672   -    
2     1     0
    1640   -    2     4     8        1673   -    
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2     6     8
    1641   -    2     8     0        1674   -    
3     8     8
    1642   -    0     0     0*       1675   -    
3     4     8
    1643   -    0     0     0        1676   -    1    
18     0
    1644   -    0     0     0        1677   -    
2     2     0
    1645   -    0     0     0        1678   -    2    
19     0
    1646   -    2     8     0        1679   -    
3     0     0
    1647   -    3    13     8        1680   -    
2     5     0
    1648   -    4     5     0        1681   -    
2     6     8
    1649   -    4     0     0        1682   -    
2     4     0
    1650   -    3    16     8        1683   -    
2     0     0
    1651   -    3    13     4        1684   -    
2     4     0
    1652   -    2     9     6        1685   -    
2     6     8
    1653   -    1    15     6        1686   -    1    
14     0
    1654   -    1     6     0        1687   -    
1     5     2
    1655   -    1    13     4        1688   -    
2     6     0
    1656   -    2     3     0        1689   -    1    
10     0
    1657   -    2     6     8        1690   -    1    
14     8
    1658   -    3     5     0        1691   -    1    
14     0
    1659   -    3     6     0        1692   -    
2     6     8
    1660   -    2    16     6        1693   -    
3     7     8
    1661   -    3    10     0        1694   -    
3     4     0
    1662   -    3    14     0        1695   -    2    
13     0
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    1663   -    2    17     0        1696   -    3    
11     0
    1664   -    2     0     6        1697   -    
3     0     0
    1665   -    2     9     4        1698   -    
3     8     4
    1666   -    1    16     0        1699   -    
3     4     0
    1667   -    1    16     0        1700   -    
2     0     0
    1668   -    2     0     0                  
---------------
    1669   -    2     4     4             60)  
153     1     8
    1670   -    2     1     8                  
---------------
               --------------                   L2    
11     0 1/3
  Carry over  L79    14    10
  *Wanting in the account. The year 1646 supplied by 
Bishop Fleetwood.
                  Wheat per                        
Wheat per
   Years           quarter          Years           
quarter
                L.    s.    d.                   
L.    s.    d.
    1701   -    1    17     8     Brought over  
69     8     8
    1702   -    1     9     6        1734   -    1    
18    10
    1703   -    1    16     0        1735   -    
2     3     0
    1704   -    2     6     6        1736   -    
2     0     4
    1705   -    1    10     0        1737   -    1    
18     0
    1706   -    1     6     0        1738   -    1    
15     6
    1707   -    1     8     6        1739   -    1    
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18     6
    1708   -    2     1     6        1740   -    2    
10     8
    1709   -    3    18     6        1741   -    
2     6     8
    1710   -    3    18     0        1742   -    1    
14     0
    1711   -    2    14     0        1743   -    
1     4    10
    1712   -    2     6     4        1744   -    
1     4    10
    1713   -    2    11     0        1745   -    
1     7     6
    1714   -    2    10     4        1746   -    1    
19     0
    1715   -    2     3     0        1747   -    1    
14    10
    1716   -    2     8     0        1748   -    1    
17     0
    1717   -    2     5     8        1749   -    1    
17     0
    1718   -    1    18    10        1750   -    1    
12     6
    1719   -    1    15     0        1751   -    1    
18     6
    1720   -    1    17     0        1752   -    
2     1    10
    1721   -    1    17     6        1753   -    
2     4     8
    1722   -    1    16     0        1754   -    1    
14     8
    1723   -    1    14     8        1755   -    1    
13    10
    1724   -    1    17     0        1756   -    
2     5     3
    1725   -    2     8     6        1757   -    
3     0     0
    1726   -    2     6     0        1758   -    2    
10     0
    1727   -    2     2     0        1759   -    1    
19    10
    1728   -    2    14     6        1760   -    1    
16     6
    1729   -    2     6    10        1761   -    1    
10     3
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth1.html (187 of 189)4/11/2005 9:44:45 AM
The Wealth of Nations
    1730   -    1    16     6        1762   -    1    
19     0
    1731   -    1    12    10        1763   -    
2     0     9
    1732   -    1     6     8        1764   -    
2     6     9
    1733   -    1     8     4                  
---------------
               --------------             64)  129    
13     6
  Carry over  L69     8     8                  
---------------
                                                L2     
0     6 9/32
   Years                            Years
                L.    s.    d.                   
L.    s.    d.
    1731   -    1    12    10        1741   -    
2     6     8
    1732   -    1     6     8        1742   -    1    
14     0
    1733   -    1     8     4        1743   -    
1     4    10
    1734   -    1    18    10        1744   -    
1     4    10
    1735   -    2     3     0        1745   -    
1     7     6
    1736   -    2     0     4        1746   -    1    
19     0
    1737   -    1    18     0        1747   -    1    
14    10
    1738   -    1    15     6        1748   -    1    
17     0
    1739   -    1    18     6        1749   -    1    
17     0
    1740   -    2    10     8        1750   -    1    
12     6
               --------------                   
--------------
          10)  18    12     8              10)  16    
18     2
               --------------                  
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An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations
Adam Smith
BOOK TWO
Of the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock
Introduction
IN that rude state of society in which there is no division of labour, in which 
exchanges are seldom made, and in which every man provides everything 
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for himself, it is not necessary that any stock should be accumulated or 
stored up beforehand in order to carry on the business of the society. Every 
man endeavours to supply by his own industry his own occasional wants as 
they occur. When he is hungry, he goes to the forest to hunt; when his coat 
is worn out, he clothes himself with the skin of the first large animal he 
kills: and when his hut begins to go to ruin, he repairs it, as well as he can, 
with the trees and the turf that are nearest it. 
    But when the division of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the 
produce of a man's own labour can supply but a very small part of his 
occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by the produce 
of other men's labour, which he purchases with the produce, or, what is the 
same thing, with the price of the produce of his own. But this purchase 
cannot be made till such time as the produce of his own labour has not only 
been completed, but sold. A stock of goods of different kinds, therefore, 
must be stored up somewhere sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him 
with the materials and tools of his work till such time, at least, as both these 
events can be brought about. A weaver cannot apply himself entirely to his 
peculiar business, unless there is beforehand stored up somewhere, either in 
his own possession or in that of some other person, a stock sufficient to 
maintain him, and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work, 
till he has not only completed, but sold his web. This accumulation must, 
evidently, be previous to his applying his industry for so long a time to such 
a peculiar business. 
    As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to 
the division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in 
proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated. The 
quantity of materials which the same number of people can work up, 
increases in a great proportion as labour comes to be more and more 
subdivided; and as the operations of each workman are gradually reduced to 
a greater degree of simplicity, a variety of new machines come to be 
invented for facilitating and abridging those operations. As the division of 
labour advances, therefore, in order to give constant employment to an 
equal number of workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater stock 
of materials and tools than what would have been necessary in a ruder state 
of things, must be accumulated beforehand. But the number of workmen in 
every branch of business generally increases with the division of labour in 
that branch, or rather it is the increase of their number which enables them 
to class and subdivide themselves in this manner. 
    As the accumulation of stock is previously necessary for carrying on this 
great improvement in the productive powers of labour, so that accumulation 
naturally leads to this improvement. The person who employs his stock in 
maintaining labour, necessarily wishes to employ it in such a manner as to 
produce as great a quantity of work as possible. He endeavours, therefore, 
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both to make among his workmen the most proper distribution of 
employment, and to furnish them with the best machines which he can 
either invent or afford to purchase. His abilities in both these respects are 
generally in proportion to the extent of his stock, or to the number of people 
whom it can employ. The quantity of industry, therefore, not only increases 
in every country with the increase of the stock which employs it, but, in 
consequence of that increase, the same quantity of industry produces a 
much greater quantity of work. 
    Such are in general the effects of the increase of stock upon industry and 
its productive powers. 
    In the following book I have endeavoured to explain the nature of stock, 
the effects of its accumulation into capitals of different kinds, and the 
effects of the different employments of those capitals. This book is divided 
into five chapters. In the first chapter, I have endeavoured to show what are 
the different parts or branches into which the stock, either of an individual, 
or of a great society, naturally divides itself. In the second, I have 
endeavoured to explain the nature and operation of money considered as a 
particular branch of the general stock of the society. The stock which is 
accumulated into a capital, may either be employed by the person to whom 
it belongs, or it may be lent to some other person. In the third and fourth 
chapters, I have endeavoured to examine the manner in which it operates in 
both these situations. The fifth and last chapter treats of the different effects 
which the different employments of capital immediately produce upon the 
quantity both of national industry, and of the annual produce of land and 
labour. 
CHAPTER I
Of the Division of Stock
WHEN the stock which a man possesses is no more than sufficient to 
maintain him for a few days or a few weeks, he seldom thinks of deriving 
any revenue from it. He consumes it as sparingly as he can, and endeavours 
by his labour to acquire something which may supply its place before it be 
consumed altogether. His revenue is, in this case, derived from his labour 
only. This is the state of the greater part of the labouring poor in all 
countries. 
    But when he possesses stock sufficient to maintain him for months or 
years, he naturally endeavours to derive a revenue from the greater part of 
it; reserving only so much for his immediate consumption as may maintain 
him till this revenue begins to come in. His whole stock, therefore, is 
distinguished into two parts. That part which, he expects, is to afford him 
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this revenue, is called his capital. The other is that which supplies his 
immediate consumption; and which consists either, first, in that portion of 
his whole stock which was originally reserved for this purpose; or, 
secondly, in his revenue, from whatever source derived, as it gradually 
comes in; or, thirdly, in such things as had been purchased by either of these 
in former years, and which are not yet entirely consumed; such as a stock of 
clothes, household furniture, and the like. In one, or other, or all of these 
three articles, consists the stock which men commonly reserve for their own 
immediate consumption. 
    There are two different ways in which a capital may be employed so as to 
yield a revenue or profit to its employer. 
    First, it may be employed in raising, manufacturing, or purchasing goods, 
and selling them again with a profit. The capital employed in this manner 
yields no revenue or profit to its employer, while it either remains in his 
possession, or continues in the same shape. The goods of the merchant yield 
him no revenue or profit till he sells them for money, and the money yields 
him as little till it is again exchanged for goods. His capital is continually 
going from him in one shape, and returning to him in another, and it is only 
by means of such circulation, or successive exchanges, that it can yield him 
any profit. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called circulating 
capitals. 
    Secondly, it may be employed in the improvement of land, in the 
purchase of useful machines and instruments of trade, or in suchlike things 
as yield a revenue or profit without changing masters, or circulating any 
further. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called fixed capitals. 
    Different occupations require very different proportions between the 
fixed and circulating capitals employed in them. 
    The capital of a merchant, for example, is altogether a circulating capital. 
He has occasion for no machines or instruments of trade, unless his shop, or 
warehouse, be considered as such. 
    Some part of the capital of every master artificer or manufacturer must be 
fixed in the instruments of his trade. This part, however, is very small in 
some, and very great in others. A master tailor requires no other instruments 
of trade but a parcel of needles. Those of the master shoemaker are a little, 
though but a very little, more expensive. Those of the weaver rise a good 
deal above those of the shoemaker. The far greater part of the capital of all 
such master artificers, however, is circulated, either in the wages of their 
workmen, or in the price of their materials, and repaid with a profit by the 
price of the work. 
    In other works a much greater fixed capital is required. In a great iron-
work, for example, the furnace for melting the ore, the forge, the slitt-mill, 
are instruments of trade which cannot be erected without a very great 
expense. In coal-works and mines of every kind, the machinery necessary 
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both for drawing out the water and for other purposes is frequently still 
more expensive. 
    That part of the capital of the farmer which is employed in the 
instruments of agriculture is a fixed, that which is employed in the wages 
and maintenance of his labouring servants, is a circulating capital. He 
makes a profit of the one by keeping it in his own possession, and of the 
other by parting with it. The price or value of his labouring cattle is a fixed 
capital in the same manner as that of the instruments of husbandry. Their 
maintenance is a circulating capital in the same manner as that of the 
labouring servants. The farmer makes his profit by keeping the labouring 
cattle, and by parting with their maintenance. Both the price and the 
maintenance of the cattle which are brought in and fattened, not for labour, 
but for sale, are a circulating capital. The farmer makes his profit by parting 
with them. A flock of sheep or a herd of cattle that, in a breeding country, is 
bought in, neither for labour, nor for sale, but in order to make a profit by 
their wool, by their milk, and by their increase, is a fixed capital. The profit 
is made by keeping them. Their maintenance is a circulating capital. The 
profit is made by parting with it; and it comes back with both its own profit 
and the profit upon the whole price of the cattle, in the price of the wool, the 
milk, and the increase. The whole value of the seed, too, is properly a fixed 
capital. Though it goes backwards and forwards between the ground and the 
granary, it never changes masters, and therefore does not properly circulate. 
The farmer makes his profit, not by its sale, but by its increase. 
    The general stock of any country or society is the same with that of all its 
inhabitants or members, and therefore naturally divides itself into the same 
three portions, each of which has a distinct function or office. 
    The first is that portion which is reserved for immediate consumption, 
and of which the characteristic is, that it affords no revenue or profit. It 
consists in the stock of food, clothes, household furniture, etc., which have 
been purchased by their proper consumers, but which are not yet entirely 
consumed. The whole stock of mere dwelling-houses too, subsisting at any 
one time in the country, make a part of this first portion. The stock that is 
laid out in a house, if it is to be the dwellinghouse of the proprietor, ceases 
from that moment to serve in the function of a capital, or to afford any 
revenue to its owner. A dwellinghouse, as such, contributes nothing to the 
revenue of its inhabitant; and though it is, no doubt, extremely useful to 
him, it is as his clothes and household furniture are useful to him, which, 
however, makes a part of his expense, and not of his revenue. If it is to be 
let to a tenant for rent, as the house itself can produce nothing, the tenant 
must always pay the rent out of some other revenue which he derives either 
from labour, or stock, or land. Though a house, therefore, may yield a 
revenue to its proprietor, and thereby serve in the function of a capital to 
him, it cannot yield any to the public, nor serve in the function of a capital 
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to it, and the revenue of the whole body of the people can never be in the 
smallest degree increased by it. Clothes, and household furniture, in the 
same manner, sometimes yield a revenue, and thereby serve in the function 
of a capital to particular persons. In countries where masquerades are 
common, it is a trade to let out masquerade dresses for a night. Upholsterers 
frequently let furniture by the month or by the year. Undertakers let the 
furniture of funerals by the day and by the week. Many people let furnished 
houses, and get a rent, not only for the use of the house, but for that of the 
furniture. The revenue, however, which is derived from such things must 
always be ultimately drawn from some other source of revenue. Of all parts 
of the stock, either of an individual, or of a society, reserved for immediate 
consumption, what is laid out in houses is most slowly consumed. A stock 
of clothes may last several years: a stock of furniture half a century or a 
century: but a stock of houses, well built and properly taken care of, may 
last many centuries. Though the period of their total consumption, however, 
is more distant, they are still as really a stock reserved for immediate 
consumption as either clothes or household furniture. 
    The second of the three portions into which the general stock of the 
society divides itself, is the fixed capital, of which the characteristic is, that 
it affords a revenue or profit without circulating or changing masters. It 
consists chiefly of the four following articles: 
    First, of all useful machines and instruments of trade which facilitate and 
abridge labour: 
    Secondly, of all those profitable buildings which are the means of 
procuring a revenue, not only to their proprietor who lets them for a rent, 
but to the person who possesses them and pays that rent for them; such as 
shops, warehouses, workhouses, farmhouses, with all their necessary 
buildings; stables, granaries, etc. These are very different from mere 
dwelling houses. They are a sort of instruments of trade, and may be 
considered in the same light: 
    Thirdly, of the improvements of land, of what has been profitably laid out 
in clearing, draining, enclosing, manuring, and reducing it into the condition 
most proper for tillage and culture. An improved farm may very justly be 
regarded in the same light as those useful machines which facilitate and 
abridge labour, and by means of which an equal circulating capital can 
afford a much greater revenue to its employer. An improved farm is equally 
advantageous and more durable than any of those machines, frequently 
requiring no other repairs than the most profitable application of the 
farmer's capital employed in cultivating it: 
    Fourthly, of the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or 
members of the society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance 
of the acquirer during his education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a 
real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person. 
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Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise of that 
of the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman 
may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade 
which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain 
expense, repays that expense with a profit. 
    The third and last of the three portions into which the general stock of the 
society naturally divides itself, is the circulating capital; of which the 
characteristic is, that it affords a revenue only by circulating or changing 
masters. It is composed likewise of four parts: 
    First, of the money by means of which all the other three are circulated 
and distributed to their proper consumers: 
    Secondly, of the stock of provisions which are in the possession of the 
butcher, the grazier, the farmer, the corn-merchant, the brewer, etc., and 
from the sale of which they expect to derive a profit: 
    Thirdly, of the materials, whether altogether rude, or more or less 
manufactured, of clothes, furniture, and building, which are not yet made up 
into any of those three shapes, but which remain in the hands of the 
growers, the manufacturers, the mercers and drapers, the timber merchants, 
the carpenters and joiners, the brickmakers, etc. 
    Fourthly, and lastly, of the work which is made up and completed, but 
which is still in the hands of the merchant or manufacturer, and not yet 
disposed of or distributed to the proper consumers; such as the finished 
work which we frequently find ready-made in the shops of the smith, the 
cabinet-maker, the goldsmith, the jeweller, the china-merchant, etc. The 
circulating capital consists in this manner, of the provisions, materials, and 
finished work of all kinds that are in the hands of their respective dealers, 
and of the money that is necessary for circulating and distributing them to 
those who are finally to use or to consume them. 
    Of these four parts, three- provisions, materials, and finished work- are, 
either annually, or in a longer or shorter period, regularly withdrawn from 
it, and placed either in the fixed capital or in the stock reserved for 
immediate consumption. 
    Every fixed capital is both originally derived from, and requires to be 
continually supported by a circulating capital. All useful machines and 
instruments of trade are originally derived from a circulating capital, which 
furnishes the materials of which they are made, and the maintenance of the 
workmen who make them. They require, too, a capital of the same kind to 
keep them in constant repair. 
    No fixed capital can yield any revenue but by means of a circulating 
capital. The most useful machines and instruments of trade will produce 
nothing without the circulating capital which affords the materials they are 
employed upon, and the maintenance of the workmen who employ them. 
Land, however improved, will yield no revenue without a circulating 
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capital, which maintains the labourers who cultivate and collect its produce. 
    To maintain and augment the stock which may be reserved for immediate 
consumption is the sole end and purpose both of the fixed and circulating 
capitals. It is this stock which feeds, clothes, and lodges the people. Their 
riches or poverty depends upon the abundant or sparing supplies which 
those two capitals can afford to the stock reserved for immediate 
consumption. 
    So great a part of the circulating capital being continually withdrawn 
from it, in order to be placed in the other two branches of the general stock 
of the society; it must in its turn require continual supplies, without which it 
would soon cease to exist. These supplies are principally drawn from three 
sources, the produce of land, of mines, and of fisheries. These afford 
continual supplies of provisions and materials, of which part is afterwards 
wrought up into finished work, and by which are replaced the provisions, 
materials, and finished work continually withdrawn from the circulating 
capital. From mines, too, is drawn what is necessary for maintaining and 
augmenting that part of it which consists in money. For though, in the 
ordinary course of business, this part is not, like the other three, necessarily 
withdrawn from it, in order to be placed in the other two branches of the 
general stock of the society, it must, however, like all other things, be 
wasted and worn out at last, and sometimes, too, be either lost or sent 
abroad, and must, therefore, require continual, though, no doubt, much 
smaller supplies. 
    Land, mines, and fisheries, require all both a fixed and a circulating 
capital to cultivate them; and their produce replaces with a profit, not only 
those capitals, but all the others in the society. Thus the farmer annually 
replaces to the manufacturer the provisions which he had consumed and the 
materials which be had wrought up the year before; and the manufacturer 
replaces to the farmer the finished work which he had wasted and worn out 
in the same time. This is the real exchange that is annually made between 
those two orders of people, though it seldom happens that the rude produce 
of the one and the manufactured produce of the other, are directly bartered 
for one another; because it seldom happens that the farmer sells his corn and 
his cattle, his flax and his wool, to the very same person of whom he 
chooses to purchase the clothes, furniture, and instruments of trade which 
he wants. He sells, therefore, his rude produce for money, with which he 
can purchase, wherever it is to be had, the manufactured produce he has 
occasion for. Land even replaces, in part at least, the capitals with which 
fisheries and mines are cultivated. It is the produce of land which draws the 
fish from the waters; and it is the produce of the surface of the earth which 
extracts the minerals from its bowels. 
    The produce of land, mines, and fisheries, when their natural fertility is 
equal, is in proportion to the extent and proper application of the capitals 
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employed about them. When the capitals are equal and equally well applied, 
it is in proportion to their natural fertility. 
    In all countries where there is tolerable security, every man of common 
understanding will endeavour to employ whatever stock he can command in 
procuring either present enjoyment or future profit. If it is employed in 
procuring present enjoyment, it is a stock reserved for immediate 
consumption. If it is employed in procuring future profit, it must procure 
this profit either staying with him, or by going from him. In the one case it 
is fixed, in the other it is a circulating capital. A man must be perfectly 
crazy who, where there is tolerable security, does not employ all the stock 
which he commands, whether be his own or borrowed of other people, in 
some one or other of those three ways. 
    In those unfortunate countries, indeed, where men are continually afraid 
of the violence of their superiors, they frequently bury and conceal a great 
part of their stock, in order to have it always at hand to carry with them to 
some place of safety, in case of their being threatened with any of those 
disasters to which they consider themselves as at all times exposed. This is 
said to be a common practice in Turkey, in Indostan, and, I believe, in most 
other governments of Asia. It seems to have been a common practice among 
our ancestors during the violence of the feudal government. Treasure-trove 
was in those times considered as no contemptible part of the revenue of the 
greatest sovereigns in Europe. It consisted in such treasure as was found 
concealed in the earth, and to which no particular person could prove any 
right. This was regarded in those times as so important an object, that it was 
always considered as belonging to the sovereign, and neither to the finder 
nor to the proprietor of the land, unless the right to it had been conveyed to 
the latter by an express clause in his charter. It was put upon the same 
footing with gold and silver mines, which, without a special clause in the 
charter, were never supposed to be comprehended in the general grant of the 
lands, though mines of lead, copper, tin, and coal were as things of smaller 
consequence. 
CHAPTER II
Of Money considered as a particular Branch of the general Stock of the 
Society, or of the Expense of maintaining the National Capital
IT has been shown in the first book, that the price of the greater part of 
commodities resolves itself into three parts, of which one pays the wages of 
the labour, another the profits of the stock, and a third the rent of the land 
which had been employed in producing and bringing them to market: that 
there are, indeed, some commodities of which the price is made up of two 
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of those parts only, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock: and a very 
few in which it consists altogether in one, the wages of labour: but that the 
price of every commodity necessarily resolves itself into some one, or other, 
or all of these three parts; every part of it which goes neither to rent nor to 
wages, being necessarily profit to somebody. 
    Since this is the case, it has been observed, with regard to every particular 
commodity, taken separately, it must be so with regard to all the 
commodities which compose the whole annual produce of the land and 
labour of every country, taken complexly. The whole price or exchangeable 
value of that annual produce must resolve itself into the same three parts, 
and be parcelled out among the different inhabitants of the country, either as 
the wages of their labour, the profits of their stock, or the rent of their land. 
    But though the whole value of the annual produce of the land and labour 
of every country is thus divided among and constitutes a revenue to its 
different inhabitants, yet as in the rent of a private estate we distinguish 
between the gross rent and the net rent, so may we likewise in the revenue 
of all the inhabitants of a great country. 
    The gross rent of a private estate comprehends whatever is paid by the 
farmer; the net rent, what remains free to the landlord, after deducting the 
expense of management, of repairs, and all other necessary charges; or 
what, without hurting his estate, he can afford to place in his stock reserved 
for immediate consumption, or to spend upon his table, equipage, the 
ornaments of his house and furniture, his private enjoyments and 
amusements. His real wealth is in proportion, not to his gross, but to his net 
rent. 
    The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country comprehends 
the whole annual produce of their land and labour; the net revenue, what 
remains free to them after deducting the expense of maintaining- first, their 
fixed, and, secondly, their circulating capital; or what, without encroaching 
upon their capital, they can place in their stock reserved for immediate 
consumption, or spend upon their subsistence, conveniencies, and 
amusements. Their real wealth, too, is in proportion, not to their gross, but 
to their net revenue. 
    The whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital must evidently be 
excluded from the net revenue of the society. Neither the materials 
necessary for supporting their useful machines and instruments of trade, 
their profitable buildings, etc., nor the produce of the labour necessary for 
fashioning those materials into the proper form, can ever make any part of 
it. The price of that labour may indeed make a part of it; as the workmen so 
employed may place the whole value of their wages in their stock reserved 
for immediate consumption. But in other sorts of labour, both the price and 
the produce go to this stock, the price to that of the workmen, the produce to 
that of other people, whose subsistence, conveniences, and amusements, are 
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augmented by the labour of those workmen. 
    The intention of the fixed capital is to increase the productive powers of 
labour, or to enable the same number of labourers to perform a much greater 
quantity of work. In a farm where all the necessary buildings, fences, drains, 
communications, etc., are in the most perfect good order, the same number 
of labourers and labouring cattle will raise a much greater produce than in 
one of equal extent and equally good ground, but not furnished with equal 
conveniencies. In manufactures the same number of hands, assisted with the 
best machinery, will work up a much greater quantity of goods than with 
more imperfect instruments of trade. The expense which is properly laid out 
upon a fixed capital of any kind, is always repaid with great profit, and 
increases the annual produce by a much greater value than that of the 
support which such improvements require. This support, however, still 
requires a certain portion of that produce. A certain quantity of materials, 
and the labour of a certain number of workmen, both of which might have 
been immediately employed to augment the food, clothing and lodging, the 
subsistence and conveniencies of the society, are thus diverted to another 
employment, highly advantageous indeed, but still different from this one. It 
is upon this account that all such improvements in mechanics, as enable the 
same number of workmen to perform an equal quantity of work, with 
cheaper and simpler machinery than had been usual before, are always 
regarded as advantageous to every society. A certain quantity of materials, 
and the labour of a certain number of workmen, which had before been 
employed in supporting a more complex and expensive machinery, can 
afterwards be applied to augment the quantity of work which that or any 
other machinery is useful only for performing. The undertaker of some great 
manufactory who employs a thousand a year in the maintenance of his 
machinery, if he can reduce this expense to five hundred will naturally 
employ the other five hundred in purchasing an additional quantity of 
materials to be wrought up by an additional number of workmen. The 
quantity of that work, therefore, which his machinery was useful only for 
performing, will naturally be augmented, and with it all the advantage and 
conveniency which the society can derive from that work. 
    The expense of maintaining the fixed capital in a great country may very 
properly be compared to that of repairs in a private estate. The expense of 
repairs may frequently be necessary for supporting the produce of the estate, 
and consequently both the gross and the net rent of the landlord. When by a 
more proper direction, however, it can be diminished without occasioning 
any diminution of produce, the gross rent remains at least the same as 
before, and the net rent is necessarily augmented. 
    But though the whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital is thus 
necessarily excluded from the net revenue of the society, it is not the same 
case with that of maintaining the circulating capital. Of the four parts of 
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which this latter capital is composed- money, provisions, materials, and 
finished work- the three last, it has already been observed, are regularly 
withdrawn from it, and placed either in the fixed capital of the society, or in 
their stock reserved for immediate consumption. Whatever portion of those 
consumable goods is employed in maintaining the former, goes all to the 
latter, and makes a part of the net revenue of the society. The maintenance 
of those three parts of the circulating capital, therefore, withdraws no 
portion of the annual produce from the net revenue of the society, besides 
what is necessary for maintaining the fixed capital. 
    The circulating capital of a society is in this respect different from that of 
an individual. That of an individual is totally excluded from making any 
part of his net revenue, which must consist altogether in his profits. But 
though the circulating capital of every individual makes a part of that of the 
society to which he belongs, it is not upon that account totally excluded 
from making a part likewise of their net revenue. Though the whole goods 
in a merchant's shop must by no means be placed in his own stock reserved 
for immediate consumption, they may in that of other people, who, from a 
revenue derived from other funds, may regularly replace their value to him, 
together with its profits, without occasioning any diminution either of his 
capital or of theirs. 
    Money, therefore, is the only part of the circulating capital of a society, of 
which the maintenance can occasion any diminution in their net revenue. 
    The fixed capital, and that part of the circulating capital which consists in 
money, so far as they affect the revenue of the society, bear a very great 
resemblance to one another. 
    First, as those machines and instruments of trade, etc., require a certain 
expense, first to erect them, and afterwards to support them, both which 
expenses, though they make a part of the gross, are deductions from the net 
revenue of the society; so the stock of money which circulates in any 
country must require a certain expense, first to collect it, and afterwards to 
support it, both which expenses, though they make a part of the gross, are, 
in the same manner, deductions from the net revenue of the society. A 
certain quantity of very valuable materials, gold and silver, and of very 
curious labour, instead of augmenting the stock reserved for immediate 
consumption, the subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements of 
individuals, is employed in supporting that great but expensive instrument 
of commerce, by means of which every individual in the society has his 
subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements regularly distributed to him in 
their proper proportions. 
    Secondly, as the machines and instruments of a trade, etc., which 
compose the fixed capital either of an individual or of a society, make no 
part either of the gross or of the net revenue of either; so money, by means 
of which the whole revenue of the society is regularly distributed among all 
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its different members, makes itself no part of that revenue. The great wheel 
of circulation is altogether different from the goods which are circulated by 
means of it. The revenue of the society consists altogether in those goods, 
and not in the wheel which circulates them. In computing either the gross or 
the net revenue of any society, we must always, from their whole annual 
circulation of money and goods, deduct the whole value of the money, of 
which not a single farthing can ever make any part of either. 
    It is the ambiguity of language only which can make this proposition 
appear either doubtful or paradoxical. When properly explained and 
understood, it is almost self-evident. 
    When we talk of any particular sum of money, we sometimes mean 
nothing but the metal pieces of which it is composed; and sometimes we 
include in our meaning some obscure reference to the goods which can be 
had in exchange for it, or to the power of purchasing which the possession 
of it conveys. Thus when we say that the circulating money of England has 
been computed at eighteen millions, we mean only to express the amount of 
the metal pieces, which some writers have computed, or rather have 
supposed to circulate in that country. But when we say that a man is worth 
fifty or a hundred pounds a year, we mean commonly to express not only 
the amount of the metal pieces which are annually paid to him, but the value 
of the goods which he can annually purchase or consume. We mean 
commonly to ascertain what is or ought to be his way of living, or the 
quantity and quality of the necessaries and conveniencies of life in which he 
can with propriety indulge himself. 
    When, by any particular sum of money, we mean not only to express the 
amount of the metal pieces of which it is composed, but to include in its 
signification some obscure reference to the goods which can be had in 
exchange for them, the wealth or revenue which it in this case denotes, is 
equal only to one of the two values which are thus intimated somewhat 
ambiguously by the same word, and to the latter more properly than to the 
former, to the money's worth more properly than to the money. 
    Thus if a guinea be the weekly pension of a particular person, he can in 
the course of the week purchase with it a certain quantity of subsistence, 
conveniencies, and amusements. In proportion as this quantity is great or 
small, so are his real riches, his real weekly revenue. His weekly revenue is 
certainly not equal both to the guinea, and to what can be purchased with it, 
but only to one or other of those two equal values; and to the latter more 
properly than to the former, to the guinea's worth rather than to the guinea. 
    If the pension of such a person was paid to him, not in gold, but in a 
weekly bill for a guinea, his revenue surely would not so properly consist in 
the piece of paper, as in what he could get for it. A guinea may be 
considered as a bill for a certain quantity of necessaries and conveniencies 
upon all the tradesmen in the neighbourhood. The revenue of the person to 
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whom it is paid, does not so properly consist in the piece of gold, as in what 
he can get for it, or in what he can exchange it for. If it could be exchanged 
for nothing, it would, like a bill upon a bankrupt, be of no more value than 
the most useless piece of paper. 
    Though the weekly or yearly revenue of all the different inhabitants of 
any country, in the same manner, may be, and in reality frequently is paid to 
them in money, their real riches, however, the real weekly or yearly revenue 
of all of them taken together, must always be great or small in proportion to 
the quantity of consumable goods which they can all of them purchase with 
this money. The whole revenue of all of them taken together is evidently not 
equal to both the money and the consumable goods; but only to one or other 
of those two values, and to the latter more properly than to the former. 
    Though we frequently, therefore, express a person's revenue by the metal 
pieces which are annually paid to him, it is because the amount of those 
pieces regulates the extent of his power of purchasing, or the value of the 
goods which he can annually afford to consume. We still consider his 
revenue as consisting in this power of purchasing or consuming, and not in 
the pieces which convey it. 
    But if this is sufficiently evident even with regard to an individual, it is 
still more so with regard to a society. The amount of the metal pieces which 
are annually paid to an individual, is often precisely equal to his revenue, 
and is upon that account the shortest and best expression of its value. But 
the amount of the metal pieces which circulate in a society can never be 
equal to the revenue of all its members. As the same guinea which pays the 
weekly pension of one man to-day, may pay that of another to-morrow, and 
that of a third the day thereafter, the amount of the metal pieces which 
annually circulate in any country must always be of much less value than 
the whole money pensions annually paid with them. But the power of 
purchasing, or the goods which can successively be bought with the whole 
of those money pensions as they are successively paid, must always be 
precisely of the same value with those pensions; as must likewise be the 
revenue of the different persons to whom they are paid. That revenue, 
therefore, cannot consist in those metal pieces, of which the amount is so 
much inferior to its value, but in the power of purchasing, in the goods 
which can successively be bought with them as they circulate from hand to 
hand. 
    Money, therefore, the great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of 
commerce, like all other instruments of trade, though it makes a part and a 
very valuable part of the capital, makes no part of the revenue of the society 
to which it belongs; and though the metal pieces of which it is composed, in 
the course of their annual circulation, distribute to every man the revenue 
which properly belongs to him, they make themselves no part of that 
revenue. 
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    Thirdly, and lastly, the machines and instruments of trade, etc., which 
compose the fixed capital, bear this further resemblance to that part of the 
circulating capital which consists in money; that as every saving in the 
expense of erecting and supporting those machines, which does not 
diminish the productive powers of labour, is an improvement of the net 
revenue of the society, so every saving in the expense of collecting and 
supporting that part of the circulating capital which consists in money, is an 
improvement of exactly the same kind. 
    It is sufficiently obvious, and it has partly, too, been explained already, in 
what manner every saving in the expense of supporting the fixed capital is 
an improvement of the net revenue of the society. The whole capital of the 
undertaker of every work is necessarily divided between his fixed and his 
circulating capital. While his whole capital remains the same, the smaller 
the one part, the greater must necessarily be the other. It is the circulating 
capital which furnishes the materials and wages of labour, and puts industry 
into motion. Every saving, therefore, in the expense of maintaining the fixed 
capital, which does not diminish the productive powers of labour, must 
increase the fund which puts industry into motion, and consequently the 
annual produce of land and labour, the real revenue of every society. 
    The substitution of paper in the room of gold and silver money, replaces a 
very expensive instrument of commerce with one much less costly, and 
sometimes equally convenient. Circulation comes to be carried on by a new 
wheel, which it costs less both to erect and to maintain than the old one. But 
in what manner this operation is performed, and in what manner it tends to 
increase either the gross or the net revenue of the society, is not altogether 
so obvious, and may therefore require some further explication. 
    There are several different sorts of paper money; but the circulating notes 
of banks and bankers are the species which is best known, and which seems 
best adapted for this purpose. 
    When the people of any particular country have such confidence in the 
fortune, probity, and prudence of a particular banker, as to believe that he is 
always ready to pay upon demand such of his promissory notes as are likely 
to be at any time presented to him; those notes come to have the same 
currency as gold and silver money, from the confidence that such money 
can at any time be had for them. 
    A particular banker lends among his customers his own promissory notes, 
to the extent, we shall suppose, of a hundred thousand pounds. As those 
notes serve all the purposes of money, his debtors pay him the same interest 
as if he had lent them so much money. This interest is the source of his 
gain. Though some of those notes are continually coming back upon him for 
payment, part of them continue to circulate for months and years together. 
Though he has generally in circulation, therefore, notes to the extent of a 
hundred thousand pounds, twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver may 
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frequently be a sufficient provision for answering occasional demands. By 
this operation, therefore, twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver perform 
all the functions which a hundred thousand could otherwise have 
performed. The same exchanges may be made, the same quantity of 
consumable goods may be circulated and distributed to their proper 
consumers, by means of his promissory notes, to the value of a hundred 
thousand pounds, as by an equal value of gold and silver money. Eighty 
thousand pounds of gold and silver, therefore, can, in this manner, be spared 
from the circulation of the country; and if different operations of the same 
kind should, at the same time, be carried on by many different banks and 
bankers, the whole circulation may thus be conducted with a fifth part only 
of the gold and silver which would otherwise have been requisite. 
    Let us suppose, for example, that the whole circulating money of some 
particular country amounted, at a particular time, to one million sterling, 
that sum being then sufficient for circulating the whole annual produce of 
their land and labour. Let us suppose, too, that some time thereafter, 
different banks and bankers issued promissory notes, payable to the bearer, 
to the extent of one million, reserving in their different coffers two hundred 
thousand pounds for answering occasional demands. There would remain, 
therefore, in circulation, eight hundred thousand pounds in gold and silver, 
and a million of bank notes, or eighteen hundred thousand pounds of paper 
and money together. But the annual produce of the land and labour of the 
country had before required only one million to circulate and distribute it to 
its proper consumers, and that annual produce cannot be immediately 
augmented by those operations of banking. One million, therefore, will be 
sufficient to circulate it after them. The goods to be bought and sold being 
precisely the same as before, the same quantity of money will be sufficient 
for buying and selling them. The channel of circulation, if I may be allowed 
such an expression, will remain precisely the same as before. One million 
we have supposed sufficient to fill that channel. Whatever, therefore, is 
poured into it beyond this sum cannot run in it, but must overflow. One 
million eight hundred thousand pounds are poured into it. Eight hundred 
thousand pounds, therefore, must overflow, that sum being over and above 
what can be employed in the circulation of the country. But though this sum 
cannot be employed at home, it is too valuable to be allowed to lie idle. It 
will, therefore, be sent abroad, in order to seek that profitable employment 
which it cannot find at home. But the paper cannot go abroad; because at a 
distance from the banks which issue it, and from the country in which 
payment of it can be exacted by law, it will not be received in common 
payments. Gold and silver, therefore, to the amount of eight hundred 
thousand pounds will be sent abroad, and the channel of home circulation 
will remain filled with a million of paper, instead of the million of those 
metals which filled it before. 
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    But though so great a quantity of gold and silver is thus sent abroad, we 
must not imagine that it is sent abroad for nothing, or that its proprietors 
make a present of it to foreign nations. They will exchange it for foreign 
goods of some kind or another, in order to supply the consumption either of 
some other foreign country or of their own. 
    If they employ it in purchasing goods in one foreign country in order to 
supply the consumption of another, or in what is called the carrying trade, 
whatever profit they make will be an addition to the net revenue of their 
own country. It is like a new fund, created for carrying on a new trade; 
domestic business being now transacted by paper, and the gold and silver 
being converted into a fund for this new trade. 
    If they employ it in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption, 
they may either, first, purchase such goods as are likely to be consumed by 
idle people who produce nothing, such as foreign wines, foreign silks, etc.; 
or, secondly, they may purchase an additional stock of materials, tools, and 
provisions, in order to maintain and employ an additional number of 
industrious people, who reproduce, with a profit, the value of their annual 
consumption. 
    So far as it is employed in the first way, it promotes prodigality, increases 
expense and consumption without increasing production, or establishing 
any permanent fund for supporting that expense, and is in every respect 
hurtful to the society. 
    So far as it is employed in the second way, it promotes industry; and 
though it increases the consumption of the society, it provides a permanent 
fund for supporting that consumption, the people who consume 
reproducing, with a profit, the whole value of their annual consumption. 
The gross revenue of the society, the annual produce of their land and 
labour, is increased by the whole value which the labour of those workmen 
adds to the materials upon which they are employed; and their net revenue 
by what remains of this value, after deducting what is necessary for 
supporting the tools and instruments of their trade. 
    That the greater part of the gold and silver which, being forced abroad by 
those operations of banking, is employed in purchasing foreign goods for 
home consumption, is and must be employed in purchasing those of this 
second kind, seems not only probable but almost unavoidable. Though 
some particular men may sometimes increase their expense very 
considerably though their revenue does not increase at all, we may be 
assured that no class or order of men ever does so; because, though the 
principles of common prudence do not always govern the conduct of every 
individual, they always influence that of the majority of every class or 
order. But the revenue of idle people, considered as a class or order, cannot, 
in the smallest degree, be increased by those operations of banking. Their 
expense in general, therefore, cannot be much increased by them, though 
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that of a few individuals among them may, and in reality sometimes is. The 
demand of idle people, therefore, for foreign goods being the same, or very 
nearly the same, as before, a very small part of the money, which being 
forced abroad by those operations of banking, is employed in purchasing 
foreign goods for home consumption, is likely to be employed in 
purchasing those for their use. The greater part of it will naturally be 
destined for the employment of industry, and not for the maintenance of 
idleness. 
    When we compute the quantity of industry which the circulating capital 
of any society can employ, we must always have regard to those parts of it 
only which consist in provisions, materials, and finished work: the other, 
which consists in money, and which serves only to circulate those three, 
must always be deducted. In order to put industry into motion, three things 
are requisite; materials to work upon, tools to work with, and the wages or 
recompense for the sake of which the work is done. Money is neither a 
material to work upon, nor a tool to work with; and though the wages of the 
workman are commonly paid to him in money, his real revenue, like that of 
all other men, consists, not in money, but in the money's worth; not in the 
metal pieces, but in what can be got for them. 
    The quantity of industry which any capital can employ must, evidently, 
be equal to the number of workmen whom it can supply with materials, 
tools, and a maintenance suitable to the nature of the work. Money may be 
requisite for purchasing the materials and tools of the work, as well as the 
maintenance of the workmen. But the quantity of industry which the whole 
capital can employ is certainly not equal both to the money which 
purchases, and to the materials, tools, and maintenance, which are 
purchased with it; but only to one or other of those two values, and to the 
latter more properly than to the former. 
    When paper is substituted in the room of gold and silver money, the 
quantity of the materials, tools, and maintenance, which the whole 
circulating capital can supply, may be increased by the whole value of gold 
and silver which used to be employed in purchasing them. The whole value 
of the great wheel of circulation and distribution is added to the goods 
which are circulated and distributed by means of it. The operation, in some 
measure, resembles that of the undertaker of some great work, who, in 
consequence of some improvement in mechanics, takes down his old 
machinery, and adds the difference between its price and that of the new to 
his circulating capital, to the fund from which he furnishes materials and 
wages to his workmen. 
    What is the proportion which the circulating money of any country bears 
to the whole value of the annual produce circulated by means of it, it is, 
perhaps, impossible to determine. It has been computed by different authors 
at a fifth, at a tenth, at a twentieth, and at a thirtieth part of that value. But 
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how small soever the proportion which the circulating money may bear to 
the whole value of the annual produce, as but a part, and frequently but a 
small part, of that produce, is ever destined for the maintenance of industry, 
it must always bear a very considerable proportion to that part. When, 
therefore, by the substitution of paper, the gold and silver necessary for 
circulation is reduced to, perhaps, a fifth part of the former quantity, if the 
value of only the greater part of the other four-fifths be added to the funds 
which are destined for the maintenance of industry, it must make a very 
considerable addition to the quantity of that industry, and, consequently, to 
the value of the annual produce of land and labour. 
    An operation of this kind has, within these five-and-twenty or thirty 
years, been performed in Scotland, by the erection of new banking 
companies in almost every considerable town, and even in some country 
villages. The effects of it have been precisely those above described. The 
business of the country is almost entirely carried on by means of the paper 
of those different banking companies, with which purchases and payments 
of kinds are commonly made. Silver very seldom appears except in the 
change of a twenty shillings bank note, and gold still seldomer. But though 
the conduct of all those different companies has not been unexceptionable, 
and has accordingly required an act of Parliament to regulate it, the country, 
notwithstanding, has evidently derived great benefit from their trade. I have 
heard it asserted, that the trade of the city of Glasgow doubled in about 
fifteen years after the first erection of the banks there; and that the trade of 
Scotland has more than quadrupled since the first erection of the two public 
banks at Edinburgh, of which the one, called the Bank of Scotland, was 
established by act of Parliament in 1695; the other, called the Royal Bank, 
by royal charter in 1727. Whether the trade, either of Scotland in general, or 
the city of Glasgow in particular, has really increased in so great a 
proportion, during so short a period, I do not pretend to know. If either of 
them has increased in this proportion, it seems to be an effect too great to be 
accounted for by the sole operation of this cause. That the trade and industry 
of Scotland, however, have increased very considerably during this period, 
and that the banks have contributed a good deal to this increase, cannot be 
doubted. 
    The value of the silver money which circulated in Scotland before the 
union, in 1707, and which, immediately after it, was brought into the Bank 
of Scotland in order to be recoined, amounted to L411,117 10s. 9d. sterling. 
No account has been got of the gold coin; but it appears from the ancient 
accounts of the mint of Scotland, that the value of the gold annually coined 
somewhat exceeded that of the silver. There were a good many people, too, 
upon this occasion, who, from a diffidence of repayment, did not bring their 
silver into the Bank of Scotland: and there was, besides, some English coin 
which was not called in. The whole value of the gold and silver, therefore, 
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which circulated in Scotland before the union, cannot be estimated at less 
than a million sterling. It seems to have constituted almost the whole 
circulation of that country; for though the circulation of the Bank of 
Scotland, which had then no rival, was considerable, it seems to have made 
but a very small part of the whole. In the present times the whole circulation 
of Scotland cannot be estimated at less than two millions, of which that part 
which consists in gold and silver most probably does not amount to half a 
million. But though the circulating gold and silver of Scotland have suffered 
so great a diminution during this period, its real riches and prosperity do not 
appear to have suffered any. Its agriculture, manufactures, and trade, on the 
contrary, the annual produce of its land and labour, have evidently been 
augmented. 
    It is chiefly by discounting bills of exchange, that is, by advancing money 
upon them before they are due, that the greater part of banks and bankers 
issue their promissory notes. They deduct always, upon whatever sum they 
advance, the legal interest till the bill shall become due. The payment of the 
bill, when it becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what had been 
advanced, together with a clear profit of the interest. The banker who 
advances to the merchant whose bill he discounts, not gold and silver, but 
his own promissory notes, has the advantage of being able to discount to a 
greater amount, by the whole value of his promissory notes, which he finds 
by experience are commonly in circulation. He is thereby enabled to make 
his clear gain of interest on so much a larger sum. 
    The commerce of Scotland, which at present is not very great, was still 
more inconsiderable when the two first banking companies were 
established, and those companies would have had but little trade had they 
confined their business to the discounting of bills of exchange. They 
invented, therefore, another method of issuing their promissory notes; by 
granting what they called cash accounts, that is by giving credit to the extent 
of a certain sum (two or three thousand pounds, for example) to any 
individual who could procure two persons of undoubted credit and good 
landed estate to become surety for him, that whatever money should be 
advanced to him, within the sum for which the credit had been given, 
should be repaid upon demand, together with the legal interest. Credits of 
this kind are, I believe, commonly granted by banks and bankers in all 
different parts of the world. But the easy terms upon which the Scotch 
banking companies accept of repayment are, so far as I know, peculiar to 
them, and have, perhaps, been the principal cause, both of the great trade of 
those companies and of the benefit which the country has received from it. 
    Whoever has a credit of this kind with one of those companies, and 
borrows a thousand pounds upon it, for example, may repay this sum 
piecemeal, by twenty and thirty pounds at a time, the company discounting 
a proportionable part of the interest of the great sum from the day on which 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth2.html (20 of 81)4/11/2005 9:45:35 AM
The Wealth of Nations
each of those small sums is paid in till the whole be in this manner repaid. 
All merchants, therefore, and almost all men of business, find it convenient 
to keep such cash accounts with them, and are thereby interested to promote 
the trade of those companies, by readily receiving their notes in all 
payments, and by encouraging all those with whom they have any influence 
to do the same. The banks, when their customers apply to them for money, 
generally advance it to them in their own promissory notes. These the 
merchants pay away to the manufacturers for goods, the manufacturers to 
the farmers for materials and provisions, the farmers to their landlords for 
rent, the landlords repay them to the merchants for the conveniencies and 
luxuries with which they supply them, and the merchants again return them 
to the banks in order to balance their cash accounts, or to replace what they 
may have borrowed of them; and thus almost the whole money business of 
the country is transacted by means of them. Hence the great trade of those 
companies. 
    By means of those cash accounts every merchant can, without 
imprudence, carry on a greater trade than he otherwise could do. If there are 
two merchants, one in London and the other in Edinburgh, who employ 
equal stocks in the same branch of trade, the Edinburgh merchant can, 
without imprudence, carry on a greater trade and give employment to a 
greater number of people than the London merchant. The London merchant 
must always keep by him a considerable sum of money, either in his own 
coffers, or in those of his banker, who gives him no interest for it, in order 
to answer the demands continually coming upon him for payment of the 
goods which he purchases upon credit. Let the ordinary amount of this sum 
be supposed five hundred pounds. The value of the goods in his warehouse 
must always be less by five hundred pounds than it would have been had he 
not been obliged to keep such a sum unemployed. Let us suppose that he 
generally disposes of his whole stock upon hand, or of goods to the value of 
his whole stock upon hand, once in the year. By being obliged to keep so 
great a sum unemployed, he must sell in a year five hundred pounds' worth 
less goods than he might otherwise have done. His annual profits must be 
less by all that he could have made by the sale of five hundred pounds 
worth more goods; and the number of people employed in preparing his 
goods for the market must be less by all those that five hundred pounds 
more stock could have employed. The merchant in Edinburgh, on the other 
hand, keeps no money unemployed for answering such occasional demands. 
When they actually come upon him, he satisfies them from his cash account 
with the bank, and gradually replaces the sum borrowed with the money or 
paper which comes in from the occasional sales of his goods. With the same 
stock, therefore, he can, without imprudence, have at all times in his 
warehouse a larger quantity of goods than the London merchant; and can 
thereby both make a greater profit himself, and give constant employment 
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to a greater number of industrious people who prepare those goods for the 
market. Hence the great benefit which the country has derived from this 
trade. 
    The facility of discounting bills of exchange it may be thought indeed, 
gives the English merchants a conveniency equivalent to the cash accounts 
of the Scotch merchants. But the Scotch merchants, it must be remembered, 
can discount their bills of exchange as easily as the English merchants; and 
have, besides, the additional conveniency of their cash accounts. 
    The whole paper money of every kind which can easily circulate in any 
country never can exceed the value of the gold and silver, of which it 
supplies the place, or which (the commerce being supposed the same) 
would circulate there, if there was no paper money. If twenty shilling notes, 
for example, are the lowest paper money current in Scotland, the whole of 
that currency which can easily circulate there cannot exceed the sum of gold 
and silver which would be necessary for transacting the annual exchanges 
of twenty shillings value and upwards usually transacted within that 
country. Should the circulating paper at any time exceed that sum, as the 
excess could neither be sent abroad nor be employed in the circulation of 
the country, it must immediately return upon the banks to be exchanged for 
gold and silver. Many people would immediately perceive that they had 
more of this paper than was necessary for transacting their business at 
home, and as they could not send it abroad, they would immediately 
demand payment of it from the banks. When this superfluous paper was 
converted into gold and silver, they could easily find a use for it by sending 
it abroad; but they could find none while it remained in the shape of paper. 
There would immediately, therefore, be a run upon the banks to the whole 
extent of this superfluous paper, and, if they showed any difficulty or 
backwardness in payment, to a much greater extent; the alarm which this 
would occasion necessarily increasing the run. 
    Over and above the expenses which are common to every branch of 
trade; such as the expense of house-rent, the wages of servants, clerks, 
accountants, etc.; the expenses peculiar to a bank consist chiefly in two 
articles: first, in the expense of keeping at all times in its coffers, for 
answering the occasional demands of the holders of its notes, a large sum of 
money, of which it loses the interest; and, secondly, in the expense of 
replenishing those coffers as fast as they are emptied by answering such 
occasional demands. 
    A banking company, which issues more paper than can be employed in 
the circulation of the country, and of which the excess is continually 
returning upon them for payment, ought to increase the quantity of gold and 
silver, which they keep at all times in their coffers, not only in proportion to 
this excessive increase of their circulation, but in a much greater proportion; 
their notes returning upon them much faster than in proportion to the excess 
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of their quantity. Such a company, therefore, ought to increase the first 
article of their expense, not only in proportion to this forced increase of 
their business, but in a much greater proportion. 
    The coffers of such a company too, though they ought to be filled much 
fuller, yet must empty themselves much faster than if their business was 
confined within more reasonable bounds, and must require, not only a more 
violent, but a more constant and uninterrupted exertion of expense in order 
to replenish them. The coin too, which is thus continually drawn in such 
large quantities from their coffers, cannot be employed in the circulation of 
the country. It comes in place of a paper which is over and above what can 
be employed in that circulation, and is therefore over and above what can be 
employed in it too. But as that coin will not be allowed to lie idle, it must, in 
one shape or another, be sent abroad, in order to find that profitable 
employment which it cannot find at home; and this continual exportation of 
gold and silver, by enhancing the difficulty, must necessarily enhance still 
further the expense of the bank, in finding new gold and silver in order to 
replenish those coffers, which empty themselves so very rapidly. Such a 
company, therefore, must, in proportion to this forced increase of their 
business, increase the second article of their expense still more than the 
first. 
    Let us suppose that all the paper of a particular bank, which the 
circulation of the country can easily absorb and employ, amounts exactly to 
forty thousand pounds; and that for answering occasional demands, this 
bank is obliged to keep at all times in its coffers ten thousand pounds in 
gold and silver. Should this bank attempt to circulate forty-four thousand 
pounds, the four thousand pounds which are over and above what the 
circulation can easily absorb and employ, will return upon it almost as fast 
as they are issued. For answering occasional demands, therefore, this bank 
ought to keep at all times in its coffers, not eleven thousand pounds only, 
but fourteen thousand pounds. It will thus gain nothing by the interest of the 
four thousand pounds' excessive circulation; and it will lose the whole 
expense of continually collecting four thousand pounds in gold and silver, 
which will be continually going out of its coffers as fast as they are brought 
into them. 
    Had every particular banking company always understood and attended 
to its own particular interest, the circulation never could have been 
overstocked with paper money. But every particular banking company has 
not always understood or attended to its own particular interest, and the 
circulation has frequently been overstocked with paper money. 
    By issuing too great a quantity of paper, of which the excess was 
continually returning, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, the Bank 
of England was for many years together obliged to coin gold to the extent of 
between eight hundred thousand pounds and a million a year; or at an 
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average, about eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds. For this great 
coinage the bank (in consequence of the worn and degraded state into which 
the gold coin had fallen a few years ago) was frequently obliged to purchase 
gold bullion at the high price of four pounds an ounce, which it soon after 
issued in coin at 53 17s. 10 1/2d. an ounce, losing in this manner between 
two and a half and three per cent upon the coinage of so very large a sum. 
Though the bank therefore paid no seignorage, though the government was 
properly at the expense of the coinage, this liberality of government did not 
prevent altogether the expense of the bank. 
    The Scotch banks, in consequence of an excess of the same kind, were all 
obliged to employ constantly agents at London to collect money for them, at 
an expense which was seldom below one and a half or two per cent. This 
money was sent down by the waggon, and insured by the carriers at an 
additional expense of three quarters per cent or fifteen shillings on the 
hundred pounds. Those agents were not always able to replenish the coffers 
of their employers so fast as they were emptied. In this case the resource of 
the banks was to draw upon their correspondents in London bills of 
exchange to the extent of the sum which they wanted. When those 
correspondents afterwards drew upon them for the payment of this sum, 
together with the interest and a commission, sonic of those banks, from the 
distress into which their excessive circulation had thrown them, had 
sometimes no other means of satisfying this draught but by drawing a 
second set of bills either upon the same, or upon some other correspondents 
in London; and the same sum, or rather bills for the same sum, would in this 
manner make sometimes more than two or three journeys, the debtor, bank, 
paying always the interest and commission upon the whole accumulated 
sum. Even those Scotch banks which never distinguished themselves by 
their extreme imprudence, were sometimes obliged to employ this ruinous 
resource. 
    The gold coin which was paid out either by the Bank of England, or by 
the Scotch banks, in exchange for that part of their paper which was over 
and above what could be employed in the circulation of the country, being 
likewise over and above what could be employed in that circulation, was 
sometimes sent abroad in the shape of coin, sometimes melted down and 
sent abroad in the shape of bullion, and sometimes melted down and sold to 
the Bank of England at the high price of four pounds an ounce. It was the 
newest, the heaviest, and the best pieces only which were carefully picked 
out of the whole coin, and either sent abroad or melted down. At home, and 
while they remained in the shape of coin, those heavy pieces were of no 
more value than the light. But they were of more value abroad, or when 
melted down into bullion, at home. The Bank of England, notwithstanding 
their great annual coinage, found to their astonishment that there was every 
year the same scarcity of coin as there had been the year before; and that 
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notwithstanding the great quantity of good and new coin which was every 
year issued from the bank, the state of the coin, instead of growing better 
and better, became every year worse and worse. Every year they found 
themselves under the necessity of coining nearly the same quantity of gold 
as they had coined the year before, and from the continual rise in the price 
of gold bullion, in consequence of the continual wearing and clipping of the 
coin, the expense of this great annual coinage became every year greater 
and greater. The Bank of England, it is to be observed, by supplying its own 
coffers with coin, is indirectly obliged to supply the whole kingdom, into 
which coin is continually flowing from those coffers in a great variety of 
ways. Whatever coin therefore was wanted to support this excessive 
circulation both of Scotch and English paper money, whatever vacuities this 
excessive circulation occasioned in the necessary coin of the kingdom, the 
Bank of England was obliged to supply them. The Scotch banks, no doubt, 
paid all of them very dearly for their own imprudence and inattention. But 
the Bank of England paid very dearly, not only for its own imprudence, but 
for the much greater imprudence of almost all the Scotch banks. 
    The overtrading of some bold projectors in both parts of the United 
Kingdom was the original cause of this excessive circulation of paper 
money. 
    What a bank can with propriety advance to a merchant or undertaker of 
any kind, is not either the whole capital with which he trades, or even any 
considerable part of that capital; but that part of it only which he would 
otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money for 
answering occasional demands. If the paper money which the bank 
advances never exceeds this value, it can never exceed the value of the gold 
and silver which would necessarily circulate in the country if there was no 
paper money; it can never exceed the quantity which the circulation of the 
country can easily absorb and employ. 
    When a bank discounts to a merchant a real bill of exchange drawn by a 
real creditor upon a real debtor, and which, as soon as it becomes due, is 
really paid by that debtor, it only advances to him a part of the value which 
he would otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready 
money for answering occasional demands. The payment of the bill, when it 
becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what it had advanced, 
together with the interest. The coffers of the bank, so far as its dealings are 
confined to such customers, resemble a water pond, from which, though a 
stream is continually running out, yet another is continually running in, 
fully equal to that which runs out; so that, without any further care or 
attention, the pond keeps always equally, or very near equally full. Little or 
no expense can ever be necessary for replenishing the coffers of such a 
bank. 
    A merchant, without overtrading, may frequently have occasion for a sum 
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of ready money, even when he has no bills to discount. When a bank, 
besides discounting his bills, advances him likewise upon such occasions 
such sums upon his cash account, and accepts of a piecemeal repayment as 
the money comes in from the occasional sale of his goods, upon the easy 
terms of the banking companies of Scotland; it dispenses him entirely from 
the necessity of keeping any part of his stock by him unemployed and in 
ready money for answering occasional demands. When such demands 
actually come upon him, he can answer them sufficiently from his cash 
account. The bank, however, in dealing with such customers, ought to 
observe with great attention, whether in the course of some short period (of 
four, five, six, or eight months for example) the sum of the repayments 
which it commonly receives from them is, or is not, fully equal to that of the 
advances which it commonly makes to them. If, within the course of such 
short periods, the sum of the repayments from certain customers is, upon 
most occasions, fully equal to that of the advances, it may safely continue to 
deal with such customers. Though the stream which is in this case 
continually running out from its coffers may be very large, that which is 
continually running into them must be at least equally large; so that without 
any further care or attention those coffers are likely to be always equally or 
very near equally full; and scarce ever to require any extraordinary expense 
to replenish them. If, on the contrary, the sum of the repayments from 
certain other customers falls commonly very much short of the advances 
which it makes to them, it cannot with any safety continue to deal with such 
customers, at least if they continue to deal with it in this manner. The 
stream which is in this case continually running out from its coffers is 
necessarily much larger than that which is continually running in; so that, 
unless they are replenished by some great and continual effort of expense, 
those coffers must soon be exhausted altogether. 
    The banking companies of Scotland, accordingly, were for a long time 
very careful to require frequent and regular repayments from all their 
customers, and did not care to deal with any person, whatever might be his 
fortune or credit, who did not make, what they called, frequent and regular 
operations with them. By this attention, besides saving almost entirely the 
extraordinary expense of replenishing their coffers, they gained two other 
very considerable advantages. 
    First, by this attention they were enabled to make some tolerable 
judgment concerning the thriving or declining circumstances of their 
debtors, without being obliged to look out for any other evidence besides 
what their own books afforded them; men being for the most part either 
regular or irregular in their repayments, according as their circumstances are 
either thriving or declining. A private man who lends out his money to 
perhaps half a dozen or a dozen of debtors, may, either by himself or his 
agents, observe and inquire both constantly and carefully into the conduct 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth2.html (26 of 81)4/11/2005 9:45:35 AM
The Wealth of Nations
and situation of each of them. But a banking company, which lends money 
to perhaps five hundred different people, and of which the attention is 
continually occupied by objects of a very different kind, can have no regular 
information concerning the conduct and circumstances of the greater part of 
its debtors beyond what its own books afford it. In requiring frequent and 
regular repayments from all their customers, the banking companies of 
Scotland had probably this advantage in view. 
    Secondly, by this attention they secured themselves from the possibility 
of issuing more paper money than what the circulation of the country could 
easily absorb and employ. When they observed that within moderate 
periods of time the repayments of a particular customer were upon most 
occasions fully equal to the advances which they had made to him, they 
might be assured that the paper money which they had advanced to him had 
not at any time exceeded the quantity of gold and silver which he would 
otherwise have been obliged to keep by him for answering occasional 
demands; and that, consequently, the paper money, which they had 
circulated by his means, had not at any time exceeded the quantity of gold 
and silver which would have circulated in the country had there been no 
paper money. The frequency, regularity, and amount of his repayments 
would sufficiently demonstrate that the amount of their advances had at no 
time exceeded that part of his capital which he would otherwise have been 
obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money for answering 
occasional demands; that is, for the purpose of keeping the rest of his capital 
in constant employment. It is this part of his capital only which, within 
moderate periods of time, is continually returning to every dealer in the 
shape of money, whether paper or coin, and continually going from him in 
the same shape. If the advances of the bank had commonly exceeded this 
part of his capital, the ordinary amount of his repayments could not, within 
moderate periods of time, have equalled the ordinary amount of its 
advances. The stream which, by means of his dealings, was continually 
running into the coffers of the bank, could not have been equal to the stream 
which, by means of the same dealings, was continually running out. The 
advances of the bank paper, by exceeding the quantity of gold and silver 
which, had there been no such advances, he would have been obliged to 
keep by him for answering occasional demands, might soon come to exceed 
the whole quantity of gold and silver which (the commerce being supposed 
the same) would have circulated in the country had there been no paper 
money; and consequently to exceed the quantity which the circulation of the 
country could easily absorb and employ; and the excess of this paper money 
would immediately have returned upon the bank in order to be exchanged 
for gold and silver. This second advantage, though equally real, was not 
perhaps so well understood by all the different banking companies of 
Scotland as the first. 
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    When, partly by the conveniency of discounting bills, and partly by that 
of cash accounts, the creditable traders of any country can be dispensed 
from the necessity of keeping any part of their stock by them unemployed 
and in ready money for answering occasional demands, they can reasonably 
expect no farther assistance from banks and bankers, who, when they have 
gone thus far, cannot, consistently with their own interest and safety, go 
farther. A bank cannot, consistently with its own interest, advance to a 
trader the whole or even the greater part of the circulating capital with 
which he trades; because, though that capital is continually returning to him 
in the shape of money, and going from him in the same shape, yet the whole 
of the returns is too distant from the whole of the outgoings, and the sum of 
his repayments could not equal the sum of its advances within such 
moderate periods of time as suit the conveniency of a bank. Still less, could 
a bank afford to advance him any considerable part of his fixed capital; of 
the capital which the undertaker of an iron forge, for example, employs in 
erecting his forge and smelting-house, his workhouses and warehouses, the 
dwelling-houses of his workmen, etc.; of the capital which the undertaker of 
a mine employs in sinking his shafts, in erecting engines for drawing out the 
water, in making roads and waggon-ways, etc.; of the capital which the 
person who undertakes to improve land employs in clearing, draining, 
enclosing, manuring, and ploughing waste and uncultivated fields, in 
building farm-houses, with all their necessary appendages of stables, 
granaries, etc. The returns of the fixed capital are in almost all cases much 
slower than those of the circulating capital; and such expenses, even when 
laid out with the greatest prudence and judgment, very seldom return to the 
undertaker till after a period of many years, a period by far too distant to 
suit the conveniency of a bank. Traders and other undertakers may, no 
doubt, with great propriety, carry on a very considerable part of their 
projects with borrowed money. In justice to their creditors, however, their 
own capital ought, in this case, to be sufficient to ensure, if I may say so, the 
capital of those creditors; or to render it extremely improbable that those 
creditors should incur any loss, even though the success of the project 
should fall very much short of the expectation of the projectors. Even with 
this precaution too, the money which is borrowed, and which it is meant 
should not be repaid till after a period of several years, ought not to be 
borrowed of a bank, but ought to be borrowed upon bond or mortgage of 
such private people as propose to live upon the interest of their money 
without taking the trouble themselves to employ the capital, and who are 
upon that account willing to lend that capital to such people of good credit 
as are likely to keep it for several years. A bank, indeed, which lends its 
money without the expense of stamped paper, or of attorneys' fees for 
drawing bonds and mortgages, and which accepts of repayment upon the 
easy terms of the banking companies of Scotland, would, no doubt, be a 
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very convenient creditor to such traders and undertakers. But such traders 
and undertakers would, surely, be most inconvenient debtors to such a bank. 
    It is now more than five-and-twenty years since the paper money issued 
by the different banking companies of Scotland was fully equal, or rather 
was somewhat more than fully equal, to what the circulation of the country 
could easily absorb and employ. Those companies, therefore, had so long 
ago given all the assistance to the traders and other undertakers of Scotland 
which it is possible for banks and bankers, consistently with their own 
interest, to give. They had even done somewhat more. They had overtraded 
a little, and had brought upon themselves that loss, or at least that 
diminution of profit, which in this particular business never fails to attend 
the smallest degree of overtrading. Those traders and other undertakers, 
having got so much assistance from banks and bankers, wished to get still 
more. The banks, they seem to have thought, could extend their credits to 
whatever sum might be wanted, without incurring any other expense 
besides that of a few reams of paper. They complained of the contracted 
views and dastardly spirit of the directors of those banks, which did not, 
they said, extend their credits in proportion to the extension of the trade of 
the country; meaning, no doubt, by the extension of that trade the extension 
of their own projects beyond what they could carry on, either with their own 
capital, or with what they had credit to borrow of private people in the usual 
way of bond or mortgage. The banks, they seem to have thought, were in 
honour bound to supply the deficiency, and to provide them with all the 
capital which they wanted to trade with. The banks, however, were of a 
different opinion, and upon their refusing to extend their credits, some of 
those traders had recourse to an expedient which, for a time, served their 
purpose, though at a much greater expense, yet as effectually as the utmost 
extension of bank credits could have done. This expedient was no other than 
the well-known shift of drawing and redrawing; the shift to which 
unfortunate traders have sometimes recourse when they are upon the brink 
of bankruptcy. The practice of raising money in this manner had been long 
known in England, and during the course of the late war, when the high 
profits of trade afforded a great temptation to overtrading, is said to have 
carried on to a very great extent. From England it was brought into 
Scotland, where, in proportion to the very limited commerce, and to the 
very moderate capital of the country, it was soon carried on to a much 
greater extent than it ever had been in England. 
    The practice of drawing and redrawing is so well known to all men of 
business that it may perhaps be thought unnecessary to give an account of it. 
But as this book may come into the hands of many people who are not men 
of business, and as the effects of this practice upon the banking trade are not 
perhaps generally understood even by men of business themselves, I shall 
endeavour to explain it as distinctly as I can. 
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    The customs of merchants, which were established when the barbarous 
laws of Europe did not enforce the performance of their contracts, and 
which during the course of the two last centuries have been adopted into the 
laws of all European nations, have given such extraordinary privileges to 
bills of exchange that money is more readily advanced upon them than upon 
any other species of obligation, especially when they are made payable 
within so short a period as two or three months after their date. If, when the 
bill becomes due, the acceptor does not pay it as soon as it is presented, he 
becomes from that moment a bankrupt. The bill is protested, and returns 
upon the drawer, who, if he does not immediately pay it, becomes likewise 
a bankrupt. If, before it came to the person who presents it to the acceptor 
for payment, it had passed through the hands of several other persons, who 
had successively advanced to one another the contents of it either in money 
or goods, and who to express that each of them had in his turn received 
those contents, had all of them in their order endorsed, that is, written their 
names upon the back of the bill; each endorser becomes in his turn liable to 
the owner of the bill for those contents, and, if he fails to pay, he becomes 
too from that moment a bankrupt. Though the drawer, acceptor, and 
endorsers of the bill should, all of them, be persons of doubtful credit; yet 
still the shortness of the date gives some security to the owner of the bill. 
Though all of them may be very likely to become bankrupts, it is a chance if 
they all become so in so short a time. The house is crazy, says a weary 
traveller to himself, and will not stand very long; but it is a chance if it falls 
to-night, and I will venture, therefore, to sleep in it to-night. 
    The trader A in Edinburgh, we shall suppose, draws a bill upon B in 
London, payable two months after date. In reality B in London owes 
nothing to A in Edinburgh; but he agrees to accept of A's bill, upon 
condition that before the term of payment he shall redraw upon A in 
Edinburgh for the same sum, together with the interest and a commission, 
another bill, payable likewise two months after date. B accordingly, before 
the expiration of the first two months, redraws this bill upon A in 
Edinburgh; who again, before the expiration of the second two months, 
draws a second bill upon B in London, payable likewise two months after 
date; and before the expiration of the third two months, B in London 
redraws upon A in Edinburgh another bill, payable also two months after 
date. This practice has sometimes gone on, not only for several months, but 
for several years together, the bill always returning upon A in Edinburgh, 
with the accumulated interest and commission of all the former bills. The 
interest was five per cent in the year, and the commission was never less 
than one half per cent on each draft. This commission being repeated more 
than six times in the year, whatever money A might raise by this expedient 
must necessarily have, cost him something more than eight per cent in the 
year, and sometimes a great deal more; when either the price of the 
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commission happened to rise, or when he was obliged to pay compound 
interest upon the interest and commission of former bills. This practice was 
called raising money by circulation. 
    In a country where the ordinary profits of stock in the greater part of 
mercantile projects are supposed to run between six and ten per cent, it must 
have been a very fortunate speculation of which the returns could not only 
repay the enormous expense at which the money was thus borrowed for 
carrying it on; but afford, besides, a good surplus profit to the projector. 
Many vast and extensive projects, however, were undertaken, and for 
several years carried on without any other fund to support them besides 
what was raised at this enormous expense. The projectors, no doubt, had in 
their golden dreams the most distinct vision of this great profit. Upon their 
awaking, however, either at the end of their projects, or when they were no 
longer able to carry them on, they very seldom, I believe, had the good 
fortune to find it. 
    The bills A in Edinburgh drew upon B in London, he regularly 
discounted two months before they were due with some bank or banker in 
Edinburgh; and the bills which B in London redrew upon A in Edinburgh, 
he as regularly discounted either with the Bank of England, or with some 
other bankers in London. Whatever was advanced upon such circulating 
bills, was, in Edinburgh, advanced in the paper of the Scotch banks, and in 
London, when they were discounted at the Bank of England, in the paper of 
that bank. Though the bills upon which this paper had been advanced were 
all of them repaid in their turn as soon as they became due; yet the value 
which had been really advanced upon the first bill, was never really 
returned to the banks which advanced it; because, before each bill became 
due, another bill was always drawn to somewhat a greater amount than the 
bill which was soon to be paid; and the discounting of this other bill was 
essentially necessary towards the payment of that which was soon to be due. 
This payment, therefore, was altogether fictitious. The stream, which, by 
means of those circulating bills of exchange, had once been made to run out 
from the coffers of the banks, was never replaced by any stream which 
really run into them. 
    The paper which was issued upon those circulating bills of exchange, 
amounted, upon many occasions, to the whole fund destined for carrying on 
some vast and extensive project of agriculture, commerce, or manufactures; 
and not merely to that part of it which, had there been no paper money, the 
projector would have been obliged to keep by him, unemployed and in 
ready money for answering occasional demands. The greater part of this 
paper was, consequently, over and above the value of the gold and silver 
which would have circulated in the country, had there been no paper money. 
It was over and above, therefore, what the circulation of the country could 
easily absorb and employ, and upon that account, immediately returned 
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upon the banks in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, which they 
were to find as they could. It was a capital which those projectors had very 
artfully contrived to draw from those banks, not only without their 
knowledge or deliberate consent, but for some time, perhaps, without their 
having the most distant suspicion that they had really advanced it. 
    When two people, who are continually drawing and redrawing upon one 
another, discount their bills always with the same banker, he must 
immediately discover what they are about, and see clearly that they are 
trading, not with any capital of their own, but with the capital which he 
advances to them. But this discovery is not altogether so easy when they 
discount their bills sometimes with one banker, and sometimes with 
another, and when the same two persons do not constantly draw and redraw 
upon one another, but occasionally run the round of a great circle of 
projectors, who find it for their interest to assist one another in this method 
of raising money, and to render it, upon that account, as difficult as possible 
to distinguish between a real and fictitious bill of exchange; between a bill 
drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and a bill for which there was 
properly no real creditor but the bank which discounted it, nor any real 
debtor but the projector who made use of the money. When a banker had 
even made this discovery, he might sometimes make it too late, and might 
find that he had already discounted the bills of those projectors to so great 
an extent that, by refusing to discount any more, he would necessarily make 
them all bankrupts, and thus, by ruining them, might perhaps ruin himself. 
For his own interest and safety, therefore, he might find it necessary, in this 
very perilous situation, to go on for some time, endeavouring, however, to 
withdraw gradually, and upon that account making every day greater and 
greater difficulties about discounting, in order to force those projectors by 
degrees to have recourse, either to other bankers, or to other methods of 
raising money; so that he himself might, as soon as possible, get out of the 
circle. The difficulties, accordingly, which the Bank of England, which the 
principal bankers in London, and which even the more prudent Scotch 
banks began, after a certain time, and when all of them had already gone too 
far, to make about discounting, not only alarmed, but enraged in the highest 
degree those projectors. Their own distress, of which this prudent and 
necessary reserve of the banks was, no doubt, the immediate occasion, they 
called the distress of the country; and this distress of the country, they said, 
was altogether owing to the ignorance, pusillanimity, and bad conduct of 
the banks, which did not give a sufficiently liberal aid to the spirited 
undertakings of those who exerted themselves in order to beautify, improve, 
and enrich the country. It was the duty of the banks, they seemed to think, to 
lend for as long a time, and to as great an extent as they might wish to 
borrow. The banks, however, by refusing in this manner to give more credit 
to those to whom they had already given a great deal too much, took the 
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only method by which it was now possible to save either their own credit or 
the public credit of the country. 
    In the midst of this clamour and distress, a new bank was established in 
Scotland for the express purpose of relieving the distress of the country. The 
design was generous; but the execution was imprudent, and the nature and 
causes of the distress which it meant to relieve were not, perhaps, well 
understood. This bank was more liberal than any other had ever been, both 
in granting cash accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange. With regard 
to the latter, it seems to have made scarce any distinction between real and 
circulating bills, but to have discounted all equally. It was the avowed 
principle of this bank to advance, upon any reasonable security, the whole 
capital which was to be employed in those improvements of which the 
returns are the most slow and distant, such as the improvements of land. To 
promote such improvements was even said to be the chief of the public-
spirited purposes for which it was instituted. By its liberality in granting 
cash accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange, it, no doubt, issued 
great quantities of its bank notes. But those bank notes being, the greater 
part of them, over and above what the circulation of the country could easily 
absorb and employ, returned upon it, in order to be exchanged for gold and 
silver as fast as they were issued. Its coffers were never well filled. The 
capital which had been subscribed to this bank at two different 
subscriptions, amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand pounds, of 
which eighty per cent only was paid up. This sum ought to have been paid 
in at several different instalments. A great part of the proprietors, when they 
paid in their first instalment, opened a cash account with the bank; and the 
directors, thinking themselves obliged to treat their own proprietors with the 
same liberality with which they treated all other men, allowed many of them 
to borrow upon this cash account what they paid in upon all their 
subsequent instalments. Such payments, therefore, only put into one coffer 
what had the moment before been taken out of another. But had the coffers 
of this bank been filled ever so well, its excessive circulation must have 
emptied them faster than they could have been replenished by any other 
expedient but the ruinous one of drawing upon London, and when the bill 
became due, paying it, together with interest and commission, by another 
draft upon the same place. Its coffers having been filled so very ill, it is said 
to have been driven to this resource within a very few months after it began 
to do business. The estates of the proprietors of this bank were worth 
several millions, and by their subscription to the original bond or contract of 
the bank, were really pledged for answering all its engagements. By means 
of the great credit which so great a pledge necessarily gave it, it was, 
notwithstanding its too liberal conduct, enabled to carry on business for 
more than two years. When it was obliged to stop, it had in the circulation 
about two hundred thousand pounds in bank notes. In order to support the 
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circulation of those notes which were continually returning upon it as fast 
they were issued, it had been constantly in the practice of drawing bills of 
exchange upon London, of which the number and value were continually 
increasing, and, when it stopped, amounted to upwards of six hundred 
thousand pounds. This bank, therefore, had, in little more than the course of 
two years, advanced to different people upwards of eight hundred thousand 
pounds at five per cent. Upon the two hundred thousand pounds which it 
circulated in bank notes, this five per cent might, perhaps, be considered as 
clear gain, without any other deduction besides the expense of management. 
But upon upwards of six hundred thousand pounds, for which it was 
continually drawing bills of exchange upon London, it was paying, in the 
way of interest and commission, upwards of eight per cent, and was 
consequently losing more than three per cent upon more than three-fourths 
of all its dealings. 
    The operations of this bank seem to have produced effects quite opposite 
to those which were intended by the particular persons who planned and 
directed it. They seem to have intended to support the spirited undertakings, 
for as such they considered them, which were at that time carrying on in 
different parts of the country; and at the same time, by drawing the whole 
banking business to themselves, to supplant all the other Scotch banks, 
particularly those established in Edinburgh, whose backwardness in 
discounting bills of exchange had given some offence. This bank, no doubt, 
gave some temporary relief to those projectors, and enabled them to carry 
on their projects for about two years longer than they could otherwise have 
done. But it thereby only enabled them to get so much deeper into debt, so 
that, when ruin came, it fell so much the heavier both upon them and upon 
their creditors. The operations of this bank, therefore, instead of relieving, 
in reality aggravated in the long-run the distress which those projectors had 
brought both upon themselves and upon their country. It would have been 
much better for themselves, their creditors, and their country, had the 
greater part of them been obliged to stop two years sooner than they 
actually did. The temporary relief, however, which this bank afforded to 
those projectors, proved a real and permanent relief to the other Scotch 
banks. All the dealers in circulating bills of exchange, which those other 
banks had become so backward in discounting, had recourse to this new 
bank, where they were received with open arms. Those other banks, 
therefore, were enabled to get very easily out of that fatal circle, from which 
they could not otherwise have disengaged themselves without incurring a 
considerable loss, and perhaps too even some degree of discredit. 
    In the long-run, therefore, the operations of this bank increased the real 
distress of the country which it meant to relieve; and effectually relieved 
from a very great distress those rivals whom it meant to supplant. 
    At the first setting out of this bank, it was the opinion of some people that 
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how fast soever its coffers might be emptied, it might easily replenish them 
by raising money upon the securities of those to whom it had advanced its 
paper. Experience, I believe, soon convinced them that this method of 
raising money was by much too slow to answer their purpose; and that 
coffers which originally were so ill filled, and which emptied themselves so 
very fast, could be replenished by no other expedient but the ruinous one of 
drawing bills upon London, and when they became due, paying them by 
other drafts upon the same place with accumulated interest and commission. 
But though they had been able by this method to raise money as fast as they 
wanted it, yet, instead of making a profit, they must have suffered a loss by 
every such operation; so that in the long-run they must have ruined 
themselves as a mercantile company, though, perhaps, not so soon as by the 
more expensive practice of drawing and redrawing. They could still have 
made nothing by the interest of the paper, which, being over and above 
what the circulation of the country could absorb and employ, returned upon 
them, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, as fast as they issued it; 
and for the payment of which they were themselves continually obliged to 
borrow money. On the contrary, the whole expense of this borrowing, of 
employing agents to look out for people who had money to lend, of 
negotiating with those people, and of drawing the proper bond or 
assignment, must have fallen upon them, and have been so much clear loss 
upon the balance of their accounts. The project of replenishing their coffers 
in this manner may be compared to that of a man who had a water-pond 
from which a stream was continually running out, and into which no stream 
was continually running, but who proposed to keep it always equally full by 
employing a number of people to go continually with buckets to a well at 
some miles distance in order to bring water to replenish it. 
    But though this operation had proved not only practicable but profitable 
to the bank as a mercantile company, yet the country could have derived no 
benefit from it; but, on the contrary, must have suffered a very considerable 
loss by it. This operation could not augment in the smallest degree the 
quantity of money to be lent. It could only have erected this bank into a sort 
of general loan office for the whole country. Those who wanted to borrow 
must have applied to this bank instead of applying to the private persons 
who had lent it their money. But a bank which lends money perhaps to five 
hundred different people, the greater part of whom its directors can know 
very little about, is not likely to be more judicious in the choice of its 
debtors than a private person who lends out his money among a few people 
whom he knows, and in whose sober and frugal conduct he thinks he has 
good reason to confide. The debtors of such a bank as that whose conduct I 
have been giving some account of were likely, the greater part of them, to 
be chimerical projectors, the drawers and re-drawers of circulating bills of 
exchange, who would employ the money in extravagant undertakings, 
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which, with all the assistance that could be given them, they would 
probably never be able to complete, and which, if they should be completed, 
would never repay the expense which they had really cost, would never 
afford a fund capable of maintaining a quantity of labour equal to that 
which had been employed about them. The sober and frugal debtors of 
private persons, on the contrary, would be more likely to employ the money 
borrowed in sober undertakings which were proportioned to their capitals, 
and which, though they might have less of the grand and the marvellous, 
would have more of the solid and the profitable, which would repay with a 
large profit whatever had been laid out upon them, and which would thus 
afford a fund capable of maintaining a much greater quantity of labour than 
that which had been employed about them. The success of this operation, 
therefore, without increasing in the smallest degree the capital of the 
country, would only have transferred a great part of it from prudent and 
profitable to imprudent and unprofitable undertakings. 
    That the industry of Scotland languished for want of money to employ it 
was the opinion of the famous Mr. Law. By establishing a bank of a 
particular kind, which he seems to have imagined might issue paper to the 
amount of the whole value of all the lands in the country, he proposed to 
remedy this want of money. The Parliament of Scotland, when he first 
proposed his project, did not think proper to adopt it. It was afterwards 
adopted, with some variations, by the Duke of Orleans, at that time Regent 
of France. The idea of the possibility of multiplying paper to almost any 
extent was the real foundation of what is called the Mississippi scheme, the 
most extravagant project both of banking and stock-jobbing that, perhaps, 
the world ever saw. The different operations of this scheme are explained so 
fully, so clearly, and with so much order and distinctness, by Mr. du 
Verney, in his Examination of the Political Reflections upon Commerce and 
Finances of Mr. du Tot, that I shall not give any account of them. The 
principles upon which it was founded are explained by Mr. Law himself, in 
a discourse concerning money and trade, which he published in Scotland 
when he first proposed his project. The splendid but visionary ideas which 
are set forth in that and some other works upon the same principles still 
continue to make an impression upon many people, and have, perhaps, in 
part, contributed to that excess of banking which has of late been 
complained of both in Scotland and in other places. 
    The Bank of England is the greatest bank of circulation in Europe. It was 
incorporated, in pursuance of an act of Parliament, by a charter under the 
Great Seal, dated the 27th of July, 1694. It at that time advanced to 
government the sum of one million two hundred thousand pounds, for an 
annuity of one hundred thousand pounds; or for L96,000 a year interest, at 
the rate of eight per cent, and L4000 a year for the expense of management. 
The credit of the new government, established by the Revolution, we may 
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believe, must have been very low, when it was obliged to borrow at so high 
an interest. 
    In 1697 the bank was allowed to enlarge its capital stock by an 
engraftment of L1,001,171 10s. Its whole capital stock therefore, amounted 
at this time to L2,201,171 10s. This engraftment is said to have been for the 
support of public credit. In 1696, tallies had been at forty, and fifty, and 
sixty per cent discount, and bank notes at twenty per cent. During the great 
recoinage of the silver, which was going on at this time, the bank had 
thought proper to discontinue the payment of its notes, which necessarily 
occasioned their discredit. 
    In pursuance of the 7th Anne, c. 7, the bank advanced and paid into the 
exchequer the sum of L400,000; making in all the sum of L1,600,000 which 
it had advanced upon its original annuity of L96,000 interest and L4000 for 
expense of management. In 1708, therefore, the credit of government was as 
good as that of private persons, since it could borrow at six per cent interest 
the common legal and market rate of those times. In pursuance of the same 
act, the bank cancelled exchequer bills to the amount of L1,775,027 17s. 10 
1/2d. at six per cent interest, and was at the same time allowed to take in 
subscriptions for doubling its capital. In 1708, therefore, the capital of the 
bank amounted to L4,402,343; and it had advanced to government the sum 
of L3,375,027 17s. 10 1/2d. 
    By a call of fifteen per cent in 1709, there was paid in and made stock 
L656,204 Is. 9d.; and by another of ten per cent in 1710, L501,448 12s. 11d. 
In consequence of those two calls, therefore, the bank capital amounted to 
L5,559,995 14s. 8d. 
    In pursuance of the 3rd George I, c. 8, the bank delivered up two millions 
of exchequer bills to be cancelled. It had at this time, therefore, advanced to 
government 17s. 10d. In pursuance of the 8th George 1, c. 21, the bank 
purchased of the South Sea Company stock to the amount of 14,000,000; 
and in 1722, in consequence of the subscriptions which it had taken in for 
enabling it to make this purchase, its capital stock was increased by 
L3,400,000. At this time, therefore, the bank had advanced to the public 
L9,375,027 17s. 10 1/2d.; and its capital stock amounted only to L8,959,995 
14s. 8d. It was upon this occasion that the sum which the bank had 
advanced to the public, and for which it received interest, began first to 
exceed its capital stock, or the sum for which it paid a dividend to the 
proprietors of bank stock; or, in other words, that the bank began to have an 
undivided capital, over and above its divided one. It has continued to have 
an undivided capital of the same kind ever since. In 1746, the bank had, 
upon different occasions, advanced to the public L11,686,800 and its 
divided capital had been raised by different calls and subscriptions to 
L10,780,000. The state of those two sums has continued to be the same ever 
since. In pursuance of the 4th of George III, c. 25, the bank agreed to pay to 
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government for the renewal of its charter L110,000 without interest or 
repayment. This sum, therefore, did not increase either of those two other 
sums. 
    The dividend of the bank has varied according to the variations in the rate 
of the interest which it has, at different times, received for the money it had 
advanced to the public, as well as according to other circumstances. This 
rate of interest has gradually been reduced from eight to three per cent. For 
some years past the bank dividend has been at five and a half per cent. 
    The stability of the Bank of England is equal to that of the British 
government. All that it has advanced to the public must be lost before its 
creditors can sustain any loss. No other banking company in England can be 
established by act of Parliament, or can consist of more than six members. It 
acts, not only as an ordinary bank, but as a great engine of state. It receives 
and pays the greater part of the annuities which are due to the creditors of 
the public, it circulates exchequer bills, and it advances to government the 
annual amount of the land and malt taxes, which are frequently not paid up 
till some years thereafter. In those different operations, its duty to the public 
may sometimes have obliged it, without any fault of its directors, to 
overstock the circulation with paper money. It likewise discounts 
merchants' bills, and has, upon several different occasions, supported the 
credit of the principal houses, not only of England, but of Hamburg and 
Holland. Upon one occasion, in 1763, it is said to have advanced for this 
purpose, in one week, about L1,600,000, a great part of it in bullion. I do 
not, however, pretend to warrant either the greatness of the sum, or the 
shortness of the time. Upon other occasions, this great company has been 
reduced to the necessity of paying in sixpences. 
    It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a 
greater part of that capital active and productive than would otherwise be 
so, that the most judicious operations of banking can increase the industry 
of the country. That part of his capital which a dealer is obliged to keep by 
him unemployed, and in ready money, for answering occasional demands, 
is so much dead stock, which, so long as it remains in this situation, 
produces nothing either to him or to his country. The judicious operations of 
banking enable him to convert this dead stock into active and productive 
stock; into materials to work upon, into tools to work with, and into 
provisions and subsistence to work for; into stock which produces 
something both to himself and to his country. The gold and silver money 
which circulates in any country, and by means of which the produce of its 
land and labour is annually circulated and distributed to the proper 
consumers, is, in the same manner as the ready money of the dealer, all 
dead stock. It is a very valuable part of the capital of the country, which 
produces nothing to the country. The judicious operations of banking, by 
substituting paper in the room of a great part of this gold and silver, enables 
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the country to convert a great part of this dead stock into active and 
productive stock; into stock which produces something to the country. The 
gold and silver money which circulates in any country may very properly be 
compared to a highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market all 
the grass and corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either. 
The judicious operations of banking, by providing, if I may be allowed so 
violent a metaphor, a sort of waggon-way through the air, enable the 
country to convert, as it were, a great part of its highways into good pastures 
and corn-fields, and thereby to increase very considerably the annual 
produce of its land and labour. The commerce and industry of the country, 
however, it must be acknowledged, though they may be somewhat 
augmented, cannot be altogether so secure when they are thus, as it were, 
suspended upon the Daedalian wings of paper money as when they travel 
about upon the solid ground of gold and silver. Over and above the 
accidents to which they are exposed from the unskillfulness of the 
conductors of this paper money, they are liable to several others, from 
which no prudence or skill of those conductors can guard them. 
    An unsuccessful war, for example, in which the enemy got possession of 
the capital, and consequently of that treasure which supported the credit of 
the paper money, would occasion a much greater confusion in a country 
where the whole circulation was carried on by paper, than in one where the 
greater part of it was carried on by gold and silver. The usual instrument of 
commerce having lost its value, no exchanges could be made but either by 
barter or upon credit. All taxes having been usually paid in paper money, 
the prince would not have wherewithal either to pay his troops, or to furnish 
his magazines; and the state of the country would be much more 
irretrievable than if the greater part of its circulation had consisted in gold 
and silver. A prince, anxious to maintain his dominions at all times in the 
state in which he can most easily defend them, ought, upon this account, to 
guard, not only against that excessive multiplication of paper money which 
ruins the very banks which issue it; but even against that multiplication of it 
which enables them to fill the greater part of the circulation of the country 
with it. 
    The circulation of every country may be considered as divided into two 
different branches: the circulation of the dealers with one another, and the 
circulation between the dealers and the consumers. Though the same pieces 
of money, whether paper or metal, may be employed sometimes in the one 
circulation and sometimes in the other, yet as both are constantly going on 
at the same time, each requires a certain stock of money of one kind or 
another to carry it on. The value of the goods circulated between the 
different dealers, never can exceed the value of those circulated between the 
dealers and the consumers; whatever is bought by the dealers, being 
ultimately destined to be sold to the consumers. The circulation between the 
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dealers, as it is carried on by wholesale, requires generally a pretty large 
sum for every particular transaction. That between the dealers and the 
consumers, on the contrary, as it is generally carried on by retail, frequently 
requires but very small ones, a shilling, or even a halfpenny, being often 
sufficient. But small sums circulate much faster than large ones. A shilling 
changes masters more frequently than a guinea, and a halfpenny more 
frequently than a shilling. Though the annual purchases of all the 
consumers, therefore, are at least equal in value to those of all the dealers, 
they can generally be transacted with a much smaller quantity of money; the 
same pieces, by a more rapid circulation, serving as the instrument of many 
more purchases of the one kind than of the other. 
    Paper money may be so regulated as either to confine itself very much to 
the circulation between the different dealers, or to extend itself likewise to a 
great part of that between the dealers and the consumers. Where no bank 
notes are circulated under ten pounds value, as in London, paper money 
confines itself very much to the circulation between the dealers. When a ten 
pound bank note comes into the hands of a consumer, he is generally 
obliged to change it at the first shop where he has occasion to purchase five 
shillings' worth of goods, so that it often returns into the hands of a dealer 
before the consumer has spent the fortieth part of the money. Where bank 
notes are issued for so small sums as twenty shillings, as in Scotland, paper 
money extends itself to a considerable part of the circulation between 
dealers and consumers. Before the Act of Parliament, which put a stop to 
the circulation of ten and five shilling notes, it filled a still greater part of 
that circulation. In the currencies of North America, paper was commonly 
issued for so small a sum as a shilling, and filled almost the whole of that 
circulation. In some paper currencies of Yorkshire, it was issued even for so 
small a sum as a sixpence. 
    Where the issuing of bank notes for such very small sums is allowed and 
commonly practised, many mean people are both enabled and encouraged 
to become bankers. A person whose promissory note for five pounds, or 
even for twenty shillings, would be rejected by everybody, will get it to be 
received without scruple when it is issued for so small a sum as a sixpence. 
But the frequent bankruptcies to which such beggarly bankers must be 
liable may occasion a very considerable inconveniency, and sometimes 
even a very great calamity to many poor people who had received their 
notes in payment. 
    It were better, perhaps, that no bank notes were issued in any part of the 
kingdom for a smaller sum than five pounds. Paper money would then, 
probably, confine itself, in every part of the kingdom, to the circulation 
between the different dealers, as much as it does at present in London, 
where no bank notes are issued under ten pounds' value; five pounds being, 
in most parts of the kingdom, a sum which, though it will purchase, little 
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more than half the quantity of goods, is as much considered, and is as 
seldom spent all at once, as ten pounds are amidst the profuse expense of 
London. 
    Where paper money, it is to be observed, is pretty much confined to the 
circulation between dealers and dealers, as at London, there is always plenty 
of gold and silver. Where it extends itself to a considerable part of the 
circulation between dealers and consumers, as in Scotland, and still more in 
North America, it banishes gold and silver almost entirely from the country; 
almost all the ordinary transactions of its interior commerce being thus 
carried on by paper. The suppression of ten and five shilling bank notes 
somewhat relieved the scarcity of gold and silver in Scotland; and the 
suppression of twenty shilling notes would probably relieve it still more. 
Those metals are said to have become more abundant in America since the 
suppression of some of their paper currencies. They are said, likewise, to 
have been more abundant before the institution of those currencies. 
    Though paper money should be pretty much confined to the circulation 
between dealers and dealers, yet banks and bankers might still be able to 
give nearly the same assistance to the industry and commerce of the country 
as they had done when paper money filled almost the whole circulation. The 
ready money which a dealer is obliged to keep by him, for answering 
occasional demands, is destined altogether for the circulation between 
himself and other dealers of whom he buys goods. He has no occasion to 
keep any by him for the circulation between himself and the consumers, 
who are his customers, and who bring ready money to him, instead of 
taking any from him. Though no paper money, therefore, was allowed to be 
issued but for such sums as would confine it pretty much to the circulation 
between dealers and dealers, yet, partly by discounting real bills of 
exchange, and partly by lending upon cash accounts, banks and bankers 
might still be able to relieve the greater part of those dealers from the 
necessity of keeping any considerable part of their stock by them, 
unemployed and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. They 
might still be able to give the utmost assistance which banks and bankers 
can, with propriety, give to traders of every kind. 
    To restrain private people, it may be said, from receiving in payment the 
promissory notes of a banker, for any sum whether great or small, when 
they themselves are willing to receive them, or to restrain a banker from 
issuing such notes, when all his neighbours are willing to accept of them, is 
a manifest violation of that natural liberty which it is the proper business of 
law not to infringe, but to support. Such regulations may, no doubt, be 
considered as in some respects a violation of natural liberty. But those 
exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger 
the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the 
laws of all governments, of the most free as well as of the most despotical. 
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The obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the 
communication of fire, is a violation of natural liberty exactly of the same 
kind with the regulations of the banking trade which are here proposed. 
    A paper money consisting in bank notes, issued by people of undoubted 
credit, payable upon demand without any condition, and in fact always 
readily paid as soon as presented, is, in every respect, equal in value to gold 
and silver money; since gold and silver money can at any time be had for it. 
Whatever is either bought or sold for such paper must necessarily be bought 
or sold as cheap as it could have been for gold and silver. 
    The increase of paper money, it has been said, by augmenting the 
quantity, and consequently diminishing the value of the whole currency, 
necessarily augments the money price of commodities. But as the quantity 
of gold and silver, which is taken from the currency, is always equal to the 
quantity of paper which is added to it, paper money does not necessarily 
increase the quantity of the whole currency. From the beginning of the last 
century to the present time, provisions never were cheaper in Scotland than 
in 1759, though, from the circulation of ten and five shilling bank notes, 
there was then more paper money in the country than at present. The 
proportion between the price of provisions in Scotland and that in England 
is the same now as before the great multiplication of banking companies in 
Scotland. Corn is, upon most occasions, fully as cheap in England as in 
France; though there is a great deal of paper money in England, and scarce 
any in France. In 1751 and in 1752, when Mr. Hume published his Political 
Discourses, and soon after the great multiplication of paper money in 
Scotland, there was a very sensible rise in the price of provisions, owing, 
probably, to the badness of the seasons, and not to the multiplication of 
paper money. 
    It would be otherwise, indeed, with a paper money consisting in 
promissory notes, of which the immediate payment depended, in any 
respect, either upon the good will of those who issued them, or upon a 
condition which the holder of the notes might not always have it in his 
power to fulfil; or of which the payment was not exigible till after a certain 
number of years, and which in the meantime bore no interest. Such a paper 
money would, no doubt, fall more or less below the value of gold and silver, 
according as the difficulty or uncertainty of obtaining immediate payment 
was supposed to be greater or less; or according to the greater or less 
distance of time at which payment was exigible. 
    Some years ago the different banking companies of Scotland were in the 
practice of inserting into their bank notes, what they called an Optional 
Clause, by which they promised payment to the bearer, either as soon as the 
note should be presented, or, in the option of the directors, six months after 
such presentment, together with the legal interest for the said six months. 
The directors of some of those banks sometimes took advantage of this 
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optional clause, and sometimes threatened those who demanded gold and 
silver in exchange for a considerable number of their notes that they Would 
take advantage of it, unless such demanders would content themselves with 
a part of what they demanded. The promissory notes of those banking 
companies constituted at that time the far greater part of the currency of 
Scotland, which this uncertainty of payment necessarily degraded below the 
value of gold and silver money. During the continuance of this abuse 
(which prevailed chiefly in 1762, 1763, and 1764), while the exchange 
between London and Carlisle was at par, that between London and 
Dumfries would sometimes be four per cent against Dumfries, though this 
town is not thirty miles distant from Carlisle. But at Carlisle, bills were paid 
in gold and silver; whereas at Dumfries they were paid in Scotch bank 
notes, and the uncertainty of getting those bank notes exchanged for gold 
and silver coin had thus degraded them four per cent below the value of that 
coin. The same Act of Parliament which suppressed ten and five shilling 
bank notes suppressed likewise this optional clause, and thereby restored 
the exchange between England and Scotland to its natural rate, or to what 
the course of trade and remittances might happen to make it. 
    In the paper currencies of Yorkshire, the payment of so small a sum as a 
sixpence sometimes depended upon the condition that the holder of the note 
should bring the change of a guinea to the person who issued it; a condition 
which the holders of such notes might frequently find it very difficult to 
fulfil, and which must have degraded this currency below the value of gold 
and silver money. An Act of Parliament accordingly declared all such 
clauses unlawful, and suppressed, in the same manner as in Scotland, all 
promissory notes, payable to the bearer, under twenty shillings value. 
    The paper currencies of North America consisted, not in bank notes 
payable to the bearer on demand, but in government paper, of which the 
payment was not exigible till several years after it was issued; and though 
the colony governments paid no interest to the holders of this paper, they 
declared it to be, and in fact rendered it, a legal tender of payment for the 
full value for which it was issued. But allowing the colony security to be 
perfectly good, a hundred pounds payable fifteen years hence, for example, 
in a country where interest at six per cent, is worth little more than forty 
pounds ready money. To oblige a creditor, therefore, to accept of this as full 
payment for a debt of a hundred pounds actually paid down in ready money 
was an act of such violent injustice as has scarce, perhaps, been attempted 
by the government of any other country which pretended to be free. It bears 
the evident marks of having originally been, what the honest and downright 
Doctor Douglas assures us it was, a scheme of fraudulent debtors to cheat 
their creditors. The government of Pennsylvania, indeed, pretended, upon 
their first emission of paper money, in 1722, to render their paper of equal 
value with gold and silver by enacting penalties against all those who made 
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any difference in the price of their goods when they sold them for a colony 
paper, and when they sold them for gold and silver; a regulation equally 
tyrannical, but much less effectual than that which it was meant to support. 
A positive law may render a shilling a legal tender for guinea, because it 
may direct the courts of justice to discharge the debtor who has made that 
tender. But no positive law can oblige a person who sells goods, and who is 
at liberty to sell or not to sell as he pleases, to accept of a shilling as 
equivalent to a guinea in the price of them. Notwithstanding any regulation 
of this kind, it appeared by the course of exchange with Great Britain, that a 
hundred pounds sterling was occasionally considered as equivalent, in some 
of the colonies, to a hundred and thirty pounds, and in others to so great a 
sum as eleven hundred pounds currency; this difference in the value arising 
from the difference in the quantity of paper emitted in the different colonies, 
and in the distance and probability of the term of its final discharge and 
redemption. 
    No law, therefore, could be more equitable than the Act of Parliament, so 
unjustly complained of in the colonies, which declared that no paper 
currency to be emitted there in time coming should be a legal tender of 
payment. 
    Pennsylvania was always more moderate in its emissions of paper money 
than any other of our colonies. Its paper currency, accordingly, is said never 
to have sunk below the value of the gold and silver which was current in the 
colony before the first emission of its paper money. Before that emission, 
the colony had raised the denomination of its coin, and had, by act of 
assembly, ordered five shillings sterling to pass in the colony for six and 
threepence, and afterwards for six and eightpence. A pound colony 
currency, therefore, even when that currency was gold and silver, was more 
than thirty per cent below the value of a pound sterling, and when that 
currency was turned into paper it was seldom much more than thirty per 
cent below that value. The pretence for raising the denomination of the coin, 
was to prevent the exportation of gold and silver, by making equal 
quantities of those metals pass for greater sums in the colony than they did 
in the mother country. It was found, however, that the price of all goods 
from the mother country rose exactly in proportion as they raised the 
denomination of their coin, so that their gold and silver were exported as 
fast as ever. 
    The paper of each colony being received in the payment of the provincial 
taxes, for the full value for which it had been issued, it necessarily derived 
from this use some additional value over and above what it would have had 
from the real or supposed distance of the term of its final discharge and 
redemption. This additional value was greater or less, according as the 
quantity of paper issued was more or less above what could be employed in 
the payment of the taxes of the particular colony which issued it. It was in 
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all the colonies very much above what could be employed in this manner. 
    A prince who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes should be 
paid in a paper money of a certain kind might thereby give a certain value to 
this paper money, even though the term of its final discharge and 
redemption should depend altogether upon the will of the prince. If the bank 
which issued this paper was careful to keep the quantity of it always 
somewhat below what could easily be employed in this manner, the demand 
for it might be such as to make it even bear a premium, or sell for somewhat 
more in the market than the quantity of gold or silver currency for which it 
was issued. Some people account in this manner for what is called the Agio 
of the bank of Amsterdam, or for the superiority of bank money over 
current money; though this bank money, as they pretend, cannot be taken 
out of the bank at the will of the owner. The greater part of foreign bills of 
exchange must be paid in bank money, that is, by a transfer in the books of 
the bank; and the directors of the bank, they allege, are careful to keep the 
whole quantity of bank money always below what this use occasions a 
demand for. It is upon this account, they say, that bank money sells for a 
premium, or bears an agio of four or five per cent above the same nominal 
sum of the gold and silver currency of the country. This account of the bank 
of Amsterdam, however, it will appear hereafter, is in a great measure 
chimerical. 
    A paper currency which falls below the value of gold and silver coin does 
not thereby sink the value of those metals, or occasion equal quantities of 
them to exchange for a smaller quantity of goods of any other kind. The 
proportion between the value of gold and silver and that of goods of any 
other kind depends in all cases not upon the nature or quantity of any 
particular paper money, which may be current in any particular country, but 
upon the richness or poverty of the mines, which happen at any particular 
time to supply the great market of the commercial world with those metals. 
It depends upon the proportion between the quantity of labour which is 
necessary in order to bring a certain quantity of gold and silver to market, 
and that which is necessary in order to bring thither a certain quantity of any 
other sort of goods. 
    If bankers are restrained from issuing any circulating bank notes, or notes 
payable to the bearer, for less than a certain sum, and if they are subjected 
to the obligation of an immediate and unconditional payment of such bank 
notes as soon as presented, their trade may, with safety to the public, be 
rendered in all other respects perfectly free. The late multiplication of 
banking companies in both parts of the United Kingdom, an event by which 
many people have been much alarmed, instead of diminishing, increases the 
security of the public. It obliges all of them to be more circumspect in their 
conduct, and, by not extending their currency beyond its due proportion to 
their cash, to guard themselves against those malicious runs which the 
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rivalship of so many competitors is always ready to bring upon them. It 
restrains the circulation of each particular company within a narrower 
circle, and reduces their circulating notes to a smaller number. By dividing 
the whole circulation into a greater number of parts, the failure of any one 
company, an accident which, in the course of things, must sometimes 
happen, becomes of less consequence to the public. This free competition, 
too, obliges all bankers to be more liberal in their dealings with their 
customers, lest their rivals should carry them away. In general, if any 
branch of trade, or any division of labour, be advantageous to the public, the 
freer and more general the competition, it will always be the more so. 
CHAPTER III
Of the Accumulation of Capital, or of Productive and Unproductive Labour
THERE is one sort of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon 
which it is bestowed: there is another which has no such effect. The former, 
as it produces a value, may be called productive; the latter, unproductive 
labour. Thus the labour of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of 
the materials which he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of his 
master's profit. The labour of a menial servant, on the contrary, adds to the 
value of nothing. Though the manufacturer has his wages advanced to him 
by his master, he, in reality, costs him no expense, the value of those wages 
being generally restored, together with a profit, in the improved value of the 
subject upon which his labour is bestowed. But the maintenance of a menial 
servant never is restored. A man grows rich by employing a multitude of 
manufacturers: he grows poor by maintaining a multitude of menial 
servants. The labour of the latter, however, has its value, and deserves its 
reward as well as that of the former. But the labour of the manufacturer 
fixes and realizes itself in some particular subject or vendible commodity, 
which lasts for some time at least after that labour is past. It is, as it were, a 
certain quantity of labour stocked and stored up to be employed, if 
necessary, upon some other occasion. That subject, or what is the same 
thing, the price of that subject, can afterwards, if necessary, put into motion 
a quantity of labour equal to that which had originally produced it. The 
labour of the menial servant, on the contrary, does not fix or realize itself in 
any particular subject or vendible commodity. His services generally perish 
in the very instant of their performance, and seldom leave any trace or value 
behind them for which an equal quantity of service could afterwards be 
procured. 
    The labour of some of the most respectable orders in the society is, like 
that of menial servants, unproductive of any value, and does not fix or 
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realize itself in any permanent subject; or vendible commodity, which 
endures after that labour is past, and for which an equal quantity of labour 
could afterwards be procured. The sovereign, for example, with all the 
officers both of justice and war who serve under him, the whole army and 
navy, are unproductive labourers. They are the servants of the public, and 
are maintained by a part of the annual produce of the industry of other 
people. Their service, how honourable, how useful, or how necessary 
soever, produces nothing for which an equal quantity of service can 
afterwards be procured. The protection, security, and defence of the 
commonwealth, the effect of their labour this year will not purchase its 
protection, security, and defence for the year to come. In the same class 
must be ranked, some both of the gravest and most important, and some of 
the most frivolous professions: churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of 
letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-
dancers, etc. The labour of the meanest of these has a certain value, 
regulated by the very same principles which regulate that of every other sort 
of labour; and that of the n oblest and most useful, 50 produces nothing 
which could afterwards purchase or procure an equal quantity of labour. 
Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the tune of 
the musician, the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its 
production. 
    Both productive and unproductive labourers, and those who do not labour 
at all, are all equally maintained by the annual produce of the land and 
labour of the country. This produce, how great soever, can never be infinite, 
but must have certain limits. According, therefore, as a smaller or greater 
proportion of it is in any one year employed in maintaining unproductive 
hands, the more in the one case and the less in the other will remain for the 
productive, and the next year's produce will be greater or smaller 
accordingly; the whole annual produce, if we except the spontaneous 
productions of the earth, being the effect of productive labour. 
    Though the whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country 
is, no doubt, ultimately destined for supplying the consumption of its 
inhabitants, and for procuring a revenue to them, yet when it first comes 
either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, it 
naturally divides itself into two parts. One of them, and frequently the 
largest, is, in the first place, destined for replacing a capital, or for renewing 
the provisions, materials, and finished work, which had been withdrawn 
from a capital; the other for constituting a revenue either to the owner of 
this capital, as the profit of his stock, or to some other person, as the rent of 
his land. Thus, of the produce of land, one part replaces the capital of the 
farmer; the other pays his profit and the rent of the landlord; and thus 
constitutes a revenue both to the owner of this capital, as the profits of his 
stock; and to some other person, as the rent of his land. Of the produce of a 
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great manufactory, in the same manner, one part, and that always the 
largest, replaces the capital of the undertaker of the work; the other pays his 
profit, and thus constitutes a revenue to the owner of this capital. 
    That part of the annual produce of the land and labour of any country 
which replaces a capital never is immediately employed to maintain any but 
productive hands. It pays the wages of productive labour only. That which 
is immediately destined for constituting a revenue, either as profit or as rent, 
may maintain indifferently either productive or unproductive hands. 
    Whatever part of his stock a man employs as a capital, he always expects 
is to be replaced to him with a profit. He employs it, therefore, in 
maintaining productive bands only; and after having served in the function 
of a capital to him, it constitutes a revenue to them. Whenever he employs 
any part of it in maintaining unproductive hands of any kind, that part is, 
from that moment, withdrawn from his capital, and placed in his stock 
reserved for immediate consumption. 
    Unproductive labourers, and those who do not labour at all, are all 
maintained by revenue; either, first, by that part of the annual produce 
which is originally destined for constituting a revenue to some particular 
persons, either as the rent of land or as the profits of stock; or, secondly, by 
that part which, though originally destined for replacing a capital and for 
maintaining productive labourers only, yet when it comes into their hands 
whatever part of it is over and above their necessary subsistence may be 
employed in maintaining indifferently either productive or unproductive 
hands. Thus, not only the great landlord or the rich merchant, but even the 
common workman, if his wages are considerable, may maintain a menial 
servant; or he may sometimes go to a play or a puppetshow, and so 
contribute his share towards maintaining one set of unproductive labourers; 
or he may pay some taxes, and thus help to maintain another set, more 
honourable and useful indeed, but equally unproductive. No part of the 
annual produce, however, which had been originally destined to replace a 
capital, is ever directed towards maintaining unproductive hands till after it 
has put into motion its full complement of productive labour, or all that it 
could put into motion in the way in which it was employed. The workman 
must have earned his wages by work done before he can employ any part of 
them in this manner. That part, too, is generally but a small one. It is his 
spare revenue only, of which productive labourers have seldom a great deal. 
They generally have some, however; and in the payment of taxes the 
greatness of their number may compensate, in some measure, the smallness 
of their contribution. The rent of land and the profits of stock are 
everywhere, therefore, the principal sources from which unproductive hands 
derive their subsistence. These are the two sorts of revenue of which the 
owners have generally most to spare. They might both maintain 
indifferently either productive or unproductive hands. They seem, however, 
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to have some predilection for the latter. The expense of a great lord feeds 
generally more idle than industrious people. The rich merchant, though with 
his capital he maintains industrious people only, yet by his expense, that is, 
by the employment of his revenue, he feeds commonly the very same sort as 
the great lord. 
    The proportion, therefore, between the productive and unproductive 
hands, depends very much in every country upon the proportion between 
that part of the annual produce, which, as soon as it comes either from the 
ground or from the hands of the productive labourers, is destined for 
replacing a capital, and that which is destined for constituting a revenue, 
either as rent or as profit. This proportion is very different in rich from what 
it is in poor countries. 
    Thus, at present, in the opulent countries of Europe, a very large, 
frequently the largest portion of the produce of the land is destined for 
replacing the capital of the rich and independent farmer; the other for 
paying his profits and the rent of the landlord. But anciently, during the 
prevalency of the feudal government, a very small portion of the produce 
was sufficient to replace the capital employed in cultivation. It consisted 
commonly in a few wretched cattle, maintained altogether by the 
spontaneous produce of uncultivated land, and which might, therefore, be 
considered as a part of that spontaneous produce. It generally, too, belonged 
to the landlord, and was by him advanced to the occupiers of the land. All 
the rest of the produce properly belonged to him too, either as rent for his 
land, or as profit upon this paltry capital. The occupiers of land were 
generally bondmen, whose persons and effects were equally his property. 
Those who were not bondmen were tenants at will, and though the rent 
which they paid was often nominally little more than a quit-rent, it really 
amounted to the whole produce of the land. Their lord could at all times 
command their labour in peace and their service in war. Though they lived 
at a distance from his house, they were equally dependent upon him as his 
retainers who lived in it. But the whole produce of the land undoubtedly 
belongs to him who can dispose of the labour and service of all those whom 
it maintains. In the present state of Europe, the share of the landlord seldom 
exceeds a third, sometimes not a fourth part of the whole produce of the 
land. The rent of land, however, in all the improved parts of the country, has 
been tripled and quadrupled since those ancient times; and this third or 
fourth part of the annual produce is, it seems, three or four times greater 
than the whole had been before. In the progress of improvement, rent, 
though it increases in proportion to the extent, diminishes in proportion to 
the produce of the land. 
    In the opulent countries of Europe, great capitals are at present employed 
in trade and manufactures. In the ancient state, the little trade that was 
stirring, and the few homely and coarse manufactures that were carried on, 
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required but very small capitals. These, however, must have yielded very 
large profits. The rate of interest was nowhere less than ten per cent, and 
their profits must have been sufficient to afford this great interest. At 
present the rate of interest, in the improved parts of Europe, is nowhere 
higher than six per cent, and in some of the most improved it is so low as 
four, three, and two per cent. Though that part of the revenue of the 
inhabitants which is derived from the profits of stock is always much 
greater in rich than in poor countries, it is because the stock is much greater: 
in proportion to the stock the profits are generally much less. 
    That part of the annual produce, therefore, which, as soon as it comes 
either from the ground or from the hands of the productive labourers, is 
destined for replacing a capital, is not only much greater in rich than in poor 
countries, but bears a much greater proportion to that which is immediately 
destined for constituting a revenue either as rent or as profit. The funds 
destined for the maintenance of productive labour are not only much greater 
in the former than in the latter, but bear a much greater proportion to those 
which, though they may be employed to maintain either productive or 
unproductive hands, have generally a predilection for the latter. 
    The proportion between those different funds necessarily determines in 
every country the general character of the inhabitants as to industry or 
idleness. We are more industrious than our forefathers; because in the 
present times the funds destined for the maintenance of industry are much 
greater in proportion to those which are likely to be employed in the 
maintenance of idleness than they were two or three centuries ago. Our 
ancestors were idle for want of a sufficient encouragement to industry. It is 
better, says the proverb, to play for nothing than to work for nothing. In 
mercantile and manufacturing towns, where the inferior ranks of people are 
chiefly maintained by the employment of capital, they are in general 
industrious, sober, and thriving; as in many English, and in most Dutch 
towns. In those towns which are principally supported by the constant or 
occasional residence of a court, and in which the inferior ranks of people are 
chiefly maintained by the spending of revenue, they are in general idle, 
dissolute, and poor; as at Rome, Versailles, Compiegne, and Fontainebleu. 
If you except Rouen and Bordeaux, there is little trade or industry in any of 
the parliament towns of France; and the inferior ranks of people, being 
elderly maintained by the expense of the members of the courts of justice, 
and of those who come to plead before them, are in general idle and poor. 
The great trade of Rouen and Bordeaux seems to be altogether the effect of 
their situation. Rouen is necessarily the entrepot of almost all the goods 
which are brought either from foreign countries, or from the maritime 
provinces of France, for the consumption of the great city of Paris. 
Bordeaux is in the same manner the entrepot of the wines which grow upon 
the banks of the Garonne, and of the rivers which run into it, one of the 
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richest wine countries in the world, and which seems to produce the wine 
fittest for exportation, or best suited to the taste of foreign nations. Such 
advantageous situations necessarily attract a great capital by the great 
employment which they afford it; and the employment of this capital is the 
cause of the industry of those two cities. In the other parliament towns of 
France, very little more capital seems to be employed than what is 
necessary for supplying their own consumption; that is, little more than the 
smallest capital which can be employed in them. The same thing may be 
said of Paris, Madrid, and Vienna. Of those three cities, Paris is by far the 
most industrious; but Paris itself is the principal market of all the 
manufactures established at Paris, and its own consumption is the principal 
object of all the trade which it carries on. London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen, 
are, perhaps, the only three cities in Europe which are both the constant 
residence of a court, and can at the same time be considered as trading 
cities, or as cities which trade not only for their own consumption, but for 
that of other cities and countries. The situation of all the three is extremely 
advantageous, and naturally fits them to be the entrepots of a great part of 
the goods destined for the consumption of distant places. In a city where a 
great revenue is spent, to employ with advantage a capital for any other 
purpose than for supplying the consumption of that city is probably more 
difficult than in one in which the inferior ranks of people have no other 
maintenance but what they derive from the employment of such a capital. 
The idleness of the greater part of the people who are maintained by the 
expense of revenue corrupts, it is probable, the industry of those who ought 
to be maintained by the employment of capital, and renders it less 
advantageous to employ a capital there than in other places. There was little 
trade or industry in Edinburgh before the union. When the Scotch 
Parliament was no longer to be assembled in it, when it ceased to be the 
necessary residence of the principal nobility and gentry of Scotland, it 
became a city of some trade and industry. It still continues, however, to be 
the residence of the principal courts of justice in Scotland, of the Boards of 
Customs and Excise, etc. A considerable revenue, therefore, still continues 
to be spent in it. In trade and industry it is much inferior to Glasgow, of 
which the inhabitants are chiefly maintained by the employment of capital. 
The inhabitants of a large village, it has sometimes been observed, after 
having made considerable progress in manufactures, have become idle and 
poor in consequence of a great lord having taken up his residence in their 
neighbourhood. 
    The proportion between capital and revenue, therefore, seems everywhere 
to regulate the proportion between industry and idleness. Wherever capital 
predominates, industry prevails: wherever revenue, idleness. Every increase 
or diminution of capital, therefore, naturally tends to increase or diminish 
the real quantity of industry, the number of productive hands, and 
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consequently the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and 
labour of the country, the real wealth and revenue of all its inhabitants. 
    Capitals are increased by parsimony, and diminished by prodigality and 
misconduct. 
    Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital, and 
either employs it himself in maintaining an additional number of productive 
hands, or enables some other person to do so, by lending it to him for an 
interest, that is, for a share of the profits. As the capital of an individual can 
be increased only by what he saves from his annual revenue or his annual 
gains, so the capital of a society, which is the same with that of all the 
individuals who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner. 
    Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of 
capital. Industry, indeed, provides the subject which parsimony 
accumulates. But whatever industry might acquire, if parsimony did not 
save and store up, the capital would never be the greater. 
    Parsimony, by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance 
of productive hands, tends to increase the number of those hands whose 
labour adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed. It tends, 
therefore, to increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the 
land and labour of the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of 
industry, which gives an additional value to the annual produce. 
    What is annually saved is as regularly consumed as what is annually 
spent, and nearly in the same time too; but it is consumed by a different set 
of people. That portion of his revenue which a rich man annually spends is 
in most cases consumed by idle guests and menial servants, who leave 
nothing behind them in return for their consumption. That portion which he 
annually saves, as for the sake of the profit it is immediately employed as a 
capital, is consumed in the same manner, and nearly in the same time too, 
but by a different set of people, by labourers, manufacturers, and artificers, 
who reproduce with a profit the value of their annual consumption. His 
revenue, we shall suppose, is paid him in money. Had he spent the whole, 
the food, clothing, and lodging, which the whole could have purchased, 
would have been distributed among the former set of people. By saving a 
part of it, as that part is for the sake of the profit immediately employed as a 
capital either by himself or by some other person, the food, clothing, and 
lodging, which may be purchased with it, are necessarily reserved for the 
latter. The consumption is the same, but the consumers are different. 
    By what a frugal man annually saves, he not only affords maintenance to 
an additional number of productive hands, for that or the ensuing year, but, 
like the founder of a public workhouse, he establishes as it were a perpetual 
fund for the maintenance of an equal number in all times to come. The 
perpetual allotment and destination of this fund, indeed, is not always 
guarded by any positive law, by any trust-right or deed of mortmain. It is 
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always guarded, however, by a very powerful principle, the plain and 
evident interest of every individual to whom any share of it shall ever 
belong. No part of it can ever afterwards be employed to maintain any but 
productive hands without an evident loss to the person who thus perverts it 
from its proper destination. 
    The prodigal perverts it in this manner. By not confining his expense 
within his income, he encroaches upon his capital. Like him who perverts 
the revenues of some pious foundation to profane purposes, he pays the 
wages of idleness with those funds which the frugality of his forefathers 
had, as it were, consecrated to the maintenance of industry. By diminishing 
the funds destined for the employment of productive labour, he necessarily 
diminishes, so far as it depends upon him, the quantity of that labour which 
adds a value to the subject upon which it is bestowed, and, consequently, 
the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the whole country, 
the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. If the prodigality of some was 
not compensated by the frugality of others, the conduct of every prodigal, 
by feeding the idle with the bread of the industrious, tends not only to 
beggar himself, but to impoverish his country. 
    Though the expense of the prodigal should be altogether in home-made, 
and no part of it in foreign commodities, its effect upon the productive 
funds of the society would still be the same. Every year there would still be 
a certain quantity of food and clothing, which ought to have maintained 
productive, employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Every year, 
therefore, there would still be some diminution in what would otherwise 
have been the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the 
country. 
    This expense, it may be said indeed, not being in foreign goods, and not 
occasioning any exportation of gold and silver, the same quantity of money 
would remain in the country as before. But if the quantity of food and 
clothing, which were thus consumed by unproductive, had been distributed 
among productive hands, they would have reproduced, together with a 
profit, the full value of their consumption. The same quantity of money 
would in this case equally have remained in the country, and there would 
besides have been a reproduction of an equal value of consumable goods. 
There would have been two values instead of one. 
    The same quantity of money, besides, cannot long remain in any country 
in which the value of the annual produce diminishes. The sole use of money 
is to circulate consumable goods. By means of it, provisions, materials, and 
finished work, are bought and sold, and distributed to their proper 
consumers. The quantity of money, therefore, which can be annually 
employed in any country must be determined by the value of the 
consumable goods annually circulated within it. These must consist either in 
the immediate produce of the land and labour of the country itself, or in 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth2.html (53 of 81)4/11/2005 9:45:35 AM
The Wealth of Nations
something which had been, purchased with some part of that produce. Their 
value, therefore, must diminish as the value of that produce diminishes, and 
along with it the quantity of money which can be employed in circulating 
them. But the money which by this annual diminution of produce is 
annually thrown out of domestic circulation will not be allowed to lie idle. 
The interest of whoever possesses it requires that it should be employed. 
But having no employment at home, it will, in spite of all laws and 
prohibitions, be sent abroad, and employed in purchasing consumable goods 
which may be of some use at home. Its annual exportation will in this 
manner continue for some time to add something to the annual consumption 
of the country beyond the value of its own annual produce. What in the days 
of its prosperity had been saved from that annual produce, and employed in 
purchasing gold and silver, will contribute for some little time to support its 
consumption in adversity. The exportation of gold and silver is, in this case, 
not the cause, but the effect of its declension, and may even, for some little 
time, alleviate the misery of that declension. 
    The quantity of money, on the contrary, must in every country naturally 
increase as the value of the annual produce increases. The value of the 
consumable goods annually circulated within the society being greater will 
require a greater quantity of money to circulate them. A part of the 
increased produce, therefore, will naturally be employed in purchasing, 
wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of gold and silver necessary 
for circulating the rest. The increase of those metals will in this case be the 
effect, not the cause, of the public prosperity. Gold and silver are purchased 
everywhere in the same manner. The food, clothing, and lodging, the 
revenue and maintenance of all those whose labour or stock is employed in 
bringing them from the mine to the market, is the price paid for them in 
Peru as well as in England. The country which has this price to pay will 
never be long without the quantity of those metals which it has occasion for; 
and no country will ever long retain a quantity which it has no occasion for. 
    Whatever, therefore, we may imagine the real wealth and revenue of a 
country to consist in, whether in the value of the annual produce of its land 
and labour, as plain reason seems to dictate; or in the quantity of the 
precious metals which circulate within it, as vulgar prejudices suppose; in 
either view of the matter, every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and 
every frugal man a public benefactor. 
    The effects of misconduct are often the same as those of prodigality. 
Every injudicious and unsuccessful project in agriculture, mines, fisheries, 
trade, or manufactures, tends in the same manner to diminish the funds 
destined for the maintenance of productive labour. In every such project, 
though the capital is consumed by productive hands only, yet, as by the 
injudicious manner in which they are employed they do not reproduce the 
full value of their consumption, there must always be some diminution in 
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what would otherwise have been the productive funds of the society. 
    It can seldom happen, indeed, that the circumstances of a great nation can 
be much affected either by the prodigality or misconduct of individuals; the 
profusion or imprudence of some being always more than compensated by 
the frugality and good conduct of others. 
    With regard to profusion, the principle which prompts to expense is the 
passion for present enjoyment; which, though sometimes violent and very 
difficult to be restrained, is in general only momentary and occasional. But 
the principle which prompts to save is the desire of bettering our condition, 
a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us 
from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole 
interval which separates those two moments, there is scarce perhaps a single 
instant in which any man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his 
situation as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of any 
kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of 
men propose and wish to better their condition. It is the means the most 
vulgar and the most obvious; and the most likely way of augmenting their 
fortune is to save and accumulate some part of what they acquire, either 
regularly and annually, or upon some extraordinary occasions. Though the 
principle of expense, therefore, prevails in almost all men upon some 
occasions, and in some men upon almost all occasions, yet in the greater 
part of men, taking the whole course of their life at an average, the principle 
of frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly. 
    With regard to misconduct, the number of prudent and successful 
undertakings is everywhere much greater than that of injudicious and 
unsuccessful ones. After all our complaints of the frequency of 
bankruptcies, the unhappy men who fall into this misfortune make but a 
very small part of the whole number engaged in trade, and all other sorts of 
business; not much more perhaps than one in a thousand. Bankruptcy is 
perhaps the greatest and most humiliating calamity which can befall an 
innocent man. The greater part of men, therefore, are sufficiently careful to 
avoid it. Some, indeed, do not avoid it; as some do not avoid the gallows. 
    Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they sometimes 
are by public prodigality and misconduct. The whole, or almost the whole 
public revenue, is in most countries employed in maintaining unproductive 
hands. Such are the people who compose a numerous and splendid court, a 
great ecclesiastical establishment, great fleets and armies, who in time of 
peace produce nothing, and in time of war acquire nothing which can 
compensate the expense of maintaining them, even while the war lasts. 
Such people, as they themselves produce nothing, are all maintained by the 
produce of other men's labour. When multiplied, therefore, to an 
unnecessary number, they may in a particular year consume so great a share 
of this produce, as not to leave a sufficiency for maintaining the productive 
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labourers, who should reproduce it next year. The next year's produce, 
therefore, will be less than that of the foregoing, and if the same disorder 
should continue, that of the third year will be still less than that of the 
second. Those unproductive hands, who should be maintained by a part 
only of the spare revenue of the people, may consume so great a share of 
their whole revenue, and thereby oblige so great a number to encroach upon 
their capitals, upon the funds destined for the maintenance of productive 
labour, that all the frugality and good conduct of individuals may not be 
able to compensate the waste and degradation of produce occasioned by this 
violent and forced encroachment. 
    This frugality and good conduct, however, is upon most occasions, it 
appears from experience, sufficient to compensate, not only the private 
prodigality and misconduct of individuals, but the public extravagance of 
government. The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man 
to better his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well 
as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to 
maintain the natural progress of things towards improvement, in spite both 
of the extravagance of government and of the greatest errors of 
administration. Like the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently 
restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite, not only of the 
disease, but of the absurd prescriptions of the doctor. 
    The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be increased 
in its value by no other means but by increasing either the number of its 
productive labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers who had 
before been employed. The number of its productive labourers, it is evident, 
can never be much increased, but in consequence of an increase of capital, 
or of the funds destined for maintaining them. The productive powers of the 
same number of labourers cannot be increased, but in consequence either of 
some addition and improvement to those machines and instruments which 
facilitate and abridge labour; or of a more proper division and distribution 
of employment. In either case an additional capital is almost always 
required. It is by means of an additional capital only that the undertaker of 
any work can either provide his workmen with better machinery or make a 
more proper distribution of employment among them. When the work to be 
done consists of a number of parts, to keep every man constantly employed 
in one way requires a much greater capital than where every man is 
occasionally employed in every different part of the work. When we 
compare, therefore, the state of a nation at two different periods, and find, 
that the annual produce of its land and labour is evidently greater at the 
latter than at the former, that its lands are better cultivated, its manufactures 
more numerous and more flourishing, and its trade more extensive, we may 
be assured that its capital must have increased during the interval between 
those two periods, and that more must have been added to it by the good 
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conduct of some than had been taken from it either by the private 
misconduct of others or by the public extravagance of government. But we 
shall find this to have been the case of almost all nations, in all tolerably 
quiet and peaceable times, even of those who have not enjoyed the most 
prudent and parsimonious governments. To form a right judgment of it, 
indeed, we must compare the state of the country at periods somewhat 
distant from one another. The progress is frequently so gradual that, at near 
periods, the improvement is not only not sensible, but from the declension 
either of certain branches of industry, or of certain districts of the country, 
things which sometimes happen though the country in general be in great 
prosperity, there frequently arises a suspicion that the riches and industry of 
the whole are decaying. 
    The annual produce of the land and labour of England, for example, is 
certainly much greater than it was, a little more than a century ago, at the 
restoration of Charles II. Though, at present, few people, I believe, doubt of 
this, yet during this period, five years have seldom passed away in which 
some book or pamphlet has not been published, written, too, with such 
abilities as to gain some authority with the public, and pretending to 
demonstrate that the wealth of the nation was fast declining, that the country 
was depopulated, agriculture neglected, manufactures decaying, and trade 
undone. Nor have these publications been all party pamphlets, the wretched 
offspring of falsehood and venality. Many of them have been written by 
very candid and very intelligent people, who wrote nothing but what they 
believed, and for no other reason but because they believed it. 
    The annual produce of the land and labour of England, again, was 
certainly much greater at the Restoration, than we can suppose it to have 
been about an hundred years before, at the accession of Elizabeth. At this 
period, too, we have all reason to believe, the country was much more 
advanced in improvement than it had been about a century before, towards 
the close of the dissensions between the houses of York and Lancaster. 
Even then it was, probably, in a better condition than it had been at the 
Norman Conquest, and at the Norman Conquest than during the confusion 
of the Saxon Heptarchy. Even at this early period, it was certainly a more 
improved country than at the invasion of Julius Caesar, when its inhabitants 
were nearly in the same state with the savages in North America. 
    In each of those periods, however, there was not only much private and 
public profusion, many expensive and unnecessary wars, great perversion of 
the annual produce from maintaining productive to maintain unproductive 
hands; but sometimes, in the confusion of civil discord, such absolute waste 
and destruction of stock, as might be supposed, not only to retard, as it 
certainly did, the natural accumulation of riches, but to have left the 
country, at the end of the period, poorer than at the beginning. Thus, in the 
happiest and most fortunate period of them all, that which has passed since 
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the Restoration, how many disorders and misfortunes have occurred, which, 
could they have been foreseen, not only the impoverishment, but the total 
ruin of the country would have been expected from them? The fire and the 
plague of London, the two Dutch wars, the disorders of the Revolution, the 
war in Ireland, the four expensive French wars of 1688, 1702, 1742, and 
1756, together with the two rebellions of 1715 and 1745. In the course of 
the four French wars, the nation has contracted more than a hundred and 
forty-five millions of debt, over and above all the other extraordinary annual 
expense which they occasioned, so that the whole cannot be computed at 
less than two hundred millions. So great a share of the annual produce of 
the land and labour of the country has, since the Revolution, been employed 
upon different occasions in maintaining an extraordinary number of 
unproductive hands. But had not those wars given this particular direction 
to so large a capital, the greater part of it would naturally have been 
employed in maintaining productive hands, whose labour would have 
replaced, with a profit, the whole value of their consumption. The value of 
the annual produce of the land and labour of the country would have been 
considerably increased by it every year, and every year's increase would 
have augmented still more that of the following year. More houses would 
have been built, more lands would have been improved, and those which 
had been improved before would have been better cultivated, more 
manufactures would have been established. and those which had been 
established before would have been more extended; and to what height the 
real wealth and revenue of the country might, by this time, have been raised, 
it is not perhaps very easy even to imagine. 
    But though the profusion of government must, undoubtedly, have 
retarded the natural progress of England towards wealth and improvement, 
it has not been able to stop it. The annual produce of its land and labour is, 
undoubtedly, much greater at present than it was either at the Restoration or 
at the Revolution. The capital, therefore, annually employed in cultivating 
this land, and in maintaining this labour, must likewise be much greater. In 
the midst of all the exactions of government, this capital has been silently 
and gradually accumulated by the private frugality and good conduct of 
individuals, by their universal, continual, and uninterrupted effort to better 
their own condition. It is this effort, protected by law and allowed by liberty 
to exert itself in the manner that is most advantageous, which has 
maintained the progress of England towards opulence and improvement in 
almost all former times, and which, it is to be hoped, will do so in all future 
times. England, however, as it has never been blessed with a very 
parsimonious government, so parsimony has at no time been the 
characteristical virtue of its inhabitants. It is the highest impertinence and 
presumption, therefore, in kings and ministers, to pretend to watch over the 
economy of private people, and to restrain their expense, either by 
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sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of foreign luxuries. They 
are themselves always, and without any exception, the greatest spendthrifts 
in the society. Let them look well after their own expense, and they may 
safely trust private people with theirs. If their own extravagance does not 
ruin the state, that of their subjects never will. 
    As frugality increases and prodigality diminishes the public capital, so 
the conduct of those whose expense just equals their revenue, without either 
accumulating or encroaching, neither increases nor diminishes it. Some 
modes of expense, however, seem to contribute more to the growth of 
public opulence than others. 
    The revenue of an individual may be spent either in things which are 
consumed immediately, and in which one day's expense can neither 
alleviate nor support that of another, or it may be spent in things more 
durable, which can therefore be accumulated, and in which every day's 
expense may, as he chooses, either alleviate or support and heighten the 
effect of that of the following day. A man of fortune, for example, may 
either spend his revenue in a profuse and sumptuous table, and in 
maintaining a great number of menial servants, and a multitude of dogs and 
horses; or contenting himself with a frugal table and few attendants, he may 
lay out the greater part of it in adorning his house or his country villa, in 
useful or ornamental buildings, in useful or ornamental furniture, in 
collecting books, statues, pictures; or in things more frivolous, jewels, 
baubles, ingenious trinkets of different kinds; or, what is most trifling of all, 
in amassing a great wardrobe of fine clothes, like the favourite and minister 
of a great prince who died a few years ago. Were two men of equal fortune 
to spend their revenue, the one chiefly in the one way, the other in the other, 
the magnificence of the person whose expense had been chiefly in durable 
commodities, would be continually increasing, every day's expense 
contributing something to support and heighten the effect of that of the 
following day: that of the other, on the contrary, would be no greater at the 
end of the period than at the beginning. The former, too, would, at the end 
of the period, be the richer man of the two. He would have a stock of goods 
of some kind or other, which, though it might not be worth all that it cost, 
would always be worth something. No trace or vestige of the expense of the 
latter would remain, and the effects of ten or twenty years profusion would 
be as completely annihilated as if they had never existed. 
    As the one mode of expense is more favourable than the other to the 
opulence of an individual, so is it likewise to that of a nation. The houses, 
the furniture, the clothing of the rich, in a little time, become useful to the 
inferior and middling ranks of people. They are able to purchase them when 
their superiors grow weary of them, and the general accommodation of the 
whole people is thus gradually improved, when this mode of expense 
becomes universal among men of fortune. In countries which have long 
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been rich, you will frequently find the inferior ranks of people in possession 
both of houses and furniture perfectly good and entire, but of which neither 
the one could have been built, nor the other have been made for their use. 
What was formerly a seat of the family of Seymour is now an inn upon the 
Bath road. The marriage-bed of James the First of Great Britain, which his 
queen brought with her from Denmark as a present fit for a sovereign to 
make to a sovereign, was, a few years ago, the ornament of an alehouse at 
Dunfermline. In some ancient cities, which either have been long stationary, 
or have gone somewhat to decay, you will sometimes scarce find a single 
house which could have been built for its present inhabitants. If you go into 
those houses too, you will frequently find many excellent, though 
antiquated pieces of furniture, which are still very fit for use, and which 
could as little have been made for them. Noble palaces, magnificent villas, 
great collections of books, statues, pictures and other curiosities, are 
frequently both an ornament and an honour, not only to the neighbourhood, 
but to the whole country to which they belong. Versailles is an ornament 
and an honour to France, Stowe and Wilton to England. Italy still continues 
to command some sort of veneration by the number of monuments of this 
kind which it possesses, though the wealth which produced them has 
decayed, and though the genius which planned them seems to be 
extinguished, perhaps from not having the same employment. 
    The expense too, which is laid out in durable commodities, is favourable, 
not only to accumulation, but to frugality. If a person should at any time 
exceed in it, he can easily reform without exposing himself to the censure of 
the public. To reduce very much the number of his servants, to reform his 
table from great profusion to great frugality, to lay down his equipage after 
he has once set it up, are changes which cannot escape the observation of 
his neighbours, and which are supposed to imply some acknowledgment of 
preceding bad conduct. Few, therefore, of those who have once been so 
unfortunate as to launch out too far into this sort of expense, have 
afterwards the courage to reform, till ruin and bankruptcy oblige them. But 
if a person has, at any time, been at too great an expense in building, in 
furniture, in books or pictures, no imprudence can be inferred from his 
changing his conduct. These are things in which further expense is 
frequently rendered unnecessary by former expense; and when a person 
stops short, he appears to do so, not because he has exceeded his fortune, 
but because he has satisfied his fancy. 
    The expense, besides, that is laid out in durable commodities gives 
maintenance, commonly, to a greater number of people than that which is 
employed in the most profuse hospitality. Of two or three hundredweight of 
provisions, which may sometimes be served up at a great festival, one half, 
perhaps, is thrown to the dunghill, and there is always a great deal wasted 
and abused. But if the expense of this entertainment had been employed in 
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setting to work masons, carpenters, upholsterers, mechanics, etc., a quantity 
of provisions, of equal value, would have been distributed among a still 
greater number of people who would have bought them in pennyworths and 
pound weights, and not have lost or thrown away a single ounce of them. In 
the one way, besides, this expense maintains productive, in the other 
unproductive hands. In the one way, therefore, it increases, in the other, it 
does not increase, the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land 
and labour of the country. 
    I would not, however, by all this be understood to mean that the one 
species of expense always betokens a more liberal or generous spirit than 
the other. When a man of fortune spends his revenue chiefly in hospitality, 
he shares the greater part of it with his friends and companions; but when he 
employs it in purchasing such durable commodities, he often spends the 
whole upon his own person, and gives nothing to anybody without an 
equivalent. The latter species of expense, therefore, especially when 
directed towards frivolous objects, the little ornaments of dress and 
furniture, jewels, trinkets, gewgaws, frequently indicates, not only a trifling, 
but a base and selfish disposition. All that I mean is, that the one sort of 
expense, as it always occasions some accumulation of valuable 
commodities, as it is more favourable to private frugality, and, 
consequently, to the increase of the public capital, and as it maintains 
productive, rather than unproductive hands, conduces more than the other to 
the growth of public opulence. 
CHAPTER IV
Of Stock Lent at Interest
THE stock which is lent at interest is always considered as a capital by the 
lender. He expects that in due time it is to be restored to him, and that in the 
meantime the borrower is to pay him a certain annual rent for the use of it. 
The borrower may use it either as a capital, or as a stock reserved for 
immediate consumption. If he uses it as a capital, he employs it in the 
maintenance of productive labourers, who reproduce the value with a profit. 
He can, in this case, both restore the capital and pay the interest without 
alienating or encroaching upon any other source of revenue. If he uses it as 
a stock reserved for immediate consumption, he acts the part of a prodigal, 
and dissipates in the maintenance of the idle what was destined for the 
support of the industrious. He can, in this case, neither restore the capital 
nor pay the interest without either alienating or encroaching upon some 
other source of revenue, such as the property or the rent of land. 
    The stock which is lent at interest is, no doubt, occasionally employed in 
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both these ways, but in the former much more frequently than in the latter. 
The man who borrows in order to spend will soon be ruined, and he who 
lends to him will generally have occasion to repent of his folly. To borrow 
or to lend for such a purpose, therefore, is in all cases, where gross usury is 
out of the question, contrary to the interest of both parties; and though it no 
doubt happens sometimes that people do both the one and the other; yet, 
from the regard that all men have for their own interest, we may be assured 
that it cannot happen so very frequently as we are sometimes apt to imagine. 
Ask any rich man of common prudence to which of the two sorts of people 
he has lent the greater part of his stock, to those who, he thinks, will employ 
it profitably, or to those who will spend it idly, and he will laugh at you for 
proposing the question. Even among borrowers, therefore, not the people in 
the world most famous for frugality, the number of the frugal and 
industrious surpasses considerably that of the prodigal and idle. 
    The only people to whom stock is commonly lent, without their being 
expected to make any very profitable use of it, are country gentlemen who 
borrow upon mortgage. Even they scarce ever borrow merely to spend. 
What they borrow, one may say, is commonly spent before they borrow it. 
They have generally consumed so great a quantity of goods, advanced to 
them upon credit by shopkeepers and tradesmen, that they find it necessary 
to borrow at interest in order to pay the debt. The capital borrowed replaces 
the capitals of those shopkeepers and tradesmen, which the country 
gentlemen could not have replaced from the rents of their estates. It is not 
properly borrowed in order to be spent, but in order to replace a capital 
which had been spent before. 
    Almost all loans at interest are made in money, either of paper, or of gold 
and silver. But what the borrower really wants, and what the lender really 
supplies him with, is not the money, but the money's worth, or the goods 
which it can purchase. If he wants it as a stock for immediate consumption, 
it is those goods only which he can place in that stock. If he wants it as a 
capital for employing industry, it is from those goods only that the 
industrious can be furnished with the tools, materials, and maintenance 
necessary for carrying on their work. By means of the loan, the lender, as it 
were, assigns to the borrower his right to a certain portion of the annual 
produce of the land and labour of the country to be employed as the 
borrower pleases. 
    The quantity of stock, therefore, or, as it is commonly expressed, of 
money which can be lent at interest in any country, is not regulated by the 
value of the money, whether paper or coin, which serves as the instrument 
of the different loans made in that country, but by the value of that part of 
the annual produce which, as soon as it comes either from the ground, or 
from the hands of the productive labourers, is destined not only for 
replacing a capital, but such a capital as the owner does not care to be at the 
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trouble of employing himself. As such capitals are commonly lent out and 
paid back in money, they constitute what is called the monied interest. It is 
distinct, not only from the landed, but from the trading and manufacturing 
interests, as in these last the owners themselves employ their own capitals. 
Even in the monied interest, however, the money is, as it were, but the deed 
of assignment, which conveys from one hand to another those capitals 
which the owners do not care to employ themselves. Those capitals may be 
greater in almost any proportion than the amount of the money which serves 
as the instrument of their conveyance; the same pieces of money 
successively serving for many different loans, as well as for many different 
purchases. A, for example, lends to W a thousand pounds, with which W 
immediately purchases of B a thousand pounds' worth of goods. B having 
no occasion for the money himself, lends the identical pieces to X, with 
which X immediately purchases of C another thousand pounds' worth of 
goods. C in the same manner, and for the same reason, lends them to Y, 
who again purchases goods with them of D. In this manner the same pieces, 
either of coin or paper, may in the course of a few days, serve as the 
instrument of three different loans, and of three different purchases, each of 
which is, in value, equal to the whole amount of those pieces. What the 
three monied men A, B, and C assign to the three borrowers, W, X, Y, is the 
power of making those purchases. In this power consist both the value and 
the use of the loans. The stock lent by the three monied men is equal to the 
value of the goods which can be purchased with it, and is three times greater 
than that of the money with which the purchases are made. Those loans 
however, may be all perfectly well secured, the goods purchased by the 
different debtors being so employed as, in due time, to bring back, with a 
profit, an equal value either of coin or of paper. And as the same pieces of 
money can thus serve as the instrument of different loans to three, or for the 
same reason, to thirty times their value, so they may likewise successively 
serve as the instrument of repayment. 
    A capital lent at interest may, in this manner, be considered as an 
assignment from the lender to the borrowers of a certain considerable 
portion of the annual produce; upon condition that the borrower in return 
shall, during the continuance of the loan, annually assign to the lender a 
smaller portion, called the interest; and at the end of it a portion equally 
considerable with that which had originally been assigned to him, called the 
repayment. Though money, either coin or paper, serves generally as the 
deed of assignment both to the smaller and to the more considerable 
portion, it is itself altogether different from what is assigned by it. 
    In proportion as that share of the annual produce which, as soon as it 
comes either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive 
labourers, is destined for replacing a capital, increases in any country, what 
is called the monied interest naturally increases with it. The increase of 
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those particular capitals from which the owners wish to derive a revenue, 
without being at the trouble of employing them themselves, naturally 
accompanies the general increase of capitals; or, in other words, as stock 
increases, the quantity of stock to be lent at interest grows gradually greater 
and greater. 
    As the quantity of stock to be lent at interest increases, the interest, or the 
price which must be paid for the use of that stock, necessarily diminishes, 
not only from those general causes which make the market price of things 
commonly diminish as their quantity increases, but from other causes which 
are peculiar to this particular case. As capitals increase in any country, the 
profits which can be made by employing them necessarily diminish. It 
becomes gradually more and more difficult to find within the country a 
profitable method of employing any new capital. There arises in 
consequence a competition between different capitals, the owner of one 
endeavouring to get possession of that employment which is occupied by 
another. But upon most occasions he can hope to jostle that other out of this 
employment by no other means but by dealing upon more reasonable terms. 
He must not only sell what he deals in somewhat cheaper, but in order to get 
it to sell, he must sometimes, too, buy it dearer. The demand for productive 
labour, by the increase of the funds which are destined for maintaining it, 
grows every day greater and greater. Labourers easily find employment, but 
the owners of capitals find it difficult to get labourers to employ. Their 
competition raises the wages of labour and sinks the profits of stock. But 
when the profits which can be made by the use of a capital are in this 
manner diminished, as it were, at both ends, the price which can be paid for 
the use of it, that is, the rate of interest, must necessarily be diminished with 
them. 
    Mr. Locke, Mr. Law, and Mr. Montesquieu, as well as many other 
writers, seem to have imagined that the increase of the quantity of gold and 
silver, in consequence of the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, was the 
real cause of the lowering of the rate of interest through the greater part of 
Europe. Those metals, they say, having become of less value themselves, 
the use of any particular portion of them necessarily became of less value 
too, and consequently the price which could be paid for it. This notion, 
which at first sight seems plausible, has been so fully exposed by Mr. Hume 
that it is, perhaps, unnecessary to say anything more about it. The following 
very short and plain argument, however, may serve to explain more 
distinctly the fallacy which seems to have misled those gentlemen. 
    Before the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, ten per cent seems to 
have been the common rate of interest through the greater part of Europe. It 
has since that time in different countries sunk to six, five, four, and three per 
cent. Let us suppose that in every particular country the value of silver has 
sunk precisely in the same proportion as the rate of interest; and that in 
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those countries, for example, where interest has been reduced from ten to 
five per cent, the same quantity of silver can now purchase just half the 
quantity of goods which it could have purchased before. This supposition 
will not, I believe, be found anywhere agreeable to the truth, but it is the 
most favourable to the opinion which we are going to examine; and even 
upon this supposition it is utterly impossible that the lowering of the value 
of silver could have the smallest tendency to lower the rate of interest. If a 
hundred pounds are in those countries now of no more value than fifty 
pounds were then, ten pounds must now be of no more value than five 
pounds were then. Whatever were the causes which lowered the value of the 
capital, the same must necessarily have lowered that of the interest, and 
exactly in the same proportion. The proportion between the value of the 
capital and that of the interest must have remained the same, though the rate 
had been altered. By altering the rate, on the contrary, the proportion 
between those two values is necessarily altered. If a hundred pounds now 
are worth no more than fifty were then, five pounds now can be worth no 
more than two pounds ten shillings were then. By reducing the rate of 
interest, therefore, from ten to five per cent, we give for the use of a capital, 
which is supposed to be equal to one half of its former value, an interest 
which is equal to one fourth only of the value of the former interest. 
    Any increase in the quantity of silver, while that of the commodities 
circulated by means of it remained the same, could have no other effect than 
to diminish the value of that metal. The nominal value of all sorts of goods 
would be greater, but their real value would be precisely the same as before. 
They would be exchanged for a greater number of pieces of silver; but the 
quantity of labour which they could command, the number of people whom 
they could maintain and employ, would be precisely the same. The capital 
of the country would be the same, though a greater number of pieces might 
be requisite for conveying any equal portion of it from one hand to another. 
The deeds of assignment, like the conveyances of a verbose attorney, would 
be more cumbersome, but the thing assigned would be precisely the same as 
before, and could produce only the same effects. The funds for maintaining 
productive labour being the same, the demand for it would be the same. Its 
price or wages, therefore, though nominally greater, would really be the 
same. They would be paid in a greater number of pieces of silver; but they 
would purchase only the same quantity of goods. The profits of stock would 
be the same both nominally and really. The wages of labour are commonly 
computed by the quantity of silver which is paid to the labourer. When that 
is increased, therefore, his wages appear to be increased, though they may 
sometimes be no greater than before. But the profits of stock are not 
computed by the number of pieces of silver with which they are paid, but by 
the proportion which those pieces bear to the whole capital employed. Thus 
in a particular country five shillings a week are said to be the common 
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wages of labour, and ten per cent the common profits of stock. But the 
whole capital of the country being the same as before, the competition 
between the different capitals of individuals into which it was divided 
would likewise be the same. They would all trade with the same advantages 
and disadvantages. The common proportion between capital and profit, 
therefore, would be the same, and consequently the common interest of 
money; what can commonly be given for the use of money being 
necessarily regulated by what can commonly be made by the use of it. 
    Any increase in the quantity of commodities annually circulated within 
the country, while that of the money which circulated them remained the 
same, would, on the contrary, produce many other important effects, besides 
that of raising the value of the money. The capital of the country, though it 
might nominally be the same, would really be augmented. It might continue 
to be expressed by the same quantity of money, but it would command a 
greater quantity of labour. The quantity of productive labour which it could 
maintain and employ would be increased, and consequently the demand for 
that labour. Its wages would naturally rise with the demand, and yet might 
appear to sink. They might be paid with a smaller quantity of money, but 
that smaller quantity might purchase a greater quantity of goods than a 
greater had done before. The profits of stock would be diminished both 
really and in appearance. The whole capital of the country being 
augmented, the competition between the different capitals of which it was 
composed would naturally be augmented along with it. The owners of those 
particular capitals would be obliged to content themselves with a smaller 
proportion of the produce of that labour which their respective capitals 
employed. The interest of money, keeping pace always with the profits of 
stock, might, in this manner, be greatly diminished, though the value of 
money, or the quantity of goods which any particular sum could purchase, 
was greatly augmented. 
    In some countries the interest of money has been prohibited by law. But 
as something can everywhere be made by the use of money, something 
ought everywhere to be paid for the use of it. This regulation, instead of 
preventing, has been found from experience to increase the evil of usury; 
the debtor being obliged to pay, not only for the use of the money, but for 
the risk which his creditor runs by accepting a compensation for that use. 
He is obliged, if one may say so, to insure his creditor from the penalties of 
usury. 
    In countries where interest is permitted, the law, in order to prevent the 
extortion of usury, generally fixes the highest rate which can be taken 
without incurring a penalty. This rate ought always to be somewhat above 
the lowest market price, or the price which is commonly paid for the use of 
money by those who can give the most undoubted security. If this legal rate 
should be fixed below the lowest market rate, the effects of this fixation 
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must be nearly the same as those of a total prohibition of interest. The 
creditor will not lend his money for less than the use of it is worth, and the 
debtor must pay him for the risk which he runs by accepting the full value 
of that use. If it is fixed precisely at the lowest market price, it ruins with 
honest people, who respect the laws of their country, the credit of all those 
who cannot give the very best security, and obliges them to have recourse to 
exorbitant usurers. In a country, such as Great Britain, where money is lent 
to government at three per cent and to private people upon a good security 
at four and four and a half, the present legal rate, five per cent, is perhaps as 
proper as any. 
    The legal rate, it is to be observed, though it ought to be somewhat above, 
ought not to be much above the lowest market rate. If the legal rate of 
interest in Great Britain, for example, was fixed so high as eight or ten per 
cent, the greater part of the money which was to be lent would be lent to 
prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this high 
interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a 
part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into 
the competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus be 
kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and 
advantageous use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to 
waste and destroy it. Where the legal rate of interest, on the contrary, is 
fixed but a very little above the lowest market rate, sober people are 
universally preferred, as borrowers, to prodigals and projectors. The person 
who lends money gets nearly as much interest from the former as he dares 
to take from the latter, and his money is much safer in the hands of the one 
set of people than in those of the other. A great part of the capital of the 
country is thus thrown into the hands in which it is most likely to be 
employed with advantage. 
    No law can reduce the common rate of interest below the lowest ordinary 
market rate at the time when that law is made. Notwithstanding the edict of 
1766, by which the French king attempted to reduce the rate of interest from 
five to four per cent, money continued to be lent in France at five per cent, 
the law being evaded in several different ways. 
    The ordinary market price of land, it is to be observed, depends 
everywhere upon the ordinary market rate of interest. The person who has a 
capital from which he wishes to derive a revenue, without taking the trouble 
to employ it himself, deliberates whether he should buy land with it or lend 
it out at interest. The superior security of land, together with some other 
advantages which almost everywhere attend upon this species of property, 
will generally dispose him to content himself with a smaller revenue from 
land than what he might have by lending out his money at interest. These 
advantages are sufficient to compensate a certain difference of revenue; but 
they will compensate a certain difference only; and if the rent of land should 
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fall short of the interest of money by a greater difference, nobody would 
buy land, which would soon reduce its ordinary price. On the contrary, if 
the advantages should much more than compensate the difference, 
everybody would buy land, which again would soon raise its ordinary price. 
When interest was at ten per cent, land was commonly sold for ten and 
twelve years' purchase. As interest sunk to six, five, and four per cent, the 
price of land rose to twenty, five-and-twenty, and thirty years' purchase. 
The market rate of interest is higher in France than in England; and the 
common price of land is lower. In England it commonly sells at thirty, in 
France at twenty years' purchase. 
CHAPTER V
Of the Different Employment of Capitals
THOUGH all capitals are destined for the maintenance of productive labour 
only, yet the quantity of that labour which equal capitals are capable of 
putting into motion varies extremely according to the diversity of their 
employment; as does likewise the value which that employment adds to the 
annual produce of the land and labour of the country. 
    A capital may be employed in four different ways: either, first, in 
procuring the rude produce annually required for the use and consumption 
of the society; or, secondly, in manufacturing and preparing that rude 
produce for immediate use and consumption; or, thirdly, in transporting 
either the rude or manufactured produce from the places where they abound 
to those where they are wanted; or, lastly, in dividing particular portions of 
either into such small parcels as suit the occasional demands of those who 
want them. In the first way are employed the capitals of all those who 
undertake the improvement or cultivation of lands, mines, or fisheries; in 
the second, those of all master manufacturers; in the third, those of all 
wholesale merchants; and in the fourth, those of all retailers. It is difficult to 
conceive that a capital should be employed in any way which may not be 
classed under some one or other of those four. 
    Each of these four methods of employing a capital is essentially 
necessary either to the existence or extension of the other three, or to the 
general conveniency of the society. 
    Unless a capital was employed in furnishing rude produce to a certain 
degree of abundance, neither manufactures nor trade of any kind could 
exist. 
    Unless a capital was employed in manufacturing that part of the rude 
produce which requires a good deal of preparation before it can be fit for 
use and consumption, it either would never be produced, because there 
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could be no demand for it; or if it was produced spontaneously, it would be 
of no value in exchange, and could add nothing to the wealth of the society. 
    Unless a capital was employed in transporting either the rude or 
manufactured produce from the places where it abounds to those where it is 
wanted, no more of either could be produced than was necessary for the 
consumption of the neighbourhood. The capital of the merchant exchanges 
the surplus produce of one place for that of another, and thus encourages the 
industry and increases the enjoyments of both. 
    Unless a capital was employed in breaking and dividing certain portions 
either of the rude or manufactured produce into such small parcels as suit 
the occasional demands of those who want them, every man would be 
obliged to purchase a greater quantity of the goods he wanted than his 
immediate occasions required. If there was no such trade as a butcher, for 
example, every man would be obliged to purchase a whole ox or a whole 
sheep at a time. This would generally be inconvenient to the rich, and much 
more so to the poor. If a poor workman was obliged to purchase a month's 
or six months' provisions at a time, a great part of the stock which he 
employs as a capital in the instruments of his trade, or in the furniture of his 
shop, and which yields him a revenue. he would be forced to place in that 
part of his stock which is reserved for immediate consumption, and which 
yields him no revenue. Nothing can be more convenient for such a person 
than to be able to purchase his subsistence from day to day, or even from 
hour to hour, as he wants it. He is thereby enabled to employ almost his 
whole stock as a capital. He is thus enabled to furnish work to a greater 
value, and the profit, which he makes by it in this way, much more than 
compensates the additional price which the profit of the retailer imposes 
upon the goods. The prejudices of some political writers against 
shopkeepers and tradesmen are altogether without foundation. So far is it 
from being necessary either to tax them or to restrict their numbers that they 
can never be multiplied so as to hurt the public, though they may so as to 
hurt one another. The quantity of grocery goods, for example, which can be 
sold in a particular town is limited by the demand of that town and its 
neighbourhood. The capital, therefore, which can be employed in the 
grocery trade cannot exceed what is sufficient to purchase that quantity. If 
this capital is divided between two different grocers, their competition will 
tend to make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of one 
only; and if it were divided among twenty, their competition would be just 
so much the greater, and the chance of their combining together, in order to 
raise the price, just so much the less. Their competition might perhaps ruin 
some of themselves; but to take care of this is the business of the parties 
concerned, and it may safely be trusted to their discretion. It can never hurt 
either the consumer or the producer; on the contrary, it must tend to make 
the retailers both sell cheaper and buy dearer than if the whole trade was 
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monopolized by one or two persons. Some of them, perhaps, may 
sometimes decoy a weak customer to buy what he has no occasion for. This 
evil, however, is of too little importance to deserve the public attention, nor 
would it necessarily be prevented by restricting their numbers. It is not the 
multitude of ale-houses, to give the most suspicious example, that occasions 
a general disposition to drunkenness among the common people; but that 
disposition arising from other causes necessarily gives employment to a 
multitude of ale-houses. 
    The persons whose capitals are employed in any of those four ways are 
themselves productive labourers. Their labour, when properly directed, 
fixes and realizes itself in the subject or vendible commodity upon which it 
is bestowed, and generally adds to its price the value at least of their own 
maintenance and consumption. The profits of the farmer, of the 
manufacturer, of the merchant, and retailer, are all drawn from the price of 
the goods which the two first produce, and the two last buy and sell. Equal 
capitals, however, employed in each of those four different ways, will 
immediately put into motion very different quantities of productive labour, 
and augment, too, in very different proportions the value of the annual 
produce of the land and labour of the society to which they belong. 
    The capital of the retailer replaces, together with its profits, that of the 
merchant of whom he purchases goods, and thereby enables him to continue 
his business. The retailer himself is the only productive labourer whom it 
immediately employs. In his profits consists the whole value which its 
employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the 
society. 
    The capital of the wholesale merchant replaces, together with their 
profits, the capitals of the farmers and manufacturers of whom he purchases 
the rude and manufactured produce which he deals in, and thereby enables 
them to continue their respective trades. It is by this service chiefly that he 
contributes indirectly to support the productive labour of the society, and to 
increase the value of its annual produce. His capital employs, too, the 
sailors and carriers who transport his goods from one place to another, and 
it augments the price of those goods by the value, not only of his profits, but 
of their wages. This is all the productive labour which it immediately puts 
into motion, and all the value which it immediately adds to the annual 
produce. Its operation in both these respects is a good deal superior to that 
of the capital of the retailer. 
    Part of the capital of the master manufacturer is employed as a fixed 
capital in the instruments of his trade, and replaces, together with its profits, 
that of some other artificer of whom he purchases them. Part of his 
circulating capital is employed in purchasing materials, and replaces, with 
their profits, the capitals of the farmers and miners of whom he purchases 
them. But a great part of it is always, either annually, or in a much shorter 
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period, distributed among the different workmen whom he employs. It 
augments the value of those materials by their wages, and by their matters' 
profits upon the whole stock of wages, materials, and instruments of trade 
employed in the business. It puts immediately into motion, therefore, a 
much greater quantity of productive labour, and adds a much greater value 
to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society than an equal 
capital in the hands of any wholesale merchant. 
    No equal capital puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour 
than that of the farmer. Not only his labouring servants, but his labouring 
cattle, are productive labourers. In agriculture, too, nature labours along 
with man; and though her labour costs no expense, its produce has its value, 
as well as that of the most expensive workmen. The most important 
operations of agriculture seem intended not so much to increase, though 
they do that too, as to direct the fertility of nature towards the production of 
the plants most profitable to man. A field overgrown with briars and 
brambles may frequently produce as great a quantity of vegetables as the 
best cultivated vineyard or corn field. Planting and tillage frequently 
regulate more than they animate the active fertility of nature; and after all 
their labour, a great part of the work always remains to be done by her. The 
labourers and labouring cattle, therefore, employed in agriculture, not only 
occasion, like the workmen in manufactures, the reproduction of a value 
equal to their own consumption, or to the capital which employs them, 
together with its owners' profits; but of a much greater value. Over and 
above the capital of the farmer and all its profits, they regularly occasion the 
reproduction of the rent of the landlord. This rent may be considered as the 
produce of those powers of nature, the use of which the landlord lends to 
the farmer. It is greater or smaller according to the supposed extent of those 
powers, or in other words, according to the supposed natural or improved 
fertility of the land. It is the work of nature which remains after deducting 
or compensating everything which can be regarded as the work of man. It is 
seldom less than a fourth, and frequently more than a third of the whole 
produce. No equal quantity of productive labour employed in manufactures 
can ever occasion so great a reproduction. In them nature does nothing; man 
does all; and the reproduction must always be in proportion to the strength 
of the agents that occasion it. The capital employed in agriculture, therefore, 
not only puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour than any 
equal capital employed in manufactures, but in proportion, too, to the 
quantity of productive labour which it employs, it adds a much greater value 
to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, to the real 
wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. Of all the ways in which a capital can 
be employed, it is by far the most advantageous to the society. 
    The capitals employed in the agriculture and in the retail trade of any 
society must always reside within that society. Their employment is 
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confined almost to a precise spot, to the farm and to the shop of the retailer. 
They must generally, too, though there are some exceptions to this, belong 
to resident members of the society. 
    The capital of a wholesale merchant, on the contrary, seems to have no 
fixed or necessary residence anywhere, but may wander about from place to 
place, according as it can either buy cheap or sell dear. 
    The capital of the manufacturer must no doubt reside where the 
manufacture is carried on; but where this shall be is not always necessarily 
determined. It may frequently be at a great distance both from the place 
where the materials grow, and from that where the complete manufacture is 
consumed. Lyons is very distant both from the places which afford the 
materials of its manufactures, and from those which consume them. The 
people of fashion in Sicily are clothed in silks made in other countries, from 
the materials which their own produces. Part of the wool of Spain is 
manufactured in Great Britain, and some part of that cloth is afterwards sent 
back to Spain. 
    Whether the merchant whose capital exports the surplus produce of any 
society be a native or a foreigner is of very little importance. If he is a 
foreigner, the number of their productive labourers is necessarily less than if 
he had been a native by one man only, and the value of their annual produce 
by the profits of that one man. The sailors or carriers whom he employs 
may still belong indifferently either to his country or to their country, or to 
some third country, in the same manner as if he had been a native. The 
capital of a foreigner gives a value to their surplus produce equally with that 
of a native by exchanging it for something for which there is a demand at 
home. It as effectually replaces the capital of the person who produces that 
surplus, and as effectually enables him to continue his business; the service 
by which the capital of a wholesale merchant chiefly contributes to support 
the productive labour, and to augment the value of the annual produce of the 
society to which he belongs. 
    It is of more consequence that the capital of the manufacturer should 
reside within the country. It necessarily puts into motion a greater quantity 
of productive labour, and adds a greater value to the annual produce of the 
land and labour of the society. It may, however, be very useful to the 
country, though it should not reside within it. The capitals of the British 
manufacturers who work up the flax and hemp annually imported from the 
coasts of the Baltic are surely very useful to the countries which produce 
them. Those materials are a part of the surplus produce of those countries 
which, unless it was annually exchanged for something which is in demand 
there, would be of no value, and would soon cease to be produced. The 
merchants who export it replace the capitals of the people who produce it, 
and thereby encourage them to continue the production; and the British 
manufacturers replace the capitals of those merchants. 
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    A particular country, in the same manner as a particular person, may 
frequently not have capital sufficient both to improve and cultivate all its 
lands, to manufacture and prepare their whole rude produce for immediate 
use and consumption, and to transport the surplus part either of the rude or 
manufactured produce to those distant markets where it can be exchanged 
for something for which there is a demand at home. The inhabitants of 
many different parts of Great Britain have not capital sufficient to improve 
and cultivate all their lands. The wool of the southern counties of Scotland 
is, a great part of it, after a long land carriage through very bad roads, 
manufactured in Yorkshire, for want of capital to manufacture it at home. 
There are many little manufacturing towns in Great Britain, of which the 
inhabitants have not capital sufficient to transport the produce of their own 
industry to those distant markets where there is demand and consumption 
for it. If there are any merchants among them, they are properly only the 
agents of wealthier merchants who reside in some of the greater commercial 
cities. 
    When the capital of any country is not sufficient for all those three 
purposes, in proportion as a greater share of it is employed in agriculture, 
the greater will be the quantity of productive labour which it puts into 
motion within the country; as will likewise be the value which its 
employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the 
society. After agriculture, the capital employed in manufactures puts into 
motion the greatest quantity of productive labour, and adds the greatest 
value to the annual produce. That which is employed in the trade of 
exportation has the least effect of any of the three. 
    The country, indeed, which has not capital sufficient for all those three 
purposes has not arrived at that degree of opulence for which it seems 
naturally destined. To attempt, however, prematurely and with an 
insufficient capital to do all the three is certainly not the shortest way for a 
society, no more than it would be for an individual, to acquire a sufficient 
one. The capital of all the individuals of a nation has its limits in the same 
manner as that of a single individual, and is capable of executing only 
certain purposes. The capital of all the individuals of a nation is increased in 
the same manner as that of a single individual by their continually 
accumulating and adding to it whatever they save out of their revenue. It is 
likely to increase the fastest, therefore, when it is employed in the way that 
affords the greatest revenue to all the inhabitants of the country, as they will 
thus be enabled to make the greatest savings. But the revenue of all the 
inhabitants of the country is necessarily in proportion to the value of the 
annual produce of their land and labour. 
    It has been the principal cause of the rapid progress of our American 
colonies towards wealth and greatness that almost their whole capitals have 
hitherto been employed in agriculture. They have no manufactures, those 
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household and courser manufactures excepted which necessarily 
accompany the progress of agriculture, and which are the work of the 
women and children in every private family. The greater part both of the 
exportation and coasting trade of America is carried on by the capitals of 
merchants who reside in Great Britain. Even the stores and warehouses 
from which goods are retailed in some provinces, particularly in Virginia 
and Maryland, belong many of them to merchants who reside in the mother 
country, and afford one of the few instances of the retail trade of a society 
being carried on by the capitals of those who are not resident members of it. 
Were the Americans, either by combination or by any other sort of violence, 
to stop the importation of European manufactures, and, by thus giving a 
monopoly to such of their own countrymen as could manufacture the like 
goods, divert any considerable part of their capital into this employment, 
they would retard instead of accelerating the further increase in the value of 
their annual produce, and would obstruct instead of promoting the progress 
of their country towards real wealth and greatness. This would be still more 
the case were they to attempt, in the same manner, to monopolize to 
themselves their whole exportation trade. 
    The course of human prosperity, indeed, seems scarce ever to have been 
of so long continuance as to enable any great country to acquire capital 
sufficient for all those three purposes; unless perhaps, we give credit to the 
wonderful accounts of the wealth and cultivation of China, of those of 
ancient Egypt, and of the ancient state of Indostan. Even those three 
countries, the wealthiest, according to all accounts, that ever were in the 
world, are chiefly renowned for their superiority in agriculture and 
manufactures. They do not appear to have been eminent for foreign trade. 
The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious antipathy to the sea; a superstition 
nearly of the same kind prevails among the Indians; and the Chinese have 
never excelled in foreign commerce. The greater part of the surplus produce 
of all those three countries seems to have been always exported by 
foreigners, who gave in exchange for it something else for which they found 
a demand there, frequently gold and silver. 
    It is thus that the same capital will in any country put into motion a 
greater or smaller quantity of productive labour, and add a greater or 
smaller value to the annual produce of its land and labour, according to the 
different proportions in which it is employed in agriculture, manufactures, 
and wholesale trade. The difference, too, is very great, according to the 
different sorts of wholesale trade in which any part of it is employed. 
    All wholesale trade, all buying in order to sell again by wholesale, may 
be reduced to three different sorts. The home trade, the foreign trade of 
consumption, and the carrying trade. The home trade is employed in 
purchasing in one part of the same country, and selling in another, the 
produce of the industry of that country. It comprehends both the inland and 
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the coasting trade. The foreign trade of consumption is employed in 
purchasing foreign goods for home consumption. The carrying trade is 
employed in transacting the commerce of foreign countries, or in carrying 
the surplus produce of one to another. 
    The capital which is employed in purchasing in one part of the country in 
order to sell in another the produce of the industry of that country, generally 
replaces by every such operation two distinct capitals that had both been 
employed in the agriculture or manufactures of that country, and thereby 
enables them to continue that employment. When it sends out from the 
residence of the merchant a certain value of commodities, it generally 
brings back in return at least an equal value of other commodities. When 
both are the produce of domestic industry, it necessarily replaces by every 
such operation two distinct capitals which had both been employed in 
supporting productive labour, and thereby enables them to continue that 
support. The capital which sends Scotch manufactures to London, and 
brings back English corn and manufactures to Edinburgh, necessarily 
replaces by every such operation, two British capitals which had both been 
employed in the agriculture or manufactures of Great Britain. 
    The capital employed in purchasing foreign goods for home 
consumption, when this purchase is made with the produce of domestic 
industry, replaces too, by every such operation, two distinct capitals; but 
one of them only is employed in supporting domestic industry. The capital 
which sends British goods to Portugal, and brings back Portuguese goods to 
Great Britain, replaces by every such operation only one British capital. The 
other is a Portuguese one. Though the returns, therefore, of the foreign trade 
of consumption should be as quick as those of the home trade, the capital 
employed in it will give but one half the encouragement to the industry or 
productive labour of the country. 
    But the returns of the foreign trade of consumption are very seldom so 
quick as those of the home trade. The returns of the home trade generally 
come in before the end of the year, and sometimes three or four times in the 
year. The returns of the foreign trade of consumption seldom come in 
before the end of the year, and sometimes not till after two or three years. A 
capital, therefore, employed in the home trade will sometimes make twelve 
operations, or be sent out and returned twelve times, before a capital 
employed in the foreign trade of consumption has made one. If the capitals 
are equal, therefore, the one will give four-and-twenty times more 
encouragement and support to the industry of the country than the other. 
    The foreign goods for home consumption may sometimes be purchased, 
not with the produce of domestic industry, but with some other foreign 
goods. These last, however, must have been purchased either immediately 
with the produce of domestic industry, or with something else that had been 
purchased with it; for, the case of war and conquest excepted, foreign goods 
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can ever be acquired but in exchange for something that had been produced 
at home, either immediately, or after two or more different exchanges. The 
effects, therefore, of a capital employed in such a roundabout foreign trade 
of consumption, are, in every respect, the same as those of one employed in 
the most direct trade of the same kind, except that the final returns are likely 
to be still more distant, as they must depend upon the returns of two or three 
distinct foreign trades. If the flax and hemp of Riga are purchased with the 
tobacco of Virginia, which had been purchased with British manufactures, 
the merchant must wait for the returns of two distinct foreign trades before 
he can employ the same capital in re-purchasing a like quantity of British 
manufactures. If the tobacco of Virginia had been purchased, not with 
British manufactures, but with the sugar and rum of Jamaica which had 
been purchased with those manufactures, he must wait for the returns of 
three. If those two or three distinct foreign trades should happen to be 
carried on by two or three distinct merchants, of whom the second buys the 
goods imported by the first, and the third buys those imported by the 
second, in order to export them again, each merchant indeed will in this 
case receive the returns of his own capital more quickly; but the final 
returns of the whole capital employed in the trade will be just as slow as 
ever. Whether the whole capital employed in such a round-about trade 
belong to one merchant or to three can make no difference with regard to 
the country, though it may with regard to the particular merchants. Three 
times a greater capital must in both cases be employed in order to exchange 
a certain value of British manufactures for a certain quantity of flax and 
hemp than would have been necessary had the manufactures and the flax 
and hemp been directly exchanged for one another. The whole capital 
employed, therefore, in such a round-about foreign trade of consumption 
will generally give less encouragement and support to the productive labour 
of the country than an equal capital employed in a more direct trade of the 
same kind. 
    Whatever be the foreign commodity with which the foreign goods for 
home consumption are purchased, it can occasion no essential difference 
either in the nature of the trade, or in the encouragement and support which 
it can give to the productive labour of the country from which it is carried 
on. If they are purchased with the gold of Brazil, for example, or with the 
silver of Peru, this gold and silver, like the tobacco of Virginia, must have 
been purchased with something that either was the produce of the industry 
of the country, or that had been purchased with something else that was so. 
So far, therefore, as the productive labour of the country is concerned, the 
foreign trade of consumption which is carried on by means of gold and 
silver has all the advantages and all the inconveniences of any other equally 
round-about foreign trade of consumption, and will replace just as fast or 
just as slow the capital which is immediately employed in supporting that 
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productive labour. It seems even to have one advantage over any other 
equally roundabout foreign trade. The transportation of those metals from 
one place to another, on account of their small bulk and great value, is less 
expensive than that of almost any other foreign goods of equal value. Their 
freight is much less, and their insurance not greater; and no goods, besides, 
are less liable to suffer by the carriage. An equal quantity of foreign goods, 
therefore, may frequently be purchased with a smaller quantity of the 
produce of domestic industry, by the intervention of gold and silver, than by 
that of any other foreign goods. The demand of the country may frequently, 
in this manner, be supplied more completely and at a smaller expense than 
in any other. Whether, by the continual exportation of those metals, a trade 
of this kind is likely to impoverish the country from which it is carried on, 
in any other way, I shall have occasion to examine at great length hereafter. 
    That part of the capital of any country which is employed in the carrying 
trade is altogether withdrawn from supporting the productive labour of that 
particular country, to support that of some foreign countries. Though it may 
replace by every operation two distinct capitals, yet neither of them belongs 
to that particular country. The capital of the Dutch merchant, which carries 
the corn of Poland to Portugal, and brings back the fruits and wines of 
Portugal to Poland, replaces by every such operation two capitals, neither of 
which had been employed in supporting the productive labour of Holland; 
but one of them in supporting that of Poland, and the other that of Portugal. 
The profits only return regularly to Holland, and constitute the whole 
addition which this trade necessarily makes to the annual produce of the 
land and labour of that country. When, indeed, the carrying trade of any 
particular country is carried on with the ships and sailors of that country, 
that part of the capital employed in it which pays the freight is distributed 
among, and puts into motion, a certain number of productive labourers of 
that country. Almost all nations that have had any considerable share of the 
carrying trade have, in fact, carried it on in this manner. The trade itself has 
probably derived its name from it, the people of such countries being the 
carriers to other countries. It does not, however, seem essential to the nature 
of the trade that it should be so. A Dutch merchant may, for example, 
employ his capital in transacting the commerce of Poland and Portugal, by 
carrying part of the surplus produce of the one to the other, not in Dutch, 
but in British bottoms. It may be presumed that he actually does so upon 
some particular occasions. It is upon this account, however, that the 
carrying trade has been supposed peculiarly advantageous to such a country 
as Great Britain, of which the defence and security depend upon the number 
of its sailors and shipping. But the same capital may employ as many sailors 
and shipping, either in the foreign trade of consumption, or even in the 
home trade, when carried on by coasting vessels, as it could in the carrying 
trade. The number of sailors and shipping which any particular capital can 
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employ does not depend upon the nature of the trade, but partly upon the 
bulk of the goods in proportion to their value, and partly upon the distance 
of the ports between which they are to be carried; chiefly upon the former of 
those two circumstances. The coal trade from Newcastle to London, for 
example, employs more shipping than all the carrying trade of England, 
though the ports are at no great distance. To force, therefore, by 
extraordinary encouragements, a larger share of the capital of any country 
into the carrying trade than what would naturally go to it will not always 
necessarily increase the shipping of that country. 
    The capital, therefore, employed in the home trade of any country will 
generally give encouragement and support to a greater quantity of 
productive labour in that country, and increase the value of its annual 
produce more than an equal capital employed in the foreign trade of 
consumption: and the capital employed in this latter trade has in both these 
respects a still greater advantage over an equal capital employed in the 
carrying trade. The riches, and so far as power depends upon riches, the 
power of every country must always be in proportion to the value of its 
annual produce, the fund from which all taxes must ultimately be paid. But 
the great object of the political economy of every country is to increase the 
riches and power of that country. It ought, therefore, to give no preference 
nor superior encouragement to the foreign trade of consumption above the 
home trade, nor to the carrying trade above either of the other two. It ought 
neither to force nor to allure into either of those two channels a greater share 
of the capital of the country than what would naturally flow into them of its 
own accord. 
    When the produce of any particular branch of industry exceeds what the 
demand of the country requires, the surplus must be sent abroad and 
exchanged for something for which there is a demand at home. Without 
such exportation a part of the productive labour of the country must cease, 
and the value of its annual produce diminish. The land and labour of Great 
Britain produce generally more corn, woollens, and hardware than the 
demand of the home market requires. The surplus part of them, therefore, 
must be sent abroad, and exchanged for something for which there is a 
demand at home. It is only by means of such exportation that this surplus 
can acquire a value sufficient to compensate the labour and expense of 
producing it. The neighbourhood of the sea-coast, and the banks of all 
navigable rivers, are advantageous situations for industry, only because they 
facilitate the exportation and exchange of such surplus produce for 
something else which is more in demand there. 
    When the foreign goods which are thus purchased with the surplus 
produce of domestic industry exceed the demand of the home market, the 
surplus part of them must be sent abroad again and exchanged for 
something more in demand at home. About ninety-six thousand hogsheads 
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of tobacco are annually purchased in Virginia and Maryland with a part of 
the surplus produce of British industry. But the demand of Great Britain 
does not require, perhaps, more than fourteen thousand. If the remaining 
eighty-two thousand, therefore, could not be sent abroad and exchanged for 
something more in demand at home, the importation of them must cease 
immediately, and with it the productive labour of all those inhabitants of 
Great Britain, who are at present employed in preparing the goods with 
which these eighty-two thousand hogsheads are annually purchased. Those 
goods, which are part of the produce of the land and labour of Great Britain, 
having no market at home, and being deprived of that which they had 
abroad, must cease to be produced. The most round-about foreign trade of 
consumption, therefore may, upon some occasions, be as necessary for 
supporting the productive labour of the country, and the value of its annual 
produce, as the most direct. 
    When the capital stock of any country is increased to such a degree that it 
cannot be all employed in supplying the consumption and supporting the 
productive labour of that particular country, the surplus part of it naturally 
disgorges itself into the carrying trade, and is employed in performing the 
same offices to other countries. The carrying trade is the natural effect and 
symptom of great national wealth; but it does not seem to be the natural 
cause of it. Those statesmen who have been disposed to favour it with 
particular encouragements seem to have mistaken the effect and symptom 
for the cause. Holland, in proportion to the extent of the land and the 
number of its inhabitants, by far the richest country in Europe, has, 
accordingly, the greatest share of the carrying trade of Europe. England, 
perhaps the second richest country of Europe, is likewise supposed to have 
a considerable share of it; though what commonly passes for the carrying 
trade of England will frequently, perhaps, be found to be no more than a 
round-about foreign trade of consumption. Such are, in a great measure, the 
trades which carry the goods of the East and West Indies, and of America, 
to different European markets. Those goods are generally purchased either 
immediately with the produce of British industry, or with something else 
which had been purchased with that produce, and the final returns of those 
trades are generally used or consumed in Great Britain. The trade which is 
carried on in British bottoms between the different ports of the 
Mediterranean, and some trade of the same kind carried on by British 
merchants between the different ports of India, make, perhaps, the principal 
branches of what is properly the carrying trade of Great Britain. 
    The extent of the home trade and of the capital which can be employed in 
it, is necessarily limited by the value of the surplus produce of all those 
distant places within the country which have occasion to exchange their 
respective productions with another: that of the foreign trade of 
consumption, by the value of the surplus produce of the whole country and 
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of what can be purchased with it: that of the carrying trade by the value of 
the surplus produce of all the different countries in the world. Its possible 
extent, therefore, is in a manner infinite in comparison of that of the other 
two, and is capable of absorbing the greatest capitals. 
    The consideration of his own private profit is the sole motive which 
determines the owner of any capital to employ it either in agriculture, in 
manufactures, or in some particular branch of the wholesale or retail trade. 
The different quantities of productive labour which it may put into motion, 
and the different values which it may add to the annual, produce of the land 
and labour of the society, according as it is employed in one or other of 
those different ways, never enter into his thoughts. In countries, therefore, 
where agriculture is the most profitable of all employments, and farming 
and improving the most direct roads to a splendid fortune, the capitals of 
individuals will naturally be employed in the manner most advantageous to 
the whole society. The profits of agriculture, however, seem to have no 
superiority over those of other employments in any part of Europe. 
Projectors, indeed, in every corner of it, have within these few years amused 
the public with most magnificent accounts of the profits to be made by the 
cultivation and improvement of land. Without entering into any particular 
discussion of their calculations, a very simple observation may satisfy us 
that the result of them must be false. We see every day the most splendid 
fortunes that have been acquired in the course of a single life by trade and 
manufacturers, frequently from a very small capital, sometimes from no 
capital. A single instance of such a fortune acquired by agriculture in the 
same time, and from such a capital, has not, perhaps, occurred in Europe 
during the course of the present century. In all the great countries of Europe, 
however, much good land still remains uncultivated, and the greater part of 
what is cultivated is far from being improved to the degree of which it is 
capable. Agriculture, therefore, is almost everywhere capable of absorbing a 
much greater capital than has ever yet been employed in it. What 
circumstances in the policy of Europe have given the trades which are 
carried on in towns so great an advantage over that which is carried on in 
the country that private persons frequently find it more for their advantage 
to employ their capitals in the most distant carrying trades of Asia and 
America than in the improvement and cultivation of the most fertile fields 
in their own neighbourhood, I shall endeavour to explain at full length in 
the two following books. 
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THE great commerce of every civilised society is that carried on between 
the inhabitants of the town and those of the country. It consists in the 
exchange of rude for manufactured produce, either immediately, or by the 
intervention of money, or of some sort of paper which represents money. 
The country supplies the town with the means of subsistence and the 
materials of manufacture. The town repays this supply by sending back a 
part of the manufactured produce to the inhabitants of the country. The 
town, in which there neither is nor can be any reproduction of substances, 
may very properly be said to gain its whole wealth and subsistence from the 
country. We must not, however, upon this account, imagine that the gain of 
the town is the loss of the country. The gains of both are mutual and 
reciprocal, and the division of labour is in this, as in all other cases, 
advantageous to all the different persons employed in the various 
occupations into which it is subdivided. The inhabitants of the country 
purchase of the town a greater quantity of manufactured goods, with the 
produce of a much smaller quantity of their own labour, than they must 
have employed had they attempted to prepare them themselves. The town 
affords a market for the surplus produce of the country, or what is over and 
above the maintenance of the cultivators, and it is there that the inhabitants 
of the country exchange it for something else which is in demand among 
them. The greater the number and revenue of the inhabitants of the town, 
the more extensive is the market which it affords to those of the country; 
and the more extensive that market, it is always the more advantageous to a 
great number. The corn which grows within a mile of the town sells there 
for the same price with that which comes from twenty miles distance. But 
the price of the latter must generally not only pay the expense of raising and 
bringing it to market, but afford, too, the ordinary profits of agriculture to 
the farmer. The proprietors and cultivators of the country, therefore, which 
lies in the neighbourhood of the town, over and above the ordinary profits 
of agriculture, gain, in the price of what they sell, the whole value of the 
carriage of the like produce that is brought from more distant parts, and they 
have, besides, the whole value of this carriage in the price of what they buy. 
Compare the cultivation of the lands in the neighbourhood of any 
considerable town with that of those which lie at some distance from it, and 
you will easily satisfy yourself how much the country is benefited by the 
commerce of the town. Among all the absurd speculations that have been 
propagated concerning the balance of trade, it has never been pretended that 
either the country loses by its commerce with the town, or the town by that 
with the country which maintains it. 
   As subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior to conveniency and luxury, 
so the industry which procures the former must necessarily be prior to that 
which ministers to the latter. The cultivation and improvement of the 
country, therefore, which affords subsistence, must, necessarily, be prior to 
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the increase of the town, which furnishes only the means of conveniency 
and luxury. It is the surplus produce of the country only, or what is over and 
above the maintenance of the cultivators, that constitutes the subsistence of 
the town, which can therefore increase only with the increase of this surplus 
produce. The town, indeed, may not always derive its whole subsistence 
from the country in its neighbourhood, or even from the territory to which it 
belongs, but from very distant countries; and this, though it forms no 
exception from the general rule, has occasioned considerable variations in 
the progress of opulence in different ages and nations. 
   That order of things which necessity imposes in general, though not in 
every particular country, is, in every particular country, promoted by the 
natural inclinations of man. If human institutions had never thwarted those 
natural inclinations, the towns could nowhere have increased beyond what 
the improvement and cultivation of the territory in which they were situated 
could support; till such time, at least, as the whole of that territory was 
completely cultivated and improved. Upon equal, or nearly equal profits, 
most men will choose to employ their capitals rather in the improvement 
and cultivation of land than either in manufactures or in foreign trade. The 
man who employs his capital in land has it more under his view and 
command, and his fortune is much less liable to accidents than that of the 
trader, who is obliged frequently to commit it, not only to the winds and the 
waves, but to the more uncertain elements of human folly and injustice, by 
giving great credits in distant countries to men with whose character and 
situation he can seldom be thoroughly acquainted. The capital of the 
landlord, on the contrary, which is fixed in the improvement of his land, 
seems to be as well secured as the nature of human affairs can admit of. The 
beauty of the country besides, the pleasures of a country life, the tranquillity 
of mind which it promises, and wherever the injustice of human laws does 
not disturb it, the independency which it really affords, have charms that 
more or less attract everybody; and as to cultivate the ground was the 
original destination of man, so in every stage of his existence he seems to 
retain a predilection for this primitive employment. 
   Without the assistance of some artificers, indeed, the cultivation of land 
cannot be carried on but with great inconveniency and continual 
interruption. Smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, and ploughwrights, masons, 
and bricklayers, tanners, shoemakers, and tailors are people whose service 
the farmer has frequent occasion for. Such artificers, too, stand occasionally 
in need of the assistance of one another; and as their residence is not, like 
that of the farmer, necessarily tied down to a precise spot, they naturally 
settle in the neighbourhood of one another, and thus form a small town or 
village. The butcher, the brewer, and the baker soon join them, together 
with many other artificers and retailers, necessary or useful for supplying 
their occasional wants, and who contribute still further to augment the town. 
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The inhabitants of the town and those of the country are mutually the 
servants of one another. The town is a continual fair or market, to which the 
inhabitants of the country resort in order to exchange their rude for 
manufactured produce. It is this commerce which supplies the inhabitants of 
the town both with the materials of their work, and the means of their 
subsistence. The quantity of the finished work which they sell to the 
inhabitants of the country necessarily regulates the quantity of the materials 
and provisions which they buy. Neither their employment nor subsistence, 
therefore, can augment but in proportion to the augmentation of the demand 
from the country for finished work; and this demand can augment only in 
proportion to the extension of improvement and cultivation. Had human 
institutions, therefore, never disturbed the natural course of things, the 
progressive wealth and increase of the towns would, in every political 
society, be consequential, and in proportion to the improvement and 
cultivation of the territory or country. 
   In our North American colonies, where uncultivated land is still to be had 
upon easy terms, no manufactures for distant sale have ever yet been 
established in any of their towns. When an artificer has acquired a little 
more stock than is necessary for carrying on his own business in supplying 
the neighbouring country, he does not, in North America, attempt to 
establish with it a manufacture for more distant sale, but employs it in the 
purchase and improvement of uncultivated land. From artificer he becomes 
planter, and neither the large wages nor the easy subsistence which that 
country affords to artificers can bribe him rather to work for other people 
than for himself. He feels that an artificer is the servant of his customers, 
from whom he derives his subsistence; but that a planter who cultivates his 
own land, and derives his necessary subsistence from the labour of his own 
family, is really a master, and independent of all the world. 
   In countries, on the contrary, where there is either no uncultivated land, or 
none that can be had upon easy terms, every artificer who has acquired 
more stock than he can employ in the occasional jobs of the neighbourhood 
endeavours to prepare work for more distant sale. The smith erects some 
sort of iron, the weaver some sort of linen or woollen manufactory. Those 
different manufactures come, in process of time, to be gradually subdivided, 
and thereby improved and refined in a great variety of ways, which may 
easily be conceived, and which it is therefore unnecessary to explain any 
further. 
   In seeking for employment to a capital, manufactures are, upon equal or 
nearly equal profits, naturally preferred to foreign commerce, for the same 
reason that agriculture is naturally preferred to manufactures. As the capital 
of the landlord or farmer is more secure than that of the manufacturer, so 
the capital of the manufacturer, being at all times more within his view and 
command, is more secure than that of the foreign merchant. In every period, 
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indeed, of every society, the surplus part both of the rude and manufactured 
produce, or that for which there is no demand at home, must be sent abroad 
in order to be exchanged for something for which there is some demand at 
home. But whether the capital, which carries this surplus produce abroad, be 
a foreign or a domestic one is of very little importance. If the society has not 
acquired sufficient capital both to cultivate all its lands, and to manufacture 
in the completest manner the whole of its rude produce, there is even a 
considerable advantage that rude produce should be exported by a foreign 
capital, in order that the whole stock of the society may be employed in 
more useful purposes. The wealth of ancient Egypt, that of China and 
Indostan, sufficiently demonstrate that a nation may attain a very high 
degree of opulence though the greater part of its exportation trade be carried 
on by foreigners. The progress of our North American and West Indian 
colonies would have been much less rapid had no capital but what belonged 
to themselves been employed in exporting their surplus produce. 
   According to the natural course of things, therefore, the greater part of the 
capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, afterwards 
to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce. This order of things is 
so very natural that in every society that had any territory it has always, I 
believe, been in some degree observed. Some of their lands must have been 
cultivated before any considerable towns could be established, and some 
sort of coarse industry of the manufacturing kind must have been carried on 
in those towns, before they could well think of employing themselves in 
foreign commerce. 
   But though this natural order of things must have taken place in some 
degree in every such society, it has, in all the modern states of Europe, been, 
in many respects, entirely inverted. The foreign commerce of some of their 
cities has introduced all their finer manufactures, or such as were fit for 
distant sale; and manufactures and foreign commerce together have given 
birth to the principal improvements of agriculture. The manners and 
customs which the nature of their original government introduced, and 
which remained after that government was greatly altered, necessarily 
forced them into this unnatural and retrograde order. 
CHAPTER II
Of the Discouragement of Agriculture in the ancient State of Europe after 
the Fall of the Roman Empire
WHEN the German and Scythian nations overran the western provinces of 
the Roman empire, the confusions which followed so great a revolution 
lasted for several centuries. The rapine and violence which the barbarians 
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exercised against the ancient inhabitants interrupted the commerce between 
the towns and the country. The towns were deserted, and the country was 
left uncultivated, and the western provinces of Europe, which had enjoyed a 
considerable degree of opulence under the Roman empire, sunk into the 
lowest state of poverty and barbarism. During the continuance of those 
confusions, the chiefs and principal leaders of those nations acquired or 
usurped to themselves the greater part of the lands of those countries. A 
great part of them was uncultivated; but no part of them, whether cultivated 
or uncultivated, was left without a proprietor. All of them were engrossed, 
and the greater part by a few great proprietors. 
   This original engrossing of uncultivated lands, though a great, might have 
been but a transitory evil. They might soon have been divided again, and 
broke into small parcels either by succession or by alienation. The law of 
primogeniture hindered them from being divided by succession: the 
introduction of entails prevented their being broke into small parcels by 
alienation. 
   When land, like movables, is considered as the means only of subsistence 
and enjoyment, the natural law of succession divides it, like them, among 
all the children of the family; of an of whom the subsistence and enjoyment 
may be supposed equally dear to the father. This natural law of succession 
accordingly took place among the Romans, who made no more distinction 
between elder and younger, between male and female, in the inheritance of 
lands than we do in the distribution of movables. But when land was 
considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but of power and 
protection, it was thought better that it should descend undivided to one. In 
those disorderly times every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. His 
tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in some respects their 
legislator in peace, and their leader in war. He made war according to his 
own discretion, frequently against his neighbours, and sometimes against 
his sovereign. The security of a landed estate, therefore, the protection 
which its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its 
greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part of it to be 
oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its neighbours. The law of 
primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not immediately, indeed, but 
in process of time, in the succession of landed estates, for the same reason 
that it has generally taken place in that of monarchies, though not always at 
their first institution. That the power, and consequently the security of the 
monarchy, may not be weakened by division, it must descend entire to one 
of the children. To which of them so important a preference shall be given 
must be determined by some general rule, founded not upon the doubtful 
distinctions of personal merit, but upon some plain and evident difference 
which can admit of no dispute. Among the children of the same family, 
there can be no indisputable difference but that of sex, and that of age. The 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth3.html (6 of 33)4/11/2005 9:45:57 AM
The Wealth of Nations
male sex is universally preferred to the female; and when all other things 
are equal, the elder everywhere takes place of the younger. Hence the origin 
of the right of primogeniture, and of what is called lineal succession. 
   Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances which first 
gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are 
no more. In the present state of Europe, the proprietor of a single acre of 
land is as perfectly secure of his possession as the proprietor of a hundred 
thousand. The right of primogeniture, however, still continues to be 
respected, and as of all institutions it is the fittest to support the pride of 
family distinctions, it is still likely to endure for many centuries. In every 
other respect, nothing can be more contrary to the real interest of a 
numerous family than a right which, in order to enrich one, beggars all the 
rest of the children. 
   Entails are the natural consequences of the law of primogeniture. They 
were introduced to preserve a certain lineal succession, of which the law of 
primogeniture first gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the original 
estate from being carried out of the proposed line either by gift, or devise, or 
alienation; either by the folly, or by the misfortune of any of its successive 
owners. They were altogether unknown to the Romans. Neither their 
substitutions nor fideicommisses bear any resemblance to entails, though 
some French lawyers have thought proper to dress the modern institution in 
the language and garb of those ancient ones. 
   When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, entails might not 
be unreasonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of some 
monarchies, they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from 
being endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the 
present state of Europe, when small as well as great estates derive their 
security from the laws of their country, nothing can be more completely 
absurd. They are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the 
supposition that every successive generation of men have not an equal right 
to the earth, and to all that it possesses; but that the property of the present 
generation should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of 
those who died perhaps five hundred years ago. Entails, however, are still 
respected through the greater part of Europe, in those countries particularly 
in which noble birth is a necessary qualification for the enjoyment either of 
civil or military honours. Entails are thought necessary for maintaining this 
exclusive privilege of the nobility to the great offices and honours of their 
country; and that order having usurped one unjust advantage over the rest of 
their fellow citizens, lest their poverty should render it ridiculous, it is 
thought reasonable that they should have another. The common law of 
England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities, and they are accordingly 
more restricted there than in any other European monarchy; though even 
England is not altogether without them. In Scotland more than one-fifth, 
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perhaps more than one-third, part of the whole lands of the country are at 
present supposed to be under strict entail. 
   Great tracts of uncultivated land were, in this manner, not only engrossed 
by particular families, but the possibility of their being divided again was as 
much as possible precluded for ever. It seldom happens, however, that a 
great proprietor is a great improver. In the disorderly times which gave birth 
to those barbarous institutions, the great proprietor was sufficiently 
employed in defending his own territories, or in extending his jurisdiction 
and authority over those of his neighbours. He had no leisure to attend to 
the cultivation and improvement of land. When the establishment of law 
and order afforded him this leisure, he often wanted the inclination, and 
almost always the requisite abilities. If the expense of his house and person 
either equalled or exceeded his revenue, as it did very frequently, he had no 
stock to employ in this manner. If he was an economist, he generally found 
it more profitable to employ his annual savings in new purchases than in the 
improvement of his old estate. To improve land with profit, like all other 
commercial projects, requires an exact attention to small savings and small 
gains, of which a man born to a great fortune, even though naturally frugal, 
is very seldom capable. The situation of such a person naturally disposes 
him to attend rather to ornament which pleases his fancy than to profit for 
which he has so little occasion. The elegance of his dress, of his equipage, 
of his house, and household furniture, are objects which from his infancy he 
has been accustomed to have some anxiety about. The turn of mind which 
this habit naturally forms follows him when he comes to think of the 
improvement of land. He embellishes perhaps four or five hundred acres in 
the neighbourhood of his house, at ten times the expense which the land is 
worth after all his improvements; and finds that if he was to improve his 
whole estate in the same manner, and he has little taste for any other, he 
would be a bankrupt before he had finished the tenth part of it. There still 
remain in both parts of the United Kingdom some great estates which have 
continued without interruption in the hands of the same family since the 
times of feudal anarchy. Compare the present condition of those estates with 
the possessions of the small proprietors in their neighbourhood, and you 
will require no other argument to convince you how unfavourable such 
extensive property is to improvement. 
   If little improvement was to be expected from such great proprietors, still 
less was to be hoped for from those who occupied the land under them. In 
the ancient state of Europe, the occupiers of land were all tenants at will. 
They were all or almost all slaves; but their slavery was of a milder kind 
than that known among the ancient Greeks and Romans, or even in our 
West Indian colonies. They were supposed to belong more directly to the 
land than to their master. They could, therefore, be sold with it, but not 
separately. They could marry, provided it was with the consent of their 
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master; and he could not afterwards dissolve the marriage by selling the 
man and wife to different persons. If he maimed or murdered any of them, 
he was liable to some penalty, though generally but to a small one. They 
were not, however, capable of acquiring property. Whatever they acquired 
was acquired to their master, and he could take it from them at pleasure. 
Whatever cultivation and improvement could be carried on by means of 
such slaves was properly carried on by their master. It was at his expense. 
The seed, the cattle, and the instruments of husbandry were all his. It was 
for his benefit. Such slaves could acquire nothing but their daily 
maintenance. It was properly the proprietor himself, therefore, that, in this 
case, occupied his own lands, and cultivated them by his own bondmen. 
This species of slavery still subsists in Russia, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, 
Moravia, and other parts of Germany. It is only in the western and 
southwestern provinces of Europe that it has gradually been abolished 
altogether. 
   But if great improvements are seldom to be expected from great 
proprietors, they are least of all to be expected when they employ slaves for 
their workmen. The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, 
demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only 
their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A person who can 
acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as much, and to 
labour as little as possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is 
sufficient to purchase his own maintenance can be squeezed out of him by 
violence only, and not by any interest of his own. In ancient Italy, how 
much the cultivation of corn degenerated, how unprofitable it became to the 
master when it fell under the management of slaves, is remarked by both 
Pliny and Columella. In the time of Aristotle it had not been much better in 
ancient Greece. Speaking of the ideal republic described in the laws of 
Plato, to maintain five thousand idle men (the number of warriors supposed 
necessary for its defence) together with their women and servants, would 
require, he says, a territory of boundless extent and fertility, like the plains 
of Babylon. 
   The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him 
so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever 
the law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will 
generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen. The planting of 
sugar and tobacco can afford the expense of slave-cultivation. The raising of 
corn, it seems, in the present times, cannot. In the English colonies, of 
which the principal produce is corn, the far greater part of the work is done 
by freemen. The late resolution of the Quakers in Pennsylvania to set at 
liberty all their negro slaves may satisfy us that their number cannot be very 
great. Had they made any considerable part of their property, such a 
resolution could never have been agreed to. In our sugar colonies, on the 
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contrary, the whole work is done by slaves, and in our tobacco colonies a 
very great part of it. The profits of a sugar-plantation in any of our West 
Indian colonies are generally much greater than those of any other 
cultivation that is known either in Europe or America; and the profits of a 
tobacco plantation, though inferior to those of sugar, are superior to those of 
corn, as has already been observed. Both can afford the expense of slave-
cultivation, but sugar can afford it still better than tobacco. The number of 
negroes accordingly is much greater, in proportion to that of whites, in our 
sugar than in our tobacco colonies. 
   To the slave cultivators of ancient times gradually succeeded a species of 
farmers known at present in France by the name of metayers. They are 
called in Latin, Coloni partiarii. They have been so long in disuse in 
England that at present I know no English name for them. The proprietor 
furnished them with the seed, cattle, and instruments of husbandry, the 
whole stock, in short, necessary for cultivating the farm. The produce was 
divided equally between the proprietor and the farmer, after setting aside 
what was judged necessary for keeping up the stock, which was restored to 
the proprietor when the farmer either quitted, or was turned out of the farm. 
   Land occupied by such tenants is properly cultivated at the expense of the 
proprietor as much as that occupied by slaves. There is, however, one very 
essential difference between them. Such tenants, being freemen, are capable 
of acquiring property, and having a certain proportion of the produce of the 
land, they have a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as 
possible, in order that their own proportion may be so. A slave, on the 
contrary, who can acquire nothing but his maintenance, consults his own 
ease by making the land produce as little as possible over and above that 
maintenance. It is probable that it was partly upon account of this 
advantage, and partly upon account of the encroachments which the 
sovereign, always jealous of the great lords, gradually encouraged their 
villains to make upon their authority, and which seem at last to have been 
such as rendered this species of servitude altogether inconvenient, that 
tenure in villanage gradually wore out through the greater part of Europe. 
The time and manner, however, in which so important a revolution was 
brought about is one of the most obscure points in modern history. The 
Church of Rome claims great merit in it; and it is certain that so early as the 
twelfth century, Alexander III published a bull for the general emancipation 
of slaves. It seems, however, to have been rather a pious exhortation than a 
law to which exact obedience was required from the faithful. Slavery 
continued to take place almost universally for several centuries afterwards, 
till it was gradually abolished by the joint operation of the two interests 
above mentioned, that of the proprietor on the one hand, and that of the 
sovereign on the other. A villain enfranchised, and at the same time allowed 
to continue in possession of the land, having no stock of his own, could 
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cultivate it only by means of what the landlord advanced to him, and must, 
therefore, have been what the French called a metayer. 
   It could never, however, be the interest even of this last species of 
cultivators to lay out, in the further improvement of the land, any part of the 
little stock which they might save from their own share of the produce, 
because the lord, who laid out nothing, was to get one half of whatever it 
produced. The tithe, which is but a tenth of the produce, is found to be a 
very great hindrance to improvement. A tax, therefore, which amounted to 
one half must have been an effectual bar to it. It might be the interest of a 
metayer to make the land produce as much as could be brought out of it by 
means of the stock furnished by the proprietor; but it could never be his 
interest to mix any part of his own with it. In France, where five parts out of 
six of the whole kingdom are said to be still occupied by this species of 
cultivators, the proprietors complain that their metayers take every 
opportunity of employing the master's cattle rather in carriage than in 
cultivation; because in the one case they get the whole profits to themselves, 
in the other they share them with their landlord. This species of tenants still 
subsists in some parts of Scotland. They are called steel-bow tenants. Those 
ancient English tenants, who are said by Chief Baron Gilbert and Doctor 
Blackstone to have been rather bailiffs of the landlord than farmers properly 
so called, were probably of the same kind. 
   To this species of tenancy succeeded, though by very slow degrees, 
farmers properly so called, who cultivated the land with their own stock, 
paying a rent certain to the landlord. When such farmers have a lease for a 
term of years, they may sometimes find it for their interest to lay out part of 
their capital in the further improvement of the farm; because they may 
sometimes expect to recover it, with a large profit, before the expiration of 
the lease. The possession even of such farmers, however, was long 
extremely precarious, and still is so in many parts of Europe. They could 
before the expiration of their term be legally outed of their lease by a new 
purchaser; in England, even by the fictitious action of a common recovery. 
If they were turned out illegally by the violence of their master, the action 
by which they obtained redress was extremely imperfect. It did not always 
reinstate them in the possession of the land, but gave them damages which 
never amounted to the real loss. Even in England, the country perhaps of 
Europe where the yeomanry has always been most respected, it was not till 
about the 14th of Henry VII that the action of ejectment was invented, by 
which the tenant recovers, not damages only but possession, and in which 
his claim is not necessarily concluded by the uncertain decision of a single 
assize. This action has been found so effectual a remedy that, in the modern 
practice, when the landlord has occasion to sue for the possession of the 
land, he seldom makes use of the actions which properly belong to him as 
landlord, the Writ of Right or the Writ of Entry, but sues in the name of his 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth3.html (11 of 33)4/11/2005 9:45:57 AM
The Wealth of Nations
tenant by the Writ of Ejectment. In England, therefore, the security of the 
tenant is equal to that of the proprietor. In England, besides, a lease for life 
of forty shillings a year value is a freehold, and entitles the lessee to vote for 
a Member of Parliament; and as a great part of the yeomanry have freeholds 
of this kind, the whole order becomes respectable to their landlords on 
account of the political consideration which this gives them. There is, I 
believe, nowhere in Europe, except in England, any instance of the tenant 
building upon the land of which he had no lease, and trusting that the 
honour of his landlord would take no advantage of so important an 
improvement. Those laws and customs so favourable to the yeomanry have 
perhaps contributed more to the present grandeur of England than all their 
boasted regulations of commerce taken together. 
   The law which secures the longest leases against successors of every kind 
is, so far as I know, peculiar to Great Britain. It was introduced into 
Scotland so early as 1449, a law of James II. Its beneficial influence, 
however, has been much obstructed by entails; the heirs of entail being 
generally restrained from letting leases for any long term of years, 
frequently for more than one year. A late Act of Parliament has, in this 
respect, somewhat slackened their fetters, though they are still by much too 
strait. In Scotland, besides, as no leasehold gives a vote for a Member of 
Parliament, the yeomanry are upon this account less respectable to their 
landlords than in England. 
   In other parts of Europe, after it was found convenient to secure tenants 
both against heirs and purchasers, the term of their security was still limited 
to a very short period; in France, for example, to nine years from the 
commencement of the lease. It has in that country, indeed, been lately 
extended to twenty-seven, a period still too short to encourage the tenant to 
make the most important improvements. The proprietors of land were 
anciently the legislators of every part of Europe. The laws relating to land, 
therefore, were all calculated for what they supposed the interest of the 
proprietor. It was for his interest, they had imagined, that no lease granted 
by any of his predecessors should hinder him from enjoying, during a long 
term of years, the full value of his land. Avarice and injustice are always 
short-sighted, and they did not foresee how much this regulation must 
obstruct improvement, and thereby hurt in the long-run the real interest of 
the landlord. 
   The farmers too, besides paying the rent, were anciently, it was supposed, 
bound to perform a great number of services to the landlord, which were 
seldom either specified in the lease, or regulated by any precise rule, but by 
the use and wont of the manor or barony. These services, therefore, being 
almost entirely arbitrary, subjected the tenant to many vexations. In 
Scotland the abolition of all services not precisely stipulated in the lease has 
in the course of a few years very much altered for the better the condition of 
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the yeomanry of that country. 
   The public services to which the yeomanry were bound were not less 
arbitrary than the private ones. To make and maintain the high roads, a 
servitude which still subsists, I believe, everywhere, though with different 
degrees of oppression in different countries, was not the only one. When the 
king's troops, when his household or his officers of any kind passed through 
any part of the country, the yeomanry were bound to provide them with 
horses, carriages, and provisions, at a price regulated by the purveyor. Great 
Britain is, I believe, the only monarchy in Europe where the oppression of 
purveyance has been entirely abolished. It still subsists in France and 
Germany. 
   The public taxes to which they were subject were as irregular and 
oppressive as the services. The ancient lords, though extremely unwilling to 
grant themselves any pecuniary aid to their sovereign, easily allowed him to 
tallage, as they called it their tenants, and had not knowledge enough to 
foresee how much this must in the end affect their own revenue. The taille, 
as it still subsists in France, may serve as an example of those ancient 
tallages. It is a tax upon the supposed profits of the farmer, which they 
estimate by the stock that he has upon the farm. It is his interest, therefore, 
to appear to have as little as possible, and consequently to employ as little 
as possible in its cultivation, and none in its improvement. Should any stock 
happen to accumulate in the hands of a French farmer, the taille is almost 
equal to a prohibition of its ever being employed upon the land. This tax, 
besides, is supposed to dishonour whoever is subject to it, and to degrade 
him below, not only the rank of a gentleman, but that of a burgher, and 
whoever rents the lands of another becomes subject to it. No gentleman, nor 
even any burgher who has stock, will submit to this degradation. This tax, 
therefore, not only hinders the stock which accumulates upon the land from 
being employed in its improvement, but drives away an other stock from it. 
The ancient tenths and fifteenths, so usual in England in former times, 
seem, so far as they affected the land, to have been taxes of the same nature 
with the taille. 
   Under all these discouragements, little improvement could be expected 
from the occupiers of land. That order of people, with all the liberty and 
security which law can give, must always improve under great 
disadvantages. The farmer, compared with the proprietor, is as a merchant 
who trades with borrowed money compared with one who trades with his 
own. The stock of both may improve, but that of the one, with only equal 
good conduct, must always improve more slowly than that of the other, on 
account of the large share of the profits which is consumed by the interest of 
the loan. The lands cultivated by the farmer must, in the same manner, with 
only equal good conduct, be improved more slowly than those cultivated by 
the proprietor, on account of the large share of the produce which is 
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consumed in the rent, and which, had the farmer been proprietor, he might 
have employed in the further improvement of the land. The station of a 
farmer besides is, from the nature of things, inferior to that of a proprietor. 
Through the greater part of Europe the yeomanry are regarded as an inferior 
rank of people, even to the better sort of tradesmen and mechanics, and in 
all parts of Europe to the great merchants and master manufacturers. It can 
seldom happen, therefore, that a man of any considerable stock should quit 
the superior in order to place himself in an inferior station. Even in the 
present state of Europe, therefore, little stock is likely to go from any other 
profession to the improvement of land in the way of farming. More does 
perhaps in Great Britain than in any other country, though even there the 
great stocks which are, in some places, employed in farming have generally 
been acquired by farming, the trade, perhaps, in which of all others stock is 
commonly acquired most slowly. After small proprietors, however, rich and 
great farmers are, in every country, the principal improvers. There are more 
such perhaps in England than in any other European monarchy. In the 
republican governments of Holland and of Berne in Switzerland, the 
farmers are said to be not inferior to those of England. 
   The ancient policy of Europe was, over and above all this, unfavourable to 
the improvement and cultivation of land, whether carried on by the 
proprietor or by the farmer; first, by the general prohibition of the 
exportation of corn without a special licence, which seems to have been a 
very universal regulation; and secondly, by the restraints which were laid 
upon the inland commerce, not only of corn, but of almost every other part 
of the produce of the farm by the absurd laws against engrossers, regrators, 
and forestallers, and by the privileges of fairs and markets. It has already 
been observed in what manner the prohibition of the exportation of corn, 
together with some encouragement given to the importation of foreign corn, 
obstructed the cultivation of ancient Italy, naturally the most fertile country 
in Europe, and at that time the seat of the greatest empire in the world. To 
what degree such restraints upon the inland commerce of this commodity, 
joined to the general prohibition of exportation, must have discouraged the 
cultivation of countries less fertile and less favourably circumstanced, it is 
not perhaps very easy to imagine. 
CHAPTER III
Of the Rise and Progress of Cities and Towns after the Fall of the Roman 
Empire
THE inhabitants of cities and towns were, after the fall of the Roman 
empire, not more favoured than those of the country. They consisted, 
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indeed, of a very different order of people from the first inhabitants of the 
ancient republics of Greece and Italy. These last were composed chiefly of 
the proprietors of lands, among whom the public territory was originally 
divided, and who found it convenient to build their houses in the 
neighbourhood of one another, and to surround them with a wall, for the 
sake of common defence. After the fall of the Roman empire, on the 
contrary, the proprietors of land seem generally to have lived in fortified 
castles on their own estates, and in the midst of their own tenants and 
dependants. The towns were chiefly inhabited by tradesmen and mechanics, 
who seem in those days to have been of servile, or very nearly of servile 
condition. The privileges which we find granted by ancient charters to the 
inhabitants of some of the principal towns in Europe sufficiently show what 
they were before those grants. The people to whom it is granted as a 
privilege that they might give away their own daughters in marriage without 
the consent of their lord, that upon their death their own children, and not 
their lord, should succeed to their goods, and that they might dispose of 
their own effects by will, must, before those grants, have been either 
altogether or very nearly in the same state of villanage with the occupiers of 
land in the country. 
   They seem, indeed, to have been a very poor, mean set of people, who 
used to travel about with their goods from place to place, and from fair to 
fair, like the hawkers and pedlars of the present times. In all the different 
countries of Europe then, in the same manner as in several of the Tartar 
governments of Asia at present, taxes used to be levied upon the persons 
and goods of travellers when they passed through certain manors, when they 
went over certain bridges, when they carried about their goods from place to 
place in a fair, when they erected in it a booth or stall to sell them in. These 
different taxes were known in England by the names of passage, pontage, 
lastage, and stallage. Sometimes the king, sometimes a great lord, who had, 
it seems, upon some occasions, authority to do this, would grant to 
particular traders, to such particularly as lived in their own demesnes, a 
general exemption from such taxes. Such traders, though in other respects 
of servile, or very nearly of servile condition, were upon this account called 
free-traders. They in return usually paid to their protector a sort of annual 
poll-tax. In those days protection was seldom granted without a valuable 
consideration, and this tax might, perhaps, be considered as compensation 
for what their patrons might lose by their exemption from other taxes. At 
first, both those poll-taxes and those exemptions seem to have been 
altogether personal, and to have affected only particular individuals during 
either their lives or the pleasure of their protectors. In the very imperfect 
accounts which have been published from Domesday Book of several of the 
towns of England, mention is frequently made sometimes of the tax which 
particular burghers paid, each of them, either to the king or to some other 
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great lord for this sort of protection; and sometimes of the general amount 
only of all those taxes. 
   But how servile soever may have been originally the condition of the 
inhabitants of the towns, it appears evidently that they arrived at liberty and 
independency much earlier than the occupiers of land in the country. That 
part of the king's revenue which arose from such poll-taxes in any particular 
town used commonly to be let in farm during a term of years for a rent 
certain, sometimes to the sheriff of the county, and sometimes to other 
persons. The burghers themselves frequently got credit enough to be 
admitted to farm the revenues of this sort which arose out of their own 
town, they becoming jointly and severally answerable for the whole rent. To 
let a farm in this manner was quite agreeable to the usual economy of, I 
believe, the sovereigns of all the different countries of Europe, who used 
frequently to let whole manors to all the tenants of those manors, they 
becoming jointly and severally answerable for the whole rent; but in return 
being allowed to collect it in their own way, and to pay it into the king's 
exchequer by the hands of their own bailiff, and being thus altogether freed 
from the insolence of the king's officers- a circumstance in those days 
regarded as of the greatest importance. 
   At first the farm of the town was probably let to the burghers, in the same 
manner as it had been to other farmers, for a term of years only. In process 
of time, however, it seems to have become the general practice to grant it to 
them in fee, that is for ever, reserving a rent certain never afterwards to be 
augmented. The payment having thus become perpetual, the exemptions, in 
return for which it was made, naturally became perpetual too. Those 
exemptions, therefore, ceased to be personal, and could not afterwards be 
considered as belonging to individuals as individuals, but as burghers of a 
particular burgh, which, upon this account, was called a free burgh, for the 
same reason that they had been called free burghers or free traders. 
   Along with this grant, the important privileges above mentioned, that they 
might give away their own daughters in marriage, that their children should 
succeed to them, and that they might dispose of their own effects by will, 
were generally bestowed upon the burghers of the town to whom it was 
given. Whether such privileges had before been usually granted along with 
the freedom of trade to particular burghers, as individuals, I know not. I 
reckon it not improbable that they were, though I cannot produce any direct 
evidence of it. But however this may have been, the principal attributes of 
villanage and slavery being thus taken away from them, they now, at least, 
became really free in our present sense of the word Freedom. 
   Nor was this all. They were generally at the same time erected into a 
commonalty or corporation, with the privilege of having magistrates and a 
town council of their own, of making bye-laws for their own government, of 
building walls for their own defence, and of reducing all their inhabitants 
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under a sort of military discipline by obliging them to watch and ward, that 
is, as anciently understood, to guard and defend those walls against all 
attacks and surprises by night as well as by day. In England they were 
generally exempted from suit to the hundred and county courts; and all such 
pleas as should arise among them, the pleas of the crown excepted, were left 
to the decision of their own magistrates. In other countries much greater and 
more extensive jurisdictions were frequently granted to them. 
   It might, probably, be necessary to grant to such towns as were admitted 
to farm their own revenues some sort of compulsive jurisdiction to oblige 
their own citizens to make payment. In those disorderly times it might have 
been extremely inconvenient to have left them to seek this sort of justice 
from any other tribunal. But it must seem extraordinary that the sovereigns 
of all the different countries of Europe should have exchanged in this 
manner for a rent certain, never more to be augmented, that branch of the 
revenue which was, perhaps, of all others the most likely to be improved by 
the natural course of things, without either expense or attention of their 
own: and that they should, besides, have in this manner voluntarily erected a 
sort of independent republics in the heart of their own dominions. 
   In order to understand this, it must be remembered that in those days the 
sovereign of perhaps no country in Europe was able to protect, through the 
whole extent of his dominions, the weaker part of his subjects from the 
oppression of the great lords. Those whom the law could not protect, and 
who were not strong enough to defend themselves, were obliged either to 
have recourse to the protection of some great lord, and in order to obtain it 
to become either his slaves or vassals; or to enter into a league of mutual 
defence for the common protection of one another. The inhabitants of cities 
and burghs, considered as single individuals, had no power to defend 
themselves; but by entering into a league of mutual defence with their 
neighbours, they were capable of making no contemptible resistance. The 
lords despised the burghers, whom they considered not only as of a different 
order, but as a parcel of emancipated slaves, almost of a different species 
from themselves. The wealth of the burghers never failed to provoke their 
envy and indignation, and they plundered them upon every occasion 
without mercy or remorse. The burghers naturally hated and feared the 
lords. The king hated and feared them too; but though perhaps he might 
despise, he had no reason either to hate or fear the burghers. Mutual interest, 
therefore, disposed them to support the king, and the king to support them 
against the lords. They were the enemies of his enemies, and it was his 
interest to render them as secure and independent of those enemies as he 
could. By granting them magistrates of their own, the privilege of making 
bye-laws for their own government, that of building walls for their own 
defence, and that of reducing all their inhabitants under a sort of military 
discipline, he gave them all the means of security and independency of the 
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barons which it was in his power to bestow. Without the establishment of 
some regular government of this kind, without some authority to compel 
their inhabitants to act according to some certain plan or system, no 
voluntary league of mutual defence could either have afforded them any 
permanent security, or have enabled them to give the king any considerable 
support. By granting them the farm of their town in fee, he took away from 
those whom he wished to have for his friends, and, if one may say so, for 
his allies, all ground of jealousy and suspicion that he was ever afterwards 
to oppress them, either by raising the farm rent of their town or by granting 
it to some other farmer. 
   The princes who lived upon the worst terms with their barons seem 
accordingly to have been the most liberal in grants of this kind to their 
burghs. King John of England, for example, appears to have been a most 
munificent benefactor to his towns. Philip the First of France lost all 
authority over his barons. Towards the end of his reign, his son Lewis, 
known afterwards by the name of Lewis the Fat, consulted, according to 
Father Daniel, with the bishops of the royal demesnes concerning the most 
proper means of restraining the violence of the great lords. Their advice 
consisted of two different proposals. One was to erect a new order of 
jurisdiction, by establishing magistrates and a town council in every 
considerable town of his demesnes. The other was to form a new militia, by 
making the inhabitants of those towns, under the command of their own 
magistrates, march out upon proper occasions to the assistance of the king. 
It is from this period, according to the French antiquarians, that we are to 
date the institution of the magistrates and councils of cities in France. It was 
during the unprosperous reigns of the princes of the house of Suabia that the 
greater part of the free towns of Germany received the first grants of their 
privileges, and that the famous Hanseatic league first became formidable. 
   The militia of the cities seems, in those times, not to have been inferior to 
that of the country, and as they could be more readily assembled upon any 
sudden occasion, they frequently had the advantage in their disputes with 
the neighbouring lords. In countries, such as Italy and Switzerland, in 
which, on account either of their distance from the principal seat of 
government, of the natural strength of the country itself, or of some other 
reason, the sovereign came to lose the whole of his authority, the cities 
generally became independent republics, and conquered all the nobility in 
their neighbourhood, obliging them to pull down their castles in the country 
and to live, like other peaceable inhabitants, in the city. This is the short 
history of the republic of Berne as well as of several other cities in 
Switzerland. If you except Venice, for of that city the history is somewhat 
different, it is the history of all the considerable Italian republics, of which 
so great a number arose and perished between the end of the twelfth and the 
beginning of the sixteenth century. 
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   In countries such as France or England, where the authority of the 
sovereign, though frequently very low, never was destroyed altogether, the 
cities had no opportunity of becoming entirely independent. They became, 
however, so considerable that the sovereign could impose no tax upon them, 
besides the stated farm-rent of the town, without their own consent. They 
were, therefore, called upon to send deputies to the general assembly of the 
states of the kingdom, where they might join with the clergy and the barons 
in granting, upon urgent occasions, some extraordinary aid to the king. 
Being generally, too, more favourable to his power, their deputies seem, 
sometimes, to have been employed by him as a counterbalance in those 
assemblies to the authority of the great lords. Hence the origin of the 
representation of burghs in the states-general of all the great monarchies in 
Europe. 
   Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security 
of individuals, were, in this manner, established in cities at a time when the 
occupiers of land in the country were exposed to every sort of violence. But 
men in this defenceless state naturally content themselves with their 
necessary subsistence, because to acquire more might only tempt the 
injustice of their oppressors. On the contrary, when they are secure of 
enjoying the fruits of their industry, they naturally exert it to better their 
condition, and to acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniences and 
elegancies of life. That industry, therefore, which aims at something more 
than necessary subsistence, was established in cities long before it was 
commonly practised by the occupiers of land in the country. If in the hands 
of a poor cultivator, oppressed with the servitude of villanage, some little 
stock should accumulate, he would naturally conceal it with great care from 
his master, to whom it would otherwise have belonged, and take the first 
opportunity of running away to a town. The law was at that time so 
indulgent to the inhabitants of towns, and so desirous of diminishing the 
authority of the lords over those of the country, that if he could conceal 
himself there from the pursuit of his lord for a year, he was free for ever. 
Whatever stock, therefore, accumulated in the hands of the industrious part 
of the inhabitants of the country naturally took refuge in cities as the only 
sanctuaries in which it could be secure to the person that acquired it. 
   The inhabitants of a city, it is true, must always ultimately derive their 
subsistence, and the whole materials and means of their industry, from the 
country. But those of a city, situated near either the sea coast or the banks of 
a navigable river, are not necessarily confined to derive them from the 
country in their neighbourhood. They have a much wider range, and may 
draw them from the most remote corners of the world, either in exchange 
for the manufactured produce of their own industry, or by performing the 
office of carriers between distant countries and exchanging the produce of 
one for that of another. A city might in this manner grow up to great wealth 
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and splendour, while not only the country in its neighbourhood, but all 
those to which it traded, were in poverty and wretchedness. Each of those 
countries, perhaps, taken singly, could afford it but a small part either of its 
subsistence or of its employment, but all of them taken together could 
afford it both a great subsistence and a great employment. There were, 
however, within the narrow circle of the commerce of those times, some 
countries that were opulent and industrious. Such was the Greek empire as 
long as it subsisted, and that of the Saracens during the reigns of the 
Abassides. Such too was Egypt till it was conquered by the Turks, some 
part of the coast of Barbary, and all those provinces of Spain which were 
under the government of the Moors. 
   The cities of Italy seem to have been the first in Europe which were raised 
by commerce to any considerable degree of opulence. Italy lay in the centre 
of what was at that time the improved and civilised part of the world. The 
Crusades too, though by the great waste of stock and destruction of 
inhabitants which they occasioned they must necessarily have retarded the 
progress of the greater part of Europe, were extremely favourable to that of 
some Italian cities. The great armies which marched from all parts to the 
conquest of the Holy Land gave extraordinary encouragement to the 
shipping of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, sometimes in transporting them 
thither, and always in supplying them with provisions. They were the 
commissaries, if one may say so, of those armies; and the most destructive 
frenzy that ever befell the European nations was a source of opulence to 
those republics. 
   The inhabitants of trading cities, by importing the improved manufactures 
and expensive luxuries of richer countries, afforded some food to the vanity 
of the great proprietors, who eagerly purchased them with great quantities 
of the rude produce of their own lands. The commerce of a great part of 
Europe in those times, accordingly, consisted chiefly in the exchange of 
their own rude for the, manufactured produce of more civilised nations. 
Thus the wool of England used to be exchanged for the wines of France and 
the fine cloths of Flanders, in the same manner as the corn in Poland is at 
this day exchanged for the wines and brandies of France and for the silks 
and velvets of France and Italy. 
   A taste for the finer and more improved manufactures was in this manner 
introduced by foreign commerce into countries where no such works were 
carried on. But when this taste became so general as to occasion a 
considerable demand, the merchants, in order to save the expense of 
carriage, naturally endeavoured to establish some manufactures of the same 
kind in their own country. Hence the origin of the first manufactures for 
distant sale that seem to have been established in the western provinces of 
Europe after the fall of the Roman empire. No large country, it must be 
observed, ever did or could subsist without some sort of manufactures being 
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carried on in it; and when it is said of any such country that it has no 
manufactures, it must always be understood of the finer and more improved 
or of such as are fit for distant sale. In every large country both the clothing 
and household furniture of the far greater part of the people are the produce 
of their own industry. This is even more universally the case in those poor 
countries which are commonly said to have no manufactures than in those 
rich ones that are said to abound in them. In the latter, you will generally 
find, both in the clothes and household furniture of the lowest rank of 
people, a much greater proportion of foreign productions than in the former. 
   Those manufactures which are fit for distant sale seem to have been 
introduced into different countries in two different ways. 
   Sometimes they have been introduced, in the manner above mentioned, by 
the violent operation, if one may say so, of the stocks of particular 
merchants and undertakers, who established them in imitation of some 
foreign manufactures of the same kind. Such manufactures, therefore, are 
the offspring of foreign commerce, and such seem to have been the ancient 
manufactures of silks, velvets, and brocades, which flourished in Lucca 
during the thirteenth century. They were banished from thence by the 
tyranny of one of Machiavel's heroes, Castruccio Castracani. In 1310, nine 
hundred families were driven out of Lucca, of whom thirty-one retired to 
Venice and offered to introduce there the silk manufacture. Their offer was 
accepted; many privileges were conferred upon them, and they began the 
manufacture with three hundred workmen. Such, too, seem to have been the 
manufactures of fine cloths that anciently flourished in Flanders, and which 
were introduced into England in the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth; and 
such are the present silk manufactures of Lyons and Spitalfields. 
Manufactures introduced in this manner are generally employed upon 
foreign materials, being imitations of foreign manufactures. When the 
Venetian manufacture was first established, the materials were all brought 
from Sicily and the Levant. The more ancient manufacture of Lucca was 
likewise carried on with foreign materials. The cultivation of mulberry trees 
and the breeding of silk-worms seem not to have been common in the 
northern parts of Italy before the sixteenth century. Those arts were not 
introduced into France till the reign of Charles IX. The manufactures of 
Flanders were carried on chiefly with Spanish and English wool. Spanish 
wool was the material, not of the first woollen manufacture of England, but 
of the first that was fit for distant sale. More than one half the materials of 
the Lyons manufacture is at this day, foreign silk; when it was first 
established, the whole or very nearly the whole was so. No part of the 
materials of the Spitalfields manufacture is ever likely be the produce of 
England. The seat of such manufactures, as they are generally introduced by 
the scheme and project of a few individuals, is sometimes established in a 
maritime city, and sometimes in an inland town, according as their interest, 
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judgment, or caprice happen to determine. 
   At other times, manufactures for distant sale group up naturally, and as it 
were of their own accord, by the gradual refinement of those household and 
coarser manufactures which must at all times be carried on even in the 
poorest and rudest countries. Such manufactures are generally employed 
upon the materials which the country produces, and they seem frequently to 
have been first refined and improved in such inland countries as were, not 
indeed at a very great, but at a considerable distance from the sea coast, and 
sometimes even from all water carriage. An inland country, naturally fertile 
and easily cultivated, produces a great surplus of provisions beyond what is 
necessary for maintaining the cultivators, and on account of the expense of 
land carriage, and inconveniency of river navigation, it may frequently be 
difficult to send this surplus abroad. Abundance, therefore, renders 
provisions cheap, and encourages a great number of workmen to settle in 
the neighbourhood, who find that their industry can there procure them 
more of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than in other places. They 
work up the materials of manufacture which the land produces, and 
exchange their finished work, or what is the same thing the price of it, for 
more materials and provisions. They give a new value to the surplus part of 
the rude produce by saving the expense of carrying it to the water side or to 
some distant market; and they furnish the cultivators with something in 
exchange for it that is either useful or agreeable to them upon easier terms 
than they could have obtained it before. The cultivators get a better price for 
their surplus produce, and can purchase cheaper other conveniences which 
they have occasion for. They are thus both encouraged and enabled to 
increase this surplus produce by a further improvement and better 
cultivation of the land; and as the fertility of the land had given birth to the 
manufacture, so the progress of the manufacture reacts upon the land and 
increases still further its fertility. The manufacturers first supply the 
neighbourhood, and afterwards, as their work improves and refines, more 
distant markets. For though neither the rude produce nor even the coarse 
manufacture could, without the greatest difficulty, support the expense of a 
considerable land carriage, the refined and improved manufacture easily 
may. In a small bulk it frequently contains the price of a great quantity of 
rude produce. A piece of fine cloth, for example, which weighs only eighty 
pounds, contains in it, the price, not only of eighty pounds' weight of wool, 
but sometimes of several thousand weight of corn, the maintenance of the 
different working people and of their immediate employers. The corn, 
which could with difficulty have been carried abroad in its own shape, is in 
this manner virtually exported in that of the complete manufacture, and may 
easily be sent to the remotest corners of the world. In this manner have 
grown up naturally, and as it were of their own accord, the manufactures of 
Leeds, Halifax, Sheffield, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton. Such 
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manufactures are the offspring of agriculture. In the modern history of 
Europe, their extension and improvement have generally been posterior to 
those which were the offspring of foreign commerce. England was noted for 
the manufacture of fine cloths made of Spanish wool more than a century 
before any of those which now flourish in the places above mentioned were 
fit for foreign sale. The extension and improvement of these last could not 
take place but in consequence of the extension and improvement of 
agriculture the last and greatest effect of foreign commerce, and of the 
manufactures immediately introduced by it, and which I shall now proceed 
to explain. 
CHAPTER IV
How the Commerce of the Towns Contributed to the Improvement of the 
Country
THE increase and riches of commercial and manufacturing towns 
contributed to the improvement and cultivation of the countries to which 
they belonged in three different ways. 
   First, by affording a great and ready market for the rude produce of the 
country, they gave encouragement to its cultivation and further 
improvement. This benefit was not even confined to the countries in which 
they were situated, but extended more or less to all those with which they 
had any dealings. To all of them they afforded a market for some part either 
of their rude or manufactured produce, and consequently gave some 
encouragement to the industry and improvement of all. Their own country, 
however, on account of its neighbourhood, necessarily derived the greatest 
benefit from this market. Its rude produce being charged with less carriage, 
the traders could pay the growers a better price for it, and yet afford it as 
cheap to the consumers as that of more distant countries. 
   Secondly, the wealth acquired by the inhabitants of cities was frequently 
employed in purchasing such lands as were to be sold, of which a great part 
would frequently be uncultivated. Merchants are commonly ambitious of 
becoming country gentlemen, and when they do, they are generally the best 
of all improvers. A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in 
profitable projects, whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to 
employ it chiefly in expense. The one often sees his money go from him 
and return to him again with a profit; the other, when once he parts with it, 
very seldom expects to see any more of it. Those different habits naturally 
affect their temper and disposition in every sort of business. A merchant is 
commonly a bold, a country gentleman a timid undertaker. The one is not 
afraid to lay out at once a large capital upon the improvement of his land 
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when he has a probable prospect of raising the value of it in proportion to 
the expense. The other, if he has any capital, which is not always the case, 
seldom ventures to employ it in this manner. If he improves at all, it is 
commonly not with a capital, but with what he can save out of his annual 
revenue. Whoever has had the fortune to live in a mercantile town situated 
in an unimproved country must have frequently observed how much more 
spirited the operations of merchants were in this way than those of mere 
country gentlemen. The habits, besides, of order, economy, and attention, to 
which mercantile business naturally forms a merchant, render him much 
fitter to execute, with profit and success, any project of improvement. 
   Thirdly, and lastly, commerce and manufactures gradually introduced 
order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of 
individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived 
almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours and of servile 
dependency upon their superiors. This, though it has been the least 
observed, is by far the most important of all their effects. Mr. Hume is the 
only writer who, so far as I know, has hitherto taken notice of it. 
   In a country which has neither foreign commerce, nor any of the finer 
manufactures, a great proprietor, having nothing for which he can exchange 
the greater part of the produce of his lands which is over and above the 
maintenance of the cultivators, consumes the whole in rustic hospitality at 
home. If this surplus produce is sufficient to maintain a hundred or a 
thousand men, he can make use of it in no other way than by maintaining a 
hundred or a thousand men. He is at all times, therefore, surrounded with a 
multitude of retainers and dependants, who, having no equivalent to give in 
return for their maintenance, but being fed entirely by his bounty, must obey 
him, for the same reason that soldiers must obey the prince who pays them. 
Before the extension of commerce and manufacture in Europe, the 
hospitality of the rich, and the great, from the sovereign down to the 
smallest baron, exceeded everything which in the present times we can 
easily form a notion of. Westminster Hall was the dining-room of William 
Rufus, and might frequently, perhaps, not be too large for his company. It 
was reckoned a piece of magnificence in Thomas Becket that he strewed the 
floor of his hall with clean hay or rushes in the season, in order that the 
knights and squires who could not get seats might not spoil their fine 
clothes when they sat down on the floor to eat their dinner. The great Earl of 
Warwick is said to have entertained every day at his different manors thirty 
thousand people, and though the number here may have been exaggerated, 
it must, however, have been very great to admit of such exaggeration. A 
hospitality nearly of the same kind was exercised not many years ago in 
many different parts of the highlands of Scotland. It seems to be common in 
all nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known. "I have 
seen," says Doctor Pocock, "an Arabian chief dine in the streets of a town 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth3.html (24 of 33)4/11/2005 9:45:57 AM
The Wealth of Nations
where he had come to sell his cattle, and invite all passengers, even 
common beggars, to sit down with him and partake of his banquet." 
   The occupiers of land were in every respect as dependent upon the great 
proprietor as his retainers. Even such of them as were not in a state of 
villanage were tenants at will, who paid a rent in no respect equivalent to 
the subsistence which the land afforded them. A crown, half a crown, a 
sheep, a lamb, was some years ago in the highlands of Scotland a common 
rent for lands which maintained a family. In some places it is so at this day; 
nor will money at present purchase a greater quantity of commodities there 
than in other places. In a country where the surplus produce of a large estate 
must be consumed upon the estate itself, it will frequently be more 
convenient for the proprietor that part of it be consumed at a distance from 
his own house provided they who consume it are as dependent upon him as 
either his retainers or his menial servants. He is thereby saved from the 
embarrassment of either too large a company or too large a family. A tenant 
at will, who possesses land sufficient to maintain his family for little more 
than a quit-rent, is as dependent upon the proprietor as any servant or 
retainer whatever and must obey him with as little reserve. Such a 
proprietor, as he feeds his servants and retainers at his own house, so he 
feeds his tenants at their houses. The subsistence of both is derived from his 
bounty, and its continuance depends upon his good pleasure. 
   Upon the authority which the great proprietor necessarily had in such a 
state of things over their tenants and retainers was founded the power of the 
ancient barons. They necessarily became the judges in peace, and the 
leaders in war, of all who dwelt upon their estates. They could maintain 
order and execute the law within their respective demesnes, because each of 
them could there turn the whole force of all the inhabitants against the 
injustice of any one. No other persons had sufficient authority to do this. 
The king in particular had not. In those ancient times he was little more than 
the greatest proprietor in his dominions, to whom, for the sake of common 
defence against their common enemies, the other great proprietors paid 
certain respects. To have enforced payment of a small debt within the lands 
of a great proprietor, where all the inhabitants were armed and accustomed 
to stand by one another, would have cost the king, had he attempted it by 
his own authority, almost the same effort as to extinguish a civil war. He 
was, therefore, obliged to abandon the administration of justice through the 
greater part of the country to those who were capable of administering it; 
and for the same reason to leave the command of the country militia to 
those whom that militia would obey. 
   It is a mistake to imagine that those territorial jurisdictions took their 
origin from the feudal law. Not only the highest jurisdictions both civil and 
criminal, but the power of levying troops, of coining money, and even that 
of making bye-laws for the government of their own people, were all rights 
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possessed allodially by the great proprietors of land several centuries before 
even the name of the feudal law was known in Europe. The authority and 
jurisdiction of the Saxon lords in England appear to have been as great 
before the Conquest as that of any of the Norman lords after it. But the 
feudal law is not supposed to have become the common law of England till 
after the Conquest. That the most extensive authority and jurisdictions were 
possessed by the great lords in France allodially long before the feudal law 
was introduced into that country is a matter of fact that admits of no doubt. 
That authority and those jurisdictions all necessarily flowed from the state 
of property and manners just now described. Without remounting to the 
remote antiquities of either the French or English monarchies, we may find 
in much later times many proofs that such effects must always flow from 
such causes. It is not thirty years ago since Mr. Cameron of Lochiel, a 
gentleman of Lochabar in Scotland, without any legal warrant whatever, not 
being what was then called a lord of regality, nor even a tenant in chief, but 
a vassal of the Duke of Argyle, and without being so much as a justice of 
peace, used, notwithstanding, to exercise the highest criminal jurisdiction 
over his own people. He is said to have done so with great equity, though 
without any of the formalities of justice; and it is not improbable that the 
state of that part of the country at that time made it necessary for him to 
assume this authority in order to maintain the public peace. That gentleman, 
whose rent never exceeded five hundred pounds a year, carried, in 1745, 
eight hundred of his own people into the rebellion with him. 
   The introduction of the feudal law, so far from extending, may be 
regarded as an attempt to moderate the authority of the great allodial lords. 
It established a regular subordination, accompanied with a long train of 
services and duties, from the king down to the smallest proprietor. During 
the minority of the proprietor, the rent, together with the management of his 
lands, fell into the hands of his immediate superior, and, consequently, 
those of all great proprietors into the hands of the king, who was charged 
with the maintenance and education of the pupil, and who, from his 
authority as guardian, was supposed to have a right of disposing of him in 
marriage, provided it was in a manner not unsuitable to his rank. But though 
this institution necessarily tended to strengthen the authority of the king, 
and to weaken that of the great proprietors, it could not do either sufficiently 
for establishing order and good government among the inhabitants of the 
country, because it could not alter sufficiently that state of property and 
manners from which the disorders arose. The authority of government still 
continued to be, as before, too weak in the head and too strong in the 
inferior members, and the excessive strength of the inferior members was 
the cause of the weakness of the head. After the institution of feudal 
subordination, the king was as incapable of restraining the violence of the 
great lords as before. They still continued to make war according to their 
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own discretion, almost continually upon one another, and very frequently 
upon the king; and the open country still continued to be a scene of 
violence, rapine, and disorder. 
   But what all the violence of the feudal institutions could never have 
effected, the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce and 
manufactures gradually brought about. These gradually furnished the great 
proprietors with something for which they could exchange the whole 
surplus produce of their lands, and which they could consume themselves 
without sharing it either with tenants or retainers. All for ourselves and 
nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the 
vile maxim of the masters of mankind. As soon, therefore, as they could 
find a method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, they 
had no disposition to share them with any other persons. For a pair of 
diamond buckles, perhaps, or for something as frivolous and useless, they 
exchanged the maintenance, or what is the same thing, the price of the 
maintenance of a thousand men for a year, and with it the whole weight and 
authority which it could give them. The buckles, however, were to be all 
their own, and no other human creature was to have any share of them; 
whereas in the more ancient method of expense they must have shared with 
at least a thousand people. With the judges that were to determine the 
preference this difference was perfectly decisive; and thus, for the 
gratification of the most childish, the meanest, and the most sordid of all 
vanities, they gradually bartered their whole power and authority. 
   In a country where there is no foreign commerce, nor any of the finer 
manufactures, a man of ten thousand a year cannot well employ his revenue 
in any other way than in maintaining, perhaps, a thousand families, who are 
all of them necessarily at his command. In the present state of Europe, a 
man of ten thousand a year can spend his whole revenue, and he generally 
does so, without directly maintaining twenty people, or being able to 
command more than ten footmen not worth the commanding. Indirectly, 
perhaps, he maintains as great or even a greater number of people than he 
could have done by the ancient method of expense. For though the quantity 
of precious productions for which he exchanges his whole revenue be very 
small, the number of workmen employed in collecting and preparing it must 
necessarily have been very great. Its great price generally arises from the 
wages of their labour, and the profits of all their immediate employers. By 
paying that price he indirectly pays all those wages and profits and thus 
indirectly contributes to the maintenance of all the workmen and their 
employers. He generally contributes, however, but a very small proportion 
to that of each, to very few perhaps a tenth, to many not a hundredth, and to 
some not a thousandth, nor even a ten-thousandth part of their whole annual 
maintenance. Though he contributes, therefore, to the maintenance of them 
all, they are all more or less independent of him, because generally they can 
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all be maintained without him. 
   When the great proprietors of land spend their rents in maintaining their 
tenants and retainers, each of them maintains entirely all his own tenants 
and all his own retainers. But when they spend them in maintaining 
tradesmen and artificers, they may, all of them taken together, perhaps, 
maintain as great, or, on account of the waste which attends rustic 
hospitality, a greater number of people than before. Each of them, however, 
taken singly, contributes often but a very small share to the maintenance of 
any individual of this greater number. Each tradesman or artificer derives 
his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a 
thousand different customers. Though in some measure obliged to them all, 
therefore, he is not absolutely dependent upon any one of them. 
   The personal expense of the great proprietors having in this manner 
gradually increased, it was impossible that the number of their retainers 
should not as gradually diminish till they were at last dismissed altogether. 
The same cause gradually led them to dismiss the unnecessary part of their 
tenants. Farms were enlarged, and the occupiers of land, notwithstanding 
the complaints of depopulation, reduced to the number necessary for 
cultivating it, according to the imperfect state of cultivation and 
improvement in those times. By the removal of the unnecessary mouths, 
and by exacting from the farmer the full value of the farm, a greater surplus, 
or what is the same thing, the price of a greater surplus, was obtained for the 
proprietor, which the merchants and manufacturers soon furnished him with 
a method of spending upon his own person in the same manner as he had 
done the rest. The same cause continuing to operate, he was desirous to 
raise his rents above what his lands, in the actual state of their improvement, 
could afford. His tenants could agree to this upon one condition only, that 
they should be secured in their possession for such a term of years as might 
give them time to recover with profit whatever they should lay out in the 
further improvement of the land. The expensive vanity of the landlord made 
him willing to accept of this condition; and hence the origin of long leases. 
   Even a tenant at will, who pays the full value of the land, is not altogether 
dependent upon the landlord. The pecuniary advantages which they receive 
from one another are mutual and equal, and such a tenant will expose 
neither his life nor his fortune in the service of the proprietor. But if he has a 
lease for a long term of years, he is altogether independent; and his landlord 
must not expect from him the most trifling service beyond what is either 
expressly stipulated in the lease or imposed upon him by the common and 
known law of the country. 
   The tenants having in this manner become independent, and the retainers 
being dismissed, the great proprietors were no longer capable of 
interrupting the regular execution of justice or of disturbing the peace of the 
country. Having sold their birthright, not like Esau for a mess of pottage in 
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time of hunger and necessity, but in the wantonness of plenty, for trinkets 
and baubles, fitter to be the playthings of children than the serious pursuits 
of men, they became as insignificant as any substantial burgher or 
tradesman in a city. A regular government was established in the country as 
well as in the city, nobody having sufficient power to disturb its operations 
in the one any more than in the other. 
   It does not, perhaps, relate to the present subject, but I cannot help 
remarking it, that very old families, such as have possessed some 
considerable estate from father to son for many successive generations are 
very rare in commercial countries. In countries which have little commerce, 
on the contrary, such as Wales or the highlands of Scotland, they are very 
common. The Arabian histories seem to be all full of genealogies, and there 
is a history written by a Tartar Khan, which has been translated into several 
European languages, and which contains scarce anything else; a proof that 
ancient families are very common among those nations. In countries where 
a rich man can spend his revenue in no other way than by maintaining as 
many people as it can maintain, he is not apt to run out, and his benevolence 
it seems is seldom so violent as to attempt to maintain more than he can 
afford. But where he can spend the greatest revenue upon his own person, 
he frequently has no bounds to his expense, because he frequently has no 
bounds to his vanity or to his affection for his own person. In commercial 
countries, therefore, riches, in spite of the most violent regulations of law to 
prevent their dissipation, very seldom remain long in the same family. 
Among simple nations, on the contrary, they frequently do without any 
regulations of law, for among nations of shepherds, such as the Tartars and 
Arabs, the consumable nature of their property necessarily renders all such 
regulations impossible. 
   A revolution of the greatest importance to the public happiness was in this 
manner brought about by two different orders of people who had not the 
least intention to serve the public. To gratify the most childish vanity was 
the sole motive of the great proprietors. The merchants and artificers, much 
less ridiculous, acted merely from a view to their own interest, and in 
pursuit of their own pedlar principle of turning a penny wherever a penny 
was to be got. Neither of them had either knowledge or foresight of that 
great revolution which the folly of the one, and the industry of the other, 
was gradually bringing about. 
   It is thus that through the greater part of Europe the commerce and 
manufactures of cities, instead of being the effect, have been the cause and 
occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the country. 
   This order, however, being contrary to the natural course of things, is 
necessarily both slow and uncertain. Compare the slow progress of those 
European countries of which the wealth depends very much upon their 
commerce and manufactures with the rapid advances of our North 
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American colonies, of which the wealth is founded altogether in agriculture. 
Through the greater part of Europe the number of inhabitants is not 
supposed to double in less than five hundred years. In several of our North 
American colonies, it is found to double in twenty or five-and-twenty years. 
In Europe, the law of primogeniture and perpetuities of different kinds 
prevent the division of great estates, and thereby hinder the multiplication of 
small proprietors. A small proprietor, however, who knows every part of his 
little territory, who views it with all the affection which property, especially 
small property, naturally inspires, and who upon that account takes pleasure 
not only in cultivating but in adorning it, is generally of all improvers the 
most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most successful. The same 
regulations, besides, keep so much land out of the market that there are 
always more capitals to buy than there is land to sell, so that what is sold 
always sells at a monopoly price. The rent never pays the interest of the 
purchase-money, and is, besides, burdened with repairs and other occasional 
charges to which the interest of money is not liable. To purchase land is 
everywhere in Europe a most unprofitable employment of a small capital. 
For the sake of the superior security, indeed, a man of moderate 
circumstances, when he retires from business, will sometimes choose to lay 
out his little capital in land. A man of profession too, whose revenue is 
derived from. another source, often loves to secure his savings in the same 
way. But a young man, who, instead of applying to trade or to some 
profession, should employ a capital of two or three thousand pounds in the 
purchase and cultivation of a small piece of land, might indeed expect to 
live very happily, and very independently, but must bid adieu forever to all 
hope of either great fortune or great illustration, which by a different 
employment of his stock he might have had the same chance of acquiring 
with other people. Such a person too, though he cannot aspire at being a 
proprietor, will often disdain to be a farmer. The small quantity of land, 
therefore, which is brought to market, and the high price of what is brought 
thither, prevents a great number of capitals from being employed in its 
cultivation and improvement which would otherwise have taken that 
direction. In North America, on the contrary, fifty or sixty pounds is often 
found a sufficient stock to begin a plantation with. The purchase and 
improvement of uncultivated land is there the most profitable employment 
of the smallest as well as of the greatest capitals, and the most direct road to 
all the fortune and illustration which can be acquired in that country. Such 
land, indeed, is in North America to be had almost for nothing, or at a price 
much below the value of the natural produce- a thing impossible in Europe, 
or, indeed, in any country where all lands have long been private property. 
If landed estates, however, were divided equally among all the children 
upon the death of any proprietor who left a numerous family, the estate 
would generally be sold. So much land would come to market that it could 
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no longer sell at a monopoly price. The free rent of the land would go nearer 
to pay the interest of the purchase-money, and a small capital might be 
employed in purchasing land as profitably as in any other way. 
   England, on account of the natural fertility of the soil, of the great extent 
of the sea-coast in proportion to that of the whole country, and of the many 
navigable rivers which run through it and afford the conveniency of water 
carriage to some of the most inland parts of it, is perhaps as well fitted by 
nature as any large country in Europe to be the seat of foreign commerce, of 
manufactures for distant sale, and of all the improvements which these can 
occasion. From the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth too, the English 
legislature has been peculiarly attentive to the interests of commerce and 
manufactures, and in reality there is no country in Europe, Holland itself not 
excepted, of which the law is, upon the whole, more favourable to this sort 
of industry. Commerce and manufactures have accordingly been continually 
advancing during all this period. The cultivation and improvement of the 
country has, no doubt, been gradually advancing too; but it seems to have 
followed slowly, and at a distance, the more rapid progress of commerce 
and manufactures. The greater part of the country must probably have been 
cultivated before the reign of Elizabeth; and a very great part of it still 
remains uncultivated, and the cultivation of the far greater part much 
inferior to what it might be. The law of England, however, favours 
agriculture not only indirectly by the protection of commerce, but by several 
direct encouragements. Except in times of scarcity, the exportation of corn 
is not only free, but encouraged by a bounty. In times of moderate plenty, 
the importation of foreign corn is loaded with duties that amount to a 
prohibition. The importation of live cattle, except from Ireland, is prohibited 
at all times, and it is but of late that it was permitted from thence. Those 
who cultivate the land, therefore, have a monopoly against their countrymen 
for the two greatest and most important articles of land produce, bread and 
butcher's meat. These encouragements, though at bottom, perhaps, as I shall 
endeavour to show hereafter, altogether illusory, sufficiently demonstrate at 
least the good intention of the legislature to favour agriculture. But what is 
of much more importance than all of them, the yeomanry of England are 
rendered as secure, as independent, and as respectable as law can make 
them. No country, therefore, in which the right of primogeniture takes 
place, which pays tithes, and where perpetuities, though contrary to the 
spirit of the law, are admitted in some cases, can give more encouragement 
to agriculture than England. Such, however, notwithstanding, is the state of 
its cultivation. What would it have been had the law given no direct 
encouragement to agriculture besides what arises indirectly from the 
progress of commerce, and had left the yeomanry in the same condition as 
in most other countries of Europe? It is now more than two hundred years 
since the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, a period as long as the course 
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of human prosperity usually endures. 
   France seems to have had a considerable share of foreign commerce near 
a century before England was distinguished as a commercial country. The 
marine of France was considerable, according to the notions of the times, 
before the expedition of Charles VIII to Naples. The cultivation and 
improvement of France, however, is, upon the whole, inferior to that of 
England. The law of the country has never given the same direct 
encouragement to agriculture. 
   The foreign commerce of Spain and Portugal to the other parts of Europe, 
though chiefly carried on in foreign ships, is very considerable. That to their 
colonies is carried on in their own, and is much greater, on account of the 
great riches and extent of those colonies. But it has never introduced any 
considerable manufactures for distant sale into either of those countries, and 
the greater part of both still remains uncultivated. The foreign commerce of 
Portugal is of older standing than that of any great country in Europe, 
except Italy. 
   Italy is the only great country of Europe which seems to have been 
cultivated and improved in every part by means of foreign commerce and 
manufactures for distant sale. Before the invasion of Charles VIII, Italy 
according to Guicciardin, was cultivated not less in the most mountainous 
and barren parts of the country than in the plainest and most fertile. The 
advantageous situation of the country, and the great number of independent 
states which at that time subsisted in it, probably contributed not a little to 
this general cultivation. It is not impossible too, notwithstanding this 
general expression of one of the most judicious and reserved of modern 
historians, that Italy was not at that time better cultivated than England is at 
present. 
   The capital, however, that is acquired to any country by commerce and 
manufactures is all a very precarious and uncertain possession till some part 
of it has been secured and realized in the cultivation and improvement of its 
lands. A merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the 
citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him 
from what place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make 
him remove his capital, and together with it all the industry which it 
supports, from one country to another. No part of it can be said to belong to 
any particular country, till it has been spread as it were over the face of that 
country, either in buildings or in the lasting improvement of lands. No 
vestige now remains of the great wealth said to have been possessed by the 
greater part of the Hans towns except in the obscure histories of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is even uncertain where some of them 
were situated or to what towns in Europe the Latin names given to some of 
them belong. But though the misfortunes of Italy in the end of the fifteenth 
and beginning of the sixteenth centuries greatly diminished the commerce 
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and manufactures of the cities of Lombardy and Tuscany, those countries 
still continue to be among the most populous and best cultivated in Europe. 
The civil wars of Flanders, and the Spanish government which succeeded 
them, chased away the great commerce of Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges. But 
Flanders still continues to be one of the richest, best cultivated, and most 
populous provinces of Europe. The ordinary revolutions of war and 
government easily dry up the sources of that wealth which arises from 
commerce only. That which arises from the more solid improvements of 
agriculture is much more durable and cannot be destroyed but by those 
more violent convulsions occasioned by the depredations of hostile and 
barbarous nations continued for a century or two together, such as those that 
happened for some time before and after the fall of the Roman empire in the 
western provinces of Europe. 
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Causes of the Wealth of Nations
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BOOK FOUR
Of Systems of Political Economy
INTRODUCTION
POLITICAL economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman 
or legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first, to provide a plentiful 
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revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to 
provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to 
supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public 
services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign. 
    The different progress of opulence in different ages and nations has given 
occasion to two different systems of political economy with regard to 
enriching the people. The one may be called the system of commerce, the 
other that of agriculture. I shall endeavour to explain both as fully and 
distinctly as I can, and shall begin with the system of commerce. It is the 
modern system, and is best understood in our own country and in our own 
times. 
CHAPTER I
Of the Principle of the Commercial, or Mercantile System
    THAT wealth consists in money, or and silver, is a popular notion which 
naturally arises from the double function of money, as the instrument of 
commerce and as the measure of value. In consequence of its being the 
instrument of commerce, when we have money we can more readily obtain 
whatever else we have occasion for than by means of any other commodity. 
The great affair, we always find, is to get money. When that is obtained, 
there is no difficulty in making any subsequent purchase. In consequence of 
its being the measure of value, we estimate that of all other commodities by 
the quantity of money which they will exchange for. We say of a rich man 
that he is worth a great deal, and of a poor man that he is worth very little 
money. A frugal man, or a man eager to be rich, is said to love money; and 
a careless, a generous, or a profuse man, is said to be indifferent about it. To 
grow rich is to get money; and wealth and money, in short, are, in common 
language, considered as in every respect synonymous. 
    A rich country, in the same manner as a rich man, is supposed to be a 
country abounding in money; and to heap up gold and saver in any country 
is supposed to be the readiest way to enrich it. For some time after the 
discovery of America, the first inquiry of the Spaniards, when they arrived 
upon an unknown coast, used to be, if there was any gold or silver to be 
found in the neighbourhood. By the information which they received, they 
judged whether it was worth while to make a settlement there, or if the 
country was worth the conquering. Plano Carpino, a monk, sent ambassador 
from the King of France to one of the sons of the famous Genghis Khan, 
says that the Tartars used frequently to ask him if there was plenty of sheep 
and oxen in the kingdom of France. Their inquiry had the same object with 
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that of the Spaniards. They wanted to know if the country was rich enough 
to be worth the conquering. Among the Tartars, as among all other nations 
of shepherds, who are generally ignorant of the use of money, cattle are the 
instruments of commerce and the measures of value. Wealth, therefore, 
according to them, consisted in cattle, as according to the Spaniards it 
consisted in gold and silver. Of the two, the Tartar notion, perhaps, was the 
nearest to the truth. 
    Mr. Locke remarks a distinction between money and other movable 
goods. All other movable goods, he says, are of so consumable a nature that 
the wealth which consists in them cannot be much depended on, and a 
nation which abounds in them one year may, without any exportation, but 
merely their own waste and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. 
Money, on the contrary, is a steady friend, which, though it may travel 
about from hand to hand, yet if it can be kept from going out of the country, 
is not very liable to be wasted and consumed. Gold and silver, therefore, 
are, according to him, the most solid and substantial part of the movable 
wealth of a nation, and to multiply those metals ought, he thinks, upon that 
account, to be the great object of its political economy. 
    Others admit that if a nation could be separated from all the world, it 
would be of no consequence how much, or how little money circulated in it. 
The consumable goods which were circulated by means of this money 
would only be exchanged for a greater or a smaller number of pieces; but 
the real wealth or poverty of the country, they allow, would depend 
altogether upon the abundance or scarcity of those consumable goods. But it 
is otherwise, they think, with countries which have connections with foreign 
nations, and which are obliged to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain 
fleets and armies in distant countries. This, they say, cannot be done but by 
sending abroad money to pay them with; and a nation cannot send much 
money abroad unless it has a good deal at home. Every such nation, 
therefore, must endeavour in time of peace to accumulate gold and silver 
that, when occasion requires, it may have wherewithal to carry on foreign 
wars. 
    In consequence of these popular notions, all the different nations of 
Europe have studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of 
accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries. Spain and 
Portugal, the proprietors of the principal mines which supply Europe with 
those metals, have either prohibited their exportation under the severest 
penalties, or subjected it to a considerable duty. The like prohibition seems 
anciently to have made a part of the policy of most other European nations. 
It is even to be found, where we should least of all expect to find it, in some 
old Scotch acts of Parliament, which forbid under heavy penalties the 
carrying gold or silver forth of the kingdom. The like policy anciently took 
place both in France and England. 
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    When those countries became commercial, the merchants found this 
prohibition, upon many occasions, extremely inconvenient. They could 
frequently buy more advantageously with gold and silver than with any 
other commodity the foreign goods which they wanted, either to import into 
their own, or to carry to some other foreign country. They remonstrated, 
therefore, against this prohibition as hurtful to trade. 
    They represented, first, that the exportation of gold and silver in order to 
purchase foreign goods, did not always diminish the quantity of those 
metals in the kingdom. That, on the contrary, it might frequently increase 
that quantity; because, if the consumption of foreign goods was not thereby 
increased in the country, those goods might be re-exported to foreign 
countries, and, being there sold for a large profit, might bring back much 
more treasure than was originally sent out to purchase them. Mr. Mun 
compares this operation of foreign trade to the seed-time and harvest of 
agriculture. "If we only behold," says he, "the actions of the husbandman in 
the seed-time, when he casteth away much good corn into the ground, we 
shall account him rather a madman than a husbandman. But when we 
consider his labours in the harvest, which is the end of his endeavours, we 
shall find the worth and plentiful increase of his action." 
    They represented, secondly, that this prohibition could not hinder the 
exportation of gold and silver, which, on account of the smallness of their 
bulk in proportion to their value, could easily be smuggled abroad. That this 
exportation could only be prevented by a proper attention to, what they 
called, the balance of trade. That when the country exported to a greater 
value than it imported, a balance became due to it from foreign nations, 
which was necessarily paid to it in gold and silver, and thereby increased 
the quantity of those metals in the kingdom. But that when it imported to a 
greater value than it exported, a contrary balance became due to foreign 
nations, which was necessarily paid to them in the same manner, and 
thereby diminished that quantity. That in this case to prohibit the 
exportation of those metals could not prevent it, but only, by making it more 
dangerous, render it more expensive. That the exchange was thereby turned 
more against the country which owed the balance than it otherwise might 
have been; the merchant who purchased a bill upon the foreign country 
being obliged to pay the banker who sold it, not only for the natural risk, 
trouble, and expense of sending the money thither, but for the extraordinary 
risk arising from the prohibition. But that the more the exchange was 
against any country, the more the balance of trade became necessarily 
against it; the money of that country becoming necessarily of so much less 
value in comparison with that of the country to which the balance was due. 
That if the exchange between England and Holland, for example, was five 
per cent against England, it would require a hundred and five ounces of 
silver in England to purchase a bill for a hundred ounces of silver in 
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Holland: that a hundred and five ounces of silver in England, therefore, 
would be worth only a hundred ounces of silver in Holland, and would 
purchase only a proportionable quantity of Dutch goods; but that a hundred 
ounces of silver in Holland, on the contrary, would be worth a hundred and 
five ounces in England, and would purchase a proportionable quantity of 
English goods: that the English goods which were sold to Holland would be 
sold so much cheaper; and the Dutch goods which were sold to England so 
much dearer by the difference of the exchange; that the one would draw so 
much less Dutch money to England, and the other so much more English 
money to Holland, as this difference amounted to: and that the balance of 
trade, therefore, would necessarily be so much more against England, and 
would require a greater balance of gold and silver to be exported to Holland. 
    Those arguments were partly solid and partly sophistical. They were solid 
so far as they asserted that the exportation of gold and silver in trade might 
frequently be advantageous to the country. They were solid, too, in asserting 
that no prohibition could prevent their exportation when private people 
found any advantage in exporting them. But they were sophistical in 
supposing that either to preserve or to augment the quantity of those metals 
required more the attention of government than to preserve or to augment 
the quantity of any other useful commodities, which the freedom of trade, 
without any such attention, never fails to supply in the proper quantity. 
They were sophistical too, perhaps, in asserting that the high price of 
exchange necessarily increased what they called the unfavourable balance 
of trade, or occasioned the exportation of a greater quantity of gold and 
silver. That high price, indeed, was extremely disadvantageous to the 
merchants who had any money to pay in foreign countries. They paid so 
much dearer for the bills which their bankers granted them upon those 
countries. But though the risk arising from the prohibition might occasion 
some extraordinary expense to the bankers, it would not necessarily carry 
any more money out of the country. This expense would generally be all 
laid out in the country, in smuggling the money out of it, and could seldom 
occasion the exportation of a single sixpence beyond the precise sum drawn 
for. The high price of exchange too would naturally dispose the merchants 
to endeavour to make their exports nearly balance their imports, in order 
that they might have this high exchange to pay upon as small a sum as 
possible. The high price of exchange, besides, must necessarily have 
operated as a tax, in raising the price of foreign goods, and thereby 
diminishing their consumption. It would tend, therefore, not to increase but 
to diminish what they called the unfavourable balance of trade, and 
consequently the exportation of gold and silver. 
    Such as they were, however, those arguments convinced the people to 
whom they were addressed. They were addressed by merchants to 
parliaments and to the councils of princes, to nobles and to country 
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gentlemen, by those who were supposed to understand trade to those who 
were conscious to themselves that they knew nothing about the matter. That 
foreign trade enriched the country, experience demonstrated to the nobles 
and country gentlemen as well as to the merchants; but how, or in what 
manner, none of them well knew. The merchants knew perfectly in what 
manner it enriched themselves. It was their business to know it. But to know 
in what manner it enriched the country was no part of their business. This 
subject never came into their consideration but when they had occasion to 
apply to their country for some change in the laws relating to foreign trade. 
It then became necessary to say something about the beneficial effects of 
foreign trade, and the manner in which those effects were obstructed by the 
laws as they then stood. To the judges who were to decide the business it 
appeared a most satisfactory account of the matter, when they were told that 
foreign trade brought money into the country, but that the laws in question 
hindered it from bringing so much as it otherwise would do. Those 
arguments therefore produced the wished-for effect. The prohibition of 
exporting gold and silver was in France and England confined to the coin of 
those respective countries. The exportation of foreign coin and of bullion 
was made free. In Holland, and in some other places, this liberty was 
extended even to the coin of the country. The attention of government was 
turned away from guarding against the exportation of gold and silver to 
watch over the balance of trade as the only cause which could occasion any 
augmentation or diminution of those metals. From one fruitless care it was 
turned away to another care much more intricate, much more embarrassing, 
and just equally fruitless. The title of Mun's book, England's Treasure in 
Foreign Trade, became a fundamental maxim in the political economy, not 
of England only, but of all other commercial countries. The inland or home 
trade, the most important of all, the trade in which an equal capital affords 
the greatest revenue, and creates the greatest employment to the people of 
the country, was considered as subsidiary only to foreign trade. It neither 
brought money into the country, it was said, nor carried any out of it. The 
country, therefore, could never become either richer or poorer by means of 
it, except so far as its prosperity or decay might indirectly influence the state 
of foreign trade. 
    A country that has no mines of its own must undoubtedly draw its gold 
and silver from foreign countries in the same manner as one that has no 
vineyards of its own must draw its wines. It does not seem necessary, 
however, that the attention of government should be more turned towards 
the one than towards the other object. A country that has wherewithal to buy 
wine will always get the wine which it has occasion for; and a country that 
has wherewithal to buy gold and silver will never be in want of those 
metals. They are to be bought for a certain price like all other commodities, 
and as they are the price of all other commodities, so all other commodities 
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are the price of those metals. We trust with perfect security that the freedom 
of trade, without any attention of government, will always supply us with 
the wine which we have occasion for: and we may trust with equal security 
that it will always supply us with all the gold and silver which we can afford 
to purchase or to employ, either in circulating our commodities, or in other 
uses. 
    The quantity of every commodity which human industry can either 
purchase or produce naturally regulates itself in every country according to 
the effectual demand, or according to the demand of those who are willing 
to pay the whole rent, labour, and profits which must be paid in order to 
prepare and bring it to market. But no commodities regulate themselves 
more easily or more exactly according to this effectual demand than gold 
and silver; because, on account of the small bulk and great value of those 
metals, no commodities can be more easily transported from one place to 
another, from the places where they are cheap to those where they are dear, 
from the places where they exceed to those where they fall short of this 
effectual demand. If there were in England, for example, an effectual 
demand for an additional quantity of gold, a packet-boat could bring from 
Lisbon, or from wherever else it was to be had, fifty tons of gold, which 
could be coined into more than five millions of guineas. But if there were an 
effectual demand for grain to the same value, to import it would require, at 
five guineas a ton, a million of tons of shipping, or a thousand ships of a 
thousand tons each. The navy of England would not be sufficient. 
    When the quantity of gold and silver imported into any country exceeds 
the effectual demand, no vigilance of government can prevent their 
exportation. All the sanguinary laws of Spain and Portugal are not able to 
keep their gold and silver at home. The continual importations from Peru 
and Brazil exceed the effectual demand of those countries, and sink the 
price of those metals there below that in the neighbouring countries. If, on 
the contrary, in any particular country their quantity fell short of the 
effectual demand, so as to raise their price above that of the neighbouring 
countries, the government would have no occasion to take any pains to 
import them. If it were even to take pains to prevent their importation, it 
would not be able to effectuate it. Those metals, when the Spartans had got 
wherewithal to purchase them, broke through all the barriers which the laws 
of Lycurgus opposed to their entrance into Lacedemon. All the sanguinary 
laws of the customs are not able to prevent the importation of the teas of the 
Dutch and Gottenburgh East India Companies, because somewhat cheaper 
than those of the British company. A pound of tea, however, is about a 
hundred times the bulk of one of the highest prices, sixteen shillings, that is 
commonly paid for it in silver, and more than two thousand times the bulk 
of the same price in gold, and consequently just so many times more 
difficult to smuggle. 
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    It is partly owing to the easy transportation of gold and silver from the 
places where they abound to those where they are wanted that the price of 
those metals does not fluctuate continually like that of the greater part of 
other commodities, which are hindered by their bulk from shifting their 
situation when the market happens to be either over or under-stocked with 
them. The. price of those metals, indeed, is not altogether exempted from 
variation, but the changes to which it is liable are generally slow, gradual 
and uniform. In Europe, for example, it is supposed, without much 
foundation, perhaps, that during the course of the present and preceding 
century they have been constantly, but gradually, sinking in their value, on 
account of the continual importations from the Spanish West Indies. But to 
make any sudden change in the price of gold and silver, so as to raise or 
lower at once, sensibly and remarkably, the money price of all other 
commodities, requires such a revolution in commerce as that occasioned by 
the discovery of America. 
    If, notwithstanding all this, gold and silver should at any time fall short in 
a country which has wherewithal to purchase them, there are more 
expedients for supplying their place than that of almost any other 
commodity. If the materials of manufacture are wanted, industry must stop. 
If provisions are wanted, the people must starve. But if money is wanted, 
barter will supply its place, though with a good deal of inconveniency. 
Buying and selling upon credit, and the different dealers compensating their 
credits with one another, once a month or once a year, will supply it with 
less inconveniency. A well-regulated paper money will supply it, not only 
without any inconveniency, but, in some cases, with some advantages. 
Upon every account, therefore, the attention of government never was so 
unnecessarily employed as when directed to watch over the preservation or 
increase of the quantity of money in any country. 
    No complaint, however, is more common than that of a scarcity of 
money. Money, like wine, must always be scarce with those who have 
neither wherewithal to buy it nor credit to borrow it. Those who have either 
will seldom be in want either of the money or of the wine which they have 
occasion for. This complaint, however, of the scarcity of money is not 
always confined to improvident spendthrifts. It is sometimes general 
through a whole mercantile town and the country in its neighbourhood. 
Overtrading is the common cause of it. Sober men, whose projects have 
been disproportioned to their capitals, are as likely to have neither 
wherewithal to buy money nor credit to borrow it, as prodigals whose 
expense has been disproportioned to their revenue. Before their projects can 
be brought to bear, their stock is gone, and their credit with it. They run 
about everywhere to borrow money, and everybody tells them that they 
have none to lend. Even such general complaints of the scarcity of money 
do not always prove that the usual number of gold and silver pieces are not 
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circulating in the country, but that many people want those pieces who have 
nothing to give for them. When the profits of trade happen to be greater 
than ordinary, overtrading becomes a general error both among great and 
small dealers. They do not always send more money abroad than usual, but 
they buy upon credit, both at home and abroad, an unusual quantity of 
goods, which they send to some distant market in hopes that the returns will 
come in before the demand for payment. The demand comes before the 
returns, and they have nothing at hand with which they can either purchase 
money, or give solid security for borrowing. It is not any scarcity of gold 
and silver, but the difficulty which such people find in borrowing, and 
which their creditors find in getting payment, that occasions the general 
complaint of the scarcity of money. 
    It would be too ridiculous to go about seriously to prove that wealth does 
not consist in money, or in gold and silver; but in what money purchases, 
and is valuable only for purchasing. Money, no doubt, makes always a part 
of the national capital; but it has already been shown that it generally makes 
but a small part, and always the most unprofitable part of it. 
    It is not because wealth consists more essentially in money than in goods 
that the merchant find it generally more easy to buy goods with money than 
to buy money with goods; but because money is the known and established 
instrument of commerce, for which everything is readily given in exchange, 
but which is not always with equal readiness to be got in exchange for 
everything. The greater part of goods, besides, are more perishable than 
money, and he may frequently sustain a much greater loss by keeping them. 
When his goods are upon hand, too, he is more liable to such demands for 
money as he may not be able to answer than when he has got their price in 
his coffers. Over and above all this, his profit arises more directly from 
selling than from buying, and he is upon all these accounts generally much 
more anxious to exchange his goods for money than his money for goods. 
But though a particular merchant, with abundance of goods in his 
warehouse, may sometimes be ruined by not being able to sell them in time, 
a nation or country is not liable to the same accident. The whole capital of a 
merchant frequently consists in perish, able goods destined for purchasing 
money. But it is but a very small part of the annual produce of the land and 
labour of a country which can ever be destined for purchasing gold and 
silver from their neighbours. The far greater part is circulated and consumed 
among themselves; and even of the surplus which is sent abroad, the greater 
part is generally destined for the purchase of other foreign goods. Though 
gold and silver, therefore, could not be had in exchange for the goods 
destined to purchase them, the nation would not be ruined. It might, indeed, 
suffer some loss and inconveniency, and be forced upon some of those 
expedients which are necessary for supplying the place of money. The 
annual produce of its land and labour, however, would be the same, or very 
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nearly the same, as usual, because the same, or very nearly the same, 
consumable capital would be employed in maintaining it. And though goods 
do not always draw money so readily as money draws goods, in the long 
run they draw it more necessarily than even it draws them. Goods can serve 
many other purposes besides purchasing money, but money can serve no 
other purpose besides purchasing goods. Money, therefore, necessarily runs 
after goods, but goods do not always or necessarily run after money. The 
man who buys does not always mean to sell again, but frequently to use or 
to consume; whereas he who sells always means to buy again. The one may 
frequently have done the whole, but the other can never have done more 
than the one-half of his business. It is not for its own sake that men desire 
money, but for the sake of what they can purchase with it. 
    Consumable commodities, it is said, are soon destroyed; whereas gold 
and silver are of a more durable nature, and, were it not for this continual 
exportation, might be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible 
augmentation of the real wealth of the country. Nothing, therefore, it is 
pretended, can be more disadvantageous to any country than the trade which 
consists in the exchange of such lasting for such perishable commodities. 
We do not, however, reckon that trade disadvantageous which consists in 
the exchange of the hardware of England for the wines of France; and yet 
hardware is a very durable commodity, and were it not for this continual 
exportation might, too, be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible 
augmentation of the pots and pans of the country. But it readily occurs that 
the number of such utensils is in every country necessarily limited by the 
use which there is for them; that it would be absurd to have more pots and 
pans than were necessary for cooking the victuals usually consumed there; 
and that if the quantity of victuals were to increase, the number of pots and 
pans would readily increase along with it, a part of the increased quantity of 
victuals being employed in purchasing them, or in maintaining an additional 
number of workmen whose business it was to make them. It should as 
readily occur that the quantity of gold and silver is in every country limited 
by the use which there is for those metals; that their use consists in 
circulating commodities as coin, and in affording a species of household 
furniture as plate; that the quantity of coin in every country is regulated by 
the value of the commodities which are to be circulated by it: increase that 
value, and immediately a part of it will be sent abroad to purchase, 
wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of coin requisite for 
circulating them: that the quantity of plate is regulated by the number and 
wealth of those private families who choose to indulge themselves in that 
sort of magnificence: increase the number and wealth of such families, and 
a part of this increased wealth will most probably be employed in 
purchasing, wherever it is to be found, an additional quantity of plate: that 
to attempt to increase the wealth of any country, either by introducing or by 
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detaining in it an unnecessary quantity of gold and silver, is as absurd as it 
would be to attempt to increase the good cheer of private families by 
obliging them to keep an unnecessary number of kitchen utensils. As the 
expense of purchasing those unnecessary utensils would diminish instead of 
increasing either the quantity of goodness of the family provisions, so the 
expense of purchasing an unnecessary quantity of gold and silver must, in 
every country, as necessarily diminish the wealth which feeds, clothes, and 
lodges, which maintains and employs the people. Gold and silver, whether 
in the shape of coin or of plate, are utensils, it must be remembered, as 
much as the furniture of the kitchen. Increase the use for them, increase the 
consumable commodities which are to be circulated, managed, and prepared 
by means of them, and you will infallibly increase the quantity; but if you 
attempt, by extraordinary means, to increase the quantity, you will as 
infallibly diminish the use and even the quantity too, which in those metals 
can never be greater than what the use requires. Were they ever to be 
accumulated beyond this quantity, their transportation is so easy, and the 
loss which attends their lying idle and unemployed so great, that no law 
could prevent their being immediately sent out of the country. 
    It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver in order to enable 
a country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in 
distant countries. Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, 
but with consumable goods. The nation which, from the annual produce of 
its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, 
labour, and consumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those 
consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars there. 
    A nation may purchase the pay and provisions of an army in a distant 
country three different ways: by sending abroad either, first, some part of its 
accumulated gold and silver, or, secondly, some part of the annual produce 
of its manufactures; or, last of all, some part of its annual rude produce. 
    The gold and silver which can properly be considered as accumulated or 
stored up in any country may be distinguished into three parts: first, the 
circulating money; secondly, the plate of private families; and, last of all, 
the money which may have been collected by many years' parsimony, and 
laid up in the treasury of the prince. 
    It can seldom happen that much can be spared from the circulating money 
of the country; because in that there can seldom be much redundancy. The 
value of goods annually bought and sold in any country requires a certain 
quantity of money to circulate and distribute them to their proper 
consumers, and can give employment to no more. The channel of 
circulation necessarily draws to itself a sum sufficient to fill it, and never 
admits any more. Something, however, is generally withdrawn from this 
channel in the case of foreign war. By the great number of people who are 
maintained abroad, fewer are maintained at home. Fewer goods are 
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circulated there, and less money becomes necessary to circulate them. An 
extraordinary quantity of paper money, of some sort or other, such as 
exchequer notes, navy bills, and bank bills in England, is generally issued 
upon such occasions, and by supplying the place of circulating gold and 
silver, gives an opportunity of sending a greater quantity of it abroad. All 
this, however, could afford but a poor resource for maintaining a foreign 
war of great expense and several years duration. 
    The melting down the plate of private families has upon every occasion 
been found a still more insignificant one. The French, in the beginning of 
the last war, did not derive so much advantage from this expedient as to 
compensate the loss of the fashion. 
    The accumulated treasures of the prince have, in former times, afforded a 
much greater and more lasting resource. In the present times, if you except 
the king of Prussia, to accumulate treasure seems to be no part of the policy 
of European princes. 
    The funds which maintained the foreign wars of the present century, the 
most expensive perhaps which history records, seem to have had little 
dependency upon the exportation either of the circulating money, or of the 
plate of private families, or of the treasure of the prince. The last French war 
cost Great Britain upwards of ninety millions, including not only the 
seventy-five millions of new debt that was contracted, but the additional 
two shillings in the pound land-tax, and what was annually borrowed of the 
sinking fund. More than two-thirds of this expense were laid out in distant 
countries; in Germany, Portugal, America, in the ports of the 
Mediterranean, in the East and West Indies. The kings of England had no 
accumulated treasure. We never heard of any extraordinary quantity of plate 
being melted down. The circulating gold and silver of the country had not 
been supposed to exceed eighteen millions. Since the late recoinage of the 
gold, however, it is believed to have been a good deal under-rated. Let us 
suppose, therefore, according to the most exaggerated computation which I 
remember to have either seen or heard of, that, gold and silver together, it 
amounted to thirty millions. Had the war been carried on by means of our 
money, the whole of it must, even according to this computation, have been 
sent out and returned again at least twice in a period of between six and 
seven years. Should this be supposed, it would afford the most decisive 
argument to demonstrate how unnecessary it is for government to watch 
over the preservation of money, since upon this supposition the whole 
money of the country must have gone from it and returned to it again, two 
different times in so short a period, without anybody's knowing anything of 
the matter. The channel of circulation, however, never appeared more 
empty than usual during any part of this period. Few people wanted money 
who had wherewithal to pay for it. The profits of foreign trade, indeed, were 
greater than usual during the whole war; but especially towards the end of 
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it. This occasioned, what it always occasions, a general overtrading in all 
the parts of Great Britain; and this again occasioned the usual complaint of 
the scarcity of money, which always follows overtrading. Many people 
wanted it, who had neither wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it; 
and because the debtors found it difficult to borrow, the creditors found it 
difficult to get payment. Gold and silver, however, were generally to be had 
for their value, by those who had that value to give for them. 
    The enormous expense of the late war, therefore, must have been chiefly 
defrayed, not by the exportation of gold and silver, but by that of British 
commodities of some kind or other. When the government, or those who 
acted under them, contracted with a merchant for a remittance to some 
foreign country, he would naturally endeavour to pay his foreign 
correspondent, upon whom he had granted a bill, by sending abroad rather 
commodities than gold and silver. If the commodities of Great Britain were 
not in demand in that country, he would endeavour to send them to some 
other country, in which he could purchase a bill upon that country. The 
transportation of commodities, when properly suited to the market, is 
always attended with a considerable profit; whereas that of gold and silver 
is scarce ever attended with any. When those metals are sent abroad in order 
to purchase foreign commodities, the merchant's profit arises, not from the 
purchase, but from the sale of the returns. But when they are sent abroad 
merely to pay a debt, he gets no returns, and consequently no profit. He 
naturally, therefore, exerts his invention to find out a way of paying his 
foreign debts rather by the exportation of commodities than by that of gold 
and silver. The great quantity of British goods exported during the course of 
the late war, without bringing back any returns, is accordingly remarked by 
the author of The Present State of the Nation. 
    Besides the three sorts of gold and silver above mentioned, there is in all 
great commercial countries a good deal of bullion alternately imported and 
exported for the purposes of foreign trade. This bullion, as it circulates 
among different commercial countries in the same manner as the national 
coin circulates in every particular country, may be considered as the money 
of the great mercantile republic. The national coin receives its movement 
and direction from the commodities circulated within the precincts of each 
particular country: the money of the mercantile republic, from those 
circulated between different countries. Both are employed in facilitating 
exchanges, the one between different individuals of the same, the other 
between those of different nations. Part of this money of the great 
mercantile republic may have been, and probably was, employed in carrying 
on the late war. In time of a general war, it is natural to suppose that a 
movement and direction should be impressed upon it, different from what it 
usually follows in profound peace; that it should circulate more about the 
seat of the war, and be more employed in purchasing there, and in the 
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neighbouring countries, the pay and provisions of the different armies. But 
whatever part of this money of the mercantile republic Great Britain may 
have annually employed in this manner, it must have been annually 
purchased, either with British commodities, or with something else that had 
been purchased with them; which still brings us back to commodities, to the 
annual produce of the land and labour of the country, as the ultimate 
resources which enabled us to carry on the war. It is natural indeed to 
suppose that so great an annual expense must have been defrayed from a 
great annual produce. The expense of 1761, for example, amounted to more 
than nineteen millions. No accumulation could have supported so great an 
annual profusion. There is no annual produce even of gold and silver which 
could have supported it. The whole gold and silver annually imported into 
both Spain and Portugal, according to the best accounts, does not commonly 
much exceed six millions sterling, which, in some years, would scarce have 
paid four month's expense of the late war. 
    The commodities most proper for being transported to distant countries, 
in order to purchase there either the pay and provisions of an army, or some 
part of the money of the mercantile republic to be employed in purchasing 
them, seem to be the finer and more improved manufactures; such as 
contain a great value in a small bulk, and can, therefore, be exported to a 
great distance at little expense. A country whose industry produces a great 
annual surplus of such manufactures, which are usually exported to foreign 
countries, may carry on for many years a very expensive foreign war 
without either exporting any considerable quantity of gold and silver, or 
even having any such quantity to export. A considerable part of the annual 
surplus of its manufactures must, indeed, in this case be exported without 
bringing back any returns to the country, though it does to the merchant; the 
government purchasing of the merchant his bills upon foreign countries, in 
order to purchase there the pay and provisions of an army. Some part of this 
surplus, however, may still continue to bring back a return. The 
manufacturers, during the war, will have a double demand upon them, and 
be called upon, first, to work up goods to be sent abroad, for paying the bills 
drawn upon foreign countries for the pay and provisions of the army; and, 
secondly, to work up such as are necessary for purchasing the common 
returns that had usually been consumed in the country. In the midst of the 
most destructive foreign war, therefore, the greater part of manufactures 
may frequently flourish greatly; and, on the contrary, they may decline on 
the return of the peace. They may flourish amidst the ruin of their country, 
and begin to decay upon the return of its prosperity. The different state of 
many different branches of the British manufactures during the late war, and 
for some time after the peace, may serve as an illustration of what has been 
just now said. 
    No foreign war of great expense or duration could conveniently be 
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carried on by the exportation of the rude produce of the soil. The expense of 
sending such a quantity of it to a foreign country as might purchase the pay 
and provisions of an army would be too great. Few countries produce much 
more rude produce than what is sufficient for the subsistence of their own 
inhabitants. To send abroad any great quantity of it, therefore, would be to 
send abroad a part of the necessary subsistence of the people. It is otherwise 
with the exportation of manufactures. The maintenance of the people 
employed in them is kept at home, and only the surplus part of their work is 
exported. Mr. Hume frequently takes notice of the inability of the ancient 
kings of England to carry on, without interruption, any foreign war of long 
duration. The English, in those days, had nothing wherewithal to purchase 
the pay and provisions of their armies in foreign countries, but either the 
rude produce of the soil, of which no considerable part could be spared from 
the home consumption, or a few manufactures of the coarsest kind, of 
which, as well as of the rude produce, the transportation was too expensive. 
This inability did not arise from the want of money, but of the finer and 
more improved manufactures. Buying and selling was transacted by means 
of money in England then as well as now. The quantity of circulating 
money must have borne the same proportion to the number and value of 
purchases and sales usually transacted at that time, which it does to those 
transacted at present; or rather it must have borne a greater proportion, 
because there was then no paper, which now occupies a great part of the 
employment of gold and silver. Among nations to whom commerce and 
manufactures are little known, the sovereign, upon extraordinary occasions, 
can seldom draw any considerable aid from his subjects, for reasons which 
shall be explained hereafter. It is in such countries, therefore, that he 
generally endeavours to accumulate a treasure, as the only resource against 
such emergencies. Independent of this necessity, he is in such a situation 
naturally disposed to the parsimony requisite for accumulation. In that 
simple state, the expense even of a sovereign is not directed by the vanity 
which delights in the gaudy finery of a court, but is employed in bounty to 
his tenants, and hospitality to his retainers. But bounty and hospitality very 
seldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always does. Every 
Tartar chief, accordingly, has a treasure. The treasures of Mazepa, chief of 
the Cossacs in the Ukraine, the famous ally of Charles the XII, are said to 
have been very great. The French kings of the Merovingian race all had 
treasures. When they divided their kingdom among their different children, 
they divided their treasure too. The Saxon princes, and the first kings after 
the Conquest, seem likewise to have accumulated treasures. The first exploit 
of every new reign was commonly to seize the treasure of the preceding 
king, as the most essential measure for securing the succession. The 
sovereigns of improved and commercial countries are not under the same 
necessity of accumulating treasures, because they can generally draw from 
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their subjects extraordinary aids upon extraordinary occasions. They are 
likewise less disposed to do so. They naturally, perhaps necessarily, follow 
the mode of the times, and their expense comes to be regulated by the same 
extravagant vanity which directs that of all the other great proprietors in 
their dominions. The insignificant pageantry of their court becomes every 
day more brilliant, and the expense of it not only prevents accumulation, but 
frequently encroaches upon the funds destined for more necessary expenses. 
What Dercyllidas said of the court of Persia may be applied to that of 
several European princes, that he saw there much splendour but little 
strength, and many servants but few soldiers. 
    The importation of gold and silver is not the principal, much less the sole 
benefit which a nation derives from its foreign trade. Between whatever 
places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two distinct 
benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land 
and labour for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in 
return for it something else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to 
their superfluities, by exchanging them for something else, which may 
satisfy a part of their wants, and increase their enjoyments. By means of it 
the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour in 
any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest 
perfection. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the 
produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption, it encourages 
them to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual produce 
to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and wealth of the 
society. These great and important services foreign trade is continually 
occupied in performing to all the different countries between which it is 
carried on. They all derive great benefit from it, though that in which the 
merchant resides generally derives the greatest, as he is generally more 
employed in supplying the wants, and carrying out the superfluities of his 
own, than of any other particular country. To import the gold and silver 
which may be wanted into the countries which have no mines is, no doubt, a 
part of the business of foreign commerce. It is, however, a most 
insignificant part of it. A country which carried on foreign trade merely 
upon this account could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a century. 
    It is not by the importation of gold and silver that the discovery of 
America has enriched Europe. By the abundance of the American mines, 
those metals have become cheaper. A service of plate can now be purchased 
for about a third part of the corn, or a third part of the labour, which it 
would have cost in the fifteenth century. With the same annual expense of 
labour and commodities, Europe can annually purchase about three times 
the quantity of plate which it could have purchased at that time. But when a 
commodity comes to be sold for a third part of what had been its usual 
price, not only those who purchased it before can purchase three times their 
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former quantity, but it is brought down to the level of a much greater 
number of purchasers, perhaps to more than ten, perhaps to more than 
twenty times the former number. So that there may be in Europe at present 
not only more than three times, but more than twenty or thirty times the 
quantity of plate which would have been in it, even in its present state of 
improvement, had the discovery of the American mines never been made. 
So far Europe has, no doubt, gained a real conveniency, though surely a 
very trifling one. The cheapness of gold and silver renders those metals 
rather less fit for the purposes of money than they were before. In order to 
make the same purchases, we must load ourselves with a greater quantity of 
them, and carry about a shilling in our pocket where a groat would have 
done before. It is difficult to say which is most trifling, this inconveniency 
or the opposite conveniency. Neither the one nor the other could have made 
any very essential change in the state of Europe. The discovery of America, 
however, certainly made a most essential one. By opening a new and 
inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave occasion to 
new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which in the narrow circle 
of the ancient commerce, could never have taken place for want of a market 
to take off the greater part of their produce. The productive powers of 
labour were improved, and its produce increased in all the different 
countries of Europe, and together with it the real revenue and wealth of the 
inhabitants. The commodities of Europe were almost all new to America, 
and many of those of America were new to Europe. A new set of 
exchanges, therefore, began to take place which had never been thought of 
before, and which should naturally have proved as advantageous to the new, 
as it certainly did to the old continent. The savage injustice of the Europeans 
rendered an event, which ought to have been beneficial to all, ruinous and 
destructive to several of those unfortunate countries. 
    The discovery of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, 
which happened much about the same time, opened perhaps a still more 
extensive range to foreign commerce than even that of America, 
notwithstanding the greater distance. There were but two nations in 
America in any respect superior to savages, and these were destroyed 
almost as soon as discovered. The rest were mere savages. But the empires 
of China, Indostan, Japan, as well as several others in the East Indies, 
without having richer mines of gold or silver, were in every other respect 
much richer, better cultivated, and more advanced in all arts and 
manufactures than either Mexico or Peru, even though we should credit, 
what plainly deserves no credit, the exaggerated accounts of the Spanish 
writers concerning the ancient state of those empires. But rich and civilised 
nations can always exchange to a much greater value with one another than 
with savages and barbarians. Europe, however, has hitherto derived much 
less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies than from that with 
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America. The Portuguese monopolized the East India trade to themselves 
for about a century, and it was only indirectly and through them that the 
other nations of Europe could either send out or receive any goods from that 
country. When the Dutch, in the beginning of the last century, began to 
encroach upon them, they vested their whole East India commerce in an 
exclusive company. The English, French, Swedes, and Danes have all 
followed their example, so that no great nation in Europe has ever yet had 
the benefit of a free commerce to the East Indies. No other reason need be 
assigned why it has never been so advantageous as the trade to America, 
which, between almost every nation of Europe and its own colonies, is free 
to all its subjects. The exclusive privileges of those East India companies, 
their great riches, the great favour and protection which these have procured 
them from their respective governments, have excited much envy against 
them. This envy has frequently represented their trade as altogether 
pernicious, on account of the great quantities of silver which it every year 
exports from the countries from which it is carried on. The parties 
concerned have replied that their trade, by this continual exportation of 
silver, might indeed tend to impoverish Europe in general, but not the 
particular country from which it was carried on; because, by the exportation 
of a part of the returns to other European countries, it annually brought 
home a much greater quantity of that metal than it carried out. Both the 
objection and the reply are founded in the popular notion which I have been 
just now examining. It is therefore unnecessary to say anything further 
about either. By the annual exportation of silver to the East Indies, plate is 
probably somewhat dearer in Europe than it otherwise might have been; and 
coined silver probably purchases a larger quantity both of labour and 
commodities. The former of these two effects is a very small loss, the latter 
a very small advantage; both too insignificant to deserve any part of the 
public attention. The trade to the East Indies, by opening a market to the 
commodities of Europe, or, what comes nearly to the same thing, to the 
gold and silver which is purchased with those commodities, must 
necessarily tend to increase the annual production of European 
commodities, and consequently the real wealth and revenue of Europe. That 
it has hitherto increased them so little is probably owing to the restraints 
which it everywhere labours under. 
    I thought it necessary, though at the hazard of being tedious, to examine 
at full length this popular notion that wealth consists in money, or in gold 
and silver. Money in common language, as I have already observed, 
frequently signifies wealth, and this ambiguity of expression has rendered 
this popular notion so familiar to us that even they who are convinced of its 
absurdity are very apt to forget their own principles, and in the course of 
their reasonings to take it for granted as a certain and undeniable truth. 
Some of the best English writers upon commerce set out with observing that 
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the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and silver only, but in its 
lands, houses, and consumable goods of all different kinds. In the course of 
their reasonings, however, the lands, houses, and consumable goods seem to 
slip out of their memory, and the strain of their argument frequently 
supposes that all wealth consists in gold and silver, and that to multiply 
those metals is the great object of national industry and commerce. 
    The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in 
gold and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country which 
had no mines only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value 
than it imported, it necessarily became the great object of political economy 
to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home 
consumption, and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the 
produce of domestic industry. Its two great engines for enriching the 
country, therefore, were restraints upon importation, and encouragements to 
exportation. 
    The restraints upon importation were of two kinds. 
    First, restraints upon the importation of such foreign goods for home 
consumption as could be produced at home, from whatever country they 
were imported. 
    Secondly, restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds 
from those particular countries with which the balance of trade was 
supposed to be disadvantageous. 
    Those different restraints consisted sometimes in high duties, and 
sometimes in absolute prohibitions. 
    Exportation was encouraged sometimes by drawbacks, sometimes by 
bounties, sometimes by advantageous treaties of commerce with foreign 
states, and sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant countries. 
    Drawbacks were given upon two different occasions. When the home 
manufactures were subject to any duty or excise, either the whole or a part 
of it was frequently drawn back upon their exportation; and when foreign 
goods liable to a duty were imported in order to be exported again, either 
the whole or a part of this duty was sometimes given back upon such 
exportation. 
    Bounties were given for the encouragement either of some beginning 
manufactures, or of such sorts of industry of other kinds as supposed to 
deserve particular favour. 
    By advantageous treaties of commerce, particular privileges were 
procured in some foreign state for the goods and merchants of the country, 
beyond what were granted to those other countries. 
    By established establishment of colonies in distant countries, not only 
particular privileges, but a monopoly was frequently procured for the goods 
and merchants of the country which established them. 
    The two sorts of restraints upon importation above-mentioned, together 
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with these four encouragements to exportation, constitute the six principal 
means by which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of 
gold and silver in any country by turning the balance of trade in its favour. I 
shall consider each of them in a particular chapter, and without taking much 
further notice of their supposed tendency to bring money into the country, I 
shall examine chiefly what are likely to be the effects of each of them upon 
the annual produce of its industry. According as they tend either to increase 
or diminish the value of this annual produce, they must evidently tend either 
to increase or diminish the real wealth and revenue of the country. 
CHAPTER II
Of Restraints upon the Importation from Foreign Countries of such Goods 
as can be produced at Home
BY restraining, either by high duties or by absolute prohibitions, the 
importation of such goods from foreign countries as can be produced at 
home, the monopoly of the home market is more or less secured to the 
domestic industry employed in producing them. Thus the prohibition of 
importing either live cattle or salt provisions from foreign countries secures 
to the graziers of Great Britain the monopoly of the home market for 
butcher's meat. The high duties upon the importation of corn, which in 
times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, give a like advantage to 
the growers of that commodity. The prohibition of the importation of 
foreign woollens is equally favourable to the woollen manufacturers. The 
silk manufacture, though altogether employed upon foreign materials, has 
lately obtained the same advantage. The linen manufacture has not yet 
obtained it, but is making great strides towards it. Many other sorts of 
manufacturers have, in the same manner, obtained in Great Britain, either 
altogether or very nearly, a monopoly against their countrymen. The variety 
of goods of which the importation into Great Britain is prohibited, either 
absolutely, or under certain circumstances, greatly exceeds what can easily 
be suspected by those who are not well acquainted with the laws of the 
customs. 
    That this monopoly of the home market frequently gives great 
encouragement to that particular species of industry which enjoys it, and 
frequently turns towards that employment a greater share of both the labour 
and stock of the society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be 
doubted. But whether it tends either to increase the general industry of the 
society, or to give it the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, 
altogether so evident. 
    The general industry of the society never can exceed what the capital of 
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the society can employ. As the number of workmen that can be kept in 
employment by any particular person must bear a certain proportion to his 
capital, so the number of those that can be continually employed by all the 
members of a great society must bear a certain proportion to the whole 
capital of that society, and never can exceed that proportion. No regulation 
of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society beyond 
what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction 
into which it might not otherwise have gone; and it is by no means certain 
that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society 
than that into which it would have gone of its own accord. 
    Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most 
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his 
own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. 
But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads 
him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society. 
    First, every individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as 
he can, and consequently as much as he can in the support of domestic 
industry; provided always that he can thereby obtain the ordinary, or not a 
great deal less than the ordinary profits of stock. 
    Thus, upon equal or nearly equal profits, every wholesale merchant 
naturally prefers the home trade to the foreign trade of consumption, and the 
foreign trade of consumption to the carrying trade. In the home trade his 
capital is never so long out of his sight as it frequently is in the foreign trade 
of consumption. He can know better the character and situation of the 
persons whom he trusts, and if he should happen to be deceived, he knows 
better the laws of the country from which he must seek redress. In the 
carrying trade, the capital of the merchant is, as it were, divided between 
two foreign countries, and no part of it is ever necessarily brought home, or 
placed under his own immediate view and command. The capital which an 
Amsterdam merchant employs in carrying corn from Konigsberg to Lisbon, 
and fruit and wine from Lisbon to Konigsberg, must generally be the one 
half of it at Konigsberg and the other half at Lisbon. No part of it need ever 
come to Amsterdam. The natural residence of such a merchant should either 
be at Konigsberg or Lisbon, and it can only be some very particular 
circumstances which can make him prefer the residence of Amsterdam. The 
uneasiness, however, which he feels at being separated so far from his 
capital generally determines him to bring part both of the Konigsberg goods 
which he destines for the market of Lisbon, and of the Lisbon goods which 
he destines for that of Konigsberg, to Amsterdam: and though this 
necessarily subjects him to a double charge of loading and unloading, as 
well as to the payment of some duties and customs, yet for the sake of 
having some part of his capital always under his own view and command, 
he willingly submits to this extraordinary charge; and it is in this manner 
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that every country which has any considerable share of the carrying trade 
becomes always the emporium, or general market, for the goods of all the 
different countries whose trade it carries on. The merchant, in order to save 
a second loading and unloading, endeavours always to sell in the home 
market as much of the goods of all those different countries as he can, and 
thus, so far as he can, to convert his carrying trade into a foreign trade of 
consumption. A merchant, in the same manner, who is engaged in the 
foreign trade of consumption, when he collects goods for foreign markets, 
will always be glad, upon equal or nearly equal profits, to sell as great a part 
of them at home as he can. He saves himself the risk and trouble of 
exportation, when, so far as he can, he thus converts his foreign trade of 
consumption into a home trade. Home is in this manner the centre, if I may 
say so, round which the capitals of the inhabitants of every country are 
continually circulating, and towards which they are always tending, though 
by particular causes they may sometimes be driven off and repelled from it 
towards more distant employments. But a capital employed in the home 
trade, it has already been shown, necessarily puts into motion a greater 
quantity of domestic industry, and gives revenue and employment to a 
greater number of the inhabitants of the country, than an equal capital 
employed in the foreign trade of consumption: and one employed in the 
foreign trade of consumption has the same advantage over an equal capital 
employed in the carrying trade. Upon equal, or only nearly equal profits, 
therefore, every individual naturally inclines to employ his capital in the 
manner in which it is likely to afford the greatest support to domestic 
industry, and to give revenue and employment to the greatest number of 
people of his own country. 
    Secondly, every individual who employs his capital in the support of 
domestic industry, necessarily endeavours so to direct that industry that its 
produce may be of the greatest possible value. 
    The produce of industry is what it adds to the subject or materials upon 
which it is employed. In proportion as the value of this produce is great or 
small, so will likewise be the profits of the employer. But it is only for the 
sake of profit that any man employs a capital in the support of industry; and 
he will always, therefore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that 
industry of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to 
exchange for the greatest quantity either of money or of other goods. 
    But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the 
exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is 
precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual, 
therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the 
support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce 
may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render 
the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, 
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neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is 
promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign 
industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in 
such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always 
the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own 
interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than 
when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done 
by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, 
indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be 
employed in dissuading them from it. 
    What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, 
and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every 
individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much better than 
any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The statesman who should 
attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their 
capitals would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but 
assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single 
person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be 
so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption 
enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it. 
    To give the monopoly of the home market to the produce of domestic 
industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct 
private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and 
must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the 
produce of domestic can be brought there as cheap as that of foreign 
industry, the regulation is evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally be 
hurtful. It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family never to attempt 
to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy. The tailor 
does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. 
The shoemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a 
tailor. The farmer attempts to make neither the one nor the other, but 
employs those different artificers. All of them find it for their interest to 
employ their whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage 
over their neighbours, and to purchase with a part of its produce, or what is 
the same thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever else they have 
occasion for. 
    What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be 
folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a 
commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them 
with some part of the produce of our own industry employed in a way in 
which we have some advantage. The general industry of the country, being 
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always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be 
diminished, no more than that of the above-mentioned artificers; but only 
left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest 
advantage. It is certainly not employed to the greatest advantage when it is 
thus directed towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make. 
The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished when it 
is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value 
than the commodity which it is directed to produce. According to the 
supposition, that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries 
cheaper than it can be made at home. It could, therefore, have been 
purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the same thing, 
with a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry 
employed by an equal capital would have produced at home, had it been left 
to follow its natural course. The industry of the country, therefore, is thus 
turned away from a more to a less advantageous employment, and the 
exchangeable value of its annual produce, instead of being increased, 
according to the intention of the lawgiver, must necessarily be diminished 
by every such regulation. 
    By means of such regulations, indeed, a particular manufacture may 
sometimes be acquired sooner than it could have been otherwise, and after a 
certain time may be made at home as cheap or cheaper than in the foreign 
country. But though the industry of the society may be thus carried with 
advantage into a particular channel sooner than it could have been 
otherwise, it will by no means follow that the sum total, either of its 
industry, or of its revenue, can ever be augmented by any such regulation. 
The industry of the society can augment only in proportion as its capital 
augments, and its capital can augment only in proportion to what can be 
gradually saved out of its revenue. But the immediate effect of every such 
regulation is to diminish its revenue, and what diminishes its revenue is 
certainly not very likely to augment its capital faster than it would have 
augmented of its own accord had both capital and industry been left to find 
out their natural employments. 
    Though for want of such regulations the society should never acquire the 
proposed manufacture, it would not, upon that account, necessarily be the 
poorer in any one period of its duration. In every period of its duration its 
whole capital and industry might still have been employed, though upon 
different objects, in the manner that was most advantageous at the time. In 
every period its revenue might have been the greatest which its capital could 
afford, and both capital and revenue might have been augmented with the 
greatest possible rapidity. 
    The natural advantages which one country has over another in producing 
particular commodities are sometimes so great that it is acknowledged by 
all the world to be in vain to struggle with them. By means of glasses, 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth4.html (24 of 209)4/11/2005 9:46:58 AM
The Wealth of Nations
hotbeds, and hot walls, very good grapes can be raised in Scotland, and very 
good wine too can be made of them at about thirty times the expense for 
which at least equally good can be brought from foreign countries. Would it 
be a reasonable law to prohibit the importation of all foreign wines merely 
to encourage the making of claret and burgundy in Scotland? But if there 
would be a manifest absurdity in turning towards any employment thirty 
times more of the capital and industry of the country than would be 
necessary to purchase from foreign countries an equal quantity of the 
commodities wanted, there must be an absurdity, though not altogether so 
glaring, yet exactly of the same kind, in turning towards any such 
employment a thirtieth, or even a three-hundredth part more of either. 
Whether the advantages which one country has over another be natural or 
acquired is in this respect of no consequence. As long as the one country 
has those advantages, and the other wants them, it will always be more 
advantageous for the latter rather to buy of the former than to make. It is an 
acquired advantage only, which one artificer has over his neighbour, who 
exercises another trade; and yet they both find it more advantageous to buy 
of one another than to make what does not belong to their particular trades. 
    Merchants and manufacturers are the people who derive the greatest 
advantage from this monopoly of the home market. The prohibition of the 
importation of foreign cattle, and of salt provisions, together with the high 
duties upon foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a 
prohibition, are not near so advantageous to the graziers and farmers of 
Great Britain as other regulations of the same kind are to its merchants and 
manufacturers. Manufactures, those of the finer kind especially, are more 
easily transported from one country to another than corn or cattle. It is in the 
fetching and carrying manufactures, accordingly, that foreign trade is 
chiefly employed. In manufactures, a very small advantage will enable 
foreigners to undersell our own workmen, even in the home market. It will 
require a very great one to enable them to do so in the rude produce of the 
soil. If the free importation of foreign manufactures were permitted, several 
of the home manufactures would probably suffer, and some of them, 
perhaps, go to ruin altogether, and a considerable part of the stock and 
industry at present employed in them would be forced to find out some 
other employment. But the freest importation of the rude produce of the soil 
could have no such effect upon the agriculture of the country. 
    If the importation of foreign cattle, for example, were made ever so free, 
so few could be imported that the grazing trade of Great Britain could be 
little affected by it. Live cattle are, perhaps, the only commodity of which 
the transportation is more expensive by sea than by land. By land they carry 
themselves to market. By sea, not only the cattle, but their food and their 
water too, must be carried at no small expense and inconveniency. The short 
sea between Ireland and Great Britain, indeed, renders the importation of 
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Irish cattle more easy. But though the free importation of them, which was 
lately permitted only for a limited time, were rendered perpetual, it could 
have no considerable effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great 
Britain. Those parts of Great Britain which border upon the Irish Sea are all 
grazing countries. Irish cattle could never be imported for their use, but 
must be driven through those very extensive countries, at no small expense 
and inconveniency, before they could arrive at their proper market. Fat 
cattle could not be driven so far. Lean cattle, therefore, only could be 
imported, and such importation could interfere, not with the interest of the 
feeding or fattening countries, to which, by reducing the price of lean cattle, 
it would rather be advantageous, but with that of the breeding countries 
only. The small number of Irish cattle imported since their importation was 
permitted, together with the good price at which lean cattle still continue to 
sell, seem to demonstrate that even the breeding countries of Great Britain 
are never likely to be much affected by the free importation of Irish cattle. 
The common people of Ireland, indeed, are said to have sometimes opposed 
with violence the exportation of their cattle. But if the exporters had found 
any great advantage in continuing the trade, they could easily, when the law 
was on their side, have conquered this mobbish opposition. 
    Feeding and fattening countries, besides, must always be highly 
improved, whereas breeding countries are generally uncultivated. The high 
price of lean cattle, by augmenting the value of uncultivated land, is like a 
bounty against improvement. To any country which was highly improved 
throughout, it would be more advantageous to import its lean cattle than to 
breed them. The province of Holland, accordingly, is said to follow this 
maxim at present. The mountains of Scotland, Wales, and Northumberland, 
indeed, are countries not capable of much improvement, and seem destined 
by nature to be the breeding countries of Great Britain. The freest 
importation of foreign cattle could have no other effect than to hinder those 
breeding countries from taking advantage of the increasing population and 
improvement of the rest of the kingdom, from raising their price to an 
exorbitant height, and from laying a real tax upon all the more improved 
and cultivated parts of the country. 
    The freest importation of salt provisions, in the same manner, could have 
as little effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain as that of live 
cattle. Salt provisions are not only a very bulky commodity, but when 
compared with fresh meat, they are a commodity both of worse quality, and 
as they cost more labour and expense, of higher price. They could never, 
therefore, come into competition with the fresh meat, though they might 
with the salt provisions of the country. They might be used for victualling 
ships for distant voyages and such like uses, but could never make any 
considerable part of the food of the people. The small quantity of salt 
provisions imported from Ireland since their importation was rendered free 
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is an experimental proof that our graziers have nothing to apprehend from 
it. It does not appear that the price of butcher's meat has ever been sensibly 
affected by it. 
    Even the free importation of foreign corn could very little affect the 
interest of the farmers of Great Britain. Corn is a much more bulky 
commodity than butcher's meat. A pound of wheat at a penny is as dear as a 
pound of butcher's meat at fourpence. The small quantity of foreign corn 
imported even in times of the greatest scarcity may satisfy our farmers that 
they can have nothing to fear from the freest importation. The average 
quantity imported, one year with another, amounts only, according to the 
very well informed author of the tracts upon the corn trade, to twenty-three 
thousand seven hundred and twenty-eight quarters of all sorts of grain, and 
does not exceed the five hundred and seventy-first part of the annual 
consumption. But as the bounty upon corn occasions a greater exportation 
in years of plenty, so it must of consequence occasion a greater importation 
in years of scarcity than in the actual state of tillage would otherwise take 
place. By means of it the plenty of one year does not compensate the 
scarcity of another, and as the average quantity exported is necessarily 
augmented by it, so must likewise, in the actual state of tillage, the average 
quantity imported. If there were no bounty, as less corn would be exported, 
so it is probable that, one year with another, less would be imported than at 
present. The corn-merchants, the fetchers and carriers of corn between 
Great Britain and foreign countries would have much less employment, and 
might suffer considerably; but the country gentlemen and farmers could 
suffer very little. It is in the corn merchants accordingly, rather than in the 
country gentlemen and farmers, that I have observed the greatest anxiety for 
the renewal and continuation of the bounty. 
    Country gentlemen and farmers are, to their great honour, of all people, 
the least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly. The undertaker of a 
great manufactory is sometimes alarmed if another work of the same kind is 
established within twenty miles of him. The Dutch undertaker of the 
woollen manufacture at Abbeville stipulated that no work of the same kind 
should be established within thirty leagues of that city. Farmers and country 
gentlemen, on the contrary, are generally disposed rather to promote than to 
obstruct the cultivation and improvement of their neighbours' farms and 
estates. They have no secrets such as those of the greater part of 
manufacturers, but are generally rather fond of communicating to their 
neighbours and of extending as far as possible any new practice which they 
have found to be advantageous. Pius Questus, says old Cato, 
stabilissimusque, minimeque invidiosus; minimeque male cogitantes sunt, 
qui in eo studio occupati sunt. Country gentlemen and farmers, dispersed in 
different parts of the country, cannot so easily combine as merchants and 
manufacturers, who, being collected into towns, and accustomed to that 
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exclusive corporation spirit which prevails in them, naturally endeavour to 
obtain against all their countrymen the same exclusive privilege which they 
generally possess against the inhabitants of their respective towns. They 
accordingly seem to have been the original inventors of those restraints 
upon the importation of foreign goods which secure to them the monopoly 
of the home market. It was probably in imitation of them, and to put 
themselves upon a level with those who, they found, were disposed to 
oppress them, that the country gentlemen and farmers of Great Britain in so 
far forgot the generosity which is natural to their station as to demand the 
exclusive privilege of supplying their countrymen with corn and butcher's 
meat. They did not perhaps take time to consider how much less their 
interest could be affected by the freedom of trade than that of the people 
whose example they followed. 
    To prohibit by a perpetual law the importation of foreign corn and cattle 
is in reality to enact that the population and industry of the country shall at 
no time exceed what the rude produce of its own soil can maintain. 
    There seem, however, to be two cases in which it will generally be 
advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of 
domestic industry. 
    The first is, when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the 
defence of the country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends 
very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The Act of 
Navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and 
shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country in 
some cases by absolute prohibitions and in others by heavy burdens upon 
the shipping of foreign countries. The following are the principal 
dispositions of this Act. 
    First, all ships, of which the owners and three-fourths of the mariners are 
not British subjects, are prohibited, upon pain of forfeiting ship and cargo, 
from trading to the British settlements and plantations, or from being 
employed in the coasting trade of Great Britain. 
    Secondly, a great variety of the most bulky articles of importation can be 
brought into Great Britain only, either in such ships as are above described, 
or in ships of the country where those goods are purchased, and of which 
the owners, masters, and three-fourths of the mariners are of that particular 
country; and when imported even in ships of this latter kind, they are 
subject to double aliens' duty. If imported in ships of any other country, the 
penalty is forfeiture of ship and goods. When this act was made, the Dutch 
were, what they still are, the great carriers of Europe, and by this regulation 
they were entirely excluded from being the carriers to Great Britain, or from 
importing to us the goods of any other European country. 
    Thirdly, a great variety of the most bulky articles of importation are 
prohibited from being imported, even in British ships, from any country but 
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that in which they are produced, under pains of forfeiting ship and cargo. 
This regulation, too, was probably intended against the Dutch. Holland was 
then, as now, the great emporium for all European goods, and by this 
regulation British ships were hindered from loading in Holland the goods of 
any other European country. 
    Fourthly, salt fish of all kinds, whale-fins, whale-bone, oil, and blubber, 
not caught by and cured on board British vessels, when imported into Great 
Britain, are subjected to double aliens' duty. The Dutch, as they are they the 
principal, were then the only fishers in Europe that attempted to supply 
foreign nations with fish. By this regulation, a very heavy burden was laid 
upon their supplying Great Britain. 
    When the Act of Navigation was made, though England and Holland 
were not actually at war, the most violent animosity subsisted between the 
two nations. It had begun during the government of the Long Parliament, 
which first framed this act, and it broke out soon after in the Dutch wars 
during that of the Protector and of Charles the Second. It is not impossible, 
therefore, that some of the regulations of this famous act may have 
proceeded from national animosity. They are as wise, however, as if they 
had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom. National animosity at 
that particular time aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate 
wisdom would have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of 
Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of 
England. 
    The Act of Navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the 
growth of that opulence which can arise from it. The interest of a nation in 
its commercial relations to foreign nations is, like that of a merchant with 
regard to the different people with whom he deals, to buy as cheap and to 
sell as dear as possible. But it will be most likely to buy cheap, when by the 
most perfect freedom of trade it encourages all nations to bring to it the 
goods which it has occasion to purchase; and, for the same reason, it will be 
most likely to sell dear, when its markets are thus filled with the greatest 
number of buyers. The Act of Navigation, it is true, lays no burden upon 
foreign ships that come to export the produce of British industry. Even the 
ancient aliens' duty, which used to be paid upon all goods exported as well 
as imported, has, by several subsequent acts, been taken off from the greater 
part of the articles of exportation. But if foreigners, either by prohibitions or 
high duties, are hindered from coming to sell, they cannot always afford to 
come to buy; because coming without a cargo, they must lose the freight 
from their own country to Great Britain. By diminishing the number of 
sellers, therefore, we necessarily diminish that of buyers, and are thus likely 
not only to buy foreign goods dearer, but to sell our own cheaper, than if 
there was a more perfect freedom of trade. As defence, however it is of 
much more importance than opulence, the Act of Navigation is, perhaps, the 
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wisest of all the commercial regulations of England. 
    The second case, in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some 
burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry is, when 
some tax is imposed at home upon the produce of the latter. In this case, it 
seems reasonable that an equal tax should be imposed upon the like produce 
of the former. This would not give the monopoly of the home market to 
domestic industry, nor turn towards a particular employment a greater share 
of the stock and labour of the country than what would naturally go to it. It 
would only hinder any part of what would naturally go to it from being 
turned away by the tax into a less natural direction, and would leave the 
competition between foreign and domestic industry, after the tax, as nearly 
as possible upon the same footing as before it. In Great Britain, when any 
such tax is laid upon the produce of domestic industry, it is usual at the 
same time, in order to stop the clamorous complaints of our merchants and 
manufacturers that they will be undersold at home, to lay a much heavier 
duty upon the importation of all foreign goods of the same kind. 
    This second limitation of the freedom of trade according to some people 
should, upon some occasions, be extended much farther than to the precise 
foreign commodities which could come into competition with those which 
had been taxed at home. When the necessaries of life have been taxed any 
country, it becomes proper, they pretend, to tax not only the like necessaries 
of life imported from other countries, but all sorts of foreign goods which 
can come into competition with anything that is the produce of domestic 
industry. Subsistence, they say, becomes necessarily dearer in consequence 
of such taxes; and the price of labour must always rise with the price of the 
labourers' subsistence. Every commodity, therefore, which is the produce of 
domestic industry, though not immediately taxed itself, becomes dearer in 
consequence of such taxes, because the labour which produces it becomes 
so. Such taxes, therefore, are really equivalent, they say, to a tax upon every 
particular commodity produced at home. In order to put domestic upon the 
same footing with foreign industry, therefore, it becomes necessary, they 
think, to lay some duty upon every foreign commodity equal to this 
enhancement of the price of the home commodities with which it can come 
into competition. 
    Whether taxes upon the necessaries of life, such as those in Great Britain 
upon soap, salt, leather, candles, etc., necessarily raise the price of labour, 
and consequently that of all other commodities, I shall consider hereafter 
when I come to treat of taxes. Supposing, however, in the meantime, that 
they have this effect, and they have it undoubtedly, this general 
enhancement of the price of all commodities, in consequence of that of 
labour, is a case which differs in the two following respects from that of a 
particular commodity of which the price was enhanced by a particular tax 
immediately imposed upon it. 
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    First, it might always be known with great exactness how far the price of 
such a commodity could be enhanced by such a tax: but how far the general 
enhancement of the price of labour might affect that of every different 
commodity about which labour was employed could never be known with 
any tolerable exactness. It would be impossible, therefore, to proportion 
with any tolerable exactness the tax upon every foreign to this enhancement 
of the price of every home commodity. 
    Secondly, taxes upon the necessaries of life have nearly the same effect 
upon the circumstances of the people as a poor soil and a bad climate. 
Provisions are thereby rendered dearer in the same manner as if it required 
extraordinary labour and expense to raise them. As in the natural scarcity 
arising from soil and climate it would be absurd to direct the people in what 
manner they ought to employ their capitals and industry, so is it likewise in 
the artificial scarcity arising from such taxes. To be left to accommodate, as 
well as they could, their industry to their situation, and to find out those 
employments in which, notwithstanding their unfavourable circumstances, 
they might have some advantage either in the home or in the foreign market, 
is what in both cases would evidently be most for their advantage. To lay a 
new tax upon them, because they are already overburdened with taxes, and 
because they already pay too dear for the necessaries of life, to make them 
likewise pay too dear for the greater part of other commodities, is certainly 
a most absurd way of making amends. 
    Such taxes, when they have grown up to a certain height, are a curse 
equal to the barrenness of the earth and the inclemency of the heavens; and 
yet it is in the richest and most industrious countries that they have been 
most generally imposed. No other countries could support so great a 
disorder. As the strongest bodies only can live and enjoy health under an 
unwholesome regimen, so the nations only that in every sort of industry 
have the greatest natural and acquired advantages can subsist and prosper 
under such taxes. Holland is the country in Europe in which they abound 
most, and which from peculiar circumstances continues to prosper, not by 
means of them, as has been most absurdly supposed, but in spite of them. 
    As there are two cases in which it will generally be advantageous to lay 
some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, so 
there are two others in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation; 
in the one, how far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain 
foreign goods; and in the other, how far, or in what manner, it may be 
proper to restore that free importation after it has been for some time 
interrupted. 
    The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how far it 
is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods is, when 
some foreign nation restrains by high duties or prohibitions the importation 
of some of our manufactures into their country. Revenge in this case 
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naturally dictates retaliation, and that we should impose the like duties and 
prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into 
ours. Nations, accordingly, seldom fail to retaliate in this manner. The 
French have been particularly forward to favour their own manufactures by 
restraining the importation of such foreign goods as could come into 
competition with them. In this consisted a great part of the policy of Mr. 
Colbert, who, notwithstanding his great abilities, seems in this case to have 
been imposed upon by the sophistry of merchants and manufacturers, who 
are always demanding a monopoly against their countrymen. It is at present 
the opinion of the most intelligent men in France that his operations of this 
kind have not been beneficial to his country. That minister, by the tariff of 
1667, imposed very high duties upon a great number of foreign 
manufactures. Upon his refusing to moderate them in favour of the Dutch, 
they in 1671 prohibited the importation of the wines, brandies, and 
manufactures of France. The war of 1672 seems to have been in part 
occasioned by this commercial dispute. The peace of Nimeguen put an end 
to it in 1678 by moderating some of those duties in favour of the Dutch, 
who in consequence took off their prohibition. It was about the same time 
that the French and English began mutually to oppress each other's industry 
by the like duties and prohibitions, of which the French, however, seem to 
have set the first example. The spirit of hostility which has subsisted 
between the two nations ever since has hitherto hindered them from being 
moderated on either side. In 1697 the English prohibited the importation of 
bonelace, the manufacture of Flanders. The government of that country, at 
that time under the dominion of Spain, prohibited in return the importation 
of English woollens. In 1700, the prohibition of importing bonelace into 
England was taken off upon condition that the importance of English 
woollens into Flanders should be put on the same footing as before. 
    There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a 
probability that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or 
prohibitions complained of. The recovery of a great foreign market will 
generally more than compensate the transitory inconveniency of paying 
dearer during a short time for some sorts of goods. To judge whether such 
retaliations are likely to produce such an effect does not, perhaps, belong so 
much to the science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought to be 
governed by general principles which are always the same, as to the skill of 
that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, 
whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs. When 
there is no probability that any such repeal can be procured, it seems a bad 
method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people to 
do another injury ourselves, not only to those classes, but to almost all the 
other classes of them. When our neighbours prohibit some manufacture of 
ours, we generally prohibit, not only the same, for that alone would seldom 
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affect them considerably, but some other manufacture of theirs. This may 
no doubt give encouragement to some particular class of workmen among 
ourselves, and by excluding some of their rivals, may enable them to raise 
their price in the home market. Those workmen, however, who suffered by 
our neighbours' prohibition will not be benefited by ours. On the contrary, 
they and almost all the other classes of our citizens will thereby be obliged 
to pay dearer than before for certain goods. Every such law, therefore, 
imposes a real tax upon the whole country, not in favour of that particular 
class of workmen who were injured by our neighbours' prohibition, but of 
some other class. 
    The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation, how far, 
or in what manner, it is proper to restore the free importation of foreign 
goods, after it has been for some time interrupted, is, when particular 
manufactures, by means of high duties or prohibitions upon all foreign 
goods which can come into competition with them, have been so far 
extended as to employ a great multitude of hands. Humanity may in this 
case require that the freedom of trade should be restored only by slow 
gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection. Were those 
high duties and prohibitions taken away all at once, cheaper foreign goods 
of the same kind might be poured so fast into the home market as to deprive 
all at once many thousands of our people of their ordinary employment and 
means of subsistence. The disorder which this would occasion might no 
doubt be very considerable. It would in all probability, however, be much 
less than is commonly imagined, for the two following reasons:- 
    First, all those manufactures, of which any part is commonly exported to 
other European countries without a bounty, could be very little affected by 
the freest importation of foreign goods. Such manufactures must be sold as 
cheap abroad as any other foreign goods of the same quality and kind, and 
consequently must be sold cheaper at home. They would still, therefore, 
keep possession of the home market, and though a capricious man of 
fashion might sometimes prefer foreign wares, merely because they were 
foreign, to cheaper and better goods of the same kind that were made at 
home, this folly could, from the nature of things, extend to so few that it 
could make no sensible impression upon the general employment of the 
people. But a great part of all the different branches of our woollen 
manufacture, of our tanned leather, and of our hardware, are annually 
exported to other European countries without any bounty, and these are the 
manufactures which employ the greatest number of hands. The silk, 
perhaps, is the manufacture which would suffer the most by this freedom of 
trade, and after it the linen, though the latter much less than the former. 
    Secondly, though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the 
freedom of trade, be thrown all at once out of their ordinary employment 
and common method of subsistence, it would by no means follow that they 
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would thereby be deprived either of employment or subsistence. By the 
reduction of the army and navy at the end of the late war, more than a 
hundred thousand soldiers and seamen, a number equal to what is employed 
in the greatest manufactures, were all at once thrown out of their ordinary 
employment; but, though they no doubt suffered some inconveniency, they 
were not thereby deprived of all employment and subsistence. The greater 
part of the seamen, it is probable, gradually betook themselves to the 
merchant-service as they could find occasion, and in the meantime both 
they and the soldiers were absorbed in the great mass of the people, and 
employed in a great variety of occupations. Not only no great convulsion, 
but no sensible disorder arose from so great a change in the situation of 
more than a hundred thousand men, all accustomed to the use of arms, and 
many of them to rapine and plunder. The number of vagrants was scarce 
anywhere sensibly increased by it, even the wages of labour were not 
reduced by it in any occupation, so far as I have been able to learn, except in 
that of seamen in the merchant service. But if we compare together the 
habits of a soldier and of any sort of manufacturer, we shall find that those 
of the latter do not tend so much to disqualify him from being employed in 
a new trade, as those of the former from being employed in any. The 
manufacturer has always been accustomed to look for his subsistence from 
his labour only: the soldier to expect it from his pay. Application and 
industry have been familiar to the one; idleness and dissipation to the other. 
But it is surely much easier to change the direction of industry from one sort 
of labour to another than to turn idleness and dissipation to any. To the 
greater part of manufactures besides, it has already been observed, there are 
other collateral manufactures of so similar a nature that a workman can 
easily transfer his industry from one of them to another. The greater part of 
such workmen too are occasionally employed in country labour. The stock 
which employed them in a particular manufacture before will still remain in 
the country to employ an equal number of people in some other way. The 
capital of the country remaining the same, the demand for labour will 
likewise be the same, or very nearly the same, though it may be exerted in 
different places and for different occupations. Soldiers and seamen, indeed, 
when discharged from the king's service, are at liberty to exercise any trade, 
within any town or place of Great Britain or Ireland. Let the same natural 
liberty of exercising what species of industry they please, be restored to all 
his Majesty's subjects, in the same manner as to soldiers and seamen; that is, 
break down the exclusive privileges of corporations, and repeal the Statute 
of Apprenticeship, both which are real encroachments upon natural liberty, 
and add to these the repeal of the Law of Settlements, so that a poor 
workman, when thrown out of employment either in one trade or in one 
place, may seek for it in another trade or in another place without the fear 
either of a prosecution or of a removal, and neither the public nor the 
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individuals will suffer much more from the occasional disbanding some 
particular classes of manufacturers than from that of soldiers. Our 
manufacturers have no doubt great merit with their country, but they cannot 
have more than those who defend it with their blood, nor deserve to be 
treated with more delicacy. 
    To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely 
restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia 
should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but 
what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, 
irresistibly oppose it. Were the officers of the army to oppose with the same 
zeal and unanimity any reduction in the numbers of forces with which 
master manufacturers set themselves against every law that is likely to 
increase the number of their rivals in the home market; were the former to 
animate their soldiers in the same manner as the latter enflame their 
workmen to attack with violence and outrage the proposers of any such 
regulation, to attempt to reduce the army would be as dangerous as it has 
now become to attempt to diminish in any respect the monopoly which our 
manufacturers have obtained against us. This monopoly has so much 
increased the number of some particular tribes of them that, like an 
overgrown standing army, they have become formidable to the government, 
and upon many occasions intimidate the legislature. The Member of 
Parliament who supports every proposal for strengthening this monopoly is 
sure to acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great 
popularity and influence with an order of men whose numbers and wealth 
render them of great importance. If he opposes them, on the contrary, and 
still more if he has authority enough to be able to thwart them, neither the 
most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest public 
services can protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from 
personal insults, nor sometimes from real danger, arising from the insolent 
outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists. 
    The undertaker of a great manufacture, who, by the home markets being 
suddenly laid open to the competition of foreigners, should be obliged to 
abandon his trade, would no doubt suffer very considerably. That part of his 
capital which had usually been employed in purchasing materials and in 
paying his workmen might, without much difficulty, perhaps, find another 
employment. But that part of it which was fixed in workhouses, and in the 
instruments of trade, could scarce be disposed of without considerable loss. 
The equitable regard, therefore, to his interest requires that changes of this 
kind should never be introduced suddenly, but slowly, gradually, and after a 
very long warning. The legislature, were it possible that its deliberations 
could be always directed, not by the clamorous importunity of partial 
interests, but by an extensive view of the general good, ought upon this very 
account, perhaps, to be particularly careful neither to establish any new 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth4.html (35 of 209)4/11/2005 9:46:59 AM
The Wealth of Nations
monopolies of this kind, nor to extend further those which are already 
established. Every such regulation introduces some degree of real disorder 
into the constitution of the state, which it will be difficult afterwards to cure 
without occasioning another disorder. 
    How far it may be proper to impose taxes upon the importation of foreign 
goods, in order not to prevent their importation but to raise a revenue for 
government, I shall consider hereafter when I come to treat of taxes. Taxes 
imposed with a view to prevent, or even to diminish importation, are 
evidently as destructive of the revenue of the customs as of the freedom of 
trade. 
CHAPTER III
Of the extraordinary Restraints upon the Importation of Goods of almost all 
kinds from those Countries with which the Balance is supposed to be 
disadvantageous
PART 1
Of the Unreasonableness of those Restraints even upon the Principles of the 
Commercial System
TO lay extraordinary restraints upon the those particular countries with 
which the importation of goods of almost all kinds from balance of trade is 
supposed to be disadvantageous, is the second expedient by which the 
commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver. 
Thus in Great Britain, Silesia lawns may be imported for home 
consumption upon paying certain duties. But French cambrics and lawns are 
prohibited to be imported, except into the port of London, there to be 
warehoused for exportation. Higher duties are imposed upon the wines of 
France than upon those of Portugal, or indeed of any other country. By what 
is called the impost 1692, a duty of five-and-twenty per cent of the rate or 
value was laid upon all French goods; while the goods of other nations 
were, the greater part of them, subjected to much lighter duties, seldom 
exceeding five per cent. The wine, brandy, salt and vinegar of France were 
indeed excepted; these commodities being subjected to other heavy duties, 
either by other laws, or by particular clauses of the same law. In 1696, a 
second duty of twenty-five per cent, the first not having been thought a 
sufficient discouragement, was imposed upon all French goods, except 
brandy; together with a new duty of five-and-twenty pounds upon the ton of 
French wine, and another of fifteen pounds upon the ton of French vinegar. 
French goods have never been omitted in any of those general subsidies, or 
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duties of five per cent, which have been imposed upon all, or the greater 
part of the goods enumerated in the book of rates. If we count the one-third 
and two-third subsidies as making a complete subsidy between them, there 
have been five of these general subsidies; so that before the commencement 
of the present war seventy-five per cent may be considered as the lowest 
duty to which the greater part of the goods of the growth, produce, or 
manufacture of France were liable. But upon the greater part of goods, those 
duties are equivalent to a prohibition. The French in their turn have, I 
believe, treated our goods and manufactures just as hardly; though I am not 
so well acquainted with the particular hardships which they have imposed 
upon them. Those mutual restraints have put an end to almost all fair 
commerce between the two nations, and smugglers are now the principal 
importers, either of British goods into France, or of French goods into Great 
Britain. The principles which I have been examining in the foregoing 
chapter took their origin from private interest and the spirit of monopoly; 
those which I am going to examine in this, from national prejudice and 
animosity. They are, accordingly, as might well be expected, still more 
unreasonable. They are so, even upon the principles of the commercial 
system. 
    First, though it were certain that in the case of a free trade between 
France and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France, 
it would by no means follow that such a trade would be disadvantageous to 
England, or that the general balance of its whole trade would thereby be 
turned more against it. If the wines of France are better and cheaper than 
those of Portugal, or its linens than those of Germany, it would be more 
advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign 
linen which it had occasion for of France than of Portugal and Germany. 
Though the value of the annual importations from France would thereby be 
greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be 
diminished, in proportion as the French goods of the same quality were 
cheaper than those of the other two countries. This would be the case, even 
upon the supposition that the whole French goods imported were to be 
consumed in Great Britain. 
    But, secondly, a great part of them might be re-exported to other 
countries, where, being sold with profit, they might bring back a return 
equal in value, perhaps, to the prime cost of the whole French goods 
imported. What has frequently been said of the East India trade might 
possibly be true of the French; that though the greater part of East India 
goods were bought with gold and silver, the re-exportation of a part of them 
to other countries brought back more gold and silver to that which carried 
on the trade than the prime cost of the whole amounted to. One of the most 
important branches of the Dutch trade, at present, consists in the carriage of 
French goods to other European countries. Some part even of the French 
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wine drank in Great Britain is clandestinely imported from Holland and 
Zeeland. If there was either a free trade between France and England, or if 
French goods could be imported upon paying only the same duties as those 
of other European nations, to be drawn back upon exportation, England 
might have some share of a trade which is found so advantageous to 
Holland. 
    Thirdly, and lastly, there is no certain criterion by which we can 
determine on which side what is called the balance between any two 
countries lies, or which of them exports to the greatest value. National 
prejudice and animosity, prompted always by the private interest of 
particular traders, are the principles which generally direct our judgment 
upon all questions concerning it. There are two criterions, however, which 
have frequently been appealed to upon such occasions, the customhouse 
books and the course of exchange. The custom-house books, I think, it is 
now generally acknowledged, are a very uncertain criterion, on account of 
the inaccuracy of the valuation at which the greater part of goods are rated 
in them. The course of exchange is, perhaps, almost equally so. 
    When the exchange between two places, such as London and Paris, is at 
par, it is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are 
compensated by those due from Paris to London. On the contrary, when a 
premium is paid at London for a bill upon Paris, it is said to be a sign that 
the debts due from London to Paris are not compensated by those due from 
Paris to London, but that a balance in money must be sent out from the 
latter place; for the risk, trouble, and expense of exporting which, the 
premium is both demanded and given. But the ordinary state of debt and 
credit between those two cities must necessarily be regulated, it is said, by 
the ordinary course of their dealings with one another. When neither of 
them imports from the other to a greater amount than it exports to that other, 
the debts and credits of each may compensate one another. But when one of 
them imports from the other to a greater value than it exports to that other, 
the former necessarily becomes indebted to the latter in a greater sum than 
the latter becomes indebted to it; the debts and credits of each do not 
compensate one another, and money must be sent out from that place of 
which the debts overbalance the credits. The ordinary course of exchange, 
therefore, being an indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit 
between two places, must likewise be an indication of the ordinary course 
of their exports and imports, as these necessarily regulate that state. 
    But though the ordinary course of exchange should be allowed to be a 
sufficient indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between any two 
places, it would not from thence follow that the balance of trade was in 
favour of that place which had the ordinary state of debt and credit in its 
favour. The ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places is not 
always entirely regulated by the ordinary course of their dealings with one 
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another; but is often influenced by that of the dealings of either with many 
other places. If it is usual, for example, for the merchants of England to pay 
for the goods which they buy of Hamburg, Danzig, Riga, etc., by bills upon 
Holland, the ordinary state of debt and credit between England and Holland 
will not be regulated entirely by the ordinary course of the dealings of those 
two countries with one another, but will be influenced by that of the 
dealings of England with those other places. England may be obliged to 
send out every year money to Holland, though its annual exports to that 
country may exceed very much the annual value of its imports from thence; 
and though what is called the balance of trade may be very much in favour 
of England. 
    In the way, besides, in which the par of exchange has hitherto been 
computed, the ordinary course of exchange can afford no sufficient 
indication that the ordinary state of debt and credit is in favour of that 
country which seems to have, or which is supposed to have, the ordinary 
course of exchange in its favour: or, in other words, the real exchange may 
be, and, in fact, often is so very different from the computed one, that from 
the course of the latter no certain conclusion can, upon many occasions, be 
drawn concerning that of the former. 
    When for a sum of money paid in England, containing, according to the 
standard of the English mint, a certain number of ounces of pure silver, you 
receive a bill for a sum of money to be paid in France, containing, according 
to the standard of the French mint, an equal number of ounces of pure 
silver, exchange is said to be at par between England and France. When you 
pay more, you are supposed to give a premium, and exchange is said to be 
against England and in favour of France. When you pay less, you are 
supposed to get a premium, and exchange is said to be against France and in 
favour of England. 
    But, first, we cannot always judge of the value of the current money of 
different countries by the standard of their respective mints. In some it is 
more, in others it is less worn, clipt, and otherwise degenerated from that 
standard. But the value of the current coin of every country, compared with 
that of any other country, is in proportion not to the quantity of pure silver 
which it ought to contain, but to that which it actually does contain. Before 
the reformation of the silver coin in King William's time, exchange between 
England and Holland, computed in the usual manner according to the 
standard of their respective mints, was five-and-twenty per cent against 
England. But the value of the current coin of England, as we learn from Mr. 
Lowndes, was at that time rather more than five-and-twenty per cent below 
its standard value. The real exchange, therefore, may even at that time have 
been in favour of England, notwithstanding the computed exchange was so 
much against it; a smaller number of ounces of pure silver actually paid in 
England may have purchased a bill for a greater number of ounces of pure 
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silver to be paid in Holland, and the man who was supposed to give may in 
reality have got the premium. The French coin was, before the late 
reformation of the English gold coin, much less worn than the English, and 
was perhaps two or three per cent nearer its standard. If the computed 
exchange with France, therefore, was not more than two or three per cent 
against England, the real exchange might have been in its favour. Since the 
reformation of the gold coin, the exchange has been constantly in favour of 
England, and against France. 
    Secondly, in some countries, the expense of coinage is defrayed by the 
government; in others, it is defrayed by the private people who carry their 
bullion to the mint, and the government even derives some revenue from the 
coinage. In England, it is defrayed by the government, and if you carry a 
pound weight of standard silver to the mint, you get back sixty-two 
shillings, containing a pound weight of the like standard silver. In France, a 
duty of eight per cent is deducted for the coinage, which not only defrays 
the expense of it, but affords a small revenue to the government. In 
England, as the coinage costs nothing; the current coin can never be much 
more valuable than the quantity of bullion which it actually contains. In 
France, the workmanship, as you pay for it, adds to the value in the same 
manner as to that of wrought plate. A sum of French money, therefore, 
containing a certain weight of pure silver, is more valuable than a sum of 
English money containing an equal weight of pure silver, and must require 
more bullion, or other commodities, to purchase it. Though the current coin 
of the two countries, therefore, were equally near the standards of their 
respective mints, a sum of English money could not well purchase a sum of 
French money containing an equal number of ounces of pure silver, nor 
consequently a bill upon France for such a sum. If for such a bill no more 
additional money was paid than what was sufficient to compensate the 
expense of the French coinage, the real exchange might be at par between 
the two countries, their debts and credits might mutually compensate one 
another, while the computed exchange was considerably in favour of 
France. If less than this was paid, the real exchange might be in favour of 
England, while the computed was in favour of France. 
    Thirdly, and lastly, in some places, as at Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, 
etc., foreign bills of exchange are paid in what they call bank money; while 
in others, as at London, Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, etc., they are paid in the 
common currency of the country. What is called bank money is always of 
more value than the same nominal sum of common currency. A thousand 
guilders in the Bank of Amsterdam, for example, are of more value than a 
thousand guilders of Amsterdam currency. The difference between them is 
called the agio of the bank, which, at Amsterdam, is generally about five per 
cent. Supposing the current money of the two countries equally near to the 
standard of their respective mints, and that the one pays foreign bills in this 
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common currency, while the other pays them in bank money, it is evident 
that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in bank 
money, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in 
current money; for the same reason that the computed exchange may be in 
favour of that which pays in better money, or in money nearer to its own 
standard, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in 
worse. The computed exchange, before the late reformation of the gold 
coin, was generally against London with Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, 
and, I believe, with all other places which pay in what is called bank money. 
It will by no means follow, however, that the real exchange was against it. 
Since the reformation of the gold coin, it has been in favour of London even 
with those places. The computed exchange has generally been in favour of 
London with Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, and, if you except France, I 
believe, with most other parts of Europe that pay in common currency; and 
it is not improbable that the real exchange was so too. 
DIGRESSION CONCERNING BANKS OF DEPOSIT, 
PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THAT OF AMSTERDAM
    The currency of a great state, such as France or England, generally 
consists almost entirely of its own coin. Should this currency, therefore, be 
at any time worn, clipt, or otherwise degraded below its standard value, the 
state by a reformation of its coin can effectually re-establish its currency. 
But the currency of a small state, such as Genoa or Hamburg, can seldom 
consist altogether in its own coin, but must be made up, in a great measure, 
of the coins of all the neighbouring states with which its inhabitants have a 
continual intercourse. Such a state, therefore, by reforming its coin, will not 
always be able to reform its currency. If foreign bills of exchange are paid 
in this currency, the uncertain value of any sum, of what is in its own nature 
so uncertain, must render the exchange always very much against such a 
state, its currency being, in all foreign states, necessarily valued even below 
what it is worth. 
    In order to remedy the inconvenience to which this disadvantageous 
exchange must have subjected their merchants, such small states, when they 
began to attend to the interest of trade, have frequently enacted, that foreign 
bills of exchange of a certain value should be paid not in common currency, 
but by an order upon, or by a transfer in the books of a certain bank, 
established upon the credit, and under the protection of the state; this bank 
being always obliged to pay, in good and true money, exactly according to 
the standard of the state. The banks of Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, 
Hamburg, and Nuremberg, seem to have been all originally established with 
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this view, though some of them may have afterwards been made subservient 
to other purposes. The money of such banks being better than the common 
currency of the country, necessarily bore an agio, which was greater or 
smaller according as the currency was supposed to be more or less degraded 
below the standard of the state. The agio of the Bank of Hamburg, for 
example, which is said to be commonly about fourteen per cent is the 
supposed difference between the good standard money of the state, and the 
clipt, worn, and diminished currency poured into it from all the 
neighbouring states. 
    Before 1609 the great quantity of clipt and worn foreign coin, which the 
extensive trade of Amsterdam brought from all parts of Europe, reduced the 
value of its currency about nine per cent below that of good money fresh 
from the mint. Such money no sooner appeared than it was melted down or 
carried away, as it always is in such circumstances. The merchants, with 
plenty of currency, could not always find a sufficient quantity of good 
money to pay their bills of exchange; and the value of those bills, in spite of 
several regulations which were made to prevent it, became in a great 
measure uncertain. 
    In order to remedy these inconveniences, a bank was established in 1609 
under the guarantee of the city. This bank received both foreign coin, and 
the light and worn coin of the country at its real intrinsic value in the good 
standard money of the country, deducting only so much as was necessary 
for defraying the expense of coinage, and the other necessary expense of 
management. For the value which remained, after this small deduction was 
made, it gave a credit in its books. This credit was called bank money, 
which, as it represented money exactly according to the standard of the 
mint, was always of the same real value, and intrinsically worth more than 
current money. It was at the same time enacted, that all bills drawn upon or 
negotiated at Amsterdam of the value of six hundred guilders and upwards 
should be paid in bank money, which at once took away all uncertainty in 
the value of those bills. Every merchant, in consequence of this regulation, 
was obliged to keep an account with the bank in order to pay his foreign 
bills of exchange, which necessarily occasioned a certain demand for bank 
money. 
    Bank money, over and above its intrinsic superiority to currency, and the 
additional value which this demand necessarily gives it, has likewise some 
other advantages. It is secure from fire, robbery, and other accidents; the 
city of Amsterdam is bound for it; it can be paid away by a simple transfer, 
without the trouble of counting, or the risk of transporting it from one place 
to another. In consequence of those different advantages, it seems from the 
beginning to have borne agio, and it is generally believed that all the money 
originally deposited in the bank was allowed to remain there, nobody caring 
to demand payment of a debt which he could sell for a premium in the 
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market. By demanding payment of the bank, the owner of a bank credit 
would lose this premium. As a shilling fresh from the mint will buy no more 
goods in the market than one of our common worn shillings, so the good 
and true money which might be brought from the coffers of the bank into 
those of a private person, being mixed and confounded with the common 
currency of the country, would be of no more value than that currency from 
which it could no longer be readily distinguished. While it remained in the 
coffers of the bank, its superiority was known and ascertained. When it had 
come into those of a private person, its superiority could not well be 
ascertained without more trouble than perhaps the difference was worth. By 
being brought from the coffers of the bank, besides, it lost all the other 
advantages of bank money; its security, its easy and safe transferability, its 
use in paying foreign bills of exchange. Over and above all this, it could not 
be brought from those coffers, as it will appear by and by, without 
previously paying for the keeping. 
    Those deposits of coin, or those deposits which the bank was bound to 
restore in coin, constituted the original capital of the bank, or the whole 
value of what was represented by what is called bank money. At present 
they are supposed to constitute but a very small part of it. In order to 
facilitate the trade in bullion, the bank has been for these many years in the 
practice of giving credit in its books upon deposits of gold and silver 
bullion. This credit is generally about five per cent below the mint price of 
such bullion. The bank grants at the same time what is called a recipe or 
receipt, entitling the person who makes the deposit, or the bearer, to take out 
the bullion again at any time within six months, upon re-transferring to the 
bank a quantity of bank money equal to that for which credit had been given 
in its books when the deposit was made, and upon paying one-fourth per 
cent for the keeping, if the deposit was in silver; and one-half per cent if it 
was in gold; but at the same time declaring that, in default of such payment, 
and upon the expiration of this term, the deposit should belong to the bank 
at the price at which it had been received, or for which credit had been 
given in the transfer books. What is thus paid for the keeping of the deposit 
may be considered as a sort of warehouse rent; and why this warehouse rent 
should be so much dearer for gold than for silver, several different reasons 
have been assigned. The fineness of gold, it has been said, is more difficult 
to be ascertained than that of silver. Frauds are more easily practised, and 
occasion a greater loss in the more precious metal. Silver, besides, being the 
standard metal, the state, it has been said, wishes to encourage more the 
making of deposits of silver than those of gold. 
    Deposits of bullion are most commonly made when the price is 
somewhat lower than ordinary; and they are taken out again when it 
happens to rise. In Holland the market price of bullion is generally above 
the mint price, for the same reason that it was so in England before the late 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth4.html (43 of 209)4/11/2005 9:46:59 AM
The Wealth of Nations
reformation of the gold coin. The difference is said to be commonly from 
about six to sixteen stivers upon the mark, or eight ounces of silver of 
eleven parts fine and one part alloy. The bank price, or the credit which the 
bank gives for deposits of such silver (when made in foreign coin, of which 
the fineness is well known and ascertained, such as Mexico dollars), is 
twenty-two guilders the mark; the mint price is about twenty-three guilders, 
and the market price is from twenty-three guilders six to twenty-three 
guilders sixteen stivers, or from two to three per cent above the mint price.* 
The proportions between the bank price, the mint price, and the market 
price of gold bullion are nearly the same. A person can generally sell his 
receipt for the difference between the mint price of bullion and the market 
price. A receipt for bullion is almost always worth something, and it very 
seldom happens, therefore, that anybody suffers his receipt to expire, or 
allows his bullion to fall to the bank at the price at which it had been 
received, either by not taking it out before the end of the six months, or by 
neglecting to pay the one-fourth or one-half per cent in order to obtain a 
new receipt for another six months. This, however, though it happens 
seldom, is said to happen sometimes, and more frequently with regard to 
gold than with regard to silver, on account of the higher warehouse-rent 
which is paid for the keeping of the more precious metal.
* The following are the prices at which the Bank of Amsterdam at present 
(September, 1775) receives bullion and coin of different kind:- 
              SILVER
    Mexico dollars           Guilders B-22 per mark
    French crowns            Guilders B-22 per mark
    English silver coin      Guilders B-22 per mark
    Mexico dollars new coin             21 10
    Ducatoons                            3
    Rix dollars                          2 8
    Bar silver containing eleven-twelfths fine 
silver 21 per mark, and
in this proportion down to 1/4 fine, on which 5 
guilders are given.
    Fine bars, 93 per mark.
              GOLD
    Portugal coin            B-310 per mark
    Guineas                  B-310 per mark
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    Louis d'ors new          B-310 per mark
    Ditto old                  300
    New ducats                 4 19 8 per ducat
Bar or ingot gold is received in proportion to its fineness compared with the above 
foreign gold coin. Upon fine bars the bank gives 340 per mark. In general, 
however, something more is given upon coin of a known fineness, than upon gold 
and silver bars, of which the fineness cannot be ascertained but by a process of 
melting and assaying. 
    The person who by making a deposit of bullion obtains both a bank credit 
and receipt, pays his bills of exchange as they become due with his bank 
credit; and either sells or keeps his receipt according as he judges that the 
price of bullion is likely to rise or to fall. The receipt and the bank credit 
seldom keep long together, and there is no occasion that they should. The 
person who has a receipt, and who wants to take out bullion, finds always 
plenty of bank credits, or bank money to buy at the ordinary price; and the 
person who has bank money, and wants to take out bullion, finds receipts 
always in equal abundance. 
    The owners of bank credits, and the holders of receipts, constitute two 
different sorts of creditors against the bank. The holder of a receipt cannot 
draw out the bullion for which it is granted, without reassigning to the bank 
a sum of bank money equal to the price at which the bullion had been 
received. If he has no bank money of his own, he must purchase it of those 
who have it. The owner of bank money cannot draw out bullion without 
producing to the bank receipts for the quantity which he wants. If he has 
none of his own, he must buy them of those who have them. The holder of a 
receipt, when he purchases bank money, purchases the power of taking out 
a quantity of bullion, of which the mint price is five per cent above the bank 
price. The agio of five per cent therefore, which he commonly pays for it, is 
paid not for an imaginary but for a real value. The owner of bank money, 
when he purchases a receipt, purchases the power of taking out a quantity of 
bullion of which the market price is commonly from two to three per cent 
above the mint price. The price which he pays for it, therefore, is paid 
likewise for a real value. The price of the receipt, and the price of the bank 
money, compound or make up between them the full value or price of the 
bullion. 
    Upon deposits of the coin current in the country, the bank grants receipts 
likewise as well as bank credits; but those receipts are frequently of no 
value, and will bring no price in the market. Upon ducatoons, for example, 
which in the currency pass for three guilders three stivers each, the bank 
gives a credit of three guilders only, or five per cent below their current 
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value. It grants a receipt likewise entitling the bearer to take out the number 
of ducatoons deposited at any time within six months, upon paying one-
fourth per cent for the keeping. This receipt will frequently bring no price in 
the market. Three guilders bank money generally sell in the market for three 
guilders three stivers, the full value of the ducatoons, if they were taken out 
of the bank; and before they can be taken out, one-fourth per cent must be 
paid for the keeping, which would be mere loss to the holder of the receipt. 
If the agio of the bank, however, should at any time fall to three per cent 
such receipts might bring some price in the market, and might sell for one 
and three-fourths per cent. But the agio of the bank being now generally 
about five per cent such receipts are frequently allowed to expire, or as they 
express it, to fall to the bank. The receipts which are given for deposits of 
gold ducats fall to it yet more frequently, because a higher warehouse-rent, 
or one-half per cent must be paid for the keeping of them before they can be 
taken out again. The five per cent which the bank gains, when deposits 
either of coin or bullion are allowed to fall to it, may be considered as the 
warehouse-rent for the perpetual keeping of such deposits. 
    The sum of bank money for which the receipts are expired must be very 
considerable. It must comprehend the whole original capital of the bank, 
which, it is generally supposed, has been allowed to remain there from the 
time it was first deposited, nobody caring either to renew his receipt or to 
take out his deposit, as, for the reasons already assigned, neither the one nor 
the other could be done without loss. But whatever may be the amount of 
this sum, the proportion which it bears to the whole mass of bank money is 
supposed to be very small. The Bank of Amsterdam has for these many 
years past been the great warehouse of Europe for bullion, for which the 
receipts are very seldom allowed to expire, or, as they express it, to fall to 
the bank. far greater part of the bank money, or of the credits upon the 
books of the bank, is supposed to have been created, for these many years 
past, by such deposits which the dealers in bullion are continually both 
making and withdrawing. 
    No demand can be made upon the bank but by means of a recipe or 
receipt. The smaller mass of bank money, for which the receipts are 
expired, is mixed and confounded with the much greater mass for which 
they are still in force; so that, though there may be a considerable sum of 
bank money for which there are no receipts, there is no specific sum or 
portion of it which may not at any time be demanded by one. The bank 
cannot be debtor to two persons for the same thing; and the owner of bank 
money who has no receipt cannot demand payment of the bank till he buys 
one. In ordinary and quiet times, he can find no difficulty in getting one to 
buy at the market price, which generally corresponds with the price at 
which he can sell the coin or bullion it entities him to take out of the bank. 
    It might be otherwise during a public calamity; an invasion, for example, 
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such as that of the French in 1672. The owners of bank money being then 
all eager to draw it out of the bank, in order to have it their own keeping, the 
demand for receipts might raise their price to an exorbitant height. The 
holders of them might form expectations, and, instead of two or three per 
cent, demand half the bank money for which credit had been given upon the 
deposits that the receipts had respectively been granted for. The enemy, 
informed of the constitution of the bank, might even buy them up, in order 
to prevent the carrying away of the treasure. In such emergencies, the bank, 
it is supposed, would break through its ordinary rule of making payment 
only to the holders of receipts. The holders of receipts, who had no bank 
money, must have received within two or three per cent of the value of the 
deposit for which their respective receipts had been granted. The bank, 
therefore, it is said, would in this case make no scruple of paying, either 
with money or bullion, the full value of what the owners of bank money 
who could get no receipts were credited for in its books; paying at the same 
time two or three per cent to such holders of receipts as had no bank money, 
that being the whole value which in this state of things could justly be 
supposed due to them. 
    Even in ordinary and quiet times it is the interest of the holders of 
receipts to depress the agio, in order either to buy bank money (and 
consequently the bullion, which their receipts would then enable them to 
take out of the bank) so much cheaper, or to sell their receipts to those who 
have bank money, and who want to take out bullion, so much dearer; the 
price of a receipt being generally equal to the difference between the market 
price of bank money, and that of the coin or bullion for which the receipt 
had been granted. It is the interest of the owners of bank money, on the 
contrary, to raise the agio, in order either to sell their bank money so much 
dearer, or to buy a receipt so much cheaper. To prevent the stock-jobbing 
tricks which those opposite interests might sometimes occasion, the bank 
has of late years come to the resolution to sell at all times bank money for 
currency, at five per cent agio, and to buy it in again at four per cent agio. In 
consequence of this resolution, the agio can never either rise above five or 
sink below four per cent, and the proportion between the market price of 
bank and that of current money is kept at all times very near to the 
proportion between their intrinsic values. Before this resolution was taken, 
the market price of bank money used sometimes to rise so high as nine per 
cent agio, and sometimes to sink so low as par, according as opposite 
interests happened to influence the market. 
    The Bank of Amsterdam professes to lend out no part of what is 
deposited with it, but, for every guilder for which it gives credit in its books, 
to keep in its repositories the value of a guilder either in money or bullion. 
That it keeps in its repositories all the money or bullion for which there are 
receipts in force, for which it is at all times liable to be called upon, and 
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which, in reality, is continually going from it and returning to it again, 
cannot well be doubted. But whether it does so likewise with regard to that 
part of its capital, for which the receipts are long ago expired, for which in 
ordinary and quiet times it cannot be called upon, and which in reality is 
very likely to remain with it for ever, or as long as the States of the United 
Provinces subsist, may perhaps appear more uncertain. At Amsterdam, 
however, no point of faith is better established than that for every guilder, 
circulated as bank money, there is a correspondent guilder in gold or silver 
to be found in the treasure of the bank. The city is guarantee that it should 
be so. The bank is under the direction of the four reigning burgomasters 
who are changed every year. Each new set of burgomasters visits the 
treasure, compares it with the books, receives it upon oath, and delivers it 
over, with the same awful solemnity, to the set which succeeds; and in that 
sober and religious country oaths are not yet disregarded. A rotation of this 
kind seems alone a sufficient security against any practices which cannot be 
avowed. Amidst all the revolutions which faction has ever occasioned in the 
government of Amsterdam, the prevailing party has at no time accused their 
predecessors of infidelity in the administration of the bank. No accusation 
could have affected more deeply the reputation and fortune of the disgraced 
party, and if such an accusation could have been supported, we may be 
assured that it would have been brought. In 1672, when the French king was 
at Utrecht, the Bank of Amsterdam paid so readily as left no doubt of the 
fidelity with which it had observed its engagements. Some of the pieces 
which were then brought from its repositories appeared to have been 
scorched with the fire which happened in the town-house soon after the 
bank was established. Those pieces, therefore, must have lain there from 
that time. 
    What may be the amount of the treasure in the bank is a question which 
has long employed speculations of the curious. Nothing but conjecture can 
be offered concerning it. It is generally reckoned that there are about two 
thousand people who keep accounts with the bank, and allowing them to 
have, one with another, the value of fifteen hundred pounds sterling lying 
upon their respective accounts (a very large allowance), the whole quantity 
of bank money, and consequently of treasure in the bank, will amount to 
about three millions sterling, or, at eleven guilders the pound sterling, thirty-
three millions of guilders- a great sum, and sufficient to carry on a very 
extensive circulation, but vastly below the extravagant ideas which some 
people have formed of this treasure. 
    The city of Amsterdam derives a considerable revenue from the bank. 
Besides what may be called the warehouse-rent above mentioned, each 
person, upon first opening an account with the bank, pays a fee of ten 
guilders; and for every new account three guilders three stivers; for every 
transfer two stivers; and if the transfer is for less than three hundred 
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guilders, six stivers, in order to discourage the multiplicity of small 
transactions. The person who neglects to balance his account twice in the 
year forfeits twenty-five guilders. The person who orders a transfer for more 
than is upon his account, is obliged to pay three per cent for the sum 
overdrawn, and his order is set aside into the bargain. The bank is supposed, 
too, to make a considerable profit by the sale of the foreign coin or bullion 
which sometimes falls to it by the expiring of receipts, and which is always 
kept till it can be sold with advantage. It makes a profit likewise by selling 
bank money at five per cent agio, and buying it in at four. These different 
emoluments amount to a good deal more than what is necessary for paying 
the salaries of officers, and defraying the expense of management. What is 
paid for the keeping of bullion upon receipts is alone supposed to amount to 
a neat annual revenue of between one hundred and fifty thousand and two 
hundred thousand guilders. Public utility, however, and not revenue, was 
the original object of this institution. Its object was to relieve the merchants 
from the inconvenience of a disadvantageous exchange. The revenue which 
has arisen from it was unforeseen, and may be considered as accidental. But 
it is now time to return from this long digression, into which I have been 
insensibly led in endeavouring to explain the reasons why the exchange 
between the countries which pay in what is called bank money, and those 
which pay in common currency, should generally appear to be in favour of 
the former and against the latter. The former pay in a species of money of 
which the intrinsic value is always the same, and exactly agreeable to the 
standard of their respective mints; the latter is a species of money of which 
the intrinsic value is continually varying, and is almost always more or less 
below that standard. 
PART 2
Of the Unreasonableness of those extraordinary Restraints upon other 
Principles
IN the foregoing part of this chapter I have endeavoured to show, even upon 
the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to lay 
extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries 
with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous. 
    Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the 
balance of trade, upon which, not only these restraints, but almost all the 
other regulations of commerce are founded. When two places trade with one 
another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of them 
either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one of 
them loses and the other gains in proportion to its declension from the exact 
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equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A trade which is forced by means 
of bounties and monopolies may be and commonly is disadvantageous to 
the country in whose favour it is meant to be established, as I shall 
endeavour to show hereafter. But that trade which, without force or 
constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between any two places is 
always advantageous, though not always equally so, to both. 
    By advantage or gain, I understand not the increase of the quantity of 
gold and silver, but that of the exchangeable value of the annual produce of 
the land and labour of the country, or the increase of the annual revenue of 
its inhabitants. 
    If the balance be even, and if the trade between the two places consist 
altogether in the exchange of their native commodities, they will, upon most 
occasions, not only both gain, but they will gain equally, or very near 
equally; each will in this case afford a market for a part of the surplus 
produce of the other; each will replace a capital which had been employed 
in raising and preparing for the market this part of the surplus produce of 
the other, and which had been distributed among, and given revenue and 
maintenance to a certain number of its inhabitants. Some part of the 
inhabitants of each, therefore, will indirectly derive their revenue and 
maintenance from the other. As the commodities exchanged, too, are 
supposed to be of equal value, so the two capitals employed in the trade 
will, upon most occasions, be equal, or very nearly equal; and both being 
employed in raising the native commodities of the two countries, the 
revenue and maintenance which their distribution will afford to the 
inhabitants of each will be equal, or very nearly equal. This revenue and 
maintenance, thus mutually afforded, will be greater or smaller in 
proportion to the extent of their dealings. If these should annually amount to 
an hundred thousand pounds, for example, or to a million on each side, each 
of them would afford an annual revenue in the one case of an hundred 
thousand pounds, in the other of a million, to the inhabitants of the other. 
    If their trade should be of such a nature that one of them exported to the 
other nothing but native commodities, while the returns of that other 
consisted altogether in foreign goods; the balance, in this case, would still 
be supposed even, commodities being paid for with commodities. They 
would, in this case too, both gain, but they would not gain equally; and the 
inhabitants of the country which exported nothing but native commodities 
would derive the greatest revenue from the trade. If England, for example, 
should import from France nothing but the native commodities of that 
country, and, not having such commodities of its own as were in demand 
there, should annually repay them by sending thither a large quantity of 
foreign goods, tobacco, we shall suppose, and East India goods; this trade, 
though it would give some revenue to the inhabitants of both countries, 
would give more to those of France than to those of England. The whole 
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French capital annually employed in it would annually be distributed among 
the people of France. But that part of the English capital only which was 
employed in producing the English commodities with which those foreign 
goods were purchased would be annually distributed among the people of 
England. The greater part of it would replace the capitals which had been 
employed in Virginia, Indostan, and China, and which had given revenue 
and maintenance to the of those distant countries. If the capitals were equal, 
or nearly equal, therefore this employment of the French capital would 
augment much more the revenue of the people of France than that of the 
English capital would the revenue of the people of England. France would 
in this case carry on a direct foreign trade of consumption with England; 
whereas England would carry on a round-about trade of the same kind with 
France. The different effects of a capital employed in the direct and of one 
employed in the round-about foreign trade of consumption have already 
been fully explained. 
    There is not, probably, between any two countries a trade which consists 
altogether in the exchange either of native commodities on both sides, or of 
native commodities on one side and of foreign goods on the other. Almost 
all countries exchange with one another partly native and partly foreign 
goods. That country, however, in whose cargoes there is the greatest 
proportion of native, and the least of foreign goods, will always be the 
principal gainer. 
    If it was not with tobacco and East India goods, but with gold and silver, 
that England paid for the commodities annually imported from France, the 
balance, in this case, would be supposed uneven, commodities not being 
paid for with commodities, but with gold and silver. The trade, however, 
would, in this case, as in the foregoing, give some revenue to the inhabitants 
of both countries, but more to those of France than to those of England. It 
would give some revenue to those of England. The capital which had been 
employed in producing the English goods that purchased this gold and 
silver, the capital which had been distributed among, and given revenue to, 
certain inhabitants of England, would thereby be replaced and enabled to 
continue that employment. The whole capital of England would no more be 
diminished by this exportation of gold and silver than by the exportation of 
an equal value of any other goods. On the contrary, it would in most cases 
be augmented. No goods are sent abroad but those for which the demand is 
supposed to be greater abroad than at home, and of which the returns 
consequently, it is expected, will be of more value at home than the 
commodities exported. If the tobacco which, in England, is worth only a 
hundred thousand pounds, when sent to France will purchase wine which is, 
in England, worth a hundred and ten thousand, this exchange will equally 
augment the capital of England by ten thousand pounds. If a hundred 
thousand pounds of English gold, in the same manner, purchase French 
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wine which, in England, is worth a hundred and ten thousand, this exchange 
will equally augment the capital of England by ten thousand pounds. As a 
merchant who has a hundred and ten thousand pounds worth of wine in his 
cellar is a richer man than he who has only a hundred thousand pounds 
worth of tobacco in his warehouse, so is he likewise a richer man than he 
who has only a hundred thousand pounds worth of gold in his coffers. He 
can put into motion a greater quantity of industry, and give revenue, 
maintenance, and employment to a greater number of people than either of 
the other two. But the capital of the country is equal to the capitals of all its 
different inhabitants, and the quantity of industry which can be annually 
maintained in it is equal to what all those different capitals can maintain. 
Both the capital of the country, therefore, and the quantity of industry which 
can be annually maintained in it, must generally be augmented by this 
exchange. It would, indeed, be more advantageous for England that it could 
purchase the wines of France with its own hardware and broadcloth than 
with either the tobacco of Virginia or the gold and silver of Brazil and Peru. 
A direct foreign trade of consumption is always more advantageous than a 
roundabout one. But a round-about foreign trade of consumption, which is 
carried on with gold and silver, does not seem to be less advantageous than 
any other equally round-about one. Neither is a country which has no mines 
more likely to be exhausted of gold and silver by this annual exportation of 
those metals than one which does not grow tobacco by the like annual 
exportation of that plant. As a country which has wherewithal to buy 
tobacco will never be long in want of it, so neither will one be long in want 
of gold and silver which has wherewithal to purchase those metals. 
    It is a losing trade, it is said, which a workman carries on with the 
alehouse; and the trade which a manufacturing nation would naturally carry 
on with a wine country may be considered as a trade of the same nature. I 
answer, that the trade with the alehouse is not necessarily a losing trade. In 
its own nature it is just as advantageous as any other, though perhaps 
somewhat more liable to be abused. The employment of a brewer, and even 
that of a retailer of fermented liquors, are as necessary divisions of labour as 
any other. It will generally be more advantageous for a workman to buy of 
the brewer the quantity he has occasion for than to brew it himself, and if he 
is a poor workman, it will generally be more advantageous for him to buy it 
by little and little of the retailer than a large quantity of the brewer. He may 
no doubt buy too much of either, as he may of any other dealers in his 
neighbourhood, of the butcher, if he is a glutton, or of the draper, if he 
affects to be a beau among his companions. It is advantageous to the great 
body of workmen, notwithstanding, that all these trades should be free, 
though this freedom may be abused in all of them, and is more likely to be 
so, perhaps, in some than in others. Though individuals, besides, may 
sometimes ruin their fortunes by an excessive consumption of fermented 
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liquors, there seems to be no risk that a nation should do so. Though in 
every country there are many people who spend upon such liquors more 
than they can afford, there are always many more who spend less. It 
deserves to be remarked too, that, if we consult experience, the cheapness of 
wine seems to be a cause, not of drunkenness, but of sobriety. The 
inhabitants of the wine countries are in general the soberest people in 
Europe; witness the Spainards, the Italians, and the inhabitants of the 
southern provinces of France. People are seldom guilty of excess in what is 
their daily fare. Nobody affects the character of liberality and good 
fellowship by being profuse of a liquor which is as cheap as small beer. On 
the contrary, in the countries which, either from excessive heat or cold, 
produce no grapes, and where wine consequently is dear and a rarity, 
drunkenness is a common vice, as among the northern nations, and all those 
who live between the tropics, the negroes, for example, on the coast of 
Guinea. When a French regiment comes from some of the northern 
provinces of France, where wine is somewhat dear, to be quartered in the 
southern, where it is very cheap, the soldiers, I have frequently heard it 
observed are at first debauched by the cheapness and novelty of good wine; 
but after a few months' residence, the greater part of them become as sober 
as the rest of the inhabitants. Were the duties upon foreign wines, and the 
excises upon malt, beer, and ale to be taken away all at once, it might, in the 
same manner, occasion in Great Britain a pretty general and temporary 
drunkenness among the middling and inferior ranks of people, which would 
probably be soon followed by a permanent and almost universal sobriety. At 
present drunkenness is by no means the vice of people of fashion, or of 
those who can easily afford the most expensive liquors. A gentleman drunk 
with ale has scarce ever been seen among us. The restraints upon the wine 
trade in Great Britain, besides, do not so much seem calculated to hinder the 
people from going, if I may say so, to the alehouse, as from going where 
they can buy the best and cheapest liquor. They favour the wine trade of 
Portugal, and discourage that of France. The Portugese, it is said, indeed, 
are better customers for our manufactures than the French, and should 
therefore be encouraged in preference to them. As they give us their custom, 
it is pretended, we should give them ours. The sneaking arts of underling 
tradesmen are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great 
empire: for it is the most underling tradesmen only who make it a rule to 
employ chiefly their own customers. A great trader purchases his goods 
always where they are cheapest and best, without regard to any little interest 
of this kind. 
    By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their 
interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been 
made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations 
with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, 
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which ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond 
of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and 
animosity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during 
the present and the preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of 
Europe than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The 
violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, 
I am afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy. But 
the mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit of merchants and manufacturers, 
who neither are, nor ought to be, the rulers of mankind, though it cannot 
perhaps be corrected may very easily be prevented from disturbing the 
tranquillity of anybody but themselves. 
    That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented and 
propagated this doctrine cannot be doubted; and they who first taught it 
were by no means such fools as they who believed it. In every country it 
always is and must be the interest of the great body of the people to buy 
whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition is so very 
manifest that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it 
ever have been called in question had not the interested sophistry of 
merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind. 
Their interest is, in this respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of 
the people. As it is the interest of the freemen of a corporation to hinder the 
rest of the inhabitants from employing any workmen but themselves, so it is 
the interest of the merchants and manufacturers of every country to secure 
to themselves the monopoly of the home market. Hence in Great Britain, 
and in most other European countries, the extraordinary duties upon almost 
all goods imported by alien merchants. Hence the high duties and 
prohibitions upon all those foreign manufactures which can come into 
competition with our own. Hence, too, the extraordinary restraints upon the 
importation of almost all sorts of goods from those countries with which the 
balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous; that is, from those 
against whom national animosity happens to be most violently inflamed. 
    The wealth of a neighbouring nation, however, though dangerous in war 
and politics, is certainly advantageous in trade. In a state of hostility it may 
enable our enemies to maintain fleets and armies superior to our own; but in 
a state of peace and commerce it must likewise enable them to exchange 
with us to a greater value, and to afford a better market, either for the 
immediate produce of our own industry, or for whatever is purchased with 
that produce. As a rich man is likely to be a better customer to the 
industrious people in his neighbourhood than a poor, so is likewise a rich 
nation. A rich man, indeed, who is himself a manufacturer, is a very 
dangerous neighbour to all those who deal in the same way. All the rest of 
the neighbourhood, however, by far the greatest number, profit by the good 
market which his expense affords them. They even profit by his 
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underselling the poorer workmen who deal in the same way with him. The 
manufacturers of a rich nation, in the same manner, may no doubt be very 
dangerous rivals to those of their neighbours. This very competition, 
however, is advantageous to the great body of the people, who profit greatly 
besides by the good market which the great expense of such a nation affords 
them in every other way. Private people who want to make a fortune never 
think of retiring to the remote and poor provinces of the country, but resort 
either to the capital, or to some of the great commercial towns. They know 
that where little wealth circulates there is little to be got, but that where a 
great deal is in motion, some share of it may fall to them. The same maxims 
which would in this manner direct the common sense of one, or ten, or 
twenty individuals, should regulate the judgment of one, or ten, or twenty 
millions, and should make a whole nation regard the riches of its neighbours 
as a probable cause and occasion for itself to acquire riches. A nation that 
would enrich itself by foreign trade is certainly most likely to do so when its 
neighbours are all rich, industrious, and commercial nations. A great nation 
surrounded on all sides by wandering savages and poor barbarians might, no 
doubt, acquire riches by the cultivation of its own lands, and by its own 
interior commerce, but not by foreign trade. It seems to have been in this 
manner that the ancient Egyptians and the modern Chinese acquired their 
great wealth. The ancient Egyptians, it is said, neglected foreign commerce, 
and the modern Chinese, it is known, bold it in the utmost contempt, and 
scarce deign to afford it the decent protection of the laws. The modern 
maxims of foreign commerce, by aiming at the impoverishment of all our 
neighbours, so far as they are capable of producing their intended effect, 
tend to render that very commerce insignificant and contemptible. 
    It is in consequence of these maxims that the commerce between France 
and England has in both countries been subjected to so many 
discouragements and restraints. If those two countries, however, were to 
consider their real interest, without either mercantile jealousy or national 
animosity, the commerce of France might be more advantageous to Great 
Britain than that of any other country, and for the same reason that of Great 
Britain to France. France is the nearest neighbour to Great Britain. In the 
trade between the southern coast of England and the northern and north-
western coasts of France, the returns might be expected, in the same manner 
as in the inland trade, four, five, or six times in the year. The capital, 
therefore, employed in this trade could in each of the two countries keep in 
motion four, five, or six times the quantity of industry, and afford 
employment and subsistence to four, five, or six times the number of 
people, which an equal capital could do in the greater part of the other 
branches of foreign trade. Between the parts of France and Great Britain 
most remote from one another, the returns might be expected, at least, once 
in the year, and even this trade would so far be at least equally 
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advantageous as the greater part of the other branches of our foreign 
European trade. It would be, at least, three times more advantageous than 
the boasted trade with our North American colonies, in which the returns 
were seldom made in less than three years, frequently not in less than four 
or five years. France, besides, is supposed to contain twenty-four millions of 
inhabitants. Our North American colonies were never supposed to contain 
more than three millions; and France is a much richer country than North 
America; though, on account of the more unequal distribution of riches, 
there is much more poverty and beggary in the one country than in the 
other. France, therefore, could afford a market at least eight times more 
extensive, and, on account of the superior frequency of the returns, four-and-
twenty times more advantageous than that which our North American 
colonies ever afforded. The trade of Great Britain would be just as 
advantageous to France, and, in proportion to the wealth, population, and 
proximity of the respective countries, would have the same superiority over 
that which France carries on with her own colonies. Such is the very great 
difference between that trade, which the wisdom of both nations has thought 
proper to discourage, and that which it has favoured the most. 
    But the very same circumstances which would have rendered an open and 
free commerce between the two countries so advantageous to both, have 
occasioned the principal obstructions to that commerce. Being neighbours, 
they are necessarily enemies, and the wealth and power of each becomes, 
upon that account, more formidable to the other; and what would increase 
the advantage of national friendship serves only to inflame the violence of 
national animosity. They are both rich and industrious nations; and the 
merchants and manufacturers of each dread the competition of the skill and 
activity of those of the other. Mercantile jealousy is excited, and both 
inflames, and is itself inflamed, by the violence of national animosity; and 
the traders of both countries have announced, with all the passionate 
confidence of interested falsehood, the certain ruin of each, in consequence 
of that unfavourable balance of trade, which, they pretend, would be the 
infallible effect of an unrestrained commerce with the other. 
    There is no commercial country in Europe of which the approaching ruin 
has not frequently been foretold by the pretended doctors of this system 
from an unfavourable balance of trade. After all the anxiety, however, 
which they have excited about this, after all the vain attempts of almost all 
trading nations to turn that balance in their own favour and against their 
neighbours, it does not appear that any one nation in Europe has been in any 
respect impoverished by this cause. Every town and country, on the 
contrary, in proportion as they have opened their ports to all nations, instead 
of being ruined by this free trade, as the principles of the commercial 
system would lead us to expect, have been enriched by it. Though there are 
in Europe, indeed, a few towns which in some respects deserve the name of 
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free ports, there is no country which does so. Holland, perhaps, approaches 
the nearest to this character of any though still very remote from it; and 
Holland, it is acknowledged, not only derives its whole wealth, but a great 
part of its necessary subsistence, from foreign trade. 
    There is another balance, indeed, which has already been explained, very 
different from the balance of trade, and which, according as it happens to be 
either favourable or unfavourable, necessarily occasions the prosperity or 
decay of every nation. This is the balance of the annual produce and 
consumption. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, it has 
already been observed, exceeds that of the annual consumption, the capital 
of the society must annually increase in proportion to this excess. The 
society in this case lives within its revenue, and what is annually saved out 
of its revenue is naturally added to its capital, and employed so as to 
increase still further the annual produce. If the exchangeable value of the 
annual produce, on the contrary, fail short of the annual consumption, the 
capital of the society must annually decay in proportion to this deficiency. 
The expense of the society in this case exceeds its revenue, and necessarily 
encroaches upon its capital. Its capital, therefore, must necessarily decay, 
and together with it the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its 
industry. 
    This balance of produce and consumption is entirely different from what 
is called the balance of trade. It might take place in a nation which had no 
foreign trade, but which was entirely separated from all the world. It may 
take place in the whole globe of the earth, of which the wealth, population, 
and improvement may be either gradually increasing or gradually decaying. 
    The balance of produce and consumption may be constantly in favour of 
a nation, though what is called the balance of trade be generally against it. A 
nation may import to a greater value than it exports for half a century, 
perhaps, together; the gold and silver which comes into it during an this 
time may be all immediately sent out of it; its circulating coin may 
gradually decay, different sorts of paper money being substituted in its 
place, and even the debts, too, which it contracts in the principal nations 
with whom it deals, may be gradually increasing; and yet its real wealth, the 
exchangeable value of the annual produce of its lands and labour, may, 
during the same period, have been increasing in a much greater proportion. 
The state of our North American colonies, and of the trade which they 
carried on with Great Britain, before the commencement of the present 
disturbances, may serve as a proof that this is by no means an impossible 
supposition. 
CHAPTER IV
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Of Drawbacks
MERCHANTS and manufacturers are not contented with the monopoly of 
the home market, but desire likewise the most extensive foreign sale for 
their goods. Their country has no jurisdiction in foreign nations, and 
therefore can seldom procure them any monopoly there. They are generally 
obliged, therefore, to content themselves with petitioning for certain 
encouragements to exportation. 
    Of these encouragements what are called Drawbacks seem to be the most 
reasonable. To allow the merchant to draw back upon exportation, either the 
whole or a part of whatever excise or inland duty is imposed upon domestic 
industry, can never occasion the exportation of a greater quantity of goods 
than what would have been exported had no duty been imposed. Such 
encouragements do not tend to turn towards any particular employment a 
greater share of the capital of the country than what would go to that 
employment of its own accord, but only to hinder the duty from driving 
away any part of that share to other employments. They tend not to overturn 
that balance which naturally establishes itself among all the various 
employments of the society; but to hinder it from being overturned by the 
duty. They tend not to destroy, but to preserve what it is in most cases 
advantageous to preserve, the natural division and distribution of labour in 
the society. 
    The same thing may be said of the drawbacks upon the re-exportation of 
foreign goods imported, which in Great Britain generally amount to by 
much the largest part of the duty upon importation. By the second of the 
rules annexed to the Act of Parliament which imposed what is now called 
the Old Subsidy, every merchant, whether English or alien, was allowed to 
draw back half that duty upon exportation; the English merchant, provided 
the exportation took place within twelve months; the alien, provided it took 
place within nine months. Wines, currants, and wrought silks were the only 
goods which did not fall within this rule, having other and more 
advantageous allowances. The duties imposed by this Act of Parliament 
were at that time the only duties upon the importation of foreign goods. The 
term within which this and all other drawbacks could be claimed was 
afterwards (by the 7th George I, c. 21, sect. 10) extended to three years. 
    The duties which have been imposed since the Old Subsidy are, the 
greater part of them, wholly drawn back upon exportation. This general 
rule, however, is liable to a great number of exceptions, and the doctrine of 
drawbacks has become a much less simple matter than it was at their first 
institution. 
    Upon the exportation of some foreign goods, of which it was expected 
that the importation would greatly exceed what was necessary for the home 
consumption, the whole duties are drawn back, without retaining even half 
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the Old Subsidy. Before the revolt of our North American colonies, we had 
the monopoly of the tobacco of Maryland and Virginia. We imported about 
ninety-six thousand hogsheads, and the home consumption was not 
supposed to exceed fourteen thousand. To facilitate the great exportation 
which was necessary, in order to rid us of the rest, the whole duties were 
drawn back, provided the exportation took place within three years. 
    We still have, though not altogether, yet very nearly, the monopoly of the 
sugars of our West Indian Islands. If sugars are exported within a year, 
therefore, all the duties upon importation are drawn back, and if exported 
within three years all the duties, except half the Old Subsidy, which still 
continues to be retained upon the exportation of the greater part of goods. 
Though the importation of sugar exceeds, a good deal, what is necessary for 
the home consumption, the excess is inconsiderable in comparison of what 
it used to be in tobacco. 
    Some goods, the particular objects of the jealousy of our own 
manufacturers, are prohibited to be imported for home consumption. They 
may, however, upon paying certain duties, be imported and warehoused for 
exportation. But upon such exportation, no part of these duties are drawn 
back. Our manufacturers are unwilling, it seems, that even this restricted 
importation should be encouraged, and are afraid lest some part of these 
goods should be stolen out of the warehouse, and thus come into 
competition with their own. It is under these regulations only that we can 
import wrought silks, French cambrics and lawns, calicoes painted, printed, 
stained or dyed, etc. 
    We are unwilling even to be the carriers of French goods, and choose 
rather to forego a profit to ourselves than to suffer those, whom we consider 
as our enemies, to make any profit by our means. Not only half the Old 
Subsidy, but the second twenty-five per cent, is retained upon the 
exportation of all French goods. 
    By the fourth of the rules annexed to the Old Subsidy, the drawback 
allowed upon the exportation of all wines amounted to a great deal more 
than half the duties which were, at that time, paid upon their importation; 
and it seems, at that time, to have been the object of the legislature to give 
somewhat more than ordinary encouragement to the carrying trade in wine. 
Several of the other duties too, which were imposed either at the same time, 
or subsequent to the Old Subsidy- what is called the additional duty, the 
New Subsidy, the One-third and Two-thirds Subsidies, the impost 1692, the 
coinage on wine- were allowed to be wholly drawn back upon exportation. 
All those duties, however, except the additional duty and impost 1692, 
being paid down in ready money, upon importation, the interest of so large 
a sum occasioned an expense, which made it unreasonable to expect any 
profitable carrying trade in this article. Only a part, therefore, of the duty 
called the impost on wine, and no part of the twenty-five pounds the ton 
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upon French wines, or of the duties imposed in 1745, in 1763, and in 1778, 
were allowed to be drawn back upon exportation. The two imposts of five 
per cent, imposed in 1779 and 1781, upon all the former duties of customs, 
being allowed to be wholly drawn back upon the exportation of all other 
goods, were likewise allowed to be drawn back upon that of wine. The last 
duty that has been particularly imposed upon wine, that of 1780, is allowed 
to be wholly drawn back, an indulgence which, when so many heavy duties 
are retained, most probably could never occasion the exportation of a single 
ton of wine. These rules take place with regard to all places of lawful 
exportation, except the British colonies in America. 
    The 15th Charles II, c. 7, called An Act for the Encouragement of Trade, 
had given Great Britain the monopoly of supplying the colonies with all the 
commodities of the growth or manufacture of Europe; and consequently 
with wines. In a country of so extensive a coast as our North American and 
West Indian colonies, where our authority was always so very slender, and 
where the inhabitants were allowed to carry out, in their own ships, their 
non-enumerated commodities, at first to all parts of Europe, and afterwards 
to all parts of Europe south of Cape Finisterre, it is not very probable that 
this monopoly could ever be much respected; and they probably, at all 
times, found means of bringing back some cargo from the countries to 
which they were allowed to carry out one. They seem, however, to have 
found some difficulty in importing European wines from the places of their 
growth, and they could not well import them from Great Britain where they 
were loaded with many heavy duties, of which a considerable part was not 
drawn back upon exportation. Maderia wine, not being a European 
commodity, could be imported directly into America and the West Indies, 
countries which, in all their non-enumerated commodities, enjoyed a free 
trade to the island of Maderia. These circumstances had probably 
introduced that general taste for Maderia wine, which our officers found 
established in all our colonies at the commencement of the war, which 
began in 1755, and which they brought back with them to the mother 
country, where that wine had not been much in fashion before. Upon the 
conclusion of that war, in 1763 (by the 4th George III, c. 15, sect. 12), all 
the duties, except L3 10s., were allowed to be drawn back upon the 
exportation to the colonies of all wines, except French wines, to the 
commerce and consumption of which national prejudice would allow no 
sort of encouragement. The period between the granting of this indulgence 
and the revolt of our North American colonies was probably too short to 
admit of any considerable change in the customs of those countries. 
    The same act, which, in the drawback upon all wines, except French 
wines, thus favoured the colonies so much more than other countries; in 
those upon the greater part of other commodities favoured them much less. 
Upon the exportation of the greater part of commodities to other countries, 
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half the old subsidy was drawn back. But this law enacted that no part of 
that duty should be drawn back upon the exportation to the colonies of any 
commodities, of the growth or manufacture either of Europe or the East 
Indies, except wines, white calicoes, and muslins. 
    Drawbacks were, perhaps, originally granted for the encouragement of 
the carrying trade, which, as the freight of the ships is frequently paid by 
foreigners in money, was supposed to be peculiarly fitted for bringing gold 
and silver into the country. But though the carrying trade certainly deserves 
no peculiar encouragement, though the motive of the institution was 
perhaps abundantly foolish, the institution itself seems reasonable enough. 
Such drawbacks cannot force into this trade a greater share of the capital of 
the country than what would have gone to it of its own accord had there 
been no duties upon importation. They only prevent its being excluded 
altogether by those duties. The carrying trade, though it deserves no 
preference, ought not to be precluded, but to be left free like all other trades. 
It is a necessary resource for those capitals which cannot find employment 
either in the agriculture or in the manufactures of the country, either in its 
home trade or in its foreign trade of consumption. 
    The revenue of the customs, instead of suffering, profits from such 
drawbacks by that part of the duty which is retained. If the whole duties had 
been retained, the foreign goods upon which they are paid could seldom 
have been exported, nor consequently imported, for want of a market. The 
duties, therefore, of which a part is retained would never have been paid. 
    These reasons seem sufficiently to justify drawbacks, and would justify 
them, though the whole duties, whether upon the produce of domestic 
industry, or upon foreign goods, were always drawn back upon exportation. 
The revenue of excise would in this case, indeed, suffer a little, and that of 
the customs a good deal more; but the natural balance of industry, the 
natural division and distribution of labour, which is always more or less 
disturbed by such duties, would be more nearly re-established by such a 
regulation. 
    These reasons, however, will justify drawbacks only upon exporting 
goods to those countries which are altogether foreign and independent, not 
to those in which our merchants and manufacturers enjoy a monopoly. A 
drawback, for example, upon the exportation of European goods to our 
American colonies will not always occasion a greater exportation than what 
would have taken place without it. By means of the monopoly which our 
merchants and manufacturers enjoy there, the same quantity might 
frequently, perhaps, be sent thither, though the whole duties were retained. 
The drawback, therefore, may frequently be pure loss to the revenue of 
excise and customs, without altering the state of the trade, or rendering it in 
any respect more extensive. How far such drawbacks can be justified, as a 
proper encouragement to the industry of our colonies, or how far it is 
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advantageous to the mother country, that they should be exempted from 
taxes which are paid by all the rest of their fellow subjects, will appear 
hereafter when I come to treat the colonies. 
    Drawbacks, however, it must always be understood, are useful only in 
those cases in which the goods for the exportation of which they are given 
are really exported to some foreign country; and not clandestinely re-
imported into our own. That some drawbacks, particularly those upon 
tobacco, have frequently been abused in this manner, and have given 
occasion to many frauds equally hurtful both to the revenue and to the fair 
trader, is well known. 
CHAPTER V
Of Bounties
    BOUNTIES upon exportation are, in Great Britain, frequently petitioned 
for, and sometimes granted to the produce of particular branches of 
domestic industry. By means of them our merchants and manufacturers, it is 
pretended, will be enabled to sell their goods as cheap, or cheaper than their 
rivals in the foreign market. A greater quantity, it is said, will thus be 
exported, and the balance of trade consequently turned more in favour of 
our own country. We cannot give our workmen a monopoly in the foreign 
as we have done in the home market. We cannot force foreigners to buy 
their goods as we have done our own countrymen. The next best expedient, 
it has been thought, therefore, is to pay them for buying. It is in this manner 
that the mercantile system proposes to enrich the whole country, and to put 
money into all our pockets by means of the balance of trade. 
    Bounties, it is allowed, ought to be given to those branches of trade only 
which cannot be carried on without them. But every branch of trade in 
which the merchant can sell his goods for a price which replaces to him, 
with the ordinary profits of stock, the whole capital employed in preparing 
and sending them to market, can be carried on without a bounty. Every such 
branch is evidently upon a level with all the other branches of trade which 
are carried on without bounties, and cannot therefore require one more than 
they. Those trades only require bounties in which the merchant is obliged to 
sell his goods for a price which does not replace to him his capital, together 
with the ordinary profit; or in which he is obliged to sell them for less than 
it really costs him to send them to market. The bounty is given in order to 
make up this loss, and to encourage him to continue, or perhaps to begin, a 
trade of which the expense is supposed to be greater than the returns, of 
which every operation eats up a part of the capital employed in it, and 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth4.html (62 of 209)4/11/2005 9:46:59 AM
The Wealth of Nations
which is of such a nature that, if all other trades resembled it, there would 
soon be no capital left in the country. 
    The trades, it is to be observed, which are carried on by means of 
bounties, are the only ones which can be carried on between two nations for 
any considerable time together, in such a manner as that one of them shall 
always and regularly lose, or sell its goods for less than it really costs to 
send them to market. But if the bounty did not repay to the merchant what 
he would otherwise lose upon the price of his goods, his own interest would 
soon oblige him to employ his stock in another way, or to find out a trade in 
which the price of the goods would replace to him, with the ordinary profit, 
the capital employment in sending them to market. The effect of bounties, 
like that of all the other expedients of the mercantile system, can only be to 
force the trade of a country into a channel much less advantageous than that 
in which it would naturally run of its own accord. 
    The ingenious and well-informed author of the tracts upon the corn trade 
has shown very clearly that, since the bounty upon the exportation of corn 
was first established, the price of the corn exported, valued moderately 
enough, has exceeded that of the corn imported, valued very high, by a 
much greater sum than the amount of the whole bounties which have been 
paid during that period. This, he imagines, upon the true principles of the 
mercantile system, is a clear proof that this forced corn trade is beneficial to 
the nation; the value of the exportation exceeding that of the importation by 
a much greater sum than the whole extraordinary expense which the public 
has been at in order to get it exported. He does not consider that this 
extraordinary expense, or the bounty, is the smallest part of the expense 
which the exportation of corn really costs the society. The capital which the 
farmer employed in raising it must likewise be taken into the account. 
Unless the price of the corn when sold in the foreign markets replaces, not 
only the bounty, but this capital, together with the ordinary profits of stock, 
the society is a loser by the difference, or the national stock is so much 
diminished. But the very reason for which it has been thought necessary to 
grant a bounty is the supposed insufficiency of the price to do this. 
    The average price of corn, it has been said, has fallen considerably since 
the establishment of the bounty. That the average price of corn began to fall 
somewhat towards the end of the last century, and has continued to do so 
during the course of the sixty-four first years of the present, I have already 
endeavoured to show. But this event, supposing it to be as real as I believe it 
to be, must have happened in spite of the bounty, and cannot possibly have 
happened in consequence of it. It has happened in France, as well as in 
England, though in France there was not only no bounty, but, till 1764, the 
exportation of corn was subjected to a general prohibition. This gradual fall 
in the average price of grain, it is probable, therefore, is ultimately owing 
neither to the one regulation nor to the other. but to that gradual and 
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insensible rise in the real value of silver, which, in the first book in this 
discourse, I have endeavoured to show has taken place in the general market 
of Europe during the course of the present century. It seems to be altogether 
impossible that the bounty could ever contribute to lower the price of grain. 
    In years of plenty, it has already been observed, the bounty, by 
occasioning an extraordinary exportation, necessarily keeps up the price of 
corn in the home market above what it would naturally fall to. To do so was 
the avowed purpose of the institution. In years of scarcity, though the 
bounty is frequently suspended, yet the great exportation which it occasions 
in years of plenty must frequently hinder more or less the plenty of one year 
from relieving the scarcity of another. Both in years of plenty and in years 
of scarcity, therefore, the bounty necessarily tends to raise the money price 
of corn somewhat higher than it otherwise would be in the home market. 
    That, in the actual state of tillage, the bounty must necessarily have this 
tendency will not, I apprehend, be disputed by any reasonable person. But it 
has been thought by many people that it tends to encourage tillage, and that 
in two different ways; first, by opening a more extensive foreign market to 
the corn of the farmer, it tends, they imagine, to increase the demand for, 
and consequently the production of that commodity; and secondly, by 
securing to him a better price than he could otherwise expect in the actual 
state of tillage, it tends, they suppose, to encourage tillage. This double 
encouragement must, they imagine, in a long period of years, occasion such 
an increase in the production of corn as may lower its price in the home 
market much more than the bounty can raise it, in the actual state which 
tillage may, at the end of that period, happen to be in. 
    I answer, that whatever extension of the foreign market can be 
occasioned by the bounty must, in every particular year, be altogether at the 
expense of the home market; as every bushel of corn which is exported by 
means of the bounty, and which would not have been exported without the 
bounty, would have remained in the home market to increase the 
consumption and to lower the price of that commodity. The corn bounty, it 
is to be observed, as well as every other bounty upon exportation, imposes 
two different taxes upon the people; first, the tax which they are obliged to 
contribute in order to pay the bounty; and secondly, the tax which arises 
from the advanced price of the commodity in the home market, and which, 
as the whole body of the people are purchasers of corn, must, in this 
particular commodity, be paid by the whole body of the people. In this 
particular commodity, therefore, this second tax is by much the heavier of 
the two. Let us suppose that, taking one year with another, the bounty of 
five shillings upon the exportation of the quarter of wheat raises the price of 
that commodity in the home market only sixpence the bushel, or four 
shillings the quarter, higher than it otherwise would have been in the actual 
state of the crop. Even upon this very moderate supposition, the great body 
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of the people, over and above contributing the tax which pays the bounty of 
five shillings upon every quarter of wheat exported, must pay another of 
four shillings upon every quarter which they themselves consume. But, 
according to the very well informed author of the tracts upon the corn trade, 
the average proportion of the corn exported to that consumed at home is not 
more than that of one to thirty-one. For every five shillings, therefore, 
which they contribute to the payment of the first tax, they must contribute 
six pounds four shillings to the payment of the second. So very heavy a tax 
upon the first necessary of life must either reduce the subsistence of the 
labouring poor, or it must occasion some augmentation in their pecuniary 
wages proportionable to that in the pecuniary price of their subsistence. So 
far as it operates in the one way, it must reduce the ability of the labouring 
poor to educate and bring up their children, and must, so far, tend to restrain 
the population of the country. So far as it operates in the other, it must 
reduce the ability of the employers of the poor to employ so great a number 
as they otherwise might do, and must, so far, tend to restrain the industry of 
the country. The extraordinary exportation of corn, therefore, occasioned by 
the bounty, not only, in every particular year, diminishes the home, just as 
much as it extends the foreign, market and consumption, but, by restraining 
the population and industry of the country, its final tendency is to stunt and 
restrain the gradual extension of the home market; and thereby, in the long 
run, rather to diminish, than to augment, the whole market and consumption 
of corn. 
    This enhancement of the money price of corn, however, it has been 
thought, by rendering that commodity more profitable to the farmer, must 
necessarily encourage its production. 
    I answer, that this might be the case if the effect of the bounty was to 
raise the real price of corn, or to enable the farmer, with an equal quantity of 
it, to maintain a greater number of labourers in the same manner, whether 
liberal, moderate, or scanty, that other labourers are commonly maintained 
in his neighbourhood. But neither the bounty, it is evident, nor any other 
human institution can have any such effect. It is not the real, but the 
nominal price of corn, which can in any considerable degree be affected by 
the bounty. And though the tax which that institution imposes upon the 
whole body of the people may be very burdensome to those who pay it, it is 
of very little advantage to those who receive it. 
    The real effect of the bounty is not so much to raise the real value of corn 
as to degrade the real value of silver, or to make an equal quantity of it 
exchange for a smaller quantity, not only of corn, but of all other homemade 
commodities: for the money price of corn regulates that of all other home-
made commodities. 
    It regulates the money price of labour, which must always be such as to 
enable the labourer to purchase a quantity of corn sufficient to maintain him 
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and his family either in the liberal, moderate, or scanty manner in which the 
advancing, stationary, or declining circumstances of the society oblige his 
employers to maintain him. 
    It regulates the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce of 
land, which, in every period of improvement, must bear a certain proportion 
to that of corn, though this proportion is different in different periods. It 
regulates, for example, the money price of grass and hay, of butcher's meat, 
of horses, and the maintenance of horses, of land carriage consequently, or 
of the greater part of the inland commerce of the country. 
    By regulating the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce of 
land, it regulates that of the materials of almost all manufactures. By 
regulating the money price of labour, it regulates that of manufacturing art 
and industry. And by regulating both, it regulates that of the complete 
manufacture. The money price of labour, and of everything that is the 
produce either of land or labour, must necessarily either rise or fall in 
proportion to the money price of corn. 
    Though in consequence of the bounty, therefore, the farmer should be 
enabled to sell his corn for four shillings a bushel instead of three-and-
sixpence, and to pay his landlord a money rent proportionable to this rise in 
the money price of his produce, yet if, in consequence of this rise in the 
price of corn, four shillings will purchase no more homemade goods of any 
other kind than three-and-sixpence would have done before, neither the 
circumstances of the farmer nor those of the landlord will be much mended 
by this change. The farmer will not be able to cultivate much better: the 
landlord will not be able to live much better. In the purchase of foreign 
commodities this enhancement in the price of corn may give them some 
little advantage. In that of home-made commodities it can give them none at 
all. And almost the whole expense of the farmer, and the far greater part 
even of that of the landlord, is in homemade commodities. 
    That degradation in the value of silver which is the effect of the fertility 
of the mines, and which operates equally, or very near equally, through the 
greater part of the commercial world, is a matter of very little consequence 
to any particular country. The consequent rise of all money prices, though it 
does not make those who receive them really richer, does make them really 
poorer. A service of plate becomes really cheaper, and everything else 
remains precisely of the same real value as before. 
    But that degradation in the value of silver which, being the effect either 
of the peculiar situation or of the political institutions of a particular 
country, takes place only in that country, is a matter of very great 
consequence, which, far from tending to make anybody really richer, tends 
to make everybody really poorer. The rise in the money price of all 
commodities, which is in this case peculiar to that country, tends to 
discourage more or less every sort of industry which is carried on within it, 
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and to enable foreign nations, by furnishing almost all sorts of goods for a 
smaller quantity of silver than its own workmen can afford to do, to 
undersell them, not only in the foreign, but even in the home market. 
    It is the peculiar situation of Spain and Portugal as proprietors of the 
mines to be the distributors of gold and silver to all the other countries of 
Europe. Those metals ought naturally, therefore, to be somewhat cheaper in 
Spain and Portugal than in any other part of Europe. The difference, 
however, should be no more than the amount of the freight and insurance; 
and, on account of the great value and small bulk of those metals, their 
freight is no great matter, and their insurance is the same as that of any other 
goods of equal value. Spain and Portugal, therefore, could suffer very little 
from their peculiar situation, if they did not aggravate its disadvantages by 
their political institutions. 
    Spain by taxing, and Portugal by prohibiting the exportation of gold and 
silver, load that exportation with the expense of smuggling, and raise the 
value of those metals in other countries so much more above what it is in 
their own by the whole amount of this expense. When you dam up a stream 
of water, as soon as the dam is full as much water must run over the dam-
head as if there was no dam at all. The prohibition of exportation cannot 
detain a greater quantity of gold and silver in Spain and Portugal than what 
they can afford to employ, than what the annual produce of their land and 
labour will allow them to employ, in coin, plate, gilding, and other 
ornaments of gold and silver. When they have got this quantity the dam is 
full, and the whole stream which flows in afterwards must run over. The 
annual exportation of gold and silver from Spain and Portugal accordingly 
is, by all accounts, notwithstanding these restraints, very near equal to the 
whole annual importation. As the water, however, must always be deeper 
behind the dam-head than before it, so the quantity of gold and silver which 
these restraints detain in Spain and Portugal must, in proportion to the 
annual produce of their land and labour, be greater than what is to be found 
in other countries. The higher and stronger the dam-head, the greater must 
be the difference in the depth of water behind and before it. The higher the 
tax, the higher the penalties with which the prohibition is guarded, the more 
vigilant and severe the police which looks after the execution of the law, the 
greater must be the difference in the proportion of gold and silver to the 
annual produce of the land and labour of Spain and Portugal, and to that of 
other countries. It is said accordingly to be very considerable, and that you 
frequently find there a profusion of plate in houses where there is nothing 
else which would, in other countries, be thought suitable or correspondent 
to this sort of magnificence. The cheapness of gold and silver, or what is the 
same thing, the dearness of all commodities, which is the necessary effect of 
this redundancy of the precious metals, discourages both the agriculture and 
manufactures of Spain and Portugal, and enables foreign nations to supply 
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them with many sorts of rude, and with almost all sorts of manufactured 
produce, for a smaller quantity of gold and silver than what they themselves 
can either raise or make them for at home. The tax and prohibition operate 
in two different ways. They not only lower very much the value of the 
precious metals in Spain and Portugal, but by detaining there a certain 
quantity of those metals which would otherwise flow over other countries, 
they keep up their value in those other countries somewhat above what it 
otherwise would be, and thereby give those countries a double advantage in 
their commerce with Spain and Portugal. Open the flood-gates, and there 
will presently be less water above, and more below, the dam-head, and it 
will soon come to a level in both places. Remove the tax and the 
prohibition, and as the quantity of gold and silver will diminish 
considerably in Spain and Portugal, so it will increase somewhat in other 
countries, and the value of those metals, their proportion to the annual 
produce of land and labour, will soon come to a level, or very near to a 
level, in all. The loss which Spain and Portugal could sustain by this 
exportation of their gold and silver would be altogether nominal and 
imaginary. The nominal value of their goods, and of the annual produce of 
their land and labour, would fall, and would be expressed or represented by 
a smaller quantity of silver than before; but their real value would be the 
same as before, and would be sufficient to maintain, command, and employ, 
the same quantity of labour. As the nominal value of their goods would fall, 
the real value of what remained of their gold and silver would rise, and a 
smaller quantity of those metals would answer all the same purposes of 
commerce and circulation which had employed a greater quantity before. 
The gold and silver which would go abroad would not go abroad for 
nothing, but would bring back an equal value of goods of some kind or 
another. Those goods, too, would not be all matters of mere luxury and 
expense, to be consumed by idle people who produce nothing in return for 
their consumption. As the real wealth and revenue of idle people would not 
be augmented by this extraordinary exportation of gold and silver, so 
neither would their consumption be much augmented by it. Those goods 
would, probably, the greater part of them, and certainly some part of them, 
consist in materials, tools, and provisions, for the employment and 
maintenance of industrious people, who would reproduce, with a profit, the 
full value of their consumption. A part of the dead stock of the society 
would thus be turned into active stock, and would put into motion a greater 
quantity of industry than had been employed before. The annual produce of 
their land and labour would immediately be augmented a little, and in a few 
years would, probably, be augmented a great deal; their industry being thus 
relieved from one of the most oppressive burdens which it at present labours 
under. 
    The bounty upon the exportation of corn necessarily operates exactly in 
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the same way as this absurd policy of Spain and Portugal. Whatever be the 
actual state of tillage, it renders our corn somewhat dearer in the home 
market than it otherwise would be in that state, and somewhat cheaper in the 
foreign; and as the average money price of corn regulates more or less that 
of all other commodities, it lowers the value of silver considerably in the 
one, and tends to raise it a little in the other. It enables foreigners, the Dutch 
in particular, not only to eat our corn cheaper than they otherwise could do, 
but sometimes to eat it cheaper than even our own people can do upon the 
same occasions, as we are assured by an excellent authority, that of Sir 
Matthew Decker. It hinders our own workmen from furnishing their goods 
for so small a quantity of silver as they otherwise might do; and enables the 
Dutch to furnish theirs for a smaller. It tends to render our manufactures 
somewhat dearer in every market, and theirs somewhat cheaper than they 
otherwise would be, and consequently to give their industry a double 
advantage over our own. 
    The bounty, as it raises in the home market not so much the real as the 
nominal price of our corn, as it augments, not the quantity of labour which a 
certain quantity of corn can maintain and employ but only the quantity of 
silver which it will exchange for, it discourages our manufactures, without 
rendering any considerable service either to our farmers or country 
gentlemen. It puts, indeed, a little more money into the pockets of both, and 
it will perhaps be somewhat difficult to persuade the greater part of them 
that this is not rendering them a very considerable service. But if this money 
sinks in its value, in the quantity of labour, provisions, and homemade 
commodities of all different kinds which it is capable of purchasing as much 
as it rises in its quantity, the service will be little more than nominal and 
imaginary. 
    There is, perhaps, but one set of men in the whole commonwealth to 
whom the bounty either was or could be essentially serviceable. These were 
the corn merchants, the exporters and importers of corn. In years of plenty 
the bounty necessarily occasioned a greater exportation than would 
otherwise have taken place; and by hindering the plenty of one year from 
relieving the scarcity of another, it occasioned in years of scarcity a greater 
importation than would otherwise have been necessary. It increased the 
business of the corn merchant in both; and in years of scarcity, it not only 
enabled him to import a greater quantity, but to sell it for a better price, and 
consequently with a greater profit than he could otherwise have made, if the 
plenty of one year had not been more or less hindered from relieving the 
scarcity of another. It is in this set of men, accordingly, that I have observed 
the greatest zeal for the continuance or renewal of the bounty. 
    Our country gentlemen, when they imposed the high duties upon the 
importation of foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a 
prohibition, and when they established the bounty, seem to have imitated 
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the conduct of our manufacturers. By the one institution, they secured to 
themselves the monopoly of the home market, and by the other they 
endeavoured to prevent that market from ever being overstocked with their 
commodity. By both they endeavoured to raise its real value, in the same 
manner as our manufacturers had, by the like institutions, raised the real 
value of many different sorts of manufactured goods. They did not perhaps 
attend to the great and essential difference which nature has established 
between corn and almost every other sort of goods. When, either by the 
monopoly of the home market, or by a bounty upon exportation, you enable 
our woollen or linen manufacturers to sell their goods for somewhat a better 
price than they otherwise could get for them, you raise, not only the 
nominal, but the real price of those goods. You render them equivalent to a 
greater quantity of labour and subsistence, you increase not only the 
nominal, but the real profit, the real wealth and revenue of those 
manufacturers, and you enable them either to live better themselves, or to 
employ a greater quantity of labour in those particular manufactures. You 
really encourage those manufactures, and direct towards them a greater 
quantity of the industry of the country than what would probably go to them 
of its own accord. But when by the like institutions you raise the nominal or 
money-price of corn, you do not raise its real value. You do not increase the 
real wealth, the real revenue either of our farmers or country gentlemen. 
You do not encourage the growth of corn because you do not enable them to 
maintain and employ more labourers in raising it. The nature of things has 
stamped upon corn a real value which cannot be altered by merely altering 
its money price. No bounty upon exportation, no monopoly of the home 
market, can raise that value. The freest competition cannot lower it. 
Through the world in general that value is equal to the quantity of labour 
which it can maintain, and in every particular place it is equal to the 
quantity of labour which it can maintain in the way, whether liberal, 
moderate, or scanty, in which labour is commonly maintained in that place. 
Woollen or linen cloth are not the regulating commodities by which the real 
value of all other commodities must be finally measured and determined; 
corn is. The real value of every other commodity is finally measured and 
determined by the proportion which its average money price bears to the 
average money price of corn. The real value of corn does not vary with 
those variations in its average money price, which sometimes occur from 
one century to another. It is the real value of silver which varies with them. 
    Bounties upon the exportation of any homemade commodity are liable, 
first to that general objection which may be made to all the different 
expedients of the mercantile system; the objection of forcing some part of 
the industry of the country into a channel less advantageous than that in 
which it would run of its own accord: and, secondly, to the particular 
objection of forcing it, not only into a channel that is less advantageous, but 
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into one that is actually disadvantageous; the trade which cannot be carried 
on but by means of a bounty being necessarily a losing trade. The bounty 
upon the exportation of corn is liable to this further objection, that it can in 
no respect promote the raising of that particular commodity of which it was 
meant to encourage the production. When our country gentlemen, therefore, 
demanded the establishment of the bounty, though they acted in imitation of 
our merchants and manufacturers, they did not act with that complete 
comprehension of their own interest which commonly directs the conduct of 
those two other orders of people. They loaded the public revenue with a 
very considerable expense; they imposed a very heavy tax upon the whole 
body of the people; but they did not, in any sensible degree, increase the 
real value of their own commodity; and by lowering somewhat the real 
value of silver, they discouraged in some degree, the general industry of the 
country, and, instead of advancing, retarded more or less the improvement 
of their own lands, which necessarily depends upon the general industry of 
the country. 
    To encourage the production of any commodity, a bounty upon 
production, one should imagine, would have a more direct operation than 
one upon exportation. It would, besides, impose only one tax upon the 
people, that which they must contribute in order to pay the bounty. Instead 
of raising, it would tend to lower the price of the commodity in the home 
market; and thereby, instead of imposing a second tax upon the people, it 
might, at least, in part, repay them for what they had contributed to the first. 
Bounties upon production, however, have been very rarely granted. The 
prejudices established by the commercial system have taught us to believe 
that national wealth arises more immediately from exportation than from 
production. It has been more favoured accordingly, as the more immediate 
means of bringing money into the country. Bounties upon production, it has 
been said too, have been found by experience more liable to frauds than 
those upon exportation. How far this is true, I know not. That bounties upon 
exportation have been abused to many fraudulent purposes is very well 
known. But it is not the interest of merchants and manufacturers, the great 
inventors of all these expedients, that the home market should be 
overstocked with their goods, an event which a bounty upon production 
might sometimes occasion. A bounty upon exportation, by enabling them to 
send abroad the surplus part, and to keep up the price of what remains in the 
home market, effectually prevents this. Of all the expedients of the 
mercantile system, accordingly, it is the one of which they are the fondest. I 
have known the different undertakers of some particular works agree 
privately among themselves to give a bounty out of their own pockets upon 
the exportation of a certain proportion of the goods which they dealt in. This 
expedient succeeded so well that it more than doubled the price of their 
goods in the home market, notwithstanding a very considerable increase in 
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the produce. The operation of the bounty upon corn must have been 
wonderfully different if it has lowered the money price of that commodity. 
    Something like a bounty upon production, however, has been granted 
upon some particular occasions. The tonnage bounties given to the white-
herring and whale fisheries may, perhaps, be considered as somewhat of 
this nature. They tend directly, it may be supposed, to render the goods 
cheaper in the home market than they otherwise would be. In other respects 
their effects, it must be acknowledged, are the same as those of bounties 
upon exportation. By means of them a part of the capital of the country is 
employed in bringing goods to market, of which the price does not repay the 
cost together with the ordinary profits of stock. 
    But though the tonnage bounties of those fisheries do not contribute to 
the opulence of the nation, it may perhaps be thought that they contribute to 
its defence by augmenting the number of its sailors and shipping. This, it 
may be alleged, may sometimes be done by means of such bounties at a 
much smaller expense than by keeping up a great standing navy, if I may 
use such an expression, in the same way as a standing army. 
    Notwithstanding these favourable allegations, however, the following 
considerations dispose me to believe that, in granting at least one of these 
bounties, the legislature has been very grossly imposed upon. 
    First, the herring buss bounty seems too large. 
    From the commencement of the winter fishing, 1771, to the end of the 
winter fishing, 1781, the tonnage bounty upon the herring buss fishery has 
been at thirty shillings the ton. During these eleven years the whole number 
of barrels caught by the herring buss fishery of Scotland amounted to 
378,347. The herrings caught and cured at sea are called sea-sticks. In order 
to render them what are called merchantable herrings, it is necessary to 
repack them with an additional quantity of salt; and in this case, it is 
reckoned that three barrels of sea-sticks are usually repacked into two 
barrels of merchantable herrings. The number of barrels of merchantable 
herrings, therefore, caught during these eleven years will amount only, 
according to this account, to 252,231 1/3. During these eleven years the 
tonnage bounties paid amounted to L155,463 11s. or to 8s. 2 1/4d. upon 
every barrel of seasticks, and to 12s. 3 3/4d. upon every barrel of 
merchantable herrings. 
    The salt with which these herrings are cured is sometimes Scotch and 
sometimes foreign salt, both which are delivered free of all excise duty to 
the fish-curers. The excise duty upon Scotch salt is at present 1s. 6d., that 
upon foreign salt 10s. the bushel. A barrel of herrings is supposed to require 
about one bushel and one-fourth of a bushel foreign salt. Two bushels are 
the supposed average of Scotch salt. If the herrings are entered for 
exportation, no part of this duty is paid up; if entered for home 
consumption, whether the herrings were cured with foreign or with Scotch 
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salt, only one shilling the barrel is paid up. It was the old Scotch duty upon 
a bushel of salt, the quantity which, at a low estimation, had been supposed 
necessary for curing a barrel of herrings. In Scotland, foreign salt is very 
little used for any other purpose but the curing of fish. But from the 5th 
April 1771 to the 5th April 1782, the quantity of foreign salt imported 
amounted to 936,974 bushels, at eighty-four pounds the bushel: the quantity 
of Scotch salt, delivered from the works to the fish-curers, to no more than 
168,226, at fifty-six pounds the bushel only. It would appear, therefore, that 
it is principally foreign salt that is used in the fisheries. Upon every barrel of 
herrings exported there is, besides, a bounty of 2s. 8d., and more than two-
thirds of the buss caught herrings are exported. Put all these things together 
and you will find that, during these eleven years, every barrel of buss caught 
herrings, cured with Scotch salt when exported, has cost government L1 7s. 
5 3/4d.; and when entered for home consumption 14s. 3 3/4d.; and that 
every barrel cured with foreign salt, when exported, has cost government L1 
7s. 5 3/4d.; and when entered for home consumption L1. 3s. 9 3/4d. The 
price of a barrel of good merchantable herrings runs from seventeen and 
eighteen to four and five and twenty shillings, about a guinea at an average. 
    Secondly, the bounty to the white-herring fishery is a tonnage bounty; 
and is proportioned to the burden of the ship, not to her diligence or success 
in the fishery; and it has, I am afraid, been too common for vessels to fit out 
for the sole purpose of catching, not the fish, but the bounty. In the year 
1759, when the bounty was at fifty shillings the ton, the whole buss fishery 
of Scotland brought in only four barrels of sea-sticks. In that year each 
barrel of sea-sticks cost government in bounties alone L113 15s.; each 
barrel of merchantable herrings L159 7s. 6d. 
    Thirdly, the mode of fishing for which this tonnage bounty in the white-
herring fishery has been given (by busses or decked vessels from twenty to 
eighty tons burthen), seems not so well adapted to the situation of Scotland 
as to that of Holland, from the practice of which country it appears to have 
been borrowed. Holland lies at a great distance from the seas to which 
herrings are known principally to resort, and can, therefore, carry on that 
fishery only in decked vessels, which can carry water and provisions 
sufficient for a voyage to a distant sea. But the Hebrides or western islands, 
the islands of Shetland, and the northern and northwestern coasts of 
Scotland, the countries in whose neighbourhood the herring fishery is 
principally carried on, are everywhere intersected by arms of the sea, which 
run up a considerable way into the land, and which, in the language of the 
country, are called sea-lochs. It is to these sea-lochs that the herrings 
principally resort during the seasons in which they visit those seas; for the 
visits of this and, I am assured, of many other sorts of fish are not quite 
regular and constant. A boat fishery, therefore, seems to be the mode of 
fishing best adapted to the peculiar situation of Scotland, the fishers 
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carrying the herrings on shore, as fast as they are taken, to be either cured or 
consumed fresh. But the great encouragement which a bounty of thirty 
shillings the ton gives to the buss fishery is necessarily a discouragement to 
the boat fishery, which, having no such bounty, cannot bring its cured fish 
to market upon the same terms as the buss fishery. The boat fishery, 
accordingly, which before the establishment of the buss bounty was very 
considerable, and is said have employed a number of seamen not inferior to 
what the buss fishery employs at present, is now gone almost entirely to 
decay. Of the former extent, however, of this now ruined and abandoned 
fishery, I must acknowledge that I cannot pretend to speak with much 
precision. As no bounty was paid upon the outfit of the boat fishery, no 
account was taken of it by the officers of the customs or salt duties. 
    Fourthly, in many parts of Scotland, during certain seasons of the year, 
herrings make no inconsiderable part of the food of the people. A bounty, 
which tended to lower their price in the home market, might contribute a 
good deal to the relief of a great number of our fellow-subjects, whose 
circumstances are by no means affluent. But the herring buss bounty 
contributes to no such good purpose. It has ruined the boat fishery, which is, 
by far, the best adapted for the supply of the home market, and the 
additional bounty of 2s. 8d. the barrel upon exportation carries the greater 
part, more than two-thirds, of the produce of the buss fishery abroad. 
Between thirty and forty years ago, before the establishment of the buss 
bounty, fifteen shillings the barrel, I have been assured, was the common 
price of white herrings. Between ten and fifteen years ago, before the boat 
fishery was entirely ruined, the price is said to have run from seventeen to 
twenty shillings the barrel. For these last five years, it has, at an average, 
been at twenty-five shillings the barrel. This high price, however, may have 
been owing to the real scarcity of the herrings upon the coast of Scotland. I 
must observe, too, that the cask or barrel, which is usually sold with the 
herrings, and of which the price is included in all the foregoing prices, has, 
since the commencement of the American war, risen to about double its 
former price, or from about three shillings to about six shillings. I must 
likewise observe that the accounts I have received of the prices of former 
times have been by no means quite uniform and consistent; and an old man 
of great accuracy and experience has assured me that, more than fifty years 
ago, a guinea was the usual price of a barrel of good merchantable herrings; 
and this, I imagine, may still be looked upon as the average price. All 
accounts, however, I think, agree that the price has not been lowered in the 
home market in consequence of the buss bounty. 
    When the undertakers of fisheries, after such liberal bounties have been 
bestowed upon them, continue to sell their commodity at the same, or even 
at a higher price than they were accustomed to do before, it might be 
expected that their profits should be very great; and it is not improbable that 
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those of some individuals may have been so. In general, however, I have 
every reason to believe they have been quite otherwise. The usual effect of 
such bounties is to encourage rash undertakers to adventure in a business 
which they do not understand, and what they lose by their own negligence 
and ignorance more than compensates all that they can gain by the utmost 
liberality of government. In 1750, by the same act, which first gave the 
bounty of thirty shillings the ton for the encouragement of the white-herring 
fishery (the 23rd George II, c. 24), a joint-stock company was erected, with 
a capital of five hundred thousand pounds, to which the subscribers (over 
and above all other encouragements, the tonnage bounty just now 
mentioned, the exportation bounty of two shillings and eightpence the 
barrel, the delivery of both British and foreign salt duty free) were, during 
the space of fourteen years, for every hundred pounds which they 
subscribed and paid in to the stock of the society, entitled to three pounds a 
year, to be paid by the receiver-general of the customs in equal half-yearly 
payments. Besides this great company, the residence of whose governor and 
directors was to be in London, it was declared lawful to erect different 
fishing-chambers in all the different outports of the kingdom, provided a 
sum not less than ten thousand pounds was subscribed into the capital of 
each, to be managed at its own risk, and for its own profit and loss. The 
same annuity, and the same encouragements of all kinds, were given to the 
trade of those inferior chambers as to that of the great company. The 
subscription of the great company was soon filled up, and several different 
fishing-chambers were erected in the different outports of the kingdom. In 
spite of all these encouragements, almost all those different companies, both 
great and small, lost either the whole, or the greater part of their capitals; 
scarce a vestige now remains of any of them, and the white-herring fishery 
is now entirely, or almost entirely, carried on by private adventurers. 
    If any particular manufacture was necessary, indeed, for the defence of 
the society, it might not always be prudent to depend upon our neighbours 
for the supply; and if such manufacture could not otherwise be supported at 
home, it might not be unreasonable that all the other branches of industry 
should be taxed in order to support it. The bounties upon the exportation of 
British-made sailcloth and British-made gunpowder may, perhaps, both be 
vindicated upon this principle. 
    But though it can very seldom be reasonable to tax the industry of the 
great body of the people in order to support that of some particular class of 
manufacturers, yet in the wantonness of great prosperity, when the public 
enjoys a greater revenue than it knows well what to do with, to give such 
bounties to favourite manufactures may, perhaps, be as natural as to incur 
any other idle expense. In public as well as in private expenses, great wealth 
may, perhaps, frequently be admitted as an apology for great folly. But 
there must surely be something more than ordinary absurdity in continuing 
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such profusion in times of general difficulty and distress. 
    What is called a bounty is sometimes no more than a drawback, and 
consequently is not liable to the same objections as what is properly a 
bounty. The bounty, for example, upon refined sugar exported may be 
considered as a drawback of the duties upon the brown and muscovado 
sugars from which it is made. The bounty upon wrought silk exported, a 
drawback of the duties upon raw and thrown silk imported. The bounty 
upon gunpowder exported, a drawback of the duties upon brimstone and 
saltpetre imported. In the language of the customs those allowances only are 
called drawbacks which are given upon goods exported in the same form in 
which they are imported. When that form has been so altered by 
manufacture of any kind as to come under a new denomination, they are 
called bounties. 
    Premiums given by the public to artists and manufacturers who excel in 
their particular occupations are not liable to the same objections as bounties. 
By encouraging extraordinary dexterity and ingenuity, they serve to keep up 
the emulation of the workmen actually employed in those respective 
occupations, and are not considerable enough to turn towards any one of 
them a greater share of the capital of the country than what would go to it of 
its own accord. Their tendency is not to overturn the natural balance of 
employments, but to render the work which is done in each as perfect and 
complete as possible. The expense of premiums, besides, is very trifling; 
that of bounties very great. The bounty upon corn alone has sometimes cost 
the public in one year more than three hundred thousand pounds. 
DIGRESSION CONCERNING THE CORN TRADE AND CORN 
LAWS
I cannot conclude this chapter concerning bounties without observing that 
the praises which have been bestowed upon the law which establishes the 
bounty upon the exportation of corn, and upon that system of regulations 
which is connected with it, are altogether unmerited. A particular 
examination of the nature of the corn trade, and of the principal British laws 
which relate to it. will sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this assertion. 
The great importance of this subject must justify the length of the 
digression. 
    The trade of the corn merchant is composed of four different branches, 
which, though they may sometimes be all carried on by the same person, are 
in their own nature four separate and distinct trades. These are, first, the 
trade of the inland dealer; secondly, that of the merchant importer for home 
consumption; thirdly, that of the merchant exporter of home produce for 
foreign consumption; and, fourthly, that of the merchant carrier, or of the 
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importer of corn in order to export it again. 
    I. The interest of the inland dealer, and that of the great body of the 
people, how opposite soever they may at first sight appear, are, even in 
years of the greatest scarcity, exactly the same. It is his interest to raise the 
price of his corn as high as the real scarcity of the season requires, and it 
can never be his interest to raise it higher. By raising the price he 
discourages the consumption, and puts everybody more or less, but 
particularly the inferior ranks of people, upon thrift and good management. 
If, by raising it too high, he discourages the consumption so much that the 
supply of the season is likely to go beyond the consumption of the season, 
and to last for some time after the next crop begins to come in, he runs the 
hazard, not only of losing a considerable part of his corn by natural causes, 
but of being obliged to sell what remains of it for much less than what he 
might have had for it several months before. If by not raising the price high 
enough he discourages the consumption so little that the supply of the 
season is likely to fall short of the consumption of the season, he not only 
loses a part of the profit which he might otherwise have made, but he 
exposes the people to suffer before the end of the season, instead of the 
hardships of a dearth, the dreadful horrors of a famine. It is the interest of 
the people that their daily, weekly, and monthly consumption should be 
proportioned as exactly as possible to the supply of the season. The interest 
of the inland corn dealer is the same. By supplying them, as nearly as he can 
judge, in this proportion, he is likely to sell all his corn for the highest price, 
and with the greatest profit; and his knowledge of the state of the crop, and 
of his daily, weekly, and monthly sales, enable him to judge, with more or 
less accuracy, how far they really are supplied in this manner. Without 
intending the interest of the people, he is necessarily led, by a regard to his 
own interest, to treat them, even in years of scarcity, pretty much in the 
same manner as the prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged to treat 
his crew. When he foresees that provisions are likely to run short, he puts 
them upon short allowance. Though from excess of caution he should 
sometimes do this without any real necessity, yet all the inconveniences 
which his crew can thereby suffer are inconsiderable in comparison of the 
danger, misery, and ruin to which they might sometimes be exposed by a 
less provident conduct. Though from excess of avarice, in the same manner, 
the inland corn merchant should sometimes raise the price of his corn 
somewhat higher than the scarcity of the season requires, yet all the 
inconveniences which the people can suffer from this conduct, which 
effectually secures them from a famine in the end of the season, are 
inconsiderable in comparison of what they might have been exposed to by a 
more liberal way of dealing in the beginning of it. The corn merchant 
himself is likely to suffer the most by this excess of avarice; not only from 
the indignation which it generally excites against him, but, though he should 
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escape the effects of this indignation, from the quantity of corn which it 
necessarily leaves upon his hands in the end of the season, and which, if the 
next season happens to prove favourable, he must always sell for a much 
lower price than he might otherwise have had. 
    Were it possible, indeed, for one great company of merchants to possess 
themselves of the whole crop of an extensive country, it might, perhaps, be 
their interest to deal with it as the Dutch are said to do with the spiceries of 
the Moluccas, to destroy or throw away a considerable part of it in order to 
keep up the price of the rest. But it is scarce possible, even by the violence 
of law, to establish such an extensive monopoly with regard to corn; and, 
wherever the law leaves the trade free, it is of all commodities the least 
liable to be engrossed or monopolized by the force of a few large capitals, 
which buy up the greater part of it. Not only its value far exceeds what the 
capitals of a few private men are capable of purchasing, but, supposing they 
were capable of purchasing it, the manner in which it is produced renders 
this purchase practicable. As in every civilised country it is the commodity 
of which the annual consumption is the greatest, so a greater quantity of 
industry is annually employed in producing corn than in producing any 
other commodity. When it first comes from the ground, too, it is necessarily 
divided among a greater number of owners than any other commodity; and 
these owners can never be collected into one place like a number of 
independent manufacturers, but are necessarily scattered through all the 
different corners of the country. These first owners either immediately 
supply the consumers in their own neighbourhood, or they supply other 
inland dealers who supply those consumers. The inland dealers in corn, 
therefore, including both the farmer and the baker, are necessarily more 
numerous than the dealers in any other commodity, and their dispersed 
situation renders it altogether impossible for them to enter into any general 
combination. If in a year of scarcity, therefore, any of them should find that 
he had a good deal more corn upon hand than, at the current price, he could 
hope to dispose of before the end of the season, he would never think of 
keeping up this price to his own loss, and to the sole benefit of his rivals and 
competitors, but would immediately lower it, in order to get rid of his corn 
before the new crop began to come in. The same motives, the same 
interests, which would thus regulate the conduct of any one dealer, would 
regulate that of every other, and oblige them all in general to sell their corn 
at the price which, according to the best of their judgment, was most 
suitable to the scarcity or plenty of the season. 
    Whoever examines with attention the history of the dearths and famines 
which have afflicted any part of Europe, during either the course of the 
present or that of the two preceding centuries, of several of which we have 
pretty exact accounts, will find, I believe, that a dearth never has arisen 
from any combination among the inland dealers in corn, nor from any other 
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cause but a real scarcity, occasioned sometimes perhaps, and in some 
particular places, by the waste of war, but in by far the greatest number of 
cases by the fault of the seasons; and that a famine has never arisen from 
any other cause but the violence of government attempting, by improper 
means, to remedy the inconveniences of a dearth. 
    In an extensive corn country, between all the different parts of which 
there is a free commerce and communication, the scarcity occasioned by the 
most unfavourable seasons can never be so great as to produce a famine; 
and the scantiest crop, if managed with frugality and economy, will 
maintain through the year the same number of people that are commonly 
fed on a more affluent manner by one of moderate plenty. The seasons most 
unfavourable to the crop are those of excessive drought or excessive rain. 
But as corn grows equally upon high and low lands, upon grounds that are 
disposed to be too wet, and upon those that are disposed to be too dry, either 
the drought or the rain which is hurtful to one part of the country is 
favourable to another; and though both in the wet and in the dry season the 
crop is a good deal less than in one more properly tempered, yet in both 
what is lost in one part of the country is in some measure compensated by 
what is gained in the other. In rice countries, where the crop not only 
requires a very moist soil, but where in a certain period of its growing it 
must be laid under water, the effects of a drought are much more dismal. 
Even in such countries, however, the drought is, perhaps, scarce ever so 
universal as necessarily to occasion a famine, if the government would 
allow a free trade. The drought in Bengal, a few years ago, might probably 
have occasioned a very great dearth. Some improper regulations, some 
injudicious restraints imposed by the servants of the East India Company 
upon the rice trade, contributed, perhaps, to turn that dearth into a famine. 
    When the government, in order to remedy the inconveniences of a dearth, 
orders all the dealers to sell their corn at what it supposes a reasonable 
price, it either hinders them from bringing it to market, which may 
sometimes produce a famine even in the beginning of the season; or if they 
bring it thither, it enables the people, and thereby encourages them to 
consume it so fast as must necessarily produce a famine before the end of 
the season. The unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the corn trade, as it is 
the only effectual preventative of the miseries of a famine, so it is the best 
palliative of the inconveniences of a dearth; for the inconveniences of a real 
scarcity cannot be remedied, they can only be palliated. No trade deserves 
more the full protection of the law, and no trade requires it so much, 
because no trade is so much exposed to popular odium. 
    In years of scarcity the inferior ranks of people impute their distress to 
the avarice of the corn merchant, who becomes the object of their hatred 
and indignation. Instead of making profit upon such occasions, therefore, he 
is often in danger of being utterly ruined, and of having his magazines 
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plundered and destroyed by their violence. It is in years of scarcity, 
however, when prices are high, that the corn merchant expects to make his 
principal profit. He is generally in contract with some farmers to furnish 
him for a certain number of years with a certain quantity of corn at a certain 
price. This contract price is settled according to what is supposed to be the 
moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average price, which 
before the late years of scarcity was commonly about eight-and-twenty 
shillings for the quarter of wheat, and for that of other grain in proportion. 
In years of scarcity, therefore, the corn merchant buys a great part of his 
corn for the ordinary price, and sells it for a much higher. That this 
extraordinary profit, however, is no more than sufficient to put his trade 
upon a fair level with other trades, and to compensate the many losses 
which he sustains upon other occasions, both from the perishable nature of 
the commodity itself, and from the frequent and unforeseen fluctuations of 
its price, seems evident enough, from this single circumstance, that great 
fortunes are as seldom made in this as in any other trade. The popular 
odium, however, which attends it in years of scarcity, the only years in 
which it can be very profitable, renders people of character and fortune 
averse to enter into it. It is abandoned to an inferior set of dealers; and 
millers, bakers, mealmen, and meal factors, together with a number of 
wretched hucksters, are almost the only middle people that, in the home 
market, come between the grower and the consumer. 
    The ancient policy of Europe, instead of discountenancing this popular 
odium against a trade so beneficial to the public, seems, on the contrary, to 
have authorized and encouraged it. 
    By the 5th and 6th of Edward VI, c. 14, it was enacted that whoever 
should buy any corn or grain with intent to sell it again, should be reputed 
an unlawful engrosser, and should, for the first fault, suffer two months' 
imprisonment, and forfeit the value of the corn; for the second, suffer six 
months' imprisonment, and forfeit double the value; and for the third, be set 
in the pillory, suffer imprisonment during the king's pleasure, and forfeit all 
his goods and chattels. The ancient policy of most other parts of Europe was 
no better than that of England. 
    Our ancestors seem to have imagined that the people would buy their 
corn cheaper of the farmer than of the corn merchant, who, they were afraid, 
would require, over and above the price which he paid to the farmer, an 
exorbitant profit to himself. They endeavoured, therefore, to annihilate his 
trade altogether. They even endeavoured to hinder as much as possible any 
middle man of any kind from coming in between the grower and the 
consumer; and this was the meaning of the many restraints which they 
imposed upon the trade of those whom they called kidders or carriers of 
corn, a trade which nobody was allowed to exercise without a licence 
ascertaining his qualifications as a man of probity and fair dealing. The 
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authority of three justices of the peace was, by the statute of Edward VI, 
necessary in order to grant this licence. But even this restraint was 
afterwards thought insufficient, and by a statute of Elizabeth the privilege of 
granting it was confined to the quarter-sessions. 
    The ancient policy of Europe endeavoured in this manner to regulate 
agriculture, the great trade of the country, by maxims quite different from 
those which it established with regard to manufactures, the great trade of the 
towns. By leaving the farmer no other customers but either the consumers 
or their immediate factors, the kidders and carriers of corn, it endeavoured 
to force him to exercise the trade, not only of a farmer, but of a corn 
merchant or corn retailer. On the contrary, it in many cases prohibited the 
manufacturer from exercising the trade of a shopkeeper, or from selling his 
own goods by retail. It meant by the one law to promote the general interest 
of the country, or to render corn cheap, without, perhaps, its being well 
understood how this was to be done. By the other it meant to promote that 
of a particular order of men, the shopkeepers, who would be so much 
undersold by the manufacturer, it was supposed, that their trade would be 
ruined if he was allowed to retail at all. 
    The manufacturer, however, though he had been allowed to keep a shop, 
and to sell his own goods by retail, could not have undersold the common 
shopkeeper. Whatever part of his capital he might have placed in his shop, 
he must have withdrawn it from his manufacture. In order to carry on his 
business on a level with that of other people, as he must have had the profit 
of a manufacturer on the one part, so he must have had that of a shopkeeper 
upon the other. Let us suppose, for example, that in the particular town 
where he lived, ten per cent was the ordinary profit both of manufacturing 
and shopkeeping stock; he must in this case have charged upon every piece 
of his own goods which he sold in his shop, a profit of twenty per cent. 
When he carried them from his workhouse to his shop, he must have valued 
them at the price for which he could have sold them to a dealer or 
shopkeeper, who would have bought them by wholesale. If he valued them 
lower, he lost a part of the profit of his manufacturing capital. When again 
he sold them from his shop, unless he got the same price at which a 
shopkeeper would have sold them, he lost a part of the profit of his 
shopkeeping capital. Though he might appear, therefore, to make a double 
profit upon the same piece of goods, yet as these goods made successively a 
part of two distinct capitals, he made but a single profit upon the whole 
capital employed about them; and if he made less than his profit, he was a 
loser, or did not employ his whole capital with the same advantage as the 
greater part of his neighbours. 
    What the manufacturer was prohibited to do, the farmer was in some 
measure enjoined to do; to divide his capital between two different 
employments; to keep one part of it in his granaries and stack yard, for 
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supplying the occasional demands of the market; and to employ the other in 
the cultivation of his land. But as he could not afford to employ the latter 
for less than the ordinary profits of farming stock, so he could as little 
afford to employ the former for less than the ordinary profits of mercantile 
stock. Whether the stock which really carried on the business of the corn 
merchant belonged to the person who was called a farmer, or to the person 
who was called a corn merchant, an equal profit was in both cases requisite 
in order to indemnify its owner for employing it in this manner; in order to 
put his business upon a level with other trades, and in order to hinder him 
from having an interest to change it as soon as possible for some other. The 
farmer, therefore, who was thus forced to exercise the trade of a corn 
merchant, could not afford to sell his corn cheaper than any other corn 
merchant would have been obliged to do in the case of a free competition. 
    The dealer who can employ his whole stock in one single branch of 
business has an advantage of the same kind with the workman who can 
employ his whole labour in one single operation. As the latter acquires a 
dexterity which enables him, with the same two hands, to perform a much 
greater quantity of work; so the former acquires so easy and ready a method 
of transacting his business, of buying and disposing of his goods, that with 
the same capital he can transact a much greater quantity of business. As the 
one can commonly afford his work a good deal cheaper, so the other can 
commonly afford his goods somewhat cheaper than if his stock and 
attention were both employed about a greater variety of objects. The greater 
part of manufacturers could not afford to retail their own goods so cheap as 
a vigilant and active shopkeeper, whose sole business it was to buy them at 
wholesale and to retail them again. The greater part of farmers could still 
less afford to retail their own corn, to supply the inhabitants of a town, at 
perhaps four or five miles distance from the greater part of them, so cheap 
as a vigilant and active corn merchant, whose sole business it was to 
purchase corn by wholesale, to collect it into a great magazine, and to retail 
it again. 
    The law which prohibited the manufacturer from exercising the trade of a 
shopkeeper endeavoured to force this division in the employment of stock 
to go on faster than it might otherwise have done. The law which obliged 
the farmer to exercise the trade of a corn merchant endeavoured to hinder it 
from going on so fast. Both laws were evident violations of natural liberty, 
and therefore unjust; and they were both, too, as impolitic as they were 
unjust. It is the interest of every society that things of this kind should never 
either be forced or obstructed. The man who employs either his labour or 
his stock in a greater variety of ways than his situation renders necessary 
can never hurt his neighbour by underselling him. He may hurt himself, and 
he generally does so. Jack of all trades will never be rich, says the proverb. 
But the law ought always to trust people with the care of their own interest, 
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as in their local situations they must generally be able to judge better of it 
than the legislator can do. The law, however, which obliged the farmer to 
exercise the trade of a corn merchant was by far the most pernicious of the 
two. 
    It obstructed not only that division in the employment of stock which is 
so advantageous to every society, but it obstructed likewise the 
improvement and cultivation of the land. By obliging the farmer to carry on 
two trades instead of one, it forced him to divide his capital into two parts, 
of which one only could be employed in cultivation. But if he had been at 
liberty to sell his whole crop to a corn merchant as fast as he could thresh it 
out, his whole capital might have returned immediately to the land, and 
have been employed in buying more cattle, and hiring more servants, in 
order to improve and cultivate it better. But by being obliged to sell his corn 
by retail, he was obliged to keep a great part of his capital in his granaries 
and stack yard through the year, and could not, therefore, cultivate so well 
as with the same capital he might otherwise have done. This law, therefore, 
necessarily obstructed the improvement of the land, and, instead of tending 
to render corn cheaper, must have tended to render it scarcer, and therefore 
dearer, than it would otherwise have been. 
    After the business of the farmer, that of the corn merchant is in reality the 
trade which, if properly protected and encouraged, would contribute the 
most to the raising of corn. It would support the trade of the farmer in the 
same manner as the trade of the wholesale dealer supports that of the 
manufacturer. 
    The wholesale dealer, by affording a ready market to the manufacturer, 
by taking his goods off his hand as fast as he can make their price to him 
before he has made them, enables him to keep his whole capital, and 
sometimes even more than his whole capital, constantly employed in 
manufacturing, and consequently to manufacture a much greater quantity of 
goods than if he was obliged to dispose of them himself to the immediate 
consumers, or even to the retailers. As the capital of the wholesale 
merchant, too, is generally sufficient to replace that of many manufacturers, 
this intercourse between him and them interests the owner of a large capital 
to support the owners of a great number of small ones, and to assist them in 
those losses and misfortunes which might otherwise prove ruinous to them. 
    An intercourse of the same kind universally established between the 
farmers and the corn merchants would be attended with effects equally 
beneficial to the farmers. They would be enabled to keep their whole 
capitals, and even more than their whole capitals, constantly employed in 
cultivation. In case of any of those accidents, to which no trade is more 
liable than theirs, they would find in their ordinary customer, the wealthy 
corn merchant, a person who had both an interest to support them, and the 
ability to do it, and they would not, as at present, be entirely dependent 
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upon the forbearance of their landlord, or the mercy of his steward. Were it 
possible, as perhaps it is not, to establish this intercourse universally, and all 
at once, were it possible to turn all at once the whole farming stock of the 
kingdom to its proper business, the cultivation of land, withdrawing it from 
every other employment into which any part of it may be at present 
diverted, and were it possible, in order to support and assist upon occasion 
the operations of this great stock, to provide all at once another stock almost 
equally great, it is not perhaps very easy to imagine how great, how 
extensive, and how sudden would be the improvement which this change of 
circumstances would alone produce upon the whole face of the country. 
    The statute of Edward VI, therefore, by prohibiting as much as possible 
any middle man from coming between the grower and the consumer, 
endeavoured to annihilate a trade, of which the free exercise is not only the 
best palliative of the inconveniences of a dearth but the best preventative of 
that calamity: after the trade of the farmer, no trade contributing so much to 
the growing of corn as that of the corn merchant. 
    The rigour of this law was afterwards softened by several subsequent 
statutes, which successively permitted the engrossing of corn when the price 
of wheat should not exceed twenty, twenty-four, thirty-two, and forty 
shillings the quarter. At last, by the 15th of Charles II, c. 7, the engrossing 
or buying of corn in order to sell it again, as long as the price of wheat did 
not exceed forty-eight shillings the quarter, and that of other grain in 
proportion, was declared lawful to all persons not being forestallers, that is, 
not selling again in the same market within three months. All the freedom 
which the trade of the inland corn dealer has ever yet enjoyed was bestowed 
upon it by this statute. The statute of the 12th of the present king, which 
repeals almost all the other ancient laws against engrossers and forestallers, 
does not repeal the restrictions of this particular statute, which therefore still 
continue in force. 
    This statute, however, authorizes in some measure two very absurd 
popular prejudices. 
    First, it supposes that when the price of wheat has risen so high as forty-
eight shillings the quarter, and that of other grains in proportion, corn is 
likely to be so engrossed as to hurt the people. But from what has been 
already said, it seems evident enough that corn can at no price be so 
engrossed by the inland dealers as to hurt the people: and forty-eight 
shillings the quarter, besides, though it may be considered as a very high 
price, yet in years of scarcity it is a price which frequently takes place 
immediately after harvest, when scarce any part of the new crop can be sold 
off, and when it is impossible even for ignorance to suppose that any part of 
it can be so engrossed as to hurt the people. 
    Secondly, it supposes that there is a certain price at which corn is likely 
to be forestalled, that is, bought up in order to be sold again soon after in the 
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same market, so as to hurt the people. But if a merchant ever buys up corn, 
either going to a particular market or in a particular market, in order to sell 
it again soon after in the same market, it must be because he judges that the 
market cannot be so liberally supplied through the whole season as upon 
that particular occasion, and that the price, therefore, must soon rise. If he 
judges wrong in this, and if the price does not rise, he not only loses the 
whole profit of the stock which he employs in this manner, but a part of the 
stock itself, by the expense and loss which necessarily attend the storing and 
keeping of corn. He hurts himself, therefore, much more essentially than he 
can hurt even the particular people whom he may hinder from supplying 
themselves upon that particular market day, because they may afterwards 
supply themselves just as cheap upon any other market day. If he judges 
right, instead of hurting the great body of the people, he renders them a 
most important service. By making them feel the inconveniencies of a 
dearth somewhat earlier than they otherwise might do, he prevents their 
feeling them afterwards so severely as they certainly would do, if the 
cheapness of price encouraged them to consume faster than suited the real 
scarcity of the season. When the scarcity is real, the best thing that can be 
done for the people is to divide the inconveniencies of it as equally as 
possible through all the different months, and weeks, and days of the year. 
The interest of the corn merchant makes him study to do this as exactly as 
he can: and as no other person can have either the same interest, or the same 
knowledge, or the same abilities to do it so exactly as he, this most 
important operation of commerce ought to be trusted entirely to him; or, in 
other words, the corn trade, so far at least as concerns the supply of the 
home market, ought to be left perfectly free. 
    The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling may be compared to the 
popular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft. The unfortunate wretches 
accused of this latter crime were not more innocent of the misfortunes 
imputed to them than those who have been accused of the former. The law 
which put an end to all prosecutions against witchcraft, which put it out of 
any man's power to gratify his own malice by accusing his neighbour of that 
imaginary crime, seems effectually to have put an end to those fears and 
suspicions by taking away the great cause which encouraged and supported 
them. The law which should restore entire freedom to the inland trade of 
corn would probably prove as effectual to put an end to the popular fears of 
engrossing and forestalling. 
    The 15th of Charles II, c. 7, however, with all its imperfections, has 
perhaps contributed more both to the plentiful supply of the home market, 
and to the increase of tillage, than any other law in the statute book. It is 
from this law that the inland corn trade has derived all the liberty and 
protection which it has ever yet enjoyed; and both the supply of the home 
market, and the interest of tillage, are much more effectually promoted by 
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the inland than either by the importation or exportation trade. 
    The proportion of the average quantity of all sorts of grain imported into 
Great Britain to that of all sorts of grain consumed, it has been computed by 
the author of the tracts upon the corn trade, does not exceed that of one to 
five hundred and seventy. For supplying the home market, therefore, the 
importance of the inland trade must be to that of the importation trade as 
five hundred and seventy to one. 
    The average quantity of all sorts of grain exported from Great Britain 
does not, according to the same author, exceed the one-and-thirtieth part of 
the annual produce. For the encouragement of tillage, therefore, by 
providing a market for the home produce, the importance of the inland trade 
must be to that of the exportation. 
    I have no great faith in political arithmetic, computations. I mention them 
only in order to show of how much less consequence, in the opinion of the 
most judicious and experienced persons, the foreign trade of corn is than the 
home trade. The great cheapness of corn in the years immediately preceding 
the establishment of the bounty may perhaps, with reason, be ascribed in 
some measure to the operation of this statute of Charles II, which had been 
enacted about five-and-twenty years before, and which had therefore full 
time to produce its effect. 
    A very few words will sufficiently explain all that I have to say 
concerning the other three branches of the corn trade. 
    II. The trade of the merchant importer of foreign corn for home 
consumption evidently contributes to the immediate supply of the home 
market, and must so far be immediately beneficial to the great body of the 
people. It tends, indeed, to lower somewhat the average money price of 
corn, but not to diminish its real value, or the quantity of labour which it is 
capable of maintaining. If importation was at all times free, our farmers and 
country gentlemen would, probably, one year with another, get less money 
for their corn than they do at present, when importation is at most times in 
effect prohibited; but the money which they got would be of more value, 
would buy more goods of all other kinds, and would employ more labour. 
Their real wealth, their real revenue, therefore, would be the same as at 
present, though it might be expressed by a smaller quantity of silver; and 
they would neither be disabled nor discouraged from cultivating corn as 
much as they do at present. On the contrary, as the rise in the real value of 
silver, in consequence of lowering the money price of corn, lowers 
somewhat the money price of all other commodities, it gives the industry of 
the country, where it takes place, some advantage in all foreign markets, 
and thereby tends to encourage and increase that industry. But the extent of 
the home market for corn must be in proportion to the general industry of 
the country where it grows, or to the number of those who produce 
something else, and therefore have something else, or what comes to the 
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same thing, the price of something else, to give in exchange for corn. But in 
every country the home market, as it is the nearest and most convenient, so 
is it likewise the greatest and most important market for corn. That rise in 
the real value of silver, therefore, which is the effect of lowering the 
average money price of corn, tends to enlarge the greatest and most 
important market for corn, and thereby to encourage, instead of 
discouraging, its growth. 
    By the 22nd of Charles II, c. 13, the importation of wheat, whenever the 
price in the home market did not exceed fifty-three shillings and fourpence 
the quarter, was subjected to a duty of sixteen shillings the quarter, and to a 
duty of eight shillings whenever the price did not exceed four pounds. The 
former of these two prices has, for more than a century past, taken place 
only in times of very great scarcity; and the latter has, so far as I know, not 
taken place at all. Yet, till wheat had risen above this latter price, it was by 
this statute subjected to a very high duty; and, tin it had risen above the 
former, to a duty which amounted to a prohibition. The importation of other 
sorts of grain was restrained at rates, and by duties, in proportion to the 
value of the grain, almost equally high.* Subsequent laws still further 
increased those duties. 
* Before the 13th of the present king, the following were the duties payable upon 
the importation of the different sorts of grain:- 
      Grain            Duties                     
Duties     Duties
  Beans to 28s. per qr. 19s. 10d. after till 40s.  
16s. 8d.  then 12d.
  Barley to 28s.        19s. 10d.            32s.  
16s.           12d.
    Malt is prohibited by the annual Malt-tax Bill.
  Oats to 16s.           5s. 10d. 
after                       9 1/2d.
  Pease to 40s.         16s. 10d. 
after                       9 3/4d.
  Rye to 36s.           19s. 10d. till       40s.  
16s. 8d.  then 12d.
  Wheat to 44s.         21s. 10d. till   53s. 4d.  
17s.      then  8s.
    till 4 l. and after that about 1s. 4d.
    Buckwheat to 32s. per qr. to pay 16s.
These different duties were imposed, partly by the 92nd of Charles II, in 
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place of the Old Subsidy, partly by the New Subsidy, by the One-third and 
Two-thirds Subsidy, and by the Subsidy, 1747. 
The distress which, in years of scarcity, the strict execution of those laws 
might have brought upon the people, would probably have been very great. 
But, upon such occasions, its execution was generally suspended by 
temporary statutes, which permitted, for a limited time, the importation of 
foreign corn. The necessity of these temporary statutes sufficiently 
demonstrates the impropriety of this general one. 
    These restraints upon importation, though prior to the establishment of 
the bounty, were dictated by the same spirit, by the same principles, which 
afterwards enacted that regulation. How hurtful soever in themselves, these 
or some other restraints upon importation became necessary in consequence 
of that regulation. If, when wheat was either below forty-eight shillings the 
quarter, or not much above it, foreign corn could have been imported either 
duty free, or upon paying only a small duty, it might have been exported 
again, with the benefit of the bounty, to the great loss of the public revenue, 
and to the entire perversion of the institution, of which the object was to 
extend the market for the home growth, not that for the growth of foreign 
countries. 
    III. The trade of the merchant exporter of corn for foreign consumption 
certainly does not contribute directly to the plentiful supply of the home 
market. It does so, however, indirectly. From whatever source this supply 
may be usually drawn, whether from home growth or from foreign 
importation, unless more corn is either usually grown, or usually imported 
into the country, than what is usually consumed in it, the supply of the 
home market can never be very plentiful. But unless the surplus can in all 
ordinary cases be exported, the growers will be careful never to grow more, 
and the importers never to import more, than what the bare consumption of 
the home market requires. That market will very seldom be overstocked; but 
it will generally be understocked, the people whose business it is to supply 
it being generally afraid lest their goods should be left upon their hands. The 
prohibition of exportation limits the improvement and cultivation of the 
country to what the supply of its own inhabitants requires. The freedom of 
exportation enables it to extend cultivation for the supply of foreign nations. 
    By the 12th of Charles II, c. 4, the exportation of corn was permitted 
whenever the price of wheat did not exceed forty shillings the quarter, and 
that of other grain in proportion. By the 15th of the same prince, this liberty 
was extended till the price of wheat exceeded forty-eight shillings the 
quarter; and by the 22nd, to all higher prices. A poundage, indeed, was to be 
paid to the king upon such exportation. But all grain was rated so low in the 
book of rates that this poundage amounted only upon wheat to a shilling, 
upon oats to fourpence, and upon all other grain to sixpence the quarter. By 
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the 1st of William and Mary, the act which established the bounty, this 
small duty was virtually taken off whenever the price of wheat did not 
exceed, forty-eight shillings the quarter; and by the 11th and l2th of William 
III, c. 20, it was expressly taken off at all higher prices. 
    The trade of the merchant exporter was, in this manner, not only 
encouraged by a bounty, but rendered much more free than that of the 
inland dealer. By the last of these statutes, corn could be engrossed at any 
price for exportation, but it could not be engrossed for inland sale except 
when the price did not exceed forty-eight shillings the quarter. The interest 
of the inland dealer, however, it has already been shown, can never be 
opposite to that of the great body of the people. That of the merchant 
exporter may, and in fact sometimes is. If, while his own country labours 
under a dearth, a neighbouring country should be afflicted with a famine, it 
might be his interest to carry corn to the latter country in such quantities as 
might very much aggravate the calamities of the dearth. The plentiful 
supply of the home market was not the direct object of those statutes; but, 
under the pretence of encouraging agriculture, to raise the money price of 
corn as high as possible, and thereby to occasion, as much as possible, a 
constant dearth in the home market. By the discouragement of importation, 
the supply of that market, even in times of great scarcity, was confined to 
the home growth; and by the encouragement of exportation, when the price 
was so high as forty-eight shillings the quarter, that market was not, even in 
times of considerable scarcity, allowed to enjoy the whole of that growth. 
The temporary laws, prohibiting for a limited time the exportation of corn, 
and taking off for a limited time the duties upon its importation, expedients 
to which Great Britain has been obliged so frequently to have recourse, 
sufficiently demonstrate the impropriety of her general system. Had that 
system been good, she would not so frequently have been reduced to the 
necessity of departing from it. 
    Were all nations to follow the liberal system of free exportation and free 
importation, the different states into which a great continent was divided 
would so far resemble the different provinces of a great empire. As among 
the different provinces of a great empire the freedom of the inland trade 
appears, both from reason and experience, not only the best palliative of a 
dearth, but the most effectual preventative of a famine; so would the 
freedom of the exportation and importation trade be among the different 
states into which a great continent was divided. The larger the continent, the 
easier the communication through all the different parts of it, both by land 
and by water, the less would any one particular part of it ever be exposed to 
either of these calamities, the scarcity of any one country being more likely 
to be relieved by the plenty of some other. But very few countries have 
entirely adopted this liberal system. The freedom of the corn trade is almost 
everywhere more or less restrained, and, in many countries, is confined by 
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such absurd regulations as frequently aggravate the unavoidable misfortune 
of a dearth into the dreadful calamity of a famine. The demand of such 
countries for corn may frequently become so great and so urgent that a 
small state in their neighbourhood, which happened at the same time to be 
labouring under some degree of dearth, could not venture to supply them 
without exposing itself to the like dreadful calamity. The very bad policy of 
one country may thus render it in some measure dangerous and imprudent 
to establish what would otherwise be the best policy in another. The 
unlimited freedom of exportation, however, would be much less dangerous 
in great states, in which the growth being much greater, the supply could 
seldom be much affected by any quantity of corn that was likely to be 
exported. In a Swiss canton, or in some of the little states of Italy, it may 
perhaps sometimes be necessary to restrain the exportation of corn. In such 
great countries as France or England it scarce ever can. To hinder, besides, 
the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market is 
evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of public utility, 
to a sort of reasons of state; an act of legislative authority which ought to be 
exercised only, which can be pardoned only in cases of the most urgent 
necessity. The price at which the exportation of corn is prohibited, if it is 
ever to be prohibited, ought always to be a very high price. 
    The laws concerning corn may everywhere be compared to the laws 
concerning religion. The people feel themselves so much interested in what 
relates either of their subsistence in this life, or to their happiness in a life to 
come, that government must yield to their prejudices, and, in order to 
preserve the public tranquillity, establish that system which they approve of. 
It is upon this account, perhaps, that we so seldom find a reasonable system 
established with regard to either of those two capital objects. 
    IV. The trade of the merchant carrier, or of the importer of foreign corn in 
order to export it again, contributes to the plentiful supply of the home 
market. It is not indeed the direct purpose of his trade to sell his corn there. 
But he will generally be willing to do so, and even for a good deal less 
money than he might expect in a foreign market; because he saves in this 
manner the expense of loading and unloading, of freight and insurance. The 
inhabitants of the country which, by means of the carrying trade, becomes 
the magazine and storehouse for the supply of other countries can very 
seldom be in want themselves. Though the carrying trade might thus 
contribute to reduce the average money price of corn in the home market, it 
would not thereby lower its real value. It would only raise somewhat the 
real value of silver. 
    The carrying trade was in effect prohibited in Great Britain, upon all 
ordinary occasions, by the high duties upon the importation of foreign corn, 
of the greater part of which there was no drawback; and upon extraordinary 
occasions, when a scarcity made it necessary to suspend those duties by 
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temporary statutes, exportation was always prohibited. By this system of 
laws, therefore, the carrying trade was in effect prohibited upon all 
occasions. 
    That system of laws, therefore, which is connected with the establishment 
of the bounty, seems to deserve no part of the praise which has been 
bestowed upon it. The improvement and prosperity of Great Britain, which 
has been so often ascribed to those laws, may very easily be accounted for 
by other causes. That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every 
man that he shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour is alone sufficient to 
make any country flourish, notwithstanding these and twenty other absurd 
regulations of commerce; and this security was perfected by the revolution 
much about the same time that the bounty was established. The natural 
effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert 
itself with freedom and security is so powerful a principle that it is alone, 
and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to 
wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent 
obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often incumbers its 
operations; though the effect of these obstructions is always more or less 
either to encroach upon its freedom, or to diminish its security. In Great 
Britain industry is perfectly secure; and though it is far from being perfectly 
free, it is as free or freer than in any other part of Europe. 
    Though the period of the greatest prosperity and improvement of Great 
Britain has been posterior to that system of laws which is connected with 
the bounty, we must not upon that account impute it to those laws. It has 
been posterior likewise to the national debt. But the national debt has most 
assuredly not been the cause of it. 
    Though the system of laws which is connected with the bounty has 
exactly the same tendency of tendency with the police of Spain and 
Portugal, to lower somewhat the value of the precious metals in the country 
where it takes place, yet Great Britain is certainly one of the richest 
countries in Europe, while Spain and Portugal are perhaps among the most 
beggarly. This difference of situation, however, may easily be accounted for 
from two different causes. First, the tax of Spain, the prohibition in Portugal 
of exporting gold and silver, and the vigilant police which watches over the 
execution of those laws, must, in two very poor countries, which between 
them import annually upwards of six millions sterling, operate not only 
more directly but much more forcibly in reducing the value of those metals 
there than the corn laws can do in Great Britain. And, secondly, this bad 
policy is not in those countries counterbalanced by the general liberty and 
security of the people. Industry is there neither free nor secure, and the civil 
and ecclesiastical governments of both Spain and Portugal are such as 
would alone be sufficient to perpetuate their present state of poverty, even 
though their regulations of commerce were as wise as the greater part of 
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them are absurd and foolish. 
    The 13th of the present king, c. 43, seems to have established a new 
system with regard to the corn laws in many respects better than the ancient 
one, but in one or two respects perhaps not quite so good. 
    By this statute the high duties upon importations for home consumption 
are taken off so soon as the price of middling wheat rises to forty-eight 
shillings the quarter; that of middling rye, pease or beans, to thirty-two 
shillings; that of barley to twenty-four shillings; and that of oats to sixteen 
shillings; and instead of them a small duty is imposed of only sixpence upon 
the quarter of wheat, and upon that of other grain in proportion. With regard 
to all these different sorts of grain, but particularly with regard to wheat, the 
home market is thus opened to foreign supplies at prices considerably lower 
than before. 
    By the same statute the old bounty of five shillings upon the exportation 
of wheat ceases so soon as the price rises to forty-four shillings the quarter, 
instead of forty-eight, the price at which it ceased before; that of two 
shillings and sixpence upon the exportation of barley ceases so soon as the 
price rises to twenty-two shillings, instead of twenty-four, the price at which 
it ceased before; that of two shillings and sixpence upon the exportation of 
oatmeal ceases so soon as the price rises to fourteen shillings, instead of 
fifteen, the price at which it ceased before. The bounty upon rye is reduced 
from three shillings and sixpence to three shillings, and it ceases so soon as 
the price rises to twenty-eight shillings instead of thirty-two, the price at 
which it ceased before. If bounties are as improper as I have endeavoured to 
prove them to be, the sooner they cease, and the lower they are, so much the 
better. 
    The same statute permits, at the lowest prices, the importation of corn, in 
order to be exported again duty free, provided it is in the meantime lodged 
in a warehouse under the joint locks of the king and the importer. This 
liberty, indeed, extends to no more than twenty-five of the different ports of 
Great Britain. They are, however, the principal ones, and there may not, 
perhaps, be warehouses proper for this purpose in the greater part of the 
others. 
    So far this law seems evidently an improvement upon the ancient system. 
    But by the same law a bounty of two shillings the quarter is given for the 
exportation of oats whenever the price does not exceed fourteen shillings. 
No bounty had ever been given before for the exportation of this grain, no 
more than for that of pease or beans. 
    By the same law, too, the exportation of wheat is prohibited so soon as 
the price rises to forty-four shillings the quarter; that of rye so soon as it 
rises to twenty-eight shillings; that of barley so soon as it rises to twenty-
two shillings; and that of oats so soon as they rise to fourteen shillings. 
Those several prices seem all of them a good deal too low, and there seems 
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to be an impropriety, besides, in prohibiting exportation altogether at those 
precise prices at which that bounty, which was given in order to force it, is 
withdrawn. The bounty ought certainly either to have been withdrawn at a 
much lower price, or exportation ought to have been allowed at a much 
higher. 
    So far, therefore, this law seems to be inferior to the ancient system. With 
all its imperfections, however, we may perhaps say of it what was said of 
the laws of Solon, that, though not the best in itself, it is the best which the 
interests, prejudices, and temper of the times would admit of. It may 
perhaps in due time prepare the way for a better. 
CHAPTER VI
Of Treaties of Commerce
WHEN a nation binds itself by treaty either to permit the entry of certain 
goods from one foreign country which it prohibits from all others, or to 
exempt the goods of one country from duties to which it subjects those of 
all others, the country, or at least the merchants and manufacturers of the 
country, whose commerce is so favoured, must necessarily derive great 
advantage from the treaty. Those merchants and manufacturers enjoy a sort 
of monopoly in the country which is so indulgent to them. That country 
becomes a market both more extensive and more advantageous for their 
goods: more extensive, because the goods of other nations being either 
excluded or subjected to heavier duties, it takes off a greater quantity of 
theirs: more advantageous, because the merchants of the favoured country, 
enjoying a sort of monopoly there, will often sell their goods for a better 
price than if exposed to the free competition of all other nations. 
    Such treaties, however, though they may be advantageous to the 
merchants and manufacturers of the favoured, are necessarily 
disadvantageous to those of the favouring country. A monopoly is thus 
granted against them to a foreign nation; and they must frequently buy the 
foreign goods they have occasion for dearer than if the free competition of 
other nations was admitted. That part of its own produce with which such a 
nation purchases foreign goods must consequently be sold cheaper, because 
when two things are exchanged for one another, the cheapness of the one is 
a necessary consequence, or rather the same thing with the dearness of the 
other. The exchangeable value of its annual produce, therefore, is likely to 
be diminished by every such treaty. This diminution, however, can scarce 
amount to any positive loss, but only to a lessening of the gain which it 
might otherwise make. Though it sells its goods cheaper than it otherwise 
might do, it will not probably sell them for less than they cost; nor, as in the 
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case of bounties, for a price which will not replace the capital employed in 
bringing them to market, together with the ordinary profits of stock. The 
trade could not go on long if it did. Even the favouring country, therefore, 
may still gain by the trade, though less than if there was a free competition. 
    Some treaties of commerce, however, have been supposed advantageous 
upon principles very different from these; and a commercial country has 
sometimes granted a monopoly of this kind against itself to certain goods of 
a foreign nation, because it expected that in the whole commerce between 
them, it would annually sell more than it would buy, and that a balance in 
gold and silver would be annually returned to it. It is upon this principle that 
the treaty of commerce between England and Portugal, concluded in 1703 
by Mr. Methuen, has been so much commended. The following is a literal 
translation of that treaty, which consists of three articles only. 
ART. I.
His sacred royal majesty of Portugal promises, both in his own name, and 
that of his successors, to admit, for ever hereafter, into Portugal, the woollen 
cloths, and the rest of the woollen manufactures of the British, as was 
accustomed, till they were prohibited by the law; nevertheless upon this 
condition: 
ART. II.
That is to say, that her sacred royal majesty of Great Britain shall, in her 
own name, and that of her successors, be obliged, for ever hereafter, to 
admit the wines of the growth of Portugal into Britain; so that at no time, 
whether there shall be peace or war between the kingdoms of Britain and 
France, anything more shall be demanded for these wines by the name of 
custom or duty, or by whatsoever other title, directly or indirectly, whether 
they shall be imported into Great Britain in or hogsheads, or other casks, 
than what shall be demanded for the like quantity or measure of French 
wine, deducting or abating a third part of the custom or duty. But if at any 
time this deduction or abatement of customs, which is to be made as 
aforesaid, shall in any manner be attempted and prejudiced, it shall be just 
and lawful for his sacred royal majesty of Portugal, again to prohibit the 
woollen cloths, and the rest of the British woollen manufactures. 
ART. III.
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The most excellent lords the plenipotentiaries promise and take upon 
themselves, that their above named masters shall ratify this treaty; and 
within the space of two months the ratifications shall be exchanged. 
    By this treaty the crown of Portugal becomes bound to admit the English 
woollens upon the same footing as before the prohibition; that is, not to 
raise the duties which had been paid before that time. But it does not 
become bound to admit them upon any better terms than those of any other 
nation, of France or Holland for example. The crown of Great Britain, on 
the contrary, becomes bound to admit the wines of Portugal upon paying 
only two-thirds of the duty which is paid for those of France, the wines 
most likely to come into competition with them. So far this treaty, therefore, 
is evidently advantageous to Portugal, and disadvantageous to Great Britain. 
    It has been celebrated, however, as a masterpiece of the commercial 
policy of England. Portugal receives annually from the Brazils a greater 
quantity of gold than can be employed in its domestic commerce, whether 
in the shape of coin or of plate. The surplus is too valuable to be allowed to 
lie idle and locked up in coffers, and as it can find no advantageous market 
at home, it must, notwithstanding any prohibition, be sent abroad, and 
exchanged for something for which there is a more advantageous market at 
home. A large share of it comes annually to England, in return either for 
English goods, or for those of other European nations that receive their 
returns through England. Mr. Baretti was informed that the weekly packet-
boat from Lisbon brings, one week with another, more than fifty thousand 
pounds in gold to England. The sum had probably been exaggerated. It 
would amount to more than two millions six hundred thousand pounds a 
year, which is more than the Brazils are supposed to afford. 
    Our merchants were some years ago out of humour with the crown of 
Portugal. Some privileges which had been granted them, not by treaty, but 
by the free grace of that crown, at the solicitation indeed, it is probable, and 
in return for much greater favours, defence and protection, from the crown 
of Great Britain had been either infringed or revoked. The people, therefore, 
usually most interested in celebrating the Portugal trade were then rather 
disposed to represent it as less advantageous than it had commonly been 
imagined. The far greater part, almost the whole, they pretended, of this 
annual importation of gold, was not on account of Great Britain, but of 
other European nations; the fruits and wines of Portugal annually imported 
into Great Britain nearly compensating the value of the British goods sent 
thither. 
    Let us suppose, however, that the whole was on account of Great Britain, 
and that it amounted to a still greater sum than Mr. Baretti seems to 
imagine; this trade would not, upon that account, be more advantageous 
than any other in which, for the same value sent out, we received an equal 
value of consumable goods in return. 
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    It is but a very small part of this importation which, it can be supposed, is 
employed as an annual addition either to the plate or to the coin of the 
kingdom. The rest must all be sent abroad and exchanged for consumable 
goods of some kind or other. But if those consumable goods were purchased 
directly with the produce of English industry, it would be more for the 
advantage of England than first to purchase with that produce the gold of 
Portugal, and afterwards to purchase with that gold those consumable 
goods. A direct foreign trade of consumption is always more advantageous 
than a round-about one; and to bring the same value of foreign goods to the 
home market, requires a much smaller capital in the one way than in the 
other. If a smaller share of its industry, therefore, had been employed in 
producing goods fit for the Portugal market, and a greater in producing 
those fit for the other markets, where those consumable goods for which 
there is a demand in Great Britain are to be had, it would have been more 
for the advantage of England. To procure both the gold, which it wants for 
its own use, and the consumable goods, would, in this way, employ a much 
smaller capital than at present. There would be a spare capital, therefore, to 
be employed for other purposes, in exciting an additional quantity of 
industry, and in raising a greater annual produce. 
    Though Britain were entirely excluded from the Portugal trade, it could 
find very little difficulty in procuring all the annual supplies of gold which 
it wants, either for the purposes of plate, or of coin, or of foreign trade. 
Gold, like every other commodity, is always somewhere or another to be 
got for its value by those who have that value to give for it. The annual 
surplus of gold in Portugal, besides, would still be sent abroad, and though 
not carried away by Great Britain, would be carried away by some other 
nation, which would be glad to sell it again for its price, in the same manner 
as Great Britain does at present. In buying gold of Portugal, indeed, we buy 
it at the first hand; whereas, in buying it of any other nation, except Spain, 
we should buy it at the second, and might pay somewhat dearer. This 
difference, however, would surely be too insignificant to deserve the public 
attention. 
    Almost all our gold, it is said, comes from Portugal. With other nations 
the balance of trade is either against us, or not much in our favour. But we 
should remember that the more gold we import from one country, the less 
we must necessarily import from all others. The effectual demand for gold, 
like that for every other commodity, is in every country limited to a certain 
quantity. If nine-tenths of this quantity are imported from one country, there 
remains a tenth only to be imported from all others. The more gold besides 
that is annually imported from some particular countries, over and above 
what is requisite for plate and for coin, the more must necessarily be 
exported to some others; and the more that most insignificant object of 
modern policy, the balance of trade, appears to be in our favour with some 
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particular countries, the more it must necessarily appear to be against us 
with many others. 
    It was upon this silly notion, however, that England could not subsist 
without the Portugal trade, that, towards the end of the late war, France and 
Spain, without pretending either offence or provocation, required the King 
of Portugal to exclude all British ships from his ports, and for the security of 
this exclusion, to receive into them French or Spanish garrisons. Had the 
king of Portugal submitted to those ignominious terms which his brother-in-
law the king of Spain proposed to him, Britain would have been freed from 
a much greater inconveniency than the loss of the Portugal trade, the burden 
of supporting a very weak ally, so unprovided of everything for his own 
defence that the whole power of England, had it been directed to that single 
purpose, could scarce perhaps have defended him for another campaign. 
The loss of the Portugal trade would, no doubt, have occasioned a 
considerable embarrassment to the merchants at that time engaged in it, who 
might not, perhaps, have found out, for a year or two, any other equally 
advantageous method of employing their capitals; and in this would 
probably have consisted all the inconveniency which England could have 
suffered from this notable piece of commercial policy. 
    The great annual importation of gold and silver is neither for the purpose 
of plate nor of coin, but of foreign trade. A round-about foreign trade of 
consumption can be carried on more advantageously by means of these 
metals than of almost any other goods. As they are the universal instruments 
of commerce, they are more readily received in return for all commodities 
than any other goods; and on account of their small bulk and great value, it 
costs less to transport them backward and forward from one place to another 
than almost any other sort of merchandise, and they lose less of their value 
by being so transported. Of all the commodities, therefore, which are bought 
in one foreign country, for no other purpose but to be sold or exchanged 
again for some other goods in another, there are none so convenient as gold 
and silver. In facilitating all the different round-about foreign trades of 
consumption which are carried on in Great Britain consists the principal 
advantage of the Portugal trade; and though it is not a capital advantage, it 
is no doubt a considerable one. 
    That any annual addition which, it can reasonably be supposed, is made 
either to the plate or to the coin of the kingdom, could require but a very 
small annual importation of gold and silver, seems evident enough; and 
though we had no direct trade with Portugal, this small quantity could 
always, somewhere or another, be very easily got. 
    Though the goldsmith's trade be very considerable in Great Britain, the 
far. greater part of the new plate which they annually sell is made from 
other old plate melted down; so that the addition annually made to the 
whole plate of the kingdom cannot be very great, and could require but a 
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very small annual importation. 
    It is the same case with the coin. Nobody imagines, I believe, that even 
the greater part of the annual coinage, amounting, for ten years together, 
before the late reformation of the gold coin, to upwards of eight hundred 
thousand pounds a year in gold, was an annual addition to the money before 
current in the kingdom. In a country where the expense of the coinage is 
defrayed by the government, the value of the coin, even when it contains its 
full standard weight of gold and silver, can never be much greater than that 
of an equal quantity of those metals uncoined; because it requires only the 
trouble of going to the mint, and the delay perhaps of a few weeks, to 
procure for any quantity of uncoined gold and silver an equal quantity of 
those metals in coin. But, in every country, the greater part of the current 
coin is almost always more or less worn, or otherwise degenerated from its 
standard. In Great Britain it was, before the late reformation, a good deal so, 
the gold being more than two per cent and the silver more than eight per 
cent below its standard weight. But if forty-four guineas and a half, 
containing their full standard weight, a pound weight of gold, could 
purchase very little more than a pound weight could of uncoined gold, forty-
four guineas and a half wanting a part of their weight could not purchase a 
pound weight, and something was to be added in order to make up the 
deficiency. The current price of gold bullion at market, therefore, instead of 
being the same with the mint price, or L46 14s. 6d., was then about L47 
14s. and sometimes about L48. When the greater part of the coin, however, 
was in this degenerate condition, forty-four guineas and a half, fresh from 
the mint, would purchase no more goods in the market than any other 
ordinary guineas, because when they came into the coffers of the merchant, 
being confounded with other money, they could not afterwards be 
distinguished without more trouble than the difference was worth. Like 
other guineas they were worth no more than L46 14s. 6d. If thrown into the 
melting pot, however, they produced, without any sensible loss, a pound 
weight of standard gold, which could be sold at any time for between L47 
14s. and L48 either of gold or silver, as fit for all the purposes of coin as 
that which had been melted down. There was an evident profit, therefore, in 
melting down new coined money, and it was done so instantaneously, that 
no precaution of government could prevent it. The operations of the mint 
were, upon this account, somewhat like the web of Penelope; the work that 
was done in the day was undone in the night. The mint was employed, not 
so much in making daily additions to the coin, as in replacing the very best 
part of it which was daily melted down. 
    Were the private people, who carry their gold and silver to the mint, to 
pay themselves for the coinage, it would add to the value of those metals in 
the same manner as the fashion does to that of plate. Coined gold and silver 
would be more valuable than uncoined. The seignorage, if it was not 
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exorbitant, would add to the bullion the whole value of the duty; because, 
the government having everywhere the exclusive privilege of coining, no 
coin can come to market cheaper than they think proper to afford it. If the 
duty was exorbitant indeed, that is, if it was very much above the real value 
of the labour and expense requisite for coinage, false coiners, both at home 
and abroad, might be encouraged, by the great difference between the value 
of bullion and that of coin, to pour in so great a quantity of counterfeit 
money as might reduce the value of the government money. In France, 
however, though the seignorage is eight per cent, no sensible inconveniency 
of this kind is found to arise from it. The dangers to which a false coiner is 
everywhere exposed, if he lives in the country of which he counterfeits the 
coin, and to which his agents or correspondents are exposed if he lives in a 
foreign country, are by far too great to be incurred for the sake of a profit of 
six or seven per cent. 
    The seignorage in France raises the value of the coin higher than in 
proportion to the quantity of pure gold which it contains. Thus by the edict 
of January 1726, the mint price of fine gold of twenty-four carats was fixed 
at seven hundred and forty livres nine sous and one denier one-eleventh, the 
mark of eight Paris ounces. The gold coin of France, making an allowance 
for the remedy of the mint, contains twenty-one carats and three-fourths of 
fine gold, and two carats one fourth of alloy. The mark of standard gold, 
therefore, is worth no more than about six hundred and seventy-one livres 
ten deniers. But in France this mark of standard gold is coined into thirty 
Louis d'ors of twenty-four livres each, or into seven hundred and twenty 
livres. The coinage, therefore, increases the value of a mark of standard 
gold bullion, by the difference between six hundred and seventy-one livres 
ten deniers, and seven hundred and twenty livres; or by forty-eight livres 
nineteen sous and two deniers. 
    A seignorage will, in many cases, take away altogether, and will, in all 
cases, diminish the profit of melting down the new coin. This profit always 
arises from the difference between the quantity of bullion which the 
common currency ought to contain, and that which it actually does contain. 
If this difference is less than the seignorage, there will be loss instead of 
profit. If it is equal to the seignorage, there will neither be profit nor loss. If 
it is greater than the seignorage, there will indeed be some profit, but less 
than if there was no seignorage. If, before the late reformation of the gold 
coin, for example, there had been a seignorage of five per cent upon the 
coinage, there would have been a loss of three per cent upon the melting 
down of the gold coin. If the seignorage had been two per cent there would 
have been neither profit nor loss. If the seignorage had been one per cent 
there would have been a profit, but of one per cent only instead of two per 
cent. Wherever money is received by tale, therefore, and not by weight, a 
seignorage is the most effectual preventative of the melting down of the 
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coin, and, for the same reason, of its exportation. It is the best and heaviest 
pieces that are commonly either melted down or exported; because it is 
upon such that the largest profits are made. 
    The law for encouragement of the coinage, by rendering it duty-free, was 
first enacted during the reign of Charles II for a limited time; and afterwards 
continued, by different prolongations, till 1769, when it was rendered 
perpetual. The Bank of England, in order to replenish their coffers with 
money, are frequently obliged to carry bullion to the mint; and it was more 
for their interest, they probably imagined, that the coinage should be at the 
expense of the government than at their own. It was probably out of 
complaisance to this great company that the government agreed to render 
this law perpetual. Should the custom of weighing gold, however, come to 
be disused, as it is very likely to be on account of its inconveniency; should 
the gold coin of England come to be received by tale, as it was before the 
late recoinage, this great company may, perhaps, find that they have upon 
this, as upon some other occasions, mistaken their own interest not a little. 
    Before the late recoinage, when the gold currency of England was two 
per cent below its standard weight, as there was no seignorage, it was two 
per cent below the value of that quantity of standard gold bullion which it 
ought to have contained. When this great company, therefore, bought gold 
bullion in order to have it coined, they were obliged to pay for it two per 
cent more than it was worth after coinage. But if there had been a 
seignorage of two per cent upon the coinage, the common gold currency, 
though two per cent below its standard weight, would notwithstanding have 
been equal in value to the quantity of standard gold which it ought to have 
contained; the value of the fashion compensating in this case the diminution 
of the weight. They would indeed have had the seignorage to pay, which 
being two per cent, their loss upon the whole transaction would have been 
two per cent exactly the same, but no greater than it actually was. 
    If the seignorage had been five per cent, and the gold currency only two 
per cent below its standard weight, the bank would in this case have gained 
three per cent upon the price of the bullion; but as they would have had a 
seignorage of five per cent to pay upon the coinage, their loss upon the 
whole transaction would, in the same manner, have been exactly two per 
cent. 
    If the seignorage had been only one per cent and the gold currency two 
per cent below its standard weight, the bank would in this case have lost 
only one per cent upon the price of the bullion; but as they would likewise 
have had a seignorage of one per cent to pay, their loss upon the whole 
transaction would have been exactly two per cent in the same manner as in 
all other cases. 
    If there was a reasonable seignorage, while at the same time the coin 
contained its full standard weight, as it has done very nearly since the last 
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recoinage, whatever the bank might lose by the seignorage, they would gain 
upon the price of the bullion; and whatever they might gain upon the price 
of the bullion, they would lose by the seignorage. They would neither lose 
nor gain, therefore, upon the whole transaction, and they would in this, as in 
all the foregoing cases, be exactly in the same situation as if there was no 
seignorage. 
    When the tax upon a commodity is so moderate as not to encourage 
smuggling, the merchant who deals in it, though he advances, does not 
properly pay the tax, as he gets it back in the price of the commodity. The 
tax is finally paid by the last purchaser or consumer. But money is a 
commodity with regard to which every man is a merchant. Nobody buys it 
but in order to sell it again; and with regard to it there is in ordinary cases 
no last purchaser or consumer. When the tax upon coinage, therefore, is so 
moderate as not to encourage false coining, though everybody advances the 
tax, nobody finally pays it; because everybody gets it back in the advanced 
value of the coin. 
    A moderate seignorage, therefore, would not in any case augment the 
expense of the bank, or of any other private persons who carry their bullion 
to the mint in order to be coined, and the want of a moderate seignorage 
does not in any case diminish it. Whether there is or is not a seignorage, if 
the currency contains its full standard weight, the coinage costs nothing to 
anybody, and if it is short of that weight, the coinage must always cost the 
difference between the quantity of bullion which ought to be contained in it, 
and that which actually is contained in it. 
    The government, therefore, when it defrays the expense of coinage, not 
only incurs some small expense, but loses some small revenue which it 
might get by a proper duty; and neither the bank nor any other private 
persons are in the smallest degree benefited by this useless piece of public 
generosity. 
    The directors of the bank, however, would probably be unwilling to agree 
to the imposition of a seignorage upon the authority of a speculation which 
promises them no gain, but only pretends to insure them from any loss. In 
the present state of the gold coin, and as long as it continues to be received 
by weight, they certainly would gain nothing by such a change. But if the 
custom of weighing the gold coin should ever go into misuse, as it is very 
likely to do, and if the gold coin should ever fall into the same state of 
degradation in which it was before the late recoinage, the gain, or more 
properly the savings of the bank, in consequence of the imposition of a 
seignorage, would probably be very considerable. The Bank of England is 
the only company which sends any considerable quantity of bullion to the 
mint, and the burden of the annual coinage falls entirely, or almost entirely, 
upon it. If this annual coinage had nothing to do but to repair the 
unavoidable losses and necessary wear and tear of the coin, it could seldom 
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exceed fifty thousand or at most a hundred thousand pounds. But when the 
coin is degraded below its standard weight, the annual coinage must, 
besides this, fill up the large vacuities which exportation and the melting pot 
are continually making in the current coin. It was upon this account that 
during the ten or twelve years immediately preceding the late reformation of 
the gold coin, the annual coinage amounted at an average to more than eight 
hundred and fifty thousand pounds. But if there had been a seignorage of 
four or five per cent upon the gold coin, it would probably, even in the state 
in which things then were, have put an effectual stop to the business both of 
exportation and of the melting pot. The bank, instead of losing every year 
about two and a half per cent upon the bullion which was to be coined into 
more than eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds, or incurring an annual 
loss of more than twenty-one thousand two hundred and fifty pounds, 
would not probably have incurred the tenth part of that loss. 
    The revenue allotted by Parliament for defraying the expense of the 
coinage is but fourteen thousand pounds a year, and the real expense which 
it costs the government, or the fees of the officers of the mint, do not upon 
ordinary occasions, I am assured, exceed the half of that sum. The saving of 
so very small a sum, or even the gaining of another which could not well be 
much larger, are objects too inconsiderable, it may be thought, to deserve 
the serious attention of government. But the saving of eighteen or twenty 
thousand pounds a year in case of an event which is not improbable, which 
has frequently happened before, and which is very likely to happen again, is 
surely an object which well deserves the serious attention even of so great a 
company as the Bank of England. 
    Some of the foregoing reasonings and observations might perhaps have 
been more properly placed in those chapters of the first book which treat of 
the origin and use of money, and of the difference between the real and the 
nominal price of commodities. But as the law for the encouragement of 
coinage derives its origin from those vulgar prejudices which have been 
introduced by the mercantile system, I judged it more proper to reserve 
them for this chapter. Nothing could be more agreeable to the spirit of that 
system than a sort of bounty upon the production of money, the very thing 
which, it supposes, constitutes the wealth of every nation. It is one of its 
many admirable expedients for enriching the country. 
CHAPTER VII
Of Colonies
PART 1
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Of the Motives for establishing new Colonies
THE interest which occasioned the first settlement of the different European 
colonies in America and the West Indies was not altogether so plain and 
distinct as that which directed the establishment of those of ancient Greece 
and Rome. 
    All the different states of ancient Greece possessed, each of them, but a 
very small territory, and when the people in any one of them multiplied 
beyond what that territory could easily maintain, a part of them were sent in 
quest of a new habitation in some remote and distant part of the world; the 
warlike neighbours who surrounded them on all sides, rendering it difficult 
for any of them to enlarge very much its territory at home. The colonies of 
the Dorians resorted chiefly to Italy and Sicily, which, in the times 
preceding the foundation of Rome, were inhabited by barbarous and 
uncivilised nations: those of the Ionians and Aeolians, the two other great 
tribes of the Greeks, to Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean Sea, of 
which the inhabitants seem at that time to have been pretty much in the 
same state as those of Sicily and Italy. The mother city, though she 
considered the colony as a child, at all times entitled to great favour and 
assistance, and owing in return much gratitude and respect, yet considered it 
as an emancipated child over whom she pretended to claim no direct 
authority or jurisdiction. The colony settled its own form of government, 
enacted its own laws, elected its own magistrates, and made peace or war 
with its neighbours as an independent state, which had no occasion to wait 
for the approbation or consent of the mother city. Nothing can be more plain 
and distinct than the interest which directed every such establishment. 
    Rome, like most of the other ancient republics, was originally founded 
upon an Agrarian law which divided the public territory in a certain 
proportion among the different citizens who composed the state. The course 
of human affairs by marriage, by succession, and by alienation, necessarily 
deranged this original division, and frequently threw the lands, which had 
been allotted for the maintenance of many different families, into the 
possession of a single person. To remedy this disorder, for such it was 
supposed to be, a law was made restricting the quantity of land which any 
citizen could possess to five hundred jugera, about three hundred and fifty 
English acres. This law, however, though we read of its having been 
executed upon one or two occasions, was either neglected or evaded, and 
the inequality of fortunes went on continually increasing. The greater part of 
the citizens had no land, and without it the manners and customs of those 
times rendered it difficult for a freeman to maintain his independency. In 
the present time, though a poor man has no land of his own, if he has a little 
stock he may either farm the lands of another, or he may carry on some little 
retail trade; and if he has no stock, he may find employment either as a 
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country labourer or as an artificer. But among the ancient Romans the lands 
of the rich were all cultivated by slaves, who wrought under an overseer 
who was likewise a slave; so that a poor freeman had little chance of being 
employed either as a farmer or as a labourer. All trades and manufactures 
too, even the retail trade, were carried on by the slaves of the rich for the 
benefit of their masters, whose wealth, authority, and protection made it 
difficult for a poor freeman to maintain the competition against them. The 
citizens, therefore, who had no land, had scarce any other means of 
subsistence but the bounties of the candidates at the annual elections. The 
tribunes, when they had a mind to animate the people against the rich and 
the great, put them in mind of the ancient division of lands, and represented 
that law which restricted this sort of private property as the fundamental law 
of the republic. The people became clamorous to get land, and the rich and 
the great, we may believe, were perfectly determined not to give them any 
part of theirs. To satisfy them in some measure therefore, they frequently 
proposed to send out a new colony. But conquering Rome was, even upon 
such occasions, under no necessity of turning out her citizens to seek their 
fortune, if one may say so, through the wide world, without knowing where 
they were to settle. She assigned them lands generally in the conquered 
provinces of Italy, where, being within the dominions of the republic, they 
could never form an independent state; but were at best but a sort of 
corporation, which, though it had the power of enacting bye-laws for its 
own government, was at all times subject to the correction, jurisdiction, and 
legislative authority of the mother city. The sending out a colony of this 
kind not only gave some satisfaction to the people, but often established a 
sort of garrison, too, in a newly conquered province, of which the obedience 
might otherwise have been doubtful. A Roman colony therefore, whether 
we consider the nature of the establishment itself or the motives for making 
it, was altogether different from a Greek one. The words accordingly, which 
in the original languages denote those different establishments, have very 
different meanings. The Latin word (Colonia) signifies simply a plantation. 
The Greek word apoikia, on the contrary, signifies a separation of dwelling, 
a departure from home, a going out of the house. But, though the Roman 
colonies were in many respects different from the Greek ones, the interest 
which prompted to establish them was equally plain and distinct. Both 
institutions derived their origin either from irresistible necessity, or from 
clear and evident utility. 
    The establishment of the European colonies in America and the West 
Indies arose from no necessity: and though the utility which has resulted 
from them has been very great, it is not altogether so clear and evident. It 
was not understood at their first establishment, and was not the motive 
either of that establishment or of the discoveries which gave occasion to it, 
and the nature, extent, and limits of that utility are not, perhaps, well 
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understood at this day. 
    The Venetians, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, carried on a 
very advantageous commerce in spiceries, and other East India goods, 
which they distributed among the other nations of Europe. They purchased 
them chiefly in Egypt, at that time under the dominion of the Mamelukes, 
the enemies of the Turks, of whom the Venetians were the enemies; and this 
union of interest, assisted by the money of Venice, formed such a 
connection as gave the Venetians almost a monopoly of the trade. 
    The great profits of the Venetians tempted the avidity of the Portuguese. 
They had been endeavouring, during the course of the fifteenth century, to 
find out by sea a way to the countries from which the Moors brought them 
ivory and gold dust across the desert. They discovered the Madeiras, the 
Canaries, the Azores, the Cape de Verde Islands, the coast of Guinea, that 
of Loango, Congo, Angola, and Benguela, and, finally, the Cape of Good 
Hope. They had long wished to share in the profitable traffic of the 
Venetians, and this last discovery opened to them a probable prospect of 
doing so. In 1497, Vasco de Gama sailed from the port of Lisbon with a 
fleet of four ships, and after a navigation of eleven months arrived upon the 
coast of Indostan, and thus completed a course of discoveries which had 
been pursued with great steadiness, and with very little interruption, for 
nearly a century together. 
    Some years before this, while the expectations of Europe were in 
suspense about the projects of the Portuguese, of which the success 
appeared yet to be doubtful, a Genoese pilot formed the yet more daring 
project of sailing to the East Indies by the West. The situation of those 
countries was at that time very imperfectly known in Europe. The few 
European travellers who had been there had magnified the distance, perhaps 
through simplicity and ignorance, what was really very great appearing 
almost infinite to those who could not measure it; or, perhaps, in order to 
increase somewhat more the marvellous of their own adventures in visiting 
regions so immensely remote from Europe. The longer the way was by the 
East, Columbus very justly concluded, the shorter it would be by the West. 
He proposed, therefore, to take that way, as both the shortest and the surest, 
and he had the good fortune to convince Isabella of Castile of the 
probability of his project. He sailed from the port of Palos in August 1492, 
nearly five years before the expedition of Vasco de Gama set out from 
Portugal, and, after a voyage of between two and three months, discovered 
first some of the small Bahamas or Lucayan islands, and afterwards the 
great island of St. Domingo. 
    But the countries which Columbus discovered, either in this or in any of 
his subsequent voyages, had no resemblance to those which he had gone in 
quest of. Instead of the wealth, cultivation, and populousness of China and 
Indostan, he found, in St. Domingo, and in all the other parts of the new 
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world which he ever visited, nothing but a country quite covered with wood, 
uncultivated, and inhabited only by some tribes of naked and miserable 
savages. He was not very willing, however, to believe that they were not the 
same with some of the countries described by Marco Polo, the first 
European who had visited, or at least had left behind him, any description of 
China or the East Indies; and a very slight resemblance, such as that which 
he found between the name of Cibao, a mountain in St. Domingo, and that 
of Cipango mentioned by Marco Polo, was frequently sufficient to make 
him return to this favourite prepossession, though contrary to the clearest 
evidence. In his letters to Ferdinand and Isabella he called the countries 
which he had discovered the Indies. He entertained no doubt but that they 
were the extremity of those which had been described by Marco Polo, and 
that they were not very distant from the Ganges, or from the countries 
which had been conquered by Alexander. Even when at last convinced that 
they were different, he still flattered himself that those rich countries were 
at no great distance, and, in a subsequent voyage, accordingly, went in quest 
of them along the coast of Terra Firma, and towards the Isthmus of Darien. 
    In consequence of this mistake of Columbus, the name of the Indies has 
stuck to those unfortunate countries ever since; and when it was at last 
clearly discovered that the new were altogether different from the old 
Indies, the former were called the West, in contradistinction to the latter, 
which were called the East Indies. 
    It was of importance to Columbus, however, that the countries which he 
had discovered, whatever they were, should be represented to the court of 
Spain as of very great consequence; and, in what constitutes the real riches 
of every country, the animal and vegetable productions of the soil, there was 
at that time nothing which could well justify such a representation of them. 
    The Cori, something between a rat and a rabbit, and supposed by Mr. 
Buffon to be the same with the Aperea of Brazil, was the largest viviparous 
quadruped in St. Domingo. This species seems never to have been very 
numerous, and the dogs and cats of the Spaniards are said to have long ago 
almost entirely extirpated it, as well as some other tribes of a still smaller 
size. These, however, together with a pretty large lizard, called the ivana, or 
iguana, constituted the principal part of the animal food which the land 
afforded. 
    The vegetable food of the inhabitants, though from their want of industry 
not very abundant, was not altogether so scanty. It consisted in Indian corn, 
yams, potatoes, bananas, etc., plants which were then altogether unknown in 
Europe, and which have never since been very much esteemed in it, or 
supposed to yield a sustenance equal to what is drawn from the common 
sorts of grain and pulse, which have been cultivated in this part of the world 
time out of mind. 
    The cotton plant, indeed, afforded the material of a very important 
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manufacture, and was at that time to Europeans undoubtedly the most 
valuable of all the vegetable productions of those islands. But though in the 
end of the fifteenth century the muslins and other cotton goods of the East 
Indies were much esteemed in every part of Europe, the cotton manufacture 
itself was not cultivated in any part of it. Even this production, therefore, 
could not at that time appear in the eyes of Europeans to be of very great 
consequence. 
    Finding nothing either in the animals or vegetables of the newly 
discovered countries which could justify a very advantageous representation 
of them, Columbus turned his view towards their minerals; and in the 
richness of the productions of this third kingdom, he flattered himself he 
had found a full compensation for the insignificancy of those of the other 
two. The little bits of gold with which the inhabitants ornamented their 
dress, and which, he was informed, they frequently found in the rivulets and 
torrents that fell from the mountains, were sufficient to satisfy him that 
those mountains abounded with the richest gold mines. St. Domingo, 
therefore, was represented as a country abounding with gold, and, upon that 
account, (according to the prejudices not only of the present time, but of 
those times) an inexhaustible source of real wealth to the crown and 
kingdom of Spain. When Columbus, upon his return from his first voyage, 
was introduced with a sort of triumphal honours to the sovereigns of Castile 
and Arragon, the principal productions of the countries which he had 
discovered were carried in solemn procession before him. The only valuable 
part of them consisted in some little fillets, bracelets, and other ornaments 
of gold, and in some bales of cotton. The rest were mere objects of vulgar 
wonder and curiosity; some reeds of an extraordinary size, some birds of a 
very beautiful plumage, and some stuffed skins of the huge alligator and 
manati; all of which were preceded by six or seven of the wretched natives, 
whose singular colour and appearance added greatly to the novelty of the 
show. 
    In consequence of the representations of Columbus, the council of Castile 
determined to take possession of countries of which the inhabitants were 
plainly incapable of defending themselves. The pious purpose of converting 
them to Christianity sanctified the injustice of the project. But the hope of 
finding treasures of gold there was the sole motive which prompted him to 
undertake it; and to give this motive the greater weight, it was proposed by 
Columbus that the half of all the gold and silver that should be found there 
should belong to the crown. This proposal was approved of by the council. 
    As long as the whole or the far greater part of the gold, which the first 
adventurers imported into Europe, was got by so very easy a method as the 
plundering of the defenceless natives, it was not perhaps very difficult to 
pay even this heavy tax. But when the natives were once fairly stripped of 
all that they had, which, in St. Domingo, and in all the other countries 
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discovered by Columbus, was done completely in six or eight years, and 
when in order to find more it had become necessary to dig for it in the 
mines, there was no longer any possibility of paying this tax. The rigorous 
exaction of it, accordingly, first occasioned, it is said, the total abandoning 
of the mines of St. Domingo, which have never been wrought since. It was 
soon reduced therefore to a third; then to a fifth; afterwards to a tenth; and 
at last to a twentieth part of the gross produce of the gold mines. The tax 
upon silver continued for a long time to be a fifth of the gross produce. It 
was reduced to a tenth only in the course of the present century. But the first 
adventurers do not appear to have been much interested about silver. 
Nothing less precious than gold seemed worthy of their attention. 
    All the other enterprises of the Spaniards in the new world, subsequent to 
those of Columbus, seem to have been prompted by the same motive. It was 
the sacred thirst of gold that carried Oieda, Nicuessa, and Vasco Nugnes de 
Balboa, to the Isthmus of Darien, that carried Cortez to Mexico, and 
Almagro and Pizzarro to Chili and Peru. When those adventurers arrived 
upon any unknown coast, their first inquiry was always if there was any 
gold to be found there; and according to the information which they 
received concerning this particular, they determined either to quit the 
country or to settle in it. 
    Of all those expensive and uncertain projects, however, which bring 
bankruptcy upon the greater part of the people who engage in them, there is 
none perhaps more ruinous than the search after new silver and gold mines. 
It is perhaps the most disadvantageous lottery in the world, or the one in 
which the gain of those who draw the prizes bears the least proportion to the 
loss of those who draw the blanks: for though the prizes are few and the 
blanks many, the common price of a ticket is the whole fortune of a very 
rich man. Projects of mining, instead of replacing the capital employed in 
them, together with the ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both 
capital and profit. They are the projects, therefore, to which of all others a 
prudent lawgiver, who desired to increase the capital of his nation, would 
least choose to give any extraordinary encouragement, or to turn towards 
them a greater share of that capital than that would go to them of its own 
accord. Such in reality is the absurd confidence which almost all men have 
in their own good fortune that, wherever there is the least probability of 
success, too great a share of it is apt to go to them of its own accord. 
    But though the judgment of sober reason and experience concerning such 
projects has always been extremely unfavourable, that of human avidity has 
commonly been quite otherwise. The same passion which has suggested to 
so many people the absurd idea of the philosopher's stone, has suggested to 
others the equally absurd one of immense rich mines of gold and silver. 
They did not consider that the value of those metals has, in all ages and 
nations, arisen chiefly from their scarcity, and that their scarcity has arisen 
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from the very small quantities of them which nature has anywhere deposited 
in one place, from the hard and intractable substances with which she has 
almost everywhere surrounded those small quantities, and consequently 
from the labour and expense which are everywhere necessary in order to 
penetrate to and get at them. They flattered themselves that veins of those 
metals might in many places be found as large and as abundant as those 
which are commonly found of lead, or copper, or tin, or iron. The dream of 
Sir Walter Raleigh concerning the golden city and country of Eldorado, may 
satisfy us that even wise men are not always exempt from such strange 
delusions. More than a hundred years after the death of that great man, the 
Jesuit Gumila was still convinced of the reality of that wonderful country, 
and expressed with great warmth, and I dare to say with great sincerity, how 
happy he should be to carry the light of the gospel to a people who could so 
well reward the pious labours of their missionary. 
    In the countries first discovered by the Spaniards, no gold or silver mines 
are at present known which are supposed to be worth the working. The 
quantities of those metals which the first adventurers are said to have found 
there had probably been very much magnified, as well as the fertility of the 
mines which were wrought immediately after the first discovery. What 
those adventurers were reported to have found, however, was sufficient to 
inflame the avidity of all their countrymen. Every Spaniard who sailed to 
America expected to find an Eldorado. Fortune, too, did upon this what she 
has done upon very few other occasions. She realized in some measure the 
extravagant hopes of her votaries, and in the discovery and conquest of 
Mexico and Peru (of which the one happened about thirty, the other about 
forty years after the first expedition of Columbus), she presented them with 
something not very unlike that profusion of the precious metals which they 
sought for. 
    A project of commerce to the East Indies, therefore, gave occasion to the 
first discovery of the West. A project of conquest gave occasion to all the 
establishments of the Spaniards in those newly discovered countries. The 
motive which excited them to this conquest was a project of gold and silver 
mines; and a course of accidents, which no human wisdom could foresee, 
rendered this project much more successful than the undertakers had any 
reasonable grounds for expecting. 
    The first adventurers of all the other nations of Europe who attempted to 
make settlements in America were animated by the like chimerical views; 
but they were not equally successful. It was more than a hundred years after 
the first settlement of the Brazils before any silver, gold, or diamond mines 
were discovered there. In the English, French, Dutch, and Danish colonies, 
none have ever yet been discovered; at least none that are at present 
supposed to be worth the working. The first English settlers in North 
America, however, offered a fifth of all the gold and silver which should be 
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found there to the king, as a motive for granting them their patents. In the 
patents to Sir Walter Raleigh, to the London and Plymouth Companies, to 
the Council of Plymouth, etc., this fifth was accordingly reserved to the 
crown. To the expectation of finding gold and silver mines, those first 
settlers, too, joined that of discovering a northwest passage to the East 
Indies. They have hitherto been disappointed in both. 
PART 2
Causes of Prosperity of New Colonies
THE colony of a civilised nation which takes possession either of a waste 
country, or of one so thinly inhabited that the natives easily give place to the 
new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other 
human society. 
    The colonists carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of other 
useful arts superior to what can grow up of its own accord in the course of 
many centuries among savage and barbarous nations. They carry out with 
them, too, the habit of subordination, some notion of the regular 
government which takes place in their own country, of the system of laws 
which support it, and of a regular administration of justice; and they 
naturally establish something of the same kind in the new settlement. But 
among savage and barbarous nations, the natural progress of law and 
government is still slower than the natural progress of arts, after law and 
government have been go far established as is necessary for their protection. 
Every colonist gets more land than he can possibly cultivate. He has no rent, 
and scarce any taxes to pay. No landlord shares with him in its produce, and 
the share of the sovereign is commonly but a trifle. He has every motive to 
render as great as possible a produce, which is thus to be almost entirely his 
own. But his land is commonly so extensive that, with all his own industry, 
and with all the industry of other people whom he can get to employ, he can 
seldom make it produce the tenth part of what it is capable of producing. He 
is eager, therefore, to collect labourers from all quarters, and to reward them 
with the most liberal wages. But those liberal wages, joined to the plenty 
and cheapness of land, soon make those labourers leave him, in order to 
become landlords themselves, and to reward, with equal liberality, other 
labourers, who soon leave them for the same reason that they left their first 
master. The liberal reward of labour encourages marriage. The children, 
during the tender years of infancy, are well fed and properly taken care of, 
and when they are grown up, the value of their labour greatly overpays their 
maintenance. When arrived at maturity, the high price of labour, and the 
low price of land, enable them to establish themselves in the same manner 
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as their fathers did before them. 
    In other countries, rent and profit eat up wages, and the two superior 
orders of people oppress the inferior one. But in new colonies the interest of 
the two superior orders obliges them to treat the inferior one with more 
generosity and humanity; at least where that inferior one is not in a state of 
slavery. Waste lands of the greatest natural fertility are to be had for a trifle. 
The increase of revenue which the proprietor, who is always the undertaker, 
expects from their improvement, constitutes his profit which in these 
circumstances is commonly very great. But this great profit cannot be made 
without employing the labour of other people in clearing and cultivating the 
land; and the disproportion between the great extent of the land and the 
small number of the people, which commonly takes place in new colonies, 
makes it difficult for him to get this labour. He does not, therefore, dispute 
about wages, but is willing to employ labour at any price. The high wages 
of labour encourage population. The cheapness and plenty of good land 
encourage improvement, and enable the proprietor to pay those high wages. 
In those wages consists almost the whole price of the land; and though they 
are high considered as the wages of labour, they are low considered as the 
price of what is so very valuable. What encourages the progress of 
population and improvement encourages that of real wealth and greatness. 
    The progress of many of the ancient Greek colonies towards wealth and 
greatness seems accordingly to have been very rapid. In the course of a 
century or two, several of them appear to have rivalled, and even to have 
surpassed their mother cities. Syracuse and Agrigentum in Sicily, Tarentum 
and Locri in Italy, Ephesus and Miletus in Lesser Asia, appear by all 
accounts to have been at least equal to any of the cities of ancient Greece. 
Though posterior in their establishment, yet all the arts of refinement, 
philosophy, poetry, and eloquence seem to have been cultivated as early, 
and to have been improved as highly in them as in any part of the mother 
country. The schools of the two oldest Greek philosophers, those of Thales 
and Pythagoras, were established, it is remarkable, not in ancient Greece, 
but the one in an Asiatic, the other in an Italian colony. All those colonies 
had established themselves in countries inhabited by savage and barbarous 
nations, who easily gave place to the new settlers. They had plenty of good 
land, and as they were altogether independent of the mother city, they were 
at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way that they judged was most 
suitable to their own interest. 
    The history of the Roman colonies is by no means so brilliant. Some of 
them, indeed, such as Florence, have in the course of many ages, and after 
the fall of the mother city, grown up to be considerable states. But the 
progress of no one of them seems ever to have been very rapid. They were 
all established in conquered provinces, which in most cases had been fully 
inhabited before. The quantity of land assigned to each colonist was seldom 
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very considerable, and as the colony was not independent, they were not 
always at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way they judged was 
most suitable to their own interest. 
    In the plenty of good land, the European colonies established in America 
and the West Indies resemble, and even greatly surpass, those of ancient 
Greece. In their dependency upon the mother state, they resemble those of 
ancient Rome; but their great distance from Europe has in all of them 
alleviated more or less the effects of this dependency. Their situation has 
placed them less in the view and less in the power of their mother country. 
In pursuing their interest their own way, their conduct has, upon many 
occasions, been overlooked, either because not known or not understood in 
Europe; and upon some occasions it has been fairly suffered and submitted 
to, because their distance rendered it difficult to restrain it. Even the violent 
and arbitrary government of Spain has, upon many occasions, been obliged 
to recall or soften the orders which had been given for the government of 
her colonies for fear of a general insurrection. The progress of all the 
European colonies in wealth, population, and improvement, has accordingly 
been very great. 
    The crown of Spain, by its share of the gold and silver, derived some 
revenue from its colonies from the moment of their first establishment. It 
was a revenue, too, of a nature to excite in human avidity the most 
extravagant expectations of still greater riches. The Spanish colonies, 
therefore, from the moment of their first establishment, attracted very much 
the attention of their mother country, while those of the other European 
nations were for a long time in a great measure neglected. The former did 
not, perhaps, thrive the better in consequence of this attention; nor the latter 
the worse in consequence of this neglect. In proportion to the extent of the 
country which they in some measure possess, the Spanish colonies are 
considered as less populous and thriving than those of almost any other 
European nation. The progress even of the Spanish colonies, however, in 
population and improvement, has certainly been very rapid and very great. 
The city of Lima, founded since the conquest, is represented by Ulloa as 
containing fifty thousand inhabitants near thirty years ago. Quito, which had 
been but a miserable hamlet of Indians, is represented by the same author as 
in his time equally populous. Gemelli Carreri, a pretended traveller, it is 
said, indeed, but who seems everywhere to have written upon extremely 
good information, represents the city of Mexico as containing a hundred 
thousand inhabitants; a number which, in spite of all the exaggerations of 
the Spanish writers, is, probably, more than five times greater than what it 
contained in the time of Montezuma. These numbers exceed greatly those of 
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, the three greatest cities of the English 
colonies. Before the conquest of the Spaniards there were no cattle fit for 
draught either in Mexico or Peru. The llama was their only beast of burden, 
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and its strength seems to have been a good deal inferior to that of a common 
ass. The plough was unknown among them. They were ignorant of the use 
of iron. They had no coined money, nor any established instrument of 
commerce of any kind. Their commerce was carried on by barter. A sort of 
wooden spade was their principal instrument of agriculture. Sharp stones 
served them for knives and hatchets to cut with; fish bones and the hard 
sinews of certain animals served them for needles to sew with; and these 
seem to have been their principal instruments of trade. In this state of 
things, it seems impossible that either of those empires could have been so 
much improved or so well cultivated as at present, when they are plentifully 
furnished with all sorts of European cattle, and when the use of iron, of the 
plough, and of many of the arts of Europe, has been introduced among 
them. But the populousness of every country must be in proportion to the 
degree of its improvement and cultivation. In spite of the cruel destruction 
of the natives which followed the conquest, these two great empires are, 
probably, more populous now than they ever were before: and the people 
are surely very different; for we must acknowledge, I apprehend, that the 
Spanish creoles are in many respects superior to the ancient Indians. 
    After the settlements of the Spaniards, that of the Portuguese in Brazil is 
the oldest of any European nation in America. But as for a long time after 
the first discovery neither gold nor silver mines were found in it, and as it 
afforded, upon that account, little or no revenue to the crown, it was for a 
long time in a great measure neglected; and during this state of neglect it 
grew up to be a great and powerful colony. While Portugal was under the 
dominion of Spain, Brazil was attacked by the Dutch, who got possession of 
seven of the fourteen provinces into which it is divided. They expected soon 
to conquer the other seven, when Portugal recovered its independency by 
the elevation of the family of Braganza to the throne. The Dutch then, as 
enemies to the Spaniards, became friends to the Portuguese, who were 
likewise the enemies of the Spaniards. They agreed, therefore, to leave that 
part of Brazil, which they had not conquered, to the King of Portugal, who 
agreed to leave that part which they had conquered to them, as a matter not 
worth disputing about with such good allies. But the Dutch government 
soon began to oppress the Portuguese colonists, who, instead of amusing 
themselves with complaints, took arms against their new masters, and by 
their own valour and resolution, with the connivance, indeed, but without 
any avowed assistance from the mother country, drove them out of Brazil. 
The Dutch, therefore, finding it impossible to keep any part of the country 
to themselves, were contented that it should be entirely restored to the 
crown of Portugal. In this colony there are said to be more than six hundred 
thousand people, either Portuguese or descended from Portuguese, creoles, 
mulattoes, and a mixed race between Portuguese and Brazilians. No one 
colony in America is supposed to contain so great a number of people of 
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European extraction. 
    Towards the end of the fifteenth, and during the greater part of the 
sixteenth century, Spain and Portugal were the two great naval powers upon 
the ocean; for though the commerce of Venice extended to every part of 
Europe, its fleets had scarce ever sailed beyond the Mediterranean. The 
Spaniards, in virtue of the first discovery, claimed all America as their own; 
and though they could not hinder so great a naval power as that of Portugal 
from settling in Brazil, such was, at that time, the terror of their name, that 
the greater part of the other nations of Europe were afraid to establish 
themselves in any other part of that great continent. The French, who 
attempted to settle in Florida, were all murdered by the Spaniards. But the 
declension of the naval power of this latter nation, in consequence of the 
defeat or miscarriage of what they called their Invincible Armada, which 
happened towards the end of the sixteenth century, put it out of their power 
to obstruct any longer the settlements of the other European nations. In the 
course of the seventeenth century, therefore, the English, French, Dutch, 
Danes, and Swedes, all the great nations who had any ports upon the ocean, 
attempted to make some settlements in the new world. 
    The Swedes established themselves in New Jersey; and the number of 
Swedish families still to be found there sufficiently demonstrates that this 
colony was very likely to prosper had it been protected by the mother 
country. But being neglected by Sweden, it was soon swallowed up by the 
Dutch colony of New York, which again, in 1674, fell under the dominion 
of the English. 
    The small islands of St. Thomas and Santa Cruz are the only countries in 
the new world that have ever been possessed By the Danes. These little 
settlements, too, were under the government of an exclusive company, 
which had the sole right, both of purchasing the surplus produce of the 
colonists, and of supplying them with such goods of other countries as they 
wanted, and which, therefore, both in its purchases and sales, had not only 
the power of oppressing them, but the greatest temptation to do so. The 
government of an exclusive company of merchants is, perhaps, the worst of 
all governments for any country whatever. It was not, however, able to stop 
altogether the progress of these colonies, though it rendered it more slow 
and languid. The late King of Denmark dissolved this company, and since 
that time the prosperity of these colonies has been very great. 
    The Dutch settlements in the West, as well as those in the East Indies, 
were originally put under the government of an exclusive company. The 
progress of some of them, therefore, though it has been considerable, in 
comparison with that of almost any country that has been long peopled and 
established, has been languid and slow in comparison with that of the 
greater part of new colonies. The colony of Surinam, though very 
considerable, is still inferior to the greater part of the sugar colonies of the 
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other European nations. The colony of Nova Belgia, now divided into the 
two provinces of New York and New Jersey, would probably have soon 
become considerable too, even though it had remained under the 
government of the Dutch. The plenty and cheapness of good land are such 
powerful causes of prosperity that the very worst government is scarce 
capable of checking altogether the efficacy of their operation. The great 
distance, too, from the mother country would enable the colonists to evade 
more or less, by smuggling, the monopoly which the company enjoyed 
against them. At present the company allows all Dutch ships to trade to 
Surinam upon paying two and a half per cent upon the value of their cargo 
for a licence; and only reserves to itself exclusively the direct trade from 
Africa to America, which consists almost entirely in the slave trade. This 
relaxation in the exclusive privileges of the company is probably the 
principal cause of that degree of prosperity which that colony at present 
enjoys. Curacoa and Eustatia, the two principal islands belonging to the 
Dutch, are free ports open to the ships of all nations; and this freedom, in 
the midst of better colonies whose ports are open to those of one nation 
only, has been the great cause of the prosperity of those two barren islands. 
    The French colony of Canada was, during the greater part of the last 
century, and some part of the present, under the government of an exclusive 
company. Under so unfavourable an administration its progress was 
necessarily very slow in comparison with that of other new colonies; but it 
became much more rapid when this company was dissolved after the fall of 
what is called the Mississippi scheme. When the English got possession of 
this country, they found in it near double the number of inhabitants which 
Father Charlevoix had assigned to it between twenty and thirty years before. 
That Jesuit had travelled over the whole country, and had no inclination to 
represent it as less considerable than it really was. 
    The French colony of St. Domingo was established by pirates and 
freebooters, who, for a long time, neither required the protection, nor 
acknowledged the authority of France; and when that race of banditti 
became so far citizens as to acknowledge this authority, it was for a long 
time necessary to exercise it with very great gentleness. During this period 
the population and improvement of this colony increased very fast. Even the 
oppression of the exclusive company, to which it was for some time 
subjected, with all the other colonies of France, though it no doubt retarded, 
had not been able to stop its progress altogether. The course of its prosperity 
returned as soon as it was relieved from that oppression. It is now the most 
important of the sugar colonies of the West Indies, and its produce is said to 
be greater than that of all the English sugar colonies put together. The other 
sugar colonies of France are in general all very thriving. 
    But there are no colonies of which the progress has been more rapid than 
that of the English in North America. 
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    Plenty of good land, and liberty to manage their own affairs their own 
way, seem to be the two great causes of the prosperity of all new colonies. 
    In the plenty of good land the English colonies of North America, though 
no doubt very abundantly provided, are however inferior to those of the 
Spaniards and Portuguese, and not superior to some of those possessed by 
the French before the late war. But the political institutions of the English 
colonies have been more favourable to the improvement and cultivation of 
this land than those of any of the other three nations. 
    First, the engrossing of uncultivated land, though it has by no means been 
prevented altogether, has been more restrained in the English colonies than 
in any other. The colony law which imposes upon every proprietor the 
obligation of improving and cultivating, within a limited time, a certain 
proportion of his lands, and which in case of failure, declares those 
neglected lands grantable to any other person, though it has not, perhaps, 
been very strictly executed, has, however, had some effect. 
    Secondly, in Pennsylvania there is no right of primogeniture, and lands, 
like movables, are divided equally among all the children of the family. In 
three of the provinces of New England the oldest has only a double share, as 
in the Mosaical law. Though in those provinces, therefore, too great a 
quantity of land should sometimes be engrossed by a particular individual, 
it is likely, in the course of a generation or two, to be sufficiently divided 
again. In the other English colonies, indeed, the right of primogeniture takes 
place, as in the law of England. But in all the English colonies the tenure of 
the lands, which are all held by free socage, facilitates alienation, and the 
grantee of any extensive tract of land generally finds it for his interest to 
alienate, as fast as he can, the greater part of it, reserving only a small quit-
rent. In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, what is called the right of 
Majorazzo takes place in the succession of all those great estates to which 
any title of honour is annexed. Such estates go all to one person, and are in 
effect entailed and unalienable. The French colonies, indeed, are subject to 
the custom of Paris, which, in the inheritance of land, is much more 
favourable to the younger children than the law of England. But in the 
French colonies, if any part of an estate, held by the noble tenure of chivalry 
and homage, is alienated, it is, for a limited time, subject to the right of 
redemption, either by the heir of the superior or by the heir of the family; 
and all the largest estates of the country are held by such noble tenures, 
which necessarily embarrass alienation. But in a new colony a great 
uncultivated estate is likely to be much more speedily divided by alienation 
than by succession. The plenty and cheapness of good land, it has already 
been observed, are the principal causes of the rapid prosperity of new 
colonies. The engrossing of land, in effect, destroys this plenty and 
cheapness. The engrossing of uncultivated land, besides, is the greatest 
obstruction to its improvement. But the labour that is employed in the 
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improvement and cultivation of land affords the greatest and most valuable 
produce to the society. The produce of labour, in this case, pays not only its 
own wages, and the profit of the stock which employs it, but the rent of the 
land too upon which it is employed. The labour of the English colonists, 
therefore, being more employed in the improvement and cultivation of land, 
is likely to afford a greater and more valuable produce than that of any of 
the other three nations, which, by the engrossing of land, is more or less 
diverted towards other employments. 
    Thirdly, the labour of the English colonists is not only likely to afford a 
greater and more valuable produce, but, in consequence of the moderation 
of their taxes, a greater proportion of this produce belongs to themselves, 
which they may store up and employ in putting into motion a still greater 
quantity of labour. The English colonists have never yet contributed 
anything towards the defence of the mother country, or towards the support 
of its civil government. They themselves, on the contrary, have hitherto 
been defended almost entirely at the expense of the mother country. But the 
expense of fleets and armies is out of all proportion greater than the 
necessary expense of civil government. The expense of their own civil 
government has always been very moderate. It has generally been confined 
to what was necessary for paying competent salaries to the governor, to the 
judges, and to some other officers of police, and for maintaining a few of 
the most useful public works. The expense of the civil establishment of 
Massachusetts Bay, before the commencement of the present disturbances, 
used to be but about L18,000 a year. That of New Hampshire and Rhode 
Island, L3500 each. That of Connecticut, L4000. That of New York and 
Pennsylvania, L4500 each. That of New Jersey, L1200. That of Virginia 
and South Carolina, L8000 each. The civil establishments of Nova Scotia 
and Georgia are partly supported by an annual grant of Parliament. But 
Nova Scotia pays, besides, about L7000 a year towards the public expenses 
of the colony; and Georgia about L2500 a year. All the different civil 
establishments in North America, in short, exclusive of those of Maryland 
and North Carolina, of which no exact account has been got, did not, before 
the commencement of the present disturbances, cost the inhabitants above 
L64,700 a year; an ever-memorable example at how small an expense three 
millions of people may not only be governed, but well governed. The most 
important part of the expense of government, indeed, that of defence and 
protection, has constantly fallen upon the mother country. The ceremonial, 
too, of the civil government in the colonies, upon the reception of a new 
governor, upon the opening of a new assembly, etc., though sufficiently 
decent, is not accompanied with any expensive pomp or parade. Their 
ecclesiastical government is conducted upon a plan equally frugal. Tithes 
are unknown among them; and their clergy, who are far from being 
numerous, are maintained either by moderate stipends, or by the voluntary 
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contributions of the people. The power of Spain and Portugal, on the 
contrary, derives some support from the taxes levied upon their colonies. 
France, indeed, has never drawn any considerable revenue from its colonies, 
the taxes which it levies upon them being generally spent among them. But 
the colony government of all these three nations is conducted upon a much 
more expensive ceremonial. The sums spent upon the reception of a new 
viceroy of Peru, for example, have frequently been enormous. Such 
ceremonials are not only real taxes paid by the rich colonists upon those 
particular occasions, but they serve to introduce among them the habit of 
vanity and expense upon all other occasions. They are not only very 
grievous occasional taxes, but they contribute to establish perpetual taxes of 
the same kind still more grievous; the ruinous taxes of private luxury and 
extravagance. In the colonies of all those three nations too, the ecclesiastical 
government is extremely oppressive. Tithes take place in all of them, and 
are levied with the utmost rigour in those of Spain and Portugal. All of 
them, besides, are oppressed with a numerous race of mendicant friars, 
whose beggary being not only licensed but consecrated by religion, is a 
most grievous tax upon the poor people, who are most carefully taught that 
it is a duty to give, and a very great sin to refuse them their charity. Over 
and above all this, the clergy are, in all of them, the greatest engrossers of 
land. 
    Fourthly, in the disposal of their surplus produce, or of what is over and 
above their own consumption, the English colonies have been more 
favoured, and have been allowed a more extensive market, than those of any 
other European nation. Every European nation has endeavoured more or 
less to monopolise to itself the commerce of its colonies, and, upon that 
account, has prohibited the ships of foreign nations from trading to them, 
and has prohibited them from importing European goods from any foreign 
nation. But the manner in which this monopoly has been exercised in 
different nations has been very different. 
    Some nations have given up the whole commerce of their colonies to an 
exclusive company, of whom the colonists were obliged to buy all such 
European goods as they wanted, and to whom they were obliged to sell the 
whole of their own surplus produce. It was the interest of the company, 
therefore, not only to sell the former as dear, and to buy the latter as cheap 
as possible, but to buy no more of the latter, even at this low price than what 
they could dispose of for a very high price in Europe. It was their interest, 
not only to degrade in all cases the value of the surplus produce of the 
colony, but in many cases to discourage and keep down the natural increase 
of its quantity. Of all the expedients that can well be contrived to stunt the 
natural growth of a new colony, that of an exclusive company is 
undoubtedly the most effectual. This, however, has been the policy of 
Holland, though their company, in the course of the present century, has 
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given up in many respects the exertion of their exclusive privilege. This, 
too, was the policy of Denmark till the reign of the late king. It has 
occasionally been the policy of France, and of late, since 1755, after it had 
been abandoned by all other nations on account of its absurdity, it has 
become the policy of Portugal with regard at least to two of the principal 
provinces of Brazil, Fernambuco and Marannon. 
    Other nations, without establishing an exclusive company, have confined 
the whole commerce of their colonies to a particular port of the mother 
country, from whence no ship was allowed to sail, but either in a fleet and at 
a particular season, or, if single, in consequence of a particular licence, 
which in most cases was very well paid for. This policy opened, indeed, the 
trade of the colonies to all the natives of the mother country, provided they 
traded from the proper port, at the proper season, and in the proper vessels. 
But as all the different merchants, who joined their stocks in order to fit out 
those licensed vessels, would find it for their interest to act in concert, the 
trade which was carried on in this manner would necessarily be conducted 
very nearly upon the same principles as that of an exclusive company. The 
profit of those merchants would be almost equally exorbitant and 
oppressive. The colonies would be ill supplied, and would be obliged both 
to buy very dear, and to sell very cheap. This, however, till within these few 
years, had always been the policy of Spain, and the price of all European 
goods, accordingly, is said to have been enormous in the Spanish West 
Indies. At Quito, we are told by Ulloa, a pound of iron sold for about four 
and sixpence, and a pound of steel for about six and ninepence sterling. But 
it is chiefly in order to purchase European goods that the colonies part with 
their own produce. The more, therefore, they pay for the one, the less they 
really get for the other, and the dearness of the one is the same thing with 
the cheapness of the other. The policy of Portugal is in this respect the same 
as the ancient policy of Spain with regard to all its colonies, except 
Fernambuco and Marannon, and with regard to these it has lately adopted a 
still worse. 
    Other nations leave the trade of their colonies free to all their subjects 
who may carry it on from all the different ports of the mother country, and 
who have occasion for no other licence than the common despatches of the 
custom-house. In this case the number and dispersed situation of the 
different traders renders it impossible for them to enter into any general 
combination, and their competition is sufficient to hinder them from making 
very exorbitant profits. Under so liberal a policy the colonies are enabled 
both to sell their own produce and to buy the goods of Europe at a 
reasonable price. But since the dissolution of the Plymouth Company, when 
our colonies were but in their infancy, this has always been the policy of 
England. It has generally, too, been that of France, and has been uniformly 
so since the dissolution of what, in England, is commonly called their 
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Mississippi Company. The profits of the trade, therefore, which France and 
England carry on with their colonies, though no doubt somewhat higher 
than if the competition was free to all other nations, are, however, by no 
means exorbitant; and the price of European goods accordingly is not 
extravagantly high in the greater part of the colonies of either of those 
nations. 
    In the exportation of their own surplus produce too, it is only with regard 
to certain commodities that the colonies of Great Britain are confined to the 
market of the mother country. These commodities having been enumerated 
in the Act of Navigation and in some other subsequent acts, have upon that 
account been called enumerated commodities. The rest are called non-
enumerated, and may be exported directly to other countries provided it is 
in British or Plantation ships, of which the owners and three-fourths of the 
mariners are British subjects. 
    Among the non-enumerated commodities are some of the most important 
productions of America and the West Indies; grain of all sorts, lumber, salt 
provisions, fish, sugar and rum. 
    Grain is naturally the first and principal object of the culture of all new 
colonies. By allowing them a very extensive market for it, the law 
encourages them to extend this culture much beyond the consumption of a 
thinly inhabited country, and thus to provide beforehand an ample 
subsistence for a continually increasing population. 
    In a country quite covered with wood, where timber consequently is of 
little or no value, the expense of clearing the ground is the principal obstacle 
to improvement. By allowing the colonies a very extensive market for their 
lumber, the law endeavours to facilitate improvement by raising the price of 
a commodity which would otherwise be of little value, and thereby enabling 
them to make some profit of what would otherwise be a mere expense. 
    In a country neither half-peopled nor half-cultivated, cattle naturally 
multiply beyond the consumption of the inhabitants, and are often upon that 
account of little or no value. But it is necessary, it has already been shown, 
that the price of cattle should bear a certain proportion to that of corn before 
the greater part of the lands of any country can be improved. By allowing to 
American cattle, in all shapes, dead or alive, a very extensive market, the 
law endeavors to raise the value of a commodity of which the high price is 
so very essential to improvement. The good effects of this liberty, however, 
must be somewhat diminished by the 4th of George III, c. 15, which puts 
hides and skins among the enumerated commodities, and thereby tends to 
reduce the value of American cattle. 
    To increase the shipping and naval power of Great Britain, by the 
extension of the fisheries of our colonies, is an object which the legislature 
seems to have had almost constantly in view. Those fisheries, upon this 
account, have had all the encouragement which freedom can give them, and 
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they have flourished accordingly. The New England fishery in particular 
was, before the late disturbances, one of the most important, perhaps, in the 
world. The whale-fishery which, notwithstanding an extravagant bounty, is 
in Great Britain carried on to so little purpose that in the opinion of many 
people (which I do not, however, pretend to warrant) the whole produce 
does not much exceed the value of the bounties which are annually paid for 
it, is in New England carried on without any bounty to a very great extent. 
Fish is one of the principal articles with which the North Americans trade to 
Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean. 
    Sugar was originally an enumerated commodity which could be exported 
only to Great Britain. But in 1731, upon a representation of the sugar-
planters, its exportation was permitted to all parts of the world. The 
restrictions, however, with which this liberty was granted, joined to the high 
price of sugar in Great Britain, have rendered it, in a great measure, 
ineffectual. Great Britain and her colonies still continue to be almost the 
sole market for all the sugar produced in the British plantations. Their 
consumption increases so fast that, though in consequence of the increasing 
improvement of Jamaica, as well as of the Ceded Islands, the importation of 
sugar has increased very greatly within these twenty years, the exportation 
to foreign countries is said to be not much greater than before. 
    Rum is a very important article in the trade which the Americans carry on 
to the coast of Africa, from which they bring back negro slaves in return. 
    If the whole surplus produce of America in grain of all sorts, in salt 
provisions and in fish, had been put into the enumeration, and thereby 
forced into the market of Great Britain, it would have interfered too much 
with the produce of the industry of our own people. It was probably not so 
much from any regard to the interest of America as from a jealousy of this 
interference that those important commodities have not only been kept out 
of the enumeration, but that the importation into Great Britain of all grain, 
except rice, and of salt provisions, has, in the ordinary state of the law, been 
prohibited. 
    The non-enumerated commodities could originally be exported to all 
parts of the world. Lumber and rice, having been once put into the 
enumeration, when they were afterwards taken out of it, were confined, as 
to the European market, to the countries that lie south of Cape Finisterre. By 
the 6th of George III, c. 52, all non-enumerated commodities were subjected 
to the like restriction. The parts of Europe which lie south of Cape Finisterre 
are not manufacturing countries, and we were less jealous of the colony 
ships carrying home from them any manufactures which could interfere 
with our own. 
    The enumerated commodities are of two sorts: first, such as are either the 
peculiar produce of America, or as cannot be produced, or at least are not 
produced, in the mother country. Of this kind are molasses, coffee, cocoa-
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nuts, tobacco, pimento, ginger, whalefins, raw silk, cotton-wool, beaver, 
and other peltry of America, indigo, fustic, and other dyeing woods; 
secondly, such as are not the peculiar produce of America, but which are 
and may be produced in the mother country, though not in such quantities 
as to supply the greater part of her demand, which is principally supplied 
from foreign countries. Of this kind are all naval stores, masts, yards, and 
bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine, pig and bar iron, copper ore, hides and 
skins, pot and pearl ashes. The largest importation of commodities of the 
first kind could not discourage the growth or interfere with the sale of any 
part of the produce of the mother country. By confining them to the home 
market, our merchants, it was expected, would not only be enabled to buy 
them cheaper in the plantations, and consequently to sell them with a better 
profit at home, but to establish between the plantations and foreign 
countries an advantageous carrying trade, of which Great Britain was 
necessarily to be the centre or emporium, as the European country into 
which those commodities were first to be imported. The importation of 
commodities of the second kind might be so managed too, it was supposed, 
as to interfere, not with the sale of those of the same kind which were 
produced at home, but with that of those which were imported from foreign 
countries; because, by means of proper duties, they might be rendered 
always somewhat dearer than the former, and yet a good deal cheaper than 
the latter. By confining such commodities to the home market, therefore, it 
was proposed to discourage the produce, not of Great Britain, but of some 
foreign countries with which the balance of trade was believed to be 
unfavourable to Great Britain. 
    The prohibition of exporting from the colonies, to any other country but 
Great Britain, masts, yards, and bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine, 
naturally tended to lower the price of timber in the colonies, and 
consequently to increase the expense of clearing their lands, the principal 
obstacle to their improvement. But about the beginning of the present 
century, in 1703, the pitch and tar company of Sweden endeavoured to raise 
the price of their commodities to Great Britain, by prohibiting their 
exportation, except in their own ships, at their own price, and in such 
quantities as they thought proper. In order to counteract this notable piece of 
mercantile policy, and to render herself as much as possible independent, 
not only of Sweden, but of all the other northern powers, Great Britain gave 
a bounty upon the importation of naval stores from America, and the effect 
of this bounty was to raise the price of timber in America much more than 
the confinement to the home market could lower it; and as both regulations 
were enacted at the same time, their joint effect was rather to encourage 
than to discourage the clearing of land in America. 
    Though pig and bar iron too have been put among the enumerated 
commodities, yet as, when imported from America, they were exempted 
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from considerable duties to which they are subject when imported from any 
other country, the one part of the regulation contributes more to encourage 
the erection of furnaces in America than the other to discourage it. There is 
no manufacture which occasions so great a consumption of wood as a 
furnace, or which can contribute so much to the clearing of a country 
overgrown with it. 
    The tendency of some of these regulations to raise the value of timber in 
America, and thereby to facilitate the clearing of the land, was neither, 
perhaps, intended nor understood by the legislature. Though their beneficial 
effects, however, have been in this respect accidental, they have not upon 
that account been less real. 
    The most perfect freedom of trade is permitted between the British 
colonies of America and the West Indies, both in the enumerated and in the 
non-enumerated commodities. Those colonies are now become so populous 
and thriving that each of them finds in some of the others a great and 
extensive market for every part of its produce. All of them taken together, 
they make a great internal market for the produce of one another. 
    The liberality of England, however, towards the trade of her colonies has 
been confined chiefly to what concerns the market for their produce, either 
in its rude state, or in what may be called the very first stage of 
manufacture. The more advanced or more refined manufactures even of the 
colony produce, the merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain choose to 
reserve to themselves, and have prevailed upon the legislature to prevent 
their establishment in the colonies, sometimes by high duties, and 
sometimes by absolute prohibitions. 
    While, for example, Muskovado sugars from the British plantations pay 
upon importation only 6s. 4d. the hundredweight; white sugars pay L1 1s. 
1d.; and refined, either double or single, in loaves L4 2s. 5 8/20d. When 
those high duties were imposed, Great Britain was the sole, and she still 
continues to be the principal market to which the sugars of the British 
colonies could be exported. They amounted, therefore, to a prohibition, at 
first of claying or refining sugar for any foreign market, and at present of 
claying or refining it for the market, which takes off, perhaps, more than 
nine-tenths of the whole produce. The manufacture of claying or refining 
sugar accordingly, though it has flourished in all the sugar colonies of 
France, has been little cultivated in any of those of England except for the 
market of the colonies themselves. While Grenada was in the hands of the 
French there was a refinery of sugar, by claying at least, upon almost every 
plantation. Since it fell into those of the English, almost all works of this 
kind have been given tip, and there are at present, October 1773, I am 
assured not above two or three remaining in the island. At present, however, 
by an indulgence of the custom-house, clayed or refined sugar, if reduced 
from loaves into powder, is commonly imported as Muskovado. 
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    While Great Britain encourages in America the manufactures of pig and 
bar iron, by exempting them from duties to which the like commodities are 
subject when imported from any other country, she imposes an absolute 
prohibition upon the erection of steel furnaces and slitmills in any of her 
American plantations. She will not suffer her colonists to work in those 
more refined manufactures even for their own consumption; but insists upon 
their purchasing of her merchants and manufacturers all goods of this kind 
which they have occasion for. 
    She prohibits the exportation from one province to another by water, and 
even the carriage by land upon horseback or in a cart, of hats, of wools and 
woollen goods, of the produce of America; a regulation which effectually 
prevents the establishment of any manufacture of such commodities for 
distant sale, and confines the industry of her colonists in this way to such 
coarse and household manufactures as a private family commonly makes 
for its own use or for that of some of its neighbours in the same province. 
    To prohibit a great people, however, from making all that they can of 
every part of their own produce, or from employing their stock and industry 
in the way that they judge most advantageous to themselves, is a manifest 
violation of the most sacred rights of mankind. Unjust, however, as such 
prohibitions may be, they have not hitherto been very hurtful to the 
colonies. Land is still so cheap, and, consequently, labour so dear among 
them, that they can import from the mother country almost all the more 
refined or more advanced manufactures cheaper than they could make for 
themselves. Though they had not, therefore, been prohibited from 
establishing such manufactures, yet in their present state of improvement a 
regard to their own interest would, probably, have prevented them from 
doing so. In their present state of improvement those prohibitions, perhaps, 
without cramping their industry, or restraining it from any employment to 
which it would have gone of its own accord, are only impertinent badges of 
slavery imposed upon them, without any sufficient reason, by the 
groundless jealousy of the merchants and manufacturers of the mother 
country. In a more advanced state they might be really oppressive and 
insupportable. 
    Great Britain too, as she confines to her own market some of the most 
important productions of the colonies, so in compensation she gives to some 
of them an advantage in that market, sometimes by imposing higher duties 
upon the like productions when imported from other countries, and 
sometimes by giving bounties upon their importation from the colonies. In 
the first way she gives an advantage in the home market to the sugar, 
tobacco, and iron of her own colonies, and in the second to their raw silk, to 
their hemp and flax, to their indigo, to their naval stores, and to their 
building timber. This second way of encouraging the colony produce by 
bounties upon importation, is, so far as I have been able to learn, peculiar to 
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Great Britain. The first is not. Portugal does not content herself with 
imposing higher duties upon the importation of tobacco from any other 
country, but prohibits it under the severest penalties. 
    With regard to the importation of goods from Europe, England has 
likewise dealt more liberally with her colonies than any other nation. 
    Great Britain allows a part, almost always the half, generally a larger 
portion, and sometimes the whole of the duty which is paid upon the 
importation of foreign goods, to be drawn back upon their exportation to 
any foreign country. No independent foreign country, it was easy to foresee, 
would receive them if they came to it loaded with the heavy duties to which 
almost all foreign goods are subjected on their importation into Great 
Britain. Unless, therefore, some part of those duties was drawn back upon 
exportation, there was an end of the carrying trade; a trade so much 
favoured by the mercantile system. 
    Our colonies, however, are by no means independent foreign countries; 
and Great Britain having assumed to herself the exclusive right of supplying 
them with all goods from Europe, might have forced them (in the same 
manner as other countries have done their colonies) to receive such goods, 
loaded with all the same duties which they paid in the mother country. But, 
on the contrary, till 1763, the same drawbacks were paid upon the 
exportation of the greater part of foreign goods to our colonies as to any 
independent foreign country. In 1763, indeed, by the 4th of George III, c. 
15, this indulgence was a good deal abated, and it was enacted, "That no 
part of the duty called the Old Subsidy should be drawn back for any goods 
of the growth, production, or manufacture of Europe or the East Indies, 
which should be exported from this kingdom to any British colony or 
plantation in America; wines, white calicoes and muslins excepted." Before 
this law, many different sorts of foreign goods might have been bought 
cheaper in the plantations than in the mother country; and some may still. 
    Of the greater part of the regulations concerning the colony trade, the 
merchants who carry it on, it must be observed, have been the principal 
advisers. We must not wonder, therefore, if, in the greater part of them, their 
interest has been more considered than either that of the colonies or that of 
the mother country. In their exclusive privilege of supplying the colonies 
with all the goods which they wanted from Europe, and of purchasing all 
such parts of their surplus produce as could not interfere with any of the 
trades which they themselves carried on at home, the interest of the colonies 
was sacrificed to the interest of those merchants. In allowing the same 
drawbacks upon the re-exportation of the greater part of European and East 
India goods to the colonies as upon their re-exportation to any independent 
country, the interest of the mother country was sacrificed to it, even 
according to the mercantile ideas of that interest. It was for the interest of 
the merchants to pay as little as possible for the foreign which they sent to 
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the colonies, and, consequently, to get back as much as possible of the 
duties which they advanced upon their importation into Great Britain. They 
might thereby be enabled to sell in the colonies either the same quantity of 
goods with a greater profit, or a greater quantity with the same profit, and, 
consequently, to gain something either in the one way or the other. It was 
likewise for the interest of the colonies to get all such goods as cheap and in 
as great abundance as possible. But this might not always be for the interest 
of the mother country. She might frequently suffer both in her revenue, by 
giving back a great part of the duties which had been paid upon the 
importation of such goods; and in her manufactures, by being undersold in 
the colony market, in consequence of the easy terms upon which foreign 
manufactures could be carried thither by means of those drawbacks. The 
progress of the linen manufacture of Great Britain, it is commonly said, has 
been a good deal retarded by the drawbacks upon the re-exportation of 
German linen to the American colonies. 
    But though the policy of Great Britain with regard to the trade of her 
colonies has been dictated by the same mercantile spirit as that of other 
nations, it has, however, upon the whole, been less illiberal and oppressive 
than that of any of them. 
    In everything, except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English 
colonists to manage their own affairs their own way is complete. It is in 
every respect equal to that of their fellow-citizens at home, and is secured in 
the same manner, by an assembly of the representatives of the people, who 
claim the sole right of imposing taxes for the support of the colony 
government. The authority of this assembly overawes the executive power, 
and neither the meanest nor the most obnoxious colonist, as long as he 
obeys the law, has anything to fear from the resentment, either of the 
governor or of any other civil or military officer in the province. The colony 
assemblies though, like the House of Commons in England, are not always 
a very equal representation of the people, yet they approach more nearly to 
that character; and as the executive power either has not the means to 
corrupt them, or, on account of the support which it receives from the 
mother country, is not under the necessity of doing so, they are perhaps in 
general more influenced by the inclinations of their constituents. The 
councils which, in the colony legislatures, correspond to the House of Lords 
in Great Britain, are not composed of an hereditary nobility. In some of the 
colonies, as in three of the governments of New England, those councils are 
not appointed by the king, but chosen by the representatives of the people. 
In none of the English colonies is there any hereditary nobility. In all of 
them, indeed, as in all other free countries, the descendant of an old colony 
family is more respected than an upstart of equal merit and fortune; but he is 
only more respected, and he has no privileges by which he can be 
troublesome to his neighbours. Before the commencement of the present 
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disturbances, the colony assemblies had not only the legislative but a part of 
the executive power. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, they elected the 
governor. In the other colonies they appointed the revenue officers who 
collected the taxes imposed by those respective assemblies, to whom those 
officers were immediately responsible. There is more equality, therefore, 
among the English colonists than among the inhabitants of the mother 
country. Their manners are more republican, and their governments, those 
of three of the provinces of New England in particular, have hitherto been 
more republican too. 
    The absolute governments of Spain, Portugal, and France, on the 
contrary, take place in their colonies; and the discretionary powers which 
such governments commonly delegate to all their inferior officers are, on 
account of the great distance, naturally exercised there with more than 
ordinary violence. Under all absolute governments there is more liberty in 
the capital than in any other part of the country. The sovereign himself can 
never have either interest or inclination to pervert the order of justice, or to 
oppress the great body of the people. In the capital his presence overawes 
more or less all his inferior officers, who in the remoter provinces, from 
whence the complaints of the people are less likely to reach him, can 
exercise their tyranny with much more safety. But the European colonies in 
America are more remote than the most distant provinces of the greatest 
empires which had ever been known before. The government of the English 
colonies is perhaps the only one which, since the world began, could give 
perfect security to the inhabitants of so very distant a province. The 
administration of the French colonies, however, has always been conducted 
with more gentleness and moderation than that of the Spanish and 
Portugese. This superiority of conduct is suitable both to the character of the 
French nation, and to what forms the character of every nation, the nature of 
their government, which though arbitrary and violent in comparison with 
that of Great Britain, is legal and free in comparison with those of Spain and 
Portugal. 
    It is in the progress of the North American colonies, however, that the 
superiority of the English policy chiefly appears. The progress of the sugar 
colonies of France has been at least equal, perhaps superior, to that of the 
greater part of those of England, and yet the sugar colonies of England 
enjoy a free government nearly of the same kind with that which takes place 
in her colonies of North America. But the sugar colonies of France are not 
discouraged, like those of England, from refining their own sugar; and, what 
is of still greater importance, the genius of their government naturally 
introduces a better management of their negro slaves. 
    In all European colonies the culture of the sugar-cane is carried on by 
negro slaves. The constitution of those who have been born in the temperate 
climate of Europe could not, it is supposed, support the labour of digging 
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the ground under the burning sun of the West Indies; and the culture of the 
sugarcane, as it is managed at present, is all hand labour, though, in the 
opinion of many, the drill plough might be introduced into it with great 
advantage. But, as the profit and success of the cultivation which is carried 
on by means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of 
those cattle, so the profit and success of that which is carried on by slaves 
must depend equally upon the good management of those slaves; and in the 
good management of their slaves the French planters, I think it is generally 
allowed, are superior to the English. The law, so far as it gives some weak 
protection to the slave against the violence of his master, is likely to be 
better executed in a colony where the government is in a great measure 
arbitrary than in one where it is altogether free. In every country where the 
unfortunate law of slavery is established, the magistrate, when he protects 
the slave, intermeddles in some measure in the management of the private 
property of the master; and, in a free country, where the master is perhaps 
either a member of the colony assembly, or an elector of such a member, he 
dare not do this but with the greatest caution and circumspection. The 
respect which he is obliged to pay to the master renders it more difficult for 
him to protect the slave. But in a country where the government is in a great 
measure arbitrary, where it is usual for the magistrate to intermeddle even in 
the management of the private property of individuals, and to send them, 
perhaps, a lettre de cachet if they do not manage it according to his liking, it 
is much easier for him to give some protection to the slave; and common 
humanity naturally disposes him to do so. The protection of the magistrate 
renders the slave less contemptible in the eyes of his master, who is thereby 
induced to consider him with more regard, and to treat him with more 
gentleness. Gentle usage renders the slave not only more faithful, but more 
intelligent, and therefore, upon a double account, more useful. He 
approaches more to the condition of a free servant, and may possess some 
degree of integrity and attachment to his master's interest, virtues which 
frequently belong to free servants, but which never can belong to a slave 
who is treated as slaves commonly are in countries where the master is 
perfectly free and secure. 
    That the condition of a slave is better under an arbitrary than under a free 
government is, I believe, supported by the history of all ages and nations. In 
the Roman history, the first time we read of the magistrate interposing to 
protect the slave from the violence of his master is under the emperors. 
When Vedius Pollio, in the presence of Augustus, ordered one of his slaves, 
who had committed a slight fault, to be cut into pieces and thrown into his 
fish pond in order to feed his fishes, the emperor commanded him, with 
indignation, to emancipate immediately, not only that slave, but all the 
others that belonged to him. Under the republic no magistrate could have 
had authority enough to protect the slave, much less to punish the master. 
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    The stock, it is to be observed, which has improved the sugar colonies of 
France, particularly the great colony of St. Domingo, has been raised almost 
entirely from the gradual improvement and cultivation of those colonies. It 
has been almost altogether the produce of the soil and of the industry of the 
colonies, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of that produce 
gradually accumulated by good management, and employed in raising a still 
greater produce. But the stock which has improved and cultivated the sugar 
colonies of England has, a great part of it, been sent out from England, and 
has by no means been altogether the produce of the soil and industry of the 
colonists. The prosperity of the English sugar colonies has been, in a great 
measure, owing to the great riches of England, of which a part has 
overflowed, if one may say so, upon those colonies. But the prosperity of 
the sugar colonies of France has been entirely owing to the good conduct of 
the colonists, which must therefore have had some superiority over that of 
the English; and this superiority has been remarked in nothing so much as in 
the good management of their slaves. 
    Such have been the general outlines of the policy of the different 
European nations with regard to their colonies. 
    The policy of Europe, therefore, has very little to boast of, either in the 
original establishment or, so far as concerns their internal government, in 
the subsequent prosperity of the colonies of America. 
    Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided over 
and directed the first project of establishing those colonies; the folly of 
hunting after gold and silver mines, and the injustice of coveting the 
possession of a country whose harmless natives, far from having ever 
injured the people of Europe, had received the first adventurers with every 
mark of kindness and hospitality. 
    The adventurers, indeed, who formed some of the later establishments, 
joined to the chimerical project of finding gold and silver mines other 
motives more reasonable and more laudable; but even these motives do very 
little honour to the policy of Europe. 
    The English Puritans, restrained at home, fled for freedom to America, 
and established there the four governments of New England. The English 
Catholics, treated with much greater injustice, established that of Maryland; 
the Quakers, that of Pennsylvania. The Portuguese Jews, persecuted by the 
Inquisition, stripped of their fortunes, and banished to Brazil, introduced by 
their example some sort of order and industry among the transported felons 
and strumpets by whom that colony was originally peopled, and taught 
them the culture of the sugar-cane. Upon all these different occasions it was 
not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and injustice of the European 
governments which peopled and cultivated America. 
    In effectuating some of the most important of these establishments, the 
different governments of Europe had as little merit as in projecting them. 
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The conquest of Mexico was the project, not of the council of Spain, but of 
a governor of Cuba; and it was effectuated by the spirit of the bold 
adventurer to whom it was entrusted, in spite of everything which that 
governor, who soon repented of having trusted such a person, could do to 
thwart it. The conquerors of Chili and Peru, and of almost all the other 
Spanish settlements upon the continent of America, carried out with them 
no other public encouragement, but a general permission to make 
settlements and conquests in the name of the king of Spain. Those 
adventures were all at the private risk and expense of the adventurers. The 
government of Spain contributed scarce anything to any of them. That of 
England contributed as little towards effectuating the establishment of some 
of its most important colonies in North America. 
    When those establishments were effectuated, and had become so 
considerable as to attract the attention of the mother country, the first 
regulations which she made with regard to them had always in view to 
secure to herself the monopoly of their commerce; to confine their market, 
and to enlarge her own at their expense, and, consequently, rather to damp 
and discourage than to quicken and forward the course of their prosperity. 
In the different ways in which this monopoly has been exercised consists 
one of the most essential differences in the policy of the different European 
nations with regard to their colonies. The best of them all, that of England, 
is only somewhat less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of the rest. 
    In what way, therefore, has the policy of Europe contributed either to the 
first establishment, or to the present grandeur of the colonies of America? In 
one way, and in one way only, it has contributed a good deal. Magna virum 
Mater! It bred and formed the men who were capable of achieving such 
great actions, and of laying the foundation of so great an empire; and there 
is no other quarter of the world of which the policy is capable of forming, or 
has ever actually and in fact formed such men. The colonies owe to the 
policy of Europe the education and great views of their active and 
enterprising founders; and some of the greatest and most important of them, 
so far as concerns their internal government, owe to it scarce anything else. 
PART 3
Of the Advantages which Europe has derived from the Discovery of 
America, and from that of a Passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good 
Hope
SUCH are the advantages which the colonies of America have derived from 
the policy of Europe. 
    What are those which Europe has derived from the discovery and 
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colonization of America? 
    Those advantages may be divided, first, into the general advantages 
which Europe, considered as one great country, has derived from those 
great events; and, secondly, into the particular advantages which each 
colonizing country has derived from the colonies which particularly belong 
to it, in consequence of the authority or dominion which it exercises over 
them. 
    The general advantages which Europe, considered as one great country, 
has derived from the discovery and colonisation of America, consist, first, 
in the increase of its enjoyments; and, secondly, in the augmentation of its 
industry. 
    The surplus produce of America, imported into Europe, furnishes the 
inhabitants of this great continent with a variety of commodities which they 
could not otherwise have possessed; some for conveniency and use, some 
for pleasure, and some for ornament, and thereby contributes to increase 
their enjoyments. 
    The discovery and colonization of America, it will readily be allowed, 
have contributed to augment the industry, first, of all the countries which 
trade to it directly, such as Spain, Portugal, France, and England; and, 
secondly, of all those which, without trading to it directly, send, through the 
medium of other countries, goods to it of their own produce; such as 
Austrian Flanders, and some provinces of Germany, which, through the 
medium of the countries before mentioned, send to it a considerable 
quantity of linen and other goods. All such countries have evidently gained 
a more extensive market for their surplus produce, and must consequently 
have been encouraged to increase its quantity. 
    But that those great events should likewise have contributed to encourage 
the industry of countries, such as Hungary and Poland, which may never, 
perhaps, have sent a single commodity of their own produce to America, is 
not, perhaps, altogether so evident. That those events have done so, 
however, cannot be doubted. Some part of the produce of America is 
consumed in Hungary and Poland, and there is some demand there for the 
sugar, chocolate, and tobacco of that new quarter of the world. But those 
commodities must be purchased with something which is either the produce 
of the industry of Hungary and Poland, or with something which had been 
purchased with some part of that produce. Those commodities of America 
are new values, new equivalents, introduced into Hungary and Poland to be 
exchanged there for the surplus produce of those countries. By being carried 
thither they create a new and more extensive market for that surplus 
produce. They raise its value, and thereby contribute to encourage its 
increase. Though no part of it may ever be carried to America, it may be 
carried to other countries which purchase it with a part of their share of the 
surplus produce of America; and it may find a market by means of the 
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circulation of that trade which was originally put into motion by the surplus 
produce of America. 
    Those great events may even have contributed to increase the 
enjoyments, and to augment the industry of countries which not only never 
sent any commodities to America, but never received any from it. Even 
such countries may have received a greater abundance of other commodities 
from countries of which the surplus produce had been augmented by means 
of the American trade. This greater abundance, as it must necessarily have 
increased their enjoyments, so it must likewise have augmented their 
industry. A greater number of new equivalents of some kind or other must 
have been presented to them to be exchanged for the surplus produce of that 
industry. A more extensive market must have been created for that surplus 
produce so as to raise its value, and thereby encourage its increase. The 
mass of commodities annually thrown into the great circle of European 
commerce, and by its various revolutions annually distributed among all the 
different nations comprehended within it, must have been augmented by the 
whole surplus produce of America. A greater share of this greater mass, 
therefore, is likely to have fallen to each of those nations, to have increased 
their enjoyments, and augmented their industry. 
    The exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to diminish, or, at least, 
to keep down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments 
and industry of all those nations in general, and of the American colonies in 
particular. It is a dead weight upon the action of one of the great springs 
which puts into motion a great part of the business of mankind. By 
rendering the colony produce dearer in all other countries, it lessens its 
consumption, and thereby cramps the industry of the colonies, and both the 
enjoyments and the industry of all other countries, which both enjoy less 
when they pay more for what they enjoy, and produce less when they get 
less for what they produce. By rendering the produce of all other countries 
dearer in the colonies, it cramps, in the same manner the industry of all 
other countries, and both the enjoyments and the industry of the colonies. It 
is a clog which, for the supposed benefit of some particular countries, 
embarrasses the pleasures and encumbers the industry of all other countries; 
but of the colonies more than of any other. It not only excludes, as much as 
possible, all other countries from one particular market; but it confines, as 
much as Possible, the colonies to one particular market; and the difference 
is very great between being excluded from one particular market, when all 
others are open, and being confined to one particular market, when all 
others are shut up. The surplus produce of the colonies, however, is the 
original source of all that increase of enjoyments and industry which Europe 
derives from the discovery and colonization of America; and the exclusive 
trade of the mother countries tends to render this source much less abundant 
than it otherwise would be. 
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    The particular advantages which each colonizing country derives from 
the colonies which particularly belong to it are of two different kinds; first, 
those common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces 
subject to its dominion; and, secondly, those peculiar advantages which are 
supposed to result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the 
European colonies of America. 
    The common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces 
subject to its dominion consist, first, in the military force which they furnish 
for its defence; and, secondly, in the revenue which they furnish for the 
support of its civil government. The Roman colones furnished occasionally 
both the one and the other. The Greek colonies, sometimes, furnished a 
military force, but seldom any revenue. They seldom acknowledged 
themselves subject to the dominion of the mother city. They were generally 
her allies in war, but very seldom her subjects in peace. 
    The European colonies of America have never yet furnished any military 
force for the defence of the mother country. Their military force has never 
yet been sufficient for their own defence; and in the different wars in which 
the mother countries have been engaged, the defence of their colonies has 
generally occasioned a very considerable distraction of the military force of 
those countries. In this respect, therefore, all the European colonies have, 
without exception, been a cause rather of weakness than of strength to their 
respective mother countries. 
    The colonies of Spain and Portugal only have contributed any revenue 
towards the defence of the mother country, or the support of her civil 
government. The taxes which have been levied upon those of other 
European nations, upon those of England in particular, have seldom been 
equal to the expense laid out upon them in time of peace, and never 
sufficient to defray that which they occasioned in time of war. Such 
colonies, therefore, have been a source of expense and not of revenue to 
their respective mother countries. 
    The advantages of such colonies to their respective mother countries 
consist altogether in those peculiar advantages which are supposed to result 
from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European colonies of 
America; and the exclusive trade, it is acknowledged, is the sole source of 
all those peculiar advantages. 
    In consequence of this exclusive trade, all that part of the surplus produce 
of the English colonies, for example, which consists in what are called 
enumerated commodities, can be sent to no other country but England. 
Other countries must afterwards buy it of her. It must be cheaper therefore 
in England than it can be in any other country, and must contribute more to 
increase the enjoyments of England than those of any other country. It must 
likewise contribute more to encourage her industry. For all those parts of 
her own surplus produce which England exchanges for those enumerated 
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commodities, she must get a better price than any other countries can get for 
the like parts of theirs, when they exchange them for the same commodities. 
The manufacturers of England, for example, will purchase a greater quantity 
of the sugar and tobacco of her own colonies than the like manufactures of 
other countries can purchase of that sugar and tobacco. So far, therefore, as 
the manufactures of England and those of other countries are both to be 
exchanged for the sugar and tobacco of the English colonies, this superiority 
of price gives an encouragement to the former beyond what the latter can in 
these circumstances enjoy. The exclusive trade of the colonies, therefore, as 
it diminishes, or at least keeps down below what they would otherwise rise 
to, both the enjoyments and the industry of the countries which do not 
possess it; so it gives an evident advantage to the countries which do 
possess it over those other countries. 
    This advantage, however, will perhaps be found to be rather what may be 
called a relative than an absolute advantage; and to give a superiority to the 
country which enjoys it rather by depressing the industry and produce of 
other countries than by raising those of that particular country above what 
they would naturally rise to in the case of a free trade. 
    The tobacco of Maryland and Virginia, for example, by means of the 
monopoly which England enjoys of it, certainly comes cheaper to England 
than it can do to France, to whom England commonly sells a considerable 
part of it. But had France, and all other European countries been, at all 
times, allowed a free trade to Maryland and Virginia, the tobacco of those 
colonies might, by this time, have come cheaper than it actually does, not 
only to all those other countries, but likewise to England. The produce of 
tobacco, in consequence of a market so much more extensive than any 
which it has hitherto enjoyed, might, and probably would, by this time, have 
been so much increased as to reduce the profits of a tobacco plantation to 
their natural level with those of a corn plantation, which, it is supposed, 
they are still somewhat above. The price of tobacco might, and probably 
would, by this time, have fallen somewhat lower than it is at present. An 
equal quantity of the commodities either of England or of those other 
countries might have purchased in Maryland and Virginia a greater quantity 
of tobacco than it can do at present, and consequently have been sold there 
for so much a better price. So far as that weed, therefore, can, by its 
cheapness and abundance, increase the enjoyments or augment the industry 
either of England or of any other country, it would, probably, in the case of 
a free trade, have produced both these effects in somewhat a greater degree 
than it can do at present. England, indeed, would not in this case have had 
any advantage over other countries. She might have bought the tobacco of 
her colonies somewhat cheaper, and consequently have sold some of her 
own commodities somewhat dearer than she actually does. But she could 
neither have bought the one cheaper nor sold the other dearer than any other 
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country might have done. She might, perhaps have gained an absolute, but 
she would certainly have lost a relative advantage. 
    In order, however, to obtain this relative advantage in the colony trade, in 
order to execute the invidious and malignant project of excluding as much 
as possible other nations from any share in it, England, there are very 
probable reasons for believing, has not only sacrificed a part of the absolute 
advantage which she, as well as every other nation, might have derived 
from that trade, but has subjected herself both to an absolute and to a 
relative disadvantage in almost every other branch of trade. 
    When, by the Act of Navigation, England assumed to herself the 
monopoly of the colony trade, the foreign capitals which had before been 
employed in it were necessarily withdrawn from it. The English capital, 
which had before carried on but a part of it, was now to carry on the whole. 
The capital which had before supplied the colonies with but a part of the 
goods which they wanted from Europe was now all that was employed to 
supply them with the whole. But it could not supply them with the whole, 
and the goods with which it did supply them were necessarily sold very 
dear. The capital which had before bought but a part of the surplus produce 
of the colonies, was now all that was employed to buy the whole. But it 
could not buy the whole at anything near the old price, and, therefore, 
whatever it did buy it necessarily bought very cheap. But in an employment 
of capital in which the merchant sold very dear and bought very cheap, the 
profit must have been very great, and much above the ordinary level of 
profit in other branches of trade. This superiority of profit in the colony 
trade could not fail to draw from other branches of trade a part of the capital 
which had before been employed in them. But this revulsion of capital, as it 
must have gradually increased the competition of capitals in the colony 
trade, so it must have gradually diminished that competition in all those 
other branches of trade; as it must have gradually lowered the profits of the 
one, so it must have gradually raised those of the other, till the profits of all 
came to a new level, different from and somewhat higher than that at which 
they had been before. 
    This double effect of drawing capital from all other trades, and of raising 
the rate of profit somewhat higher than it otherwise would have been in all 
trades, was not only produced by this monopoly upon its first establishment, 
but has continued to be produced by it ever since. 
    First, this monopoly has been continually drawing capital from all other 
trades to be employed in that of the colonies. 
    Though the wealth of Great Britain has increased very much since the 
establishment of the Act of Navigation, it certainly has not increased in the 
same proportion as that of the colonies. But the foreign trade of every 
country naturally increases in proportion to its wealth, its surplus produce in 
proportion to its whole produce; and Great Britain having engrossed to 
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herself almost the whole of what may be called the foreign trade of the 
colonies, and her capital not having increased in the same proportion as the 
extent of that trade, she could not carry it on without continually 
withdrawing from other branches of trade some part of the capital which 
had before been employed in them as well as withholding from them a great 
deal more which would otherwise have gone to them. Since the 
establishment of the Act of Navigation, accordingly, the colony trade has 
been continually increasing, while many other branches of foreign trade, 
particularly of that to other parts of Europe, have been continually decaying. 
Our manufactures for foreign sale, instead of being suited, as before the Act 
of Navigation, to the neighbouring market of Europe, or to the more distant 
one of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean Sea, have, the 
greater part of them, been accommodated to the still more distant one of the 
colonies, to the market in which they have the monopoly rather than to that 
in which they have many competitors. The causes of decay in other 
branches of foreign trade, which, by Sir Matthew Decker and other writers, 
have been sought for in the excess and improper mode of taxation, in the 
high price of labour, in the increase of luxury, etc., may all be found in the 
overgrowth of the colony trade. The mercantile capital of Great Britain, 
though very great, yet not being infinite, and though greatly increased since 
the Act of Navigation, yet not being increased in the same proportion as the 
colony trade, that trade could not possibly be carried on without 
withdrawing some part of that capital from other branches of trade, nor 
consequently without some decay of those other branches. 
    England, it must be observed, was a great trading country, her mercantile 
capital was very great and likely to become still greater and greater every 
day, not only before the Act of Navigation had established the monopoly of 
the colony trade, but before that trade was very considerable. In the Dutch 
war, during the government of Cromwell, her navy was superior to that of 
Holland; and in that which broke out in the beginning of the reign of 
Charles II, it was at last equal, perhaps superior, to the united navies of 
France and Holland. Its superiority, perhaps, would scarce appear greater in 
the present times; at least if the Dutch navy was to bear the same proportion 
to the Dutch commerce now which it did then. But this great naval power 
could not, in either of those wars, be owing to the Act of Navigation. 
During the first of them the plan of that act had been but just formed; and 
though before the breaking out of the second it had been fully enacted by 
legal authority, yet no part of it could have had time to produce any 
considerable effect, and least of all that part which established the exclusive 
trade to the colonies. Both the colonies and their trade were inconsiderable 
then in comparison of what they are now. The island of Jamaica was an 
unwholesome desert, little inhabited, and less cultivated. New York and 
New Jersey were in the possession of the Dutch: the half of St. 
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Christopher's in that of the French. The island of Antigua, the two 
Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Nova Scotia were not planted. 
Virginia, Maryland, and New England were planted; and though they were 
very thriving colonies, yet there was not, perhaps, at that time, either in 
Europe or America, a single person who foresaw or even suspected the 
rapid progress which they have since made in wealth, population, and 
improvement. The island of Barbadoes, in short, was the only British 
colony of any consequence of which the condition at that time bore any 
resemblance to what it is at present. The trade of the colonies, of which 
England, even for some time after the Act of Navigation, enjoyed but a part 
(for the Act of Navigation was not very strictly executed till several years 
after it was enacted), could not at that time be the cause of the great trade of 
England, nor of the great naval power which was supported by that trade. 
The trade which at that time supported that great naval power was the trade 
of Europe, and of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean Sea. But 
the share which Great Britain at present enjoys of that trade could not 
support any such great naval power. Had the growing trade of the colonies 
been left free to all nations, whatever share of it might have fallen to Great 
Britain, and a very considerable share would probably have fallen to her, 
must have been all an addition to this great trade of which she was before in 
possession. In consequence of the monopoly, the increase of the colony 
trade has not so much occasioned an addition to the trade which Great 
Britain had before as a total change in its direction. 
    Secondly, this monopoly has necessarily contributed to keep up the rate 
of profit in all the different branches of British trade higher than it naturally 
would have been had all nations been allowed a free trade to the British 
colonies. 
    The monopoly of the colony trade, as it necessarily drew towards that 
trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would 
have gone to it of its own accord; so by the expulsion of all foreign capitals 
it necessarily reduced the whole quantity of capital employed in that trade 
below what it naturally would have been in the case of a free trade. But, by 
lessening the competition of capitals in that branch of trade, it necessarily 
raised the rate of profit in that branch. By lessening, too, the competition of 
British capitals in all other branches of trade, it necessarily raised the rate of 
British profit in all those other branches. Whatever may have been, at any 
particular period, since the establishment of the Act of Navigation, the state 
or extent of the mercantile capital of Great Britain, the monopoly of the 
colony trade must, during the continuance of that state, have raised the 
ordinary rate of British profit higher than it otherwise would have been both 
in that and in all the other branches of British trade. If, since the 
establishment of the Act of Navigation, the ordinary rate of British profit 
has fallen considerably, as it certainly has, it must have fallen still lower, 
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had not the monopoly established by that act contributed to keep it up. 
    But whatever raises in any country the ordinary rate of profit higher than 
it otherwise would be, necessarily subjects that country both to an absolute 
and to a relative disadvantage in every branch of trade of which she has not 
the monopoly. 
    It subjects her to an absolute disadvantage; because in such branches of 
trade her merchants cannot get this greater profit without selling dearer than 
they otherwise would do both the goods of foreign countries which they 
import into their own, and the goods of their own country which they export 
to foreign countries. Their own country must both buy dearer and sell 
dearer; must both buy less and sell less; must both enjoy less and produce 
less, than she otherwise would do. 
    It subjects her to a relative disadvantage; because in such branches of 
trade it sets other countries which are not subject to the same absolute 
disadvantage either more above her or less below her than they otherwise 
would be. It enables them both to enjoy more and to produce more in 
proportion to what she enjoys and produces. It renders their superiority 
greater or their inferiority less than it otherwise would be. By raising the 
price of her produce above what it otherwise would be, it enables the 
merchants of other countries to undersell her in foreign markets, and 
thereby to jostle her out of almost all those branches of trade, of which she 
has not the monopoly. 
    Our merchants frequently complain of the high wages of British labour as 
the cause of their manufactures being undersold in foreign markets, but they 
are silent about the high profits of stock. They complain of the extravagant 
gain of other people, but they say nothing of their own. The high profits of 
British stock, however, may contribute towards raising the price of British 
manufactures in many cases as much, and in some perhaps more, than the 
high wages of British labour. 
    It is in this manner that the capital of Great Britain, one may justly say, 
has partly been drawn and partly been driven from the greater part of the 
different branches of trade of which she has not the monopoly; from the 
trade of Europe in particular, and from that of the countries which lie round 
the Mediterranean Sea. 
    It has partly been drawn from those branches of trade by the attraction of 
superior profit in the colony trade in consequence of the continual increase 
of that trade, and of the continual insufficiency of the capital which had 
carried it on one year to carry it on the next. 
    It has partly been driven from them by the advantage which the high rate 
of profit, established in Great Britain, gives to other countries in all the 
different branches of trade of which Great Britain has not the monopoly. 
    As the monopoly of the colony trade has drawn from those other 
branches a part of the British capital which would otherwise have been 
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employed in them, so it has forced into them many foreign capitals which 
would never have gone to them had they not been expelled from the colony 
trade. In those other branches of trade it has diminished the competition of 
British capital, and thereby raised the rate of British profit higher than it 
otherwise would have been. On the contrary, it has increased the 
competition of foreign capitals, and thereby sunk the rate of foreign profit 
lower than it otherwise would have been. Both in the one way and in the 
other it must evidently have subjected Great Britain to a relative 
disadvantage in all those other branches of trade. 
    The colony trade, however, it may perhaps be said, is more advantageous 
to Great Britain than any other; and the monopoly, by forcing into that trade 
a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would 
otherwise have gone to it, has turned that capital into an employment more 
advantageous to the country than any other which it could have found. 
    The most advantageous employment of any capital to the country to 
which it belongs is that which maintains there the greatest quantity of 
productive labour, and increases the most the annual produce of the land 
and labour of that country. But the quantity of productive labour which any 
capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption can maintain is 
exactly in proportion, it has been shown in the second book, to the 
frequency of its returns. A capital of a thousand pounds, for example, 
employed in a foreign trade of consumption, of which the returns are made 
regularly once in the year, can keep in constant employment, in the country 
to which it belongs, a quantity of productive labour equal to what a 
thousand pounds can maintain there for a year. If the returns are made twice 
or thrice in the year, it can keep in constant employment a quantity of 
productive labour equal to what two or three thousand pounds can maintain 
there for a year. A foreign trade of consumption carried on with a 
neighbouring country is, upon this account, in general more advantageous 
than one carried on with a distant country; and for the same reason a direct 
foreign trade of consumption, as it has likewise been shown in the second 
book, is in general more advantageous than a round-about one. 
    But the monopoly of the colony trade, so far as it has operated upon the 
employment of the capital of Great Britain, has in all cases forced some part 
of it from a foreign trade of consumption carried on with a neighbouring, to 
one carried on with a more distant country, and in many cases from a direct 
foreign trade of consumption to a round-about one. 
    First, the monopoly of the colony trade has in all cases forced some part 
of the capital of Great Britain from a foreign trade of consumption carried 
on with a neighbouring to one carried on with a more distant country. 
    It has, in all cases, forced some part of that capital from the trade with 
Europe, and with the countries which lie round the Mediterranean Sea, to 
that with the more distant regions of America and the West Indies, from 
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which the returns are necessarily less frequent, not only on account of the 
greater distance, but on account of the peculiar circumstances of those 
countries. New colonies, it has already been observed, are always 
understocked. Their capital is always much less than what they could 
employ with great profit and advantage in the improvement and cultivation 
of their land. They have a constant demand, therefore, for more capital than 
they have of their own; and, in order to supply the deficiency of their own, 
they endeavour to borrow as much as they can of the mother country, to 
whom they are, therefore, always in debt. The most common way in which 
the colonists contract this debt is not by borrowing upon bond of the rich 
people of the mother country, though they sometimes do this too, but by 
running as much in arrear to their correspondents, who supply them with 
goods from Europe, as those correspondents will allow them. Their annual 
returns frequently do not amount to more than a third, and sometimes not to 
so great a proportion of what they owe. The whole capital, therefore, which 
their correspondents advance to them is seldom returned to Britain in less 
than three, and sometimes not in less than four or five years. But a British 
capital of a thousand pounds, for example, which is returned to Great 
Britain only once in five years, can keep in constant employment only one-
fifth part of the British industry which it could maintain if the whole was 
returned once in the year; and, instead of the quantity of industry which a 
thousand pounds could maintain for a year, can keep in constant 
employment the quantity only which two hundred pounds can maintain for 
a year. The planter, no doubt, by the high price which he pays for the goods 
from Europe, by the interest upon the bills which he grants at distant dates, 
and by the commission upon the renewal of those which he grants at near 
dates, makes up, and probably more than makes up, all the loss which his 
correspondent can sustain by this delay. But though he may make up the 
loss of his correspondent, he cannot make up that of Great Britain. In a trade 
of which the returns are very distant, the profit of the merchant may be as 
great or greater than in one in which they are very frequent and near; but the 
advantage of the country in which he resides, the quantity of productive 
labour constantly maintained there, the annual produce of the land and 
labour must always be much less. That the returns of the trade to America, 
and still more those of that to the West Indies are, in general, not only more 
distant but more irregular, and more uncertain too, than those of the trade to 
any part of Europe, or even of the countries which lie round the 
Mediterranean Sea, will readily be allowed, I imagine, by everybody who 
has any experience of those different branches of trade. 
    Secondly, the monopoly of the colony trade has, in many cases, forced 
some part of the capital of Great Britain from a direct foreign trade of 
consumption into a round-about one. 
    Among the enumerated commodities which can be sent to no other 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth4.html (140 of 209)4/11/2005 9:47:00 AM
The Wealth of Nations
market but Great Britain, there are several of which the quantity exceeds 
very much the consumption of Great Britain, and of which a part, therefore, 
must be exported to other countries. But this cannot be done without forcing 
some part of the capital of Great Britain into a round-about foreign trade of 
consumption. Maryland and Virginia, for example, send annually to Great 
Britain upwards of ninety-six thousand hogsheads of tobacco, and the 
consumption of Great Britain is said not to exceed fourteen thousand. 
Upwards of eighty-two thousand hogsheads, therefore, must be exported to 
other countries, to France, to Holland, and to the countries which lie round 
the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas. But that part of the capital of Great 
Britain which brings those eighty-two thousand hogsheads to Great Britain, 
which re-exports them from thence to those other countries, and which 
brings back from those other countries to Great Britain either goods or 
money in return, is employed in a round-about foreign trade of 
consumption; and is necessarily forced into this employment in order to 
dispose of this great surplus. If we would compute in how many years the 
whole of this capital is likely to come back to Great Britain, we must add to 
the distance of the American returns that of the returns from those other 
countries. If, in the direct foreign trade of consumption which we carry on 
with America, the whole capital employed frequently does not come back in 
less than three or four years, the whole capital employed in this round-about 
one is not likely to come back in less than four or five. If the one can keep 
in constant employment but a third or a fourth part of the domestic industry 
which could be maintained by a capital returned once in the year, the other 
can keep in constant employment but a fourth or fifth part of that industry. 
At some of the out-ports a credit is commonly given to those foreign 
correspondents to whom they export their tobacco. At the port of London, 
indeed, it is commonly sold for ready money. The rule is, Weigh and pay. 
At the port of London, therefore, the final returns of the whole round-about 
trade are more distant than the returns from America by the time only which 
the goods may lie unsold in the warehouse; where, however, they may 
sometimes lie long enough. But had not the colonies been confined to the 
market of Great Britain for the sale of their tobacco, very little more of it 
would probably have come to us than what was necessary for the home 
consumption. The goods which Great Britain purchases at present for her 
own consumption with the great surplus of tobacco which she exports to 
other countries, she would in this case probably have purchased with the 
immediate produce of her own industry, or with some part of her own 
manufactures. That produce, those manufactures, instead of being almost 
entirely suited to one great market, as at present, would probably have been 
fitted to a great number of smaller markets. Instead of one great round-
about foreign trade of consumption, Great Britain would probably have 
carried on a great number of small direct foreign trades of the same kind. 
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On account of the frequency of the returns, a part, and probably but a small 
part; perhaps not above a third or a fourth of the capital which at present 
carries on this great round-about trade might have been sufficient to carry 
on all those small direct ones, might have kept in constant employment an 
equal quantity of British industry, and have equally supported the annual 
produce of the land and labour of Great Britain. All the purposes of this 
trade being, in this manner, answered by a much smaller capital, there 
would have been a large spare capital to apply to other purposes: to improve 
the lands, to increase the manufactures, and to extend the commerce of 
Great Britain; to come into competition at least with the other British 
capitals employed in all those different ways, to reduce the rate of profit in 
them all, and thereby to give to Great Britain, in all of them, a superiority 
over other countries still greater than what she at present enjoys. 
    The monopoly of the colony trade, too, has forced some part of the 
capital of Great Britain from all foreign trade of consumption to a carrying 
trade; and consequently, from supporting more or less the industry of Great 
Britain, to be employed altogether in supporting partly that of the colonies 
and partly that of some other countries. 
    The goods, for example, which are annually purchased with the great 
surplus of eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco annually re-exported 
from Great Britain are not all consumed in Great Britain. Part of them, linen 
from Germany and Holland, for example, is returned to the colonies for 
their particular consumption. But that part of the capital of Great Britain 
which buys the tobacco with which this linen is afterwards bought is 
necessarily withdrawn from supporting the industry of Great Britain, to be 
employed altogether in supporting, partly that of the colonies, and partly 
that of the particular countries who pay for this tobacco with the produce of 
their own industry. 
    The monopoly of the colony trade besides, by forcing towards it a much 
greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would naturally 
have gone to it, seems to have broken altogether that natural balance which 
would otherwise have taken place among all the different branches of 
British industry. The industry of Great Britain, instead of being 
accommodated to a great number of small markets, has been principally 
suited to one great market. Her commerce, instead of running in a great 
number of small channels, has been taught to run principally in one great 
channel. But the whole system of her industry and commerce has thereby 
been rendered less secure, the whole state of her body politic less healthful 
than it otherwise would have been. In her present condition, Great Britain 
resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in which some of the vital 
parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are liable to many 
dangerous disorders scarce incident to those in which all the parts are more 
properly proportioned. A small stop in that great blood-vessel, which has 
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been artificially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through which 
an unnatural proportion of the industry and commerce of the country has 
been forced to circulate, is very likely to bring on the most dangerous 
disorders upon the whole body politic. The expectation of a rupture with the 
colonies, accordingly, has struck the people of Great Britain with more 
terror than they ever felt for a Spanish armada, or a French invasion. It was 
this terror, whether well or ill grounded, which rendered the repeal of the 
Stamp Act, among the merchants at least, a popular measure. In the total 
exclusion from the colony market, was it to last only for a few years, the 
greater part of our merchants used to fancy that they foresaw an entire stop 
to their trade; the greater part of our master manufacturers, the entire ruin of 
their business; and the greater part of our workmen, an end of their 
employment. A rupture with any of our neighbours upon the continent, 
though likely, too, to occasion some stop or interruption in the employments 
of some of all these different orders of people, is foreseen, however, without 
any such general emotion. The blood, of which the circulation is stopped in 
some of the smaller vessels, easily disgorges itself into the greater without 
occasioning any dangerous disorder; but, when it is stopped in any of the 
greater vessels, convulsions, apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and 
unavoidable consequences. If but one of those overgrown manufactures, 
which, by means either of bounties or of the monopoly of the home and 
colony markets, have been artificially raised up to an unnatural height, finds 
some small stop or interruption in its employment, it frequently occasions a 
mutiny and disorder alarming to government, and embarrassing even to the 
deliberations of the legislature. How great, therefore, would be the disorder 
and confusion, it was thought, which must necessarily be occasioned by a 
sudden and entire stop in the employment of so great a proportion of our 
principal manufacturers. 
    Some moderate and gradual relaxation of the laws which give to Great 
Britain the exclusive trade to the colonies, till it is rendered in a great 
measure free, seems to be the only expedient which can, in all future times, 
deliver her from this danger, which can enable her or even force her to 
withdraw some part of her capital from this overgrown employment, and to 
turn it, though with less profit, towards other employments; and which, by 
gradually diminishing one branch of her industry and gradually increasing 
all the rest, can by degrees restore all the different branches of it to that 
natural, healthful, and proper proportion which perfect liberty necessarily 
establishes, and which perfect liberty can alone preserve. To open the 
colony trade all at once to all nations might not only occasion some 
transitory inconveniency, but a great permanent loss to the greater part of 
those whose industry or capital is at present engaged in it. The sudden loss 
of the employment even of the ships which import the eighty-two thousand 
hogsheads of tobacco, which are over and above the consumption of Great 
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Britain, might alone be felt very sensibly. Such are the unfortunate effects 
of all the regulations of the mercantile system! They not only introduce very 
dangerous disorders into the state of the body politic, but disorders which it 
is often difficult to remedy, without occasioning for a time at least, still 
greater disorders. In what manner, therefore, the colony trade ought 
gradually to be opened; what are the restraints which ought first, and what 
are those which ought last to be taken away; or in what manner the natural 
system of perfect liberty and justice ought gradually to be restored, we must 
leave to the wisdom of future statesmen and legislators to determine. 
    Five different events, unforeseen and unthought of, have very fortunately 
concurred to hinder Great Britain from feeling, so sensibly as it was 
generally expected she would, the total exclusion which has now taken 
place for more than a year (from the first of December, 1774) from a very 
important branch of the colony trade, that of the twelve associated provinces 
of North America. First, those colonies, in preparing themselves for their 
non-importation agreement, drained Great Britain completely of all the 
commodities which were fit for their market; secondly, the extraordinary 
demand of the Spanish Flota has, this year, drained Germany and the North 
of many commodities, linen in particular, which used to come into 
competition, even in the British market, with the manufactures of Great 
Britain; thirdly, the peace between Russia and Turkey has occasioned an 
extraordinary demand from the Turkey market, which, during the distress of 
the country, and while a Russian fleet was cruising in the Archipelago, had 
been very poorly supplied; fourthly, the demand of the North of Europe for 
the manufactures of Great Britain has been increasing from year to year for 
some time past; and fifthly, the late partition and consequential pacification 
of Poland, by opening the market of that great country, have this year added 
an extraordinary demand from thence to the increasing demand of the 
North. These events are all, except the fourth, in their nature transitory and 
accidental, and the exclusion from so important a branch of the colony 
trade, if unfortunately it should continue much longer, may still occasion 
some degree of distress. This distress, however, as it will come on 
gradually, will be felt much less severely than if it had come on all at once; 
and, in the meantime, the industry and capital of the country may find a new 
employment and direction, so as to prevent this distress from ever rising to 
any considerable height. 
    The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, so far as it has turned 
towards that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than 
what would otherwise have gone to it, has in all cases turned it, from a 
foreign trade of consumption with a neighbouring into one with a more 
distant country; in many cases, from a direct foreign trade of consumption 
into a round-about one; and in some cases, from all foreign trade of 
consumption into a carrying trade. It has in all cases, therefore, turned it 
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from a direction in which it would have maintained a greater quantity of 
productive labour into one in which it can maintain a much smaller 
quantity. By suiting, besides, to one particular market only so great a part of 
the industry and commerce of Great Britain, it has rendered the whole state 
of that industry and commerce more precarious and less secure than if their 
produce had been accommodated to a greater variety of markets. 
    We must carefully distinguish between the effects of the colony trade and 
those of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and necessarily 
beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful. But the former are so 
beneficial that the colony trade, though subject to a monopoly, and 
notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that monopoly, is still upon the whole 
beneficial, and greatly beneficial; though a good deal less so than it 
otherwise would be. 
    The effect of the colony trade in its natural and free state is to open a 
great, though distant, market for such parts of the produce of British 
industry as may exceed the demand of the markets nearer home, of those of 
Europe, and of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean Sea. In its 
natural and free state, the colony trade, without drawing from those markets 
any part of the produce which had ever been sent to them, encourages Great 
Britain to increase the surplus continually by continually presenting new 
equivalents to be exchanged for it. In its natural and free state, the colony 
trade tends to increase the quantity of productive labour in Great Britain, 
but without altering in any respect the direction of that which had been 
employed there before. In the natural and free state of the colony trade, the 
competition of all other nations would hinder the rate of profit from rising 
above the common level either in the new market or in the new 
employment. The new market, without drawing anything from the old one, 
would create, if one may say so, a new produce for its own supply; and that 
new produce would constitute a new capital for carrying on the new 
employment, which in the same manner would draw nothing from the old 
one. 
    The monopoly of the colony trade, on the contrary, by excluding the 
competition of other nations, and thereby raising the rate of profit both in 
the new market and in the new employment, draws produce from the old 
market and capital from the old employment. To augment our share of the 
colony trade beyond what it otherwise would be is the avowed purpose of 
the monopoly. If our share of that trade were to be no greater with than it 
would have been without the monopoly, there could have been no reason 
for establishing the monopoly. But whatever forces into a branch of trade of 
which the returns are slower and more distant than those of the greater part 
of other trades, a greater proportion of the capital of any country than what 
of its own accord would go to that branch, necessarily renders the whole 
quantity of productive labour annually maintained there, the whole annual 
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produce of the land and labour of that country, less than they otherwise 
would be. It keeps down the revenue of the inhabitants of that country 
below what it would naturally rise to, and thereby diminishes their power of 
accumulation. It not only hinders, at all times, their capital from 
maintaining so great a quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise 
maintain, but it hinders it from increasing so fast as it would otherwise 
increase, and consequently from maintaining a still greater quantity of 
productive labour. 
    The natural good effects of the colony trade, however, more than 
counterbalance to Great Britain the bad effects of the monopoly, so that, 
monopoly and all together, that trade, even as it carried on at present, is not 
only advantageous, but greatly advantageous. The new market and the new 
employment which are opened by the colony trade are of much greater 
extent than that portion of the old market and of the old employment which 
is lost by the monopoly. The new produce and the new capital which has 
been created, if one may say so, by the colony trade, maintain in Great 
Britain a greater quantity of productive labour than what can have been 
thrown out of employment by the revulsion of capital from other trades of 
which the returns are more frequent. If the colony trade, however, even as it 
is carried on at present, is advantageous to Great Britain, it is not by means 
of the monopoly, but in spite of the monopoly. 
    It is rather for the manufactured than for the rude produce of Europe that 
the colony trade opens a new market. Agriculture is the proper business of 
all new colonies; a business which the cheapness of land renders more 
advantageous than any other. They abound, therefore, in the rude produce of 
land, and instead of importing it from other countries, they have generally a 
large surplus to export. In new colonies, agriculture either draws hands from 
all other employments, or keeps them from going to any other employment. 
There are few hands to spare for the necessary, and none for the ornamental 
manufactures. The greater part of the manufactures of both kinds they find 
it cheaper to purchase of other countries than to make for themselves. It is 
chiefly by encouraging the manufactures of Europe that the colony trade 
indirectly encourages its agriculture. The manufactures of Europe, to whom 
that trade gives employment, constitute a new market for the produce of the 
land; and the most advantageous of all markets, the home market for the 
corn and cattle, for the bread and butcher's meat of Europe, is thus greatly 
extended by means of the trade to America. 
    But that the monopoly of the trade of populous and thriving colonies is 
not alone sufficient to establish, or even to maintain manufactures in any 
country, the examples of Spain and Portugal sufficiently demonstrate. Spain 
and Portugal were manufacturing countries before they had any 
considerable colonies. Since they had the richest and most fertile in the 
world, they have both ceased to be so. 
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    In Spain and Portugal the bad effects of the monopoly, aggravated by 
other causes, have perhaps nearly overbalanced the natural good effects of 
the colony trade. These causes seem to be other monopolies of different 
kinds; the degradation of the value of gold and silver below what it is in 
most other countries; the exclusion from foreign markets by improper taxes 
upon exportation, and the narrowing of the home market, by still more 
improper taxes upon the transportation of goods from one part of the 
country to another; but above all, that irregular and partial administration of 
justice, which often protects the rich and powerful debtor from the pursuit 
of his injured creditor, and which makes the industrious part of the nation 
afraid to prepare goods for the consumption of those haughty and great men 
to whom they dare not refuse to sell upon credit, and from they are 
altogether uncertain of repayment. 
    In England, on the contrary, the natural good effects of the colony trade, 
assisted by other causes, have in a great measure conquered the bad effects 
of the monopoly. These causes seem to be: the general liberty of trade, 
which, notwithstanding some restraints, is at least equal, perhaps superior, 
to what it is in any other country; the liberty of exporting, duty free, almost 
all sorts of goods which are the produce of domestic industry to almost any 
foreign country; and what perhaps is of still greater importance, the 
unbounded liberty of transporting them from any one part of our own 
country to any other without being obliged to give any account to any 
public office, without being liable to question or examination of any kind; 
but above all, that equal and impartial administration of justice which 
renders the rights of the meanest British subject respectable to the greatest, 
and which, by securing to every man the fruits of his own industry, gives 
the greatest and most effectual encouragement to every sort of industry. 
    If the manufactures of Great Britain, however, have been advanced, as 
they certainly have, by the colony trade, it has not been by means of the 
monopoly of that trade but in spite of the monopoly. The effect of the 
monopoly has been, not to augment the quantity, but to alter the quality and 
shape of a part of the manufactures of Great Britain, and to accommodate to 
a market, from which the returns are slow and distant, what would 
otherwise have been accommodated to one from which the returns are 
frequent and near. Its effect has consequently been to turn a part of the 
capital of Great Britain from an employment in which it would have 
maintained a greater quantity of manufacturing industry to one in which it 
maintains a much smaller, and thereby to diminish, instead of increasing, 
the whole quantity of manufacturing industry maintained in Great Britain. 
    The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, like all the other mean and 
malignant expedients of the mercantile system, depresses the industry of all 
other countries, but chiefly that of the colonies, without in the least 
increasing, but on the contrary diminishing that of the country in whose 
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favour it is established. 
    The monopoly hinders the capital of that country, whatever may at any 
particular time be the extent of that capital, from maintaining so great a 
quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise maintain, and from 
affording so great a revenue to the industrious inhabitants as it would 
otherwise afford. But as capital can be increased only by savings from 
revenue, the monopoly, by hindering it from affording so great a revenue as 
it would otherwise afford, necessarily hinders it from increasing so fast as it 
would otherwise increase, and consequently from maintaining a still greater 
quantity of productive labour, and affording a still greater revenue to the 
industrious inhabitants of that country. One great original source of revenue, 
therefore, the wages of labour, the monopoly must necessarily have 
rendered at all times less abundant than it otherwise would have been. 
    By raising the rate of mercantile profit, the monopoly discourages the 
improvement of land. The profit of improvement depends upon the 
difference between what the land actually produces, and what, by the 
application of a certain capital, it can be made to produce. If this difference 
affords a greater profit than what can be drawn from an equal capital in any 
mercantile employment, the improvement of land will draw capital from all 
mercantile employments. If the profit is less, mercantile employments will 
draw capital from the improvement of land. Whatever, therefore, raises the 
rate of mercantile profit, either lessens the superiority or increases the 
inferiority of the profit of improvement; and in the one case hinders capital 
from going to improvement, and in the other draws capital from it. But by 
discouraging improvement, the monopoly necessarily retards the natural 
increase of another great original source of revenue, the rent of land. By 
raising the rate of profit, too, the monopoly necessarily keeps up the market 
rate of interest higher than it otherwise would be. But the price of land in 
proportion to the rent which it affords, the number of years purchase which 
is commonly paid for it, necessarily falls as the rate of interest rises, and 
rises as the rate of interest falls. The monopoly, therefore, hurts the interest 
of the landlord two different ways, by retarding the natural increase, first, of 
his rent, and secondly, of the price which he would get for his land in 
proportion to the rent which it affords. 
    The monopoly indeed raises the rate of mercantile profit, and thereby 
augments somewhat the gain of our merchants. But as it obstructs the 
natural increase of capital, it tends rather to diminish than to increase the 
sum total of the revenue which the inhabitants of the country derive from 
the profits of stock; a small profit upon a great capital generally affording a 
greater revenue than a great profit upon a small one. The monopoly raises 
the rate of profit, but it hinders the sum of profit from rising so high as it 
otherwise would do. 
    All the original sources of revenue, the wages of labour, the rent of land, 
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and the profits of stock, the monopoly renders much less abundant than they 
otherwise would be. To promote the little interest of one little order of men 
in one country, it hurts the interest of all other orders of men in that country, 
and of all men in all other countries. 
    It is solely by raising the ordinary rate of profit that the monopoly either 
has proved or could prove advantageous to any one particular order of men. 
But besides all the bad effects to the country in general, which have already 
been mentioned as necessarily resulting from a high rate of profit, there is 
one more fatal, perhaps, than all these put together, but which, if we may 
judge from experience, is inseparably connected with it. The high rate of 
profit seems everywhere to destroy that parsimony which in other 
circumstances is natural to the character of the merchant. When profits are 
high that sober virtue seems to be superfluous and expensive luxury to suit 
better the affluence of his situation. But the owners of the great mercantile 
capitals are necessarily the leaders and conductors of the whole industry of 
every nation, and their example has a much greater influence upon the 
manners of the whole industrious part of it than that of any other order of 
men. If his employer is attentive and parsimonious, the workman is very 
likely to be so too; but if the master is dissolute and disorderly, the servant 
who shapes his work according to the pattern which his master prescribes to 
him will shape his life too according to the example which he sets him. 
Accumulation is thus prevented in the hands of all those who are naturally 
the most disposed to accumulate, and the funds destined for the 
maintenance of productive labour receive no augmentation from the 
revenue of those who ought naturally to augment them the most. The capital 
of the country, instead of increasing, gradually dwindles away, and the 
quantity of productive labour maintained in it grows every day less and less. 
Have the exorbitant profits of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon 
augmented the capital of Spain and Portugal? Have they alleviated the 
poverty, have they promoted the industry of those two beggarly countries? 
Such has been the tone of mercantile expense in those two trading cities that 
those exorbitant profits, far from augmenting the general capital of the 
country, seem scarce to have been sufficient to keep up the capitals upon 
which they were made. Foreign capitals are every day intruding themselves, 
if I may say so, more and more into the trade of Cadiz and Lisbon. It is to 
expel those foreign capitals from a trade which their own grows every day 
more and more insufficient for carrying on that the Spaniards and 
Portuguese endeavour every day to straighten more and more the galling 
bands of their absurd monopoly. Compare the mercantile manners of Cadiz 
and Lisbon with those of Amsterdam, and you will be sensible how 
differently the conduct and character of merchants are affected by the high 
and by the low profits of stock. The merchants of London, indeed, have not 
yet generally become such magnificent lords as those of Cadiz and Lisbon, 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth4.html (149 of 209)4/11/2005 9:47:00 AM
The Wealth of Nations
but neither are they in general such attentive and parsimonious burghers as 
those of Amsterdam. They are supposed, however, many of them, to be a 
good deal richer than the greater part of the former, and not quite so rich as 
many of the latter. But the rate of their profit is commonly much lower than 
that of the former, and a good deal higher than that of the latter. Light come, 
light go, says the proverb; and the ordinary tone of expense seems 
everywhere to be regulated, not so much according to the real ability of 
spending, as to the supposed facility of getting money to spend. 
    It is thus that the single advantage which the monopoly procures to a 
single order of men is in many different ways hurtful to the general interest 
of the country. 
    To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of 
customers may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of 
shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of 
shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced 
by shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are capable of 
fancying that they will find some advantage in employing the blood and 
treasure of their fellow-citizens to found and maintain such an empire. Say 
to a shopkeeper, "Buy me a good estate, and I shall always buy my clothes 
at your shop, even though I should pay somewhat dearer than what I can 
have them for at other shops"; and you will not find him very forward to 
embrace your proposal. But should any other person buy you such an estate, 
the shopkeeper would be much obliged to your benefactor if he would 
enjoin you to buy all your clothes at his shop. England purchased for some 
of her subjects, who found themselves uneasy at home, a great estate in a 
distant country. The price, indeed, was very small, and instead of thirty 
years' purchase, the ordinary price of land in the present times, it amounted 
to little more than the expense of the different equipments which made the 
first discovery, reconnoitred the coast, and took a fictitious possession of 
the country. The land was good and of great extent, and the cultivators 
having plenty of good ground to work upon, and being for some time at 
liberty to sell their produce where they pleased, became in the course of 
little more than thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660) so numerous 
and thriving a people that the shopkeepers and other traders of England 
wished to secure to themselves the monopoly of their custom. Without 
pretending, therefore, that they had paid any part, either of the original 
purchase-money, or of the subsequent expense of improvement, they 
petitioned the Parliament that the cultivators of America might for the 
future be confined to their shop; first, for buying all the goods which they 
wanted from Europe; and, secondly, for selling all such parts of their own 
produce as those traders might find it convenient to buy. For they did not 
find it convenient to buy every part of it. Some parts of it imported into 
England might have interfered with some of the trades which they 
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themselves carried on at home. Those particular parts of it, therefore, they 
were willing that the colonists should sell where they could- the farther off 
the better; and upon that account purposed that their market should be 
confined to the countries south of Cape Finisterre. A clause in the famous 
Act of Navigation established this truly shopkeeper proposal into a law. 
    The maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or 
more properly perhaps the sole end and purpose of the dominion which 
Great Britain assumes over her colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is 
supposed, consists the great advantage of provinces, which have never yet 
afforded either revenue or military force for the support of the civil 
government, or the defence of the mother country. The monopoly is the 
principal badge of their dependency, and it is the sole fruit which has 
hitherto been gathered from that dependency. Whatever expense Great 
Britain has hitherto laid out in maintaining this dependency has really been 
laid out in order to support this monopoly. The expense of the ordinary 
peace establishment of the colonies amounted, before the commencement of 
the present disturbances, to the pay of twenty regiments of foot; to the 
expense of the artillery, stores, and extraordinary provisions with which it 
was necessary to supply them; and to the expense of a very considerable 
naval force which was constantly kept up, in order to guard, from the 
smuggling vessels of other nations, the immense coast of North America, 
and that of our West Indian islands. The whole expense of this peace 
establishment was a charge upon the revenue of Great Britain, and was, at 
the same time, the smallest part of what the dominion of the colonies has 
cost the mother country. If we would know the amount of the whole, we 
must add to the annual expense of this peace establishment the interest of 
the sums which, in consequence of her considering her colonies as 
provinces subject to her dominion, Great Britain has upon different 
occasions laid out upon their defence. We must add to it, in particular, the 
whole expense of the late war, and a great part of that of the war which 
preceded it. The late war was altogether a colony quarrel, and the whole 
expense of it, in whatever part of the world it may have been laid out, 
whether in Germany or the East Indies, ought justly to be stated to the 
account of the colonies. It amounted to more than ninety millions sterling, 
including not only the new debt which was contracted, but the two shillings 
in the pound additional land tax, and the sums which were every year 
borrowed from the sinking fund. The Spanish war, which began in 1739, 
was principally a colony quarrel. Its principal object was to prevent the 
search of the colony ships which carried on a contraband trade with the 
Spanish Main. This whole expense is, in reality, a bounty which has been 
given in order to support a monopoly. The pretended purpose of it was to 
encourage the manufactures, and to increase the commerce of Great Britain. 
But its real effect has been to raise the rate of mercantile profit, and to 
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enable our merchants to turn into a branch of trade, of which the returns are 
more slow and distant than those of the greater part of other trades, a greater 
proportion of their capital than they otherwise would have done; two events 
which, if a bounty could have prevented, it might perhaps have been very 
well worth while to give such a bounty. 
    Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives 
nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies. 
    To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority 
over her colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact 
their own laws, and to make peace and war as they might think proper, 
would be to propose such a measure as never was, and never will be 
adopted, by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the 
dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it, 
and how small soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion 
to the expense which it occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they might 
frequently be agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying to the pride of 
every nation, and what is perhaps of still greater consequence, they are 
always contrary to the private interest of the governing part of it, who would 
thereby be deprived of the disposal of many places of trust and profit, of 
many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction, which the 
possession of the most turbulent, and, to the great body of the people, the 
most unprofitable province seldom fails to afford. The most visionary 
enthusiast would scarce be capable of proposing such a measure with any 
serious hopes at least of its ever being adopted. If it was adopted, however, 
Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual 
expense of the peace establishment of the colonies, but might settle with 
them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually secure to her a free 
trade, more advantageous to the great body of the people, though less so to 
the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present enjoys. By thus 
parting good friends, the natural affection of the colonies to the mother 
country which, perhaps, our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished, 
would quickly revive. It might dispose them not only to respect, for whole 
centuries together, that treaty of commerce which they had concluded with 
us at parting, but to favour us in war as well as in trade, and, instead of 
turbulent and factious subjects, to become our most faithful, affectionate, 
and generous allies; and the same sort of parental affection on the one side, 
and filial respect on the other, might revive between Great Britain and her 
colonies, which used to subsist between those of ancient Greece and the 
mother city from which they descended. 
    In order to render any province advantageous to the empire to which it 
belongs, it ought to afford, in time of peace, a revenue to the public 
sufficient not only for defraying the whole expense of its own peace 
establishment, but for contributing its proportion to the support of the 
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general government of the empire. Every province necessarily contributes, 
more or less, to increase the expense of that general government. If any 
particular province, therefore, does not contribute its share towards 
defraying this expense, an unequal burden must be thrown upon some other 
part of the empire. The extraordinary revenue, too, which every province 
affords to the public in time of war, ought, from parity of reason, to bear the 
same proportion to the extraordinary revenue of the whole empire which its 
ordinary revenue does in time of peace. That neither the ordinary nor 
extraordinary revenue which Great Britain derives from her colonies, bears 
this proportion to the whole revenue of the British empire, will readily be 
allowed. The monopoly, it has been supposed, indeed, by increasing the 
private revenue of the people of Great Britain, and thereby enabling them to 
pay greater taxes, compensates the deficiency of the public revenue of the 
colonies. But this monopoly, I have endeavoured to show, though a very 
grievous tax upon the colonies, and though it may increase the revenue of a 
particular order of men in Great Britain, diminishes instead of increasing 
that of the great body of the people; and consequently diminishes instead of 
increasing the ability of the great body of the people to pay taxes. The men, 
too, whose revenue the monopoly increases, constitute a particular order, 
which it is both absolutely impossible to tax beyond the proportion of other 
orders, and extremely impolitic even to attempt to tax beyond that 
proportion, as I shall endeavour to show in the following book. No 
particular resource, therefore, can be drawn from this particular order. 
    The colonies may be taxed either by their own assemblies, or by the 
Parliament of Great Britain. 
    That the colony assemblies can ever be so managed as to levy upon their 
constituents a public revenue sufficient not only to maintain at all times 
their own civil and military establishment, but to pay their proper 
proportion of the expense of the general government of the British empire 
seems not very probable. It was a long time before even the Parliament of 
England, though placed immediately under the eye of the sovereign, could 
be brought under such a system of management, or could be rendered 
sufficiently liberal in their grants for supporting the civil and military 
establishments even of their own country. It was only by distributing among 
the particular Members of Parliament a great part either of the offices, or of 
the disposal of the offices arising from this civil and military establishment, 
that such a system of management could be established even with regard to 
the Parliament of England. But the distance of the colony assemblies from 
the eye of the sovereign, their number, their dispersed situation, and their 
various constitutions, would render it very difficult to manage them in the 
same manner, even though the sovereign had the same means of doing it; 
and those means are wanting. It would be absolutely impossible to 
distribute among all the leading members of all the colony assemblies such 
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a share, either of the offices or of the disposal of the offices arising from the 
general government of the British empire, as to dispose them to give up 
their popularity at home, and to tax their constituents for the support of that 
general government, of which almost the whole emoluments were to be 
divided among people who were strangers to them. The unavoidable 
ignorance of administration, besides, concerning the relative importance of 
the different members of those different assemblies, the offences which 
must frequently be given, the blunders which must constantly be committed 
in attempting to manage them in this manner, seems to render such a system 
of management altogether impracticable with regard to them. 
    The colony assemblies, besides, cannot be supposed the proper judges of 
what is necessary for the defence and support of the whole empire. The care 
of that defence and support is not entrusted to them. It is not their business, 
and they have no regular means of information concerning it. The assembly 
of a province, like the vestry of a parish, may judge very properly 
concerning the affairs of its own particular district; but can have no proper 
means of judging concerning those of the whole empire. It cannot even 
judge properly concerning the proportion which its own province bears to 
the whole empire; or concerning the relative degree of its wealth and 
importance compared with the other provinces; because those other 
provinces are not under the inspection and superintendency of the assembly 
of a particular province. What is necessary for the defence and support of 
the whole empire, and in what proportion each part ought to contribute, can 
be judged of only by that assembly which inspects and superintends the 
affairs of the whole empire. 
    It has been proposed, accordingly, that the colonies should be taxed by 
requisition, the Parliament of Great Britain determining the sum which each 
colony ought to pay, and the provincial assembly assessing and levying it in 
the way that suited best the circumstances of the province. What concerned 
the whole empire would in this way be determined by the assembly which 
inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole empire; and the provincial 
affairs of each colony might still be regulated by its own assembly. Though 
the colonies should in this case have no representatives in the British 
Parliament, yet, if we may judge by experience, there is no probability that 
the Parliamentary requisition would be unreasonable. The Parliament of 
England has not upon any occasion shown the smallest disposition to 
overburden those parts of the empire which are not represented in 
Parliament. The islands of Guernsey and Jersey, without any means of 
resisting the authority of Parliament, are more lightly taxed than any part of 
Great Britain. Parliament in attempting to exercise its supposed right, 
whether well or ill grounded, of taxing the colonies, has never hitherto 
demanded of them anything which even approached to a just proportion to 
what was paid by their fellow subjects at home. If the contribution of the 
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colonies, besides, was to rise or fall in proportion to the rise or fall of the 
land tax, Parliament could not tax them without taxing at the same time its 
own constituents, and the colonies might in this case be considered as 
virtually represented in Parliament. 
    Examples are not wanting of empires in which all the different provinces 
are not taxed, if I may be allowed the expression, in one mass; but in which 
the sovereign regulates the sum which each province ought to pay, and in 
some provinces assesses and levies it as he thinks proper; while in others, he 
leaves it to be assessed and levied as the respective states of each province 
shall determine. In some provinces of France, the king not only imposes 
what taxes he thinks proper, but assesses and levies them in the way he 
thinks proper. From others he demands a certain sum, but leaves it to the 
states of each province to assess and levy that sum as they think proper. 
According to the scheme of taxing by requisition, the Parliament of Great 
Britain would stand nearly in the same situation towards the colony 
assemblies as the King of France does towards the states of those provinces 
which still enjoy the privilege of having states of their own, the provinces of 
France which are supposed to be the best governed. 
    But though, according to this scheme, the colonies could have no just 
reason to fear that their share of the public burdens should ever exceed the 
proper proportion to that of their fellow-citizens at home; Great Britain 
might have just reason to fear that it never would amount to that proper 
proportion. The Parliament of Great Britain has not for some time past had 
the same established authority in the colonies, which the French king has in 
those provinces of France which still enjoy the privilege of having states of 
their own. The colony assemblies, if they were not very favourably disposed 
(and unless more skilfully managed than they ever have been hitherto, they 
are not very likely to be so) might still find many pretences for evading or 
rejecting the most reasonable requisitions of Parliament. A French war 
breaks out, we shall suppose; ten millions must immediately be raised in 
order to defend the seat of the empire. This sum must be borrowed upon the 
credit of some Parliamentary fund mortgaged for paying the interest. Part of 
this fund Parliament proposes to raise by a tax to be levied in Great Britain, 
and part of it by a requisition to all the different colony assemblies of 
America and the West Indies. Would people readily advance their money 
upon the credit of a fund, which partly depended upon the good humour of 
all those assemblies, far distant from the seat of the war, and sometimes, 
perhaps, thinking themselves not much concerned in the event of it? Upon 
such a fund no more money would probably be advanced than what the tax 
to be levied in Great Britain might be supposed to answer for. The whole 
burden of the debt contracted on account of the war would in this manner 
fall, as it always has done hitherto, upon Great Britain; upon a part of the 
empire, and not upon the whole empire. Great Britain is, perhaps, since the 
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world began, the only state which, as it has extended its empire, has only 
increased its expense without once augmenting its resources. Other states 
have generally disburdened themselves upon their subject and subordinate 
provinces of the most considerable part of the expense of defending the 
empire. Great Britain has hitherto suffered her subject and subordinate 
provinces to disburden themselves upon her of almost this whole expense. 
In order to put Great Britain upon a footing of equality with her own 
colonies, which the law has hitherto supposed to be subject and subordinate, 
it seems necessary, upon the scheme of taxing them by Parliamentary 
requisition, that Parliament should have some means of rendering its 
requisitions immediately effectual, in case the colony assemblies should 
attempt to evade or reject them; and what those means are, it is not very 
easy to conceive, and it has not yet been explained. 
    Should the Parliament of Great Britain, at the same time, be ever fully 
established in the right of taxing the colonies, even independent of the 
consent of their own assemblies, the importance of those assemblies would 
from that moment be at an end, and with it, that of all the leading men of 
British America. Men desire to have some share in the management of 
public affairs chiefly on account of the importance which it gives them. 
Upon the power which the greater part of the leading men, the natural 
aristocracy of every country, have of preserving or defending their 
respective importance, depends the stability and duration of every system of 
free government. In the attacks which those leading men are continually 
making upon the importance of one another, and in the defence of their 
own, consists the whole play of domestic faction and ambition. The leading 
men of America, like those of all other countries, desire to preserve their 
own importance. They feel, or imagine, that if their assemblies, which they 
are fond of calling parliaments, and of considering as equal in authority to 
the Parliament of Great Britain, should be so far degraded as to become the 
humble ministers and executive officers of that Parliament, the greater part 
of their own importance would be at end. They have rejected, therefore, the 
proposal of being taxed by Parliamentary requisition, and like other 
ambitious and high-spirited men, have rather chosen to draw the sword in 
defence of their own importance. 
    Towards the declension of the Roman republic, the allies of Rome, who 
had borne the principal burden of defending the state and extending the 
empire, demanded to be admitted to all the privileges of Roman citizens. 
Upon being refused, the social war broke out. During the course of that war, 
Rome granted those privileges to the greater part of them one by one, and in 
proportion as they detached themselves from the general confederacy. The 
Parliament of Great Britain insists upon taxing the colonies; and they refuse 
to be taxed by a Parliament in which they are not represented. If to each 
colony, which should detach itself from the general confederacy, Great 
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Britain should allow such a number of representatives as suited the 
proportion of what is contributed to the public revenue of the empire, in 
consequence of its being subjected to the same taxes, and in compensation 
admitted to the same freedom of trade with its fellow-subjects at home; the 
number of its representatives to be augmented as the proportion of its 
contribution might afterwards augment; a new method of acquiring 
importance, a new and more dazzling object of ambition would be presented 
to the leading men of each colony. Instead of piddling for the little prizes 
which are to be found in what may be called the paltry raffle of colony 
faction; they might then hope, from the presumption which men naturally 
have in their own ability and good fortune, to draw some of the great prizes 
which sometimes come from the wheel of the great state lottery of British 
polities. Unless this or some other method is fallen upon, and there seems to 
be none more obvious than this, of preserving the importance and of 
gratifying the ambition of the leading men of America, it is not very 
probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us; and we ought to 
consider that the blood which must be shed in forcing them to do so is, 
every drop of it, blood either of those who are, or of those whom we wish to 
have for our fellow citizens. They are very weak who flatter themselves 
that, in the state to which things have come, our colonies will be easily 
conquered by force alone. The persons who now govern the resolutions of 
what they call their Continental Congress, feel in themselves at this moment 
a degree of importance which, perhaps, the greatest subjects in Europe 
scarce feel. From shopkeepers, tradesmen, and attornies, they are become 
statesmen and legislators, and are employed in contriving a new form of 
government for an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves, will 
become, and which, indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the 
greatest and most formidable that ever was in the world. Five hundred 
different people, perhaps, who in different ways act immediately under the 
Continental Congress; and five hundred thousand, perhaps, who act under 
those five hundred, all feel in the same manner a proportionable rise in their 
own importance. Almost every individual of the governing party in America 
fills, at present in his own fancy, a station superior, not only to what he had 
ever filled before, but to what he had ever expected to fill; and unless some 
new object of ambition is presented either to him or to his leaders, if he has 
the ordinary spirit of a man, he will die in defence of that station. 
    It is a remark of the president Henaut, that we now read with pleasure the 
account of many little transactions of the Ligue, which when they happened 
were not perhaps considered as very important pieces of news. But every 
man then, says he, fancied himself of some importance; and the 
innumerable memoirs which have come down to us from those times, were, 
the greater part of them, written by people who took pleasure in recording 
and magnifying events in which, they flattered themselves, they had been 
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considerable actors. How obstinately the city of Paris upon that occasion 
defended itself, what a dreadful famine it supported rather than submit to 
the best and afterwards to the most beloved of all the French kings, is well 
known. The greater part of the citizens, or those who governed the greater 
part of them, fought in defence of their own importance, which they foresaw 
was to be at an end whenever the ancient government should be re-
established. Our colonies, unless they can be induced to consent to a union, 
are very likely to defend themselves against the best of all mother countries 
as obstinately as the city of Paris did against one of the best of kings. 
    The idea of representation was unknown in ancient times. When the 
people of one state were admitted to the right of citizenship in another, they 
had no other means of exercising that right but by coming in a body to vote 
and deliberate with the people of that other state. The admission of the 
greater part of the inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of Roman citizens 
completely ruined the Roman republic. It was no longer possible to 
distinguish between who was and who was not a Roman citizen. No tribe 
could know its own members. A rabble of any kind could be introduced into 
the assemblies of the people, could drive out the real citizens, and decide 
upon the affairs of the republic as if they themselves had been such. But 
though America were to send fifty or sixty new representatives to 
Parliament, the doorkeeper of the House of Commons could not find any 
great difficulty in distinguishing between who was and who was not a 
member. Though the Roman constitution, therefore, was necessarily ruined 
by the union of Rome with the allied states of Italy, there is not the least 
probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the union of Great 
Britain with her colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would be 
completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which 
deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in 
order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from 
every part of it That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or that 
difficulties and great difficulties might not occur in the execution, I do not 
pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear insurmountable. 
The principal perhaps arise, not from the nature of things, but from the 
prejudices and opinions of the people both on this and on the other side of 
the Atlantic. 
    We, on this side of the water, are afraid lest the multitude of American 
representatives should overturn the balance of the constitution, and increase 
too much either the influence of the crown on the one hand, or the force of 
the democracy on the other. But if the number of American representatives 
were to be in proportion to the produce of American taxation, the number of 
people to be managed would increase exactly in proportion to the means of 
managing them; and the means of managing to the number of people to be 
managed. The monarchical and democratical parts of the constitution 
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would, after the union, stand exactly in the same degree of relative force 
with regard to one another as they had done before. 
    The people on the other side of the water are afraid lest their distance 
from the seat of government might expose them to many oppressions. But 
their representatives in Parliament, of which the number ought from the first 
to be considerable, would easily be able to protect them from all oppression. 
The distance could not much weaken the dependency of the representative 
upon the constituent, and the former would still feel that he owed his seat in 
Parliament, and all the consequences which he derived from it, to the good 
will of the latter. It would be the interest of the former, therefore, to 
cultivate that good will by complaining, with all the authority of a member 
of the legislature, of every outrage which any civil or military officer might 
be guilty of in those remote parts of the empire. The distance of America 
from the seat of government, besides, the natives of that country might 
flatter themselves, with some appearance of reason too, would not be of 
very long continuance. Such has hitherto been the rapid progress of that 
country in wealth, population, and improvement, that in the course of little 
more than a century, perhaps, the produce of American might exceed that of 
British taxation. The seat of the empire would then naturally remove itself 
to that part of the empire which contributed most to the general defence and 
support of the whole. 
    The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the 
Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events 
recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already been 
very great; but, in the short period of between two and three centuries which 
has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the 
whole extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits or 
what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great events, 
no human wisdom can foresee. By uniting, in some measure, the most 
distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another's wants, 
to increase one another's enjoyments, and to encourage one another's 
industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives 
however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits 
which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the 
dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. These misfortunes, 
however, seem to have arisen rather from accident than from anything in the 
nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when these 
discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on 
the side of the Europeans that they were enabled to commit with impunity 
every sort of injustice in those remote countries. Hereafter, perhaps, the 
natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow 
weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may 
arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, 
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can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of 
respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to 
establish this equality of force than that mutual communication of 
knowledge and of all sorts of improvements which an extensive commerce 
from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries 
along with it. 
    In the meantime one of the principal effects of those discoveries has been 
to raise the mercantile system to a degree of splendour and glory which it 
could never otherwise have attained to. It is the object of that system to 
enrich a great nation rather by trade and manufactures than by the 
improvement and cultivation of land, rather by the industry of the towns 
than by that of the country. But, in consequence of those discoveries, the 
commercial towns of Europe, instead of being the manufacturers and 
carriers for but a very small part of the world (that part of Europe which is 
washed by the Atlantic Ocean, and the countries which lie round the Baltic 
and Mediterranean seas), have now become the manufacturers for the 
numerous and thriving cultivators of America, and the carriers, and in some 
respects the manufacturers too, for almost all the different nations of Asia, 
Africa, and America. Two new worlds have been opened to their industry, 
each of them much greater and more extensive than the old one, and the 
market of one of them growing still greater and greater every day. 
    The countries which possess the colonies of America, and which trade 
directly to the East Indies, enjoy, indeed, the whole show and splendour of 
this great commerce. Other countries, however, notwithstanding all the 
invidious restraints by which it is meant to exclude them, frequently enjoy a 
greater share of the real benefit of it. The colonies of Spain and Portugal, for 
example, give more real encouragement to the industry of other countries 
than to that of Spain and Portugal. In the single article of linen alone the 
consumption of those colonies amounts, it is said, but I do not pretend to 
warrant the quantity, to more than three millions sterling a year. But this 
great consumption is almost entirely supplied by France, Flanders, Holland, 
and Germany. Spain and Portugal furnish but a small part of it. The capital 
which supplies the colonies with this great quantity of linen is annually 
distributed among, and furnishes a revenue to the inhabitants of, those other 
countries. The profits of it only are spent in Spain and Portugal, where they 
help to support the sumptuous profusion of the merchants of Cadiz and 
Lisbon. 
    Even the regulations by which each nation endeavours to secure to itself 
the exclusive trade of its own colonies are frequently more hurtful to the 
countries in favour of which they are established than to those against which 
they are established. The unjust oppression of the industry of other countries 
falls back, if I may say so, upon the heads of the oppressors, and crushes 
their industry more than it does that of those other countries. By those 
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regulations for example, the merchant of Hamburg must send the linen 
which he destines for the American market to London, and he must bring 
back from thence the tobacco which he destines for the German market, 
because he can neither send the one directly to America nor bring back the 
other directly from thence. By this restraint he is probably obliged to sell 
the one somewhat cheaper, and to sell the one somewhat cheaper, and to 
buy the other somewhat dearer than he otherwise might have done; and his 
profits are probably somewhat abridged by means of it. In this trade, 
however, between Hamburg and London, he certainly receives the returns 
of his capital much more quickly than he could possibly have done in the 
direct trade to America, even though we should suppose, what is by no 
means the case, that the payments of America were as punctual as those of 
London. In the trade, therefore, to which those regulations confine the 
merchant of Hamburg, his capital can keep in constant employment a much 
greater quantity of German industry than it possibly could have done in the 
trade from which he is excluded. Though the one employment, therefore, 
may to him perhaps be less profitable than the other, it cannot be less 
advantageous to his country. It is quite otherwise with the employment into 
which the monopoly naturally attracts, if I may say so, the capital of the 
London merchant. That employment may, perhaps, be more profitable to 
him than the greater part of other employments, but, on account of the 
slowness of the returns, it cannot be more advantageous to his country. 
    After all the unjust attempts, therefore, of every country in Europe to 
engross to itself the whole advantage of the trade of its own colonies, no 
country has yet been able to engross itself anything but the expense of 
supporting in time of peace and of defending in time of war the oppressive 
authority which it assumes over them. The inconveniencies resulting from 
the possession of its colonies, every country has engrossed to itself 
completely. The advantages resulting from their trade it has been obliged to 
share with many other countries. 
    At first sight, no doubt, the monopoly of the great commerce of America 
naturally seems to be an acquisition of the highest value. To the 
undiscerning eye of giddy ambition, it naturally presents itself amidst the 
confused scramble of politics and war as a very dazzling object to fight for. 
The dazzling splendour of the object, however, the immense greatness of 
the commerce, is the very quality which renders the monopoly of it hurtful, 
or which makes one employment, in its own nature necessarily less 
advantageous to the country than the greater part of other employments, 
absorb a much greater proportion of the capital of the country than what 
would otherwise have gone to it. 
    The mercantile stock of every country, it has been shown in the second 
book, naturally seeks, if one may say so, the employment most 
advantageous to that country. If it is employed in the carrying trade, the 
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country to which it belongs becomes the emporium of the goods of all the 
countries whose trade that stock carries on. But the owner of that stock 
necessarily wishes to dispose of as great a part of those goods as he can at 
home. He thereby saves himself the trouble, risk, and expense of 
exportation, and he will upon that account be glad to sell them at home, not 
only for a much smaller price, but with somewhat a smaller profit than he 
might expect to make by sending them abroad. He naturally, therefore, 
endeavours as much as he can to turn his carrying trade into a foreign trade 
of consumption. If his stock, again, is employed in a foreign trade of 
consumption, he will, for the same reason, be glad to dispose of at home as 
great a part as he can of the home goods, which he collects in order to 
export to some foreign market, and he will thus endeavour, as much as he 
can, to turn his foreign trade of consumption into a home trade. The 
mercantile stock of every country naturally courts in this manner the near, 
and shuns the distant employment; naturally courts the employment in 
which the returns are frequent, and shuns that in which they are distant and 
slow; naturally courts the employment in which it can maintain the greatest 
quantity of productive labour in the country to which it belongs, or in which 
its owner resides, and shuns that in which it can maintain there the smallest 
quantity. It naturally courts the employment which in ordinary cases is most 
advantageous, and shuns that which in ordinary cases is least advantageous 
to that country. 
    But if in any of those distant employments, which in ordinary cases are 
less advantageous to the country, the profit should happen to rise somewhat 
higher than what is sufficient to balance the natural preference which is 
given to nearer employments, this superiority of profit will draw stock from 
those nearer employments, till the profits of all return to their proper level. 
This superiority of profit, however, is a proof that, in the actual 
circumstances of the society, those distant employments are somewhat 
understocked in proportion to other employments, and that the stock of the 
society is not distributed in the properest manner among all the different 
employments carried on in it. It is a proof that something is either bought 
cheaper or sold dearer than it ought to be, and that some particular class of 
citizens is more or less oppressed either by paying more or by getting less 
than what is suitable to that equality which ought to take place, and which 
naturally does take place among all the different classes of them. Though 
the same capital never will maintain the same quantity of productive labour 
in a distant as in a near employment, yet a distant employment may be as 
necessary for the welfare of the society as a near one; the goods which the 
distant employment deals in being necessary, perhaps, for carrying on many 
of the nearer employments. But if the profits of those who deal in such 
goods are above their proper level, those goods will be sold dearer than they 
ought to be, or somewhat above their natural price, and all those engaged in 
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the nearer employments will be more or less oppressed by this high price. 
Their interest, therefore, in this case requires that some stock should be 
withdrawn from those nearer employments, and turned towards that distant 
one, in order to reduce its profits to their proper level, and the price of the 
goods which it deals in to their natural price. In this extraordinary case, the 
public interest requires that some stock should be withdrawn from those 
employments which in ordinary cases are more advantageous, and turned 
towards one which in ordinary cases is less advantageous to the public; and 
in this extraordinary case the natural interests and inclinations of men 
coincide as exactly with the public interest as in all other ordinary cases, 
and lead them to withdraw stock from the near, and to turn it towards the 
distant employment. 
    It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally 
dispose them to turn their stocks towards the employments which in 
ordinary cases are most advantageous to the society. But if from this natural 
preference they should turn too much of it towards those employments, the 
fall of profit in them and the rise of it in all others immediately dispose 
them to alter this faulty distribution. Without any intervention of law, 
therefore, the private interests and passions of men naturally lead them to 
divide and distribute the stock of every society among all the different 
employments carried on in it as nearly as possible in the proportion which is 
most agreeable to the interest of the whole society. 
    All the different regulations of the mercantile system necessarily derange 
more or less this natural and most advantageous distribution of stock. But 
those which concern the trade to America and the East Indies derange it 
perhaps more than any other, because the trade to those two great continents 
absorbs a greater quantity of stock than any two other branches of trade. 
The regulations, however, by which this derangement is effected in those 
two different branches of trade are not altogether the same. Monopoly is the 
great engine of both; but it is a different sort of monopoly. Monopoly of one 
kind or another, indeed, seems to be the sole engine of the mercantile 
system. 
    In the trade to America every nation endeavours to engross as much as 
possible the whole market of its own colonies by fairly excluding all other 
nations from any direct trade to them. During the greater part of the 
sixteenth century, the Portuguese endeavoured to manage the trade to the 
East Indies in the same manner, by claiming the sole right of sailing in the 
Indian seas, on account of the merit of having first found out the road to 
them. The Dutch still continue to exclude all other European nations from 
any direct trade to their spice islands. Monopolies of this kind are evidently 
established against all other European nations, who are thereby not only 
excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient for them to turn some 
part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in 
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somewhat dearer than if they could import them themselves directly from 
the countries which produce them. 
    But since the fall of the power of Portugal, no European nation has 
claimed the exclusive right of sailing in the Indian seas, of which the 
principal ports are now open to the ships of all European nations. Except in 
Portugal, however, and within these few years in France, the trade to the 
East Indies has in every European country been subjected to an exclusive 
company. Monopolies of this kind are properly established against the very 
nation which erects them. The greater part of that nation are thereby not 
only excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient for them to turn 
some part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade 
deals somewhat dearer than if it was open and free to all their countrymen. 
Since the establishment of the English East India Company, for example, 
the other inhabitants of England, over and above being excluded from the 
trade, must have paid in the price of the East India goods which they have 
consumed, not only for all the extraordinary profits which the company may 
have made upon those goods in consequence of their monopoly, but for all 
the extraordinary waste which the fraud and abuse, inseparable from the 
management of the affairs of so great a company, must necessarily have 
occasioned. The absurdity of this second kind of monopoly, therefore, is 
much more manifest than that of the first. 
    Both these kinds of monopolies derange more or less the natural 
distribution of the stock of the society; but they do not always derange it in 
the same way. 
    Monopolies of the first kind always attract to the particular trade in which 
they are established a greater proportion of the stock of the society than 
what would go to that trade of its own accord. 
    Monopolies of the second kind may sometimes attract stock towards the 
particular trade in which they are established, and sometimes repel it from 
that trade according to different circumstances. In poor countries they 
naturally attract towards that trade more stock than would otherwise go to it. 
In rich countries they naturally repel from it a good deal of stock which 
would otherwise go to it. 
    Such poor countries as Sweden and Denmark, for example, would 
probably have never sent a single ship to the East Indies had not the trade 
been subjected to an exclusive company. The establishment of such a 
company necessarily encourages adventurers. Their monopoly secures them 
against all competitors in the home market, and they have the same chance 
for foreign markets with the traders of other nations. Their monopoly shows 
them the certainty of a great profit upon a considerable quantity of goods, 
and the chance of a considerable profit upon a great quantity. Without such 
extraordinary encouragement, the poor traders of such poor countries would 
probably never have thought of hazarding their small capitals in so very 
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distant and uncertain an adventure as the trade to the East Indies must 
naturally have appeared to them. 
    Such a rich country as Holland, on the contrary, would probably, in the 
case of a free trade, send many more ships to the East Indies than it actually 
does. The limited stock of the Dutch East India Company probably repels 
from that trade many great mercantile capitals which would otherwise go to 
it. The mercantile capital of Holland is so great that it is, as it were, 
continually overflowing, sometimes into the public funds of foreign 
countries, sometimes into loans to private traders and adventurers of foreign 
countries, sometimes into the most round-about foreign trades of 
consumption, and sometimes into the carrying trade. All near employments 
being completely filled up, all the capital which can be placed in them with 
any tolerable profit being already placed in them, the capital of Holland 
necessarily flows towards the most distant employments. The trade to the 
East Indies, if it were altogether free, would probably absorb the greater part 
of this redundant capital. The East Indies offer a market for the 
manufactures of Europe and for the gold and silver as well as for several 
other productions of America greater and more extensive than both Europe 
and America put together. 
    Every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily 
hurtful to the society in which it takes place; whether it be by repelling from 
a particular trade the stock which would otherwise go to it, or by attracting 
towards a particular trade that which would not otherwise come to it. If, 
without any exclusive company, the trade of Holland to the East Indies 
would be greater than it actually is, that country must suffer a considerable 
loss by part of its capital being excluded from the employment most 
convenient for that part. And in the same manner, if, without an exclusive 
company, the trade of Sweden and Denmark to the East Indies would be 
less than it actually is, or, what perhaps is more probable, would not exist at 
all, those two countries must likewise suffer a considerable loss by part of 
their capital being drawn into an employment which must be more or less 
unsuitable to their present circumstances. Better for them, perhaps, in their 
present circumstances, to buy East India goods of other nations, even 
though they should pay somewhat dearer, than to turn so great a part of their 
small capital to so very distant a trade, in which the returns are so very 
slow, in which that capital can maintain so small a quantity of productive 
labour at home, where productive labour is so much wanted, where so little 
is done, and where so much is to do. 
    Though without an exclusive company, therefore, a particular country 
should not be able to carry on any direct trade to the East Indies, it will not 
from thence follow that such a company ought to be established there, but 
only that such a country ought not in these circumstances to trade directly to 
the East Indies. That such companies are not in general necessary for 
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carrying on the East India trade is sufficiently demonstrated by the 
experience of the Portuguese, who enjoyed almost the whole of it for more 
than a century together without any exclusive company. 
    No private merchant, it has been said, could well have capital sufficient 
to maintain factors and agents in the different ports of the East Indies, in 
order to provide goods for the ships which he might occasionally send 
thither; and yet, unless he was able to do this, the difficulty of finding a 
cargo might frequently make his ships lose the season for returning, and the 
expense of so long a delay would not only eat up the whole profit of the 
adventure, but frequently occasion a very considerable loss. This argument, 
however, if it proved anything at all, would prove that no one great branch 
of trade could be carried on without an exclusive company, which is 
contrary to the experience of all nations. There is no great branch of trade in 
which the capital of any one private merchant is sufficient for carrying on 
all the subordinate branches which must be carried on, in order to carry on 
the principal one. But when a nation is ripe for any great branch of trade, 
some merchants naturally turn their capitals towards the principal, and some 
towards the subordinate branches of it; and though all the different branches 
of it are in this manner carried on, yet it very seldom happens that they are 
all carried on by the capital of one private merchant. If a nation, therefore, is 
ripe for the East India trade, a certain portion of its capital will naturally 
divide itself among all the different branches of that trade. Some of its 
merchants will find it for their interest to reside in the East Indies, and to 
employ their capitals there in providing goods for the ships which are to be 
sent out by other merchants who reside in Europe. The settlements which 
different European nations have obtained in the East Indies, if they were 
taken from the exclusive companies to which they at present belong and put 
under the immediate protection of the sovereign, would render this 
residence both safe and easy, at least to the merchants of the particular 
nations to whom those settlements belong. If at any particular time that part 
of the capital of any country which of its own accord tended and inclined, if 
I may say so, towards the East India trade, was not sufficient for carrying on 
all those different branches of it, it would be a proof that, at that particular 
time, that country was not ripe for that trade, and that it would do better to 
buy for some time, even at a higher price, from other European nations, the 
East India goods it had occasion for, than to import them itself directly from 
the East Indies. What it might lose by the high price of those goods could 
seldom be equal to the loss which it would sustain by the distraction of a 
large portion of its capital from other employments more necessary, or more 
useful, or more suitable to its circumstances and situation, than a direct 
trade to the East Indies. 
    Though the Europeans possess many considerable settlements both upon 
the coast of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not yet established in 
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either of those countries such numerous and thriving colonies as those in the 
islands and continent of America. Africa, however, as well as several of the 
countries comprehended under the general name of the East Indies, are 
inhabited by barbarous nations. But those nations were by no means so 
weak and defenceless as the miserable and helpless Americans; and in 
proportion to the natural fertility of the countries which they inhabited, they 
were besides much more populous. The most barbarous nations either of 
Africa or of the East Indies were shepherds; even the Hottentots were so. 
But the natives of every part of America, except Mexico and Peru, were 
only hunters; and the difference is very great between the number of 
shepherds and that of hunters whom the same extent of equally fertile 
territory can maintain. In Africa and the East Indies, therefore, it was more 
difficult to displace the natives, and to extend the European plantations over 
the greater part of the lands of the original inhabitants. The genius of 
exclusive companies, besides, is unfavourable, it has already been observed, 
to the growth of new colonies, and has probably been the principal cause of 
the little progress which they have made in the East Indies. The Portuguese 
carried on the trade both to Africa and the East Indies without any exclusive 
companies, and their settlements at Congo, Angola, and Benguela on the 
coast of Africa, and at Goa in the East Indies, though much depressed by 
superstition and every sort of bad government, yet bear some faint 
resemblance to the colonies of America, and are partly inhabited by 
Portuguese who have been established there for several generations. The 
Dutch settlements at the Cape of Good Hope and at Batavia are at present 
the most considerable colonies which the Europeans have established either 
in Africa or in the East Indies, and both these settlements are peculiarly 
fortunate in their situation. The Cape of Good Hope was inhabited by a race 
of people almost as barbarous and quite as incapable of defending 
themselves as the natives of America. It is besides the halfway house, if one 
may say so, between Europe and the East Indies, at which almost every 
European ship makes some stay, both in going and returning. The supplying 
of those ships with every sort of fresh provisions, with fruit and sometimes 
with wine, affords alone a very extensive market for the surplus produce of 
the colonists. What the Cape of Good Hope is between Europe and every 
part of the East Indies, Batavia is between the principal countries of the East 
Indies. It lies upon the most frequented road from Indostan to China and 
Japan, and is nearly about midway upon that road. Almost all the ships, too, 
that sail between Europe and China touch at Batavia; and it is, over and 
above all this, the centre and principal mart of what is called the country 
trade of the East Indies, not only of that part of it which is carried on by 
Europeans, but of that which is carried on by the native Indians; and vessels 
navigated by the inhabitants of China and Japan, of Tonquin, Malacca, 
Cochin China, and the island of Celebes, are frequently to be seen in its 
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port. Such advantageous situations have enabled those two colonies to 
surmount all the obstacles which the oppressive genius of an exclusive 
company may have occasionally opposed to their growth. They have 
enabled Batavia to surmount the additional disadvantage of perhaps the 
most unwholesome climate in the world. 
    The English and Dutch companies, though they have established no 
considerable colonies, except the two above mentioned, have both made 
considerable conquests in the East Indies. But in the manner in which they 
both govern their new subjects, the natural genius of an exclusive company 
has shown itself most distinctly. In the spice islands the Dutch are said to 
burn all the spiceries which a fertile season produces beyond what they 
expect to dispose of in Europe with such a profit as they think sufficient. In 
the islands where they have no settlements, they give a premium to those 
who collect the young blossoms and green leaves of the clove and nutmeg 
trees which naturally grow there, but which the savage policy has now, it is 
said, almost completely extirpated. Even in the islands where they have 
settlements they have very much reduced, it is said, the number of those 
trees. If the produce even of their own islands was much greater than what 
suited their market, the natives, they suspect, might find means to convey 
some part of it to other nations; and the best way, they imagine, to secure 
their own monopoly is to take care that no more shall grow than what they 
themselves carry to market. By different arts of oppression they have 
reduced the population of several of the Moluccas nearly to the number 
which is sufficient to supply with fresh provisions and other necessaries of 
life their own insignificant garrisons, and such of their ships as occasionally 
come there for a cargo of spices. Under the government even of the 
Portuguese, however, those islands are said to have been tolerably well 
inhabited. The English company have not yet had time to establish in 
Bengal so perfectly destructive a system. The plan of their government, 
however, has had exactly the same tendency. It has not been uncommon, I 
am well assured, for the chief, that is, the first clerk of a factory, to order a 
peasant to plough up a rich field of poppies and sow it with rice or some 
other grain. The pretence was, to prevent a scarcity of provisions; but the 
real reason, to give the chief an opportunity of selling at a better price a 
large quantity of opium, which he happened then to have upon hand. Upon 
other occasions the order has been reversed; and a rich field of rice or other 
grain has been ploughed up, in order to make room for a plantation of 
poppies; when the chief foresaw that extraordinary profit was likely to be 
made by opium. The servants of the company have upon several occasions 
attempted to establish in their own favour the monopoly of some of the 
most important branches, not only of the foreign, but of the inland trade of 
the country. Had they been allowed to go on, it is impossible that they 
should not at some time or another have attempted to restrain the production 
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of the particular articles of which they had thus usurped the monopoly, not 
only to the quantity which they themselves could purchase, but to that 
which they could expect to sell with such a profit as they might think 
sufficient. In the course of the century or two, the policy of the English 
company would in this manner have probably proved as completely 
destructive as that of the Dutch. 
    Nothing, however, can be more directly contrary to the real interest of 
those companies, considered as the sovereigns of the countries which they 
have conquered, than this destructive plan. In almost all countries the 
revenue of the sovereign is drawn from that of the people. The greater the 
revenue of the people, therefore, the greater the annual produce of their land 
and labour, the more they can afford to the sovereign. It is his interest, 
therefore, to increase as much as possible that annual produce. But if this is 
the interest of every sovereign, it is peculiarly so of one whose revenue, like 
that of the sovereign of Bengal, arises chiefly from a land-rent. That rent 
must necessarily be in proportion to the quantity and value of the produce, 
and both the one and the other must depend upon the extent of the market. 
The quantity will always be suited with more or less exactness to the 
consumption of those who can afford to pay for it, and the price which they 
will pay will always be in proportion to the eagerness of their competition. 
It is the interest of such a sovereign, therefore, to open the most extensive 
market for the produce of his country, to allow the most perfect freedom of 
commerce, in order to increase as much as possible the number and the 
competition of buyers; and upon this account to abolish, not only all 
monopolies, but all restraints upon the transportation of the home produce 
from one part of the country to another, upon its exportation to foreign 
countries, or upon the importation of goods of any kind for which it can be 
exchanged. It is in this manner most likely to increase both the quantity and 
value of that produce, and consequently of his own share of it, or of his own 
revenue. 
    But a company of merchants are, it seems, incapable of considering 
themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become such. Trade, or 
buying in order to sell again, they still consider as their principal business, 
and by a strange absurdity regard the character of the sovereign as but an 
appendix to that of the merchant, as something which ought to be made 
subservient to it, or by means of which they may be enabled to buy cheaper 
in India, and thereby to sell with a better profit in Europe. They endeavour 
for this purpose to keep out as much as possible all competitors from the 
market of the countries which are subject to their government, and 
consequently to reduce, at least, some part of the surplus produce of those 
countries to what is barely sufficient for supplying their own demand, or to 
what they can expect to sell in Europe with such a profit as they may think 
reasonable. Their mercantile habits draw them in this manner, almost 
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necessarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer upon all ordinary occasions 
the little and transitory profit of the monopolist to the great and permanent 
revenue of the sovereign, and would gradually lead them to treat the 
countries subject to their government nearly as the Dutch treat the 
Moluceas. It is the interest of the East India Company, considered as 
sovereigns, that the European goods which are carried to their Indian 
dominions should be sold there as cheap as possible; and that the Indian 
goods which are brought from thence should bring there as good a price, or 
should be sold there as dear as possible. But the reverse of this is their 
interest as merchants. As sovereigns, their interest is exactly the same with 
that of the country which they govern. As merchants their interest is directly 
opposite to that interest. 
    But if the genius of such a government, even as to what concerns its 
direction in Europe, is in this manner essentially and perhaps incurably 
faulty, that of its administration in India is still more so. That administration 
is necessarily composed of a council of merchants, a profession no doubt 
extremely respectable, but which in no country in the world carries along 
with it that sort of authority which naturally overawes the people, and 
without force commands their willing obedience. Such a council can 
command obedience only by the military force with which they are 
accompanied, and their government is therefore necessarily military and 
despotical. Their proper business, however, is that of merchants. It is to sell, 
upon their masters' account, the European goods consigned to them, and to 
buy in return Indian goods for the European market. It is to sell the one as 
dear and to buy the other as cheap as possible, and consequently to exclude 
as much as possible all rivals from the particular market where they keep 
their shop. The genius of the administration therefore, so far as concerns the 
trade of the company, is the same as that of the direction. It tends to make 
government subservient to the interest of monopoly, and consequently to 
stunt the natural growth of some parts at least of the surplus produce of the 
country to what is barely sufficient for answering the demand of the 
company. 
    All the members of the administration, besides, trade more or less upon 
their own account, and it is in vain to prohibit them from doing so. Nothing 
can be more completely foolish than to expect that the clerks of a great 
counting-house at ten thousand miles distance, and consequently almost 
quite out of sight, should, upon a simple order from their masters, give up at 
once doing any sort of business upon their own account, abandon for ever 
all hopes of making a fortune, of which they have the means in their hands, 
and content themselves with the moderate salaries which those masters 
allow them, and which, moderate as they are, can seldom be augmented, 
being commonly as large as the real profits of the company trade can afford. 
In such circumstances, to prohibit the servants of the company from trading 
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upon their own account can have scarce any other effect than to enable the 
superior servants, under pretence of executing their masters' order, to 
oppress such of the inferior ones as have had the misfortune to fall under 
their displeasure. The servants naturally endeavour to establish the same 
monopoly in favour of their own private trade as of the public trade of the 
company. If they are suffered to act as they could wish, they will establish 
this monopoly openly and directly, by fairly prohibiting all other people 
from trading in the articles in which they choose to deal; and this, perhaps, 
is the best and least oppressive way of establishing it. But if by an order 
from Europe they are prohibited from doing this, they will, notwithstanding, 
endeavour to establish a monopoly of the same kind, secretly and indirectly, 
in a way that is much more destructive to the country. They will employ the 
whole authority of government, and pervert the administration of justice, in 
order to harass and ruin those who interfere with them in any branch of 
commerce, which by means of agents, either concealed, or at least not 
publicly avowed, they may choose to carry on. But the private trade of the 
servants will naturally extend to a much greater variety of articles than the 
public trade of the company. The public trade of the company extends no 
further than the trade with Europe, and comprehends a part only of the 
foreign trade of the country. But the private trade of the servants may 
extend to all the different branches both of its inland and foreign trade. The 
monopoly of the company can tend only to stunt the natural growth of that 
part of the surplus produce which, in the case of a free trade, would be 
exported to Europe. That of the servants tends to stunt the natural growth of 
every part of the produce in which they choose to deal, of what is destined 
for home consumption, as well as of what is destined for exportation; and 
consequently to degrade the cultivation of the whole country, and to reduce 
the number of its inhabitants. It tends to reduce the quantity of every sort of 
produce, even that of the necessaries of life, whenever the servants of the 
company choose to deal in them, to what those servants can both afford to 
buy and expect to sell with such a profit as pleases them. 
    From the nature of their situation, too, the servants must be more 
disposed to support with rigorous severity their own interest against that of 
the country which they govern than their masters can be to support theirs. 
The country belongs to their masters, who cannot avoid having some regard 
for the interest of what belongs to them. But it does not belong to the 
servants. The real interest of their masters, if they were capable of 
understanding it, is the same with that of the country, and it is from 
ignorance chiefly, and the meanness of mercantile prejudice, that they ever 
oppress it. But the real interest of the servants is by no means the same with 
that of the country, and the most perfect information would not necessarily 
put an end to their oppressions. The regulations accordingly which have 
been sent out from Europe, though they have been frequently weak, have 
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upon most occasions been well-meaning. More intelligence and perhaps less 
good-meaning has sometimes appeared in those established by the servants 
in India. It is a very singular government in which every member of the 
administration wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to have 
done with the government as soon as he can, and to whose interest, the day 
after he has left it and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly 
indifferent though the whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake. 
    I mean not, however, by anything which I have here said, to throw any 
odious imputation upon the general character of the servants of the East 
India Company, and much less upon that of any particular persons. It is the 
system of government, the situation in which they are placed, that I mean to 
censure, not the character of those who have acted in it. They acted as their 
situation naturally directed, and they who have clamoured the loudest 
against them would probably not have acted better themselves. In war and 
negotiation, the councils of Madras and Calcutta have upon several 
occasions conducted themselves with a resolution and decisive wisdom 
which would have done honour to the senate of Rome in the best days of 
that republic. The members of those councils, however, had been bred to 
professions very different from war and polities. But their situation alone, 
without education, experience, or even example, seems to have formed in 
them all at once the great qualities which it required, and to have inspired 
them both with abilities and virtues which they themselves could not well 
know that they possessed. If upon some occasions, therefore, it has 
animated them to actions of magnanimity which could not well have been 
expected from them, we should not wonder if upon others it has prompted 
them to exploits of somewhat a different nature. 
    Such exclusive companies, therefore, are nuisances in every respect; 
always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they are 
established, and destructive to those which have the misfortune to fall under 
their government. 
CHAPTER VIII
Conclusion of the Mercantile System
THOUGH the encouragement of exportation and the discouragement of 
importation are the two great engines by which the mercantile system 
proposes to enrich every country, yet with regard to some particular 
commodities it seems to follow an opposite plan: to discourage exportation 
and to encourage importation. Its ultimate object, however, it pretends, is 
always the same, to enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade. 
It discourages the exportation of the materials of manufacture, and of the 
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instruments of trade, in order to give our own workmen an advantage, and 
to enable them to undersell those of other nations in all foreign markets; and 
by restraining, in this manner, the exportation of a few commodities, of no 
great price, it proposes to occasion a much greater and more valuable 
exportation of others. It encourages the importation of the materials of 
manufacture in order that our own people may be enabled to work them up 
more cheaply, and thereby prevent a greater and more valuable importation 
of the manufactured commodities. I do not observe, at least in our Statute 
Book, any encouragement given to the importation of the instruments of 
trade. When manufactures have advanced to a certain pitch of greatness, the 
fabrication of the instruments of trade becomes itself the object of a great 
number of very important manufactures. To give any particular 
encouragement to the importation of such instruments would interfere too 
much with the interest of those manufactures. Such importation, therefore, 
instead of being encouraged, has frequently been prohibited. Thus the 
importation of wool cards, except from Ireland, or when brought in as 
wreck or prize goods, was prohibited by the 3rd of Edward IV; which 
prohibition was renewed by the 39th of Elizabeth, and has been continued 
and rendered perpetual by subsequent laws. 
    The importation of the materials of manufacture has sometimes been 
encouraged by an exemption from the duties to which other goods are 
subject, and sometimes by bounties. 
    The importation of sheep's wool from several different countries, of 
cotton wool from all countries, of undressed flax, of the greater part of 
dyeing drugs, of the greater part of undressed hides from Ireland or the 
British colonies, of sealskins from the British Greenland fishery, of pig and 
bar iron from the British colonies, as well as of several other materials of 
manufacture, has been encouraged by an exemption from all duties, if 
properly entered at the custom house. The private interest of our merchants 
and manufacturers may, perhaps, have extorted from the legislature these 
exemptions as well as the greater part of our other commercial regulations. 
They are, however, perfectly just and reasonable, and if, consistently with 
the necessities of the state, they could be extended to all the other materials 
of manufacture, the public would certainly be a gainer. 
    The avidity of our great manufacturers, however, has in some cases 
extended these exemptions a good deal beyond what can justly be 
considered as the rude materials of their work. By the 24th George III, c. 46, 
a small duty of only one penny the pound was imposed upon the 
importation of foreign brown linen yam, instead of much higher duties to 
which it had been subjected before, viz. of sixpence the pound upon sail 
yarn, of one shilling the pound upon all French and Dutch yarn, and of two 
pounds thirteen shillings and fourpence upon the hundredweight of all 
spruce or Muscovia yarn. But our manufacturers were not long satisfied 
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with this reduction. By the 29th of the same king, c. 15, the same law which 
gave a bounty upon the exportation of British and Irish linen of which the 
price did not exceed eighteenpence the yard, even this small duty upon the 
importation of brown linen yarn was taken away. In the different operations, 
however, which are necessary for the preparation of linen yarn, a good deal 
more industry is employed than in the subsequent operation of preparing 
linen cloth from linen yarn. To say nothing of the industry of the flax-
growers and flax-dressers, three or four spinners, at least, are necessary in 
order to keep one weaver in constant employment; and more than four-fifths 
of the whole quantity of labour necessary for the preparation of linen cloth 
is employed in that of linen yarn; but our spinners are poor people, women 
commonly scattered about in all different parts of the country, without 
support or protection. It is not by the sale of their work, but by that of the 
complete work of the weavers, that our great master manufacturers make 
their profits. As it is their interest to sell the complete manufacture as dear, 
so is it to buy the materials as cheap as possible. By extorting from the 
legislature bounties upon the exportation of their own linen, high duties 
upon the importation of all foreign linen, and a total prohibition of the home 
consumption of some sorts of French linen, they endeavour to sell their own 
goods as dear as possible. By encouraging the importation of foreign linen 
yarn, and thereby bringing it into competition with that which is made by 
our own people, they endeavour to buy the work of the poor spinners as 
cheap as possible. They are as intent to keep down the wages of their own 
weavers as the earnings of the poor spinners, and it is by no means for the 
benefit of the workman that they endeavour either to raise the price of the 
complete work or to lower that of the rude materials. It is the industry which 
is carried on for the benefit of the rich and the powerful that is principally 
encouraged by our mercantile system. That which is carried on for the 
benefit of the poor and the indigent is too often either neglected or 
oppressed. 
    Both the bounty upon the exportation of linen, and the exemption from 
duty upon the importation of foreign yarn, which were granted only for 
fifteen years, but continued by two different prolongations, expire with the 
end of the session of Parliament which shall immediately follow the 24th of 
June 1786. 
    The encouragement given to the importation of the materials of 
manufacture by bounties has been principally confined to such as were 
imported from our American plantations. 
    The first bounties of this kind were those granted about the beginning of 
the present century upon the importation of naval stores from America. 
Under this denomination were comprehended timber fit for masts, yards, 
and bowsprits; hemp; tar, pitch, and turpentine. The bounty, however, of 
one pound the ton upon masting-timber, and that of six pounds the ton upon 
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hemp, were extended to such as should be imported into England from 
Scotland. Both these bounties continued without any variation, at the same 
rate, till they were severally allowed to expire; that upon hemp on the 1st of 
January 1741, and that upon masting-timber at the end of the session of 
Parliament immediately following the 24th June 1781. 
    The bounties upon the importation of tar, pitch, and turpentine 
underwent, during their continuance, several alterations. Originally that 
upon tar was four pounds the ton; that upon pitch the same; and that upon 
turpentine, three pounds the ton. The bounty of four pounds the ton upon tar 
was afterwards confined to such as had been prepared in a particular 
manner; that upon other good, clean, and merchantable tar was reduced to 
two pounds four shillings the ton. The bounty upon pitch was likewise 
reduced to one pound; and that upon turpentine to one pound ten shillings 
the ton. 
    The second bounty upon the importation of any of the materials of 
manufacture, according to the order of time, was that granted by the 21st 
George II, c. 30, upon the importation of indigo from the British 
plantations. When the plantation indigo was worth three-fourths of the price 
of the best French indigo, it was by this act entitled to a bounty of sixpence 
the pound. This bounty, which, like most others, was granted only for a 
limited time, was continued by several prolongations, but was reduced to 
fourpence the pound. It was allowed to expire with the end of the session of 
Parliament which followed the 25th March 1781. 
    The third bounty of this kind was that granted (much about the time that 
we were beginning sometimes to court and sometimes to quarrel with our 
American colonies) by the 4th George III, c. 26, upon the importation of 
hemp, or undressed flax, from the British plantations. This bounty was 
granted for twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1764 to the 24th June 
1785. For the first seven years it was to be at the rate of eight pounds the 
ton, for the second at six pounds, and for the third at four pounds. It was not 
extended to Scotland, of which the climate (although hemp is sometimes 
raised there in small quantities and of an inferior quality) is not very fit for 
that produce. Such a bounty upon the importation of Scotch flax into 
England would have been too great a discouragement to the native produce 
of the southern part of the United Kingdom. 
    The fourth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 5th George III, c. 
45, upon the importation of wood from America. It was granted for nine 
years, from the 1st January 1766 to the 1st January 1775. During the first 
three years, it was to be for every hundred and twenty good deals, at the rate 
of one pound, and for every load containing fifty cubic feet of other squared 
timber at the rate of twelve shillings. For the second three years, it was for 
deals to be at. the rate of fifteen shillings, and for other squared timber at 
the rate of eight shillings; and for the third three years, it was for deals to be 
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at the rate of ten shillings, and for other squared timber at the rate of five 
shillings. 
    The fifth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 9th George III, c. 38, 
upon the importation of raw silk from the British plantations. It was granted 
for twenty-one years, from the 1st January 1770 to the 1st January 1791. 
For the first seven years it was to be at the rate of twenty-five pounds for 
every hundred pounds value; for the second at twenty pounds; and for the 
third at fifteen pounds. The management of the silk worm, and the 
preparation of silk, requires so much hand labour, and labour is so very dear 
in America that even this great bounty, I have been informed, was not likely 
to produce any considerable effect. 
    The sixth bounty of this kind was that granted by 2nd George III, c. 50, 
for the importation of pipe, hogshead, and barrel staves and heading from 
the British plantations. It was granted for nine years, from 1st January 1772 
to the 1st January 1781. For the first three years it was for a certain quantity 
of each to be at the rate of six pounds; for the second three years at four 
pounds; and for the third three years at two pounds. 
    The seventh and last bounty of this kind was that granted by the 19th 
George III, c. 37, upon the importation of hemp from Ireland. It was granted 
in the same manner as that for the importation of hemp and undressed flax 
from America, for twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1779 to the 24th 
June 1800. This term is divided, likewise, into three periods of seven years 
each; and in each of those periods the rate of the Irish bounty is the same 
with that of the American. It does not, however, like the American bounty, 
extend to the importation of undressed flax. It would have been too great a 
discouragement to the cultivation of that plant in Great Britain. When this 
last bounty was granted, the British and Irish legislatures were not in much 
better humour with one another than the British and American had been 
before. But this boon to Ireland, it is to be hoped, has been granted under 
more fortunate auspices than all those to America. 
    The same commodities upon which we thus gave bounties when 
imported from America were subjected to considerable duties when 
imported from any other country. The interest of our American colonies was 
regarded as the same with that of the mother country. Their wealth was 
considered as our wealth. Whatever money was sent out to them, it was 
said, came all back to us by the balance of trade, and we could never 
become a farthing the poorer by any expense which we could lay out upon 
them. They were our own in every respect, and it was an expense laid out 
upon the improvement of our own property and for the profitable 
employment of our own people. It is unnecessary, I apprehend, at present to 
say anything further in order to expose the folly of a system which fatal 
experience has now sufficiently exposed. Had our American colonies really 
been a part of Great Britain, those bounties might have been considered as 
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bounties upon production, and would still have been liable to all the 
objections to which such bounties are liable, but to no other. 
    The exportation of the materials of manufacture is sometimes 
discouraged by absolute prohibitions, and sometimes by high duties. 
    Our woollen manufacturers have been more successful than any other 
class of workmen in persuading the legislature that the prosperity of the 
nation depended upon the success and extension of their particular business. 
They have not only obtained a monopoly against the consumers by an 
absolute prohibition of importing woollen cloths from any foreign country, 
but they have likewise obtained another monopoly against the sheep farmers 
and growers of wool by a similar prohibition of the exportation of live 
sheep and wool. The severity of many of the laws which have been enacted 
for the security of the revenue is very justly complained of, as imposing 
heavy penalties upon actions which, antecedent to the statutes that declared 
them to be crimes, had always been understood to be innocent. But the 
cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture to affirm, are mild and gentle in 
comparison of some of those which the clamour of our merchants and 
manufacturers has extorted from the legislature for the support of their own 
absurd and oppressive monopolies. Like the laws of Draco, these laws may 
be said to be all written in blood. 
    By the 8th of Elizabeth, c. 3, the exporter of sheep, lambs, or rams was 
for the first offence to forfeit all his goods for ever, to suffer a year's 
imprisonment, and then to have his left hand cut off in a market town upon 
a market day, to be there nailed up; and for the second offence to be 
adjudged a felon, and to suffer death accordingly. To prevent the breed of 
our sheep from being propagated in foreign countries seems to have been 
the object of this law. By the 13th and 14th of Charles II, c. 18, the 
exportation of wool was made felony, and the exporter subjected to the 
same penalties and forfeitures as a felon. 
    For the honour of the national humanity, it is to be hoped that neither of 
these statutes were ever executed. The first of them, however; so far as I 
know, has never been directly repealed, and Serjeant Hawkins seems to 
consider it as still in force. It may however, perhaps, be considered as 
virtually repealed by the 12th of Charles II, c. 32, sect. 3, which, without 
expressly taking away the penalties imposed by former statutes, imposes a 
new penalty, viz., that of twenty shillings for every sheep exported, or 
attempted to be exported, together with the forfeiture of the sheep and of the 
owner's share of the ship. The second of them was expressly repealed by the 
7th and 8th of William III, c. 28, sect. 4. By which it is declared that, 
"Whereas the statute of the 13th and 14th of King Charles II, made against 
the exportation of wool, among other things in the said act mentioned, doth 
enact the same to be deemed felony; by the severity of which penalty the 
prosecution of offenders hath not been so effectually put in execution: Be it, 
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therefore, enacted by the authority aforesaid, that so much of the said act, 
which relates to the making the said offence felony, be repealed and made 
void." 
    The penalties, however, which are either imposed by this milder statute, 
or which, though imposed by former statutes, are not repealed by this one, 
are still sufficiently severe. Besides the forfeiture of the goods, the exporter 
incurs the penalty of three shillings for every pound weight of wool either 
exported or attempted to be exported, that is about four or five times the 
value. Any merchant or other person convicted of this offence is disabled 
from requiring any debt or account belonging to him from any factor or 
other person. Let his fortune be what it will, whether he is or is not able to 
pay those heavy penalties, the law means to ruin him completely. But as the 
morals of the great body of the people are not yet so corrupt as those of the 
contrivers of this statute, I have not heard that any advantage has ever been 
taken of this clause. If the person convicted of this offence is not able to pay 
the penalties within three months after judgment, he is to be transported for 
seven years, and if he returns before the expiration of that term, he is liable 
to the pains of felony, without benefit of clergy. The owner of the ship, 
knowing this offence, forfeits all his interest in the ship and furniture. The 
master and mariners, knowing this offence, forfeit all their goods and 
chattels, and suffer three months' imprisonment. By a subsequent statute the 
master suffers six months' imprisonment. 
    In order to prevent exportation, the whole inland commerce of wool is 
laid under very burdensome and oppressive restrictions. It cannot be packed 
in any box, barrel, cask, case, chest, or any other package, but only in packs 
of leather or pack-cloth, on which must be marked on the outside the words 
wool or yam, in large letters not less than three inches long, on pain of 
forfeiting the same and the package, and three shillings for every pound 
weight, to be paid by the owner or packer. It cannot be loaden on any horse 
or cart, or carried by land within five miles of the coast, but between sun-
rising and sun-setting, on pain of forfeiting the same, the horses and 
carriages. The hundred next adjoining to the sea-coast, out of or through 
which the wool is carried or exported, forfeits twenty pounds, if the wool is 
under the value of ten pounds; and if of greater value, then treble that value, 
together with treble costs, to be sued for within the year. The execution to 
be against any two of the inhabitants, whom the sessions must reimburse, 
by an assessment on the other inhabitants, as in the cases of robbery. And if 
any person compounds with the hundred for less than this penalty, he is to 
be imprisoned for five years; and any other person may prosecute. These 
regulations take place through the whole kingdom. 
    But in the particular counties of Kent and Sussex, the restrictions are still 
more troublesome. Every owner of wool within ten miles of the sea-coast 
must given an account in writing, three days after shearing to the next 
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officer of the customs, of the number of his fleeces, and of the places where 
they are lodged. And before he removes any part of them he must give the 
like notice of the number and weight of the fleeces, and of the name and 
abode of the person to whom they are sold, and of the place to which it is 
intended they should be carried. No person within fifteen miles of the sea, 
in the said counties, can buy any wool before he enters into bond to the king 
that no part of the wool which he shall so buy shall be sold by him to any 
other person within fifteen miles of the sea. If any wool is found carrying 
towards the sea-side in the said counties, unless it has been entered and 
security given as aforesaid, it is forfeited, and the offender also forfeits three 
shillings for every pound weight. If any person lays any wool not entered as 
aforesaid within fifteen miles of the sea, it must be seized and forfeited; and 
if, after such seizure, any person claim the same, he must give security to 
the Exchequer that if he is cast upon trial he shall pay treble costs, besides 
all other penalties. 
    When such restrictions are imposed upon the inland trade, the coasting 
trade, we may believe, cannot be left very free. Every owner of wool who 
carries or causes to be carried any wool to any port or place on the seacoast, 
in order to be from thence transported by sea to any other place or port on 
the coast, must first cause an entry thereof to be made at the port from 
whence it is intended to be conveyed, containing the weight, marks, and 
number of the packages, before he brings the same within five miles of that 
port, on pain of forfeiting the same, and also the horses, carts, and other 
carriages; and also of suffering and forfeiting as by the other laws in force 
against the exportation of wool. This law, however (1st William III, c. 32), 
is so very indulgent as to declare that, "This shall not hinder any person 
from carrying his wool home from the place of shearing, though it be within 
five miles of the sea, provided that in ten days after shearing, and before he 
remove the wool, he do under his hand certify to the next officer of the 
customs, the true number of fleeces, and where it is housed; and do not 
remove the same, without certifying to such officer, under his hand, his 
intention so to do, three days before." Bond must be given that the wool to 
be carried coastways is to be landed at the particular port for which it is 
entered outwards; and if any part of it is landed without the presence of an 
officer, not only the forfeiture of the wool is incurred as in other goods, but 
the usual additional penalty of three shillings for every pound weight is 
likewise incurred. 
    Our woollen manufactures, in order to justify their demand of such 
extraordinary restrictions and regulations, confidently asserted that English 
wool was of a peculiar quality, superior to that of any other country; that the 
wool of other countries could not, without some mixture of it, be wrought 
up into any tolerable manufacture; that fine cloth could not be made without 
it; that England, therefore, if the exportation of it could be totally prevented, 
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could monopolize to herself almost the whole woollen trade of the world; 
and thus, having no rivals, could sell at what price she pleased, and in a 
short time acquire the most incredible degree of wealth by the most 
advantageous balance of trade. This doctrine, like most other doctrines 
which are confidently asserted by any considerable number of people, was, 
and still continues to be, most implicitly believed by a much greater 
number- by almost all those who are either unacquainted with the woollen 
trade, or who have not made particular inquiries. It is, however, so perfectly 
false that English wool is in any respect necessary for the making of fine 
cloth that it is altogether unfit for it. Fine cloth is made altogether of 
Spanish wool. English wool cannot be even so mixed with Spanish wool as 
to enter into the composition without spoiling and degrading, in some 
degree, the fabric of the cloth. 
    It has been shown in the foregoing part of this work that the effect of 
these regulations has been to depress the price of English wool, not only 
below what it naturally would be in the present times, but very much below 
what it actually was in the time of Edward III. The price of Scots wool, 
when in consequence of the union it became subject to the same regulations, 
is said to have fallen about one half. It is observed by the very accurate and 
intelligent author of the Memoirs of Wool, the Reverend Mr. John Smith, 
that the price of the best English wool in England is generally below what 
wool of a very inferior quality commonly sells for in the market of 
Amsterdam. To depress the price of this commodity below what may be 
called its natural and proper price was the avowed purpose of those 
regulations; and there seems to be no doubt of their having produced the 
effect that was expected from them. 
    This reduction of price, it may perhaps be thought, by discouraging the 
growing of wool, must have reduced very much the annual produce of that 
commodity, though not below what it formerly was, yet below what, in the 
present state of things, it probably would have been, had it, in consequence 
of an open and free market, been allowed to rise to the natural and proper 
price. I am, however, disposed to believe that the quantity of the annual 
produce cannot have been much, though it may perhaps have been a little, 
affected by these regulations. The growing of wool is not the chief purpose 
for which the sheep farmer employs his industry and stock. He expects his 
profit not so much from the price of the fleece as from that of the carcass; 
and the average or ordinary price of the latter must even, in many cases, 
make up to him whatever deficiency there may be in the average or ordinary 
price of the former. It has been observed in the foregoing part of this work 
that, "Whatever regulations tend to sink the price, either of wool or of raw 
hides, below what it naturally would be, must, in an improved and 
cultivated country, have some tendency to raise the price of butcher's meat. 
The price both of the great and small cattle which are fed on improved and 
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cultivated land must be sufficient to pay the rent which the landlord, and the 
profit which the farmer has reason to expect from improved and cultivated 
land. If it is not, they will soon cease to feed them. Whatever part of this 
price, therefore, is not paid by the wool and the hide must be paid by the 
carcass. The less there is paid for the one, the more must be paid for the 
other. In what manner this price is to be divided upon the different parts of 
the beast is indifferent to the landlords and farmers, provided it is all paid to 
them. In an improved and cultivated country, therefore, their interest as 
landlords and farmers cannot be much affected by such regulations, though 
their interest as consumers may by the rise in the price of provisions." 
According to this reasoning, therefore, this degradation in the price of wool 
is not likely, in an improved and cultivated country, to occasion any 
diminution in the annual produce of that commodity, except so far as, by 
raising the price of mutton, it may somewhat diminish the demand for, and 
consequently the production of, that particular species of butcher's meat. Its 
effect, however, even in this way, it is probable, is not very considerable. 
    But though its effect upon the quantity of the annual produce may not 
have been very considerable, its effect upon the quality, it may perhaps be 
thought, must necessarily have been very great. The degradation in the 
quality of English wool, if not below what it was in former times, yet below 
what it naturally would have been in the present state of improvement and 
cultivation, must have been, it may perhaps be supposed, very nearly in 
proportion to the degradation of price. As the quality depends upon the 
breed, upon the pasture, and upon the management and cleanliness of the 
sheep, during the whole progress of the growth of the fleece, the attention to 
these circumstances, it may naturally enough be imagined, can never be 
greater than in proportion to the recompense which the price of the fleece is 
likely to make for the labour and expense which that attention requires. It 
happens, however, that the goodness of the fleece depends, in a great 
measure, upon the health, growth, and bulk of the animal; the same 
attention which is necessary for the improvement of the carcase is, in some 
respects, sufficient for that of the fleece. Notwithstanding the degradation of 
price, English wool is said to have been improved considerably during the 
course even of the present century. The improvement might perhaps have 
been greater if the price had been better; but the lowness of price, though it 
may have obstructed, yet certainly it has not altogether prevented that 
improvement. 
    The violence of these regulations, therefore, seems to have affected 
neither the quantity nor the quality of the annual produce of wool so much 
as it might have been expected to do (though I think it probable that it may 
have affected the latter a good deal more than the former); and the interest 
of the growers of wool, though it must have been hurt in some degree, 
seems, upon the whole, to have been much less hurt than could well have 
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been imagined. 
    These considerations, however, will not justify the absolute prohibition of 
the exportation of wool. But they will fully justify the imposition of a 
considerable tax upon that exportation. 
    To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens, for no 
other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to 
that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the 
different orders of his subjects. But the prohibition certainly hurts, in some 
degree, the interest of the growers of wool, for no other purpose but to 
promote that of the manufacturers. 
    Every different order of citizens is bound to contribute to the support of 
the sovereign or commonwealth. A tax of five, or even of ten shillings upon 
the exportation of every ton of wool would produce a very considerable 
revenue to the sovereign. It would hurt the interest of the growers somewhat 
less than the prohibition, because it would not probably lower the price of 
wool quite so much. It would afford a sufficient advantage to the 
manufacturer, because, though he might not buy his wool altogether so 
cheap as under the prohibition, he would still buy it, at least, five or ten 
shillings cheaper than any foreign manufacturer could buy it, besides saving 
the freight and insurance, which the other would be obliged to pay. It is 
scarce possible to devise a tax which could produce any considerable 
revenue to the sovereign, and at the same time occasion so little 
inconveniency to anybody. 
    The prohibition, notwithstanding all the penalties which guard it, does 
not prevent the exportation of wool. It is exported, it is well known, in great 
quantities. The great difference between the price in the home and that in 
the foreign market presents such a temptation to smuggling that all the 
rigour of the law cannot prevent it. This illegal exportation is advantageous 
to nobody but the smuggler. A legal exportation subject to a tax, by 
affording a revenue to the sovereign, and thereby saving the imposition of 
some other, perhaps, more burdensome and inconvenient taxes might prove 
advantageous to all the different subjects of the state. 
    The exportation of fuller's earth or fuller's clay, supposed to be necessary 
for preparing and cleansing the woolen manufactures, has been subjected to 
nearly the same penalties as the exportation of wool. Even tobacco-pipe 
clay, though acknowledged to be different from fuller's clay, yet, on account 
of their resemblance, and because fuller's clay might sometimes be exported 
as tobacco-pipe clay, has been laid under the same prohibitions and 
penalties. 
    By the 13th and 14th of Charles II, c. 7, the exportation, not only of raw 
hides, but of tanned leather, except in the shape of boots, shoes, or slippers, 
was prohibited; and the law gave a monopoly to our bootmakers and 
shoemakers, not only against our graziers, but against our tanners. By 
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subsequent statutes our tanners have got themselves exempted from this 
monopoly upon paying a small tax of only one shilling on the hundred-
weight of tanned leather, weighing one hundred and twelve pounds. They 
have obtained likewise the drawback of two-thirds of the excise duties 
imposed upon their commodity even when exported without further 
manufacture. All manufactures of leather may be exported duty free; and 
the exporter is besides entitled to the drawback of the whole duties of 
excise. Our graziers still continue subject to the old monopoly. Graziers 
separated from one another, and dispersed through all the different corners 
of the country, cannot, without great difficulty, combine together for the 
purpose either of imposing monopolies upon their fellow citizens, or of 
exempting themselves from such as may have been imposed upon them by 
other people. Manufacturers of all kinds, collected together in numerous 
bodies in all great cities, easily can. Even the horns of cattle are prohibited 
to be exported; and the two insignificant trades of the horner and 
combmaker enjoy, in this respect, a monopoly against the graziers. 
    Restraints, either by prohibitions or by taxes, upon the exportation of 
goods which are partially, but not completely manufactured, are not peculiar 
to the manufacture of leather. As long as anything remains to be done, in 
order to fit any commodity for immediate use and consumption, our 
manufacturers think that they themselves ought to have the doing of it. 
Woolen yarn and worsted are prohibited to be exported under the same 
penalties as wool. Even white cloths are subject to a duty upon exportation, 
and our dyers have so far obtained a monopoly against our clothiers. Our 
clothiers would probably have been able to defend themselves against it, but 
it happens that the greater part of our principal clothiers are themselves 
likewise dyers. Watch-cases, clockcases, and dial-plates for clocks and 
watches have been prohibited to be exported. Our clock-makers and watch-
makers are, it seems, unwilling that the price of this sort of workmanship 
should be raised upon them by the competition of foreigners. 
    By some old statutes of Edward M, Henry VIII, and Edward VI, the 
exportation of all metals was prohibited. Lead and tin were alone excepted 
probably on account of the great abundance of those metals, in the 
exportation of which a considerable part of the trade of the kingdom in 
those days consisted. For the encouragement of the mining trade, the 5th of 
William and Mary, c. 17, exempted from the prohibition iron, copper, and 
mundic metal made from British ore. The exportation of all sorts of copper 
bars, foreign as well as British, was afterwards permitted by the 9th and 
10th of William III, c. 26. The exportation of unmanufactured brass, of what 
is called gun-metal, bell-metal, and shroff-metal, still continues to be 
prohibited. Brass manufactures of all sorts may be exported duty free. 
    The exportation of the materials of manufacture, where it is not altogether 
prohibited, is in many cases subjected to considerable duties. 
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    By the 8th George I, c. 15, the exportation of all goods, the produce or 
manufacture of Great Britain, upon which any duties had been imposed by 
former statutes, was rendered duty free. The following goods, however, 
were excepted: alum, lead, lead ore, tin, tanned leather, copperas, coals, 
wool cards, white woolen cloths, lapis calaminaris, skins of all sorts, glue, 
coney hair or wool, hares' wool, hair of all sorts, horses, and litharge of 
lead. If you expect horses, all these are either materials of manufacture, or 
incomplete manufactures (which may be considered as materials for still 
further manufacture), or instruments of trade. This statute leaves them 
subject to all the old duties which had ever been imposed upon them, the 
old subsidy and one per cent outwards. 
    By the same statute a great number of foreign drugs for dyers' use are 
exempted from all duties upon importation. Each of them, however, is 
afterwards subjected to a certain duty, not indeed a very heavy one, upon 
exportation. Our dyers, it seems, while they thought it for their interest to 
encourage the importation of those drugs, by an exemption from all duties, 
thought it likewise for their interest to throw some small discouragement 
upon their exportation. The avidity, however, which suggested this notable 
piece of mercantile ingenuity, most probably disappointed itself of its 
object. It necessarily taught the importers to be more careful than they 
might otherwise have been that their importation should not exceed what 
was necessary for the supply of the home market. The home market was at 
all times likely to be more scantily supplied; the commodities were at all 
times likely to be somewhat dearer there than they would have been had the 
exportation been rendered as free as the importation. 
    By the above-mentioned statute, gum senega, or gum arabic, being 
among the enumerated dyeing drugs, might be imported duty free. They 
were subjected, indeed, to a small poundage duty, amounting only to 
threepence in the hundredweight upon their re-exportation. France enjoyed, 
at that time, an exclusive trade to the country most productive of those 
drugs, that which lies in the neighbourhood of the Senegal; and the British 
market could not easily be supplied by the immediate importation of them 
from the place of growth. By the 25th George II, therefore, gum senega was 
allowed to be imported (contrary to the general dispositions of the Act of 
Navigation) from any part of Europe. As the law, however, did not mean to 
encourage this species of trade, so contrary to the general principles of the 
mercantile policy of England, it imposed a duty of ten shillings the 
hundredweight upon such importation, and no part of this duty was to be 
afterwards drawn back upon its exportation. The successful war which 
began in 1755 gave Great Britain the same exclusive trade to those 
countries which France had enjoyed before. Our manufacturers, as soon as 
the peace was made, endeavoured to avail themselves of this advantage, and 
to establish a monopoly in their own favour both against the growers and 
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against the importers of this commodity. By the 5th George III, therefore, c. 
37, the exportation of gum senega from his Majesty's dominions in Africa 
was confined to Great Britain, and was subjected to all the same restrictions, 
regulations, forfeitures, and penalties as that of the enumerated commodities 
of the British colonies in America and the West Indies. Its importation, 
indeed, was subjected to a small duty of sixpence the hundredweight, but its 
re-exportation was subjected to the enormous duty of one pound ten 
shillings the hundredweight. It was the intention of our manufacturers that 
the whole produce of those countries should be imported into Great Britain, 
and, in order that they themselves might be enabled to buy it at their own 
price, that no part of it should be exported again but at such an expense as 
would sufficiently discourage that exportation. Their avidity, however, upon 
this, as well as upon many other occasions, disappointed itself of its object. 
This enormous duty presented such a temptation to smuggling that great 
quantities of this commodity were clandestinely exported, probably to all 
the manufacturing countries of Europe, put particularly to Holland, not only 
from Great Britain but from Africa. Upon this account, by the 14th George 
III, c. 10, this duty upon exportation was reduced to five shillings the 
hundredweight. 
    In the book of rates, according to which the Old Subsidy was levied, 
beaver skins were estimated at six shillings and eightpence a piece, and the 
different subsidies and imposts, which before the year 1722 had been laid 
upon their importation, amounted to one-fifth part of the rate, or to 
sixteenpence upon each skin; all of which, except half the Old Subsidy, 
amounting only to twopence, was drawn back upon exportation. This duty 
upon the importation of so important a material of manufacture had been 
thought too high, and in the year 1722 the rate was reduced to two shillings 
and sixpence, which reduced the duty upon importation to sixpence, and of 
this only one half was to be drawn back upon exportation. The same 
successful war put the country most productive of beaver under the 
dominion of Great Britain, and beaver skins being among the enumerated 
commodities, their exportation from America was consequently confined to 
the market of Great Britain. Our manufacturers soon bethought themselves 
of the advantage which they might make of this circumstance, and in the 
year 1764 the duty upon the importation of beaver-skin was reduced to one 
penny, but the duty upon exportation was raised to sevenpence each skin, 
without any drawback of the duty upon importation. By the same law, a 
duty of eighteenpence the pound was imposed upon the exportation of 
beaverwool or wombs, without making any alteration in the duty upon the 
importation of that commodity, which, when imported by Britain and in 
British shipping, amounted at that time to between fourpence and fivepence 
the piece. 
    Coals may be considered both as a material of manufacture and as an 
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instrument of trade. Heavy duties, accordingly, have been imposed upon 
their exportation, amounting at present (1783) to more than five shillings 
the ton, or to more than fifteen shillings the chaldron, Newcastle measures, 
which is in most cases more than the original value of the commodity at the 
coal pit, or even at the shipping port for exportation. 
    The exportation, however, of the instruments of trade, properly so called, 
is commonly restrained, not by high duties, but by absolute prohibitions. 
Thus by the 7th and 8th of William III, c. 20, sect. 8, the exportation of 
frames or engines for knitting gloves or stockings is prohibited under the 
penalty, not only of the forfeiture of such frames or engines so exported, or 
attempted to be exported, but of forty pounds, one half to the king, the other 
to the person who shall inform or sue for the same. In the same manner, by 
the 14th George III, c. 71, the exportation to foreign parts of any utensils 
made use of in the cotton, linen, woollen, and silk manufactures is 
prohibited under the penalty, not only of the forfeiture of such utensils, but 
of two hundred pounds, to be paid by the person who shall offend in this 
manner, and likewise of two hundred pounds to be paid by the master of the 
ship who shall knowingly suffer such utensils to be loaded on board his 
ship. 
    When such heavy penalties were imposed upon the exportation of the 
dead instruments of trade, it could not well be expected that the living 
instrument, the artificer, should be allowed to go free. Accordingly, by the 
5th George I, c. 27, the person who shall be convicted of enticing any 
artificer of, or in any of the manufactures of Great Britain, to go into any 
foreign parts in order to practise or teach his trade, is liable for the first 
offence to be fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred pounds, and to 
three months' imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid; and for the 
second offence, to be fined in any sum at the discretion of the court, and to 
imprisonment for twelve months, and until the fine shall be paid. By the 
23rd George II, c. 13, this penalty is increased for the first offence to five 
hundred pounds for every artificer so enticed, and to twelve months' 
imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid; and for the second offence, to 
one thousand pounds, and to two years' imprisonment, and until the fine 
shall be paid. 
    By the former of those two statutes, upon proof that any person has been 
enticing any artificer, or that any artificer has promised or contracted to go 
into foreign parts for the purposes aforesaid, such artificer may be obliged 
to give security at the discretion of the court that he shall not go beyond the 
seas, and may be committed to prison until he give such security. 
    If any artificer has gone beyond the seas, and is exercising or teaching his 
trade in any foreign country, upon warning being given to him by any of his 
Majesty's ministers or consuls abroad, or by one of his Majesty's Secretaries 
of State for the time being, if he does not, within six months after such 
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warning, return into this realm, and from thenceforth abide and inhabit 
continually within the same, he is from thenceforth declared incapable of 
taking any legacy devised to him within this kingdom, or of being executor 
or administrator to any person, or of taking any lands within this kingdom 
by descent, device, or purchase. He likewise forfeits to the king all his 
lands, goods, and chattels, is declared an alien in every respect, and is put 
out of the king's protection. 
    It is unnecessary, I imagine, to observe how contrary such regulations are 
to the boasted liberty of the subject, of which we affect to be so very 
jealous; but which, in this case, is so plainly sacrificed to the futile interests 
of our merchants and manufacturers. 
    The laudable motive of all these regulations is to extend our own 
manufactures, not by their own improvement, but by the depression of those 
of all our neighbours, and by putting an end, as much as possible, to the 
troublesome competition of such odious and disagreeable rivals. Our master 
manufacturers think it reasonable that they themselves should have the 
monopoly of the ingenuity of all their countrymen. Though by restraining, 
in some trades, the number of apprentices which can be employed at one 
time, and by imposing the necessity of a long apprenticeship in all trades, 
they endeavour, all of them, to confine the knowledge of their respective 
employments to as small a number as possible; they are unwilling, however, 
that any part of this small number should go abroad to instruct foreigners. 
    Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the 
interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be 
necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly 
self evident that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the 
mercantile system the interest of the consumer is almost constantly 
sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider production, and 
not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry and 
commerce. 
    In the restraints upon the importation of all foreign commodities which 
can come into competition with those of our own growth or manufacture, 
the interest of the home consumer is evidently sacrificed to that of the 
producer. It is altogether for the benefit of the latter that the former is 
obliged to pay that enhancement of price which this monopoly almost 
always occasions. 
    It is altogether for the benefit of the producer that bounties are granted 
upon the exportation of some of his productions. The home consumer is 
obliged to pay, first, the tax which is necessary for paying the bounty, and 
secondly, the still greater tax which necessarily arises from the 
enhancement of the price of the commodity in the home market. 
    By the famous treaty of commerce with Portugal, the consumer is 
prevented by high duties from purchasing of a neighbouring country a 
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commodity which our own climate does not produce, but is obliged to 
purchase it of a distant country, though it is acknowledged that the 
commodity of the distant country is of a worse quality than that of the near 
one. The home consumer is obliged to submit to this inconveniency in order 
that the producer may import into the distant country some of his 
productions upon more advantageous terms than he would otherwise have 
been allowed to do. The consumer, too, is obliged to pay whatever 
enhancement in the price if those very productions this forced exportation 
may occasion in the home market. 
    But in the system of laws which has been established for the management 
of our American and West Indian colonies, the interest of the home 
consumer has been sacrificed to that of the producer with a more 
extravagant profusion than in all our other commercial regulations. A great 
empire has been established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation of 
customers who should be obliged to buy from the shops of our different 
producers all the goods with which these could supply them. For the sake of 
that little enhancement of price which this monopoly might afford our 
producers, the home consumers have been burdened with the whole expense 
of maintaining and defending that empire. For this purpose, and for this 
purpose only, in the two last wars, more than two hundred millions have 
been spent, and a new debt of more than a hundred and seventy millions has 
been contracted over and above all that had been expended for the same 
purpose in former wars. The interest of this debt alone is not only greater 
than the whole extraordinary profit which it ever could be pretended was 
made by the monopoly of the colony trade, but than the whole value of that 
trade, or than the whole value of the goods which at an average have been 
annually exported to the colonies. 
    It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of 
this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose 
interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has 
been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class our merchants and 
manufacturers have been by far the principal architects. In the mercantile 
regulations, which have been taken notice of in this chapter, the interest of 
our manufacturers has been most peculiarly attended to; and the interest, not 
so much of the consumers, as that of some other sets of producers, has been 
sacrificed to it. 
CHAPTER IX
Of the Agricultural Systems, or of those Systems of Political Economy 
which represent the Produce of Land as either the sole or the principal 
Source of the Revenue and Wealth every Country
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THE agricultural systems of political economy will not require so long an 
explanation as that which I have thought it necessary to bestow upon the 
mercantile or commercial system. 
    That system which represents the produce of land as the sole source of 
the revenue and wealth of every country has, so far as I know, never been 
adopted by any nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations of a 
few men of great learning and ingenuity in France. It would not, surely, be 
worth while to examine at great length the errors of a system which never 
has done, and probably never will do, any harm in any part of the world. I 
shall endeavour to explain, however, as distinctly as I can, the great outlines 
of this very ingenious system. 
    Mr. Colbert, the famous minister of Louis XIV, was a man of probity, of 
great industry and knowledge of detail, of great experience and acuteness in 
the examination of public accounts, and of abilities, in short, every way 
fitted for introducing method and good order into the collection and 
expenditure of the public revenue. That minister had unfortunately 
embraced all the prejudices of the mercantile system, in its nature and 
essence a system of restraint and regulation, and such as could scarce fail to 
be agreeable to a laborious and plodding man of business, who had been 
accustomed to regulate the different departments of public offices, and to 
establish the necessary checks and controls for confining each to its proper 
sphere. The industry and commerce of a great country he endeavoured to 
regulate upon the same model as the departments of a public office; and 
instead of allowing every man to pursue his own interest in his own way, 
upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice, he bestowed upon 
certain branches of industry extraordinary privileges, while he laid others 
under as extraordinary restraints. He was not only disposed, like other 
European ministers, to encourage more the industry of the towns than that 
of the country; but, in order to support the industry of the towns, he was 
willing even to depress and keep down that of the country. In order to 
render provisions cheap to the inhabitants of the towns, and thereby to 
encourage manufactures and foreign commerce, he prohibited altogether the 
exportation of corn, and thus excluded the inhabitants of the country from 
every foreign market for by far the most important part of the produce of 
their industry. This prohibition, joined to the restraints imposed by the 
ancient provincial laws of France upon the transportation of corn from one 
province to another, and to the arbitrary and degrading taxes which are 
levied upon the cultivators in almost all the provinces, discouraged and kept 
down the agriculture of that country very much below the state to which it 
would naturally have risen in so very fertile a soil and so very happy a 
climate. This state of discouragement and depression was felt more or less 
in every different part of the country, and many different inquiries were set 
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on foot concerning the causes of it. One of those causes appeared to be the 
preference given, by the institutions of Mr. Colbert, to the industry of the 
towns above that of the country. 
    If the rod be bent too much one way, says the proverb, in order to make it 
straight you must bend it as much the other. The French philosophers, who 
have proposed the system which represents agriculture as the sole source of 
the revenue and wealth of every country, seem to have adopted this 
proverbial maxim; and as in the plan of Mr. Colbert the industry of the 
towns was certainly overvalued in comparison with that of the country; so 
in their system it seems to be as certainly undervalued. 
    The different orders of people who have ever been supposed to contribute 
in any respect towards the annual produce of the land and labour of the 
country, they divide into three classes. The first is the class of the 
proprietors of land. The second is the class of the cultivators, of farmers and 
country labourers, whom they honour with the peculiar appellation of the 
productive class. The third is the class of artificers, manufacturers, and 
merchants, whom they endeavour to degrade by the humiliating appellation 
of the barren or unproductive class. 
    The class of proprietors contributes to the annual produce by the expense 
which they may occasionally lay out upon the improvement of the land, 
upon the buildings, drains, enclosures, and other ameliorations, which they 
may either make or maintain upon it, and by means of which the cultivators 
are enabled, with the same capital, to raise a greater produce, and 
consequently to pay a greater rent. This advanced rent may be considered as 
the interest or profit due to the proprietor upon the expense or capital which 
he thus employs in the improvement of his land. Such expenses are in this 
system called ground expenses (depenses foncieres.) 
    The cultivators or farmers contribute to the annual produce by what are in 
this system called the original and annual expenses (depenses primitives et 
depenses annuelles) which they lay out upon the cultivation of the land. The 
original expenses consist in the instruments of husbandry, in the stock of 
cattle, in the seed, and in the maintenance of the farmer's family, servants, 
and cattle during at least a great part of the first year of his occupancy, or 
till he can receive some return from the land. The annual expenses consist in 
the seed, in the wear and tear of the instruments of husbandry, and in the 
annual maintenance of the farmer's servants and cattle, and of his family 
too, so far as any part of them can be considered as servants employed in 
cultivation. That part of the produce of the land which remains to him after 
paying the rent ought to be sufficient, first, to replace to him within a 
reasonable time, at least during the term of his occupancy, the whole of his 
original expenses, together with the ordinary profits of stock; and, secondly, 
to replace to him annually the whole of his annual expenses, together 
likewise with the ordering profits of stock. Those two sorts of expenses are 
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two capitals which the farmer employs in cultivation; and unless they are 
regularly restored to him, together with a reasonable profit, he cannot carry 
on his employment upon a level with other employments; but, from a regard 
to his own interest, must desert it as soon as possible and seek some other. 
That part of the produce of the land which is thus necessary for enabling the 
farmer to continue his business ought to be considered as a fund sacred to 
cultivation, which, if the landlord violates, he necessarily reduces the 
produce of his own land, and in a few years not only disables the farmer 
from paying this racked rent, but from paying the reasonable rent which he 
might otherwise have got for his land. The rent which properly belongs to 
the landlord is no more than the net produce which remains after paying in 
the completest manner all the necessary expenses which must be previously 
laid out in order to raise the gross or the whole produce. It is because the 
labour of the cultivators, over and above paying completely all those 
necessary expenses, affords a net produce of this kind that this class of 
people are in this system peculiarly distinguished by the honourable 
appellation of the productive class. Their original and annual expenses are 
for the same reason called, in this system, productive expenses, because, 
over and above replacing their own value, they occasion the annual 
reproduction of this net produce. 
    The ground expenses, as they are called, or what the landlord lays out 
upon the improvement of his land, are in this system, too, honoured with the 
appellation of productive expenses. Till the whole of those expenses, 
together with the ordinary profits of stock, have been completely repaid to 
him by the advanced rent which he gets from his land, that advanced rent 
ought to be regarded as sacred and inviolable, both by the church and by the 
king; ought to be subject neither to tithe nor to taxation. If it is otherwise, by 
discouraging the improvement of land the church discourages the future 
increase of her own tithes, and the king the future increase of his own taxes. 
As in a well-ordered state of things, therefore, those ground expenses, over 
and above reproducing in the completest manner their own value, occasion 
likewise after a certain time a reproduction of a net produce, they are in this 
system considered as productive expenses. 
    The ground expenses of the landlord, however, together with the original 
and the annual expenses of the farmer, are the only three sorts of expenses 
which in this system are considered as productive. All other expenses and 
all other orders of people, even those who in the common apprehensions of 
men are regarded as the most productive, are in this account of things 
represented as altogether barren and unproductive. 
    Artificers and manufacturers in particular, whose industry, in the 
common apprehensions of men, increases so much the value of the rude 
produce of land, are in this system represented as a class of people 
altogether barren and unproductive. Their labour, it is said, replaces only the 
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stock which employs them, together with its ordinary profits. That stock 
consists in the materials, tools, and wages advanced to them by their 
employer; and is the fund destined for their employment and maintenance. 
Its profits are the fund destined for the maintenance of their employer. Their 
employer, as he advances to them the stock of materials, tools, and wages 
necessary for their employment, so he advances to himself what is 
necessary for his own maintenance, and this maintenance he generally 
proportions to the profit which he expects to make by the price of their 
work. Unless its price repays to him the maintenance which he advances to 
himself, as well as the materials, tools, and wages which he advances to his 
workmen, it evidently does not repay to him the whole expense which he 
lays out upon it. The profits of manufacturing stock therefore are not, like 
the rent of land, a net produce which remains after completely repaying the 
whole expense which must be laid out in order to obtain them. The stock of 
the farmer yields him a profit as well as that of the master manufacturer; 
and it yields a rent likewise to another person, which that of the master 
manufacturer does not. The expense, therefore, laid out in employing and 
maintaining artificers and manufacturers does no more than continue, if one 
may say so, the existence of its own value, and does not produce any new 
value. It is therefore altogether a barren and unproductive expense. The 
expense, on the contrary, laid out in employing farmers and country 
labourers, over and above continuing the existence of its own value, 
produces a new value, the rent of the landlord. It is therefore a productive 
expense. 
    Mercantile stock is equally barren and unproductive with manufacturing 
stock. It only continues the existence of its own value, without producing 
any new value. Its profits are only the repayment of the maintenance which 
its employer advances to himself during the time that he employs it, or till 
he receives the returns of it. They are only the repayment of a part of the 
expense which must be laid out in employing it. 
    The labour of artificers and manufacturers never adds anything to the 
value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land. It adds, 
indeed, greatly to the value of some particular parts of it. But the 
consumption which in the meantime it occasions of other parts is precisely 
equal to the value which it adds to those parts; so that the value of the whole 
amount is not, at any one moment of time, in the least augmented by it. The 
person who works the lace of a pair of fine ruffles, for example, will 
sometimes raise the value of perhaps a pennyworth of flax to thirty pounds 
sterling. But though at first sight he appears thereby to multiply the value of 
a part of the rude produce about seven thousand and two hundred times, he 
in reality adds nothing to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude 
produce. The working of that lace costs him perhaps two years' labour. The 
thirty pounds which he gets for it when it is finished is no more than the 
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repayment of the subsistence which he advances to himself during the two 
years that he is employed about it. The value which, by every day's, 
month's, or year's labour, he adds to the flax does no more than replace the 
value of his own consumption during that day, month, or year. At no 
moment of time, therefore, does he add anything to the value of the whole 
annual amount of the rude produce of the land: the portion of that produce 
which he is continually consuming being always equal to the value which 
he is continually producing. The extreme poverty of the greater part of the 
persons employed in this expensive though trifling manufacture may satisfy 
us that the price of their work does not in ordinary cases exceed the value of 
their subsistence. It is otherwise with the work of farmers and country 
labourers. The rent of the landlord is a value which, in ordinary cases, it is 
continually producing, over and above replacing, in the most complete 
manner, the whole consumption, the whole expense laid out upon the 
employment and maintenance both of the workmen and of their employer. 
    Artificers, manufacturers, and merchants can augment the revenue and 
wealth of their society by parsimony only; or, as it in this system, by 
privation, that is, by depriving themselves a part of the funds destined for 
their own subsistence. They annually reproduce nothing but those funds. 
Unless, therefore, they annually save some part of them, unless they 
annually deprive themselves of the enjoyment of some part of them, the 
revenue and wealth of their society can never be in the smallest degree 
augmented by means of their industry. Farmers and country labourers, on 
the contrary, may enjoy completely the whole funds destined for their own 
subsistence, and yet augment at the same time the revenue and wealth of 
their society. Over and above what is destined for their own subsistence, 
their industry annually affords a net produce, of which the augmentation 
necessarily augments the revenue and wealth of their society. Nations 
therefore which, like France or England, consist in a great measure of 
proprietors and cultivators can be enriched by industry and enjoyment. 
Nations, on the contrary, which, like Holland and Hamburg, are composed 
chiefly of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers can grow rich only 
through parsimony and privation. As the interest of nations so differently 
circumstanced is very different, so is likewise the common character of the 
people: in those of the former kind, liberality, frankness and good 
fellowship naturally make a part of that common character: in the latter, 
narrowness, meanness, and a selfish disposition, averse to all social pleasure 
and enjoyment. 
    The unproductive class, that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, 
is maintained and employed altogether at the expense of the two other 
classes, of that of proprietors, and of that of cultivators. They furnish it both 
with the materials of its work and with the fund of its subsistence, with the 
corn and cattle which it consumes while it is employed about that work. The 
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proprietors and cultivators finally pay both the wages of all the workmen of 
the unproductive class, and of the profits of all their employers. Those 
workmen and their employers are properly the servants of the proprietors 
and cultivators. They are only servants who work without doors, as menial 
servants work within. Both the one and the other, however, are equally 
maintained at the expense of the same masters. The labour of both is equally 
unproductive. It adds nothing to the value of the sum total of the rude 
produce of the land. Instead of increasing the value of that sum total, it is a 
charge and expense which must be paid out of it. 
    The unproductive class, however, is not only useful, but greatly useful to 
the other two classes. By means of the industry of merchants, artificers, and 
manufacturers, the proprietors and cultivators can purchase both the foreign 
goods and the manufactured produce of their own country which they have 
occasion for with the produce of a much smaller quantity of their own 
labour than what they would be obliged to employ if they were to attempt, 
in an awkward and unskilful manner, either to import the one or to make the 
other for their own use. By means of the unproductive class, the cultivators 
are delivered from many cares which would otherwise distract their 
attention from the cultivation of land. The superiority of produce, which, in 
consequence of this undivided attention, they are enabled to raise, is fully 
sufficient to pay the whole expense which the maintenance and employment 
of the unproductive class costs either the proprietors or themselves. The 
industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, though in its own 
nature altogether unproductive, yet contributes in this manner indirectly to 
increase the produce of the land. It increases the productive powers of 
productive labour by leaving it at liberty to confine itself to its proper 
employment, the cultivation of land; and the plough goes frequently the 
easier and the better by means of the labour of the man whose business is 
most remote from the plough. 
    It can never be the interest of the proprietors and cultivators to restrain or 
to discourage in any respect the industry of merchants, artificers, and 
manufacturers. The greater the liberty which this unproductive class enjoys, 
the greater will be the competition in all the different trades which compose 
it, and the cheaper will the other two classes be supplied, both with foreign 
goods and with the manufactured produce of their own country. 
    It can never be the interest of the unproductive class to oppress the other 
two classes. It is the surplus produce of the land, or what remains after 
deducting the maintenance, first, of the cultivators, and afterwards of the 
proprietors, that maintains and employs the unproductive class. The greater 
this surplus the greater must likewise be the maintenance and employment 
of that class. The establishment of perfect justice, of perfect liberty, and of 
perfect equality is the very simple secret which most effectually secures the 
highest degree of prosperity to all the three classes. 
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    The merchants, artificers, and manufacturers of those mercantile states 
which, like Holland and Hamburg, consist chiefly of this unproductive 
class, are in the same manner maintained and employed altogether at the 
expense of the proprietors and cultivators of land. The only difference is, 
that those proprietors and cultivators are, the greater part of them, placed at 
a most inconvenient distance from the merchants, artificers, and 
manufacturers whom they supply with the materials of their work and the 
fund of their subsistences- the inhabitants of other countries and the subjects 
of other governments. 
    Such mercantile states, however, are not only useful, but greatly useful to 
the inhabitants of those other countries. They fill up, in some measure, a 
very important void, and supply the place of the merchants, artificers, and 
manufacturers whom the inhabitants of those countries ought to find at 
home, but whom, from some defect in their policy, they do not find at 
home. 
    It can never be the interest of those landed nations, if I may call them so, 
to discourage or distress the industry of such mercantile states by imposing 
high duties upon their trade or upon the commodities which they furnish. 
Such duties, by rendering those commodities dearer, could serve only to 
sink the real value of the surplus produce of their own land, with which, or, 
what comes to the same thing, with the price of which those commodities 
are purchased. Such duties could serve only to discourage the increase of 
that surplus produce, and consequently the improvement and cultivation of 
their own land. The most effectual expedient, on the contrary, for raising the 
value of that surplus produce, for encouraging its increase, and 
consequently the improvement and cultivation of their own land would be 
to allow the most perfect freedom to the trade of all such mercantile nations. 
    This perfect freedom of trade would even be the most effectual expedient 
for supplying them, in due time, with all the artificers, manufacturers, and 
merchants whom they wanted at home, and for filling up in the properest 
and most advantageous manner that very important void which they felt 
there. 
    The continual increase of the surplus produce of their land would, in due 
time, create a greater capital than what could be employed with the ordinary 
rate of profit in the improvement and cultivation of land; and the surplus 
part of it would naturally turn itself to the employment of artificers and 
manufacturers at home. But those artificers and manufacturers, finding at 
home both the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence, 
might immediately even with much less art and skill be able to work as 
cheap as the like artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states who 
had both to bring from a great distance. Even though, from want of art and 
skill, they might not for some time be able to work as cheap, yet, finding a 
market at home, they might be able to sell their work there as cheap as that 
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of the artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, which could 
not be brought to that market but from so great a distance; and as their art 
and skill improved, they would soon be able to sell it cheaper. The artificers 
and manufacturers of such mercantile states, therefore, would immediately 
be rivalled in the market of those landed nations, and soon after undersold 
and jostled out of it altogether. The cheapness of the manufactures of those 
landed nations, in consequence of the gradual improvements of art and skill, 
would, in due time, extend their sale beyond the home market, and carry 
them to many foreign markets, from which they would in the same manner 
gradually jostle out many of the manufacturers of such mercantile nations. 
    This continual increase both of the rude and manufactured produce of 
those landed nations would in due time create a greater capital than could, 
with the ordinary rate of profit, be employed either in agriculture or in 
manufactures. The surplus of this capital would naturally turn itself to 
foreign trade, and be employed in exporting to foreign countries such parts 
of the rude and manufactured produce of its own country as exceeded the 
demand of the home market. In the exportation of the produce of their own 
country, the merchants of a landed nation would have an advantage of the 
same kind over those of mercantile nations which its artificers and 
manufacturers had over the artificers and manufacturers of such nations; the 
advantage of finding at home that cargo and those stores and provisions 
which the others were obliged to seek for at a distance. With inferior art and 
skill in navigation, therefore, they would be able to sell that cargo as cheap 
in foreign markets as the merchants of such mercantile nations; and with 
equal art and skill they would be able to sell it cheaper. They would soon, 
therefore, rival those mercantile nations in this branch of foreign trade, and 
in due time would jostle them out of it altogether. 
    According to this liberal and generous system, therefore, the most 
advantageous method in which a landed nation can raise up artificers, 
manufacturers, and merchants of its own is to grant the most perfect 
freedom of trade to the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of all other 
nations. It thereby raises the value of the surplus produce of its own land, of 
which the continual increase gradually establishes a fund, which in due time 
necessarily raises up all the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants whom 
it has occasion for. 
    When a landed nation, on the contrary, oppresses either by high duties or 
by prohibitions the trade of foreign nations, it necessarily hurts its own 
interest in two different ways. First, by raising the price of all foreign goods 
and of all sorts of manufactures, it necessarily sinks the real value of the 
surplus produce of its own land, with which, or, what comes to the same 
thing, with the price of which it purchases those foreign goods and 
manufactures. Secondly, by giving a sort of monopoly of the home market 
to its own merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, it raises the rate of 
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mercantile and manufacturing profit in proportion to that of agricultural 
profit, and consequently either draws from agriculture a part of the capital 
which had before been employed in it, or hinders from going to it a part of 
what would otherwise have gone to it. This policy, therefore, discourages 
agriculture in two different ways; first, by sinking the real value of its 
produce, and thereby lowering the rate of its profit; and, secondly, by 
raising the rate of profit in all other employments. Agriculture is rendered 
less advantageous, and trade and manufactures more advantageous than 
they otherwise would be; and every man is tempted by his own interest to 
turn, as much as he can, both his capital and his industry from the former to 
the latter employments. 
    Though, by this oppressive policy, a landed nation should be able to raise 
up artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of its own somewhat sooner 
than it could do by the freedom of trade a matter, however, which is not a 
little doubtful- yet it would raise them up, if one may say so, prematurely, 
and before it was perfectly ripe for them. By raising up too hastily one 
species of industry, it would depress another more valuable species of 
industry. By raising up too hastily a species of industry which only replaces 
the stock which employs it, together with the ordinary profit, it would 
depress a species of industry which, over and above replacing that stock 
with its profit, affords likewise a net produce, a free rent to the landlord. It 
would depress productive labour, by encouraging too hastily that labour 
which is altogether barren and unproductive. 
    In what manner, according to this system, the sum total of the annual 
produce of the land is distributed among the three classes above mentioned, 
and in what manner the labour of the unproductive class does no more than 
replace the value of its own consumption, without increasing in any respect 
the value of that sum total, is represented by Mr. Quesnai, the very 
ingenious and profound author of this system, in some arithmetical 
formularies. The first of these formularies, which by way of eminence he 
peculiarly distinguishes by the name of the Economical Table, represents 
the manner in which he supposes the distribution takes place in a state of the 
most perfect liberty and therefore of the highest prosperity- in a state where 
the annual produce is such as to afford the greatest possible net produce, 
and where each class enjoys its proper share of the whole annual produce. 
Some subsequent formularies represent the manner in which he supposes 
this distribution is made in different states of restraint and regulation; in 
which either the class of proprietors or the barren and unproductive class is 
more favoured than the class of cultivators, and in which either the one or 
the other encroaches more or less upon the share which ought properly to 
belong to this productive class. Every such encroachment, every violation of 
that natural distribution, which the most perfect liberty would establish, 
must, according to this system, necessarily degrade more or less, from one 
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year to another, the value and sum total of the annual produce, and must 
necessarily occasion a gradual declension in the real wealth and revenue of 
the society; a declension of which the progress must be quicker or slower, 
according to the degree of this encroachment, according as that natural 
distribution which the most perfect liberty would establish is more or less 
violated. Those subsequent formularies represent the different degrees of 
declension which, according to this system, correspond to the different 
degrees in which this natural distribution is violated. 
    Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the 
human body could be preserved only by a certain precise regimen of diet 
and exercise, of which every, the smallest, violation necessarily occasioned 
some degree of disease or disorder proportioned to the degree of the 
violation. Experience, however, would seem to show that the human body 
frequently preserves, to all appearances at least, the most perfect state of 
health under a vast variety of different regimens; even under some which 
are generally believed to be very far from being perfectly wholesome. But 
the healthful state of the human body, it would seem, contains in itself some 
unknown principle of preservation, capable either of preventing or of 
correcting, in many respects, the bad effects even of a very faulty regimen. 
Mr. Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very speculative 
physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same kind concerning 
the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive and prosper 
only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty 
and perfect justice. He seems not to have considered that, in the political 
body, the natural effort which every man is continually making to better his 
own condition is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and 
correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political economy, in some 
degree, both partial and oppressive. Such a political economy, though it no 
doubt retards more or less, is not always capable of stopping altogether the 
natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity, and still less of 
making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper without the 
enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a 
nation which could ever have prospered. In the political body, however, the 
wisdom of nature has fortunately made ample provision for remedying 
many of the bad effects of the folly and injustice of man, in the same 
manner as it has done in the natural body for remedying those of his sloth 
and intemperance. 
    The capital error of this system, however, seems to lie in its representing 
the class of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants as altogether barren 
and unproductive. The following observations may serve to show the 
impropriety of this representation. 
    First, this class, it is acknowledged, reproduces annually the value of its 
own annual consumption, and continues, at least, the existence of the stock 
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or capital which maintains and employs it. But upon this account alone the 
denomination of barren or unproductive should seem to be very improperly 
applied to it. We should not call a marriage barren or unproductive though it 
produced only a son and a daughter, to replace the father and mother, and 
though it did not increase the number of the human species, but only 
continued it as it was before. Farmers and country labourers, indeed, over 
and above the stock which maintains and employs them, reproduce annually 
a net produce, a free rent to the landlord. As a marriage which affords three 
children is certainly more productive than one which affords only two; so 
the labour of farmers and country labourers is certainly more productive 
than that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers. The superior produce 
of the one class, however, does not render the other barren or unproductive. 
    Secondly, it seems, upon this account, altogether improper to consider 
artificers, manufacturers, and merchants in the same light as menial 
servants. The labour of menial servants does not continue the existence of 
the fund which maintains and employs them. Their maintenance and 
employment is altogether at the expense of their masters, and the work 
which they perform is not of a nature to repay that expense. That work 
consists in services which perish generally in the very instant of their 
performance, and does not fix or realize itself in any vendible commodity 
which can replace the value of their wages and maintenance. The labour, on 
the contrary, of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants naturally does fix 
and realize itself in some such vendible commodity. It is upon this account 
that, in the chapter in which I treat of productive and unproductive labour, I 
have classed artificers, manufacturers, and merchants among the productive 
labourers, and menial servants among the barren or unproductive. 
    Thirdly, it seems upon every supposition improper to say that the labour 
of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants does not increase the real 
revenue of the society. Though we should suppose, for example, as it seems 
to be supposed in this system, that the value of the daily, monthly, and 
yearly consumption of this class was exactly equal to that of its daily, 
monthly, and yearly production, yet it would not from thence follow that its 
labour added nothing to the real revenue, to the real value of the annual 
produce of the land and labour of the society. An artificer, for example, 
who, in the first six months after harvest, executes ten pounds' worth of 
work, though he should in the same time consume ten pounds' worth of corn 
and other necessaries, yet really adds the value of ten pounds to the annual 
produce of the land and labour of the society. While he has been consuming 
a half-yearly revenue of ten pounds' worth of corn and other necessaries, he 
has produced an equal value of work capable of purchasing, either to 
himself or some other person, an equal half-yearly revenue. The value, 
therefore, of what has been consumed and produced during these six months 
is equal, not to ten, but to twenty pounds. It is possible, indeed, that no more 
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than ten pounds' worth of this value may ever have existed at any one 
moment of time. But if the ten pounds' worth of corn and other necessaties, 
which were consumed by the artificer, had been consumed by a soldier or 
by a menial servant, the value of that part of the annual produce which 
existed at the end of the six months would have been ten pounds less than it 
actually is in consequence of the labour of the artificer. Though the value of 
what the artificer produces, therefore, should not at any one moment of time 
be supposed greater than the value he consumes, yet at every moment of 
time the actually existing value of goods in the market is, in consequence of 
what he produces, greater than it otherwise would be. 
    When the patrons of this system assert that the consumption of artificers, 
manufacturers, and merchants is equal to the value of what they produce, 
they probably mean no more than that their revenue, or the fund destined for 
their consumption, is equal to it. But if they had expressed themselves more 
accurately, and only asserted that the revenue of this class was equal to the 
value of what they produced, it might readily have occurred to the reader 
that what would naturally be saved out of this revenue must necessarily 
increase more or less the real wealth of the society. In order, therefore, to 
make out something like an argument, it was necessary that they should 
express themselves as they have done; and this argument, even supposing 
things actually were as it seems to presume them to be, turns out to be a 
very inconclusive one. 
    Fourthly, farmers and country labourers can no more augment, without 
parsimony, the real revenue, the annual produce of the land and labour of 
their society, than artificers, manufacturers, and merchants. The annual 
produce of the land and labour of any society can be augmented only in two 
ways; either, first, by some improvement in the productive powers of the 
useful labour actually maintained within it; or, secondly, by some increase 
in the quantity of that labour. 
    The improvement in the productive powers of useful labour depend, first, 
upon the improvement in the ability of the workman; and, secondly, upon 
that of the machinery with which he works. But the labour of artificers and 
manufacturers, as it is capable of being more subdivided, and the labour of 
each workman reduced to a greater simplicity of operation than that of 
farmers and country labourers, so it is likewise capable of both these sorts 
of improvements in a much higher degree. In this respect, therefore, the 
class of cultivators can have no sort of advantage over that of artificers and 
manufacturers. 
    The increase in the quantity of useful labour actually employed within 
any society must depend altogether upon the increase of the capital which 
employs it; and the increase of that capital again must be exactly equal to 
the amount of the savings from the revenue, either of the particular persons 
who manage and direct the employment of that capital, or of some other 
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persons who lend it to them. If merchants, artificers, and manufacturers are, 
as this system seems to suppose, naturally more inclined to parsimony and 
saving than proprietors and cultivators, they are, so far, more likely to 
augment the quantity of useful labour employed within their society, and 
consequently to increase its real revenue, the annual produce of its land and 
labour. 
    Fifthly and lastly, though the revenue of the inhabitants of every country 
was supposed to consist altogether, as this system seems to suppose, in the 
quantity of subsistence which their industry could procure to them; yet, 
even upon this supposition, the revenue of a trading and manufacturing 
country must, other things being equal, always be much greater than that of 
one without trade or manufactures. By means of trade and manufactures, a 
greater quantity of subsistence can be annually imported into a particular 
country than what its own lands, in the actual state of their cultivation, 
could afford. The inhabitants of a town, though they frequently possess no 
lands of their own, yet draw to themselves by their industry such a quantity 
of the rude produce of the lands of other people as supplies them, not only 
with the materials of their work, but with the fund of their subsistence. 
What a town always is with regard to the country in its neighbourhood, one 
independent state or country may frequently be with regard to other 
independent states or countries. It is thus that Holland draws a great part of 
its subsistence from other countries; live cattle from Holstein and Jutland, 
and corn from almost all the different countries of Europe. A small quantity 
of manufactured produce purchases a great quantity of rude produce. A 
trading and manufacturing country, therefore, naturally purchases with a 
small part of its manufactured produce a great part of the rude produce of 
other countries; while, on the contrary, a country without trade and 
manufactures is generally obliged to purchase, at the expense of a great part 
of its rude produce, a very small part of the manufactured produce of other 
countries. The one exports what can subsist and accommodate but a very 
few, and imports the subsistence and accommodation of a great number. 
The other exports the accommodation and subsistence of a great number, 
and imports that of a very few only. The inhabitants of the one must always 
enjoy a much greater quantity of subsistence than what their own lands, in 
the actual state of their cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of the other 
must always enjoy a much smaller quantity. 
    This system, however, with all its imperfections is, perhaps, the nearest 
approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon the subject of 
political economy, and is upon that account well worth the consideration of 
every man who wishes to examine with attention the principles of that very 
important science. Though in representing the labour which is employed 
upon land as the only productive labour, the notions which it inculcates are 
perhaps too narrow and confined; yet in representing the wealth of nations 
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as consisting, not in the unconsumable riches of money, but in the 
consumable goods annually reproduced by the labour of the society, and in 
representing perfect liberty as the only effectual expedient for rendering this 
annual reproduction the greatest possible, its doctrine seems to be in every 
respect as just as it is generous and liberal. Its followers are very numerous; 
and as men are fond of paradoxes, and of appearing to understand what 
surpasses the comprehension of ordinary people, the paradox which it 
maintains, concerning the unproductive nature of manufacturing labour, has 
not perhaps contributed a little to increase the number of its admirers. They 
have for some years past made a pretty considerable sect, distinguished in 
the French republic of letters by the name of The Economists. Their works 
have certainly been of some service to their country; not only by bringing 
into general discussion many subjects which had never been well examined 
before, but by influencing in some measure the public administration in 
favour of agriculture. It has been in consequence of their representations, 
accordingly, that the agriculture of France has been delivered from several 
of the oppressions which it before laboured under. The term during which 
such a lease can be granted, as will be valid against every future purchaser 
or proprietor of the land, has been prolonged from nine to twenty-seven 
years. The ancient provincial restraints upon the transportation of corn from 
one province of the kingdom to another have been entirely taken away, and 
the liberty of exporting it to all foreign countries has been established as the 
common law of the kingdom in all ordinary cases. This sect, in their works, 
which are very numerous, and which treat not only of what is properly 
called Political Economy, or of the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations, but of every other branch of the system of civil government, all 
follow implicitly and without any sensible variation, the doctrine of Mr. 
Quesnai. There is upon this account little variety in the greater part of their 
works. The most distinct and best connected account of this doctrine is to be 
found in a little book written by Mr. Mercier de la Riviere, some time 
intendant of Martinico, entitled, The Natural and Essential Order of Political 
Societies. The admiration of this whole sect for their master, who was 
himself a man of the greatest modesty and simplicity, is not inferior to that 
of any of the ancient philosophers for the founders of their respective 
systems. "There have been, since the world began," says a very diligent and 
respectable author, the Marquis de Mirabeau, "three great inventions which 
have principally given stability to political societies, independent of many 
other inventions which have enriched and adorned them. The first is the 
invention of writing, which alone gives human nature the power of 
transmitting, without alteration, its laws, its contracts, its annals, and its 
discoveries. The second is the invention of money, which binds together all 
the relations between civilised societies. The third is the Economical Table, 
the result of the other two, which completes them both by perfecting their 
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object; the great discovery of our age, but of which our posterity will reap 
the benefit." 
    As the political economy of the nations of modern Europe has been more 
favourable to manufactures and foreign trade, the industry of the towns, 
than to agriculture, the industry of the country; so that of other nations has 
followed a different plan, and has been more favourable to agriculture than 
to manufactures and foreign trade. 
    The policy of China favours agriculture more than all other employments. 
In China the condition of a labourer is said to be as much superior to that of 
an artificer as in most parts of Europe that of an artificer is to that of a 
labourer. In China, the great ambition of every man is to get possession of 
some little bit of land, either in property or in lease; and leases are there said 
to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be sufficiently secured to 
the lessees. The Chinese have little respect for foreign trade. Your beggarly 
commerce! was the language in which the Mandarins of Pekin used to talk 
to Mr. de Lange, the Russian envoy, concerning it. Except with Japan, the 
Chinese carry on, themselves, and in their own bottoms, little or no foreign 
trade; and it is only into one or two ports of their kingdom that they even 
admit the ships of foreign nations. Foreign trade therefore is, in China, 
every way confined within a much narrower circle than that to which it 
would naturally extend itself, if more freedom was allowed to it, either in 
their own ships, or in those of foreign nations. 
    Manufactures, as in a small bulk they frequently contain a great value, 
and can upon that account be transported at less expense from one country 
to another than most parts of rude produce, are, in almost all countries, the 
principal support of foreign trade. In countries, besides, less extensive and 
less favourably circumstanced for inferior commerce than China, they 
generally require the support of foreign trade. Without an extensive foreign 
market they could not well flourish, either in countries so moderately 
extensive as to afford but a narrow home market or in countries where the 
communication between one province and another was so difficult as to 
render it impossible for the goods of any particular place to enjoy the whole 
of that home market which the country could afford. The perfection of 
manufacturing industry, it must be remembered, depends altogether upon 
the division of labour; and the degree to which the division of labour can be 
introduced into any manufacture is necessarily regulated, it has already been 
shown, by the extent of the market. But the great extent of the empire of 
China, the vast multitude of its inhabitants, the variety of climate, and 
consequently of productions in its different provinces, and the easy 
communication by means of water carriage between the greater part of 
them, render the home market of that country of so great extent as to be 
alone sufficient to support very great manufactures, and to admit of very 
considerable subdivisions of labour. The home market of China is, perhaps, 
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in extent, not much inferior to the market of all the different countries of 
Europe put together. A more extensive foreign trade, however, which to this 
great home market added the foreign market of all the rest of the world- 
especially if any considerable part of this trade was carried on in Chinese 
ships- could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China, 
and to improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing 
industry. By a more extensive navigation, the Chinese would naturally learn 
the art of using and constructing themselves all the different machines made 
use of in other countries, as well as the other improvements of art and 
industry which are practised in all the different parts of the world. Upon 
their present plan they have little opportunity except that of the Japanese. 
    The policy of ancient Egypt too, and that of the Gentoo government of 
Indostan, seem to have favoured agriculture more than all other 
employments. 
    Both in ancient Egypt and Indostan the whole body of the people was 
divided into different castes or tribes, each of which was confined, from 
father to son, to a particular employment or class of employments. The son 
of a priest was necessarily a priest; the son of a soldier, a soldier; the son of 
a labourer, a labourer; the son of a weaver, a weaver; the son of a tailor, a 
tailor, etc. In both countries, the caste of the priests held the highest rank, 
and that of the soldiers the next; and in both countries, the caste of the 
farmers and labourers was superior to the castes of merchants and 
manufacturers. 
    The government of both countries was particularly attentive to the 
interest of agriculture. The works constructed by the ancient sovereigns of 
Egypt for the proper distribution of the waters of the Nile were famous in 
antiquity; and the ruined remains of some of them are still the admiration of 
travellers. Those of the same kind which were constructed by the ancient 
sovereigns of Indostan for the proper distribution of the waters of the 
Ganges as well as of many other rivers, though they have been less 
celebrated, seem to have been equally great. Both countries, accordingly, 
though subject occasionally to dearths, have been famous for their great 
fertility. Though both were extremely populous, yet, in years of moderate 
plenty, they were both able to export great quantities of grain to their 
neighbours. 
    The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious aversion to the sea; and as the 
Gentoo religion does not permit its followers to light a fire, nor 
consequently to dress any victuals upon the water, it in effect prohibits them 
from all distant sea voyages. Both the Egyptians and Indians must have 
depended almost altogether upon the navigation of other nations for the 
exportation of their surplus produce; and this dependency, as it must have 
confined the market, so it must have discouraged the increase of this surplus 
produce. It must have discouraged, too, the increase of the manufactured 
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produce more than that of the rude produce. Manufactures require a much 
more extensive market than the most important parts of the rude produce of 
the land. A single shoemaker will make more than three hundred pairs of 
shoes in the year; and his own family will not, perhaps, wear out six pairs. 
Unless therefore he has the custom of at least fifty such families as his own, 
he cannot dispose of the whole produce of his own labour. The most 
numerous class of artificers will seldom, in a large country, make more than 
one in fifty or one in a hundred of the whole number of families contained 
in it. But in such large countries as France and England, the number of 
people employed in agriculture has by some authors been computed at a 
half, by others at a third, and by no author that I know of, at less than a fifth 
of the whole inhabitants of the country. But as the produce of the agriculture 
of both France and England is, the far greater part of it, consumed at home, 
each person employed in it must, according to these computations, require 
little more than the custom of one, two, or at most, of four such families as 
his own in order to dispose of the whole produce of his own labour. 
Agriculture, therefore, can support itself under the discouragement of a 
confined market much better than manufactures. In both ancient Egypt and 
Indostan, indeed, the confinement of the foreign market was in some 
measure compensated by the conveniency of many inland navigations, 
which opened, in the most advantageous manner, the whole extent of the 
home market to every part of the produce of every different district of those 
countries. The great extent of Indostan, too, rendered the home market of 
that country very great, and sufficient to support a great variety of 
manufactures. But the small extent of ancient Egypt, which was never equal 
to England, must at all times have rendered the home market of that country 
too narrow for supporting any great variety of manufactures. Bengal, 
accordingly, the province of Indostan, which commonly exports the greatest 
quantity of rice, has always been more remarkable for the exportation of a 
great variety of manufactures than for that of its grain. Ancient Egypt, on 
the contrary, though it exported some manufactures, fine linen in particular, 
as well as some other goods, was always most distinguished for its great 
exportation of grain. It was long the granary of the Roman empire. 
    The sovereigns of China, of ancient Egypt, and of the different kingdoms 
into which Indostan has at different times been divided, have always 
derived the whole, or by far the most considerable part, of their revenue 
from some sort of land tax or land rent. This land tax or land rent, like the 
tithe in Europe, consisted in a certain proportion, a fifth, it is said, of the 
produce of the land, which was either delivered in kind, or paid in money, 
according to a certain valuation, and which therefore varied from year to 
year according to all the variations of the produce. It was natural therefore 
that the sovereigns of those countries should be particularly attentive to the 
interests of agriculture, upon the prosperity or declension of which 
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immediately depended the yearly increase or diminution of their own 
revenue. 
    The policy of the ancient republics of Greece, and that of Rome, though it 
honoured agriculture more than manufactures or foreign trade, yet seems 
rather to have discouraged the latter employments than to have given any 
direct or intentional encouragement to the former. In several of the ancient 
states of Greece, foreign trade was prohibited altogether; and in several 
others the employments of artificers and manufacturers were considered as 
hurtful to the strength and agility of the human body, as rendering it 
incapable of those habits which their military and gymnastic exercises 
endeavoured to form in it, and as thereby disqualifying it more or less for 
undergoing the fatigues and encountering the dangers of war. Such 
occupations were considered as fit only for slaves, and the free citizens of 
the state were prohibited from exercising them. Even in those states where 
no such prohibition took place, as in Rome and Athens, the great body of 
the people were in effect excluded from all the trades which are, now 
commonly exercised by the lower sort of the inhabitants of towns. Such 
trades were, at Athens and Rome, all occupied by the slaves of the rich, who 
exercised them for the benefit of their masters, whose wealth, power, and 
protection made it almost impossible for a poor freeman to find a market for 
his work, when it came into competition with that of the slaves of the rich. 
Slaves, however, are very seldom inventive; and all the most important 
improvements, either in machinery, or in the arrangement and distribution 
of work which facilitate and abridge labour, have been the discoveries of 
freemen. Should a slave propose any improvement of this kind, his master 
would be very apt to consider the proposal as the suggestion of laziness, and 
a desire to save his own labour at the master's expense. The poor slave, 
instead of reward, would probably meet with much abuse, perhaps with 
some punishment. In the manufactures carried on by slaves, therefore, more 
labour must generally have been employed to execute the same quantity of 
work than in those carried on by freemen. The work of the former must, 
upon that account, generally have been dearer than that of the latter. The 
Hungarian mines, it is remarked by Mr. Montesquieu, though not richer, 
have always been wrought with less expense, and therefore with more 
profit, than the Turkish mines in their neighbourhood. The Turkish mines 
are wrought by slaves; and the arms of those slaves are the only machines 
which the Turks have ever thought of employing. The Hungarian mines are 
wrought by freemen, who employ a great deal of machinery, by which they 
facilitate and abridge their own labour. From the very little that is known 
about the price of manufactures in the times of the Greeks and Romans, it 
would appear that those of the finer sort were excessively dear. Silk sold for 
its weight in gold. It was not, indeed, in those times a European 
manufacture; and as it was all brought from the East Indies, the distance of 
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the carriage may in some measure account for the greatness of price. The 
price, however, which a lady, it is said, would sometimes pay for a piece of 
very fine linen, seems to have been equally extravagant; and as linen was 
always either a European, or at farthest, an Egyptian manufacture, this high 
price can be accounted for only by the great expense of the labour which 
must have been employed about it, and the expense of this labour again 
could arise from nothing but the awkwardness of the machinery which it 
made use of. The price of fine woollens too, though not quite so 
extravagant, seems however to have been much above that of the present 
times. Some cloths, we are told by Pliny, dyed in a particular manner, cost a 
hundred denarii, or three pounds six shillings and eightpence the pound 
weight. Others dyed in another manner cost a thousand denarii the pound 
weight, or thirty-three pounds six shillings and eightpence. The Roman 
pound, it must be remembered, contained only twelve of our avoirdupois 
ounces. This high price, indeed, seems to have been principally owing to the 
dye. But had not the cloths themselves been much dearer than any which are 
made in the present times, so very expensive a dye would not probably have 
been bestowed upon them. The disproportion would have been too great 
between the value of the accessory and that of the principal. The price 
mentioned by the same author of some Triclinaria, a sort of woollen pillows 
or cushions made use of to lean upon as they reclined upon their couches at 
table, passes all credibility; some of them being said to have cost more than 
thirty thousand, others more than three hundred thousand pounds. This high 
price, too, is not said to have arisen from the dye. In the dress of the people 
of fashion of both sexes there seems to have been much less variety, it is 
observed by Doctor Arbuthnot, in ancient than in modern times; and the 
very little variety which we find in that of the ancient statues confirms his 
observation. He infers from this that their dress must upon the whole have 
been cheaper than ours; but the conclusion does not seem to follow. When 
the expense of fashionable dress is very great, the variety must be very 
small. But when, by the improvements in the productive powers of 
manufacturing art and industry, the expense of any one dress comes to be 
very moderate, the variety will naturally be very great. The rich, not being 
able to distinguish themselves by the expense of any one dress, will 
naturally endeavour to do so by the multitude and variety of their dresses. 
    The greatest and most important branch of the commerce of every nation, 
it has already been observed, is that which is carried on between the 
inhabitants of the town and those of the country. The inhabitants of the 
town draw from the country the rude produce which constitutes both the 
materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence; and they pay for 
this rude produce by sending back to the country a certain portion of it 
manufactured and prepared for immediate use. The trade which is carried on 
between these two different sets of people consists ultimately in a certain 
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quantity of rude produce exchanged for a certain quantity of manufactured 
produce. The dearer the latter, therefore, the cheaper the former; and 
whatever tends in any country to raise the price of manufactured produce 
tends to lower that of the rude produce of the land, and thereby to 
discourage agriculture. The smaller the quantity of manufactured produce 
which in any given quantity of rude produce, or, what comes to the same 
thing, which the price of any given quantity of rude produce is capable of 
purchasing, the smaller the exchangeable value of that given quantity of 
rude produce, the smaller the encouragement which either the landlord has 
to increase its quantity by improving or the farmer by cultivating the land. 
Whatever, besides, tends to diminish in any country the number of artificers 
and manufacturers, tends to diminish the home market, the most important 
of all markets for the rude produce of the land, and thereby still further to 
discourage agriculture. 
    Those systems, therefore, which, preferring agriculture to all other 
employments, in order to promote it, impose restraints upon manufactures 
and foreign trade, act contrary to the very end which they propose, and 
indirectly discourage that very species of industry which they mean to 
promote. They are so far, perhaps, more inconsistent than even the 
mercantile system. That system, by encouraging manufactures and foreign 
trade more than agriculture, turns a certain portion of the capital of the 
society from supporting a more advantageous, to support a less 
advantageous species of industry. But still it really and in the end 
encourages that species of industry which it means to promote. Those 
agricultural systems, on the contrary, really and in the end discourage their 
own favourite species of industry. 
    It is thus that every system which endeavours, either by extraordinary 
encouragements to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater 
share of the capital of the society than what would naturally go to it, or, by 
extraordinary restraints, force from a particular species of industry some 
share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it, is in reality 
subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It retards, 
instead of accelerating, the progress of the society towards real wealth and 
greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of the annual 
produce of its land and labour. 
    All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus 
completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty 
establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not 
violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his 
own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with 
those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely 
discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always 
be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of 
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which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of 
superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the 
employments most suitable to the interest of the society. According to the 
system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; 
three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to 
common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from 
violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of 
protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice 
or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an 
exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and 
maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can 
never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, 
to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expense to 
any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do 
much more than repay it to a great society. 
    The proper performance of those several duties of the sovereign 
necessarily supposes a certain expense; and this expense again necessarily 
requires a certain revenue to support it. In the following book, therefore, I 
shall endeavour to explain, first, what are the necessary expenses of the 
sovereign or commonwealth; and which of those expenses ought to be 
defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society; and which of 
them by that of some particular part only, or of some particular members of 
the society; secondly, what are the different methods in which the whole 
society may be made to contribute towards defraying the expenses 
incumbent on the whole society, and what are the principal advantages and 
inconveniences of each of those methods; and thirdly, what are the reasons 
and causes which have induced almost all modern governments to mortgage 
some part of this revenue, or to contract debts, and what have been the 
effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual produce of the land 
and labour of the society. The following book, therefore, will naturally be 
divided into three chapters. 
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BOOK FIVE
Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth
CHAPTER I
Of the Expenses of the Sovereign or Commonwealth
PART 1
Of the Expense of Defence
THE first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and 
invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth5.html (1 of 174)4/11/2005 9:48:50 AM
The Wealth of Nations
force. But the expense both of preparing this military force in time of peace, and of 
employing it in time of war, is very different in the different states of society, in the 
different periods of improvement. 
    Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as we find it 
among the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior as well as a hunter. 
When he goes to war, either to defend his society or to revenge the injuries which have 
been done to it by other societies, he maintains himself by his own labour in the same 
manner as when he lives at home. His society, for in this state of things there is 
properly neither sovereign nor commonwealth, is at no sort of expense, either to 
prepare him for the field, or to maintain him while he is in it. 
    Among nations of shepherds, a more advanced state of society, such as we find it 
among the Tartars and Arabs, every man is, in the same manner, a warrior. Such 
nations have commonly no fixed habitation, but live either in tents or in a sort of 
covered waggons which are easily transported from place to place. The whole tribe or 
nation changes its situation according to the different seasons of the year, as well as 
according to other accidents. When its herds and flocks have consumed the forage of 
one part of the country, it removes to another, and from that to a third. In the dry 
season it comes down to the banks of the rivers; in the wet season it retires to the 
upper country. When such a nation goes to war, the warriors will not trust their herds 
and flocks to the feeble defence of their old men, their women and children; and their 
old men, their women and children, will not be left behind without defence and 
without subsistence. The whole nation, besides, being accustomed to a wandering life, 
even in time of peace, easily takes the field in time of war. Whether it marches as an 
army, or moves about as a company of herdsmen, the way of life is nearly the same, 
though the object proposed by it be very different. They all go to war together, 
therefore, and every one does as well as he can. Among the Tartars, even the women 
have been frequently known to engage in battle. If they conquer, whatever belongs to 
the hostile tribe is the recompense of the victory. But if they are vanquished, all is lost, 
and not only their herds and flocks, but their women and children, become the booty 
of the conqueror. Even the greater part of those who survive the action are obliged to 
submit to him for the sake of immediate subsistence. The rest are commonly dissipated 
and dispersed in the desert. 
    The ordinary life, the ordinary exercises of a Tartar or Arab, prepare him 
sufficiently for war. Running, wrestling, cudgel-playing, throwing the javelin, drawing 
the bow, etc., are the common pastimes of those who live in the open air, and are all of 
them the images of war. When a Tartar or Arab actually goes to war, he is maintained 
by his own herds and flocks which he carries with him in the same manner as in peace. 
His chief or sovereign, for those nations have all chiefs or sovereigns, is at no sort of 
expense in preparing him for the field; and when he is in it the chance of plunder is the 
only pay which he either expects or requires. 
    An army of hunters can seldom exceed two or three hundred men. The precarious 
subsistence which the chase affords could seldom allow a greater number to keep 
together for any considerable time. An army of shepherds, on the contrary, may 
sometimes amount to two or three hundred thousand. As long as nothing stops their 
progress, as long as they can go on from one district, of which they have consumed the 
forage, to another which is yet entire, there seems to be scarce any limit to the number 
who can march on together. A nation of hunters can never be formidable to the 
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civilised nations in their neighbourhood. A nation of shepherds may. Nothing can be 
more contemptible than an Indian war in North America. Nothing, on the contrary, can 
be more dreadful than Tartar invasion has frequently been in Asia. The judgment of 
Thucydides, that both Europe and Asia could not resist the Scythians united, has been 
verified by the experience of all ages. The inhabitants of the extensive but defenceless 
plains of Scythia or Tartary have been frequently united under the dominion of the 
chief of some conquering horde or clan, and the havoc and devastation of Asia have 
always signalized their union. The inhabitants of the inhospitable deserts of Arabia, 
the other great nation of shepherds, have never been united but once; under Mahomet 
and his immediate successors. Their union, which was more the effect of religious 
enthusiasm than of conquest, was signalized in the same manner. If the hunting 
nations of America should ever become shepherds, their neighbourhood would be 
much more dangerous to the European colonies than it is at present. 
    In a yet more advanced state of society, among those nations of husbandmen who 
have little foreign commerce, and no other manufactures but those coarse and 
household ones which almost every private family prepares for its own use, every 
man, in the same manner, either is a warrior or easily becomes such. They who live by 
agriculture generally pass the whole day in the open air, exposed to all the 
inclemencies of the seasons. The hardiness of their ordinary life prepares them for the 
fatigues of war, to some of which their necessary occupations bear a great analogy. 
The necessary occupation of a ditcher prepares him to work in the trenches, and to 
fortify a camp as well as to enclose a field. The ordinary pastimes of such husbandmen 
are the same as those of shepherds, and are in the same manner the images of war. But 
as husbandmen have less leisure than shepherds, they are not so frequently employed 
in those pastimes. They are soldiers, but soldiers not quite so much masters of their 
exercise. Such as they are, however, it seldom costs the sovereign or commonwealth 
any expense to prepare them for the field. 
    Agriculture, even in its rudest and lowest state, supposes a settlement: some sort of 
fixed habitation which cannot be abandoned without great loss. When a nation of mere 
husbandmen, therefore, goes to war, the whole people cannot take the field together. 
The old men, the women and children, at least, must remain at home to take care of the 
habitation. All the men of the military age, however, may take the field, and, in small 
nations of this kind, have frequently done so. In every nation the men of the military 
age are supposed to amount to about a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the 
people. If the campaign, should begin after seed-time, and end before harvest, both the 
husbandman and his principal labourers can be spared from the farm without much 
loss. He trusts that the work which must be done in the meantime can be well enough 
executed by the old men, the women, and the children. He is not unwilling, therefore, 
to serve without pay during a short campaign, and it frequently costs the sovereign or 
commonwealth as little to maintain him in the field as to prepare him for it. The 
citizens of all the different states of ancient Greece seem to have served in this manner 
till after the second Persian war; and the people of Peloponnesus till after the 
Peloponnesian war. The Peloponnesians, Thucydides observes, generally left the field 
in the summer, and returned home to reap the harvest. The Roman people under their 
kings, and during the first ages of the republic, served in the same manner. It was not 
till the siege of Veii that they who stayed at home began to contribute something 
towards maintaining those who went to war. In the European monarchies, which were 
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founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, both before and for some time after the 
establishment of what is properly called the feudal law, the great lords, with all their 
immediate dependents, used to serve the crown at their own expense. In the field, in 
the same manner as at home, they maintained themselves by their own revenue, and 
not by any stipend or pay which they received from the king upon that particular 
occasion. 
    In a more advanced state of society, two different causes contribute to render it 
altogether impossible that they who take the field should maintain themselves at their 
own expense. Those two causes are, the progress of manufactures, and the 
improvement in the art of war. 
    Though a husbandman should be employed in an expedition, provided it begins 
after seed-time and ends before harvest, the interruption of his business will not 
always occasion any considerable diminution of his revenue. Without the intervention 
of his labour, nature does herself the greater part of the work which remains to be 
done. But the moment that an artificer, a smith, a carpenter, or a weaver, for example, 
quits his workhouse, the sole source of his revenue is completely dried up. Nature does 
nothing for him, he does all for himself. When he takes the field, therefore, in defence 
of the public, as he has no revenue to maintain himself, he must necessarily be 
maintained by the public. But in a country of which a great part of the inhabitants are 
artificers and manufacturers, a great part of the people who go to war must be drawn 
from those classes, and must therefore be maintained by the public as long as they are 
employed in its service. 
    When the art of war, too, has gradually grown up to be a very intricate and 
complicated science, when the event of war ceases to be determined, as in the first 
ages of society, by a single irregular skirmish or battle, but when the contest is 
generally spun out through several different campaigns, each of which lasts during the 
greater part of the year, it becomes universally necessary that the public should 
maintain those who serve the public in war, at least while they are employed in that 
service. Whatever in time of peace might be the ordinary occupation of those who go 
to war, so very tedious and expensive a service would otherwise be far too heavy a 
burden upon them. After the second Persian war, accordingly, the armies of Athens 
seem to have been generally composed of mercenary troops, consisting, indeed, partly 
of citizens, but partly too of foreigners, and all of them equally hired and paid at the 
expense of the state. From the time of the siege of Veii, the armies of Rome received 
pay for their service during the time which they remained in the field. Under the feudal 
governments the military service both of the great lords and of their immediate 
dependants was, after a certain period, universally exchanged for a payment in money, 
which was employed to maintain those who served in their stead. 
    The number of those who can go to war, in proportion to the whole number of the 
people, is necessarily much smaller in a civilised than in a rude state of society. In a 
civilised society, as the soldiers are maintained altogether by the labour of those who 
are not soldiers, the number of the former can never exceed what the latter can 
maintain, over and above maintaining, in a manner suitable to their respective stations, 
both themselves and the other officers of government and law whom they are obliged 
to maintain. In the little agrarian states of ancient Greece, a fourth or a fifth part of the 
whole body of the people considered themselves as soldiers, and would sometimes, it 
is said, take a field. Among the civilised nations of modern Europe, it is commonly 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth5.html (4 of 174)4/11/2005 9:48:50 AM
The Wealth of Nations
computed that not more than one-hundredth part of the inhabitants in any country can 
be employed as soldiers without ruin to the country which pays the expenses of their 
service. 
    The expense of preparing the army for the field seems not to have become 
considerable in any nation till long after that of maintaining it in the field had 
devolved entirely upon the sovereign or commonwealth. In all the different republics 
of ancient Greece, to learn his military exercises was a necessary part of education 
imposed by the state upon every free citizen. In every city there seems to have been a 
public field, in which, under the protection of the public magistrate, the young people 
were taught their different exercises by different masters. In this very simple 
institution consisted the whole expense which any Grecian state seems ever to have 
been at in preparing its citizens for war. In ancient Rome the exercises of the Campus 
Martius answered the same purpose with those of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece. 
Under the feudal governments, the many public ordinances that the citizens of every 
district should practise archery as well as several other military exercises were 
intended for promoting the same purpose, but do not seem to have promoted it so well. 
Either from want of interest in the officers entrusted with the execution of those 
ordinances, or from some other cause, they appear to have been universally neglected; 
and in the progress of all those governments, military exercises seem to have gone 
gradually into disuse among the great body of the people. 
    In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, during the whole period of their 
existence, and under the feudal governments for a considerable time after their first 
establishment, the trade of a soldier was not a separate, distinct trade, which 
constituted the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens. Every 
subject of the state, whatever might be the ordinary trade or occupation by which he 
gained his livelihood, considered himself, upon all ordinary occasions, as fit likewise 
to exercise the trade of a soldier, and upon many extraordinary occasions as bound to 
exercise it. 
    The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so in the progress of 
improvement it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them. The 
state of the mechanical, as well as of some other arts, with which it is necessarily 
connected, determines the degree of perfection to which it is capable of being carried 
at any particular time. But in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is 
necessary that it should become the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of 
citizens, and the division of labour is as necessary for the improvement of this, as of 
every other art. Into other arts the division of labour is naturally introduced by the 
prudence of individuals, who find that they promote their private interest better by 
confining themselves to a particular trade than by exercising a great number. But it is 
the wisdom of the state only which can render the trade of a soldier a particular trade 
separate and distinct from all others. A private citizen who, in time of profound peace, 
and without any particular encouragement from the public, should spend the greater 
part of his time in military exercises, might, no doubt, both improve himself very 
much in them, and amuse himself very well; but he certainly would not promote his 
own interest. It is the wisdom of the state only which can render it for his interest to 
give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar occupation: and states have not 
always had this wisdom, even when their circumstances had become such that the 
preservation of their existence required that they should have it. 
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    A shepherd has a great deal of leisure; a husbandman, in the rude state of 
husbandry, has some; an artificer or manufacturer has none at all. The first may, 
without any loss, employ a great deal of his time in martial exercises; the second may 
employ some part of it; but the last cannot employ a single hour in them without some 
loss, and his attention to his own interest naturally leads him to neglect them 
altogether. These improvements in husbandry too, which the progress of arts and 
manufactures necessarily introduces, leave the husbandman as little leisure as the 
artificer. Military exercises come to be as much neglected by the inhabitants of the 
country as by those of the town, and the great body of the people becomes altogether 
unwarlike. That wealth, at the same time, which always follows the improvements of 
agriculture and manufactures, and which in reality is no more than the accumulated 
produce of those improvements, provokes the invasion of all their neighbours. An 
industrious, and upon that account a wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to 
be attacked; and unless the state takes some new measures for the public defence, the 
natural habits of the people render them altogether incapable of defending themselves. 
    In these circumstances there seem to be but two methods by which the state can 
make any tolerable provision for the public defence. 
    It may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of the whole 
bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations of the people, enforce the practice of 
military exercises, and oblige either all the citizens of the military age, or a certain 
number of them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade 
or profession they may happen to carry on. 
    Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in the 
constant practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a soldier a particular 
trade, separate and distinct from all others. 
    If the state has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its military force is said 
to consist in a militia; if to the second, it is said to consist in a standing army. The 
practice of military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a 
standing army, and the maintenance or pay which the state affords them is the 
principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence. The practice of military exercises is 
only the occasional occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they derive the 
principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence from some other occupation. In a 
militia, the character of the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of 
the soldier; in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over every other 
character: and in this distinction seems to consist the essential difference between 
those two different species of military force. 
    Militias have been of several different kinds. In some countries the citizens destined 
for defending the states seem to have been exercised only, without being, if I may say 
so, regimented; that is, without being divided into separate and distinct bodies of 
troops, each of which performed its exercises under its own proper and permanent 
officers. In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, each citizen, as long as he 
remained at home, seems to have practised his exercises either separately and 
independently, or with such of his equals as he liked best, and not to have been 
attached to any particular body of troops till he was actually called upon to take the 
field. In other countries, the militia has not only been exercised, but regimented. In 
England, in Switzerland, and, I believe, in every other country of modern Europe 
where any imperfect military force of this kind has been established, every militiaman 
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is, even in time of peace, attached to a particular body of troops, which performs its 
exercises under its own proper and permanent officers. 
    Before the invention of firearms, that army was superior in which the soldiers had, 
each individually, the greatest skill and dexterity in the use of their arms. Strength and 
agility of body were of the highest consequence, and commonly determined the state 
of battles. But this skill and dexterity in the use of their arms could be acquired only, 
in the same manner as fencing is at present, by practising, not in great bodies, but each 
man separately, in a particular school, under a particular master, or with his own 
particular equals and companions. Since the invention of firearms, strength and agility 
of body, or even extraordinary dexterity and skill in the use of arms, though they are 
far from being of no consequence, are, however, of less consequence. The nature of 
the weapon, though it by no means puts the awkward upon a level with the skilful, 
puts him more nearly so than he ever was before. All the dexterity and skill, it is 
supposed, which are necessary for using it, can be well enough acquired by practising 
in great bodies. 
    Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command are qualities which, in modern 
armies, are of more importance towards determining the fate of battles than the 
dexterity and skill of the soldiers in the use of their arms. But the noise of firearms, the 
smoke, and the invisible death to which every man feels himself every moment 
exposed as soon as he comes within cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before 
the battle can be well said to be engaged, must render it very difficult to maintain any 
considerable degree of this regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even in the 
beginning of a modern battle. In an ancient battle there was no noise but what arose 
from the human voice; there was no smoke, there was no invisible cause of wounds or 
death. Every man, till some mortal weapon actually did approach him, saw clearly that 
no such weapon was near him. In these circumstances, and among troops who had 
some confidence in their own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it must have 
been a good deal less difficult to preserve some degree regularity and order, not only 
in the beginning, but through the whole progress of an ancient battle, and till one of 
the two armies was fairly defeated. But the habits of regularity, order, and prompt 
obedience to command can be acquired only by troops which are exercised in great 
bodies. 
    A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or exercised, 
must always be much inferior to a well-disciplined and well-exercised standing army. 
    The soldiers who are exercised only once a week, or once a month, can never be so 
expert in the use of their arms as those who are exercised every day, or every other 
day; and though this circumstance may not be of so much consequence in modern as it 
was in ancient times, yet the acknowledged superiority of the Prussian troops, owing, 
it is said, very much to their superior expertness in their exercise, may satisfy us that it 
is, even at this day, of very considerable consequence. 
    The soldiers who are bound to obey their officer only once a week or once a month, 
and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, 
without being in any respect accountable to him, can never be under the same awe in 
his presence, can never have the same disposition to ready obedience, with those 
whose whole life and conduct are every day directed by him, and who every day even 
rise and go to bed, or at least retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In what is 
called discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia must always be still more 
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inferior to a standing army than it may sometimes be in what is called the manual 
exercise, or in the management and use of its arms. But in modern war the habit of 
ready and instant obedience is of much greater consequence than a considerable 
superiority in the management of arms. 
    Those militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war under the same 
chieftains whom they are accustomed to obey in peace are by far the best. In respect 
for their officers, in the habit of ready obedience, they approach nearest to standing 
armies. The highland militia, when it served under its own chieftains, had some 
advantage of the same kind. As the highlanders, however, were not wandering, but 
stationary shepherds, as they had all a fixed habitation, and were not, in peaceable 
times, accustomed to follow their chieftain from place to place, so in time of war they 
were less willing to follow him to any considerable distance, or to continue for any 
long time in the field. When they had acquired any booty they were eager to return 
home, and his authority was seldom sufficient to detain them. In point of obedience 
they were always much inferior to what is reported of the Tartars and Arabs. As the 
highlanders too, from their stationary life, spend less of their time in the open air, they 
were always less accustomed to military exercises, and were less expert in the use of 
their arms than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be. 
    A militia of any kind, it must be observed, however, which has served for several 
successive campaigns in the field, becomes in every respect a standing army. The 
soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their arms, and, being constantly under 
the command of their officers, are habituated to the same prompt obedience which 
takes place in standing armies. What they were before they took the field is of little 
importance. They necessarily become in every respect a standing army after they have 
passed a few campaigns in it. Should the war in America drag out through another 
campaign, the American militia may become in every respect a match for that standing 
army of which the valour appeared, in the last war, at least not inferior to that of the 
hardiest veterans of France and Spain. 
    This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages, it will be found, bears 
testimony to the irresistible superiority which a well-regulated standing army has over 
a militia. 
    One of the first standing armies of which we have any distinct account, in any well 
authenticated history, is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent wars with the 
Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and some of the Greek cities in the neighbourhood of 
Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which in the beginning were probably militia, 
to the exact discipline of a standing army. When he was at peace, which he was very 
seldom, and never for any long time together, he was careful not to disband that army. 
It vanquished and subdued, after a long and violent struggle, indeed, the gallant and 
well exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient Greece, and afterwards, 
with very little struggle, the effeminate and ill-exercised militia of the great Persian 
empire. The fall of the Greek republics and of the Persian empire was the effect of the 
irresistible superiority which a standing army has over every sort of militia. It is the 
first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history has preserved any 
distinct or circumstantial account. 
    The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is the second. All the 
varieties in the fortune of those two famous republics may very well be accounted for 
from the same cause. 
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    From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war the armies 
of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under three great generals, 
who succeeded one another in the command: Hamilcar, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, and 
his son Hannibal; first in chastising their own rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing 
the revolted nations of Africa, and, lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. 
The army which Hannibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different 
wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a standing army. The 
Romans, in the meantime, though they had not been altogether at peace, yet they had 
not, during this period, been engaged in any war of very great consequence, and their 
military discipline, it is generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies 
which Hannibal encountered at Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannae were militia 
opposed to a standing army. This circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than 
any other to determine the fate of those battles. 
    The standing army which Hannibal left behind him in Spain had the like superiority 
over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose it, and in a few years, under the 
command of his brother, the younger Hasdrubal, expelled them almost entirely from 
that country. 
    Hannibal was ill supplied from home. The Roman militia, being continually in the 
field, became in the progress of the war a well disciplined and well-exercised standing 
army, and the superiority of Hannibal grew every day less and less. Hasdrubal judged 
it necessary to lead the whole, or almost the whole of the standing army which he 
commanded in Spain, to the assistance of his brother in Italy. In this march he is said 
to have been misled by his guides, and in a country which he did not know, was 
surprised and attacked by another standing army, in every respect equal or superior to 
his own, and was entirely defeated. 
    When Hasdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppose him but a 
militia inferior to his own. He conquered and subdued that militia, and, in the course 
of the war, his own militia necessarily became a well-disciplined and well-exercised 
standing army. That standing army was afterwards carried to Africa, where it found 
nothing but a militia to oppose it. In order to defend Carthage it became necessary to 
recall the standing army of Hannibal. The disheartened and frequently defeated 
African militia joined it, and, at the battle of Zama, composed the greater part of the 
troops of Hannibal. The event of that day determined the fate of the two rival 
republics. 
    From the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman republic, the 
armies of Rome were in every respect standing armies. The standing army of Macedon 
made some resistance to their arms. In the height of their grandeur it cost them two 
great wars, and three great battles, to subdue that little kingdom, of which the conquest 
would probably have been still more difficult had it not been for the cowardice of its 
last king. The militias of all the civilised nations of the ancient world, of Greece, of 
Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble resistance to the standing armies of Rome. The 
militias of some barbarous nations defended themselves much better. The Scythian or 
Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the countries north of the Euxine and 
Caspian seas, were the most formidable enemies whom the Romans had to encounter 
after the second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias, too, were always 
respectable, and upon several occasions gained very considerable advantages over the 
Roman armies. In general, however, and when the Roman armies were well 
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commanded, they appear to have been very much superior; and if the Romans did not 
pursue the final conquest either of Parthia or Germany, it was probably because they 
judged that it was not worth while to add those two barbarous countries to an empire 
which was already too large. The ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation of 
Scythian or Tartar extraction, and to have always retained a good deal of the manners 
of their ancestors. The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or Tartars, a nation of 
wandering shepherds, who went to war under the same chiefs whom they were 
accustomed to follow in peace. Their militia was exactly of the same kind with that of 
the Scythians or Tartars, from whom, too, they were probably descended. 
    Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the Roman armies. Its 
extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those causes. In the days of their grandeur, when 
no enemy appeared capable of opposing them, their heavy armour was laid aside as 
unnecessarily burdensome, their labourious exercises were neglected as unnecessarily 
toilsome. Under the Roman emperors, besides, the standing armies of Rome, those 
particularly which guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to 
their masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their own generals. In order 
to render them less formidable, according to some authors, Dioclesian, according to 
others, Constantine, first withdrew them from the frontier, where they had always 
before been encamped in great bodies, generally of two or three legions each, and 
dispersed them in small bodies through the different provincial towns, from whence 
they were scarce ever removed but when it became necessary to repel an invasion. 
Small bodies of soldiers quartered, in trading and manufacturing towns, and seldom 
removed from those quarters, became themselves tradesmen, artificers, and 
manufacturers. The civil came to predominate over the military character, and the 
standing armies of Rome gradually degenerated into a corrupt, neglected, and 
undisciplined militia, incapable of resisting the attack of the German and Scythian 
militias, which soon afterwards invaded the western empire. It was only by hiring the 
militia of some of those nations to oppose to that of others that the emperors were for 
some time able to defend themselves. The fall of the western empire is the third great 
revolution in the affairs of mankind of which ancient history has preserved any distinct 
or circumstantial account. It was brought about by the irresistible superiority which the 
militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilised nation; which the militia of a nation 
of shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers, and manufacturers. 
The victories which have been gained by militias have generally been, not over 
standing armies, but over other militias in exercise and discipline inferior to 
themselves. Such were the victories which the Greek militia gained over that of the 
Persian empire; and such too were those which in later times the Swiss militia gained 
over that of the Austrians and Burgundians. 
    The military force of the German and Scythian nations who established themselves 
upon the ruins of the western empire continued for some time to be of the same kind in 
their new settlements as it had been in their original country. It was a militia of 
shepherds and husbandmen, which, in time of war, took the field under the command 
of the same chieftains whom it was accustomed to obey in peace. It was, therefore, 
tolerably well exercised, and tolerably well disciplined. As arts and industry advanced, 
however, the authority of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great body of the 
people had less time to spare for military exercises. Both the discipline and the 
exercise of the feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and standing armies 
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were gradually introduced to supply the place of it. When the expedient of a standing 
army, besides, had once been adopted by one civilised nation, it became necessary that 
all its neighbours should follow their example. They soon found that their safety 
depended upon their doing so, and that their own militia was altogether incapable of 
resisting the attack of such an army. 
    The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an enemy, yet 
have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran troops and the very 
moment that they took the field to have been fit to face the hardiest and most 
experienced veterans. In 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland, the 
valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear inferior to that of the Prussians, at that 
time supposed to be the hardiest and most experienced veterans in Europe. The 
Russian empire, however, had enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, 
and could at that time have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy. When the 
Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a profound peace for about eight-
and-twenty years. The valour of her soldiers, however, far from being corrupted by 
that long peace, was never more distinguished than in the attempt upon Carthagena, 
the first unfortunate exploit of that unfortunate war. In a long peace the generals, 
perhaps, may sometimes forget their skill; but, where a well-regulated standing army 
has been kept up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour. 
    When a civilised nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at all times 
exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to be in its 
neighbourhood. The frequent conquests of all the civilised countries in Asia by the 
Tartars sufficiently demonstrates the natural superiority which the militia of a 
barbarous has over that of a civilised nation. A well-regulated standing army is 
superior to every militia. Such an army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and 
civilised nation, so it can alone defend such a nation against the invasion of a poor and 
barbarous neighbour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore, that the 
civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even preserved for any considerable 
time. 
    As it is only by means of a well-regulated standing army that a civilised country can 
be defended, so it is only by means of it that a barbarous country can be suddenly and 
tolerably civilised. A standing army establishes, with an irresistible force, the law of 
the sovereign through the remotest provinces of the empire, and maintains some 
degree of regular government in countries which could not otherwise admit of any. 
Whoever examines, with attention, the improvements which Peter the Great 
introduced into the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve themselves 
into the establishment of a well regulated standing army. It is the instrument which 
executes and maintains all his other regulations. That degree of order and internal 
peace which that empire has ever since enjoyed is altogether owing to the influence of 
that army. 
    Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army as dangerous to 
liberty. It certainly is so wherever the interest of the general and that of the principal 
officers are not necessarily connected with the support of the constitution of the state. 
The standing army of Caesar destroyed the Roman republic. The standing army of 
Cromwell turned the Long Parliament out of doors. But where the sovereign is himself 
the general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers of 
the army, where the military force is placed under the command of those who have the 
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greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have themselves the 
greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty. On 
the contrary, it may in some cases be favourable to liberty. The security which it gives 
to the sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy, which, in some 
modern republics, seems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times 
ready to disturb the peace of every citizen. Where the security of the magistrate, 
though supported by the principal people of the country, is endangered by every 
popular discontent; where a small tumult is capable of bringing about in a few hours a 
great revolution, the whole authority of government must be employed to suppress and 
punish every murmur and complaint against it. To a sovereign, on the contrary, who 
feels himself supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the country, but by a 
well-regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious 
remonstrances can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them, and 
his consciousness of his own superiority naturally disposes him to do so. That degree 
of liberty which approaches to licentiousness can be tolerated only in countries where 
the sovereign is secured by a well-regulated standing army. It is in such countries only 
that the public safety does not require that the sovereign should be trusted with any 
discretionary power for suppressing even the impertinent wantonness of this licentious 
liberty. 
    The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society from the 
violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more and more 
expensive as the society advances in civilization. The military force of the society, 
which originally cost the sovereign no expense either in time of peace or in time of 
war, must, in the progress of improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war, 
and afterwards even in time of peace. 
    The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of firearms has 
enhanced still further both the expense of exercising and disciplining any particular 
number of soldiers in time of peace, and that of employing them in time of war. Both 
their arms and their ammunition are become more expensive. A musket is a more 
expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon or a mortar than a 
balista or a catapulta. The powder which is spent in a modern review is lost 
irrecoverably, and occasions a very considerable expense. The javeline and arrows 
which were thrown or shot in an ancient one could easily be picked up again, and were 
besides of very little value. The cannon and the mortar are not only much dearer, but 
much heavier machines than the balista or catapulta, and require a greater expense, not 
only to prepare them for the field, but to carry them to it. As the superiority of the 
modern artillery too over that of the ancients is very great, it has become much more 
difficult, and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a town so as to resist even 
for a few weeks the attack of that superior artillery. In modern times many different 
causes contribute to render the defence of the society more expensive. The 
unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement have, in this respect, been 
a good deal enhanced by a great revolution in the art of war, to which a mere accident, 
the invention of gunpowder, seems to have given occasion. 
    In modern war the great expense of firearms gives an evident advantage to the 
nation which can best afford that expense, and consequently to an opulent and 
civilised over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times the opulent and civilised 
found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In 
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modern times the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves against the 
opulent and civilised. The invention of firearms, an invention which at first sight 
appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable both to the permanency and to the 
extension of civilization. 
PART 2
Of the Expense of Justice
THE second duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as far as possible, every member 
of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty 
of establishing an exact administration of justice, requires, too, very different degrees 
of expense in the different periods of society. 
    Among nations of hunters, as there is scarce any property, or at least none that 
exceeds the value of two or three days' labour, so there is seldom any established 
magistrate or any regular administration of justice. Men who have no property can 
injure one another only in their persons or reputations. But when one man kills, 
wounds, beats, or defames another, though he to whom the injury is done suffers, he 
who does it receives no benefit. It is otherwise with the injuries to property. The 
benefit of the person who does the injury is often equal to the loss of him who suffers 
it. Envy, malice, or resentment are the only passions which can prompt one man to 
injure another in his person or reputation. But the greater part of men are not very 
frequently under the influence of those passions, and the very worst of men are so only 
occasionally. As their gratification too, how agreeable soever it may be to certain 
characters, is not attended with any real or permanent advantage, it is in the greater 
part of men commonly restrained by prudential considerations. Men may live together 
in society with some tolerable degree of security, though there is no civil magistrate to 
protect them from the injustice of those passions. But avarice and ambition in the rich, 
in the poor the hatred of labour and the love of present ease and enjoyment, are the 
passions which prompt to invade property, passions much more steady in their 
operation, and much more universal in their influence. Wherever there is great 
property there is great inequality. For one very rich man there must be at least five 
hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The 
affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by 
want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of 
the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the 
labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single 
night in security. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he 
never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected 
only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually held up to chastise it. The 
acquisition of valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the 
establishment of civil government. Where there is no property, or at least none that 
exceeds the value of two or three days' labour, civil government is not so necessary. 
    Civil government supposes a certain subordination. But as the necessity of civil 
government gradually grows up with the acquisition of valuable property, so the 
principal causes which naturally introduce subordination gradually grow up with the 
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growth of that valuable property. 
    The causes or circumstances which naturally introduce subordination, or which 
naturally, and antecedent to any civil institution, give some men some superiority over 
the greater part of their brethren, seem to be four in number. 
    The first of those causes or circumstances is the superiority of personal 
qualifications, of strength, beauty, and agility of body; of wisdom and virtue, of 
prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation of mind. The qualifications of the body, 
unless supported by those of the mind, can give little authority in any period of 
society. He is a very strong man, who, by mere strength of body, can force two weak 
ones to obey him. The qualifications of the mind can alone give a very great authority. 
They are, however, invisible qualities; always disputable, and generally disputed. No 
society, whether barbarous or civilised, has ever found it convenient to settle the rules 
of precedency of rank and subordination according to those invisible qualities; but 
according to something that is more plain and palpable. 
    The second of those causes or circumstances is the superiority of age. An old man, 
provided his age is not so far advanced as to give suspicion of dotage, is everywhere 
more respected than a young man of equal rank, fortune, and abilities. Among nations 
of hunters, such as the native tribes of North America, age is the sole foundation of 
rank and precedency. Among them, father is the appellation of a superior; brother, of 
an equal; and son, of an inferior. In the most opulent and civilised nations, age 
regulates rank among those who are in every other respect equal, and among whom, 
therefore, there is nothing else to regulate it. Among brothers and among sisters, the 
eldest always takes place; and in the succession of the paternal estate everything which 
cannot be divided, but must go entire to one person, such as a title of honour, is in 
most cases given to the eldest. Age is a plain and palpable quality which admits of no 
dispute. 
    The third of those causes or circumstances is the superiority of fortune. The 
authority of riches, however, though great in every age of society, is perhaps greatest 
in the rudest age of society which admits of any considerable inequality of fortune. A 
Tartar chief, the increase of whose herds and stocks is sufficient to maintain a 
thousand men, cannot well employ that increase in any other way than in maintaining 
a thousand men. The rude state of his society does not afford him any manufactured 
produce, any trinkets or baubles of any kind, for which he can exchange that part of 
his rude produce which is over and above his own consumption. The thousand men 
whom he thus maintains, depending entirely upon him for their subsistence, must both 
obey his orders in war, and submit to his jurisdiction in peace. He is necessarily both 
their general and their judge, and his chieftainship is the necessary effect of the 
superiority of his fortune. In an opulent and civilised society, a man may possess a 
much greater fortune and yet not be able to command a dozen people. Though the 
produce of his estate may be sufficient to maintain, and may perhaps actually 
maintain, more than a thousand people, yet as those people pay for everything which 
they get from him, as he gives scarce anything to anybody but in exchange for an 
equivalent, there is scarce anybody who considers himself as entirely dependent upon 
him, and his authority extends only over a few menial servants. The authority of 
fortune, however, is very great even in an opulent and civilised society. That it is much 
greater than that either of age or of personal qualities has been the constant complaint 
of every period of society which admitted of any considerable inequality of fortune. 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth5.html (14 of 174)4/11/2005 9:48:50 AM
The Wealth of Nations
The first period of society, that of hunters, admits of no such inequality. Universal 
poverty establishes their universal equality, and the superiority either of age or of 
personal qualities are the feeble but the sole foundations of authority and 
subordination. There is therefore little or no authority or subordination in this period of 
society. The second period of society, that of shepherds, admits of very great 
inequalities of fortune, and there is no period in which the superiority of fortune gives 
so great authority to those who possess it. There is no period accordingly in which 
authority and subordination are more perfectly established. The authority of an 
Arabian sherif is very great; that of a Tartar khan altogether despotical. 
    The fourth of those causes or circumstances is the superiority of birth. Superiority of 
birth supposes an ancient superiority of fortune in the family of the person who claims 
it. All families are equally ancient; and the ancestors of the prince, though they may be 
better known, cannot well be more numerous than those of the beggar. Antiquity of 
family means everywhere the antiquity either of wealth, or of that greatness which is 
commonly either founded upon wealth, or accompanied with it. Upstart greatness is 
everywhere less respected than ancient greatness. The hatred of usurpers, the love of 
the family of an ancient monarch, are, in a great measure, founded upon the contempt 
which men naturally have for the former, and upon their veneration for the latter. As a 
military officer submits without reluctance to the authority of a superior by whom he 
has always been commanded, but cannot bear that his inferior should be set over his 
head, so men easily submit to a family to whom they and their ancestors have always 
submitted; but are fired with indignation when another family, in whom they had 
never acknowledged any such superiority, assumes a dominion over them. 
    The distinction of birth, being subsequent to the inequality of fortune, can have no 
place in nations of hunters, among whom all men, being equal in fortune, must 
likewise be very nearly equal in birth. The son of a wise and brave man may, indeed, 
even among them, be somewhat more respected than a man of equal merit who has the 
misfortune to be the son of a fool or a coward. The difference, however, will not be 
very great; and there never was, I believe, a great family in the world whose 
illustration was entirely derived from the inheritance of wisdom and virtue. 
    The distinction of birth not only may, but always does take place among nations of 
shepherds. Such nations are always strangers to every sort of luxury, and great wealth 
can scarce ever be dissipated among them by improvident profusion. There are no 
nations accordingly who abound more in families revered and honoured on account of 
their descent from a long race of great and illustrious ancestors, because there are no 
nations among whom wealth is likely to continue longer in the same families. 
    Birth and fortune are evidently the two circumstances which principally set one man 
above another. They are the two great sources of personal distinction, and are 
therefore the principal causes which naturally establish authority and subordination 
among men. Among nations of shepherds both those causes operate with their full 
force. The great shepherd or herdsman, respected on account of his great wealth, and 
of the great number of those who depend upon him for subsistence, and revered on 
account of the nobleness of his birth, and of the immemorial antiquity of his illustrious 
family, has a natural authority over all the inferior shepherds or herdsmen of his horde 
or clan. He can command the united force of a greater number of people than any of 
them. His military power is greater than that of any of them. In time of war they are all 
of them naturally disposed to muster themselves under his banner, rather than under 
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that of any other person, and his birth and fortune thus naturally procure to him some 
sort of executive power. By commanding, too, the united force of a greater number of 
people than any of them, he is best able to compel any one of them who may have 
injured another to compensate the wrong. He is the person, therefore, to whom all 
those who are too weak to defend themselves naturally look up for protection. It is to 
him that they naturally complain of the injuries which they imagine have been done to 
them, and his interposition in such cases is more easily submitted to, even by the 
person complained of, than that of any other person would be. His birth and fortune 
thus naturally procure him some sort of judicial authority. 
    It is in the age of shepherds, in the second period of society, that the inequality of 
fortune first begins to take place, and introduces among men a degree of authority and 
subordination which could not possibly exist before. It thereby introduces some degree 
of that civil government which is indispensably necessary for its own preservation: 
and it seems to do this naturally, and even independent of the consideration of that 
necessity. The consideration of that necessity comes no doubt afterwards to contribute 
very much to maintain and secure that authority and subordination. The rich, in 
particular, are necessarily interested to support that order of things which can alone 
secure them in the possession of their own advantages. Men of inferior wealth 
combine to defend those of superior wealth in the possession of their property, in order 
that men of superior wealth may combine to defend them in the possession of theirs. 
All the inferior shepherds and herdsmen feel that the security of their own herds and 
flocks depends upon the security of those of the great shepherd or herdsman; that the 
maintenance of their lesser authority depends upon that of his greater authority, and 
that upon their subordination to him depends his power of keeping their inferiors in 
subordination to them. They constitute a sort of little nobility, who feel themselves 
interested to defend the property and to support the authority of their own little 
sovereign in order that he may be able to defend their property and to support their 
authority. Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in 
reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have 
some property against those who have none at all. 
    The judicial authority of such a sovereign, however, far from being a cause of 
expense, was for a long time a source of revenue to him. The persons who applied to 
him for justice were always willing to pay for it, and a present never failed to 
accompany a petition. After the authority of the sovereign, too, was thoroughly 
established, the person found guilty, over and above the satisfaction which he was 
obliged to make to the party, was likewise forced to pay an amercement to the 
sovereign. He had given trouble, he had disturbed, he had broke the peace of his lord 
the king, and for those offences an amercement was thought due. In the Tartar 
governments of Asia, in the governments of Europe which were founded by the 
German and Scythian nations who overturned the Roman empire, the administration of 
justice was a considerable source of revenue, both to the sovereign and to all the lesser 
chiefs or lords who exercised under him any particular jurisdiction, either over some 
particular tribe or clan, or over some particular territory or district. Originally both the 
sovereign and the inferior chiefs used to exercise this jurisdiction in their own persons. 
Afterwards they universally found it convenient to delegate it to some substitute, 
bailiff, or judge. This substitute, however, was still obliged to account to his principal 
or constituent for the profits of the jurisdiction. Whoever reads the instructions which 
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were given to the judges of the circuit in the time of Henry II will see clearly that those 
judges were a sort of itinerant factors, sent round the country for the purpose of 
levying certain branches of the king's revenue. In those days the administration of 
justice not only afforded a certain revenue to the sovereign, but to procure this revenue 
seems to have been one of the principal advantages which he proposed to obtain by the 
administration of justice. 
    This scheme of making the administration of justice subservient to the purposes of 
revenue could scarce fail to be productive of several very gross abuses. The person 
who applied for justice with a large present in his hand was likely to get something 
more than justice; while he who applied for it with a small one was likely to get 
something less. Justice, too, might frequently be delayed in order that this present 
might be repeated. The amercement, besides, of the person complained of, might 
frequently suggest a very strong reason for finding him in the wrong, even when he 
had not really been so. That such abuses were far from being uncommon the ancient 
history of every country in Europe bears witness. 
    When the sovereign or chief exercised his judicial authority in his own person, how 
much soever he might abuse it, it must have been scarce possible to get any redress, 
because there could seldom be anybody powerful enough to call him to account. When 
he exercised it by a bailiff, indeed, redress might sometimes be had. If it was for his 
own benefit only that the bailiff had been guilty of any act of injustice, the sovereign 
himself might not always be unwilling to punish him, or to oblige him to repair the 
wrong. But if it was for the benefit of his sovereign, if it was in order to make court to 
the person who appointed him and who might prefer him, that he had committed any 
act of oppression, redress would upon most occasions be as impossible as if the 
sovereign had committed it himself. In all barbarous governments, accordingly, in all 
those ancient governments of Europe in particular which were founded upon the ruins 
of the Roman empire, the administration of justice appears for a long time to have 
been extremely corrupt, far from being quite equal and impartial even under the best 
monarchs, and altogether profligate under the worst. 
    Among nations of shepherds, where the sovereign or chief is only the greatest 
shepherd or herdsman of the horde or clan, he is maintained in the same manner as any 
of his vassals or subjects, by the increase of his own herds or flocks. Among those 
nations of husbandmen who are but just come out of the shepherd state, and who are 
not much advanced beyond that state, such as the Greek tribes appear to have been 
about the time of the Trojan war, and our German and Scythian ancestors when they 
first settled upon the ruins of the western empire, the sovereign or chief is, in the same 
manner, only the greatest landlord of the country, and is maintained, in the same 
manner as any other landlord, by a revenue derived from his own private estate, or 
from what, in modern Europe, was called the demesne of the crown. His subjects, 
upon ordinary occasions, contributed nothing to his support, except when, in order to 
protect them from the oppression of some of their fellow-subjects, they stand in need 
of his authority. The presents which they make him upon such occasions constitute the 
whole ordinary revenue, the whole of the emoluments which, except perhaps upon 
some very extraordinary emergencies, he derives from his dominion over them. When 
Agamemnon, in Homer, offers to Achilles for his friendship the sovereignty of seven 
Greek cities, the sole advantage which he mentions as likely to be derived from it was 
that the people would honour him with presents. As long as such presents, as long as 
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the emoluments of justice, or what may be called the fees of court, constituted in this 
manner the whole ordinary revenue which the sovereign derived from his sovereignty, 
it could not well be expected, it could not even decently be proposed, that he should 
give them up altogether. It might, and it frequently was proposed, that he should 
regulate and ascertain them. But after they had been so regulated and ascertained, how 
to hinder a person who was all-powerful from extending them beyond those 
regulations was still very difficult, not to say impossible. During the continuance of 
this state of things, therefore, the corruption of justice, naturally resulting from the 
arbitrary and uncertain nature of those presents, scarce admitted of any effectual 
remedy. 
    But when from different causes, chiefly from the continually increasing expenses of 
defending the nation against the invasion of other nations, the private estate of the 
sovereign had become altogether insufficient for defraying the expense of the 
sovereignty, and when it had become necessary that the people should, for their own 
security, contribute towards this expense by taxes of different kinds, it seems to have 
been very commonly stipulated that no present for the administration of justice should, 
under any pretence, be accepted either by the sovereign, or by his bailiffs and 
substitutes, the judges. Those presents, it seems to have been supposed, could more 
easily be abolished altogether than effectually regulated and ascertained. Fixed salaries 
were appointed to the judges, which were supposed to compensate to them the loss of 
whatever might have been their share of the ancient emoluments of justice, as the 
taxes more than compensated to the sovereign the loss of his. Justice was then said to 
be administered gratis. 
    Justice, however, never was in reality administered gratis in any country. Lawyers 
and attorneys, at least, must always be paid by the parties; and, if they were not, they 
would perform their duty still worse than they actually perform it. The fees annually 
paid to lawyers and attorneys amount, in every court, to a much greater sum than the 
salaries of the judges. The circumstance of those salaries being paid by the crown can 
nowhere much diminish the necessary expense of a law-suit. But it was not so much to 
diminish the expense, as to prevent the corruption of justice, that the judges were 
prohibited from receiving any present or fee from the parties. 
    The office of judge is in itself so very honourable that men are willing to accept of 
it, though accompanied with very small emoluments. The inferior office of justice of 
peace, though attended with a good deal of trouble, and in most cases with no 
emoluments at all, is an object of ambition to the greater part of our country 
gentlemen. The salaries of all the different judges, high and low, together with the 
whole expense of the administration and execution of justice, even where it is not 
managed with very good economy, makes, in any civilised country, but a very 
inconsiderable part of the whole expense of government. 
    The whole expense of justice, too, might easily be defrayed by the fees of court; 
and, without exposing the administration of justice to any real hazard of corruption, 
the public revenue might thus be discharged from a certain, though, perhaps, but a 
small incumbrance. It is difficult to regulate the fees of court effectually where a 
person so powerful as the sovereign is to share in them, and to derive any considerable 
part of his revenue from them. It is very easy where the judge is the principal person 
who can reap any benefit from them. The law can very easily oblige the judge to 
respect the regulation, though it might not always be able to make the sovereign 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth5.html (18 of 174)4/11/2005 9:48:50 AM
The Wealth of Nations
respect it. Where the fees of court are precisely regulated and ascertained, where they 
are paid all at once, at a certain period of every process, into the hands of a cashier or 
receiver, to be by him distributed in certain known proportions among the different 
judges after the process is decided, and not till it is decided, there seems to be no more 
danger of corruption than where such fees are prohibited altogether. Those fees, 
without occasioning any considerable increase in the expense of a lawsuit, might be 
rendered fully sufficient for defraying the whole expense of justice. By not being paid 
to the judges till the process was determined, they might be some incitement to the 
diligence of the court in examining and deciding it. In courts which consisted of a 
considerable number of judges, by proportioning the share of each judge to the number 
of hours and days which he had employed in examining the process, either in the court 
or in a committee by order of the court, those fees might give some encouragement to 
the diligence of each particular judge. Public services are never better performed than 
when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is 
proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them. In the different 
parliaments of France, the fees of court (called epices and vacations) constitute the far 
greater part of the emoluments of the judges. After all deductions are made, the net 
salary paid by the crown to a counsellor or judge in the Parliament of Toulouse, in 
rank and dignity the second parliament of the kingdom, amounts only to a hundred and 
fifty livres, about six pounds eleven shillings sterling a year. About seven years ago 
that sum was in the same place the ordinary yearly wages of a common footman. The 
distribution of those epices, too, is according to the diligence of the judges. A diligent 
judge gains a comfortable, though moderate, revenue by his office: an idle one gets 
little more than his salary. Those Parliaments are perhaps, in many respects, not very 
convenient courts of justice; but they have never been accused, they seem never even 
to have been suspected, of corruption. 
    The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different 
courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much 
business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognisance of many 
suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. The Court of 
King's Bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognisance of civil 
suits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been 
guilty of some trespass or misdemeanour. The Court of Exchequer, instituted for the 
levying of the king's revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as 
were due to the king, took cognisance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alleging 
that he could not pay the king because the defendant would not pay him. In 
consequence of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the 
parties before what court they would choose to have their cause tried; and each court 
endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as 
it could. The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, 
perhaps, originally in a great measure formed by this emulation which anciently took 
place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own 
court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for every 
sort of injustice. Originally the courts of law gave damages only for breach of contract. 
The Court of Chancery, as a court of conscience, first took upon it to enforce the 
specific performance of agreements. When the breach of contract consisted in the non-
payment of money, the damage sustained could be compensated in no other way than 
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by ordering payment, which was equivalent to a specific performance of the 
agreement. In such cases, therefore, the remedy of the courts of law was sufficient. It 
was not so in others. When the tenant sued his lord for having unjustly outed him of 
his lease, the damages which he recovered were by no means equivalent to the 
possession of the land. Such causes, therefore, for some time, went all to the Court of 
Chancery, to the no small loss of the courts of law. It was to draw back such causes to 
themselves that the courts of law are said to have invented the artificial and fictitious 
Writ of Ejectment, the most effectual remedy for an unjust outer or dispossession of 
land. 
    A stamp-duty upon the law proceedings of each particular court, to be levied by that 
court, and applied towards the maintenance of the judges and other officers belonging 
to it, might, in the same manner, afford revenue sufficient for defraying the expense of 
the administration of justice, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of 
the society. The judges indeed might, in this case, be under the temptation of 
multiplying unnecessarily the proceedings upon every cause, in order to increase, as 
much as possible, the produce of such a stamp-duty. It has been the custom in modern 
Europe to regulate, upon most occasions, the payment of the attorneys and clerks of 
court according to the number of pages which they had occasion to write; the court, 
however, requiring that each page should contain so many lines, and each line so many 
words. In order to increase their payment, the attorneys and clerks have contrived to 
multiply words beyond all necessity, to the corruption of the law language of, I 
believe, every court of justice in Europe. A like temptation might perhaps occasion a 
like corruption in the form of law proceedings. 
    But whether the administration of justice be so contrived as to defray its own 
expense, or whether the judges be maintained by fixed salaries paid to them from 
some other fund, it does not seem necessary that the person or persons entrusted with 
the executive power should be charged with the management of that fund, or with the 
payment of those salaries. That fund might arise from the rent of landed estates, the 
management of each estate being entrusted to the particular court which was to be 
maintained by it. That fund might arise even from the interest of a sum of money, the 
lending out of which might, in the same manner, be entrusted to the court which was 
to be maintained by it. A part, though indeed but a small part, of the salary of the 
judges of the Court of Session in Scotland arises from the interest of a sum of money. 
The necessary instability of such a fund seems, however, to render it an improper one 
for the maintenance of an institution which ought to last for ever. 
    The separation of the judicial from the executive power seems originally to have 
arisen from the increasing business of the society, in consequence of its increasing 
improvement. The administration of justice became so laborious and so complicated a 
duty as to require the undivided attention of the persons to whom it was entrusted. The 
person entrusted with the executive power not having leisure to attend to the decision 
of private causes himself, a deputy was appointed to decide them in his stead. In the 
progress of the Roman greatness, the consul was too much occupied with the political 
affairs of the state to attend to the administration of justice. A praetor, therefore, was 
appointed to administer it in his stead. In the progress of the European monarchies 
which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the sovereigns and the great 
lords came universally to consider the administration of justice as an office both too 
laborious and too ignoble for them to execute in their own persons. They universally, 
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therefore, discharged themselves of it by appointing a deputy, bailiff, or judge. 
    When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice 
should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called polities. The persons 
entrusted with the great interests of the state may, even without any corrupt views, 
sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private 
man. But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every 
individual, the sense which he has of his own security. In order to make every 
individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs 
to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive 
power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power. 
The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice 
of that power. The regular the good-will or even upon the good economy payment of 
his salary should not depend upon of that power. 
PART 3
Of the Expense of Public Works and Public Institutions
THE third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and 
maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, though they may 
be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature 
that the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of 
individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small 
number of individuals should erect or maintain. The performance of this duty requires, 
too, very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society. 
    After the public institutions and public works necessary for the defence of the 
society, and for the administration of justice, both of which have already been 
mentioned, the other works and institutions of this kind are chiefly those for 
facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for promoting the instruction of the 
people. The institutions for instruction are of two kinds: those for the education of 
youth, and those for the instruction of people of all ages. The consideration of the 
manner in which the expense of those different sorts of public, works and institutions 
may be most properly defrayed will divide this third part of the present chapter into 
three different articles. 
ARTICLE 1
Of the Public Works and Institutions for facilitating the Commerce of the Society
And, first, of those which are necessary for facilitating Commerce in general.
That the erection and maintenance of the public works which facilitate the commerce 
of any country, such as good roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbours, etc., must 
require very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society is evident 
without any proof. The expense of making and maintaining the public roads of any 
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country must evidently increase with the annual produce of the land and labour of that 
country, or with the quantity and weight of the goods which it becomes necessary to 
fetch and carry upon those roads. The strength of a bridge must be suited to the 
number and weight of the carriages which are likely to pass over it. The depth and the 
supply of water for a navigable canal must be proportioned to the number and tonnage 
of the lighters which are likely to carry goods upon it; the extent of a harbour to the 
number of the shipping which are likely to take shelter in it. 
    It does not seem necessary that the expense of those public works should be 
defrayed from that public revenue, as it is commonly called, of which the collection 
and application is in most countries assigned to the executive power. The greater part 
of such public works may easily be so managed as to afford a particular revenue 
sufficient for defraying their own expense, without bringing any burden upon the 
general revenue of the society. 
    A highway, a bridge, a navigable canal, for example, may in most cases be both 
made and maintained by a small toll upon the carriages which make use of them: a 
harbour, by a moderate port-duty upon the tonnage of the shipping which load or 
unload in it. The coinage, another institution for facilitating commerce, in many 
countries, not only defrays its own expense, but affords a small revenue or seignorage 
to the sovereign. The post-office, another institution for the same purpose, over and 
above defraying its own expense, affords in almost all countries a very considerable 
revenue to the sovereign. 
    When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and the lighters which 
sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their weight or their tonnage, they 
pay for the maintenance of those public works exactly in proportion to the wear and 
tear which they occasion of them. It seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable 
way of maintaining such works. This tax or toll too, though it is advanced by the 
carrier, is finally paid by the consumer, to whom it must always be charged in the 
price of the goods. As the expense of carriage, however, is very much reduced by 
means of such public works, the goods, notwithstanding the toll come cheaper to the 
consumer than the; could otherwise have done; their price not being so much raised by 
the toll as it is lowered by the cheapness of the carriage. The person who finally pays 
this tax, therefore, gains by the application more than he loses by the payment of it. 
His payment is exactly in proportion to his gain. It is in reality no more than a part of 
that gain which he is obliged to give up in order to get the rest. It seems impossible to 
imagine a more equitable method of raising a tax. 
    When the toll upon carriages of luxury upon coaches, post-chaises, etc., is made 
somewhat higher in proportion to their weight than upon carriages of necessary use, 
such as carts, waggons, etc., the indolence and vanity of the rich is made to contribute 
in a very easy manner to the relief of the poor, by rendering cheaper the transportation 
of heavy goods to all the different parts of the country. 
    When high roads, bridges, canals, etc., are in this manner made and supported by 
the commerce which is carried on by means of them, they can be made only where 
that commerce requires them, and consequently where it is proper to make them. Their 
expenses too, their grandeur and magnificence, must be suited to what that commerce 
can afford to pay. They must be made consequently as it is proper to make them. A 
magnificent high road cannot be made through a desert country where there is little or 
no commerce, or merely because it happens to lead to the country villa of the intendant 
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of the province, or to that of some great lord to whom the intendant finds it convenient 
to make his court. A great bridge cannot be thrown over a river at a place where 
nobody passes, or merely to embellish the view from the windows of a neighbouring 
palace: things which sometimes happen in countries where works of this kind are 
carried on by any other revenue than that which they themselves are capable of 
affording. 
    In several different parts of Europe the ton or lock-duty upon a canal is the property 
of private persons, whose private interest obliges them to keep up the canal. If it is not 
kept in tolerable order, the navigation necessarily ceases altogether, and along with it 
the whole profit which they can make by the tolls. If those tolls were put under the 
management of commissioners, who had themselves no interest in them, they might be 
less attentive to the maintenance of the works which produced them. The canal of 
Languedoc cost the King of France and the province upwards of thirteen millions of 
livres, which (at twenty-eight livres the mark of silver, the value of French money in 
the end of the last century) amounted to upwards of nine hundred thousand pounds 
sterling. When that great work was finished, the most likely method, it was found, of 
keeping it in constant repair was to make a present of the tolls to Riquet the engineer, 
who planned and conducted the work. Those tolls constitute at present a very large 
estate to the different branches of the family of that gentleman, who have, therefore, a 
great interest to keep the work in constant repair. But had those tolls been put under 
the management of commissioners, who had no such interest, they might perhaps have 
been dissipated in ornamental and unnecessary expenses, while the most essential 
parts of the work were allowed to go to ruin. 
    The tolls for the maintenance of a high road cannot with any safety be made the 
property of private persons. A high road, though entirely neglected, does not become 
altogether impassable, though a canal does. The proprietors of the tolls upon a high 
road, therefore, might neglect altogether the repair of the road, and yet continue to 
levy very nearly the same tolls. It is proper, therefore, that the tolls for the 
maintenance of such a work should be put under the management of commissioners or 
trustees. 
    In Great Britain, the abuses which the trustees have committed in the management 
of those tolls have in many cases been very justly complained of. At many turnpikes, it 
has been said, the money levied is more than double of what is necessary for 
executing, in the completest manner, the work which is often executed in very 
slovenly manner, and sometimes not executed at all. The system of repairing the high 
roads by tolls of this kind, it must be observed, is not of very long standing. We should 
not wonder, therefore, if it has not yet been brought to that degree of perfection of 
which it seems capable. If mean and improper persons are frequently appointed 
trustees, and if proper courts of inspection and account have not yet been established 
for controlling their conduct, and for reducing the tolls to what is barely sufficient for 
executing the work to be done by them, the recency of the institution both accounts 
and apologizes for those defects, of which, by the wisdom of Parliament, the greater 
part may in due time be gradually remedied. 
    The money levied at the different turnpikes in Great Britain is supposed to exceed 
so much what is necessary for repairing the roads, that the savings, which, with proper 
economy, might be made from it, have been considered, even by some ministers, as a 
very great resource which might at some time or another be applied to the exigencies 
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of the state. Government, it has been said, by taking the management of the turnpikes 
into its own hands, and by employing the soldiers, who would work for a very small 
addition to their pay, could keep the roads in good order at a much less expense than it 
can be done by trustees, who have no other workmen to employ but such as derive 
their whole subsistence from their wages. A great revenue, half a million perhaps,* it 
has been pretended, might in this manner be gained without laying any new burden 
upon the people; and the turnpike roads might be made to contribute to the general 
expense of the state, in the same manner as the post office does at present. * Since 
publishing the two first editions of this book, I have got good reasons to believe that all the 
turnpike tolls levied in Great Britain do not produce a net revenue that amounts to half a 
million; a sum which, under the management of Government, would not be sufficient to keep 
in repair five of the principal roads in the kingdom. 
That a considerable revenue might be gained in this manner I have no doubt, though 
probably not near so much as the projectors of this plan have supposed. The plan 
itself, however, seems liable to several very important objections. 
    First, if the tolls which are levied at the turnpikes should ever be considered as one 
of the resources for supplying the exigencies of the state, they would certainly be 
augmented as those exigencies were supposed to require. According to the policy of 
Great Britain, therefore, they would probably be augmented very fast. The facility 
with which a great revenue could be drawn from them would probably encourage 
administration to recur very frequently to this resource. Though it may, perhaps, be 
more than doubtful whether half a million could by any economy be saved out of the 
present tolls, it can scarce be doubted but that a million might be saved out of them if 
they were doubled: and perhaps two millions if they were tripled.* This great revenue, 
too, might be levied without the appointment of a single new officer to collect and 
receive it. But the turnpike tolls being continually augmented in this manner, instead 
of facilitating the inland commerce of the country as at present, would soon become a 
very great incumbrance upon it. The expense of transporting all heavy goods from one 
part of the country to another would soon be so much increased, the market for all 
such goods, consequently, would soon be so much narrowed, that their production 
would be in a great measure discouraged, and the most important branches of the 
domestic industry of the country annihilated altogether. 
* I have now good reasons to believe that all these conjectural sums are by much too large.
Secondly, a tax upon carriages in proportion to their weight, though a very equal tax 
when applied to the sole purpose of repairing the roads, is a very unequal one when 
applied to any other purpose, or to supply the common exigencies of the state. When it 
is applied to the sole purpose above mentioned, each carriage is supposed to pay 
exactly for the wear and tear which that carriage occasions of the roads. But when it is 
applied to any other purpose, each carriage is supposed to pay for more than that wear 
and tear, and contributes to the supply of some other exigency of the state. But as the 
turnpike toll raises the price of goods in proportion to their weight, and not to their 
value, it is chiefly paid by the consumers of coarse and bulky, not by those of precious 
and light, commodities. Whatever exigency of the state therefore this tax might be 
intended to supply, that exigency would be chiefly supplied at the expense of the poor, 
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not the rich; at the expense of those who are least able to supply it, not of those who 
are most able. 
    Thirdly, if government should at any time neglect the reparation of the high roads, it 
would be still more difficult than it is at present to compel the proper application of 
any part of the turnpike tolls. A large revenue might thus be levied upon the people 
without any part of it being applied to the only purpose to which a revenue levied in 
this manner ought ever to be applied. If the meanness and poverty of the trustees of 
turnpike roads render it sometimes difficult at present to oblige them to repair their 
wrong, their wealth and greatness would render it ten times more so in the case which 
is here supposed. 
    In France, the funds destined for the reparation of high roads are under the 
immediate direction of the executive power. Those funds consist partly in a certain 
number of days' labour which the country people are in most parts of Europe obliged 
to give to the reparation of the highways, and partly in such a portion of the general 
revenue of the state as the king chooses to spare from his other expenses. 
    By the ancient law of France, as well as by that of most other parts of Europe, the 
labour of the country people was under the direction of a local or provincial 
magistracy, which had no immediate dependency upon the king's council. But by the 
present practice both the labour of the people, and whatever other fund the king may 
choose to assign for the reparation of the high roads in any particular province or 
generality, are entirely under the management of the intendant; an officer who is 
appointed and removed by the king's council, and who receives his orders from it, and 
is in constant correspondence with it. In the progress of despotism the authority of the 
executive power gradually absorbs that of every other power in the state, and assumes 
to itself the management of every branch of revenue which is destined for any public 
purpose. In France, however, the great post-roads, the roads which make the 
communication between the principal towns of the kingdom, are in general kept in 
good order, and in some provinces are even a good deal superior to the greater part of 
the turnpike roads of England. But what we call the cross-roads, that is, the far greater 
part of the roads in the country, are entirely neglected, and are in many places 
absolutely impassable for any heavy carriage. In some places it is even dangerous to 
travel on horseback, and mules are the only conveyances which can safely be trusted. 
The proud minister of an ostentatious court may frequently take pleasure in executing 
a work of splendour and magnificence, such as a great highway, which is frequently 
seen by the principal nobility, whose applauses not only flatter his vanity, but even 
contribute to support his interest at court. But to execute a great number of little 
works, in which nothing that can be done can make any great appearance, or excite the 
smallest degree of admiration in any traveller, and which, in short, have nothing to 
recommend them but their extreme utility, is a business which appears in every respect 
too mean and paltry to merit the attention of so great a magistrate. Under such an 
administration, therefore, such works are almost always entirely neglected. 
    In China, and in several other governments of Asia, the executive power charges 
itself both with the reparation of the high roads and with the maintenance of the 
navigable canals. In the instructions which are given to the governor of each province, 
those objects, it is said, are constantly recommended to him, and the judgment which 
the court forms of his conduct is very much regulated by the attention which he 
appears to have paid to this part of his instructions. This branch of public police 
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accordingly is said to be very much attended to in all those countries, but particularly 
in China, where the high roads, and still more the navigable canals, it is pretended, 
exceed very much everything of the same kind which is known in Europe. The 
accounts of those works, however, which have been transmitted to Europe, have 
generally been drawn up by weak and wondering travellers; frequently by stupid and 
lying missionaries. If they had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if the 
accounts of them had been reported by more faithful witnesses, they would not, 
perhaps, appear to be so wonderful. The account which Bernier gives of some works 
of this kind in Indostan falls very much short of what had been reported of them by 
other travellers, more disposed to the marvellous than he was. It may too, perhaps, be 
in those countries, as in France, where the great roads, the great communications 
which are likely to be the subjects of conversation at the court and in the capital, are 
attended to, and all the rest neglected. In China, besides, in Indostan, and in several 
other governments of Asia, the revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether from 
a land tax or land rent, which rises or falls with the rise and fall of the annual produce 
of the land. The great interest of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue, is in such 
countries necessarily and immediately connected with the cultivation of the land, with 
the greatness of its produce, and with the value of its produce. But in order to render 
that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it is necessary to procure to it as 
extensive a market as possible, and consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, 
and the least expensive communication between all the different parts of the country; 
which can be done only by means of the best roads and the best navigable canals. But 
the revenue of the sovereign does not, in any part of Europe, arise chiefly from a land 
tax or land rent. In all the great kingdoms of Europe, perhaps, the greater part of it may 
ultimately depend upon the produce of the land: but that dependency is neither so 
immediate, nor so evident. In Europe, therefore, the sovereign does not feel himself so 
directly called upon to promote the increase, both in quantity and value, of the produce 
of the land, or, by maintaining good roads and canals, to provide the most extensive 
market for that produce. Though it should be true, therefore, what I apprehend is not a 
little doubtful, that in some parts of Asia this department of the public police is very 
properly managed by the executive power, there is not the least probability that, during 
the present state of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power in any part of 
Europe. 
    Even those public works which are of such a nature that they cannot afford any 
revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the conveniency is nearly confined 
to some particular place or district, are always better maintained by a local or 
provincial revenue, under the management of a local or provincial administration, than 
by the general revenue of the state, of which the executive power must always have 
the management. Were the streets of London to be lighted and paved at the expense of 
the treasury, is there any probability that they would be so well lighted and paved as 
they are at present, or even at so small an expense? The expense, besides, instead of 
being raised by a local tax upon the inhabitants of each particular street, parish, or 
district in London, would, in this case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the 
state, and would consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the 
kingdom, of whom the greater part derive no sort of benefit from the lighting and 
paving of the streets of London. 
    The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and provincial administration of a 
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local and provincial revenue, how enormous soever they may appear, are in reality, 
however, almost always very trifling in comparison of those which commonly take 
place in the administration and expenditure of the revenue of a great empire. They are, 
besides, much more easily corrected. Under the local or provincial administration of 
the justices of the peace in Great Britain, the six days' labour which the country people 
are obliged to give to the reparation of the highways is not always perhaps very 
judiciously applied, but it is scarce ever exacted with any circumstances of cruelty or 
oppression. In France, under the administration of the intendants, the application is not 
always more judicious, and the exaction is frequently the most cruel and oppressive. 
Such Corvees, as they are called, make one of the principal instruments of tyranny by 
which those officers chastise any parish or communaute which has had the misfortune 
to fall under their displeasure. 
Of the Public Works and Institutions which are necessary for facilitating 
particular Branches of Commerce.
The object of the public works and institutions above mentioned is to facilitate 
commerce in general. But in order to facilitate some particular branches of it, 
particular institutions are necessary, which again require a particular and extraordinary 
expense. 
    Some particular branches of commerce, which are carried on with barbarous and 
uncivilised nations, require extraordinary protection. An ordinary store or counting-
house could give little security to the goods of the merchants who trade to the western 
coast of Africa. To defend them from the barbarous natives, it is necessary that the 
place where they are deposited should be, in some measure, fortified. The disorders in 
the government of Indostan have been supposed to render a like precaution necessary 
even among that mild and gentle people; and it was under pretence of securing their 
persons and property from violence that both the English and French East India 
Companies were allowed to erect the first forts which they possessed in that country. 
Among other nations, whose vigorous government will suffer no strangers to possess 
any fortified place within their territory, it may be necessary to maintain some 
ambassador, minister, or counsel, who may both decide, according to their own 
customs, the differences arising among his own countrymen, and, in their disputes 
with the natives, may, by means of his public character, interfere with more authority, 
and afford them a more powerful protection, than they could expect from any private 
man. The interests of commerce have frequently made it necessary to maintain 
ministers in foreign countries where the purposes, either of war or alliance, would not 
have required any. The commerce of the Turkey Company first occasioned the 
establishment of an ordinary ambassador at Constantinople. The first English 
embassies to Russia arose altogether from commercial interests. The constant 
interference which those interests necessarily occasioned between the subjects of the 
different states of Europe, has probably introduced the custom of keeping, in all 
neighbouring countries, ambassadors or ministers constantly resident even in the time 
of peace. This custom, unknown to ancient times, seems not to be older than the end of 
the fifteenth or beginning of the sixteenth century; that is, than the time when 
commerce first began to extend itself to the greater part of the nations of Europe, and 
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when they first began to attend to its interests. 
    It seems not unreasonable that the extraordinary expense which the protection of 
any particular branch of commerce may occasion should be defrayed by a moderate 
tax upon that particular branch; by a moderate fine, for example, to be paid by the 
traders when they first enter into it, or, what is more equal, by a particular duty of so 
much per cent upon the goods which they either import into, or export out of, the 
particular countries with which it is carried on. The protection of trade in general, from 
pirates and freebooters, is said to have given occasion to the first institution of the 
duties of customs. But, if it was thought reasonable to lay a general tax upon trade, in 
order to defray the expense of protecting trade in general, it should seem equally 
reasonable to lay a particular tax upon a particular branch of trade, in order to defray 
the extraordinary expense of protecting that branch. 
    The protection of trade in general has always been considered as essential to the 
defence of the commonwealth, and, upon that account, a necessary part of the duty of 
the executive power. The collection and application of the general duties of customs, 
therefore, have always been left to that power. But the protection of any particular 
branch of trade is a part of the general protection of trade; a part, therefore, of the duty 
of that power; and if nations always acted consistently, the particular duties levied for 
the purposes of such particular protection should always have been left equally to its 
disposal. But in this respect, as well as in many others, nations have not always acted 
consistently; and in the greater part of the commercial states of Europe, particular 
companies of merchants have had the address to persuade the legislature to entrust to 
them the performance of this part of the duty of the sovereign, together with all the 
powers which are necessarily connected with it. 
    These companies, though they may, perhaps, have been useful for the first 
introduction of some branches of commerce, by making, at their own expense, an 
experiment which the state might not think it prudent to make, have in the long run 
proved, universally, either burdensome or useless, and have either mismanaged or 
confined the trade. 
    When those companies do not trade upon a joint stock, but are obliged to admit any 
person, properly qualified, upon paying a certain fine, and agreeing to submit to the 
regulations of the company, each member trading upon his own stock, and at his own 
risk, they are called regulated companies. When they trade upon a joint stock, each 
member sharing in the common profit or loss in proportion to his share in this stock, 
they are called joint stock companies. Such companies, whether regulated or joint 
stock, sometimes have, and sometimes have not, exclusive privileges. 
    Regulated companies resemble, in every respect, the corporations of trades so 
common in the cities and towns of all the different countries of Europe, and are a sort 
of enlarged monopolies of the same kind. As no inhabitant of a town can exercise an 
incorporated trade without first obtaining his freedom in the corporation, so in most 
cases no subject of the state can lawfully carry on any branch of foreign trade, for 
which a regulated company is established, without first becoming a member of that 
company. The monopoly is more or less strict according as the terms of admission are 
more or less difficult; and according as the directors of the company have more or less 
authority, or have it more or less in their power to manage in such a manner as to 
confine the greater part of the trade to themselves and their particular friends. In the 
most ancient regulated companies the privileges of apprenticeship were the same as in 
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other corporations, and entitled the person who had served his time to a member of the 
company to become himself a member, either without paying any fine, or upon paying 
a much smaller one than what was exacted of other people. The usual corporation 
spirit, wherever the law does not restrain it, prevails in all regulated companies. When 
they have been allowed to act according to their natural genius, they have always, in 
order to confine the competition to as small a number of persons as possible, 
endeavoured to subject the trade to many burden some regulations. When the law has 
restrained them from doing this, they have become altogether useless and 
insignificant. 
    The regulated companies for foreign commerce which at present subsist in Great 
Britain are the ancient merchant adventurers' company, now commonly called the 
Hamburg Company, the Russia Company, the Eastland Company, the Turkey 
Company, and the African Company. 
    The terms of admission into the Hamburg Company are now said to be quite easy, 
and the directors either have it not their power to subject the trade to any burdensome 
restraint or regulations, or, at least, have not of late exercised that power. It has not 
always been so. About the middle of the last century, the fine for admission was fifty, 
and at one time one hundred pounds, and the conduct of the company was said to be 
extremely oppressive. In 1643, in 1645, and in 1661, the clothiers and free traders of 
the West of England complained of them to Parliament as of monopolists who 
confined the trade and oppressed the manufactures of the country. Though those 
complaints produced an Act of Parliament, they had probably intimidated the company 
so far as to oblige them to reform their conduct. Since that time, at least, there has 
been no complaints against them. By the 10th and 11th of William III, c. 6, the fine for 
admission into the Russia Company was reduced to five pounds; and by the 25th of 
Charles II, c. 7, that for admission into the Eastland Company to forty shillings, while, 
at the same time, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, all the countries on the north side of 
the Baltic, were exempted from their exclusive charter. The conduct of those 
companies had probably given occasion to those two Acts of Parliament. Before that 
time, Sir Josiah Child had represented both these and the Hamburg Company as 
extremely oppressive, and imputed to their bad management the low state of the trade 
which we at that time carried on to the countries comprehended within their respective 
charters. But though such companies may not, in the present times, be very oppressive, 
they are certainly altogether useless. To be merely useless, indeed, is perhaps the 
highest eulogy which can ever justly be bestowed upon a regulated company; and all 
the three companies above mentioned seem, in their present state, to deserve this 
eulogy. 
    The fine for admission into the Turkey Company was formerly twenty-five pounds 
for all persons under twenty-six years of age, and fifty pounds for all persons above 
that age. Nobody but mere merchants could be admitted; a restriction which excluded 
all shopkeepers and retailers. By a bye-law, no British manufactures could be exported 
to Turkey but in the general ships of the company; and as those ships sailed always 
from the port of London, this restriction confined the trade to that expensive port, and 
the traders to those who lived in London and in its neighbourhood. By another bye-
law, no person living within twenty miles of London, and not free of the city, could be 
admitted a member; another restriction which, joined to the foregoing, necessarily 
excluded all but the freemen of London. As the time for the loading and sailing of 
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those general ships depended altogether upon the directors, they could easily fill them 
with their own goods and those of their particular friends, to the exclusion of others, 
who, they might pretend, had made their proposals too late. In this state of things, 
therefore, this company was in every respect a strict and oppressive monopoly. Those 
abuses gave occasion to the act of the 26th of George II, c. 18, reducing the fine for 
admission to twenty pounds for all persons, without any distinction of ages, or any 
restriction, either to mere merchants, or to the freemen of London; and granting to all 
such persons the liberty of exporting, from all the ports of Great Britain to any port in 
Turkey, all British goods of which the exportation was not prohibited; and of 
importing from thence all Turkish goods of which the importation was not prohibited, 
upon paying both the general duties of customs, and the particular duties assessed for 
defraying the necessary expenses of the company; and submitting, at the same time, to 
the lawful authority of the British ambassador and consuls resident in Turkey, and to 
the bye laws of the company duly enacted. To prevent any oppression by those bye-
laws, it was by the same act ordained, that if any seven members of the company 
conceived themselves aggrieved by any bye-law which should be enacted after the 
passing of this act, they might appeal to the Board of Trade and Plantations (to the 
authority of which a committee of the Privy Council has now succeeded), provided 
such appeal was brought within twelve months after the bye-law was enacted; and that 
if any seven members conceived themselves aggrieved by any bye-law which had 
been enacted before the passing of this act, they might bring a like appeal, provided it 
was within twelve months after the day on which this act was to take place. The 
experience of one year, however, may not always be sufficient to discover to all the 
members of a great company, the pernicious tendency of a particular bye-law; and if 
several of them should afterwards discover it, neither the Board of Trade, nor the 
committee of council, can afford them any redress. The object, besides, of the greater 
part of the bye-laws of all regulated companies, as well as of all other corporations, is 
not so much to oppress those who are already members, as to discourage others from 
becoming so; which may be done, not only by a high fine, but by many other 
contrivances. The constant view of such companies is always to raise the rate of their 
own profit as high as they can; to keep the market, both for the goods which they 
export, and for those which they import, as much understocked as they can: which can 
be done only by restraining the competition, or by discouraging new adventurers from 
entering into the trade. A fine even of twenty pounds, besides, though it may not 
perhaps be sufficient to discourage any man from entering into the Turkey trade with 
an intention to continue in it, may be enough to discourage a speculative merchant 
from hazarding a single adventure in it. In all trades, the regular established traders, 
even though not incorporated, naturally combine to raise profits, which are noway so 
likely to be kept, at all times, down to their proper level, as by the occasional 
competition of speculative adventure. The Turkey trade, though in some measure laid 
open by this Act of Parliament, is still considered by many people as very far from 
being altogether free. The Turkey Company contribute to maintain an ambassador and 
two or three consuls, who, like other public ministers, ought to be maintained 
altogether by the state, and the trade laid open to all his Majesty's subjects. The 
different taxes levied by the company, for this and other corporation purposes, might 
afford avenue much more than sufficient to enable the state to maintain such ministers. 
    Regulated companies, it was observed by Sir Josiah Child, though they had 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth5.html (30 of 174)4/11/2005 9:48:50 AM
The Wealth of Nations
frequently supported public ministers, had never maintained any forts or garrisons in 
the countries to which they traded; whereas joint stock companies frequently had. And 
in reality the former seem to be much more unfit for this sort of service than the latter. 
First, the directors of a regulated company have no particular interest in the prosperity 
of the general trade of the company for the sake of which such forts and garrisons are 
maintained. The decay of that general trade may even frequently contribute to the 
advantage of their own private trade; as by diminishing the number of their 
competitors it may enable them both to buy cheaper, and to sell dearer. The directors 
of a joint stock company, on the contrary, having only their share in the profits which 
are made upon the common stock committed to their management, have no private 
trade of their own of which the interest can be separated from that of the general trade 
of the company. Their private interest is connected with the prosperity of the general 
trade of the company, and with the maintenance of the forts and garrisons which are 
necessary for its defence. They are more likely, therefore, to have that continual and 
careful attention which that maintenance necessarily requires. Secondly, the directors 
of a joint stock company have always the management of a large capital, the joint 
stock of the company, a part of which they may frequently employ, with propriety, in 
building, repairing, and maintaining such necessary forts and garrisons. But the 
directors of a regulated company, having the management of no common capital, have 
no other fund to employ in this way but the casual revenue arising from the admission 
fines, and from the corporation duties imposed upon the trade of the company. Though 
they had the same interest, therefore, to attend to the maintenance of such forts and 
garrisons, they can seldom have the same ability to render that attention effectual. The 
maintenance of a public minister requiring scarce any attention, and but a moderate 
and limited expense, is a business much more suitable both to the temper and abilities 
of a regulated company. 
    Long after the time of Sir Josiah Child, however, in 1750, a regulated company was 
established, the present company of merchants trading to Africa, which was expressly 
charged at first with the maintenance of all the British forts and garrisons that lie 
between Cape Blanc and the Cape of Good Hope, and afterwards with that of those 
only which lie between Cape Rouge and the Cape of Good Hope. The act which 
establishes this company (the 23rd of George II, c. 3) seems to have had two distinct 
objects in view; first, to restrain effectually the oppressive and monopolizing spirit 
which is natural to the directors of a regulated company; and secondly, to force them, 
as much as possible, to give an attention, which is not natural to them, towards the 
maintenance of forts and garrisons. 
    For the first of these purposes the fine for admission is limited to forty shillings. The 
company is prohibited from trading in their corporate capacity, or upon a joint stock; 
from borrowing money upon common seal, or from laying any restraints upon the 
trade which may be carried on freely from all places, and by all persons being British 
subjects, and paying the fine. The government is in a committee of nine persons who 
meet at London, but who are chosen annually by the freemen of the company at 
London, Bristol, and Liverpool; three from each place. No committee-man can be 
continued in office for more than three years together. Any committee-man might be 
removed by the Board of Trade and Plantations, now by a committee council, after 
being heard in his own defence. The committee are forbid to export negroes from 
Africa, or to import any African goods into Great Britain. But as they are charged with 
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the maintenance of forts and garrisons, they may, for that purpose, export from Great 
Britain to Africa goods and stores of different kinds. Out of the monies which they 
shall receive from the company, they are allowed a sum not exceeding eight hundred 
pounds for the salaries of their clerks and agents at London, Bristol, and Liverpool, the 
house rent of their office at London, and all other expenses of management, 
commission, and agency in England. What remains of this sum, after defraying these 
different expenses, they may divide among themselves, as compensation for their 
trouble, in what manner they think proper. By this constitution, it might have been 
expected that the spirit of monopoly would have been effectually restrained, and the 
first of these purposes sufficiently answered. It would seem, however, that it had not. 
Though by the 4th of George III, c. 20, the fort of Senegal, with all its dependencies, 
had been vested in the company of merchants trading to Africa, yet in the year 
following (by the 5th of George III, c. 44) not only Senegal and its dependencies, but 
the whole coast from the port of Sallee, in south Barbary, to Cape Rouge, was 
exempted from the jurisdiction of that company, was vested in the crown, and the 
trade to it declared free to all his Majesty's subjects. The company had been suspected 
of restraining the trade, and of establishing some sort of improper monopoly. It is not, 
however, very easy to conceive how, under the regulations of the 23rd of George II, 
they could do so. In the printed debates of the House of Commons, not always the 
most authentic records of truth, I observe, however, that they have been accused of 
this. The members of the committee of nine, being all merchants, and the governors 
and factors, in their different forts and settlements, being all dependent upon them, it is 
not unlikely that the latter might have given peculiar attention to the consignments and 
commissions of the former which would establish a real monopoly. 
    For the second of these, purposes, the maintenance of the forts and garrisons, an 
annual sum has been allotted to them by Parliament, generally about L13,000. For the 
proper application of this sum, the committee is obliged to account annually to the 
Cursitor Baron of Exchequer; which account is afterwards to be laid before 
Parliament. But Parliament, which gives so little attention to the application of 
millions, is not likely to give much to that of L13,000 a year; and the Cursitor Baron 
of Exchequer, from his profession and education, is not likely to be profoundly skilled 
in the proper expense of forts and garrisons. The captains of his Majesty's navy, 
indeed, or any other commissioned officers appointed by the Board of Admiralty, may 
inquire into the condition of the forts and garrisons, and report their observations to 
that board. But that board seems to have no direct jurisdiction over the committee, nor 
any authority to correct those whose conduct it may thus inquire into; and the captains 
of his Majesty's navy, besides, are not supposed to be always deeply learned in the 
science of fortification. Removal from an office which can be enjoyed only for the 
term of three years, and of which the lawful emoluments, even during that term, are so 
very small, seems to be the utmost punishment to which any committee-man is liable 
for any fault, except direct malversation, or embezzlement, either of the public money, 
or of that of the company; and the fear of that punishment can never be a motive of 
sufficient weight to force a continual and careful attention to a business to which he 
has no other interest to attend. The committee are accused of having sent out bricks 
and stones from England for the reparation of Cape Coast Castle on the coast of 
Guinea, a business for which Parliament had several times granted an extraordinary 
sum of money. These bricks and stones too, which had thus been sent upon so long a 
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voyage, were said to have been of so bad a quality that it was necessary to rebuild 
from the foundation the walls which had been repaired with them. The forts and 
garrisons which lie north of Cape Rouge are not only maintained at the expense of the 
state, but are under the immediate government of the executive power; and why those 
which lie south of that Cape, and which are, in part at least, maintained at the expense 
of the state, should be under a different government, it seems not very easy even to 
imagine a good reason. The protection of the Mediterranean trade was the original 
purpose of pretence of the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca, and the maintenance 
and government of those garrisons has always been, very properly, committed, not to 
the Turkey Company, but to the executive power. In the extent of its dominion 
consists, in a great measure, the pride and dignity of that power; and it is not very 
likely to fail in attention to what is necessary for the defence of that dominion. The 
garrisons at Gibraltar and Minorca, accordingly, have never been neglected; though 
Minorca has been twice taken, and is now probably lost for ever, that disaster was 
never even imputed to any neglect in the executive power. I would not, however, be 
understood to insinuate that either of those expensive garrisons was ever, even in the 
smallest degree, necessary for the purpose for which they were originally 
dismembered from the Spanish monarchy. That dismemberment, perhaps, never 
served any other real purpose than to alienate from England her natural ally the King 
of Spain, and to unite the two principal branches of the house of Bourbon in a much 
stricter and more permanent alliance than the ties of blood could ever have united 
them. 
    Joint stock companies, established by Royal Charter or by Act of Parliament, differ 
in several respects, not only from regulated companies, but from private copartneries. 
    First, in a private copartnery, no partner, without the consent of the company, can 
transfer his share to another person, or introduce a new member into the company. 
Each member, however, may, upon proper warning, withdraw from the copartnery, 
and demand payment from them of his share of the common stock. In a joint stock 
company, on the contrary, no member can demand payment of his share from the 
company; but each member can, without their consent, transfer his share to another 
person, and thereby introduce a new member. The value of a share in a joint stock is 
always the price which it will bring in the market; and this may be either greater or 
less, in any proportion, than the sum which its owner stands credited for in the stock of 
the company. 
    Secondly, in a private copartnery, each partner is bound for the debts contracted by 
the company to the whole extent of his fortune. In a joint stock company, on the 
contrary, each partner is bound only to the extent of his share. 
    The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court of directors. This 
court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the control of a general court 
of proprietors. But the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand 
anything of the business of the company, and when the spirit of faction happens not to 
prevail among them, give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such 
half-yearly or yearly dividend as the directors think proper to make to them. This total 
exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum, encourages many people 
to become adventurers in joint stock companies, who would, upon no account, hazard 
their fortunes in any private copartnery. Such companies, therefore, commonly draw to 
themselves much greater stocks than any private copartnery can boast of. The trading 
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stock of the South Sea Company, at one time, amounted to upwards of thirty-three 
millions eight hundred thousand pounds. The divided capital of the Bank of England 
amounts, at present, to ten millions seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds. The 
directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it 
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily 
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, 
must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company. It is upon this account that joint stock companies for foreign trade have 
seldom been able to maintain the competition against private adventurers. They have, 
accordingly, very seldom succeeded without an exclusive privilege, and frequently 
have not succeeded with one. Without an exclusive privilege they have commonly 
mismanaged the trade. With an exclusive privilege they have both mismanaged and 
confined it. 
    The Royal African Company, the predecessors of the present African Company, had 
an exclusive privilege by charter, but as that charter had not been confirmed by Act of 
Parliament, the trade, in consequence of the Declaration of Rights, was, soon after the 
revolution, laid open to all his Majesty's subjects. The Hudson's Bay Company are, as 
to their legal rights, in the same situation as the Royal African Company. Their 
exclusive charter has not been confirmed by Act of Parliament. The South Sea 
Company, as long as they continued to be a trading company, had an exclusive 
privilege confirmed by Act of Parliament; as have likewise the present United 
Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies. 
    The Royal African Company soon found that they could not maintain the 
competition against private adventurers, whom, notwithstanding the Declaration of 
Rights, they continued for some time to call interlopers, and to persecute as such. In 
1698, however, the private adventurers were subjected to a duty of ten per cent upon 
almost all the different branches of their trade, to be employed by the company in the 
maintenance of their forts and garrisons But, notwithstanding this heavy tax, the 
company were still unable to maintain the competition. Their stock and credit 
gradually declined. In 1712, their debts had become so great that a particular Act of 
Parliament was thought necessary, both for their security and for that of their creditors. 
It was enacted that the resolution of two-thirds of these creditors in number and value 
should bind the rest, both with regard to the time which should be allowed to the 
company for the payment of their debts, and with regard to any other agreement which 
it might be thought proper to make with them concerning those debts. In 1730, their 
affairs were in so great disorder that they were altogether incapable of maintaining 
their forts and garrisons, the sole purpose and pretext of their institution. From that 
year, till their final dissolution, the Parliament judged it necessary to allow the annual 
sum of ten thousand pounds for that purpose. In 1732, after having been for many 
years losers by the trade of carrying negroes to the West Indies, they at last resolved to 
give it up altogether; to sell to the private traders to America the negroes which they 
purchased upon the coast; and to employ their servants in a trade to the inland parts of 
Africa for gold dust, elephants' teeth, dyeing drugs, etc. But their success in this more 
confined trade was not greater than in their former extensive one. Their affairs 
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continued to go gradually to decline, till at last, being in every respect a bankrupt 
company, they were dissolved by Act of Parliament, and their forts and garrisons 
vested in the present regulated company of merchants trading to Africa. Before the 
erection of the Royal African Company, there had been three other joint stock 
companies successively established, one after another, for the African trade. They 
were all equally unsuccessful. They all, however, had exclusive charters, which, 
though not confirmed by Act of Parliament, were in those days supposed to convey a 
real exclusive privilege. 
    The Hudson's Bay Company, before their misfortunes in the late war, had been 
much more fortunate than the Royal African Company. Their necessary expense is 
much smaller. The whole number of people whom they maintain in their different 
settlements and habitations, which they have honoured with the name of forts, is said 
not to exceed a hundred and twenty persons. This number, however, is sufficient to 
prepare beforehand the cargo of furs and other goods necessary for loading their ships, 
which, on account of the ice, can seldom remain above six or eight weeks in those 
seas. This advantage of having a cargo ready prepared could not for several years be 
acquired by private adventurers, and without it there seems to be no possibility of 
trading to Hudson's Bay. The moderate capital of the company, which, it is said, does 
not exceed one hundred and ten thousand pounds, may besides be sufficient to enable 
them to engross the whole, or almost the whole, trade and surplus produce of the 
miserable, though extensive country, comprehended within their charter. No private 
adventurers, accordingly, have ever attempted to trade to that country in competition 
with them. This company, therefore, have always enjoyed an exclusive trade in fact, 
though they may have no right to it in law. Over and above all this, the moderate 
capital of this company is said to be divided among a very small number of 
proprietors. But a joint stock company, consisting of a small number of proprietors, 
with a moderate capital, approaches very nearly to the nature of a private copartnery, 
and may be capable of nearly the same degree of vigilance and attention. It is not to be 
wondered at, therefore, if, in consequence of these different advantages, the Hudson's 
Bay Company had, before the late war, been able to carry on their trade with a 
considerable degree of success. It does not seem probable, however, that their profits 
ever approached to what the late Mr. Dobbs imagined them. A much more sober and 
judicious writer, Mr. Anderson, author of The Historical and Chronological Deduction 
of Commerce, very justly observes that, upon examining the accounts of which Mr. 
Dobbs himself was given for several years together of their exports and imports, and 
upon making proper allowances for their extraordinary risk and expense, it does not 
appear that their profits deserve to be envied, or that they can much, if at all, exceed 
the ordinary profits of trade. 
    The South Sea Company never had any forts or garrisons to maintain, and therefore 
were entirely exempted from one great expense to which other joint stock companies 
for foreign trade are subject. But they had an immense capital divided among an 
immense number of proprietors. It was naturally to be expected, therefore, that folly, 
negligence, and profusion should prevail in the whole management of their affairs. 
The knavery and extravagance of their stock-jobbing projects are sufficiently known, 
and the explication of them would be foreign to the present subject. Their mercantile 
projects were not much better conducted. The first trade which they engaged in was 
that of supplying the Spanish West Indies with negroes, of which (in consequence of 
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what was called the Assiento contract granted them by the Treaty of Utrecht) they had 
the exclusive privilege. But as it was not expected that much profit could be made by 
this trade, both the Portuguese and French companies, who had enjoyed it upon the 
same terms before them, having been ruined by it, they were allowed, as 
compensation, to send annually a ship of a certain burden to trade directly to the 
Spanish West Indies. Of the ten voyages which this annual ship was allowed to make, 
they are said to have gained considerably by one, that of the Royal Caroline in 1731, 
and to have been losers, more or less, by almost all the rest. Their ill success was 
imputed, by their factors and agents, to the extortion and oppression of the Spanish 
government; but was, perhaps, principally owing to the profusion and depredations of 
those very factors and agents, some of whom are said to have acquired great fortunes 
even in one year. In 1734, the company petitioned the king that they might be allowed 
to dispose of the trade and tonnage of their annual ship, on account of the little profit 
which they made by it, and to accept such equivalent as they could obtain from the of 
Spain. 
    In 1724, this company had undertaken the whale-fishery. Of this, indeed, they had 
no monopoly; but as long as they carried it on, no other British subjects appear to have 
engaged in it. Of the eight voyages which their ships made to Greenland, they were 
gainers by one, and losers by all the rest. After their eighth and last voyage, when they 
had sold their ships, stores, and utensils, they found that their whole loss, upon this 
branch, capital and interest included, amounted to upwards of two hundred and thirty-
seven thousand pounds. 
    In 1722, this company petitioned the Parliament to be allowed to divide their 
immense capital of more than thirty-three millions eight hundred thousand pounds, the 
whole of which had been lent to government, into two equal parts: The one half, or 
upwards of sixteen millions nine hundred thousand pounds, to be put upon the same 
footing with other government annuities, and not to be subject to the debts contracted, 
or losses incurred, by the directors of the company in the prosecution of their 
mercantile projects; the other half to remain, as before, a trading stock, and to be 
subject to those debts and losses. The petition was too reasonable not to be granted. In 
1733, they again petitioned the Parliament that three-fourths of their trading stock 
might be turned into annuity stock, and only one-fourth remain as trading stock, or 
exposed to the hazards arising from the bad management of their directors. Both their 
annuity and trading stocks had, by this time, been reduced more than two millions 
each by several different payments from government; so that this fourth amounted 
only to L3,662,784 8s. 6d. In 1748, all the demands of the company upon the King of 
Spain, in consequence of the Assiento contract, were, by the Treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle, given up for what was supposed an equivalent. An end was put to their trade 
with the Spanish West Indies, the remainder of their trading stock was turned into an 
annuity stock, and the company ceased in every respect to be a trading company. 
    It ought to be observed that in the trade which the South Sea Company carried on by 
means of their annual ship, the only trade by which it ever was expected that they 
could make any considerable profit, they were not without competitors, either in the 
foreign or in the home market. At Carthagena, Porto Bello, and La Vera Cruz, they 
had to encounter the competition of the Spanish merchants, who brought from Cadiz, 
to those markets, European goods of the same kind with the outward cargo of their 
ship; and in England they had to encounter that of the English merchants, who 
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imported from Cadiz goods of the Spanish West Indies of the same kind with the 
inward cargo. The goods both of the Spanish and English merchants, indeed, were, 
perhaps, subject to higher duties. But the loss occasioned by the negligence, profusion, 
and malversation of the servants of the company had probably been a tax much 
heavier than all those duties. That a joint stock company should be able to carry on 
successfully any branch of foreign trade, when private adventurers can come into any 
sort of open and fair competition with them, seems contrary to all experience. 
    The old English East India Company was established in 1600 by a charter from 
Queen Elizabeth. In the first twelve voyages which they fitted out for India, they 
appear to have traded as a regulated company, with separate stocks, though only in the 
general ships of the company. In 1612, they united into a joint stock. Their charter was 
exclusive, and though not confirmed by Act of Parliament, was in those days supposed 
to convey a real exclusive privilege. For many years, therefore, they were not much 
disturbed by interlopers. Their capital, which never exceeded seven hundred and forty-
four thousand pounds, and of which fifty pounds was a share, was not so exorbitant, 
nor their dealings so extensive, as to afford either a pretext for gross negligence and 
profusion, or a cover to gross malversation. Notwithstanding some extraordinary 
losses, occasioned partly by the malice of the Dutch East India Company, and partly 
by other accidents, they carried on for many years a successful trade. But in process of 
time, when the principles of liberty were better understood, it became every day more 
and more doubtful how far a Royal Charter, not confirmed by Act of Parliament, could 
convey an exclusive privilege. Upon this question the decisions of the courts of justice 
were not uniform, but varied with the authority of government and the humours of the 
times. Interlopers multiplied upon them, and towards the end of the reign of Charles II, 
through the whole of that of James II and during a part of that of William III, reduced 
them to great distress. In 1698, a proposal was made to Parliament of advancing two 
millions to government at eight per cent, provided the subscribers were erected into a 
new East India Company with exclusive privileges. The old East India Company 
offered seven hundred thousand pounds, nearly the amount of their capital, at four per 
cent upon the same conditions. But such was at that time the state of public credit, that 
it was more convenient for government to borrow two millions at eight per cent than 
seven hundred thousand pounds at four. The proposal of the new subscribers was 
accepted, and a new East India Company established in consequence. The old East 
India Company, however, had a right to continue their trade till 1701. They had, at the 
same time, in the name of their treasurer, subscribed, very artfully, three hundred and 
fifteen thousand pounds into the stock of the new. By a negligence in the expression of 
the Act of Parliament which vested the East India trade in the subscribers to this loan 
of two millions, it did not appear evident that they were all obliged to unite into a joint 
stock. A few private traders, whose subscriptions amounted only to seven thousand 
two hundred pounds, insisted upon the privilege of trading separately upon their own 
stocks and at their own risk. The old East India Company had a right to a separate 
trade upon their old stock till 1701; and they had likewise, both before and after that 
period, a right, like that of other private traders, to a separate trade upon the three 
hundred and fifteen thousand pounds which they had subscribed into the stock of the 
new company. The competition of the two companies with the private traders, and 
with one another, is said to have well-nigh ruined both. Upon a subsequent occasion, 
in 1730, when a proposal was made to Parliament for putting the trade under the 
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management of a regulated company, and thereby laying it in some measure open, the 
East India Company, in opposition to this proposal, represented in very strong terms 
what had been, at this time, the miserable effects, as they thought them, of this 
competition. In India, they said, it raised the price of goods so high that they were not 
worth the buying; and in England, by overstocking the market, it sunk their price so 
low that no profit could be made by them. That by a more plentiful supply, to the great 
advantage and conveniency of the public, it must have reduced, very much, the price 
of Indian goods in the English market, cannot well be doubted; but that it should have 
raised very much their price in the Indian market seems not very probable, as all the 
extraordinary demand which that competition could occasion must have been but as a 
drop of water in the immense ocean of Indian Commerce. The increase of demand, 
besides, though in the beginning it may sometimes raise the price of goods, never fails 
to lower it in the run. It encourages production, and thereby increases the competition 
of the producers, who, in order to undersell one another, have recourse to new 
divisions of labour and new improvements of art which might never otherwise have 
been thought of. The miserable effects of which the company complained were the 
cheapness of consumption and the encouragement given to production, precisely the 
two effects which it is the great business of political economy to promote. The 
competition, however, of which they gave this doleful account, had not been allowed 
to be of long continuance. In 1702, the two companies were, in some measure, united 
by an indenture tripartite, to which the queen was the third party; and in 1708, they 
were, by Act of Parliament, perfectly consolidated into one company by their present 
name of the The United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies. Into this act 
it was thought worth while to insert a clause allowing the separate traders to continue 
their trade till Michaelmas 1711, but at the same time empowering the directors, upon 
three years' notice, to redeem their little capital of seven thousand two hundred 
pounds, and thereby to convert the whole stock of the company into a joint stock. By 
the same act, the capital of the company, in consequence of a new loan to government, 
was augmented from two millions to three millions two hundred thousand pounds. In 
1743, the company advanced another million to government. But this million being 
raised, not by a call upon the proprietors, but by selling annuities and contracting bond-
debts, it did not augment the stock upon which the proprietors could claim a dividend. 
It augmented, however, their trading stock, it being equally liable with the other three 
millions two hundred thousand pounds to the losses sustained, and debts contracted, 
by the company in prosecution of their mercantile projects. From 1708, or at least 
from 1711, this company, being delivered from all competitors, and fully established 
in the monopoly of the English commerce to the East Indies, carried on a successful 
trade, and from their profits made annually a moderate dividend to their proprietors. 
During the French war, which began in 1741, the ambition of Mr. Dupleix, the French 
governor of Pondicherry, involved them in the wars of the Carnatic, and in the politics 
of the Indian princes. After many signal successes, and equally signal losses, they at 
last lost Madras, at that time their principal settlement in India. It was restored to them 
by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; and about this time the spirit of war and conquest 
seems to have taken possession of their servants in India, and never since to have left 
them. During the French war, which began in 1755, their arms partook of the general 
good fortune of those of Great Britain. They defended Madras, took Pondicherry, 
recovered Calcutta, and acquired the revenues of a rich and extensive territory, 
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amounting, it was then said, to upwards of three millions a year. They remained for 
several years in quiet possession of this revenue: but in 1767, administration laid claim 
to their territorial acquisitions, and the revenue arising from them, as of right 
belonging to the crown; and the company, in compensation for this claim, agreed to 
pay the government four hundred thousand pounds a year. They had before this 
gradually augmented their dividend from about six to ten per cent; that is, upon their 
capital of three millions two hundred thousand pounds they had increased it by a 
hundred and twenty-eight thousand pounds, or had raised it from one hundred and 
ninety-two thousand to three hundred and twenty thousand pounds a year. They were 
attempting about this time to raise it still further, to twelve and a half per cent, which 
would have made their annual payments to their proprietors equal to what they had 
agreed to pay annually to government, or to four hundred thousand pounds a year. 
    But during the two years in which their agreement with government was to take 
place, they were restrained from any further increase of dividend by two successive 
Acts of Parliament, of which the object was to enable them to make a speedier 
progress in the payment of their debts, which were at this time estimated at upwards of 
six or seven millions sterling. In 1769, they renewed their agreement with government 
for five years more, and stipulated that during the course of that period they should be 
allowed gradually to increase their dividend to twelve and a half per cent; never 
increasing it, however, more than one per cent in one year. This increase of dividend, 
therefore, when it had risen to its utmost height, could augment their annual payments, 
to their proprietors and government together, but by six hundred and eight thousand 
pounds beyond what they had been before their late territorial acquisitions. What the 
gross revenue of those territorial acquisitions was supposed to amount to has already 
been mentioned; and by an account brought by the Cruttenden East Indiaman in 1768, 
the net revenue, clear of all deductions and military charges, was stated at two millions 
forty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty-seven pounds. They were said at the 
same time to possess another revenue, arising partly from lands, but chiefly from the 
customs established at their different settlements, amounting to four hundred and 
thirty-nine thousand pounds. The profits of their trade too, according to the evidence 
of their chairman before the House of Commons, amounted at this time to at least four 
hundred thousand pounds a year, according to that of their accountant, to at least five 
hundred thousand; according to the lowest account, at least equal to the highest 
dividend that was to be paid to their proprietors. So great a revenue might certainly 
have afforded an augmentation of six hundred and eight thousand pounds in their 
annual payments, and at the same time have left a large sinking fund sufficient for the 
speedy reduction of their debts. In 1773, however, their debts, instead of being 
reduced, were augmented by an arrear to the treasury in the payment of the four 
hundred thousand pounds, by another to the custom-house for duties unpaid, by a large 
debt to the bank for money borrowed, and by a fourth for bills drawn upon them from 
India, and wantonly accepted, to the amount of upwards of twelve hundred thousand 
pounds. The distress which these accumulated claims brought upon them, obliged 
them not only to reduce all at once their dividend to six per cent, but to throw 
themselves upon the mercy of government, and to supplicate, first, a release from 
further payment of the stipulated four hundred thousand pounds a year; and, secondly, 
a loan of fourteen hundred thousand, to save them from immediate bankruptcy. The 
great increase of their fortune had, it seems, only served to furnish their servants with 
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a pretext for greater profusion, and a cover for greater malversation, than in proportion 
even to that increase of fortune. The conduct of their servants in India, and the general 
state of their affairs both in India and in Europe, became the subject of a Parliamentary 
inquiry, in consequence of which several very important alternations were made in the 
constitution of their government, both at home and abroad. In India their principal 
settlements of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, which had before been altogether 
independent of one another, were subjected to a governor-general, assisted by a 
council of four assessors, Parliament assuming to itself the first nomination of this 
governor and council who were to reside at Calcutta; that city having now become, 
what Madras was before, the most important of the English settlements in India. The 
Court of the Mayor of Calcutta, originally instituted for the trial of mercantile causes 
which arose in city and neighbourhood, had gradually extended its jurisdiction with 
the extension of the empire. It was now reduced and confined to the original purpose 
of its institution. Instead of it a new supreme court of judicature was established, 
consisting of a chief justice and three judges to be appointed by the crown. In Europe, 
the qualification necessary to entitle a proprietor to vote at their general courts was 
raised from five hundred pounds, the original price of a share in the stock of the 
company, to a thousand pounds. In order to vote upon this qualification too, it was 
declared necessary that he should have possessed it, if acquired by his own purchase, 
and not by inheritance, for at least one year, instead of six months, the term requisite 
before. The court of twenty-four directors had before been chosen annually; but it was 
now enacted that each director should, for the future, be chosen for four years; six of 
them, however, to go out of office by rotation every year, and not to be capable of 
being re-chosen at the election of the six new directors for the ensuing year. In 
consequence of these alterations, the courts, both of the proprietors and directors, it 
was expected, would be likely to act with more dignity and steadiness than they had 
usually done before. But it seems impossible, by any alterations, to render those 
courts, in any respect, fit to govern, or even to share in the government of a great 
empire; because the greater part of their members must always have too little interest 
in the prosperity of that empire to give any serious attention to what may promote it. 
Frequently a man of great, sometimes even a man of small fortune, is willing to 
purchase a thousand pounds' share in India stock merely for the influence which he 
expects to acquire by a vote in the court of proprietors. It gives him a share, though not 
in the plunder, yet in the appointment of the plunderers of India; the court of directors, 
though they make that appointment, being necessarily more or less under the influence 
of the proprietors, who not only elect those directors, but sometimes overrule the 
appointments of their servants in India. Provided he can enjoy this influence for a few 
years, and thereby provide for a certain number of his friends, he frequently cares little 
about the dividend, or even about the value of the stock upon which his vote is 
founded. About the prosperity of the great empire, in the government of which that 
vote gives him a share, he seldom cares at all. No other sovereigns ever were, or, from 
the nature of things, ever could be, so perfectly indifferent about the happiness or 
misery of their subjects, the improvement or waste of their dominions, the glory or 
disgrace of their administration, as, from irresistible moral causes, the greater part of 
the proprietors of such a mercantile company are, and necessarily must be. This 
indifference, too, was more likely to be increased than diminished by some of the new 
regulations which were made in consequence of the Parliamentary inquiry. By a 
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resolution of the House of Commons, for example, it was declared, that when the 
fourteen hundred thousand pounds lent to the company by government should be paid, 
and their bond-debts be reduced to fifteen hundred thousand pounds, they might then, 
and not till then, divide eight per cent upon their capital; and that whatever remained 
of their revenues and net profits at home should be divided into four parts; three of 
them to be paid into the exchequer for the use of the public, and the fourth to be 
reserved as a fund either for the further reduction of their bond-debts, or for the 
discharge of other contingent exigencies which the company might labour under. But 
if the company were bad stewards, and bad sovereigns, when the whole of their net 
revenue and profits belonged to themselves, and were at their own disposal, they were 
surely not likely to be better when three-fourths of them were to belong to other 
people, and the other fourth, though to be laid out for the benefit of the company, yet 
to be so under the inspection and with the approbation of other people. 
    It might be more agreeable to the company that their own servants and dependants 
should have either the pleasure of wasting or the profit of embezzling whatever 
surplus might remain after paying the proposed dividend of eight per cent than that it 
should come into the hands of a set of people with whom those resolutions could 
scarce fail to set them, in some measure, at variance. The interest of those servants and 
dependants might so far predominate in the court of proprietors as sometimes to 
dispose it to support the authors of depredations which had been committed in direct 
violation of its own authority. With the majority of proprietors, the support even of the 
authority of their own court might sometimes be a matter of less consequence than the 
support of those who had set that authority at defiance. 
    The regulations of 1773, accordingly, did not put an end to the disorders of the 
company's government in India. Notwithstanding that, during a momentary fit of good 
conduct, they had at one time collected into the treasury of Calcutta more than three 
millions sterling; notwithstanding that they had afterwards extended, either their 
dominion, or their depredations, over a vast accession of some of the richest and most 
fertile countries in India, all was wasted and destroyed. They found themselves 
altogether unprepared to stop or resist the incursion of Hyder Ali; and, in consequence 
of those disorders, the company is now (1784) in greater distress than ever; and, in 
order to prevent immediate bankruptcy, is once more reduced to supplicate the 
assistance of government. Different plans have been proposed by the different parties 
in Parliament for the better management of its affairs. And all those plans seem to 
agree insupposing, what was indeed always abundantly evident, that it is altogether 
unfit to govern its territorial possessions. Even the company itself seems to be 
convinced of its own incapacity so far, and seems, upon that account, willing to give 
them up to government. 
    With the right of possessing forts and garrisons in distant and barbarous countries is 
necessarily connected the right of making peace and war in those countries. The joint 
stock companies which have had the one right have constantly exercised the other, and 
have frequently had it expressly conferred upon them. How unjustly, how 
capriciously, how cruelly they have commonly exercised it, is too well known from 
recent experience. 
    When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense, to 
establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not be 
unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint stock company, and to grant them, in 
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case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years. It is the 
easiest and most natural way in which the state can recompense them for hazarding a 
dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the 
benefit. A temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated upon the same 
principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, 
and that of a new book to its author. But upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly 
ought certainly to determine; the forts and garrisons, if it was found necessary to 
establish any, to be taken into the hands of government, their value to be paid to the 
company, and the trade to be laid open to all the subjects of the state. By a perpetual 
monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are taxed very absurdly in two different 
ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in the case of a free trade, they could 
buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total exclusion from a branch of business 
which it might be both convenient and profitable for many of them to carry on. It is for 
the most worthless of all purposes, too, that they are taxed in this manner. It is merely 
to enable the company to support the negligence, profusion, and malversation of their 
own servants, whose disorderly conduct seldom allows the dividend of the company to 
exceed the ordinary rate of profit in trades which are altogether free, and very 
frequently makes it fall even a good deal short of that rate. Without a monopoly, 
however, a joint stock company, it would appear from experience, cannot long carry 
on any branch of foreign trade. To buy in one market, in order to sell, with profit, in 
another, when there are many competitors in both, to watch over, not only the 
occasional variations in the demand, but the much greater and more frequent 
variations in the competition, or in the supply which that demand is likely to get from 
other people, and to suit with dexterity and judgment both the quantity and quality of 
each assortment of goods to all these circumstances, is a species of warfare of which 
the operations are continually changing, and which can scarce ever be conducted 
successfully without such an unremitting exertion of vigilance and attention as cannot 
long be expected from the directors of a joint stock company. The East India 
Company, upon the redemption of their funds, and the expiration of their exclusive 
privilege, have right, by Act of Parliament, to continue a corporation with a joint 
stock, and to trade in their corporate capacity to the East Indies in common with the 
rest of their fellow-subjects. But in this situation, the superior vigilance and attention 
of private adventurers would, in all probability, soon make them weary of the trade. 
    An eminent French author, of great knowledge in matters of political economy, the 
Abbe Morellet, gives a list of fifty-five joint stock companies for foreign trade which 
have been established in different parts of Europe since the year 1600, and which, 
according to him, have all failed from mismanagement, notwithstanding they had 
exclusive privileges. He has been misinformed with regard to the history of two or 
three of them, which were not joint stock companies and have not failed. But, in 
compensation, there have been several joint stock companies which have failed, and 
which he has omitted. 
    The only trades which it seems possible for a joint stock company to carry on 
successfully without an exclusive privilege are those of which all the operations are 
capable of being reduced to what is called a Routine, or to such a uniformity of 
method as admits of little or no variation. Of this kind is, first, the banking trade; 
secondly, the trade of insurance from fire, and from sea risk and capture in time of 
war; thirdly, the trade of making and maintaining a navigable cut or canal; and, 
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fourthly, the similar trade of bringing water for the supply of a great city. 
    Though the principles of the banking trade may appear somewhat abstruse, the 
practice is capable of being reduced to strict rules. To depart upon any occasion from 
those rules, in consequence of some flattering speculation of extraordinary gain, is 
almost always extremely dangerous, and frequently fatal, to the banking company 
which attempts it. But the constitution of joint stock companies renders them in 
general more tenacious of established rules than any private copartnery. Such 
companies, therefore, seem extremely well fitted for this trade. The principal banking 
companies in Europe, accordingly, are joint stock companies, many of which manage 
their trade very successfully without any exclusive privilege. The Bank of England has 
no other exclusive privilege except that no other banking company in England shall 
consist of more than six persons. The two banks of Edinburgh are joint stock 
companies without any exclusive privilege. 
    The value of the risk, either from fire, or from loss by sea, or by capture, though it 
cannot, perhaps, be calculated very exactly, admits, however, of such a gross 
estimation as renders it, in some degree, reducible to strict rule and method. The trade 
of insurance, therefore, may be carried on successfully by a joint stock company 
without any exclusive privilege. Neither the London Assurance nor the Royal 
Exchange Assurance companies have any such privilege. 
    When a navigable cut or canal has been once made, the management of it becomes 
quite simple and easy, and it is reducible to strict rule and method. Even the making of 
it is so as it may be contracted for with undertakers at so much a mile, and so much a 
lock. The same thing may be said of a canal, an aqueduct, or a great pipe for bringing 
water to supply a great city. Such undertakings, therefore, may be, and accordingly 
frequently are, very successfully managed by joint stock companies without any 
exclusive privilege. 
    To establish a joint stock company, however, for any undertaking, merely because 
such a company might be capable of managing it successfully; or to exempt a 
particular set of dealers from some of the general laws which take place with regard to 
all their neighbours, merely because they might be capable of thriving if they had such 
an exemption, would certainly not be reasonable. To render such an establishment 
perfectly reasonable, with the circumstance of being reducible to strict rule and 
method, two other circumstances ought to concur. First, it ought to appear with the 
clearest evidence that the undertaking is of greater and more general utility than the 
greater part of common trades; and secondly, that it requires a greater capital than can 
easily be collected into a private copartnery. If a moderate capital were sufficient, the 
great utility of the undertaking would not be a sufficient reason for establishing a joint 
stock company; because, in this case, the demand for what it was to produce would 
readily and easily be supplied by private adventures. In the four trades above 
mentioned, both those circumstances concur. 
    The great and general utility of the banking trade when prudently managed has been 
fully explained in the second, book of this Inquiry. But a public bank which is to 
support public credit, and upon particular emergencies to advance to government the 
whole produce of a tax, to the amount, perhaps, of several millions, a year or two 
before it comes in, requires a greater capital than can easily be collected into any 
private copartnery. 
    The trade of insurance gives great security to the fortunes of private people, and by 
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dividing among a great many that loss which would ruin an individual, makes it fall 
light and easy upon the whole society. In order to give this security, however, it is 
necessary that the insurers should have a very large capital. Before the establishment 
of the two joint stock companies for insurance in London, a list, it is said, was laid 
before the attorney-general of one hundred and fifty private insurers who had failed in 
the course of a few years. 
    That navigable cuts and canals, and the works which are sometimes necessary for 
supplying a great city with water, are of great and general utility, while at the same 
time they frequently require a greater expense than suits the fortunes of private people, 
is sufficiently obvious. 
    Except the four trades above mentioned, I have not been able to recollect any other 
in which all the three circumstances requisite for rendering reasonable the 
establishment of a joint stock company concur. The English copper company of 
London, the lead smelting company, the glass grinding company, have not even the 
pretext of any great or singular utility in the object which they pursue; nor does the 
pursuit of that object seem to require any expense unsuitable to the fortunes of many 
private men. Whether the trade which those companies carry on is reducible to such 
strict rule and method as to render it fit for the management of a joint stock company, 
or whether they have any reason to boast of their extraordinary profits, I do not 
pretend to know. The mine-adventurers' company has been long ago bankrupt. A share 
in the stock of the British Linen Company of Edinburgh sells, at present, very much 
below par, though less so that it did some years ago. The joint stock companies which 
are established for the public-spirited purpose of promoting some particular 
manufacture, over and above managing their own affairs ill, to the dimunition of the 
general stock of the society, can in other respects scarce ever fail to do more harm than 
good. Notwithstanding the most upright intentions, the unavoidable partiality of their 
directors to particular branches of the manufacture of which the undertakers mislead 
and impose upon them is a real discouragement to the rest, and necessarily breaks, 
more or less, that natural proportion which would otherwise establish itself between 
judicious industry and profit, and which, to the general industry of the country, is of all 
encouragements the greatest and the most effectual. 
ARTICLE II
Of the Expense of the Institutions for the Education of Youth
The institutions for the education of the youth may, in the same manner, furnish a 
revenue sufficient for defraying their own expense. The fee or honorary which the 
scholar pays to the master naturally constitutes a revenue of this kind. 
    Even where the reward of the master does not arise altogether from this natural 
revenue, it still is not necessary that it should be derived from that general revenue of 
the society, of which the collection and application is, in most countries, assigned to 
the executive power. Through the greater part of Europe, accordingly, the endowment 
of schools and colleges makes either no charge upon that general revenue, or but a 
very small one. It everywhere arises chiefly from some local or provincial revenue, 
from the rent of some landed estate, or from the interest of some sum of money 
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allotted and put under the management of trustees for this particular purpose, 
sometimes by the sovereign himself, and sometimes by some private donor. 
    Have those public endowments contributed in general to promote the end of their 
institution? Have they contributed to encourage the diligence and to improve the 
abilities of the teachers? Have they directed the course of education towards objects 
more useful, both to the individual and to the public, than those to which it would 
naturally have gone of its own accord? It should not seem very difficult to give at least 
a probable answer to each of those questions. 
    In every profession, the exertion of the greater part of those who exercise it is 
always in proportion to the necessity they are under of making that exertion. This 
necessity is greatest with those to whom the emoluments of their profession are the 
only source from which they expect their fortune, or even their ordinary revenue and 
subsistence. In order to acquire this fortune, or even to get this subsistence, they must, 
in the course of a year, execute a certain quantity of work of a known value; and, 
where the competition is free, the rivalship of competitors, who are all endeavouring 
to justle one another out of employment, obliges every man to endeavour to execute 
his work with a certain degree of exactness. The greatness of the objects which are to 
be acquired by success in some particular professions may, no doubt, sometimes 
animate the exertion of a few men of extraordinary spirit and ambition. Great objects, 
however, are evidently not necessary in order to occasion the greatest exertions. 
Rivalship and emulation render excellency, even in mean professions, an object of 
ambition, and frequently occasion the very greatest exertions. Great objects, on the 
contrary, alone and unsupported by the necessity of application, have seldom been 
sufficient to occasion any considerable exertion. In England, success in the profession 
of the law leads to some very great objects of ambition; and yet how few men, born to 
easy fortunes, have ever in this country been eminent in that profession! 
    The endowments of schools and colleges have necessarily diminished more or less 
the necessity of application in the teachers. Their subsistence, so far as it arises from 
their salaries, is evidently derived from a fund altogether independent of their success 
and reputation in their particular professions. 
    In some universities the salary makes but a part, and frequently but a small part, of 
the emoluments of the teacher, of which the greater part arises from the honoraries or 
fees of his pupils. The necessity of application, though always more or less 
diminished, is not in this case entirely taken away. Reputation in his profession is still 
of some importance to him, and he still has some dependency upon the affection, 
gratitude, and favourable report of those who have attended upon his instructions; and 
these favourable sentiments he is likely to gain in no way so well as by deserving 
them, that is, by the abilities and diligence with which he discharges every part of his 
duty. 
    In other universities the teacher is prohibited from receiving any honorary or fee 
from his pupils, and his salary constitutes the whole of the revenue which he derives 
from his office. His interest is, in this case, set as directly in opposition to his duty as it 
is possible to set it. It is the interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can; 
and if his emoluments are to be precisely the same, whether he does or does not 
perform some very laborious duty, it is certainly his interest, at least as interest is 
vulgarly understood, either to neglect it altogether, or, if he is subject to some 
authority which will not suffer him to do this, to perform it in as careless and slovenly 
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a manner as that authority will permit. If he is naturally active and a lover of labour, it 
is his interest to employ that activity in any way from which he can derive some 
advantage, rather than in the performance of his duty, from which he can derive none. 
    If the authority to which he is subject resides in the body corporate, the college, or 
university, of which he himself is a member, and which the greater part of the other 
members are, like himself, persons who either are or ought to be teachers, they are 
likely to make a common cause, to be all very indulgent to one another, and every man 
to consent that his neighbour may neglect his duty, provided he himself is allowed to 
neglect his own. In the university of Oxford, the greater part of the public professors 
have, for these many years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching. 
    If the authority to which he is subject resides, not so much in the body corporate of 
which he is a member, as in some other extraneous persons- in the bishop of the 
diocese, for example; in the governor of the province; or, perhaps, in some minister of 
state it is not indeed in this case very likely that he will be suffered to neglect his duty 
altogether. All that such superiors, however, can force him to do, is to attend upon his 
pupils a certain number of hours, that is, to give a certain number of lectures in the 
week or in the year. What those lectures shall be must still depend upon the diligence 
of the teacher; and that diligence is likely to be proportioned to the motives which he 
has for exerting it. An extraneous jurisdiction of this kind, besides, is liable to be 
exercised both ignorantly and capriciously. In its nature it is arbitrary and 
discretionary, and the persons who exercise it, neither attending upon the lectures of 
the teacher themselves, nor perhaps understanding the sciences which it is his business 
to teach, are seldom capable of exercising it with judgment. From the insolence of 
office, too, they are frequently indifferent how they exercise it, and are very apt to 
censure or deprive him of his office wantonly, and without any just cause. The person 
subject to such jurisdiction is necessarily degraded by it, and, instead of being one of 
the most respectable, is rendered one of the meanest and most contemptible persons in 
the society. It is by powerful protection only that he can effectually guard himself 
against the bad usage to which he is at all times exposed; and this protection he is most 
likely to gain, not by ability or diligence in his profession, but by obsequiousness to 
the will of his superiors, and by being ready, at all times, to sacrifice to that will the 
rights, the interest, and the honour of the body corporate of which he is a member. 
Whoever has attended for any considerable time to the administration of a French 
university must have had occasion to remark the effects which naturally result from an 
arbitrary and extraneous jurisdiction of this kind. 
    Whatever forces a certain number of students to any college or university, 
independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers, tends more or less to diminish 
the necessity of that merit or reputation. 
    The privileges of graduates in arts, in law, physic, and divinity, when they can be 
obtained only by residing a certain number of years in certain universities, necessarily 
force a certain number of students to such universities, independent of the merit or 
reputation of the teachers. The privileges of graduates are a sort of statutes of 
apprenticeship, which have contributed to the improvement of education, just as the 
other statutes of apprenticeship have to that of arts, and manufactures. 
    The charitable foundations of scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, etc., necessarily 
attach a certain number of students to certain colleges, independent altogether of the 
merit of those particular colleges. Were the students upon such charitable foundations 
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left free to choose what college they liked best, such liberty might perhaps contribute 
to excite some emulation among different colleges. A regulation, on the contrary, 
which prohibited even the independent members of every particular college from 
leaving it and going to any other, without leave first asked and obtained of that which 
they meant to abandon, would tend very much to extinguish that emulation. 
    If in each college the tutor or teacher, who was to instruct each student in all arts 
and sciences, should not be voluntarily chosen by the student, but appointed by the 
head of the college; and if, in case of neglect, inability, or bad usage, the student 
should not be allowed to change him for another, without leave first asked and 
obtained, such a regulation would not only tend very much to extinguish all emulation 
among the different tutors of the same college, but to diminish very much in all of 
them the necessity of diligence and of attention to their respective pupils. Such 
teachers, though very well paid by their students, might be as much disposed to 
neglect them as those who are not paid by them at all, or who have no other 
recompense but their salary. 
    If the teacher happens to be a man of sense, it must be an unpleasant thing to him to 
be conscious, while he is lecturing his students, that he is either speaking or reading 
nonsense, or what is very little better than nonsense. It must, too, be unpleasant to him 
to observe that the greater part of his students desert his lectures, or perhaps attend 
upon them with plain enough marks of neglect, contempt, and derision. If he is 
obliged, therefore, to give a certain number of lectures, these motives alone, without 
any other interest, might dispose him to take some pains to give tolerably good ones. 
Several different expedients, however, may be fallen upon which will effectually blunt 
the edge of all those incitements to diligence. The teacher, instead of explaining to his 
pupils himself the science in which he proposes to instruct them, may read some book 
upon it; and if this book is written in a foreign and dead language, by interpreting it to 
them into their own; or, what would give him still less trouble, by making them 
interpret it to him, and by now and then making an occasional remark upon it, he may 
flatter himself that he is giving a lecture. The slightest degree of knowledge and 
application will enable him to do this without exposing himself to contempt or 
derision, or saying anything that is really foolish, absurd, or ridiculous. The discipline 
of the college, at the same time, may enable him to force all his pupils to the most 
regular attendance upon this sham lecture, and to maintain the most decent and 
respectful behaviour during the whole time of the performance. 
    The discipline of colleges and universities is in general contrived, not for the benefit 
of the students, but for the interest, or more properly speaking, for the ease of the 
masters. Its object is, in all cases, to maintain the authority of the master, and whether 
he neglects or performs his duty, to oblige the students in all cases to behave to him, as 
if he performed it with the greatest diligence and ability. It seems to presume perfect 
wisdom and virtue in the one order, and the greatest weakness and folly in the other. 
Where the masters, however, really perform their duty, there are no examples, I 
believe, that the greater part of the students ever neglect theirs. No discipline is ever 
requisite to force attendance upon lectures which are really worth the attending, as is 
well known wherever any such lectures are given. Force and restraint may, no doubt, 
be in some degree requisite in order to oblige children, or very young boys, to attend 
to those parts of education which it is thought necessary for them to acquire during 
that early period of life; but after twelve or thirteen years of age, provided the master 
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does his duty, force or restraint can scarce ever be necessary to carry on any part of 
education. Such is the generosity of the greater part of young men, that, so far from 
being disposed to neglect or despise the instructions of their master, provided he 
shows some serious intention of being of use to them, they are generally inclined to 
pardon a great deal of incorrectness in the performance of his duty, and sometimes 
even to conceal from the public a good deal of gross negligence. 
    Those parts of education, it is to be observed, for the teaching of which there are no 
public institutions, are generally the best taught. When a young man goes to a fencing 
or a dancing school, he does not indeed always learn to fence or to dance very well; 
but he seldom fails of learning to fence or to dance. The good effects of the riding 
school are not commonly so evident. The expense of a riding school is so great, that in 
most places it is a public institution. The three most essential parts of literary 
education, to read, write, and account, it still continues to be more common to acquire 
in private than in public schools; and it very seldom happens that anybody fails of 
acquiring them to the degree in which it is necessary to acquire them. 
    In England the public schools are much less corrupted than the universities. In the 
schools the youth are taught, or at least may be taught, Greek and Latin; that is, 
everything which the masters pretend to teach, or which, it is expected, they should 
teach. In the universities the youth neither are taught, nor always can find any proper 
means of being taught, the sciences which it is the business of those incorporated 
bodies to teach. The reward of the schoolmaster in most cases depends principally, in 
some cases almost entirely, upon the fees or honoraries of his scholars. Schools have 
no exclusive privileges. In order to obtain the honours of graduation, it is not 
necessary that a person should bring a certificate of his having studied a certain 
number of years at a public school. If upon examination he appears to understand what 
is taught there, no questions are asked about the place where he learnt it. 
    The parts of education which are commonly taught in universities, it may, perhaps, 
be said are not very well taught. But had it not been for those institutions they would 
not have been commonly taught at all, and both the individual and the public would 
have suffered a good deal from the want of those important parts of education. 
    The present universities of Europe were originally, the greater part of them, 
ecclesiastical corporations, instituted for the education of churchmen. They were 
founded by the authority of the Pope, and were so entirely under his immediate 
protection, that their members, whether masters or students, had all of them what was 
then called the benefit of clergy, that is, were exempted from the civil jurisdiction of 
the countries in which their respective universities were situated, and were amenable 
only to the ecclesiastical tribunals. What was taught in the greater part of those 
universities was suitable to the end of their institution, either theology, or something 
that was merely preparatory to theology. 
    When Christianity was first established by law, a corrupted Latin had become the 
common language of all the western parts of Europe. The service of the church 
accordingly, and the translation of the Bible which was read in churches, were both in 
that corrupted Latin; that is, in the common language of the country. After the 
irruption of the barbarous nations who overturned the Roman empire, Latin gradually 
ceased to be the language of any part of Europe. But the reverence of the people 
naturally preserves the established forms and ceremonies of religion long after the 
circumstances which first introduced and rendered them reasonable are no more. 
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Though Latin, therefore, was no longer understood anywhere by the great body of the 
people, the whole service of the church still continued to be performed in that 
language. Two different languages were thus established in Europe, in the same 
manner as in ancient Egypt; a language of the priests, and a language of the people; a 
sacred and a profane; a learned and an unlearned language. But it was necessary that 
the priests should understand something of that sacred and learned language in which 
they were to officiate; and the study of the Latin language therefore made, from the 
beginning, an essential part of university education. 
    It was not so with that either of the Greek or of the Hebrew language. The infallible 
decrees of the church had pronounced the Latin translation of the Bible, commonly 
called the Latin Vulgate, to have been equally dictated by divine inspiration, and 
therefore of equal authority with the Greek and Hebrew originals. The knowledge of 
those two languages, therefore, not being indispensably requisite to a churchman, the 
study of them did not for a long time make a necessary part of the common course of 
university education. There are some Spanish universities, I am assured, in which the 
study of the Greek language has never yet made any part of that course. The first 
reformers found the Greek text of the New Testament, and even the Hebrew text of the 
Old, more favorable to their opinions than the Vulgate translation, which, as might 
naturally be supposed, had been gradually accommodated to support the doctrines of 
the Catholic Church. They set themselves, therefore, to expose the many errors of that 
translation, which the Roman Catholic clergy were thus put under the necessity of 
defending or explaining. But this could not well be done without some knowledge of 
the original languages, of which the study was therefore gradually introduced into the 
greater part of universities, both of those which embraced, and of those which rejected, 
the doctrines of the Reformation. The Greek language was connected with every part 
of that classical learning which, though at first principally cultivated by Catholics and 
Italians, happened to come into fashion much about the same time that the doctrines of 
the Reformation were set on foot. In the greater part of universities, therefore, that 
language was taught previous to the study of philosophy, and as soon as the student 
had made some progress in the Latin. The Hebrew language having no connection 
with classical learning, and, except the Holy Scriptures, being the language of not a 
single book in any esteem, the study of it did not commonly commence till after that 
of philosophy, and when the student had entered upon the study of theology. 
    Originally the first rudiments both of the Greek and Latin languages were taught in 
universities, and in some universities they still continue to be so. In others it is 
expected that the student should have previously acquired at least the rudiments of one 
or both of those languages, of which the study continues to make everywhere a very 
considerable part of university education. 
    The ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three great branches; physics, or 
natural philosophy; ethics, or moral philosophy; and logic. This general division seems 
perfectly agreeable to the nature of things. 
    The great phenomena of nature- the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, eclipses, 
comets; thunder, lightning, and other extraordinary meteors; the generation, the life, 
growth, and dissolution of plants and animals- are objects which, as they necessarily 
excite the wonder, so they naturally call forth the curiosity, of mankind to inquire into 
their causes. Superstition first attempted to satisfy this curiosity, by referring all those 
wonderful appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philosophy afterwards 
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endeavoured to account for them from more familiar causes, or from such as mankind 
were better acquainted with, than the agency of the gods. As those great phenomena 
are the first objects of human curiosity, so the science which pretends to explain them 
must naturally have been the first branch of philosophy that was cultivated. The first 
philosophers, accordingly, of whom history has preserved any account, appear to have 
been natural philosophers. 
    In every age and country of the world men must have attended to the characters, 
designs, and actions of one another, and many reputable rules and maxims for the 
conduct of human life must have been laid down and approved of by common consent. 
As soon as writing came into fashion, wise men, or those who fancied themselves 
such, would naturally endeavour to increase the number of those established and 
respected maxims, and to express their own sense of what was either proper or 
improper conduct, sometimes in the more artificial form of apologues, like what are 
called the fables of Aesop; and sometimes in the more simple one of apophthegms, or 
wise sayings, like the Proverbs of Solomon, the verses of Theognis and Phocyllides, 
and some part of the works of Hesiod. They might continue in this manner for a long 
time merely to multiply the number of those maxims of prudence and morality, 
without even attempting to arrange them in any very distinct or methodical order, 
much less to connect them together by one or more general principles from which they 
were all deducible, like effects from their natural causes. The beauty of a systematical 
arrangement of different observations connected by a few common principles was first 
seen in the rude essays of those ancient times towards a system of natural philosophy. 
Something of the same kind was afterwards attempted in morals. The maxims of 
common life were arranged in some methodical order, and connected together by a 
few common principles, in the same manner as they had attempted to arrange and 
connect the phenomena of nature. The science which pretends to investigate and 
explain those connecting principles is what is properly called moral philosophy. 
    Different authors gave different systems both of natural and moral philosophy. But 
the arguments by which they supported those different systems, for from being always 
demonstrations, were frequently at best but very slender probabilities, and sometimes 
mere sophisms, which had no other foundation but the inaccuracy and ambiguity of 
common language. Speculative systems have in all ages of the world been adopted for 
reasons too frivolous to have determined the judgment of any man of common sense in 
a matter of the smallest pecuniary interest. Gross sophistry has scarce ever had any 
influence upon the opinions of mankind, except in matters of philosophy and 
speculation; and in these it has frequently had the greatest. The patrons of each system 
of natural and moral philosophy naturally endeavoured to expose the weakness of the 
arguments adduced to support the systems which were opposite to their own. In 
examining those arguments, they were necessarily led to consider the difference 
between a probable and a demonstrative argument, between a fallacious and a 
conclusive one: and Logic, or the science of the general principles of good and bad 
reasoning, necessarily arose out of the observations which a scrutiny of this kind gave 
occasion to. Though in its origin posterior both to physics and to ethics, it was 
commonly taught, not indeed in all, but in the greater part of the ancient schools of 
philosophy, previously to either of those sciences. The student, it seems to have been 
thought, to understand well the difference between good and bad reasoning before he 
was led to reason upon subjects of so great importance. 
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    This ancient division of philosophy into three parts was in the greater part of the 
universities of Europe changed for another into five. 
    In the ancient philosophy, whatever was taught concerning the nature either of the 
human mind or of the Deity, made a part of the system of physics. Those beings, in 
whatever their essence might be supposed to consist, were parts of the great system of 
the universe, and parts, too, productive of the most important effects. Whatever human 
reason could either conclude or conjecture concerning them, made, as it were, two 
chapters, though no doubt two very important ones, of the science which pretended to 
give an account of the origin and revolutions of the great system of the universe. But 
in the universities of Europe, where philosophy was taught only as subservient to 
theology, it was natural to dwell longer upon these two chapters than upon any other 
of the science. They were gradually more and more extended, and were divided into 
many inferior chapters, till at last the doctrine of spirits, of which so little can be 
known, came to take up as much room in the system of philosophy as the doctrine of 
bodies, of which so much can be known. The doctrines concerning those two subjects 
were considered as making two distinct sciences. What are called Metaphysics or 
Pneumatics were set in opposition to Physics, and were cultivated not only as the more 
sublime, but, for the purposes of a particular profession, as the more useful science of 
the two. The proper subject of experiment and observation, a subject in which a 
careful attention is capable of making so many useful discoveries, was almost entirely 
neglected. The subject in which, after a few very simple and almost obvious truths, the 
most careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, and can 
consequently produce nothing but subtleties and sophisms, was greatly cultivated. 
    When those two sciences had thus been set in opposition to one another, the 
comparison between them naturally gave birth to a third, to what was called Ontology, 
or the science which treated of the qualities and attributes which were common to both 
the subjects of the other two sciences. But if subtleties and sophisms composed the 
greater part of the Metaphysics or Pneumatics of the schools, they composed the 
whole of this cobweb science of Ontology, which was likewise sometimes called 
Metaphysics. 
    Wherein consisted the happiness and perfection of a man, considered not only as an 
individual, but as the member of a family, of a state, and of the great society of 
mankind, was the object which the ancient moral philosophy proposed to investigate. 
In that philosophy the duties of human life were treated as subservient to the happiness 
and perfection of human life. But when moral, as well as natural philosophy, came to 
be taught only as subservient to theology, the duties of human life were treated of as 
chiefly subservient to the happiness of a life to come. In the ancient philosophy the 
perfection of virtue was represented as necessarily productive, to the person who 
possessed it, of the most perfect happiness in this life. In the modern philosophy it was 
frequently represented as generally, or rather as almost always, inconsistent with any 
degree of happiness in this life; and heaven was to be earned only by penance and 
mortification, by the austerities and abasement of a monk; not by the liberal, generous, 
and spirited conduct of a man. Casuistry and an ascetic morality made up, in most 
cases, the greater part of the moral philosophy of the schools. By far the most 
important of all the different branches of philosophy became in this manner by far the 
most corrupted. 
    Such, therefore, was the common course of philosophical education in the greater 
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part of the universities in Europe. Logic was taught first: Ontology came in the second 
place: Pneumatology, comprehending the doctrine concerning the nature of the human 
soul and of the Deity, in the third: in the fourth followed a debased system of moral 
philosophy which was considered as immediately connected with the doctrines of 
Pneumatology, with the immortality of the human soul, and with the rewards and 
punishments which, from the justice of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to 
come: a short and superficial system of Physics usually concluded the course. 
    The alterations which the universities of Europe thus introduced into the ancient 
course of philosophy were all meant for the education of ecclesiastics, and to render it 
a more proper introduction to the study of theology. But the additional quantity of 
subtlety and sophistry, the casuistry and the ascetic morality which those alterations 
introduced into it, certainly did not render it more proper for the education of 
gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely either to improve the understanding, or 
to mend the heart. 
    This course of philosophy is what still continues to be taught in the greater part of 
the universities of Europe, with more or less diligence, according as the constitution of 
each particular university happens to render diligence more or less necessary to the 
teachers. In some of the richest and best endowed universities, the tutors content 
themselves with teaching a few unconnected shreds and parcels of this corrupted 
course; and even these they commonly teach very negligently and superficially. 
    The improvements which, in modern times, have been made in several different 
branches of philosophy have not, the greater part of them, been made in universities, 
though some no doubt have. The greater part of universities have not even been very 
forward to adopt those improvements after they were made; and several of those 
learned societies have chosen to remain, for a long time, the sanctuaries in which 
exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection after they had 
been hunted out of every other corner of the world. In general, the richest and best 
endowed universities have been the slowest in adopting those improvements, and the 
most averse to permit any considerable change in the established plan of education. 
Those improvements were more easily introduced into some of the poorer universities, 
in which the teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their 
subsistence, were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the world. 
    But though the public schools and universities of Europe were originally intended 
only for the education of a particular profession, that of churchmen; and though they 
were not always very diligent in instructing their pupils even in the sciences which 
were supposed necessary for that profession, yet they gradually drew to themselves the 
education of almost all other people, particularly of almost all gentlemen and men of 
fortune. No better method, it seems, could be fallen upon of spending, with any 
advantage, the long interval between infancy and that period of life at which men 
begin to apply in good earnest to the real business of the world, the business which is 
to employ them during the remainder of their days. The greater part of what is taught 
in schools and universities, however, does not seem to be the most proper preparation 
for that business. 
    In England it becomes every day more and more the custom to send young people 
to travel in foreign countries immediately upon their leaving school, and without 
sending them to any university. Our young people, it is said, generally return home 
much improved by their travels. A young man who goes abroad at seventeen or 
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eighteen, and returns home at one and twenty, returns three or four years older than he 
was when he went abroad; and at that age it is very difficult not to improve a good 
deal in three or four years. In the course of his travels he generally acquires some 
knowledge of one or two foreign languages; a knowledge, however, which is seldom 
sufficient to enable him either to speak or write them with propriety. In other respects 
he commonly returns home more conceited, more unprincipled, more dissipated, and 
more incapable of any serious application either to study or to business than he could 
well have become in so short a time had he lived at home. By travelling so very 
young, by spending in the most frivolous dissipation the most precious years of his 
life, at a distance from the inspection and control of his parents and relations, every 
useful habit which the earlier parts of his education might have had some tendency to 
form in him, instead of being riveted and confirmed, is almost necessarily either 
weakened or effaced. Nothing but the discredit into which the universities are allowing 
themselves to fall could ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that 
of travelling at this early period of life. By sending his son abroad, a father delivers 
himself at least for some time, from so disagreeable an object as that of a son 
unemployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes. 
    Such have been the effects of some of the modern institutions for education. 
    Different plans and different institutions for education seem to have taken place in 
other ages and nations. 
    In the republics of ancient Greece, every free citizen was instructed, under the 
direction of the public magistrate, in gymnastic exercises and in music. By gymnastic 
exercises it was intended to harden his body, to sharpen his courage, and to prepare 
him for the fatigues and dangers of war; and as the Greek militia was, by all accounts, 
one of the best that ever was in the world, this part of their public education must have 
answered completely the purpose for which it was intended. By the other part, music, 
it was proposed, at least by the philosophers and historians who have given us an 
account of those institutions, to humanize the mind, to soften the temper, and to 
dispose it for performing all the social and moral duties both of public and private life. 
    In ancient Rome the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the purpose as those 
of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece, and they seem to have answered it equally well. 
But among the Romans there was nothing which corresponded to the musical 
education of the Greeks. The morals of the Romans, however, both in private and 
public life, seem to have been not only equal, but, upon the whole, a good deal 
superior to those of the Greeks. That they were superior in private life, we have the 
express testimony of Polybius and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, two authors well 
acquainted with both nations; and the whole tenor if the Greek and Roman history 
bears witness to the superiority of the public morals of the Romans. The good temper 
and moderation of contending factions seems to be the most essential circumstances in 
the public morals of a free people. But the factions of the Greeks were almost always 
violent and sanguinary; whereas, till the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been 
shed in any Roman faction; and from the time of the Gracchi the Roman republic may 
be considered as in reality dissolved. Notwithstanding, therefore, the very respectable 
authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius, and notwithstanding the very ingenious 
reasons by which Mr. Montesquieu endeavours to support that authority, it seems 
probable that the musical education of the Greeks had no great effect in mending their 
morals, since, without any such education, those of the Romans were upon the whole 
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superior. The respect of those ancient sages for the institutions of their ancestors had 
probably disposed them to find much political wisdom in what was, perhaps, merely 
an ancient custom, continued without interruption from the earliest period of those 
societies to the times in which they had arrived at a considerable degree of refinement. 
Music and dancing are the great amusements of almost all barbarous nations, and the 
great accomplishments which are supposed to fit any man for entertaining his society. 
It is so at this day among the negroes on the coast of Africa. It was so among the 
ancient Celts, among the ancient Scandinavians, and, as we may learn from Homer, 
among the ancient Greeks in the times preceding the Trojan war. When the Greek 
tribes had formed themselves into little republics, it was natural that the study of those 
accomplishments should, for a long time, make a part of the public and common 
education of the people. 
    The masters who instructed the young people, either in music or in military 
exercises, do not seem to have been paid, or even appointed by the state, either in 
Rome or even in Athens, the Greek republic of whose laws and customs we are the 
best informed. The state required that every free citizen should fit himself for 
defending it in war, and should, upon that account, learn his military exercises. But it 
left him to learn them of such masters as he could find, and it seems to have advanced 
nothing for this purpose but a public field or place of exercise in which he should 
practise and perform them. 
    In the early ages both of the Greek and Roman republics, the other parts of 
education seem to have consisted in learning to read, write, and account according to 
the arithmetic of the times. These accomplishments the richer citizens seem frequently 
to have acquired at home by the assistance of some domestic pedagogue, who was 
generally either a slave or a freed-man; and the poorer citizens, in the schools of such 
masters as made a trade of teaching for hire. Such parts of education, however, were 
abandoned altogether to the care of the parents or guardians of each individual. It does 
not appear that the state ever assumed any inspection or direction of them. By a law of 
Solon, indeed, the children were acquitted from maintaining those parents in their old 
age who had neglected to instruct them in some profitable trade or business. 
    In the progress of refinement, when philosophy and rhetoric came into fashion, the 
better sort of people used to send their children to the schools of philosophers and 
rhetoricians, in order to be instructed in these fashionable sciences. But those schools 
were not supported by the public. They were for a long time barely tolerated by it. The 
demand for philosophy and rhetoric was for a long time so small that the first 
professed teachers of either could not find constant employment in any one city, but 
were obliged to travel about from place to place. In this manner lived Zeno of Elea, 
Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and many others. As the demand increased, the schools 
both of philosophy and rhetoric became stationary; first in Athens, and afterwards in 
several other cities. The state, however, seems never to have encouraged them further 
than by assigning some of them a particular place to teach in, which was sometimes 
done, too, by private donors. The state seems to have assigned the Academy to Plato, 
the Lyceum to Aristotle, and the Portico to Zeno of Citta, the founder of the Stoics. 
But Epicurus bequeathed his gardens to his own school. Till about the time of Marcus 
Antonius, however, no teacher appears to have had any salary from the public, or to 
have had any other emoluments but what arose from the honoraries or fees of his 
scholars. The bounty which that philosophical emperor, as we learn from Lucian, 
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bestowed upon one of the teachers of philosophy, probably lasted no longer than his 
own life. There was nothing equivalent to the privileges of graduation, and to have 
attended any of those schools was not necessary, in order to be permitted to practise 
any particular trade or profession. If the opinion of their own utility could not draw 
scholars to them, the law neither forced anybody to go to them nor rewarded anybody 
for having gone to them. The teachers had no jurisdiction over their pupils, nor any 
other authority besides that natural authority, which superior virtue and abilities never 
fail to procure from young people towards those who are entrusted with any part of 
their education. 
    At Rome, the study of the civil law made a part of the education, not of the greater 
part of the citizens, but of some particular families. The young people, however, who 
wished to acquire knowledge in the law, had no public school to go to, and had no 
other method of studying it than by frequenting the company of such of their relations 
and friends as were supposed to understand it. It is perhaps worth while to remark, that 
though the Laws of the Twelve Tables were, many of them, copied from those of some 
ancient Greek republics, yet law never seems to have grown up to be a science in any 
republic of ancient Greece. In Rome it became a science very early, and gave a 
considerable degree of illustration to those citizens who had the reputation of 
understanding it. In the republics of ancient Greece, particularly in Athens, the 
ordinary courts of justice consisted of numerous, and therefore disorderly, bodies of 
people, who frequently decided almost at random, or as clamour, faction, and party 
spirit happened to determine. The ignominy of an unjust decision, when it was to be 
divided among five hundred, a thousand, or fifteen hundred people (for some of their 
courts were so very numerous), could not fall very heavy upon any individual. At 
Rome, on the contrary, the principal courts of justice consisted either of a single judge 
or of a small number of judges, whose characters, especially as they deliberated 
always in public, could not fail to be very much affected by any rash or unjust 
decision. In doubtful cases such courts, from their anxiety to avoid blame, would 
naturally endeavour to shelter themselves under the example or precedent of the 
judges who had sat before them, either in the same or in some other court. This 
attention to practice and precedent necessarily formed the Roman law into that regular 
and orderly system in which it has been delivered down to us; and the like attention 
has had the like effects upon the laws of every other country where such attention has 
taken place. The superiority of character in the Romans over that of the Greeks, so 
much remarked by Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was probably more 
owing to the better constitution of their courts of justice than to any of the 
circumstances to which those authors ascribe it. The Romans are said to have been 
particularly distinguished for their superior respect to an oath. But the people who 
were accustomed to make oath only before some diligent and well-informed court of 
justice would naturally be much more attentive to what they swore than they who were 
accustomed to do the same thing before mobbish and disorderly assemblies. 
    The abilities, both civil and military, of the Greeks and Romans will readily be 
allowed to have been at least equal to those of any modern nation. Our prejudice is 
perhaps rather to overrate them. But except in what related to military exercises, the 
state seems to have been at no pains to form those great abilities, for I cannot be 
induced to believe that the musical education of the Greeks could be of much 
consequence in forming them. Masters, however, had been found, it seems, for 
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instructing the better sort of people among those nations in every art and science in 
which the circumstances of their society rendered it necessary or convenient for them 
to be instructed. The demand for such instruction produced what it always produces- 
the talent for giving it; and the emulation which an unrestrained competition never 
fails to excite, appears to have brought that talent to a very high degree of perfection. 
In the attention which the ancient philosophers excited, in the empire which they 
acquired over the opinions and principles of their auditors, in the faculty which they 
possessed of giving a certain tone and character to the conduct and conversation of 
those auditors, they appear to have been much superior to any modern teachers. In 
modern times, the diligence of public teachers is more or less corrupted by the 
circumstances which render them more or less independent of their success and 
reputation in their particular professions. Their salaries, too, put the private teacher, 
who would pretend to come into competition with them, in the same state with a 
merchant who attempts to trade without a bounty in competition with those who trade 
with a considerable one. If he sells his goods at nearly the same price, he cannot have 
the same profit, and at least, if not bankruptcy and ruin, will infallibly be his lot. If he 
attempts to sell them much dearer, he is likely to have so few customers that his 
circumstances will not be much mended. The privileges of graduation, besides, are in 
many countries necessary, or at least extremely convenient, to most men of learned 
professions, that is, to the far greater part of those who have occasion for a learned 
education. But those privileges can be obtained only by attending the lectures of the 
public teachers. The most careful attendance upon the ablest instructions of any 
private teacher cannot always give any title to demand them. It is from these different 
causes that the private teacher of any of the sciences which are commonly taught in 
universities is in modern times generally considered as in the very lowest order of men 
of letters. A man of real abilities can scarce find out a more humiliating or a more 
unprofitable employment to turn them to. The endowment of schools and colleges 
have, in this manner, not only corrupted the diligence of public teachers, but have 
rendered it almost impossible to have any good private ones. 
    Were there no public institutions for education, no system, no science would be 
taught for which there was not some demand, or which the circumstances of the times 
did not render it either necessary, or convenient, or at least fashionable, to learn. A 
private teacher could never find his account in teaching either an exploded and 
antiquated system of a science acknowledged to be useful, or a science universally 
believed to be a mere useless and pedantic heap of sophistry and nonsense. Such 
systems, such sciences, can subsist nowhere, but in those incorporated societies for 
education whose prosperity and revenue are in a great measure independent of their 
reputation and altogether independent of their industry. Were there no public 
institutions for education, a gentleman, after going through with application and 
abilities the most complete course of education which the circumstances of the times 
were supposed to afford, could not come into the world completely ignorant of 
everything which is the common subject of conversation among gentlemen and men of 
the world. 
    There are no public institutions for the education of women, and there is 
accordingly nothing useless, absurd, or fantastical in the common course of their 
education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it necessary or useful 
for them to learn, and they are taught nothing else. Every part of their education tends 
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evidently to some useful purpose; either to improve the natural attractions of their 
person, or to form their mind to reserve, to modesty, to chastity, and to economy; to 
render them both likely to become the mistresses of a family, and to behave properly 
when they have become such. In every part of her life a woman feels some 
conveniency or advantage from every part of her education. It seldom happens that a 
man, in any part of his life, derives any conveniency or advantage from some of the 
most laborious and troublesome parts of his education. 
    Ought the public, therefore, to give no attention, it may be asked, to the education of 
the people? Or if it ought to give any, what are the different parts of education which it 
ought to attend to in the different orders of the people? and in what manner ought it to 
attend to them? 
    In some cases the state of the society necessarily places the greater part of 
individuals in such situations as naturally form in them, without any attention of 
government, almost all the abilities and virtues which that state requires, or perhaps 
can admit of. In other cases the state of the society does not place the part of 
individuals in such situations, and some attention of government is necessary in order 
to prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body of the people. 
    In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of 
those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined 
to a few very simple operations, frequently to one or two. But the understandings of 
the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The 
man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the 
effects are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert 
his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing 
difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, 
and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to 
become. The torpor of his mind renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing 
a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender 
sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of 
the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country he 
is altogether incapable of judging, and unless very particular pains have been taken to 
render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The 
uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes 
him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a soldier. 
It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his 
strength with vigour and perseverance in any other employment than that to which he 
has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be 
acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every 
improved and civilised society this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, 
the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some 
pains to prevent it. 
    It is otherwise in the barbarous societies, as they are commonly called, of hunters, 
of shepherds, and even of husbandmen in that rude state of husbandry which precedes 
the improvement of manufactures and the extension of foreign commerce. In such 
societies the varied occupations of every man oblige every man to exert his capacity 
and to invent expedients for removing difficulties which are continually occurring. 
Invention is kept alive, and the mind is not suffered to fall into that drowsy stupidity 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth5.html (57 of 174)4/11/2005 9:48:51 AM
The Wealth of Nations
which, in a civilised society, seems to benumb the understanding of almost all the 
inferior ranks of people. In those barbarous societies, as they are called, every man, it 
has already been observed, is a warrior. Every man, too, is in some measure a 
statesman, and can form a tolerable judgment concerning the interest of the society 
and the conduct of those who govern it. How far their chiefs are good judges in peace, 
or good leaders in war, is obvious to the observation of almost every single man 
among them. In such a society, indeed, no man can well acquire that improved and 
refined understanding which a few men sometimes possess in a more civilised state. 
Though in a rude society there is a good deal of variety in the occupations of every 
individual, there is not a great deal in those of the whole society. Every man does, or is 
capable of doing, almost every thing which any other man does, or is capable of doing. 
Every man has a considerable degree of knowledge, ingenuity, and invention: but 
scarce any man has a great degree. The degree, however, which is commonly 
possessed, is generally sufficient for conducting the whole simple business of the 
society. In a civilised state, on the contrary, though there is little variety in the 
occupations of the greater part of individuals, there is an almost infinite variety in 
those of the whole society. These varied occupations present an almost infinite variety 
of objects to the contemplation of those few, who, being attached to no particular 
occupation themselves, have leisure and inclination to examine the occupations of 
other people. The contemplation of so great a variety of objects necessarily exercises 
their minds in endless comparisons and combinations, and renders their 
understandings, in an extraordinary degree, both acute and comprehensive. Unless 
those few, however, happen to be placed in some very particular situations, their great 
abilities, though honourable to themselves, may contribute very little to the good 
government or happiness of their society. Notwithstanding the great abilities of those 
few, all the nobler parts of the human character may be, in a great measure, obliterated 
and extinguished in the great body of the people. 
    The education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilised and 
commercial society the attention of the public more than that of people of some rank 
and fortune. People of some rank and fortune are generally eighteen or nineteen years 
of age before they enter upon that particular business, profession, or trade, by which 
they propose to distinguish themselves in the world. They have before that full time to 
acquire, or at least to fit themselves for afterwards acquiring, every accomplishment 
which can recommend them to the public esteem, or render them worthy of it. Their 
parents or guardians are generally sufficiently anxious that they should be so 
accomplished, and are, in most cases, willing enough to lay out the expense which is 
necessary for that purpose. If they are not always properly educated, it is seldom from 
the want of expense laid out upon their education, but from the improper application 
of that expense. It is seldom from the want of masters, but from the negligence and 
incapacity of the masters who are to be had, and from the difficulty, or rather from the 
impossibility, which there is in the present state of things of finding any better. The 
employments, too, in which people of some rank or fortune spend the greater part of 
their lives are not, like those of the common people, simple and uniform. They are 
almost all of them extremely complicated, and such as exercise the head more than the 
hands. The understandings of those who are engaged in such employments can seldom 
grow torpid for want of exercise. The employments of people of some rank and 
fortune, besides, are seldom such as harass them from morning to night. They 
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generally have a good deal of leisure, during which they may perfect themselves in 
every branch either of useful or ornamental knowledge of which they may have laid 
the foundation, or for which they may have acquired some taste in the earlier part of 
life. 
    It is otherwise with the common people. They have little time to spare for education. 
Their parents can scarce afford to maintain them even in infancy. As soon as they are 
able to work they must apply to some trade by which they can earn their subsistence. 
That trade, too, is generally so simple and uniform as to give little exercise to the 
understanding, while, at the same time, their labour is both so constant and so severe, 
that it leaves them little leisure and less inclination to apply to, or even to think of, 
anything else. 
    But though the common people cannot, in any civilised society, be so well 
instructed as people of some rank and fortune, the most essential parts of education, 
however, to read, write, and account, can be acquired at so early a period of life that 
the greater part even of those who are to be bred to the lowest occupations have time 
to acquire them before they can be employed in those occupations. For a very small 
expense the public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the 
whole body of the people the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of 
education. 
    The public can facilitate this acquisition by establishing in every parish or district a 
little school, where children may be taught for a reward so moderate that even a 
common labourer may afford it; the master being partly, but not wholly, paid by the 
public, because, if he was wholly, or even principally, paid by it, he would soon learn 
to neglect his business. In Scotland the establishment of such parish schools has taught 
almost the whole common people to read, and a very great proportion of them to write 
and account. In England the establishment of charity schools has had an effect of the 
same kind, though not so universally, because the establishment is not so universal. If 
in those little schools the books, by which the children are taught to read, were a little 
more instructive than they commonly are, and if, instead of a little smattering of Latin, 
which the children of the common people are sometimes taught there, and which can 
scarce ever be of any use to them, they were instructed in the elementary parts of 
geometry and mechanics, the literary education of this rank of people would perhaps 
be as complete as it can be. There is scarce a common trade which does not afford 
some opportunities of applying to it the principles of geometry and mechanics, and 
which would not therefore gradually exercise and improve the common people in 
those principles, the necessary introduction to the most sublime as well as to the most 
useful sciences. 
    The public can encourage the acquisition of those most essential parts of education 
by giving small premiums, and little badges of distinction, to the children of the 
common people who excel in them. 
    The public can impose upon almost the whole body of the people the necessity of 
acquiring those most essential parts of education, by obliging every man to undergo an 
examination or probation in them before he can obtain the freedom in any corporation, 
or be allowed to set up any trade either in a village or town corporate. 
    It was in this manner, by facilitating the acquisition of their military and gymnastic 
exercises, by encouraging it, and even by imposing upon the whole body of the people 
the necessity of learning those exercises, that the Greek and Roman republics 
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maintained the martial spirit of their respective citizens. They facilitated the 
acquisition of those exercises by appointing a certain place for learning and practising 
them, and by granting to certain masters the privilege of teaching in that place. Those 
masters do not appear to have had either salaries or exclusive privileges of any kind. 
Their reward consisted altogether in what they got from their scholars; and a citizen 
who had learnt his exercises in the public gymnasia had no sort of legal advantage 
over one who had learnt them privately, provided the latter had learnt them equally 
well. Those republics encouraged the acquisition of those exercises by bestowing little 
premiums and badges of distinction upon: those who excelled in them. To have gained 
a prize in the Olympic, Isthmian, or Nemaean games, gave illustration, not only to the 
person who gained it, but to his whole family and kindred. The obligation which every 
citizen was under to serve a certain number of years, if called upon, in the armies of 
the republic, sufficiently imposed the necessity of learning those exercises, without 
which he could not be fit for that service. 
    That in the progress of improvement the practice of military exercises, unless 
government takes proper pains to support it, goes gradually to decay, and, together 
with it, the martial spirit of the great body of the people, the example of modern 
Europe sufficiently demonstrates. But the security of every society must always 
depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of the great body of the people. In the 
present times, indeed, that martial spirit alone, and unsupported by a well-disciplined 
standing army, would not perhaps be sufficient for the defence and security of any 
society. But where every citizen had the spirit of a soldier, a smaller standing army 
would surely be requisite. That spirit, besides, would necessarily diminish very much 
the dangers to liberty, whether real or imaginary, which are commonly apprehended 
from a standing army. As it would very much facilitate the operations of that army 
against a foreign invader, so it would obstruct them as much if, unfortunately, they 
should ever be directed against the constitution of the state. 
    The ancient institutions of Greece and Rome seem to have been much more 
effectual for maintaining the martial spirit of the great body of the people than the 
establishment of what are called the militias of modern times. They were much more 
simple. When they were once established they executed themselves, and it required 
little or no attention from government to maintain them in the most perfect vigour. 
Whereas to maintain, even in tolerable execution, the complex regulations of any 
modern militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government, without 
which they are constantly falling into total neglect and disuse. The influence, besides, 
of the ancient institutions was much more universal. By means of them the whole 
body of the people was completely instructed in the use of arms. Whereas it is but a 
very small part of them who can ever be so instructed by the regulations of any 
modern militia, except, perhaps, that of Switzerland. But a coward, a man incapable 
either of defending or of revenging himself, evidently wants one of the most essential 
parts of the character of a man. He is as much mutilated and deformed in his mind as 
another is in his body, who is either deprived of some of its most essential members, 
or has lost the use of them. He is evidently the more wretched and miserable of the 
two; because happiness and misery, which reside altogether in the mind, must 
necessarily depend more upon the healthful or unhealthful, the mutilated or entire state 
of the mind, than upon that of the body. Even though the martial spirit of the people 
were of no use towards the defence of the society, yet to prevent that sort of mental 
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mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it, 
from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would still deserve 
the most serious attention of government, in the same manner as it would deserve its 
most serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and offensive 
disease, though neither mortal nor dangerous, from spreading itself among them, 
though perhaps no other public good might result from such attention besides the 
prevention of so great a public evil. 
    The same thing may be said of the gross ignorance and stupidity which, in a 
civilised society, seem so frequently to benumb the understandings of all the inferior 
ranks of people. A man without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man, is, 
if possible, more contemptible than even a coward, and seems to be mutilated and 
deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature. Though the 
state was to derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of people, it 
would still deserve its attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The 
state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more 
they are instructed the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and 
superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful 
disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are always more decent and 
orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves, each individually, more 
respectable and more likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors, and they are 
therefore more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to 
examine, and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and 
sedition, and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or 
unnecessary opposition to the measures of government. In free countries, where the 
safety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the 
people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance that they 
should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning it. 
ARTICLE III
Of the Expense of the Institutions for the Instruction of People of all Ages
The institutions for the instruction of people of all ages are chiefly those for religious 
instruction. This is a species of instruction of which the object is not so much to render 
the people good citizens in this world, as to prepare them for another and a better 
world in a life to come. The teachers of the doctrine which contains this instruction, in 
the same manner as other teachers, may either depend altogether for their subsistence 
upon the voluntary contributions of their hearers, or they may derive it from some 
other fund to which the law of their country may entitle them; such as a landed estate, 
a tithe or land tax, an established salary or stipend. Their exertion, their zeal and 
industry, are likely to be much greater in the former situation than in the latter. In this 
respect the teachers of new religions have always had a considerable advantage in 
attacking those ancient and established systems of which the clergy, reposing 
themselves upon their benefices, had neglected to keep up the fervour of faith and 
devotion in the great body of the people, and having given themselves up to indolence, 
were become altogether incapable of making any vigorous exertion in defence even of 
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their own establishment. The clergy of an established and well-endowed religion 
frequently become men of learning and elegance, who possess all the virtues of 
gentlemen, or which can recommend them to the esteem of gentlemen: but they are apt 
gradually to lose the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority and 
influence with the inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been the original 
causes of the success and establishment of their religion. Such a clergy, when attacked 
by a set of popular and bold, though perhaps stupid and ignorant enthusiasts, feel 
themselves as perfectly defenceless as the indolent, effeminate, and full-fed nations of 
the southern parts of Asia when they were invaded by the active, hardy, and hungry 
Tartars of the North. Such a clergy, upon such an emergency, have commonly no other 
resource than to call upon the civil magistrate to persecute, destroy or drive out their 
adversaries, as disturbers of the public peace. It was thus that the Roman Catholic 
clergy called upon the civil magistrates to persecute the Protestants, and the Church of 
England to persecute the Dissenters; and that in general every religious sect, when it 
has once enjoyed for a century or two the security of a legal establishment, has found 
itself incapable of making any vigorous defence against any new sect which chose to 
attack its doctrine or discipline. Upon such occasions the advantage in point of 
learning and good writing may sometimes be on the side of the established church. But 
the arts of popularity, all the arts of gaining proselytes, are constantly on the side of its 
adversaries. In England those arts have been long neglected by the well-endowed 
clergy of the established church, and are at present chiefly cultivated by the Dissenters 
and by the Methodists. The independent provisions, however, which in many places 
have been made for dissenting teachers by means of voluntary subscriptions, of trust 
rights, and other evasions of the law, seem very much to have abated the zeal and 
activity of those teachers. They have many of them become very learned, ingenious, 
and respectable men; but they have in general ceased to be very popular preachers. 
The Methodists, without half the learning of the Dissenters, are much more in vogue. 
    In the Church of Rome, the industry and zeal of the inferior clergy are kept more 
alive by the powerful motive of self-interest than perhaps in any established Protestant 
church. The parochial clergy derive, many of them, a very considerable part of their 
subsistence from the voluntary oblations of the people; a source of revenue which 
confession gives them many opportunities of improving. The mendicant orders derive 
their whole subsistence from such oblations. It is with them as with the hussars and 
light infantry of some armies; no plunder, no pay. The parochial clergy are like those 
teachers whose reward depends partly upon their salary, and partly upon the fees or 
honoraries which they get from their pupils, and these must always depend more or 
less upon their industry and reputation. The mendicant orders are like those teachers 
whose subsistence depends altogether upon the industry. They are obliged, therefore, 
to use every art which can animate the devotion of the common people. The 
establishment of the two great mendicant orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis, it is 
observed by Machiavel, revived, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the 
languishing faith and devotion of the Catholic Church. In Roman Catholic countries 
the spirit of devotion is supported altogether by the monks and by the poorer parochial 
clergy. The great dignitaries of the church, with all the accomplishments of gentlemen 
and men of the world, and sometimes with those of men of learning, are careful 
enough to maintain the necessary discipline over their inferiors, but seldom give 
themselves any trouble about the instruction of the people. 
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    "Most of the arts and professions in a state," says by far the most illustrious 
philosopher and historian of the present age, "are of such a nature that, while they 
promote the interests of the society, they are also useful or agreeable to some 
individuals; and in that case, the constant rule of the magistrate, except perhaps on the 
first introduction of any art, is to leave the profession to itself, and trust its 
encouragement to the individuals who reap the benefit of it. The artisans, finding their 
profits to rise by the favour of their customers, increase as much as possible their skill 
and industry; and as matters are not disturbed by any injudicious tampering, the 
commodity is always sure to be at all times nearly proportioned to the demand. 
    "But there are also some callings, which, though useful and even necessary in a 
state, bring no advantage or pleasure to any individual, and the supreme power is 
obliged to alter its conduct with regard to the retainers of those professions. It must 
give them public encouragement in order to their subsistence, and it must provide 
against that negligence to which they will naturally be subject, either by annexing 
particular honours to the profession, by establishing a long subordination of ranks and 
a strict dependence, or by some other expedient. The persons employed in the 
finances, fleets, and magistracy, are instances of this order of men. 
    "It may naturally be thought, at first sight, that the ecclesiastics belong to the first 
class, and that their encouragement, as well as that of lawyers and physicians, may 
safely be entrusted to the liberality of individuals, who are attached to their doctrines, 
and who find benefit or consolation from their spiritual ministry and assistance. Their 
industry and vigilance will, no doubt, be whetted by such an additional motive; and 
their skill in the profession, as well as their address in governing the minds of the 
people, must receive daily increase from their increasing practice, study, and attention. 
    "But if we consider the matter more closely, we shall find that this interested 
diligence of the clergy is what every wise legislator will study to prevent; because in 
every religion except the true it is highly pernicious, and it has even a natural tendency 
to pervert the true, by infusing into it a strong mixture of superstition, folly, and 
delusion. Each ghostly practitioner, in order to render himself more precious and 
sacred in the eyes of his retainers, will inspire them with the most violent abhorrence 
of all other sects, and continually endeavour, by some novelty, to excite the languid 
devotion of his audience. No regard will be paid to truth, morals, or decency in the 
doctrines inculcated. Every tenet will be adopted that best suits the disorderly 
affections of the human frame. Customers will be drawn to each conventicle by new 
industry and address in practising on the passions and credulity of the populace. And 
in the end, the civil magistrate will find that he has dearly paid for his pretended 
frugality, in saving a fixed establishment for the priests; and that in reality the most 
decent and advantageous composition which he can make with the spiritual guides, is 
to bribe their indolence by assigning stated salaries to their profession, and rendering it 
superfluous for them to be farther active than merely to prevent their flock from 
straying in quest of new pastures. And in this manner ecclesiastical establishments, 
though commonly they arose at first from religious views, prove in the end 
advantageous to the political interests of society." 
    But whatever may have been the good or bad effects of the independent provision of 
the clergy, it has, perhaps, been very seldom bestowed upon them from any view to 
those effects. Times of violent religious controversy have generally been times of 
equally violent political faction. Upon such occasions, each political party has either 
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found it, or imagined it, for its interest to league itself with some one or other of the 
contending religious sects. But this could be done only by adopting, or at least by 
favouring, the tenets of that particular sect. The sect which had the good fortune to be 
leagued with the conquering party necessarily shared in the victory of its ally, by 
whose favour and protection it was soon enabled in some degree to silence and subdue 
all its adversaries. Those adversaries had generally leagued themselves with the 
enemies of the conquering party, and were therefore the enemies of that party. The 
clergy of this particular sect having thus become complete masters of the field, and 
their influence and authority with the great body of the people being in its highest 
vigour, they were powerful enough to overawe the chiefs and leaders of their own 
party, and to oblige the civil magistrate to respect their opinions and inclinations. 
Their first demand was generally that he should silence and subdue an their 
adversaries: and their second, that he should bestow an independent provision on 
themselves. As they had generally contributed a good deal to the victory, it seemed not 
unreasonable that they should have some share in the spoil. They were weary, besides, 
of humouring the people, and of depending upon their caprice for a subsistence. In 
making this demand, therefore, they consulted their own ease and comfort, without 
troubling themselves about the effect which it might have in future times upon the 
influence and authority of their order. The civil magistrate, who could comply with 
this demand only by giving them something which he would have chosen much rather 
to take, or to keep to himself, was seldom very forward to grant it. Necessity, however, 
always forced him to submit at last, though frequently not till after many delays, 
evasions, and affected excuses. 
    But if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering party never 
adopted the tenets of one sect more than those of another when it had gained the 
victory, it would probably have dealt equally and impartially with all the different 
sects, and have allowed every man to choose his own priest and his own religion as he 
thought proper. There would in this case, no doubt' have been a great multitude of 
religious sects. Almost every different congregation might probably have made a little 
sect by itself, or have entertained some peculiar tenets of its own. Each teacher would 
no doubt have felt himself under the necessity of making the utmost exertion and of 
using every art both to preserve and to increase the number of his disciples. But as 
every other teacher would have felt himself under the same necessity, the success of 
no one teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very great. The interested and 
active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome only where there is 
either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the whole of a large society is 
divided into two or three great sects; the teachers of each acting by concert, and under 
a regular discipline and subordination. But that zeal must be altogether innocent where 
the society is divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps into as many thousand 
small sects, of which no one could be considerable enough to disturb the public 
tranquility. The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with 
more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and moderation 
which is so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects whose tenets, 
being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in veneration by almost all the 
inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who therefore see nothing round 
them but followers, disciples, and humble admirers. The teachers of each little sect, 
finding themselves almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every 
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other sect, and the concessions which they would mutually find it both convenient and 
agreeable to make to one another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the 
greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of 
absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world 
wished to see established; but such as positive law has perhaps never yet established, 
and probably never will establish, in any country: because, with regard to religion, 
positive law always has been, and probably always will be, more or less influenced by 
popular superstition and enthusiasm. This plan of ecclesiastical government, or more 
properly of no ecclesiastical government, was what the sect called Independents, a sect 
no doubt of very wild enthusiasts, proposed to establish in England towards the end of 
the civil war. If it had been established, though of a very unphilosophical origin, it 
would probably by this time have been productive of the most philosophical good 
temper and moderation with regard to every sort of religious principle. It has been 
established in Pennsylvania, where, though the Quakers happen to be the most 
numerous, the law in reality favours no one sect more than another, and it is there said 
to have been productive of this philosophical good temper and moderation. 
    But though this equality of treatment should not be productive of this good temper 
and moderation in all, or even in the greater part of the religious sects of a particular 
country, yet provided those sects were sufficiently numerous, and each of them 
consequently too small to disturb the public tranquillity, the excessive zeal of each for 
its particular tenets could not well be productive of any very harmful effects, but, on 
the contrary, of several good ones: and if the government was perfectly decided both 
to let them all alone, and to oblige them all to let alone one another, there is little 
danger that they would not of their own accord subdivide themselves fast enough so as 
soon to become sufficiently numerous. 
    In every civilised society, in every society where the distinction of ranks has once 
been completely established, there have been always two different schemes or systems 
of morality current at the same time; of which the one may be called the strict or 
austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loose system. The former is generally 
admired and revered by the common people: the latter is commonly more esteemed 
and adopted by what are called people of fashion. The degree of disapprobation with 
which we ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great 
prosperity, and from the excess of gaiety and good humour, seems to constitute the 
principal distinction between those two opposite schemes or systems. In the liberal or 
loose system, luxury, wanton and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to 
some degree of intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two sexes, 
etc., provided they are not accompanied with gross indecency, and do not lead to 
falsehood or injustice, are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and are 
easily either excused or pardoned altogether. In the austere system, on the contrary, 
those excesses are regarded with the utmost abhorrence and detestation. The vices of 
levity are always ruinous to the common people, and a single week's thoughtlessness 
and dissipation is often sufficient to undo a poor workman for ever, and to drive him 
through despair upon committing the most enormous crimes. The wiser and better sort 
of the common people, therefore, have always the utmost abhorrence and detestation 
of such excesses, which their experience tells them are so immediately fatal to people 
of their condition. The disorder and extravagance of several years, on the contrary, 
will not always ruin a man of fashion, and people of that rank are very apt to consider 
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the power of indulging in some degree of excess as one of the advantages of their 
fortune, and the liberty of doing so without censure or reproach as one of the 
privileges which belong to their station. In people of their own station, therefore, they 
regard such excesses with but a small degree of disapprobation, and censure them 
either very slightly or not at all. 
    Almost all religious sects have begun among the common people, from whom they 
have generally drawn their earliest as well as their most numerous proselytes. The 
austere system of morality has, accordingly, been adopted by those sects almost 
constantly, or with very few exceptions; for there have been some. It was the system 
by which they could best recommend themselves to that order of people to whom they 
first proposed their plan of reformation upon what had been before established. Many 
of them, perhaps the greater part of them, have even endeavoured to gain credit by 
refining upon this austere system, and by carrying it to some degree of folly and 
extravagance; and this excessive rigour has frequently recommended them more than 
anything else to the respect and veneration of the common people. 
    A man of rank and fortune is by his station the distinguished member of a great 
society, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby oblige him to attend 
to every part of it himself. His authority and consideration depend very much upon the 
respect which this society bears to him. He dare not do anything which would disgrace 
or discredit him in it, and he is obliged to a very strict observation of that species of 
morals, whether liberal or austere, which the general consent of this society prescribes 
to persons of his rank and fortune. A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from 
being a distinguished member of any great society. While he remains in a country 
village his conduct may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it himself. 
In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is called a character to 
lose. But as soon as he comes into a great city he is sunk in obscurity and darkness. 
His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody, and he is therefore very likely to 
neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every sort of low profligacy and vice. He 
never emerges so effectually from this obscurity, his conduct never excites so much 
the attention of any respectable society, as by his becoming the member of a small 
religious sect. He from that moment acquires a degree of consideration which he never 
had before. All his brother sectaries are, for the credit of the sect, interested to observe 
his conduct, and if he gives occasion to any scandal, if he deviates very much from 
those austere morals which they almost always require of one another, to punish him 
by what is always a very severe punishment, even where no civil effects attend it, 
expulsion or excommunication from the sect. In little religious sects, accordingly, the 
morals of the common people have been almost always remarkably regular and 
orderly; generally much more so than in the established church. The morals of those 
little sects, indeed, have frequently been rather disagreeably rigorous and unsocial. 
    There are two very easy and effectual remedies, however, by whose joint operation 
the state might, without violence, correct whatever was unsocial or disagreeably 
rigorous in the morals of all the little sects into which the country was divided. 
    The first of those remedies is the study of science and philosophy, which the state 
might render almost universal among all people of middling or more than middling 
rank and fortune; not by giving salaries to teachers in order to make them negligent 
and idle, but by instituting some sort of probation, even in the higher and more 
difficult sciences, to be undergone by every person before he was permitted to exercise 
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any liberal profession, or before he could be received as a candidate for any 
honourable office of trust or profit. If the state imposed upon this order of men the 
necessity of learning, it would have no occasion to give itself any trouble about 
providing them with proper teachers. They would soon find better teachers for 
themselves than any whom the state could provide for them. Science is the great 
antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and where all the superior ranks 
of people were secured from it, the inferior ranks could not be much exposed to it. 
    The second of those remedies is the frequency and gaiety of public diversions. The 
state, by encouraging, that is by giving entire liberty to all those who for their own 
interest would attempt without scandal or indecency, to amuse and divert the people 
by painting, poetry, music, dancing; by all sorts of dramatic representations and 
exhibitions, would easily dissipate, in the greater part of them, that melancholy and 
gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and 
enthusiasm. Public diversions have always been the objects of dread and hatred to all 
the fanatical promoters of those popular frenzies. The gaiety and good humour which 
those diversions inspire were altogether inconsistent with that temper of mind which 
was fittest for their purpose, or which they could best work upon. Dramatic 
representations, besides, frequently exposing their artifices to public ridicule, and 
sometimes even to public execration, were upon that account, more than all other 
diversions, the objects of their peculiar abhorrence. 
    In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more than those 
of another, it would not be necessary that any of them should have any particular or 
immediate dependency upon the sovereign or executive power; or that he should have 
anything to do either in appointing or in dismissing them from their offices. In such a 
situation he would have no occasion to give himself any concern about them, further 
than to keep the peace among them in the same manner as among the rest of his 
subjects; that is, to hinder them from persecuting, abusing, or oppressing one another. 
But it is quite otherwise in countries where there is an established or governing 
religion. The sovereign can in this case never be secure unless he has the means of 
influencing in a considerable degree the greater part of the teachers of that religion. 
    The clergy of every established church constitute a great incorporation. They can 
act in concert, and pursue their interest upon one plan and with one spirit, as much as 
if they were under the direction of one man; and they are frequently, too, under such 
direction. Their interest as an incorporated body is never the same with that of the 
sovereign, and is sometimes directly opposite to it. Their great interest is to maintain 
their authority with the people; and this authority depends upon the supposed certainty 
and importance of the whole doctrine which they inculcate, and upon the supposed 
necessity of adopting every part of it with the most implicit faith, in order to avoid 
eternal misery. Should the sovereign have the imprudence to appear either to deride or 
doubt himself of the most trifling part of their doctrine, or from humanity attempt to 
protect those who did either the one or the other, the punctilious honour of a clergy 
who have no sort of dependency upon him is immediately provoked to proscribe him 
as a profane person, and to employ all the terrors of religion in order to oblige the 
people to transfer their allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient prince. Should 
he oppose any of their pretensions or usurpations, the danger is equally great. The 
princes who have dared in this manner to rebel against the church, over and above this 
crime of rebellion have generally been charged, too, with the additional crime of 
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heresy, notwithstanding their solemn protestations of their faith and humble 
submission to every tenet which she thought proper to prescribe to them. But the 
authority of religion is superior to every other authority. The fears which it suggests 
conquer all other fears. When the authorized teachers of religion propagate through the 
great body of the people doctrines subversive of the authority of the sovereign, it is by 
violence only, or by the force of a standing army, that he can maintain his authority. 
Even a standing army cannot in this case give him any lasting security; because if the 
soldiers are not foreigners, which can seldom be the case, but drawn from the great 
body of the people, which must almost always be the case, they are likely to be soon 
corrupted by those very doctrines. The revolutions which the turbulence of the Greek 
clergy was continually occasioning at Constantinople, as long as the eastern empire 
subsisted; the convulsions which, during the course of several centuries, the turbulence 
of the Roman clergy was continually occasioning in every part of Europe, sufficiently 
demonstrate how precarious and insecure must always be the situation of the sovereign 
who has no proper means of influencing the clergy of the established and governing 
religion of his country. 
    Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evident enough, are not 
within the proper department of a temporal sovereign, who, though he may be very 
well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to be so for instructing the people. 
With regard to such matters, therefore, his authority can seldom be sufficient to 
counterbalance the united authority of the clergy of the established church. The public 
tranquillity, however, and his own security, may frequently depend upon the doctrines 
which they may think proper to propagate concerning such matters. As he can seldom 
directly oppose their decision, therefore, with proper weight and authority, it is 
necessary that he should be able to influence it; and be can influence it only by the 
fears and expectations which he may excite in the greater part of the individuals of the 
order. Those fears and expectations may consist in the fear of deprivation or other 
punishment, and in the expectation of further preferment. 
    In all Christian churches the benefices of the clergy are a sort of freeholds which 
they enjoy, not during pleasure, but during life or good behaviour. If they held them by 
a more precarious tenure, and were liable to be turned out upon every slight 
disobligation either of the sovereign or of his ministers, it would perhaps be 
impossible for them to maintain their authority with the people, who would then 
consider them as mercenary dependents upon the court, in the security of whose 
instructions they could no longer have any confidence. But should the sovereign 
attempt irregularly, and by violence, to deprive any number of clergymen of their 
freeholds, on account, perhaps, of their having propagated, with more than ordinary 
zeal, some factious or seditious doctrine, he would only render, by such persecution, 
both them and their doctrine ten times more popular, and therefore ten times more 
troublesome and dangerous, than they had been before. Fear is in almost all cases a 
wretched instrument of government, and ought in particular never to be employed 
against any order of men who have the smallest pretensions to independency. To 
attempt to terrify them serves only to irritate their bad humour, and to confirm them in 
an opposition which more gentle usage perhaps might easily induce them either to 
soften or to lay aside altogether. The violence which the French government usually 
employed in order to oblige all their parliaments, or sovereign courts of justice, to 
enregister any unpopular edict, very seldom succeeded. The means commonly 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth5.html (68 of 174)4/11/2005 9:48:51 AM
The Wealth of Nations
employed, however, the imprisonment of all the refractory members, one would think 
were forcible enough. The princes of the house of Stewart sometimes employed the 
like means in order to influence some of the members of the Parliament of England; 
and they generally found them equally intractable. The Parliament of England is now 
managed in another manner; and a very small experiment which the Duke of Choiseul 
made about twelve years ago upon the Parliament of Paris, demonstrated sufficiently 
that all the parliaments of France might have been managed still more easily in the 
same manner. That experiment was not pursued. For though management and 
persuasion are always the easiest and the safest instruments of governments, as force 
and violence are the worst and the most dangerous, yet such, it seems, is the natural 
insolence of man that he almost always disdains to use the good instrument, except 
when he cannot or dare not use the bad one. The French government could and durst 
use force, and therefore disdained to use management and persuasion. But there is no 
order of men, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all ages, upon whom it is so 
dangerous, or rather so perfectly ruinous, to employ force and violence, as upon the 
respected clergy of any established church. The rights, the privileges, the personal 
liberty of every individual ecclesiastic who is upon good terms with his own order are, 
even in the most despotic governments, more respected than those of any other person 
of nearly equal rank and fortune. It is so in every gradation of despotism, from that of 
the gentle and mild government of Paris to that of the violent and furious government 
of Constantinople. But though this order of men can scarce ever be forced, they may 
be managed as easily as any other; and the security of the sovereign, as well as the 
public tranquillity, seems to depend very much upon the means which he has of 
managing them; and those means seem to consist altogether in the preferment which 
he has to bestow upon them. 
    In the ancient constitution of the Christian church, the bishop of each diocese was 
elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the episcopal city. The 
people did not long retain their right of election; and while they did retain it, they 
almost always acted under the influence of the clergy, who in such spiritual matters 
appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy, however, soon grew weary of the 
trouble of managing them, and found it easier to elect their own bishops themselves. 
The abbot, in the same manner, was elected by the monks of the monastery, at least in 
the greater part of the abbacies. All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices comprehended 
within the diocese were collated by the bishop, who bestowed them upon such 
ecclesiastics as he thought proper. All church preferments were in this manner in the 
disposal of the church. The sovereign, though he might have some indirect influence 
in those elections, and though it was sometimes usual to ask both his consent to elect 
and his approbation of the election, yet had no direct or sufficient means of managing 
the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to pay court not so 
much to his sovereign as to his own order, from which only he could expect 
preferment. 
    Through the greater part of Europe the Pope gradually drew to himself first the 
collation of almost all bishoprics and abbacies, or of what were called Consistorial 
benefices, and afterwards, by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part 
of inferior benefices comprehended within each diocese; little more being left to the 
bishop than what was barely necessary to give him a decent authority with his own 
clergy. By this arrangement the condition of the sovereign was still worse than it had 
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been before. The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed into 
a sort of spiritual army, dispersed in different quarters, indeed, but of which all the 
movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon 
one uniform plan. The clergy of each particular country might be considered as a 
particular detachment of that army, or which the operations could easily be supported 
and seconded by all the other detachments quartered in the different countries round 
about. Each detachment was not only independent of the sovereign of the country in 
which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but dependent upon a foreign 
sovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against the sovereign of that particular 
country, and support them by the arms of all the other detachments. 
    Those arms were the most formidable that can well be imagined. In the ancient state 
of Europe, before the establishment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy 
gave them the same sort of influence over the common people which that of the great 
barons gave them over their respective vassals, tenants, and retainers. In the great 
landed estates which the mistaken piety both of princes and private persons had 
bestowed upon the church, jurisdictions were established of the same kind with those 
of the great barons, and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy, 
or their bailiffs, could easily keep the peace without the support or assistance either of 
the king or of any other person; and neither the king nor any other person could keep 
the peace there without the support and assistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions of 
the clergy, therefore, in their particular baronies or manors, were equally independent, 
and equally exclusive of the authority of the king's courts, as those of the great 
temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like those of the great barons, almost 
all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords, and therefore liable 
to be called out at pleasure in order to fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might 
think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of those estates, the clergy 
possessed in the tithes, a very large portion of the rents of all the other estates in every 
kingdom of Europe. The revenues arising from both those species of rents were, the 
greater part of them, paid in kind, in corn, wine, cattle poultry, etc. The quantity 
exceeded greatly what the clergy could themselves consume; and there were neither 
arts nor manufactures for the produce of which they could exchange the surplus. The 
clergy could derive advantage from this immense surplus in no other way than by 
employing it, as the great barons employed the like surplus of their revenues, in the 
most profuse hospitality, and in the most extensive charity. Both the hospitality and 
the charity of the ancient clergy, accordingly, are said to have been very great. They 
not only maintained almost the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and 
gentlemen had frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from 
monastery to monastery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy the 
hospitality of the clergy. The retainers of some particular prelates were often as 
numerous as those of the greatest lay-lords; and the retainers of all the clergy taken 
together were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all the lay-lords. There was 
always much more union among the clergy than among the lay-lords. The former were 
under a regular discipline and subordination to the papal authority. The latter were 
under no regular discipline or subordination, but almost always equally jealous of one 
another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had 
both together been less numerous than those of the great lay-lords, and their tenants 
were probably much less numerous, yet their union would have rendered them more 
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formidable. The hospitality and charity of the clergy, too, not only gave them the 
command of a great temporal force, but increased very much the weight of their 
spiritual weapons. Those virtues procured them the highest respect and veneration 
among all the inferior ranks of people, of whom many were constantly, and almost all 
occasionally, fed by them. Everything belonging or related to so popular an order, its 
possessions, its privileges, its doctrines, necessarily appeared sacred in the eyes of the 
common people, and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the highest 
act of sacrilegious wickedness and profaneness. In this state of things, if the sovereign 
frequently found it difficult to resist the confederacy of a few of the great nobility, we 
cannot wonder that he should find it still more so to resist the united force of the 
clergy of his own dominions, supported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring 
dominions. In such circumstances the wonder is, not that he was sometimes obliged to 
yield, but that he ever was able to resist. 
    The privilege of the clergy in those ancient times (which to us who live in the 
present times appear the most absurd), their total exemption from the secular 
jurisdiction, for example, or what in England was called the benefit of the clergy, were 
the natural or rather the necessary consequences of this state of things. How dangerous 
must it have been for the sovereign to attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime 
whatever, if his own order were disposed to protect him, and to represent either the 
proof as insufficient for convicting so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to 
be inflicted upon one whose person had been rendered sacred by religion? The 
sovereign could, in such circumstances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the 
ecclesiastical courts, who, for the honour of their own order, were interested to 
restrain, as much as possible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes, 
or even from giving occasion to such gross scandal as might disgust the minds of the 
people. 
    In the state in which things were through the greater part of Europe during the tenth, 
eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both before and after that 
period, the constitution of the Church of Rome may be considered as the most 
formidable combination that ever was formed against the authority and security of 
civil government, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind, 
which can flourish only where civil government is able to protect them. In that 
constitution the grossest delusions of superstition were supported in such a manner by 
the private interests of so great a number of people as put them out of all danger from 
any assault of human reason: because though human reason might perhaps have been 
able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, some of the delusions of 
superstition, it could never have dissolved the ties of private interest. Had this 
constitution been attacked by no other enemies but the feeble efforts of human reason, 
it must have endured for ever. But that immense and well-built fabric, which all the 
wisdom and virtue of man could never have shaken, much less have overturned, was 
by the natural course of things, first weakened, and afterwards in part destroyed, and is 
now likely, in the course of a few centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into ruins 
altogether. 
    The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the same causes 
which destroyed the power of the great barons, destroyed in the same manner, through 
the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of 
arts, manufactures, and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found something 
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for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby discovered the means 
of spending their whole revenues upon their own persons, without giving any 
considerable share of them to other people. Their charity became gradually less 
extensive, their hospitality less liberal or less profuse. Their retainers became 
consequently less numerous, and by degrees dwindled away altogether. The clergy 
too, like the great barons, wished to get a better rent from their landed estates, in order 
to spend it, in the same manner, upon the gratification of their own private vanity and 
folly. But this increase of rent could be got only by granting leases to their tenants, 
who thereby became in a great measure independent of them. The ties of interest 
which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy were in this manner gradually 
broken and dissolved. They were even broken and dissolved sooner than those which 
bound the same ranks of people to the great barons: because the benefices of the 
church being, the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of the great 
barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to spend the whole of its 
revenue upon his own person. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full 
vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the absolute command which they had 
once had over the great body of the people, was very much decayed. The power of the 
church was by that time very nearly reduced through the greater part of Europe to 
what arose from her spiritual authority; and even that spiritual authority was much 
weakened when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy. 
The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order, as they had done 
before, as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their indigence. On the 
contrary, they were provoked and disgusted by the vanity, luxury, and expense of the 
richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon their own pleasures what had always before 
been regarded as the patrimony of the poor. 
    In this situation of things, the sovereigns in the different states of Europe 
endeavoured to recover the influence which they had once had in the disposal of the 
great benefices of the church, by procuring to the deans and chapters of each diocese 
the restoration of their ancient right of electing the bishop, and to the monks of each 
abbacy that of electing the abbot. The re-establishing of this ancient order was the 
object of several statutes enacted in England during the course of the fourteenth 
century, particularly of what is called the Statute of Provisors; and of the Pragmatic 
Sanction established in France in the fifteenth century. In order to render the election 
valid, it was necessary that the sovereign should both consent to it beforehand, and 
afterwards approve of the person elected; and though the election was still supposed to 
be free, he had, however, all the indirect means which his situation necessarily 
afforded him of influencing the clergy in his own dominions. Other regulations of a 
similar tendency were established in other parts of Europe. But the power of the pope 
in the collation of the great benefices of the church seems, before the Reformation, to 
have been nowhere so effectually and so universally restrained as in France and 
England. The Concordat afterwards, in the sixteenth century, gave to the kings of 
France the absolute right of presenting to all the great, or what are called the 
consistorial, benefices of the Gallican Church. 
    Since the establishment of the Pragmatic Sanction and of the Concordat, the clergy 
of France have in general shown less respect to the decrees of the papal court than the 
clergy of any other Catholic country. In all the disputes which their sovereign has had 
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with the pope, they have almost constantly taken party with the former. This 
independency of the clergy of France upon the court of Rome seems to be principally 
founded upon the Pragmatic Sanction and the Concordat. In the earlier periods of the 
monarchy, the clergy of France appear to have been as much devoted to the pope as 
those of any other country. When Robert, the second prince of the Capetian race, was 
most unjustly excommunicated by the court of Rome, his own servants, it is said, 
threw the victuals which came from his table to the dogs, and refused to taste anything 
themselves which little been polluted by the contact of a person in his situation. They 
were taught to do so, it may very safely be presumed, by the clergy of his own 
dominions. 
    The claim of collating to the great benefices of the church, a claim in defence of 
which the court of Rome had frequently shaken, and sometimes overturned the thrones 
of some of the greatest sovereigns in Christendom, was in this manner either restrained 
or modified, or given up altogether, in many different parts of Europe, even before the 
time of the Reformation. As the clergy had now less influence over the people, so the 
state had more influence over the clergy. The clergy, therefore, had both less power 
and less inclination to disturb the state. 
    The authority of the Church of Rome was in this state of declension when the 
disputes which gave birth to the Reformation began in Germany, and soon spread 
themselves through every part of Europe. The new doctrines were everywhere 
received with a high degree of popular favour. They were propagated with all that 
enthusiastic zeal which commonly animates the spirit of party when it attacks 
established authority. The teachers of those doctrines, though perhaps in other respects 
not more learned than many of the divines who defended the established church, seem 
in general to have been better acquainted with ecclesiastical history, and with the 
origin and progress of that system of opinions upon which the authority of the church 
was established, and they had thereby some advantage in almost every dispute. The 
austerity of their manners gave them authority with the common people, who 
contrasted the strict regularity of their conduct with the disorderly lives of the greater 
part of their own clergy. They possessed, too, in a much higher degree than their 
adversaries all the arts of popularity and of gaining proselytes, arts which the lofty and 
dignified sons of the church had long neglected as being to them in a great measure 
useless. The reason of the new doctrines recommended them to some, their novelty to 
many; the hatred and contempt of the established clergy to a still greater number; but 
the zealous, passionate, and fanatical, though frequently coarse and rustic, eloquence 
with which they were almost everywhere inculcated, recommended them to by far the 
greatest number. 
    The success of the new doctrines was almost everywhere so great that the princes 
who at that time happened to be on bad terms with the court of Rome were by means 
of them easily enabled, in their own dominions, to overturn the church, which, having 
lost the respect and veneration of the inferior ranks of people, could make scarce any 
resistance. The court of Rome had disobliged some of the smaller princes in the 
northern parts of Germany, whom it had probably considered as too insignificant to be 
worth the managing. They universally, therefore, established the Reformation in their 
own dominions. The tyranny of Christian II and of Troll, Archbishop of Upsala, 
enabled Gustavus Vasa to expel them both from Sweden. The pope favoured the tyrant 
and the archbishop, and Gustavus Vasa found no difficulty in establishing the 
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Reformation in Sweden. Christian II was afterwards deposed from the throne of 
Denmark, where his conduct had rendered him as odious as in Sweden. The pope, 
however, was still disposed to favour him, and Frederick of Holstein, who had 
mounted the throne in his stead, revenged himself by following the example of 
Gustavus Vasa. The magistrates of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular quarrel 
with the pope, established with great ease the Reformation in their respective cantons, 
where just before some of the clergy had, by an imposture somewhat grosser than 
ordinary, rendered the whole order both odious and contemptible. 
    In this critical situation of its affairs, the papal court was at sufficient pains to 
cultivate the friendship of the powerful sovereigns of France and Spain, of whom the 
latter was at that time Emperor of Germany. With their assistance it was enabled, 
though not without great difficulty and much bloodshed, either to suppress altogether 
or to obstruct very much the progress of the Reformation in their dominions. It was 
well enough inclined, too, to be complaisant to the King of England. But from the 
circumstances of the times, it could not be so without giving offence to a still greater 
sovereign, Charles V, King of Spain and Emperor of Germany. Henry VIII 
accordingly, though he did not embrace himself the greater part of the doctrines of the 
Reformation, was yet enabled, by their general prevalence, to suppress all the 
monasteries, and to abolish the authority of the Church of Rome in his dominions. 
That he should go so far, though he went no further, gave some satisfaction to the 
patrons of the Reformation, who having got possession of the government in the reign 
of his son and successor, completed without any difficulty the work which Henry VIII 
had begun. 
    In some countries, as in Scotland, where the government was weak, unpopular, and 
not very firmly established, the Reformation was strong enough to overturn, not only 
the church, but the state likewise for attempting to support the church. 
    Among the followers of the Reformation dispersed in all the different countries of 
Europe, there was no general tribunal which, like that of the court of Rome, or an 
oecumenical council, could settle all disputes among them, and with irresistible 
authority prescribe to all of them the precise limits of orthodoxy. When the followers 
of the Reformation in one country, therefore, happened to differ from their brethren in 
another, as they had no common judge to appeal to, the dispute could never be 
decided; and many such disputes arose among them. Those concerning the 
government of the church, and the right of conferring ecclesiastical benefices, were 
perhaps the most interesting to the peace and welfare of civil society. They gave birth 
accordingly to the two principal parties of sects among the followers of the 
Reformation, the Lutheran and Calvinistic sects, the only sects among them of which 
the doctrine and discipline have ever yet been established by law in any part of 
Europe. 
    The followers of Luther, together with what is called the Church of England, 
preserved more or less of the episcopal government, established subordination among 
the clergy, gave the sovereign the disposal of all the bishoprics and other consistorial 
benefices within his dominions, and thereby rendered him the real head of the church; 
and without depriving the bishop of the right of collating to the smaller benefices 
within his diocese, they, even to those benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the 
right of presentation both in the sovereign and in all other lay-patrons. This system of 
church government was from the beginning favourable to peace and good order, and to 
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submission to the civil sovereign. It has never, accordingly, been the occasion of any 
tumult or civil commotion in any country in which it has once been established. The 
Church of England in particular has always valued herself, with great reason, upon the 
unexceptionable loyalty of her principles. Under such a government the clergy 
naturally endeavour to recommend themselves to the sovereign, to the court, and to the 
nobility and gentry of the country, by whose influence they chiefly expect to obtain 
preferment. They pay court to those patrons sometimes, no doubt, by the vilest flattery 
and assentation, but frequently, too, by cultivating all those arts which best deserve, 
and which are therefore most likely to gain them the esteem of people of rank and 
fortune; by their knowledge in all the different branches of useful and ornamental 
learning, by the decent liberality of their manners, by the social good humour of their 
conversation, and by their avowed contempt of those absurd and hypocritical 
austerities which fanatics inculcate and pretend to practise, in order to draw upon 
themselves the veneration, and upon the greater part of men of rank and fortune, who 
avow that they do not practise them, the abhorrence of the common people. Such a 
clergy, however, while they pay their court in this manner to the higher ranks of life, 
are very apt to neglect altogether the means of maintaining their influence and 
authority with the lower. They are listened to, esteemed, and respected by their 
superiors; but before their inferiors they are frequently incapable of defending, 
effectually and to the conviction of such hearers, their own sober and moderate 
doctrines against the most ignorant enthusiast who chooses to attack them. 
    The followers of Zwingli, or more properly those of Calvin, on the contrary, 
bestowed upon the people of each parish, whenever the church became vacant, the 
right of electing their own pastor, and established at the same time the most perfect 
equality among the clergy. The former part of this institution, as long as it remained in 
vigour, seems to have been productive of nothing but disorder and confusion, and to 
have tended equally to corrupt the morals both of the clergy and of the people. The 
latter part seems never to have had any effects but what were perfectly agreeable. 
    As long as the people of each parish preserved the right of electing their own 
pastors, they acted almost always under the influence of the clergy, and generally of 
the most factious and fanatical of the order. The clergy, in order to preserve their 
influence in those popular elections, became, or affected to become, many of them, 
fanatics themselves, encouraged fanaticism among the people, and gave the preference 
almost always to the most fanatical candidate. So small a matter as the appointment of 
a parish priest occasioned almost always a violent contest, not only in one parish, but 
in all the neighbouring parishes, who seldom failed to take part in the quarrel. When 
the parish happened to be situated in a great city, it divided all the inhabitants into two 
parties; and when that city happened either to constitute itself a little republic, or to be 
the head and capital of a little republic, as is the case with many of the considerable 
cities in Switzerland and Holland, every paltry dispute of this kind, over and above 
exasperating the animosity of all their other factions, threatened to leave behind it both 
a new schism in the church, and a new faction in the state. In those small republics, 
therefore, the magistrate very soon found it necessary, for the sake of preserving the 
public peace, to assume to himself the right of presenting to all vacant benefices. In 
Scotland, the most extensive country in which this Presbyterian form of church 
government has ever been established, the rights of patronage were in effect abolished 
by the act which established Presbytery in the beginning of the reign of William III. 
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That act at least put it in the power of certain classes of people in each parish to 
purchase, for a very small price, the right of electing their own pastor. The constitution 
which this act established was allowed to subsist for about two-and-twenty years, but 
was abolished by the 10th of Queen Anne, c. 12, on account of the confusions and 
disorders which this more popular mode of, election had almost everywhere 
occasioned. In so extensive a country as Scotland, however, a tumult in a remote 
parish was not so likely to give disturbance to government as in a smaller state. The 
10th of Queen Anne restored the rights of patronage. But though in Scotland the law 
gives the benefice without any exception to the person presented by the patron, yet the 
church requires sometimes (for she has not in this respect been very uniform in her 
decisions) a certain concurrence of the people before she will confer upon the 
presentee what is called the cure of souls, or the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the 
parish. She sometimes at least, from an affected concern for the peace of the parish, 
delays the settlement till this concurrence can be procured. The private tampering of 
some of the neighbouring clergy, sometimes to procure, but more frequently to 
prevent, this concurrence, and the popular arts which they cultivate in order to enable 
them upon such occasions to tamper more effectually, are perhaps the causes which 
principally keep up whatever remains of the old fanatical spirit, either in the clergy or 
in the people of Scotland. 
    The equality which the Presbyterian form of church government establishes among 
the clergy, consists, first, in the equality of authority or ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and, 
secondly, in the equality of benefice. In all Presbyterian churches the equality of 
authority is perfect: that of benefice is not so. The difference, however, between one 
benefice and another is seldom so considerable as commonly to tempt the possessor 
even of the small one to pay court to his patron by the vile arts of flattery and 
assentation in order to get a better. In all the Presbyterian churches, where the rights of 
patronage are thoroughly established, it is by nobler and better arts that the established 
clergy in general endeavour to gain the favour of their superiors; by their learning, by 
the irreproachable regularity of their life, and by the faithful and diligent discharge of 
their duty. Their patrons even frequently complain of the independency of their spirit, 
which they are apt to construe into ingratitude for past favours, but which at worst, 
perhaps, is seldom any more than that indifference which naturally arises from the 
consciousness that no further favours of the kind are ever to be expected. There is 
scarce perhaps to be found anywhere in Europe a more learned, decent, independent, 
and respectable set of men than the greater part of the Presbyterian clergy of Holland, 
Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland. 
    Where the church benefices are all nearly equal, none of them can be very great, 
and this mediocrity of benefice, though it may no doubt be carried, too far, has, 
however, some very agreeable effects. Nothing but the most exemplary morals can 
give dignity to a man of small fortune. The vices of levity and vanity necessarily 
render him ridiculous, and are, besides, almost as ruinous to him as they are to the 
common people. In his own conduct, therefore, he is obliged to follow that system of 
morals which the common people respect the most. He gains their esteem and 
affection by that plan of life which his own interest and situation would lead him to 
follow. The common people look upon him with that kindness with which we 
naturally regard one who approaches somewhat to our own condition, but who, we 
think, ought to be in a higher. Their kindness naturally provokes his kindness. He 
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becomes careful to instruct them, and attentive to assist and relieve them. He does not 
even despise the prejudices of people who are disposed to be so favourable to him, and 
never treats them with those contemptuous and arrogant airs which we so often meet 
with in the proud dignitaries of opulent and well-endowed churches. The Presbyterian 
clergy, accordingly, have more influence over the minds of the common people than 
perhaps the clergy of any other established church. It is accordingly in Presbyterian 
countries only that we ever find the common people converted, without persecution, 
completely, and almost to a man, to the established church. 
    In countries where church benefices are the greater part of them very moderate, a 
chair in a university is generally a better establishment than a church benefice. The 
universities have, in this case, the picking and choosing of their members from all the 
churchmen of the country, who, in every country, constitute by far the most numerous 
class of men of letters. Where church benefices, on the contrary, are many of them 
very considerable, the church naturally draws from the universities the greater part of 
their eminent men of letters, who generally find some patron who does himself honour 
by procuring them church preferment. In the former situation we are likely to find the 
universities filled with the most eminent men of letters that are to be found in the 
country. In the latter we are likely to find few eminent men among them, and those 
few among the youngest members of the society, who are likely, too, to be drained 
away from it before they can have acquired experience and knowledge enough to be of 
much use to it. It is observed by Mr. de Voltaire, that Father Porrie, a Jesuit of no great 
eminence in the republic of letters, was the only professor they had ever had in France 
whose works were worth the reading. In a country which has produced so many 
eminent men of letters, it must appear somewhat singular that scarce one of them 
should have been a professor in a university. The famous Gassendi was, in the 
beginning of his life, a professor in the University of Aix. Upon the first dawning of 
his genius, it was represented to him that by going into the church he could easily find 
a much more quiet and comfortable subsistence, as well as a better situation for 
pursuing his studies; and he immediately followed the advice. The observation of Mr. 
de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France, but to all other Roman 
Catholic countries. We very rarely find, in any of them, an eminent man of letters who 
is a professor in a university, except, perhaps, in the professions of law and physic; 
professions from which the church is not so likely to draw them. After the Church of 
Rome, that of England is by far the richest and best endowed church in Christendom. 
In England, accordingly, the church is continually draining the universities of all their 
best and ablest members; and an old college tutor, who is known and distinguished in 
Europe as an eminent man of letters, is as rarely to be found there as in any Roman 
Catholic country. In Geneva, on the contrary, in the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, 
in the Protestant countries of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, in Sweden, and 
Denmark, the most eminent men of letters whom those countries have produced, have, 
not all indeed, but the far greater part of them, been professors in universities. In those 
countries the universities are continually draining the church of all its most eminent 
men of letters. 
    It may, perhaps, be worth while to remark that, if we expect the poets, a few orators, 
and a few historians, the far greater part of the other eminent men of letters, both of 
Greece and Rome, appear to have been either public or private teachers; generally 
either of philosophy or of rhetoric. This remark will be found to hold true from the 
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days of Lysias and Isocrates, of Plato and Aristotle, down to those of Plutarch and 
Epictetus, of Suetonius and Quintilian. To impose upon any man the necessity of 
teaching, year after year, any particular branch of science, seems, in reality, to be the 
most effectual method for rendering him completely master of it himself. By being 
obliged to go every year over the same ground, if he is good for anything, he 
necessarily becomes, in a few years, well acquainted with every part of it: and if upon 
any particular point he should form too hasty an opinion one year, when he comes in 
the course of his lectures to reconsider the same subject the year thereafter, he is very 
likely to correct it. As to be a teacher of science is certainly the natural employment of 
a mere man of letters, so is it likewise, perhaps, the education which is most likely to 
render him a man of solid learning and knowledge. The mediocity of church benefices 
naturally tends to draw the greater part of men of letters, in the country where it takes 
place, to the employment in which they can be the most useful to the public, and, at 
the same time, to give them the best education, perhaps, they are capable of receiving. 
It tends to render their learning both as solid as possible, and as useful as possible. 
    The revenue of every established church, such parts of it excepted as may arise from 
particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be observed, of the general revenue 
of the state which is thus diverted to a purpose very different from the defence of the 
state. The tithe, for example, is a real land-tax, which puts it out of the power of the 
proprietors of land to contribute so largely towards the defence of the state as they 
otherwise might be able to do. The rent of land, however, is, according to some, the 
sole fund, and, according to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great 
monarchies, the exigencies of the state must be ultimately supplied. The more of this 
fund that is given to the church, the less, it is evident, can be spared to the state. It may 
be laid down as a certain maxim that, all other things being supposed equal, the richer 
the church, the poorer must necessarily be, either the sovereign on the one hand, or the 
people on the other; and, in all cases, the less able must the state be to defend itself. In 
several Protestant countries, particularly in all the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, 
the revenue which anciently belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, the tithes and 
church lands, has been found a fund sufficient, not only to afford competent salaries to 
the established clergy, but to defray, with little or no addition, all the other expenses of 
the state. The magistrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in particular, have 
accumulated out of the savings from this fund a very large sum, supposed to amount to 
several millions, part of which is deposited in a public treasure, and part is placed at 
interest in what are called the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe; 
chiefly in those of France and Great Britain. What may be the amount of the whole 
expense which the church, either of Berne, or of any other Protestant canton, costs the 
state, I do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it appears that, in 1755, the 
whole revenue of the clergy of the Church of Scotland, including their glebe or church 
lands, and the rent of their manses or dwelling-houses, estimated according to a 
reasonable valuation, amounted only to L68,514 1s. 5 1/12d. This very moderate 
revenue affords a decent subsistence to nine hundred and forty-four ministers. The 
whole expense of the church, including what is occasionally laid out for the building 
and reparation of churches, and of the manses of ministers, cannot well be supposed to 
exceed eighty or eighty-five thousand pounds a year. The most opulent church in 
Christendom does not maintain better the uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, 
the spirit of order, regularity, and austere morals in the great body of the people, than 
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this very poorly endowed Church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and 
religious, which an established church can be supposed to produce, are produced by it 
as completely as by any other. The greater part of the Protestant churches of 
Switzerland, which in general are not better endowed than the Church of Scotland, 
produce those effects in a still higher degree. In the greater part of the Protestant 
cantons there is not a single person to be found who does not profess himself to be of 
the established church. If he professes himself to be of any other, indeed, the law 
obliges him to leave the canton. But so severe, or rather indeed so oppressive a law, 
could never have been executed in such free countries had not the diligence of the 
clergy beforehand converted to the established church the whole body of the people, 
with the exception of, perhaps, a few individuals only. In some parts of Switzerland, 
accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a Protestant and Roman Catholic 
country, the conversion has not been so complete, both religions are not only tolerated 
but established by law. 
    The proper performance of every service seems to require that its pay or 
recompense should be, as exactly as possible, proportioned to the nature of the service. 
If any service is very much underpaid, it is very apt to suffer by the meanness and 
incapacity of the greater part of those who are employed in it. If it is very much 
overpaid, it is apt to suffer, perhaps, still more by their negligence and idleness. A man 
of a large revenue, whatever may be his profession, thinks he ought to live like other 
men of large revenues, and to spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and 
in dissipation. But in a clergyman this train of life not only consumes the time which 
ought to be employed in the duties of his function, but in the eyes of the common 
people destroys almost entirely that sanctity of character which can alone enable him 
to perform those duties with proper weight and authority. 
PART 4
Of the Expense of Supporting the Dignity of the Sovereign
Over and above the expenses necessary for enabling the sovereign to perform his 
several duties, a certain expense is requisite for the support of his dignity. This 
expense varies both with the different periods of improvement, and with the different 
forms of government. 
    In an opulent and improved society, where all the different orders of people are 
growing every day more expensive in their houses, in their furniture, in their tables, in 
their dress, and in their equipage, it cannot well be expected that the sovereign should 
alone hold out against the fashion. He naturally, therefore, or rather necessarily, 
becomes more expensive in all those different articles too. His dignity even seems to 
require that he should become so. 
    As in point of dignity a monarch is more raised above his subjects than the chief 
magistrate of any republic is ever supposed to be above his fellow-citizens, so a 
greater expense is necessary for supporting that higher dignity. We naturally expect 
more splendour in the court of a king than in the mansion-house of a doge or 
burgomaster. 
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CONCLUSION
The expense of defending the society, and that of supporting the dignity of the chief 
magistrate, are both laid out for the general benefit of the whole society. It is 
reasonable, therefore, that they should be defrayed by the general contribution of the 
whole society, all the different members contributing, as nearly as possible, in 
proportion to their respective abilities. 
    The expense of the administration of justice, too, may, no doubt, be considered as 
laid out for the benefit of the whole society. There is no impropriety, therefore, in its 
being defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society. The persons, 
however, who gave occasion to this expense are those who, by their injustice in one 
way or another, make it necessary to seek redress or protection from the courts of 
justice. The persons again most immediately benefited by this expense are those whom 
the courts of justice either restore to their rights or maintain in their rights. The 
expense of the administration of justice, therefore, may very properly be defrayed by 
the particular contribution of one or other, or both, of those two different sets of 
persons, according as different occasions may require, that is, by the fees of court. It 
cannot be necessary to have recourse to the general contribution of the whole society, 
except for the conviction of those criminals who have not themselves any estate or 
fund sufficient for paying those fees. 
    Those local or provincial expenses of which the benefit is local or provincial (what 
is laid out, for example, upon the police of a particular town or district) ought to be 
defrayed by a local or provincial revenue, and ought to be no burden upon the general 
revenue of the society. It is unjust that the whole society should contribute towards an 
expense of which the benefit is confined to a part of the society. 
    The expense of maintaining good roads and communications is, no doubt, beneficial 
to the whole society, and may, therefore, without any injustice. be defrayed by the 
general contribution of the whole society. This expense, however, is most immediately 
and directly beneficial to those who travel or carry goods from one place to another, 
and to those who consume such goods. The turnpike tolls in England, and the duties 
called peages in other countries, lay it altogether upon those two different sets of 
people, and thereby discharge the general revenue of the society from a very 
considerable burden. 
    The expense of the institutions for education and religious instruction is likewise, no 
doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without injustice, be 
defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society. This expense, however, 
might perhaps with equal propriety, and even with some advantage, be defrayed 
altogether by those who receive the immediate benefit of such education and 
instruction, or by the voluntary contribution of those who think they have occasion for 
either the one or the other. 
    When the institutions or public works which are beneficial to the whole society 
either cannot be maintained altogether, or are not maintained altogether by the 
contribution of such particular members of the society as are most immediately 
benefited by them, the deficiency must in most cases be made up by the general 
contribution of the whole society. The general revenue of the society, over and above 
defraying the expense of defending the society, and of supporting the dignity of the 
chief magistrate, must make up for the deficiency of many particular branches of 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth5.html (80 of 174)4/11/2005 9:48:51 AM
The Wealth of Nations
revenue. The sources of this general or public revenue I shall endeavour to explain in 
the following chapter. 
CHAPTER II
Of the Sources of the General or Public Revenue of the Society
THE revenue which must defray, not only the expense of defending the society and of 
supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, but all the other necessary expenses of 
government for which the constitution of the state has not provided any particular 
revenue, may be drawn either, first, from some fund which peculiarly belongs to the 
sovereign or commonwealth, and which is independent of the revenue of the people; 
or, secondly, from the revenue of the people. 
PART 1
Of the Funds or Sources of Revenue which may peculiarly belong to the Sovereign or 
Commonwealth
THE funds or sources of revenue which may peculiarly belong to the sovereign or 
commonwealth must consist either in stock or in land. 
    The sovereign, like any other owner of stock, may derive a revenue from it, either 
by employing it himself, or by lending it. His revenue is in the one case profit, in the 
other interest. 
    The revenue of a Tartar or Arabian chief consists in profit. It arises principally from 
the milk and increase of his own herds and flocks, of which he himself superintends 
the management, and is the principal shepherd or herdsman of his own horde or tribe. 
It is, however, in this earliest and rudest state of civil government only that profit has 
ever made the principal part of the public revenue of a monarchial state. 
    Small republics have sometimes derived a considerable revenue from the profit of 
mercantile projects. The republic of Hamburg is said to do so from the profits of a 
public wine cellar and apothecary's shop. The state cannot be very great of which the 
sovereign has leisure to carry on the trade of a wine merchant or apothecary. The 
profit of a public bank has been a source of revenue to more considerable states. It has 
been so not only to Hamburg, but to Venice and Amsterdam. A revenue of this kind 
has even by some people been thought not below the attention of so great an empire as 
that of Great Britain. Reckoning the ordinary dividend of the Bank of England at five 
and a half per cent and its capital at ten millions seven hundred and eighty thousand 
pounds, the net annual profit, after paying the expense of management, must amount, 
it is said, to five hundred and ninety-two thousand nine hundred pounds. Government, 
it is pretended, could borrow this capital at three per cent interest, and by taking the 
management of the bank into its own hands, might make a clear profit of two hundred 
and sixty-nine thousand five hundred pounds a year. The orderly, vigilant, and 
parsimonious administration of such aristocracies as those of Venice and Amsterdam 
is extremely proper, it appears from experience, for the management of a mercantile 
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project of this kind. But whether such a government as that of England- which, 
whatever may be its virtues, has never been famous for good economy; which, in time 
of peace, has generally conducted itself with the slothful and negligent profusion that 
is perhaps natural to monarchies; and in time of war has constantly acted with all the 
thoughtless extravagance that democracies are apt to fall into- could be safely trusted 
with the management of such a project, must at least be good deal more doubtful. 
    The post office is properly a mercantile project. The government advances the 
expense of establishing the different offices, and of buying or hiring the necessary 
horses or carriages, and is repaid with a large profit by the duties upon what is carried. 
It is perhaps the only mercantile project which has been successfully managed by, I 
believe, every sort of government. The capital to be advanced is not very considerable. 
There is no mystery in the business. The returns are not only certain, but immediate. 
    Princes, however, have frequently engaged in many other mercantile projects, and 
have been willing, like private persons, to mend their fortunes by becoming 
adventurers in the common branches of trade. They have scarce ever succeeded. The 
profusion with which the affairs of princes are always managed renders it almost 
impossible that they should. The agents of a prince regard the wealth of their master as 
inexhaustible; are careless at what price they buy; are careless at what price they sell; 
are careless at what expense they transport his goods from one place to another. Those 
agents frequently live with the profusion of princes, and sometimes too, in spite of that 
profusion, and by a proper method of making up their accounts, acquire the fortunes of 
princes. It was thus, as we are told by Machiavel, that the agents of Lorenzo of 
Medicis, not a prince of mean abilities, carried on his trade. The republic of Florence 
was several times obliged to pay the debt into which their extravagance had involved 
him. He found it convenient, accordingly, to give up the business of merchant, the 
business to which his family had originally owed their fortune, and in the latter part of 
his life to employ both what remained of that fortune, and the revenue of the state of 
which he had the disposal, in projects and expenses more suitable to his station. 
    No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of trader and sovereign. If the 
trading spirit of the English East India Company renders them very bad sovereigns, the 
spirit of sovereignty seems to have rendered them equally bad traders. While they 
were traders only they managed their trade successfully, and were able to pay from 
their profits a moderate dividend to the proprietors of their stock. Since they became 
sovereigns, with a revenue which, it is said, was originally more than three millions 
sterling, they have been obliged to beg extraordinary assistance of government in 
order to avoid immediate bankruptcy. In their former situation, their servants in India 
considered themselves as the clerks of merchants: in their present situation, those 
servants consider themselves as the ministers of sovereigns. 
    A state may sometimes derive some part of its public revenue from the interest of 
money, as well as from the profits of stock. If it has amassed a treasure, it may lend a 
part of that treasure either to foreign states, or to its own subjects. 
    The canton of Berne derives a considerable revenue by lending a part of its treasure 
to foreign states; that is, by placing it in the public funds of the different indebted 
nations of Europe, chiefly in those of France and England. The security of this revenue 
must depend, first, upon the security of the funds in which it is placed, or upon the 
good faith of the government which has the management of them; and, secondly, upon 
the certainty or probability of the continuance of peace with the debtor nation. In the 
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case of a war, the very first act of hostility, on the part of the debtor nation, might be 
the forfeiture of the funds of its creditor. This policy of lending money to foreign 
states is, so far as I know, peculiar to the canton of Berne. 
    The city of Hamburg has established a sort of public pawnshop, which lends money 
to the subjects of the state upon pledges at six per cent interest. This pawnshop or 
Lombard, as it is called, affords a revenue, it is pretended, to the state of a hundred and 
fifty thousand crowns, which, at four and sixpence the crown, amounts to L33,750 
sterling. 
    The government of Pennsylvania, without amassing any treasure, invented a method 
of lending, not money indeed, but what is equivalent to money, to its subjects. By 
advancing to private people at interest, and upon land security to double the value, 
paper bills of credit to be redeemed fifteen years after their date, and in the meantime 
made transferable from hand to hand like bank notes, and declared by act of assembly 
to be a legal tender in all payments from one inhabitant of the province to another, it 
raised a moderate revenue, which went a considerable way towards defraying an 
annual expense of about L4500, the whole ordinary expense of that frugal and orderly 
government. The success of an expedient of this kind must have depended upon three 
different circumstances; first, upon the demand for some other instrument of 
commerce besides gold and silver money; or upon the demand for such a quantity of 
consumable stock as could not be had without sending abroad the greater part of their 
gold and silver money in order to purchase it; secondly, upon the good credit of the 
government which made use of this expedient; and, thirdly, upon the moderation with 
which it was used, the whole value of the paper bills of credit never exceeding that of 
the gold and silver money which would have been necessary for carrying on their 
circulation had there been no paper bills of credit. The same expedient was upon 
different occasions adopted by several other American colonies: but, from want of this 
moderation, it produced, in the greater part of them, much more disorder than 
conveniency. 
    The unstable and perishable nature of stock and credit, however, render them unfit 
to be trusted to as the principal funds of that sure, steady, and permanent revenue 
which can alone give security and dignity to government. The government of no great 
nation that was advanced beyond the shepherd state seems ever to have derived the 
greater part of its public revenue from such sources. 
    Land is a fund of a more stable and permanent nature; and the rent of public lands, 
accordingly, has been the principal source of the public revenue of many a great nation 
that was much advanced beyond the shepherd state. From the produce or rent of the 
public lands, the ancient republics of Greece and Italy derived, for a long time, the 
greater part of that revenue which defrayed the necessary expenses of the 
commonwealth. The rent of the crown lands constituted for a long time the greater part 
of the revenue of the ancient sovereigns of Europe. 
    War and the preparation for war are the two circumstances which in modern times 
occasion the greater part of the necessary expense of all great states. But in the ancient 
republics of Greece and Italy every citizen was a soldier, who both served and 
prepared himself for service at his own expense. Neither of those two circumstances, 
therefore, could occasion any very considerable expense to the state. The rent of a very 
moderate landed estate might be fully sufficient for defraying all the other necessary 
expenses of government. 
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    In the ancient monarchies of Europe, the manners and customs of the times 
sufficiently Prepared the great body of the people for war; and when they took the 
field, they were, by the condition of their feudal tenures, to be maintained either at 
their own expense, or at that of their immediate lords, without bringing any new 
charge upon the sovereign. The other expenses of government were, the greater part of 
them, very moderate. The administration of justice, it has been shown, instead of being 
a cause of expense, was a source of revenue. The labour of the country people, for 
three days before and for three days after harvest, was thought a fund sufficient for 
making and maintaining all the bridges, highways, and other public works which the 
commerce of the country was supposed to require. In those days the principal expense 
of the sovereign seems to have consisted in the maintenance of his own family and 
household. The officers of his household, accordingly, were then the great officers of 
state. The lord treasurer received his rents. The lord steward and lord chamberlain 
looked after the expense of his family. The care of his stables was committed to the 
lord constable and the lord marshal. His houses were all built in the form of castles, 
and seem to have been the principal fortresses which he possessed. The keepers of 
those houses or castles might be considered as a sort of military governors. They seem 
to have been the only military officers whom it was necessary to maintain in time of 
peace. In these circumstances the rent of a great landed estate might, upon ordinary 
occasions, very well defray all the necessary expenses of government. 
    In the present state of the greater part of the civilised monarchies of Europe, the rent 
of all the lands in the country, managed as they probably would be if they all belonged 
to one proprietor, would scarce perhaps amount to the ordinary revenue which they 
levy upon the people even in peaceable times. The ordinary revenue of Great Britain, 
for example, including not only what is necessary for defraying the current expense of 
the year, but for paying the interest of the public debts, and for sinking a part of the 
capital of those debts, amounts to upwards of ten millions a year. But the land-tax, at 
four shillings in the pound, falls short of two millions a year. This land-tax, as it is 
called, however, is supposed to be one-fifth, not only of the rent of all the land, but of 
that of all the houses, and of the interest of all the capital stock of Great Britain, that 
part of it only excepted which is either let to the public, or employed as farming stock 
in the cultivation of land. A very considerable part of the produce of this tax arises 
from the rent of houses, and the interest of capital stock. The land-tax of the city of 
London, for example, at four shillings in the pound, amounts to L123,399 6s. 7d. That 
of the city of Westminster, to L63,092 1s. 5d. That of the palaces of Whitehall and St. 
James's, to L30,754 6s. 3d. A certain proportion of the land-tax is in the same manner 
assessed upon all the other cities and towns corporate in the kingdom, and arises 
almost altogether, either from the rent of houses, or from what is supposed to be the 
interest of trading and capital stock. According to the estimation, therefore, by which 
Great Britain is rated to the land-tax, the whole mass of revenue arising from the rent 
of all the lands, from that of all the houses, and from the interest of all the capital 
stock, that part of it only excepted which is either lent to the public, or employed in the 
cultivation of land, does not exceed ten millions sterling a year, the ordinary revenue 
which government levies upon the people even in peaceable times. The estimation by 
which Great Britain is rated to the land-tax is, no doubt, taking the whole kingdom at 
an average, very much below the real value; though in several particular counties and 
districts it is said to be nearly equal to that value. The rent of the lands alone, 
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exclusively of that of houses, and of the interest of stock, has by many people been 
estimated at twenty millions, an estimation made in a great measure at random, and 
which, I apprehend, is as likely to be above as below the truth. But if the lands of 
Great Britain, in the present state of their cultivation, do not afford a rent of more than 
twenty millions a year, they could not well afford the half, most probably not the 
fourth part of that rent, if they all belonged to a single proprietor, and were put under 
the negligent, expensive, and oppressive management of his factors and agents. The 
crown lands of Great Britain do not at present afford the fourth part of the rent which 
could probably be drawn from them if they were the property of private persons. If the 
crown lands were more extensive, it is probable they would be still worse managed. 
    The revenue which the great body of the people derives from land is in proportion, 
not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. The whole annual produce of the land of 
every country, if we except what is reserved for seed, is either annually consumed by 
the great body of the people, or exchanged for something else that is consumed by 
them. Whatever keeps down the produce of the land below what it would otherwise 
rise to keeps down the revenue of the great body of the people still more than it does 
that of the proprietors of land. The rent of land, that portion of the produce which 
belongs to the proprietors, is scarce anywhere in Great Britain supposed to be more 
than a third part of the whole produce. If the land which in one state of cultivation 
affords a rent of ten millions sterling a year would in another afford a rent of twenty 
millions, the rent being, in both cases, supposed a third part of the produce, the 
revenue of the proprietors would be less than it otherwise might be by ten millions a 
year only; but the revenue of the great body of the people would be less than it 
otherwise might be by thirty millions a year, deducting only what would be necessary 
for seed. The population of the country would be less by the number of people which 
thirty millions a year, deducting always the seed, could maintain according to the 
particular mode of living and expense which might take place in the different ranks of 
men among whom the remainder was distributed. 
    Though there is not at present, in Europe, any civilised state of any kind which 
derives the greater part of its public revenue from the rent of lands which are the 
property of the state, yet in all the great monarchies of Europe there are still many 
large tracts of land which belong to the crown. They are generally forest; and 
sometimes forest where, after travelling several miles, you will scarce find a single 
tree; a mere waste and loss of country in respect both of produce and population. In 
every great monarchy of Europe the sale of the crown lands would produce a very 
large sum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would 
deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which those lands have ever 
afforded to the crown. In countries where lands, improved and cultivated very highly, 
and yielding at the time of sale as great a rent as can easily be got from them, 
commonly sell at thirty years' purchase, the unimproved, uncultivated, and low-rented 
crown lands might well be expected to sell at forty, fifty, or sixty years' purchase. The 
crown might immediately enjoy the revenue which this great price would redeem from 
mortgage. In the course of a few years it would probably enjoy another revenue. When 
the crown lands had become private property, they would, in the course of a few years, 
become well improved and well cultivated. The increase of their produce would 
increase the population of the country by augmenting the revenue and consumption of 
the people. But the revenue which the crown derives from the duties of customs and 
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excise would necessarily increase with the revenue and consumption of the people. 
    The revenue which, in any civilised monarchy, the crown derives from the crown 
lands, though it appears to cost nothing to individuals, in reality costs more to the 
society than perhaps any other equal revenue which the crown enjoys. It would, in all 
cases, be for the interest of the society to replace this revenue to the crown by some 
other equal revenue, and to divide the lands among the people, which could not well 
be done better, perhaps, than by exposing them to public sale. 
    Lands for the purposes of pleasure and magnificence- parks, gardens, public walks, 
etc., possessions which are everywhere considered as causes of expense, not as 
sources of revenue- seem to be the only lands which, in a great and civilised 
monarchy, ought to belong to the crown. 
    Public stock and public lands, therefore, the two sources of revenue which may 
peculiarly belong to the sovereign or commonwealth, being both improper and 
insufficient funds for defraying the necessary expense of any great and civilised state, 
it remains that this expense must, the greater part of it, be defrayed by taxes of one 
kind or another; the people contributing a part of their own private revenue in order to 
make up a public revenue to the sovereign or commonwealth. 
PART 2
Of Taxes
THE private revenue of individuals, it has been shown in the first book of this Inquiry, 
arises ultimately from three different sources: Rent, Profit, and Wages. Every tax must 
finally be paid from some one or other of those three different sorts of revenue, or 
from all of them indifferently. I shall endeavour to give the best account I can, first, of 
those taxes which, it is intended, should fall upon rent; secondly, of those which, it is 
intended, should fall upon profit; thirdly, of those which, it is intended, should fall 
upon wages; and, fourthly, of those which, it is intended, should fall indifferently upon 
all those three different sources of private revenue. The particular consideration of 
each of these four different sorts of taxes will divide the second part of the present 
chapter into four articles, three of which will require several other subdivisions. Many 
of those taxes, it will appear from the following review, are not finally paid from the 
fund, or source of revenue, upon which it was intended they should fall. 
    Before I enter upon the examination of particular taxes, it is necessary to premise 
the four following maxims with regard to taxes in general. 
    I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in 
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the 
state. The expense of government to the individuals of a great nation is like the 
expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to 
contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate. In the observation or 
neglect of this maxim consists what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. 
Every tax, it must be observed once for all, which falls finally upon one only of the 
three sorts of revenue above mentioned, is necessarily unequal in so far as it does not 
affect the other two. In the following examination of different taxes I shall seldom take 
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much further notice of this sort of inequality, but shall, in most cases, confine my 
observations to that inequality which is occasioned by a particular tax falling 
unequally even upon that particular sort of private revenue which is affected by it. 
    II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not 
arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought 
all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is 
otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the tax-
gathered, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, 
by the terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself. The 
uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the corruption of an order 
of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. 
The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great 
importance that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the 
experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of 
uncertainty. 
    III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most 
likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the rent of land or of 
houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are usually paid, is levied at the 
time when it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay; or, when he is 
most likely to have wherewithal to pay. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are 
articles of luxury are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is 
very convenient for him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy 
the goods. As he is at liberty, too, either to buy, or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be 
his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconveniency from such taxes. 
    IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the 
pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public 
treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people 
a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in the four following ways. 
First, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat 
up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose 
another additional tax upon the people. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry the 
people, and discourage them from applying to certain branches of business which 
might give maintenance and unemployment to great multitudes. While it obliges the 
people to pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps destroy, some of the funds which 
might enable them more easily to do so. Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties 
which those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, 
it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the 
community might have received from the employment of their capitals. An injudicious 
tax offers a great temptation to smuggling. But the penalties of smuggling must rise in 
proportion to the temptation. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, 
first creates the temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it; and it commonly 
enhances the punishment, too, in proportion to the very circumstance which ought 
certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime. Fourthly, by subjecting the 
people to the frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers, it may 
expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression; and though 
vexation is not, strictly speaking, expense, it is certainly equivalent to the expense at 
which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. It is in some one or 
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other of these four different ways that taxes are frequently so much more burdensome 
to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign. 
    The evident justice and utility of the foregoing maxims have recommended them 
more or less to the attention of all nations. All nations have endeavoured, to the best of 
their judgment, to render their taxes as equal as they could contrive; as certain, as 
convenient to the contributor, both in the time and in the mode of payment, and, in 
proportion to the revenue which they brought to the prince, as little burdensome to the 
people. The following short review of some of the principal taxes which have taken 
place in different ages and countries will show that the endeavours of all nations have 
not in this respect been equally successful. 
ARTICLE I
Taxes upon Rent. Taxes upon the Rent of Land
A tax upon the rent of land may either every district being valued at a certain rent, be 
imposed according to a certain canon, which valuation is not afterwards to be altered, 
or it may be imposed in such a manner as to vary with every variation in the real rent 
of the land, and to rise or fall with the improvement or declension of its cultivation. 
    A land-tax which, like that of Great Britain, is assessed upon each district according 
to a certain invariable canon, though it should be equal at the time of its first 
establishment, necessarily becomes unequal in process of time, according to the 
unequal degrees of improvement or neglect in the cultivation of the different parts of 
the country. In England, the valuation according to which the different countries and 
parishes were assessed to the land-tax by the 4th of William and Mary was very 
unequal even at its first establishment. This tax, therefore, so far offends against the 
first of the four maxims above mentioned. It is perfectly agreeable to the other three. It 
is perfectly certain. The time of payment for the tax, being the same as that for the 
rent, is as convenient as it can be to the contributor though the landlord is in all cases 
the real contributor, the tax is commonly advanced by the tenant, to whom the landlord 
is obliged to allow it in the payment of the rent. This tax is levied by a much smaller 
number of officers than any other which affords nearly the same revenue. As the tax 
upon each district does not rise with the rise of the rent, the sovereign does not share in 
the profits of the landlord's improvements. Those improvements sometimes contribute, 
indeed, to the discharge of the other landlords of the district. But the aggravation of 
the tax which may sometimes occasion upon a particular estate is always so very small 
that it never can discourage those improvements, nor keep down the produce of the 
land below what it would otherwise rise to. As it has no tendency to diminish the 
quantity, it can have none to raise the price of that produce. It does not obstruct the 
industry of the people. It subjects the landlord to no other inconveniency besides the 
unavoidable one of paying the tax. 
    The advantage, however, which the landlord has derived from the invariable 
constancy of the valuation by which all the lands of Great Britain are rated to the land-
tax, has been principally owing to some circumstances altogether extraneous to the 
nature of the tax. 
    It has been owing in part to the great prosperity of almost every part of the country, 
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the rents of almost all the estates of Great Britain having, since the time when this 
valuation was first established, been continually rising, and scarce any of them having 
fallen. The landlords, therefore, have almost all gained the difference between the tax 
which they would have paid according to the present rent of their estates, and that 
which they actually pay according to the ancient valuation. Had the state of the 
country been different, had rents been gradually falling in consequence of the 
declension of cultivation, the landlords would almost all have lost this difference. In 
the state of things which has happened to take place since the revolution, the 
constancy of the valuation has been advantageous to the landlord and hurtful to the 
sovereign. In a different state of things it might have been advantageous to the 
sovereign and hurtful to the landlord. 
    As the tax is made payable in money, so the valuation of the land is expressed in 
money. Since the establishment of this valuation the value of silver has been pretty 
uniform, and there has been no alteration in the standard of the coin either as to weight 
or fineness. Had silver risen considerably in its value, as it seems to have done in the 
course of the two centuries which preceded the discovery of the mines of America, the 
constancy of the valuation might have proved very oppressive to the landlord. Had 
silver fallen considerably in its value, as it certainly did for about a century at least 
after the discovery of those mines, the same constancy of valuation would have 
reduced very much this branch of the revenue of the sovereign. Had any considerable 
alteration been made in the standard of the money, either by sinking the same quantity 
of silver to a lower denomination, or by raising it to a higher; had an ounce of silver, 
for example, instead of being coined into five shillings and twopence, been coined 
either into pieces which bore so low a denomination as two shillings and sevenpence, 
or into pieces which bore so high a one as ten shillings and fourpence, it would in the 
one case have hurt the revenue of the proprietor, in the other that of the sovereign. 
    In circumstances, therefore, somewhat different from those which have actually 
taken place, this constancy of valuation might have been a very great inconveniency, 
either to the contributors, or to the commonwealth. In the course of ages such 
circumstances, however, must, at some time or other, happen. But though empires, like 
all the other works of men, have all hitherto proved mortal, yet every empire aims at 
immortality. Every constitution, therefore, which it is meant should be as permanent as 
the empire itself, ought to be convenient, not in certain circumstances only, but in all 
circumstances; or ought to be suited, not to those circumstances which are transitory, 
occasional, or accidental, but to those which are necessary and therefore always the 
same. 
    A tax upon the rent of land which varies with every variation of the rent, or which 
rises and falls according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation, is recommended 
by that sect of men of letters in France who call themselves The Economists as the 
most equitable of all taxes. All taxes, they pretend, fall ultimately upon the rent of 
land, and ought therefore to be imposed equally upon the fund which must finally pay 
them. That all taxes ought to fall as equally as possible upon the fund which must 
finally pay them is certainly true. But without entering into the disagreeable discussion 
of the metaphysical arguments by which they support their very ingenious theory, it 
will sufficiently appear, from the following review, what are the taxes which fall 
finally upon the rent of the land, and what are those which fall finally upon some other 
fund. 
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    In the Venetian territory all the arable lands which are given in lease to farmers are 
taxed at a tenth of the rent. The leases are recorded in a public register which is kept 
by the officers of revenue in each province or district. When the proprietor cultivates 
his own lands, they are valued according to an equitable estimation, and he is allowed 
a deduction of one-fifth of the tax, so that for such lands he pays only eight instead of 
ten per cent of the supposed rent. 
    A land-tax of this kind is certainly more equal than the land-tax of England. It might 
not, perhaps, be altogether so certain, and the assessment of the tax might frequently 
occasion a good deal more trouble to the landlord. It might, too, be a good deal more 
expensive in the levying. 
    Such a system of administration, however, might perhaps be contrived as would, in 
a great measure, both prevent this uncertainty and moderate this expense. 
    The landlord and tenant, for example, might jointly be obliged to record their lease 
in a public register. Proper penalties might be enacted against concealing or 
misrepresenting any of the conditions; and if part of those penalties were to be paid to 
either of the two parties who informed against and convicted the other of such 
concealment or misrepresentation, it would effectually deter them from combining 
together in order to defraud the public revenue. All the conditions of the lease might 
be sufficiently known from such a record. 
    Some landlords, instead of raising the rent, take a fine for the renewal of the lease. 
This practice is in most cases the expedient of a spendthrift, who for a sum of ready 
money sells a future revenue of much greater value. It is in most cases, therefore, 
hurtful to the landlords. It is frequently hurtful to the tenant, and it is always hurtful to 
the community. It frequently takes from the tenant so great a part of his capital, and 
thereby diminishes so much his ability to cultivate the land, that he finds it more 
difficult to pay a small rent than it would otherwise have been to pay a great one. 
Whatever diminishes his ability to cultivate, necessarily keeps down, below what it 
would otherwise have been, the most important part of the revenue of the community. 
By rendering the tax upon such fines a good deal heavier than upon the ordinary rent, 
this hurtful practice might be discouraged, to the no small advantage of all the 
different parties concerned, of the landlord, of the tenant, of the sovereign, and of the 
whole community. 
    Some leases prescribe to the tenant a certain mode of cultivation and a certain 
succession of crops during the whole continuance of the lease. This condition, which 
is generally the effect of the landlord's conceit of his own superior knowledge (a 
conceit in most cases very ill founded), ought always to be considered as an additional 
rent; as a rent in service instead of a rent in money. In order to discourage the practice, 
which is generally a foolish one, this species of rent might be valued rather high, and 
consequently taxed somewhat higher than common money rents. 
    Some landlords, instead of a rent in money, require a rent in kind, in corn, cattle, 
poultry, wine, oil, etc.; others, again, require a rent in service. Such rents are always 
more hurtful to the tenant than beneficial to the landlord. They either take more or 
keep more out of the pocket of the former than they put into that of the latter. In every 
country where they take place the tenants are poor and beggarly, pretty much 
according to the degree in which they take place. By valuing, in the same manner, 
such rents rather high, and consequently taxing them somewhat higher than common 
money rents, a practice which is hurtful to the whole community might perhaps be 
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sufficiently discouraged. 
    When the landlord chose to occupy himself a part of his own lands, the rent might 
be valued according to an equitable arbitration of the farmers and landlords in the 
neighbourhood, and a moderate abatement of the tax might be granted to him, in the 
same manner as in the Venetian territory, provided the rent of the lands which he 
occupied did not exceed a certain sum. It is of importance that the landlord should be 
encouraged to cultivate a part of his own land. His capital is generally greater than that 
of the tenant, and with less skill he can frequently raise a greater produce. The 
landlord can afford to try experiments, and is generally disposed to do so. His 
unsuccessful experiments occasion only a moderate loss to himself. His successful 
ones contribute to the improvement and better cultivation of the whole country. It 
might be of importance, however, that the abatement of the tax should encourage him 
to cultivate to a certain extent only. If the landlords should, the greater part of them, be 
tempted to farm the whole of their own lands, the country (instead of sober and 
industrious tenants, who are bound by their own interest to cultivate as well as their 
capital and skill will allow them) would be filled with idle and profligate bailiffs, 
whose abusive management would soon degrade the cultivation and reduce the annual 
produce of the land, to the diminution, not only of the revenue of their masters, but of 
the most important part of that of the whole society. 
    Such a system of administration might, perhaps, free a tax of this kind from any 
degree of uncertainty which could occasion either oppression or inconveniency of the 
contributor; and might at the same time serve to introduce into the common 
management of land such a plan or policy as might contribute a good deal to the 
general improvement and good cultivation of the country. 
    The expense of levying a land-tax which varied with every variation of the rent 
would no doubt be somewhat greater than that of levying one which was already rated 
according to a fixed valuation. Some additional expense would necessarily be incurred 
both by the different register offices which it would be proper to establish in the 
different districts of the country, and by the different valuations which might 
occasionally be made of the lands which the proprietor chose to occupy himself. The 
expense of all this, however, might be very moderate, and much below what is 
incurred in the levying of many other taxes which afford a very inconsiderable 
revenue in comparison of what might easily be drawn from a tax of this kind. 
    The discouragement which a variable land-tax of this kind might give to the 
improvement of land seems to be the most important objection which can be made to 
it. The landlord would certainly be less disposed to improve when the sovereign, who 
contributed nothing to the expense, was to share in the profit of the improvement. 
Even this objection might perhaps be obviated by allowing the landlord, before he 
began his improvement, to ascertain, in conjunction with the officers of revenue, the 
actual value of his lands according to the equitable arbitration of a certain number of 
landlords and farmers in the neighborhood, equally chosen by both parties, and by 
rating him according to this valuation for such a number of years as might be fully 
sufficient for his complete indemnification. To draw the attention of the sovereign 
towards the improvement of the land, from a regard to the increase of his own 
revenue, is one of the principal advantages proposed by this species of land-tax. The 
term, therefore, allowed for the indemnification of the landlord ought not to be a great 
deal longer than what was necessary for that purpose, lest the remoteness of the 
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interest should discourage too much this attention. It had better, however, be 
somewhat too long than in any respect too short. No incitement to the attention of the 
sovereign can ever counterbalance the smallest discouragement to that of the landlord. 
The attention of the sovereign can be at best but a very general and vague 
consideration of what is likely to contribute to the better cultivation of the greater part 
of his dominions. The attention of the landlord is a particular and minute consideration 
of what is likely to be the most advantageous application of every inch of ground upon 
his estate. The principal attention of the sovereign ought to be to encourage, by every 
means in his power, the attention both of the landlord and of the farmer, by allowing 
both to pursue their own interest in their own way and according to their own 
judgment; by giving to both the most perfect security that they shall enjoy the full 
recompense of their own industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive market 
for every part of their produce, in consequence of establishing the easiest and safest 
communications both by land and by water through every part of his own dominions 
as well as the most unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of all other 
princes. 
    If by such a system of administration a tax of this kind could be so managed as to 
give, not only no discouragement, but, on the contrary, some encouragement to the 
improvement of land, it does not appear likely to occasion any other inconveniency to 
the landlord, except always the unavoidable one of being obliged to pay the tax. 
    In all the variations of the state of the society, in the improvement and in the 
declension of agriculture; in all the variations in the value of silver, and in all those in 
the standard of the coin, a tax of this kind would, of its own accord and without any 
attention of government, readily suit itself to the actual situation of things, and would 
be equally just and equitable in all those different changes. It would, therefore, be 
much more proper to be established as a perpetual and unalterable regulation, or as 
what is called a fundamental law of the commonwealth, than any tax which was 
always to be levied according to a certain valuation. 
    Some states, instead of the simple and obvious expedient of a register of leases, 
have had recourse to the laborious and expensive one of an actual survey and valuation 
of all the lands in the country. They have suspected, probably, that the lessor and 
lessee, in order to defraud the public revenue, might combine to conceal the real terms 
of the lease. Domesday-Book seems to have been the result of a very accurate survey 
of this kind. 
    In the ancient dominions of the King of Prussia, the land-tax is assessed according 
to an actual survey and valuation, which is reviewed and altered from time to time. 
According to that valuation, the lay proprietors pay from twenty to twenty-five per 
cent of their revenue. Ecclesiastics from forty to forty-five per cent. The survey and 
valuation of Silesia was made by order of the present king; it is said with great 
accuracy. According to that valuation, the lands belonging to the Bishop of Breslaw 
are taxed at twenty-five per cent of their rent. The other revenues of the ecclesiastics 
of both religions, at fifty per cent. The commanderies of the Teutonic order, and of 
that of Malta, at forty per cent. Lands held by a noble tenure, at thirty-eight and one-
third per cent. Lands held by a base tenure, at thirty-five and one-third per cent. 
    The survey and valuation of Bohemia is said to have been the work of more than a 
hundred years. It was not perfected till after the peace of 1748, by the orders of the 
present empress queen. The survey of the duchy of Milan, which was begun in the 
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time of Charles VI, was not perfected till after 1760. It is esteemed one of the most 
accurate that has ever been made. The survey of Savoy and Piedmont was executed 
under the orders of the late King of Sardinia. 
    In the dominions of the King of Prussia the revenue of the church is taxed much 
higher than that of lay proprietors. The revenue of the church is, the greater part of it, a 
burden upon the rent of land. It seldom happens that any part of it is applied towards 
the improvement of land, or is so employed as to contribute in any respect towards 
increasing the revenue of the great body of the people. His Prussian Majesty had 
probably, upon that account, thought it reasonable that it should contribute a good deal 
more towards relieving the exigencies of the state. In some countries the lands of the 
church are exempted from all taxes. In others they are taxed more lightly than other 
lands. In the duchy of Milan, the lands which the church possessed before 1575 are 
rated to the tax at a third only of their value. 
    In Silesia, lands held by a noble tenure are taxed three per cent higher than those 
held by a base tenure. The honours and privileges of different kinds annexed to the 
former, his Prussian Majesty had probably imagined, would sufficiently compensate to 
the proprietor a small aggravation of the tax; while at the same time the humiliating 
inferiority of the latter would be in some measure alleviated by being taxed somewhat 
more lightly. In other countries, the system of taxation, instead of alleviating, 
aggravates this inequality. In the dominions of the King of Sardinia, and in those 
provinces of France which are subject to what is called the real or predial taille, the tax 
falls altogether upon the lands held by a base tenure. Those held by a noble one are 
exempted. 
    A land-tax assessed according to a general survey and valuation, how equal soever 
it may be at first, must, in the course of a very moderate period of time, become 
unequal. To prevent its becoming so would require the continual and painful attention 
of government to all the variations in the state and produce of every different farm in 
the country. The governments of Prussia, of Bohemia, of Sardinia, and of the duchy of 
Milan actually exert an attention of this kind; an attention so unsuitable to the nature 
of government that it is not likely to be of long continuance, and which, if it is 
continued, will probably in the long-run occasion much more trouble and vexation 
than it can possibly bring relief to the contributors. 
    In 1666, the generality of Montauban was assessed to the real or predial taille 
according, it is said, to a very exact survey and valuation. By 1727, this assessment 
had become altogether unequal. In order to remedy this inconveniency, government 
has found no better expedient than to impose upon the whole generality an additional 
tax of a hundred and twenty thousand livres. This additional tax is rated upon all the 
different districts subject to the taille according to the old assessment. But it is levied 
only upon those which in the actual state of things are by that assessment undertaxed, 
and it is applied to the relief of those which by the same assessment are overtaxed. 
Two districts, for example, one of which ought in the actual state of things to be taxed 
at nine hundred, the other at eleven hundred livres, are by the old assessment both 
taxed at a thousand livres. Both these districts are by the additional tax rated at eleven 
hundred livres each. But this additional tax is levied only upon the district 
undercharged, and it is applied altogether to the relief of that overcharged, which 
consequently pays only nine hundred livres. The government neither gains nor loses 
by the additional tax, which is applied altogether to remedy the inequalities arising 
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from the old assessment. The application is pretty much regulated according to the 
discretion of the intendant of the generality, and must, therefore, be in a great measure 
arbitrary. 
Taxes which are proportioned, not to the Rent, but to the Produce of Land
Taxes upon the produce of land are in reality taxes upon the rent; and though they may 
be originally advanced by the farmer, are finally paid by the landlord. When a certain 
portion of the produce is to be paid away for a tax, the farmer computes, as well as he 
can, what the value of this portion is, one year with another, likely to amount to, and 
he makes a proportionable abatement in the rent which he agrees to pay to the 
landlord. There is no farmer who does not compute beforehand what the church tithe, 
which is a land-tax of this kind, is, one year with another, likely to amount to. 
    The tithe, and every other land-tax of this kind, under the appearance of perfect 
equality, are very unequal taxes; a certain portion of the produce being, in different 
situations, equivalent to a very different portion of the rent. In some very rich lands the 
produce is so great that the one half of it is fully sufficient to replace to the farmer his 
capital employed in cultivation, together with the ordinary profits of farming stock in 
the neighbourhood. The other half, or, what comes to the same thing, the value of the 
other half, he could afford to pay as rent to the landlord, if there was no tithe. But if a 
tenth of the produce is taken from him in the way of tithe, he must require an 
abatement of the fifth part of his rent, otherwise he cannot get back his capital with the 
ordinary profit. In this case the rent of the landlord, instead of amounting to a half or 
five-tenths of the whole produce, will amount only to four-tenths of it. In poorer lands, 
on the contrary, the produce is sometimes so small, and the expense of cultivation so 
great, that it requires four-fifths of the whole produce to replace to the farmer his 
capital with the ordinary profit. In this case, though there was no tithe, the rent of the 
landlord could amount to no more than one-fifth or two-tenths of the whole produce. 
But if the farmer pays one-tenth of the produce in the way of tithe, he must require an 
equal abatement of the rent of the landlord, which will thus be reduced to one-tenth 
only of the whole produce. Upon the rent of rich lands, the tithe may sometimes be a 
tax of no more than one-fifth part, or four shillings in the pound; whereas upon that of 
poorer lands, it may sometimes be a tax of one-half, or of ten shillings in the pound. 
    The tithe, as it is frequently a very unequal tax upon the rent, so it is always a great 
discouragement both to the improvements of the landlord and to the cultivation of the 
farmer. The one cannot venture to make the most important, which are generally the 
most expensive improvements, nor the other to raise the most valuable, which are 
generally too the most expensive crops, when the church, which lays out no part of the 
expense, is to share so very largely in the profit. The cultivation of madder was for a 
long time confined by the tithe to the United Provinces, which, being Presbyterian 
countries, and upon that account exempted from this destructive tax, enjoyed a sort of 
monopoly of that useful dyeing drug against the rest of Europe. The late attempts to 
introduce the culture of this plant into England have been made only in consequence 
of the statute which enacted that five shillings an acre should be received in lieu of all 
manner of tithe upon madder. 
    As through the greater part of Europe the church, so in many different countries of 
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Asia the state, is principally supported by a land-tax, proportioned, not to the rent, but 
to the produce of the land. In China, the principal revenue of the sovereign consists in 
a tenth part of the produce of all lands of the empire. This tenth part, however, is 
estimated so very moderately that, in many provinces, it is said not to exceed a 
thirtieth part of the ordinary produce. The land-tax or land-rent which used to be paid 
to the Mahometan government of Bengal, before that country fell into the hands of the 
English East India Company, is said to have amounted to about a fifth part of the 
produce. The land-tax of ancient Egypt is said likewise to have amounted to a fifth 
part. 
    In Asia, this sort of land-tax is said to interest the sovereign in the improvement and 
cultivation of land. The sovereigns of China, those of Bengal while under the 
Mahometan government, and those of ancient Egypt, are said accordingly to have been 
extremely attentive to the making and maintaining of good roads and navigable canals, 
in order to increase, as much as possible, both the quantity and value of every part of 
the produce of the land, by procuring to every part of it the most extensive market 
which their own dominions could afford. The tithe of the church is divided into such 
small portions that no one of its proprietors can have any interest of this kind. The 
parson of a parish could never find his account in making a road or canal to a distant 
part of the country, in order to extend the market for the produce of his own particular 
parish. Such taxes, when destined for the maintenance of the state, have some 
advantages which may serve in some measure to balance their inconveniency. When 
destined for the maintenance of the church, they are attended with nothing but 
inconveniency. 
    Taxes upon the produce of land may be levied either in kind, or, according to a 
certain valuation, in money. 
    The parson of a parish, or a gentleman of small fortune who lives upon his estate, 
may sometimes, perhaps, find some advantage in receiving, the one his tithe, and the 
other his rent, in kind. The quantity to be collected, and the district within which it is 
to be collected, are so small that they both can oversee, with their own eyes, the 
collection and disposal of every part of what is due to them. A gentleman of great 
fortune, who lived in the capital, would be in danger of suffering much by the neglect, 
and more by the fraud of his factors and agents, if the rents of an estate in a distant 
province were to be paid to him in this manner. The loss of the sovereign from the 
abuse and depredation of his tax-gatherers would necessarily be much greater. The 
servants of the most careless private person are, perhaps, more under the eye of their 
master than those of the most careful prince; and a public revenue which was paid in 
kind would suffer so much from the mismanagement of the collectors that a very small 
part of what was levied upon the people would ever arrive at the treasury of the prince. 
Some part of the public revenue of China, however, is said to be paid in this manner. 
The mandarins and other tax-gatherers will, no doubt, find their advantage in 
continuing the practice of a payment which is so much more liable to abuse than any 
payment in money. 
    A tax upon the produce of land which is levied in money may be levied either 
according to a valuation which varies with all the variations of the market price, or 
according to a fixed valuation, a bushel of wheat, for example, being always valued at 
one and the same money price, whatever may be the state of the market. The produce 
of a tax levied in the former way will vary only according to the variations in the real 
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produce of the land, according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation. The 
produce of a tax levied in the latter way will vary, not only according to the variations 
in the produce of the land, but according to both those in the value of the precious 
metals and those in the quantity of those metals which is at different times contained 
in coin of the same denomination. The produce of the former will always bear the 
same proportion to the value of the real produce of the land. The produce of the latter 
may, at different times, bear very different proportions to that value. 
    When, instead either of a certain portion of the produce of land, or of the price of a 
certain portion, a certain sum of money is to be paid in full compensation for all tax or 
tithe, the tax becomes, in this case, exactly of the same nature with the land-tax of 
England. It neither rises nor falls with the rent of the land. It neither encourages nor 
discourages improvement. The tithe in the greater part of those parishes which pay 
what is called a Modus in lieu of all other tithe is a tax of this kind. During the 
Mahometan government of Bengal, instead of the payment in kind of a fifth part of the 
produce, a modus, and, it is said, a very moderate one, was established in the greater 
part of the districts or zemindaries of the country. Some of the servants of the East 
India Company, under pretence of restoring the public revenue to its proper value, 
have, in some provinces, exchanged this modus for a payment in kind. Under their 
management this change is likely both to discourage cultivation, and to give new 
opportunities for abuse in the collection of the public revenue which has fallen very 
much below what it was said to have been when it first fell under the management of 
the company. The servants of the company may, perhaps, have profited by this 
change, but at the expense, it is probable, both of their masters and of the country. 
Taxes upon the Rent of House.
    The rent of a house may be distinguished into two parts, of which the one may very 
properly be called the Building-rent; the other is commonly called the Ground-rent. 
    The building-rent is the interest or profit of the capital expended in building the 
house. In order to put the trade of a builder upon a level with other trades, it is 
necessary that this rent should be sufficient, first, to pay him the same interest which 
he would have got for his capital if he had lent it upon good security; and, secondly, to 
keep the house in constant repair, or, what comes to the same thing, to replace, within 
a certain term of years, the capital which had been employed in building it. The 
building-rent, or the ordinary profit of building, is, therefore, everywhere regulated by 
the ordinary interest of money. Where the market rate of interest is four per cent the 
rent of a house which, over and above paying the ground-rent, affords six or six and a 
half per cent upon the whole expense of building, may perhaps afford a sufficient 
profit to the builder. Where the market rate of interest is five per cent, it may perhaps 
require seven or seven and a half per cent. If, in proportion to the interest of money, 
the trade of the builder affords at any time a much greater profit than this, it will soon 
draw so much capital from other trades as will reduce the profit to its proper level. If it 
affords at any time much less than this, other trades will soon draw so much capital 
from it as will again raise that profit. 
    Whatever part of the whole rent of a house is over and above what is sufficient for 
affording this reasonable profit naturally goes to the ground-rent; and where the owner 
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of the ground and the owner of the building are two different persons, is, in most 
cases, completely paid to the former. This surplus rent is the price which the inhabitant 
of the house pays for some real or supposed advantage of the situation. In country 
houses at a distance from any great town, where there is plenty of ground to choose 
upon, the ground-rent is scarce anything, or no more than what the ground which the 
house stands upon would pay if employed in agriculture. In country villas in the 
neighborhood of some great town, it is sometimes a good deal higher, and the peculiar 
conveniency or beauty of situation is there frequently very well paid for. Ground-rents 
are generally highest in the capital, and in those particular parts of it where there 
happens to be the greatest demand for houses, whatever be the reason of that demand, 
whether for trade and business, for pleasure and society, or for mere vanity and 
fashion. 
    A tax upon house-rent, payable by the tenant and proportioned to the whole rent of 
each house, could not, for any considerable time at least, affect the building-rent. If the 
builder did not get his reasonable profit, he would be obliged to quit the trade; which, 
by raising the demand for building, would in a short time bring back his profit to its 
proper level with that of other trades. Neither would such a tax fall altogether upon the 
ground-rent; but it would divide itself in such a manner as to fall partly upon the 
inhabitant of the house, and partly upon the owner of the ground. 
    Let us suppose, for example, that a particular person judges that he can afford for 
house-rent an expense of sixty pounds a year; and let us suppose, too, that a tax of four 
shillings in the pound, or of one-fifth, payable by the inhabitant, is laid upon house-
rent. A house of sixty pounds rent will in this case cost him seventy-two pounds a 
year, which is twelve pounds more than he thinks he can afford. He will, therefore, 
content himself with a worse house, or a house of fifty pounds rent, which, with the 
additional ten pounds that he must pay for the tax, will make up the sum of sixty 
pounds a year, the expense which he judges he can afford; and in order to pay the tax 
he will give up a part of the additional conveniency which he might have had from a 
house of ten pounds a year more rent. He will give up, I say, a part of this additional 
conveniency; for he will seldom be obliged to give up the whole, but will, in 
consequence of the tax, get a better house for fifty pounds a year than he could have 
got if there had been no tax. For as a tax of this kind by taking away this particular 
competitor, must diminish the competition for houses of sixty pounds rent, so it must 
likewise diminish it for those of fifty pounds rent, and in the same manner for those of 
all other rents, except the lowest rent, for which it would for some time increase the 
competition. But the rents of every class of houses for which the competition was 
diminished would necessarily be more or less reduced. As no part of this reduction, 
however, could, for any considerable time at least, affect the building-rent, the whole 
of it must in the long-run necessarily fall upon the ground-rent. The final payment of 
this tax, therefore, would fall partly upon the inhabitant of the house, who, in order to 
pay his share, would be obliged to give up a part of his conveniency, and partly upon 
the owner of the ground, who, in order to pay his share, would be obliged to give up a 
part of his revenue. In what proportion this final payment would be divided between 
them it is not perhaps very easy to ascertain. The division would probably be very 
different in different circumstances, and a tax of this kind might, according to those 
different circumstances, affect very unequally both the inhabitant of the house and the 
owner of the ground. 
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    The inequality with which a tax of this kind might fall upon the owners of different 
ground-rents would arise altogether from the accidental inequality of this division. But 
the inequality with which it might fall upon the inhabitants of different houses would 
arise not only from this, but from another cause. The proportion of the expense of 
house-rent to the whole expense of living is different in the different degrees of 
fortune. It is perhaps highest in the highest degree, and it diminishes gradually through 
the inferior degrees, so as in general to be lowest in the lowest degree. The necessaries 
of life occasion the great expense of the poor. They find it difficult to get food, and the 
greater part of their little revenue is spent in getting it. The luxuries and vanities of life 
occasion the principal expense of the rich, and a magnificent house embellishes and 
sets off to the best advantage all the other luxuries and vanities which they possess. A 
tax upon house-rents, therefore, would in general fall heaviest upon the rich; and in 
this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be anything very unreasonable. It is 
not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in 
proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion. 
    The rent of houses, though it in some respects resembles the rent of land, is in one 
respect essentially different from it. The rent of land is paid for the use of a productive 
subject. The land which pays it produces it. The rent of houses is paid for the use of an 
unproductive subject. Neither the house nor the ground which it stands upon produce 
anything. The person who pays the rent, therefore, must draw it from some other 
source of revenue distinct from the independent of this subject. A tax upon the rent of 
houses, so far as it falls upon the inhabitants, must be drawn from the same source as 
the rent itself, and must be paid from their revenue, whether derived from the wages of 
labour, the profits of stock, or the rent of land. So far as it falls upon the inhabitants, it 
is one of those taxes which fall, not upon one only, but indifferently upon all the three 
different sources of revenue, and is in every respect of the same nature as a tax upon 
any other sort of consumable commodities. In general there is not, perhaps, any one 
article of expense or consumption by which the liberality or narrowness of a man's 
whole expense can be better judged of than by his house-rent. A proportional tax upon 
this particular article of expense might, perhaps, produce a more considerable revenue 
than any which has hitherto been drawn from it in any part of Europe. If the tax indeed 
was very high, the greater part of people would endeavour to evade it, as much as they 
could, by contenting themselves with smaller houses, and by turning the greater part of 
their expense into some other channel. 
    The rent of houses might easily be ascertained with sufficient accuracy by a policy 
of the same kind with that which would be necessary for ascertaining the ordinary rent 
of land. Houses not inhabited ought to pay no tax. A tax upon them would fall 
altogether upon the proprietor, who would thus be taxed for a subject which afforded 
him neither conveniency nor revenue. Houses inhabited by the proprietor ought to be 
rated, not according to the expense which they might have cost in building, but 
according to the rent which an equitable arbitration might judge them likely to bring if 
leased to a tenant. If rated according to the expense which they may have cost in 
building, a tax of three or four shillings in the pound, joined with other taxes, would 
ruin almost all the rich and great families of this, and, I believe, of every other 
civilised country. Whoever will examine, with attention, the different town and 
country houses of some of the richest and greatest families in this country will find 
that, at the rate of only six and a half or seven per cent upon the original expense of 
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building, their house-rent is nearly equal to the whole net rent of their estates. It is the 
accumulated expense of several successive generations, laid out upon objects of great 
beauty and magnificance, indeed; but, in proportion to what they cost, of very small 
exchangeable value. 
    Ground-rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than the rent of houses. A 
tax upon ground-rents would not raise the rents of houses. It would fall altogether 
upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopolist, and exacts the 
greatest rent which can be got for the use of his ground. More or less can be got for it 
according as the competitors happen to be richer or poorer, or can afford to gratify 
their fancy for a particular spot of ground at a greater or smaller expense. In every 
country the greatest number of rich competitors is in the capital, and it is there 
accordingly that the highest ground-rents are always to be found. As the wealth of 
those competitors would in no respect be increased by a tax upon ground-rents, they 
would not probably be disposed to pay more for the use of the ground. Whether the tax 
was to be advanced by the inhabitant, or by the owner of the ground, would be of little 
importance. The more the inhabitant was obliged to pay for the tax, the less he would 
incline to pay for the ground; so that the final payment of the tax would fall altogether 
upon the owner of the ground-rent. The ground-rents of uninhabited houses ought to 
pay no tax. 
    Both ground-rents and the ordinary rent of land are a species of revenue which the 
owner, in many cases, enjoys without any care or attention of his own. Though a part 
of this revenue should be taken from him in order to defray the expenses of the state, 
no discouragement will thereby be given to any sort of industry. The annual produce 
of the land and labour of the society, the real wealth and revenue of the great body of 
the people, might be the same after such a tax as before. Ground-rents and the ordinary 
rent of land are, therefore, perhaps, the species of revenue which can best bear to have 
a peculiar tax imposed upon them. 
    Ground-rents seem, in this respect, a more proper subject of peculiar taxation than 
even the ordinary rent of land. The ordinary rent of land is, in many cases, owing 
partly at least to the attention and good management of the landlord. A very heavy tax 
might discourage too, much this attention and good management. Ground-rents, so far 
as they exceed the ordinary rent of land, are altogether owing to the good government 
of the sovereign, which, by protecting the industry either of the whole people, or of the 
inhabitants of some particular place, enables them to pay so much more than its real 
value for the ground which they build their houses upon; or to make to its owner so 
much more than compensation for the loss which he might sustain by this use of it. 
Nothing can be more reasonable than that a fund which owes its existence to the good 
government of the state should be taxed peculiarly, or should contribute something 
more than the greater part of other funds, towards the support of that government. 
    Though, in many different countries of Europe, taxes have been imposed upon the 
rent of houses, I do not know of any in which ground-rents have been considered as a 
separate subject of taxation. The contrivers of taxes have, probably, found some 
difficulty in ascertaining what part of the rent ought to be considered as ground-rent, 
and what part ought to be considered as building-rent. It should not, however, seem 
very difficult to distinguish those two parts of the rent from one another. 
    In Great Britain the rent of houses is supposed to be taxed in the same proportion as 
the rent of land by what is called the annual land-tax. The valuation, according to 
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which each different parish and district is assessed to this tax, is always the same. It 
was originally extremely unequal, and it still continues to be so. Through the greater 
part of the kingdom this tax falls still more lightly upon the rent of houses than upon 
that of land. In some few districts only, which were originally rated high, and in which 
the rents of houses have fallen considerably, the land-tax of three or four shillings in 
the pound is said to amount to an equal proportion of the real rent of houses. 
Untenanted houses, though by law subject to the tax, are, in most districts, exempted 
from it by the favour of the assessors; and this exemption sometimes occasions some 
little variation in the rate of particular houses, though that of the district is always the 
same. Improvements of rent, by new buildings, repairs, etc., go to the discharge of the 
district, which occasions still further variations in the rate of particular houses. 
    In the province of Holland every house is taxed at two and a half per cent of its 
value, without any regard either to the rent which it actually pays, or to the 
circumstances of its being tenanted or untenanted. There seems to be a hardship in 
obliging the proprietor to pay a tax for an untenanted house, from which he can derive 
no revenue, especially so very heavy a tax. In Holland, where the market rate of 
interest does not exceed three per cent, two and a half per cent upon the whole value of 
the house must, in most cases, amount to more than a third of the building-rent, 
perhaps of the whole rent. The valuation, indeed, according to which the houses are 
rated, though very unequal, is said to be always below the real value. When a house is 
rebuilt, improved, or enlarged, there is a new valuation, and the tax is rated 
accordingly. 
    The contrivers of the several taxes which in England have, at different times, been 
imposed upon houses, seem to have imagined that there was some great difficulty in 
ascertaining, with tolerable exactness, what was the real rent of every house. They 
have regulated their taxes, therefore, according to some more obvious circumstances, 
such as they had probably imagined would, in most cases, bear some proportion to the 
rent. 
    The first tax of this kind was hearth-money, or a tax of two shillings upon every 
hearth. In order to ascertain how many hearths were in the house, it was necessary that 
the tax-gatherer should enter every room in it. This odious visit rendered the tax 
odious. Soon after the revolution, therefore, it was abolished as a badge of slavery. 
    The next tax of this kind was a tax of two shillings upon every dwelling-house 
inhabited. A house with ten windows to pay four shillings more. A house with twenty 
windows and upwards to pay eight shillings. This tax was afterwards so far altered that 
houses with twenty windows, and with less than thirty, were ordered to pay ten 
shillings, and those with thirty windows and upwards to pay twenty shillings. The 
number of windows can, in most cases, be counted from the outside, and, in all cases, 
without entering every room in the house. The visit of the tax-gatherer, therefore, was 
less offensive in this tax than in the hearth-money. 
    This tax was afterwards repealed, and in the room of it was established the window-
tax, which has undergone, too, several alterations and augmentations. The window-
tax, as it stands at present (January 1775), over and above the duty of three shillings 
upon every house in England, and of one shilling upon every house in Scotland, lays a 
duty upon every window, which, in England, augments gradually from twopence, the 
lowest rate, upon houses with not more than seven windows, to two shillings, the 
highest rate, upon houses with twenty-five windows and upwards. 
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    The principal objection to all such taxes of the worst is their inequality, an 
inequality of the worst kind, as they must frequently fall much heavier upon the poor 
than upon the rich. A house of ten pounds rent in a country town may sometimes have 
more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in London; and though the 
inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much poorer man than that of the latter, yet so 
far as his contribution is regulated by the window-tax, he must contribute more to the 
support of the state. Such taxes are, therefore, directly contrary to the first of the four 
maxims above mentioned. They do not seem to offend much against any of the other 
three. 
    The natural tendency of the window-tax, and of all other taxes upon houses, is to 
lower rents. The more a man pays for the tax, the less, it is evident, he can afford to 
pay for the rent. Since the imposition of the window-tax, however, the rents of houses 
have upon the whole risen, more or less, in almost every town and village of Great 
Britain with which I am acquainted. Such has been almost everywhere the increase of 
the demand for houses, that it has raised the rents more than the window-tax could 
sink them; one of the many proofs of the great prosperity of the country, and of the 
increasing revenue of its inhabitants. Had it not been for the tax, rents would probably 
have risen still higher. 
ARTICLE II
Taxes on Profit, or upon the Revenue arising from Stock
    The revenue or profit arising from stock naturally divides itself into two parts; that 
which pays the interest, and which belongs to the owner of the stock, and that surplus 
part which is over and above what is necessary for paying the interest. 
    This latter part of profit is evidently a subject not taxable directly. It is the 
compensation, and in most cases it is no more than a very moderate compensation, for 
the risk and trouble of employing the stock. The employer must have this 
compensation, otherwise he cannot, consistently with his own interest, continue the 
employment. If he was taxed directly, therefore, in proportion to the whole profit, he 
would be obliged either to raise the rate of his profit, or to charge the tax upon the 
interest of money; that is, to pay less interest. If he raised the rate of his profit in 
proportion to the tax, the whole tax, though it might be advanced by him, would be 
finally paid by one or other of two different sets of people, according to the different 
ways in which he might employ the stock of which he had the management. If he 
employed it as a farming stock in the cultivation of land, he could raise the rate of his 
profit only by retaining a greater portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price 
of a greater portion of the produce of the land; and as this could be done only by a 
reduction of rent, the final payment of the tax would fall upon the landlord. If he 
employed it as a mercantile or manufacturing stock, he could raise the rate of his profit 
only by raising the price of his goods; in which case the final payment of the tax 
would fall altogether upon the consumers of those goods. If he did not raise the rate of 
his profit, he would be obliged to charge the whole tax upon that part of it which was 
allotted for the interest of money. He could afford less interest for whatever stock he 
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borrowed, and the whole weight of the tax would in this case fall ultimately upon the 
interest of money. So far as he could not relieve himself from the tax in the one way, 
he would be obliged to relieve himself in the other. 
    The interest of money seems at first sight a subject equally capable of being taxed 
directly as the rent of land. Like the rent of land, it is a net produce which remains 
after completely compensating the whole risk and trouble of employing the stock. As a 
tax upon the rent of land cannot raise rents; because the net produce which remains 
after replacing the stock of the farmer, together with his reasonable profit, cannot be 
greater after the tax than before it, so, for the same reason, a tax upon the interest of 
money could not raise the rate of interest; the quantity of stock or money in the 
country, like the quantity of land, being supposed to remain the same after the tax as 
before it. The ordinary rate of profit, it has been shown in the first book, is everywhere 
regulated by the quantity of stock to be employed in proportion to the quantity of the 
employment, or of the business which must be done by it. But the quantity of the 
employment, or of the business to be done by stock, could neither be increased nor 
diminished by any tax upon the interest of money. If the quantity of the stock to be 
employed, therefore, was neither increased nor diminished by it, the ordinary rate of 
profit would necessarily remain the same. But the portion of this profit necessary for 
compensating the risk and trouble of the employer would likewise remain the same, 
that risk and trouble being in no respect altered. The residue, therefore, that portion 
which belongs to the owner of the stock, and which pays the interest of money, would 
necessarily remain the same too. At first sight, therefore, the interest of money seems 
to be a subject as fit to be taxed directly as the rent of land. 
    There are, however, two different circumstances which render the interest of money 
a much less proper subject of direct taxation than the rent of land. 
    First, the quantity and value of the land which any man possesses can never be a 
secret, and can always be ascertained with great exactness. But the whole amount of 
the capital stock which he possesses is almost always a secret, and can scarce ever be 
ascertained with tolerable exactness. It is liable, besides, to almost continual 
variations. A year seldom passes away, frequently not a month, sometimes scarce a 
single day, in which it does not rise or fall more or less. An inquisition into every 
man's private circumstances, and an inquisition which, in order to accommodate the 
tax to them, watched over all the fluctuations of his fortunes, would be a source of 
such continual and endless vexation as no people could support. 
    Secondly, land is a subject which cannot be removed; whereas stock easily may. 
The proprietor of land is necessarily a citizen of the particular country in which his 
estate lies. The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not 
necessarily attached to any particular country. He would be apt to abandon the country 
in which he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in order to be assessed to a 
burdensome tax, and would remove his stock to some other country where he could 
either carry on his business, or enjoy his fortune more at his ease. By removing his 
stock he would put an end to all the industry which it had maintained in the country 
which he left. Stock cultivates land; stock employs labour. A tax which tended to drive 
away stock from any particular country would so far tend to dry up every source of 
revenue both to the sovereign and to the society. Not only the profits of stock, but the 
rent of land and the wages of labour would necessarily be more or less diminished by 
its removal. 
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    The nations, accordingly, who have attempted to tax the revenue arising from stock, 
instead of any severe inquisition of this kind, have been obliged to content themselves 
with some very loose, and, therefore, more or less arbitrary, estimation. The extreme 
inequality and uncertainty of a tax assessed in this manner can be compensated only 
by its extreme moderation, in consequence of which every man finds himself rated so 
very much below his real revenue that he gives himself little disturbance though his 
neighbour should be rated somewhat lower. 
    By what is called the land-tax in England, it was intended that stock should be taxed 
in the same proportion as land. When the tax upon land was at four shillings in the 
pound, or at one-fifth of the supposed rent, it was intended that stock should be taxed 
at one-fifth of the supposed interest. When the present annual land-tax was first 
imposed, the legal rate of interest was six per cent. Every hundred pounds stock, 
accordingly, was supposed to be taxed at twenty-four shillings, the fifth part of six 
pounds. Since the legal rate of interest has been reduced to five per cent every hundred 
pounds stock is supposed to be taxed at twenty shillings only. The sum to be raised by 
what is called the land-tax was divided between the country and the principal towns. 
The greater part of it was laid upon the country; and of what was laid upon the towns, 
the greater part was assessed upon the houses. What remained to be assessed upon the 
stock or trade of the towns (for the stock upon the land was not meant to be taxed) was 
very much below the real value of that stock or trade. Whatever inequalities, therefore, 
there might be in the original assessment gave little disturbance. Every parish and 
district still continues to be rated for its land, its houses, and its stock, according to the 
original assessment; and the almost universal prosperity of the country, which in most 
places has raised very much the value of all these, has rendered those inequalities of 
still less importance now. The rate, too, upon each district continuing always the same, 
the uncertainty of this tax so far as it might be assessed upon the stock of any 
individual, has been very much diminished, as well as rendered of much less 
consequence. If the greater part of the lands of England are not rated to the land-tax at 
half their actual value, the greater part of the stock of England is, perhaps, scarce rated 
at the fiftieth part of its actual value. In some towns the whole land-tax is assessed 
upon houses, as in Westminster, where stock and trade are free. It is otherwise in 
London. 
    In all countries a severe inquisition into the circumstances of private persons has 
been carefully avoided. 
    At Hamburg every inhabitant is obliged to pay to the state one-fourth per cent of all 
that he possesses; and as the wealth of the people of Hamburg consists principally in 
stock, this tax may be considered as a tax upon stock. Every man assesses himself, 
and, in the presence of the magistrate, puts annually into the public coffer a certain 
sum of money which he declares upon oath to be one-fourth per cent of all that he 
possesses, but without declaring what it amounts to, or being liable to any examination 
upon that subject. This tax is generally supposed to be paid with great fidelity. In a 
small republic, where the people have entire confidence in their magistrates, are 
convinced of the necessity of the tax for the support of the state, and believe that it will 
be faithfully applied to that purpose, such conscientious and voluntary payment may 
sometimes be expected. It is not peculiar to the people of Hamburg. 
    The canton of Unterwald in Switzerland is frequently ravaged by storms and 
inundations, and is thereby exposed to extraordinary expenses. Upon such occasions 
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the people assemble, and every one is said to declare with the greatest frankness what 
he is worth in order to be taxed accordingly. At Zurich the law orders that, in cases of 
necessity, every one should be taxed in proportion to his revenue- the amount of which 
he is obliged to declare upon oath. They have no suspicion, it is said, that any of their 
fellow-citizens will deceive them. At Basel the principal revenue of the state arises 
from a small custom upon goods exported. All the citizens make oath that they will 
pay every three months all the taxes imposed by the law. All merchants and even all 
innkeepers are trusted with keeping themselves the account of the goods which they 
sell either within or without the territory. At the end of every three months they send 
this account to the treasurer with the amount of the tax computed at the bottom of it. It 
is not suspected that the revenue suffers by this confidence. 
    To oblige every citizen to declare publicly upon oath the amount of his fortune must 
not, it seems, in those Swiss cantons be reckoned a hardship. At Hamburg it would be 
reckoned the greatest. Merchants engaged in the hazardous protects of trade all 
tremble at the thoughts of being obliged at all to expose the real state of their 
circumstances. The ruin of their credit and the miscarriage of their projects, they 
foresee, would too often be the consequence. A sober and parsimonious people, who 
are strangers to all such projects, do not feel that they have occasion for any such 
concealment. 
    In Holland, soon after the exaltation of the late Prince of Orange to the 
stadtholdership, a tax of two per cent, or the fiftieth penny, as it was called, was 
imposed upon the whole substance of every citizen. Every citizen assessed himself and 
paid his tax in the same manner as at Hamburg, and it was in general supposed to have 
been paid with great fidelity. The people had at that time the greatest affection for their 
new government, which they had just established by a general insurrection. The tax 
was to be paid but once, in order to relieve the state in a particular exigency. It was, 
indeed, too heavy to be permanent. In a country where the market rate of interest 
seldom exceeds three per cent, a tax of two per cent amounts to thirteen shillings and 
fourpence in the pound upon the highest net revenue which is commonly drawn from 
stock. It is a tax which very few people could pay without encroaching more or less 
upon their capitals. In a particular exigency the people may, from great public zeal, 
make a great effort, and give up even a part of their capital in order to relieve the state. 
But it is impossible that they should continue to do so for any considerable time; and if 
they did, the tax would ruin them so completely as to render them altogether incapable 
of supporting the state. 
    The tax upon stock imposed by the Land-tax Bill in England, though it is 
proportioned to the capital, is not intended to diminish or take away any part of that 
capital. It is meant only to be a tax upon the interest of money proportioned to that 
upon the rent of land, so that when the latter is at four shillings in the pound, the 
former may be at four shillings in the pound too. The tax at Hamburg and the still 
more moderate tax of Unterwald and Zurich are meant, in the same manner, to be 
taxes, not upon the capital, but upon the interest or net revenue of stock. That of 
Holland was meant to be a tax upon the capital. 
Taxes upon as Profit of particular Employments
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In some countries extraordinary taxes are imposed upon the profits of stock, 
sometimes when employed in particular branches of trade, and sometimes when 
employed in agriculture. 
    Of the former kind are in England the tax upon hawkers and pedlars, that upon 
hackney coaches and chairs, and that which the keepers of ale-houses pay for a licence 
to retail ale and spirituous liquors. During the late war, another tax of the same kind 
was proposed upon shops. The war having been undertaken, it was said, in defence of 
the trade of the country, the merchants, who were to profit by it, ought to contribute 
towards the support of it. 
    A tax, however, upon the profits of stock employed in any particular branch of trade 
can never fall finally upon the dealers (who must in all ordinary cases have their 
reasonable profit, and where the competition is free can seldom have more than that 
profit), but always upon the consumers, who must be obliged to pay in the price of the 
goods the tax which the dealer advances; and generally with some overcharge. 
    A tax of this kind when it is proportioned to the trade of the dealer is finally paid by 
the consumer, and occasions no oppression to the dealer. When it is not so 
proportioned, but is the same upon all dealers, though in this case, too, it is finally paid 
by the consumer, yet it favours the great, and occasions some oppression to the small 
dealer. The tax of five shillings a week upon every hackney coach, and that of ten 
shillings a year upon every hackney chair, so far as it is advanced by the different 
keepers of such coaches and chairs, is exactly enough proportioned to the extent of 
their respective dealings. It neither favours the great, nor oppresses the smaller dealer. 
The tax of twenty shillings a year for a licence to sell ale; of forty shillings for a 
licence to sell spirituous liquors; and of forty shillings more for a licence to sell wine, 
being the same upon all retailers, must necessarily give some advantage to the great, 
and occasion some oppression to the small dealers. The former must find it more easy 
to get back the tax in the price of their goods than the latter. The moderation of the tax, 
however, renders this inequality of less importance, and it may to many people appear 
not improper to give some discouragement to the multiplication of little ale-houses. 
The tax upon shops, it was intended, should be the same upon all shops. It could not 
well have been otherwise. It would have been impossible to proportion with tolerable 
exactness the tax upon a shop to the extent of the trade carried on in it without such an 
inquisition as would have been altogether insupportable in a free country. If the tax 
had been considerable, it would have oppressed the small, and forced almost the whole 
retail trade into the hands of the great dealers. The competition of the former being 
taken away, the latter would have enjoyed a monopoly of the trade, and like all other 
monopolists would soon have combined to raise their profits much beyond what was 
necessary for the payment of the tax. The final payment, instead of falling upon the 
shopkeeper, would have fallen upon the consumer, with a considerable overcharge to 
the profit of the shopkeeper. For these reasons the project of a tax upon shops was laid 
aside, and in the room of it was substituted the subsidy, 1759. 
    What in France is called the personal taille is, perhaps, the most important tax upon 
the profits of stock employed in agriculture that is levied in any part of Europe. 
    In the disorderly state of Europe during the prevalence of the feudal government, 
the sovereign was obliged to content himself with taxing those who were too weak to 
refuse to pay taxes. The great lords, though willing to assist him upon particular 
emergencies, refused to subject themselves to any constant tax, and he was not strong 
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enough to force them. The occupiers of land all over Europe were, the greater part of 
them, originally bondmen. Through the greater part of Europe they were gradually 
emancipated. Some of them acquired the property of landed estates which they held by 
some base or ignoble tenure, sometimes under the king, and sometimes under some 
other great lord, like the ancient copy-holders of England. Others without acquiring 
the property, obtained leases for terms of years of the lands which they occupied under 
their lord, and thus became less dependent upon him. The great lords seem to have 
beheld the degree of prosperity and independency which this inferior order of men had 
thus come to enjoy with a malignant and contemptuous indignation, and willingly 
consented that the sovereign should tax them. In some countries this tax was confined 
to the lands which were held in property by an ignoble tenure; and, in this case, the 
taille was said to be real. The land-tax established by the late King of Sardinia, and the 
taille in the provinces of Languedoc, Provence, Dauphine, and Brittany, in the 
generality of Montauban, and in the elections of Agen and Comdom, as well as in 
some other districts of France, are taxes upon lands held in property by an ignoble 
tenure. In other countries the tax was laid upon the supposed profits of all those who 
held in farm or lease lands belonging to other people, whatever might be the tenure by 
which the proprietor held them; and in this case the taille was said to be personal. In 
the greater part of those provinces of France which are called the Countries of 
Elections the taille is of this kind. The real taille, as it is imposed only upon a part of 
the lands of the country, is necessarily an unequal, but it is not always an arbitrary tax, 
though it is so upon some occasions. The personal taille, as it is intended to be 
proportioned to the profits of a certain class of people which can only be guessed at, is 
necessarily both arbitrary and unequal. 
    In France the personal taille at present (1775) annually imposed upon the twenty 
generalities called the Countries of Elections amounts to 40,107,239 livres, 16 sous. 
The proportion in which this sum is assessed upon those different provinces varies 
from year to year according to the reports which are made to the king's council 
concerning the goodness or badness of the crops, as well as other circumstances which 
may either increase or diminish their respective abilities to pay. Each generality it 
divided into a certain number of elections, and the proportion in which the sum 
imposed upon the whole generality is divided among those different elections varies 
likewise from year to year according to the reports made to the council concerning 
their respective abilities. It seems impossible that the council, with the best intentions, 
can ever proportion with tolerable exactness either of those two assessments to the real 
abilities of the province or district upon which they are respectively laid. Ignorance 
and misinformation must always, more or less, mislead the most upright council. The 
proportion which each parish ought to support of what is assessed upon the whole 
election, and that which each individual ought to support of what is assessed upon his 
particular parish, are both in the same manner varied, from year to year, according as 
circumstances are supposed to require. These circumstances are judged of, in the one 
case, by the officers of the election, in the other by those of the parish, and both the 
one and the other are, more or less, under the direction and influence of the intendant. 
Not only ignorance and misinformation, but friendship, party animosity, and private 
resentment are said frequently to mislead such assessors. No man subject to such a tax, 
it is evident, can ever be certain, before he is assessed, of what he is to pay. He cannot 
even be certain after he is assessed. If any person has been taxed who ought to have 
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been exempted, or if any person has been taxed beyond his proportion, though both 
must pay in the meantime, yet if they complain, and make good their complaints, the 
whole parish is reimposed next year in order to reimburse them. If any of the 
contributors become bankrupt or insolvent, the collector is obliged to advance his tax, 
and the whole parish is reimposed next year in order to reimburse the collector. If the 
collector himself should become bankrupt, the parish which elects him must answer 
for his conduct to the receiver general of the election. But, as it might be troublesome 
for the receiver to prosecute the whole parish, he takes at his choice five or six of the 
richest contributors and obliges them to make good what had been lost by the 
insolvency of the collector. The parish is afterwards reimposed in order to reimburse 
those five or six. Such reimpositions are always over and above the taille of the 
particular year in which they are laid on. 
    When a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock in a particular branch of trade, the 
traders are all careful to bring no more goods to market than what they can sell at a 
price sufficient to reimburse them for advancing the tax. Some of them withdraw a 
part of their stocks from the trade, and the market is more sparingly supplied than 
before. The price of the goods rises, and the final payment of the tax falls upon the 
consumer. But when a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock employed in 
agriculture, it is not the interest of the farmers to withdraw any part of their stock from 
that employment. Each farmer occupies a certain quantity of land, for which hi pays 
rent. For the proper cultivation of this land a certain quantity of stock is necessary, and 
by withdrawing any part of this necessary quantity, the farmer is not likely to be more 
able to pay either the rent or the tax. In order to pay the tax, it can never be his interest 
to diminish the quantity of his produce, nor consequently to supply the market more 
sparingly than before. The tax, therefore, will never enable him to raise the price of his 
produce so as to reimburse himself by throwing the final payment upon the consumer. 
The farmer, however, must have his reasonable profit as well as every other dealer, 
otherwise he must give up the trade. After the imposition of a tax of this kind, he can 
get this reasonable profit only by paying less rent to the landlord. The more he is 
obliged to pay in the way of tax the less he can afford to pay in the way of rent. A tax 
of this kind imposed during the currency of a lease may, no doubt, distress or ruin the 
farmer. Upon the renewal of the lease it must always fall upon the landlord. 
    In the countries where the personal taille takes place, the farmer is commonly 
assessed in proportion to the stock which he appears to employ in cultivation. He is, 
upon this account, frequently afraid to have a good team of horses or oxen, but 
endeavours to cultivate with the meanest and most wretched instruments of husbandry 
that he can. Such is his distrust in the justice of his assessors that he counterfeits 
poverty, and wishes to appear scarce able to pay anything for fear of being obliged to 
pay too much. By this miserable policy he does not, perhaps, always consult his own 
interest in the most effectual manner, and he probably loses more by the diminution of 
his produce than he saves by that of his tax. Though, in consequence of this wretched 
cultivation, the market is, no doubt, somewhat worse supplied, yet the small rise of 
price which may occasion, as it is not likely even to indemnify the farmer for the 
diminution of his produce, it is still less likely to enable him to pay more rent to the 
landlord. The public, the farmer, the landlord, all suffer more or less by this degraded 
cultivation. That the personal taille tends, in many different ways, to discourage 
cultivation, and consequently to dry up the principal source of the wealth of every 
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great country, I have already had occasion to observe in the third book of this Inquiry. 
    What are called poll-taxes in the southern provinces of North America, and in the 
West Indian Islands annual taxes of so much a head upon every negro, are properly 
taxes upon the profits of a certain species of stock employed in agriculture. As the 
planters are, the greater part of them, both farmers and landlords, the final payment of 
the tax falls upon them in their quality of landlords without any retribution. 
    Taxes of so much a head upon the bondmen employed in cultivation seem anciently 
to have been common all over Europe. There subsists at present a tax of this kind in 
the empire of Russia. It is probably upon this account that poll-taxes of all kinds have 
often been represented as badges of slavery. Every tax, however, is to the person who 
pays it a badge, not of slavery, but of liberty. It denotes that he is subject to 
government, indeed, but that, as he has some property, he cannot himself be the 
property of a master. A poll-tax upon slaves is altogether different from a poll-tax 
upon freemen. The latter is paid by the persons upon whom it is imposed; the former 
by a different set of persons. The latter is either altogether arbitrary or altogether 
unequal, and in most cases is both the one and the other; the former, though in some 
respects unequal, different slaves being of different values, is in no respect arbitrary. 
Every master who knows the number of his own slaves knows exactly what he has to 
pay. Those different taxes, however, being called by the same name, have been 
considered as of the same nature. 
    The taxes which in Holland are imposed upon men- and maid-servants are taxes, not 
upon stock, but upon expense, and so far resemble the taxes upon consumable 
commodities. The tax of a guinea a head for every man-servant which has lately been 
imposed in Great Britain is of the same kind. It falls heaviest upon the middling rank. 
A man of two hundred a year may keep a single manservant. A man of ten thousand a 
year will not keep fifty. It does not affect the poor. 
    Taxes upon the profits of stock in particular employments can never affect the 
interest of money. Nobody will lend his money for less interest to those who exercise 
the taxed than to those who exercise the untaxed employments. Taxes upon the 
revenue arising from stock in all employments where the government attempts to levy 
them with any degree of exactness, will, in many cases, fall upon the interest of 
money. The Vingtieme, or twentieth penny, in France is a tax of the same kind with 
what is called the land-tax in England, and is assessed, in the same manner, upon the 
revenue arising from land, houses, and stock. So far as it affects stock it is assessed, 
though not with great rigour, yet with much more exactness than that part of the land-
tax of England which is imposed upon the same fund. It, in many cases, falls 
altogether upon the interest of money. Money is frequently sunk in France upon what 
are called Contracts for the constitution of a rent; that is, perpetual annuities 
redeemable at any time by the debtor upon repayment of the sum originally advanced, 
but of which this redemption is not exigible by the creditor except in particular cases. 
The Vingtieme, seems not to have raised the rate of those annuities, though it is 
exactly levied upon them all. 
Appendix to ARTICLES I and II.
Taxes upon the Capital Value of Land, Houses, and Stock
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While property remains in the possession of the same person, whatever permanent 
taxes may have been imposed upon it, they have never been intended to diminish or 
take away any part of its capital value, but only some part of the revenue arising from 
it. But when property changes hands, when it is transmitted either from the dead to the 
living, or from the living to the living, such taxes have frequently been imposed upon 
it as necessarily take away some part of its capital value. 
    The transference of all sorts of property from the dead to the living, and that of 
immovable property, of lands and houses, from the living to the living, are transactions 
which are in their nature either public and notorious, or such as cannot be long 
concealed. Such transactions, therefore, may be taxed directly. The transference of 
stock, or movable property, from the living to the living, by the lending of money, is 
frequently a secret transaction, and may always be made so. It cannot easily, therefore, 
be taxed directly. It has been taxed indirectly in two different ways; first, by requiring 
that the deed containing the obligation to repay should be written upon paper or 
parchment which had paid a certain stamp-duty, otherwise not to be valid; secondly, 
by requiring, under the like penalty of invalidity, that it should be recorded either in a 
public or secret register, and by imposing certain duties upon such registration. Stamp-
duties and duties of registration have frequently been imposed likewise upon the deeds 
transferring property of all kinds from the dead to the living, and upon those 
transferring immovable property from the living to the living, transactions which 
might easily have been taxed directly. 
    The Vicesima Hereditatum, the twentieth penny of inheritances imposed by 
Augustus upon the ancient Romans, was a tax upon the transference of property from 
the dead to the living. Dion Cassius, the author who writes concerning it the least 
indistinctly, says that it was imposed upon all successions, legacies, and donations in 
case of death, except upon those to the nearest relations and to the poor. 
    Of the same kind is the Dutch tax upon successions. Collateral successions are 
taxed, according to the degree of relation, from five to thirty per cent upon the whole 
value of the succession. Testamentary donations, or legacies to collaterals, are subject 
to the like duties. Those from husband to wife, or from wife to husband, to the fiftieth 
penny. The Luctuosa Hereditas, the mournful succession of ascendants to descendants, 
to the twentieth penny only. Direct successions, or those of descendants to ascendants, 
pay no tax. The death of a father, to such of his children as live in the same house with 
him, is seldom attended with any increase, and frequently with a considerable 
diminution of revenue, by the loss of his industry, of his office, or of some life-rent 
estate of which he may have been in possession. That tax would be cruel and 
oppressive which aggravated their loss by taking from them any part of his succession. 
It may, however, sometimes be otherwise with those children who, in the language of 
the Roman law, are said to be emancipated; in that of the Scotch law, to be 
forisfamiliated; that is, who have received their portion, have got families of their own, 
and are supported by funds separate and independent of those of their father. Whatever 
part of his succession might come to such children would be a real addition to their 
fortune, and might therefore, perhaps, without more inconveniency than what attends 
all duties of this kind, be liable to some tax. 
    The casualties of the feudal law were taxes upon the transference of land, both from 
the dead to the living, and from the living to the living. In ancient times they 
constituted in every part of Europe one of the principal branches of the revenue of the 
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crown. 
    The heir of every immediate vassal of the crown paid a certain duty, generally a 
year's rent, upon receiving the investiture of the estate. If the heir was a minor, the 
whole rents of the estate during the continuance of the minority devolved to the 
superior without any other charge besides the maintenance of the minor, and the 
payment of the widow's dower when there happened to be a dowager upon the land. 
When the minor came to be of age, another tax, called Relief, was still due to the 
superior, which generally amounted likewise to a year's rent. A long minority, which 
in the present times so frequently disburdens a great estate of all its incumbrances and 
restores the family to their ancient splendour, could in those times have no such effect. 
The waste, and not the disincumbrance of the estate, was the common effect of a long 
minority. 
    By the feudal law the vassal could not alienate without the consent of his superior, 
who generally extorted a fine or composition for granting it. This fine, which was at 
first arbitrary, came in many countries to be regulated at a certain portion of the price 
of the land. In some countries where the greater part of the other feudal customs have 
gone into disuse, this tax upon the alienation of land still continues to make a very 
considerable branch of the revenue of the sovereign. In the canton of Berne it is so 
high as a sixth part of the price of all noble fiefs, and a tenth part of that of all ignoble 
ones. In the canton of Lucerne the tax upon the sale of lands is not universal, and takes 
place only in certain districts. But if any person sells his land in order to remove out of 
the territory, he pays ten per cent upon the whole price of the sale. Taxes of the same 
kind upon the sale either of all lands, or of lands held by certain tenures, take place in 
many other countries, and make a more or less considerable branch of the revenue of 
the sovereign. 
    Such transactions may be taxed indirectly by means either of stamp-duties, or of 
duties upon registration, and those duties either may or may not be proportioned to the 
value of the subject which is transferred. 
    In Great Britain the stamp-duties are higher or lower, not so much according to the 
value of the property transferred (an eighteenpenny or half-crown stamp being 
sufficient upon a bond for the largest sum of money) as according to the nature of the 
deed. The highest do not exceed six pounds upon every sheet of paper or skin of 
parchment, and these high duties fall chiefly upon grants from the crown, and upon 
certain law proceedings, without any regard to the value of the subject. There are in 
Great Britain no duties on the registration of deeds or writings, except the fees of the 
officers who keep the register, and these are seldom more than a reasonable 
recompense for their labour. The crown derives no revenue from them. 
    In Holland there are both stamp-duties and duties upon registration, which in some 
cases are, and in some are not, proportioned to the value of the property transferred. 
All testaments must be written upon stamped paper of which the price is proportioned 
to the property disposed of, so that there are stamps which cost from threepence, or 
three stivers a sheet, to three hundred florins, equal to about twenty-seven pounds ten 
shillings of our money. If the stamp is of an inferior price to what the testator ought to 
have made use of, his succession is confiscated. This is over and above all their other 
taxes on succession. Except bills of exchange, and some other mercantile bills, all 
other deeds, bonds, and contracts are subject to a stamp-duty. This duty, however, 
does not rise in proportion to the value of the subject. All sales of land and of houses, 
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and all mortgages upon either, must be registered, and, upon registration, pay a duty to 
the state of two and a half per cent upon the amount of the price or of the mortgage. 
This duty is extended to the sale of all ships and vessels of more than two tons burden, 
whether decked or undecked. These, it seems, are considered as a sort of houses upon 
the water. The sale of movables, when it is ordered by a court of justice, is subject to 
the like duty of two and a half per cent. 
    In France there are both stamp-duties and duties upon registration. The former are 
considered as a branch of the aides or excise, and in the provinces where those duties 
take place are levied by the excise officers. The latter are considered as a branch of the 
domain of the crown, and are levied by a different set of officers. 
    Those modes of taxation, by stamp-duties and by duties upon registration, are of 
very modern invention. In the course of little more than a century, however, stamp-
duties have, in Europe, become almost universal, and duties upon registration 
extremely common. There is no art which one government sooner learns of another 
than that of draining money from the pockets of the people. 
    Taxes upon the transference of property from the dead to the living fall finally as 
well as immediately upon the person to whom the property is transferred. Taxes upon 
the sale of land fall altogether upon the seller. The seller is almost always under the 
necessity of selling, and must, therefore, take such a price as he can get. The buyer is 
scarce ever under the necessity of buying, and will, therefore, only give such a price as 
he likes. He considers what the land will cost him in tax and price together. The more 
he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he will be disposed to give in the way of 
price. Such taxes, therefore, fall almost always upon a necessitous person, and must, 
therefore, be frequently very cruel and oppressive. Taxes upon the sale of new-built 
houses, where the building is sold without the ground, fall generally upon the buyer, 
because the builder must generally have his profit, otherwise he must give up the 
trade. If he advances the tax, therefore, the buyer must generally repay it to him. Taxes 
upon the sale of old houses, for the same reason as those upon the sale of land, fall 
generally upon the seller, whom in most cases either conveniency or necessity obliges 
to sell. The number of new-built houses that are annually brought to market is more or 
less regulated by the demand. Unless the demand is such as to afford the builder his 
profit, after paying all expenses, he will build no more houses. The number of old 
houses which happen at any time to come to market is regulated by accidents of which 
the greater part have no relation to the demand. Two or three great bankruptcies in a 
mercantile town will bring many houses to sale which must be sold for what can be 
got for them. Taxes upon the sale of ground-rents fall altogether upon the seller, for 
the same reason as those upon the sale of land. Stamp-duties, and duties upon the 
registration of bonds and contracts for borrowed money, fall altogether upon the 
borrower, and, in fact, are always paid by him. Duties of the same kind upon law 
proceedings fall upon the suitors. They reduce to both the capital value of the subject 
in dispute. The more it costs to acquire any property, the less must be the net value of 
it when acquired. 
    All taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, so far as they diminish the 
capital value of that property, tend to diminish the funds destined for the maintenance 
of productive labour. They are all more or less unthrifty taxes that increase the revenue 
of the sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive labourers, at the 
expense of the capital of the people, which maintains none but productive. 
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    Such taxes, even when they are proportioned to the value of the property 
transferred, are still unequal, the frequency of transference not being always equal in 
property of equal value. When they are not proportioned to this value, which is the 
case with the greater part of the stamp-duties and duties of registration, they are still 
more so. They are in no respect arbitrary, but are or may be in all cases perfectly clear 
and certain. Though they sometimes fall upon the person who is not very able to pay, 
the time of payment is in most cases sufficiently convenient for him. When the 
payment becomes due, he must in most cases have the money to pay. They are levied 
at very little expense, and in general subject the contributors to no other inconveniency 
besides always the unavoidable one of paying the tax. 
    In France the stamp-duties are not much complained of. Those of registration, 
which they call the Controle, are. They give occasion, it is pretended, to much 
extortion in the officers of the farmers-general who collect the tax, which is in a great 
measure arbitrary and uncertain. In the greater part of the libels which have been 
written against the present system of finances in France the abuses of the Controle 
make a principal article. Uncertainty, however, does not seem to be necessarily 
inherent in the nature of such taxes. If the popular complaints are well founded, the 
abuse must arise, not so much from the nature of the tax as from the want of precision 
and distinctness in the words of the edicts or laws which impose it. 
    The registration of mortgages, and in general of all rights upon immovable property, 
as it gives great security both to creditors and purchasers, is extremely advantageous to 
the public. That of the greater part of deeds of other kinds is frequently inconvenient 
and even dangerous to individuals, without any advantage to the public. All registers 
which, it is acknowledged, ought to be kept secret, ought certainly never to exist. The 
credit of individuals ought certainly never to depend upon so very slender a security as 
the probity and religion of the inferior officers of revenue. But where the fees of 
registration have been made a source of revenue to the sovereign, register offices have 
commonly been multiplied without end, both for the deeds which ought to be 
registered, and for those which ought not. In France there are several different sorts of 
secret registers. This abuse, though not perhaps a necessary, it must be acknowledged, 
is a very natural effect of such taxes. 
    Such stamp-duties as those in England upon cards and dice, upon newspapers and 
periodical pamphlets, etc., are properly taxes upon consumption; the final payment 
falls upon the persons who use or consume such commodities. Such stamp-duties as 
those upon licences to retail ale, wine, and spirituous liquors, though intended, 
perhaps, to fall upon the profits of the retailers, are likewise finally paid by the 
consumers of those liquors. Such taxes, though called by the same name, and levied by 
the same officers and in the same manner with the stamp-duties above mentioned upon 
the transference of property, are, however, of a quite different nature, and fall upon 
quite different funds. 
ARTICLE III
Taxes upon the Wages of Labour
The wages of the inferior classes of workmen, I have endeavoured to show in the first 
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book, are everywhere necessarily regulated by two different circumstances; the 
demand for labour, and the ordinary or average price of provisions. The demand for 
labour, according as it happens to be either increasing, stationary, or declining, or to 
require an increasing, stationary, or declining population, regulates the subsistence of 
the labourer, and determines in what degree it shall be, either liberal, moderate, or 
scanty. The ordinary or average price of provisions determines the quantity of money 
which must be paid to the workman in order to enable him, one year with another, to 
purchase this liberal, moderate, or scanty subsistence. While the demand for labour 
and the price of provisions, therefore, remain the same, a direct tax upon the wages of 
labour can have no other effect than to raise them somewhat higher than the tax. Let us 
suppose, for example, that in a particular place the demand for labour and the price of 
provisions were such as to render ten shillings a week the ordinary wages of labour, 
and that a tax of one-fifth, or four shillings in the pound, was imposed upon wages. If 
the demand for labour and the price of provisions remained the same, it would still be 
necessary that the labourer should in that place earn such a subsistence as could be 
bought only for ten shillings a week free wages. But in order to leave him such free 
wages after paying such a tax, the price of labour must in that place soon rise, not to 
twelve shillings a week only, but to twelve and sixpence; that is, in order to enable him 
to pay a tax of one-fifth, his wages must necessarily soon rise, not one-fifth part only, 
but one-fourth. Whatever was the proportion of the tax, the wages of labour must in all 
cases rise, not only in that proportion, but in a higher proportion. If the tax, for 
example, was one-tenth, the wages of labour must necessarily soon rise, not one-tenth 
part only, but one-eighth. 
    A direct tax upon the wages of labour, therefore, though the labourer might perhaps 
pay it out of his hand, could not properly be said to be even advanced by him; at least 
if tile demand for labour and the average price of provisions remained the same after 
the tax as before it. In all such cases, not only the tax but something more than the tax 
would in reality be advanced by the person who immediately employed him. The final 
payment would in different cases fall upon different persons. The rise which such a tax 
might occasion in the wages of manufacturing labour would be advanced by the 
master manufacturer, who would both be entitled and obliged to charge it, with a 
profit, upon the price of his goods. The final payment of this rise of wages, therefore, 
together with the additional profit of the master manufacturer, would fall upon the 
consumer. The rise which such a tax might occasion in the wages of country labour 
would be advanced by the farmer, who, in order to maintain the same number of 
labourers as before, would be obliged to employ a greater capital. In order to get back 
this greater capital, together with the ordinary profits of stock, it would be necessary 
that he should retain a larger portion, or what comes to the same thing, the price of a 
larger portion, of the produce of the land, and consequently that he should pay less 
rent to the landlord. The final payment of this rise of wages, therefore, would in this 
case fall upon the landlord, together with the additional profit of the farmer who had 
advanced it. In all cases a direct tax upon the wages of labour must, in the long-run, 
occasion both a greater reduction in the rent of land, and a greater rise in the price of 
manufactured goods, than would have followed from the proper assessment of a sum 
equal to the produce of the tax partly upon the rent of land, and partly upon 
consumable commodities. 
    If direct taxes upon the wages of labour have not always occasioned a 
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proportionable rise in those wages, it is because they have generally occasioned a 
considerable fall in the demand for labour. The declension of industry, the decrease of 
employment for the poor, the diminution of the annual produce of the land and labour 
of the country, have generally been the effects of such taxes. In consequence of them, 
however, the price of labour must always be higher than it otherwise would have been 
in the actual state of the demand: and this enhancement of price, together with the 
profit of those who advance it, must always be finally paid by the landlords and 
consumers. 
    A tax upon the wages of country labour does not raise the price of the rude produce 
of land in proportion to the tax, for the same reason that a tax upon the farmer's profit 
does not raise that price in that proportion. 
    Absurd and destructive as such taxes are, however, they take place in many 
countries. In France that part of the taille which is charged upon the industry of 
workmen and day-labourers in country villages is properly a tax of this kind. Their 
wages are computed according to the common rate of the district in which they reside, 
and that they may be as little liable as possible to any overcharge, their yearly gains 
are estimated at no more than two hundred working days in the year. The tax of each 
individual is varied from year to year according to different circumstances, of which 
the collector or the commissary whom the intendant appoints to assist him are the 
judges. In Bohemia, in consequence of the alteration in the system of finances which 
was begun in 1748, a very heavy tax is imposed upon the industry of artificers. They 
are divided into four classes. The highest class pay a hundred florins a year which, at 
two-and-twenty pence halfpenny a florin, amounts to L9 7s. 6d. The second class are 
taxed at seventy; the third at fifty; and the fourth, comprehending artificers in villages, 
and the lowest class of those in towns, at twenty-five florins. 
    The recompense of ingenious artists and of men of liberal professions, I have 
endeavoured to show in the first book, necessarily keeps a certain proportion to the 
emoluments of inferior trades. A tax upon this recompense, therefore, could have no 
other effect than to raise it somewhat higher than in proportion to the tax. If it did not 
rise in this manner, the ingenious arts and the liberal professions, being no longer upon 
a level with other trades, would be so much deserted that they would soon return to 
that level. 
    The emoluments of offices are not, like those of trades and professions, regulated by 
the free competition of the market, and do not, therefore, always bear a just proportion 
to what the nature of the employment requires. They are, perhaps, in most countries, 
higher than it requires; the persons who have the administration of government being 
generally disposed to reward both themselves and their immediate dependants rather 
more than enough. The emoluments of offices, therefore, can in most cases very well 
bear to be taxed. The persons, besides, who enjoy public offices, especially the more 
lucrative, are in all countries the objects of general envy, and a tax upon their 
emoluments, even though it should be somewhat higher than upon any other sort of 
revenue, is always a very popular tax. In England, for example, when by the land-tax 
every other sort of revenue was supposed to be assessed at four shillings in the pound, 
it was very popular to lay a real tax of five shillings and sixpence in the pound upon 
the salaries of offices which exceeded a hundred pounds a year, the pensions of the 
younger branches of the royal family, the pay of the officers of the army and navy, and 
a few others less obnoxious to envy excepted. There are in England no other direct 
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taxes upon the wages of labour. 
ARTICLE IV
Taxes which, it is intended, should fall indifferently upon every different Species of 
Revenue
The taxes which, it is intended, should fall indifferently upon every different species 
of revenue, are capitation taxes, and taxes upon consumable commodities. These must 
be paid indifferently from whatever revenue the contributors may possess; from the 
rent of their land, from the profits of their stock, or from the wages of their labour. 
Capitation Taxes
Capitation taxes, if it is attempted to proportion them to the fortune or revenue of each 
contributor, become altogether arbitrary. The state of a man's fortune varies from day 
to day, and without an inquisition more intolerable than any tax, and renewed at least 
once every year, can only be guessed at. His assessment, therefore, must in most cases 
depend upon the good or bad humour of his assessors, and must, therefore, be 
altogether arbitrary and uncertain. 
    Capitation taxes, if they are proportioned not to the supposed fortune, but to the 
rank of each contributor, become altogether unequal, the degrees of fortune being 
frequently unequal in the same degree of rank. 
    Such taxes, therefore, if it is attempted to render them equal, become altogether 
arbitrary and uncertain, and if it is attempted to render them certain and not arbitrary, 
become altogether unequal. Let the tax be light or heavy, uncertainty is always a great 
grievance. In a light tax a considerable degree of inequality may be supported; in a 
heavy one it is altogether intolerable. 
    In the different poll-taxes which took place in England during the reign of William 
III the contributors were, the greater part of them, assessed according to the degree of 
their rank; as dukes, marquisses, earls, viscounts, barons, esquires, gentlemen, the 
eldest and youngest sons of peers, etc. All shopkeepers and tradesmen worth more 
than three hundred pounds, that is, the better sort of them, were subject to the same 
assessment, how great soever might be the difference in their fortunes. Their rank was 
more considered than their fortune. Several of those who in the first poll-tax were 
rated according to their supposed fortune were afterwards rated according to their 
rank. Serjeants, attorneys, and proctors at law, who in the first poll-tax were assessed 
at three shillings in the pound of their supposed income, were afterwards assessed as 
gentlemen. In the assessment of a tax which was not very heavy, a considerable degree 
of inequality had been found less insupportable than any degree of uncertainty. 
    In the capitation which has been levied in France without any interruption since the 
beginning of the present century, the highest orders of people are rated according to 
their rank by an invariable tariff; the lower orders of people, according to what is 
supposed to be their fortune, by an assessment which varies from year to year. The 
officers of the king's court, the judges and other officers in the superior courts of 
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justice, the officers of the troops, etc., are assessed in the first manner. The inferior 
ranks of people in the provinces are assessed in the second. In France the great easily 
submit to a considerable degree of inequality in a tax which, so far as it affects them, 
is not a very heavy one, but could not brook the arbitrary assessment of an intendant. 
The inferior ranks of people must, in that country, suffer patiently the usage which 
their superiors think proper to give them. 
    In England the different poll-taxes never produced the sum which had been 
expected from them, or which, it was supposed, they might have produced, had they 
been exactly levied. In France the capitation always produces the sum expected from 
it. The mild government of England, when it assessed the different ranks of people to 
the poll-tax, contented itself with what that assessment happened to produce, and 
required no compensation for the loss which the state might sustain either by those 
who could not pay, or by those who would not pay (for there were many such), and 
who, by the indulgent execution of the law, were not forced to pay. The more severe 
government of France assesses upon each generality a certain sum, which the 
intendant must find as he can. If any province complains of being assessed too high, it 
may, in the assessment of next year, obtain an abatement proportioned to the 
overcharge of the year before. But it must pay in the meantime. The intendant, in order 
to be sure of finding the sum assessed upon his generality, was empowered to assess it 
in a larger sum that the failure or inability of some of the contributors might be 
compensated by the overcharge of the rest, and till 1765 the fixation of this surplus 
assessment was left altogether to his discretion. In that year, indeed, the council 
assumed this power to itself. In the capitation of the provinces, it is observed by the 
perfectly well-informed author of the Memoires upon the impositions in France, the 
proportion which falls upon the nobility, and upon those whose privileges exempt 
them from the taille, is the least considerable. The largest falls upon those subject to 
the taille, who are assessed to the capitation at so much a pound of what they pay to 
that other tax. 
    Capitation taxes, so far as they are levied upon the lower ranks of people, are direct 
taxes upon the wages of labour, and are attended with all the inconveniences of such 
taxes. 
    Capitation taxes are levied at little expense, and, where they are rigorously exacted, 
afford a very sure revenue to the state. It is upon this account that in countries where 
the ease, comfort, and security of the inferior ranks of people are little attended to, 
capitation taxes are very common. It is in general, however, but a small part of the 
public revenue which, in a great empire, has ever been drawn from such taxes, and the 
greatest sum which they have ever afforded might always have been found in some 
other way much more convenient to the people. 
Taxes upon Consumable Commodities
    The impossibility of taxing the people, in proportion to their revenue, by any 
capitation, seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon consumable 
commodities. The state, not knowing how to tax, directly and proportionably, the 
revenue of its subjects, endeavours to tax it indirectly by taxing their expense, which, 
it is supposed, will in most cases be nearly in proportion to their revenue. Their 
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expense is taxed by taxing the consumable commodities upon which it is laid out. 
    Consumable commodities are either necessaries or luxuries. 
    By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably 
necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it 
indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, 
for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans 
lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the present times, 
through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to 
appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote 
that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into 
without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes 
a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be 
ashamed to appear in public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a 
necessary of life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of women, who 
may, without any discredit, walk about barefooted. In France they are necessaries 
neither to men nor to women, the lowest rank of both sexes appearing there publicly, 
without any discredit, sometimes in wooden shoes, and sometimes barefooted. Under 
necessaries, therefore, I comprehend not only those things which nature, but those 
things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest 
rank of people. All other things I call luxuries, without meaning by this appellation to 
throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate use of them. Beer and ale, 
for example, in Great Britain, and wine, even in the wine countries, I call luxuries. A 
man of any rank may, without any reproach, abstain totally from tasting such liquors. 
Nature does not render them necessary for the support of life, and custom nowhere 
renders it indecent to live without them. 
    As the wages of labour are everywhere regulated, partly by the demand for it, and 
partly by the average price of the necessary articles of subsistence, whatever raises this 
average price must necessarily raise those wages so that the labourer may still be able 
to purchase that quantity of those necessary articles which the state of the demand for 
labour, whether increasing, stationary, or declining, requires that he should have. A tax 
upon those articles necessarily raises their price somewhat higher than the amount of 
the tax, because the dealer, who advances the tax, must generally get it back with a 
profit. Such a tax must, therefore, occasion a rise in the wages of labour 
proportionable to this rise of price. 
    It is thus that a tax upon the necessaries of life operates exactly in the same manner 
as a direct tax upon the wages of labour. The labourer, though he may pay it out of his 
hand, cannot, for any considerable time at least, be properly said even to advance it. It 
must always in the long-run be advanced to him by his immediate employer in the 
advanced rate of his wages. His employer, if he is a manufacturer, will charge upon 
the price of his goods this rise of wages, together with a profit; so that the final 
payment of the tax, together with this overcharge, will fall upon the consumer. If his 
employer is a farmer, the final payment, together with a like overcharge, will fall upon 
the rent of the landlord. 
    It is otherwise with taxes upon what I call luxuries, even upon those of the poor. 
The rise in the price of the taxed commodities will not necessarily occasion any rise in 
the wages of labour. A tax upon tobacco, for example, though a luxury of the poor as 
well as of the rich, will not raise wages. Though it is taxed in England at three times, 
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and in France at fifteen times its original price, those high duties seem to have no 
effect upon the wages of labour. The same thing may be said of the taxes upon tea and 
sugar, which in England and Holland have become luxuries of the lowest ranks of 
people, and of those upon chocolate, which in Spain is said to have become so. The 
different taxes which in Great Britain have in the course of the present century been 
imposed upon spirituous liquors are not supposed to have had any effect upon the 
wages of labour. The rise in the price of porter, occasioned by an additional tax of 
three shillings upon the barrel of strong beer, has not raised the wages of common 
labour in London. These were about eighteen pence and twenty pence a day before the 
tax, and they are not more now. 
    The high price of such commodities does not necessarily diminish the ability of the 
inferior ranks of people to bring up families. Upon the sober and industrious poor, 
taxes upon such commodities act as sumptuary laws, and dispose them either to 
moderate, or to refrain altogether from the use of superfluities which they can no 
longer easily afford. Their ability to bring up families, in consequence of this forced 
frugality, instead of being diminished, is frequently, perhaps, increased by the tax. It is 
the sober and industrious poor who generally bring up the most numerous families, 
and who principally supply the demand for useful labour. All the poor, indeed, are not 
sober and industrious, and the dissolute and disorderly might continue to indulge 
themselves in the use of such commodities after this rise of price in the same manner 
as before without regarding the distress which this indulgence might bring upon their 
families. Such disorderly persons, however, seldom rear up numerous families, their 
children generally perishing from neglect, mismanagement, and the scantiness or 
unwholesomeness of their food. If by the strength of their constitution they survive the 
hardships to which the bad conduct of their parents exposes them, yet the example of 
that bad conduct commonly corrupts their morals, so that, instead of being useful to 
society by their industry, they become public nuisances by their vices and disorders. 
Though the advanced price of the luxuries of the poor, therefore, might increase 
somewhat the distress of such disorderly families, and thereby diminish somewhat 
their ability to bring up children, it would not probably diminish much the useful 
population of the country. 
    Any rise in the average price of necessaries, unless it is compensated by a 
proportionable rise in the wages of labour, must necessarily diminish more or less the 
ability of the poor to bring up numerous families, and consequently to supply the 
demand for useful labour, whatever may be the state of that demand, whether 
increasing, stationary, or declining, or such as requires an increasing, stationary, or 
declining population. 
    Taxes upon luxuries have no tendency to raise the price of any other commodities 
except that of the commodities taxed. Taxes upon necessaries, by raising the wages of 
labour, necessarily tend to raise the price of all manufactures, and consequently to 
diminish the extent of their sale and consumption. Taxes upon luxuries are finally paid 
by the consumers of the commodities taxed without any retribution. They fall 
indifferently upon every species of revenue, the wages of labour, the profits of stock, 
and the rent of land. Taxes upon necessaries, so far as they affect the labouring poor, 
are finally paid, partly by landlords in the diminished rent of their lands, and partly by 
rich consumers, whether landlords or others, in the advanced price of manufactured 
goods, and always with a considerable overcharge. The advanced price of such 
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manufactures as are real necessaries of life, and are destined for the consumption of 
the poor, of coarse woollens, for example, must be compensated to the poor by a 
further advancement of their wages. The middling and superior ranks of people, if they 
understand their own interest, ought always to oppose all taxes upon the necessaries of 
life, as well as all direct taxes upon the wages of labour. The final payment of both the 
one and the other falls altogether upon themselves, and always with a considerable 
overcharge. They fall heaviest upon the landlords, who always pay in a double 
capacity; in that of landlords by the reduction of their rent, and in that of rich 
consumers by the increase of their expense. The observation of Sir Matthew Decker, 
that certain taxes are, in the price of certain goods, sometimes repeated and 
accumulated four or five times, is perfectly just with regard to taxes upon the 
necessaries of life. In the price of leather, for example, you must pay not only for the 
tax upon the leather of your own shoes, but for a part of that upon those of the 
shoemaker and the tanner. You must pay, too, for the tax upon the salt, upon the soap, 
and upon the candles which those workmen consume while employed in your service, 
and for the tax upon the leather which the salt-maker, the soap-maker, and the candle-
maker consume while employed in their service. 
    In Great Britain, the principal taxes upon the necessaries of life are those upon the 
four commodities just now mentioned, salt, leather, soap, and candles. 
    Salt is a very ancient and a very universal subject of taxation. It was taxed among 
the Romans, and it is so at present in, I believe, every part of Europe. The quantity 
annually consumed by any individual is so small, and may be purchased so gradually, 
that nobody, it seems to have been thought, could feel very sensibly even a pretty 
heavy tax upon it. It is in England taxed at three shillings and fourpence a bushel- 
about three times the original price of the commodity. In some other countries the tax 
is still higher. Leather is a real necessary of life. The use of linen renders soap such. In 
countries where the winter nights are long, candles are a necessary instrument of trade. 
Leather and soap are in Great Britain taxed at three halfpence a pound, candles at a 
penny; taxes which, upon the original price of leather, may amount to about eight or 
ten per cent; upon that of soap to about twenty or five-and-twenty per cent; and upon 
that of candles to about fourteen or fifteen per cent; taxes which, though lighter than 
that upon salt, are still very heavy. As all those four commodities are real necessaries 
of life, such heavy taxes upon them must increase somewhat the expense of the sober 
and industrious poor, and must consequently raise more or less the wages of their 
labour. 
    In a country where the winters are so cold as in Great Britain, fuel is, during that 
season, in the strictest sense of the word, a necessary of life, not only for the purpose 
of dressing victuals, but for the comfortable subsistence of many different sorts of 
workmen who work within doors; and coals are the cheapest of all fuel. The price of 
fuel has so important an influence upon that of labour that all over Great Britain 
manufactures have confined themselves principally to the coal countries, other parts of 
the country, on account of the high price of this necessary article, not being able to 
work so cheap. In some manufactures, besides, coal is a necessary instrument of trade, 
as in those of glass, iron, and all other metals. If a bounty could in any case be 
reasonable, it might perhaps be so upon the transportation of coals from those parts of 
the country in which they abound to those in which they are wanted. But the 
legislature, instead of a bounty, has imposed a tax of three shillings and threepence a 
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ton upon coal carried coastways, which upon most sorts of coal is more than sixty per 
cent of the original price at the coal-pit. Coals carried either by land or by inland 
navigation pay no duty. Where they are naturally cheap, they are consumed duty free: 
where they are naturally dear, they are loaded with a heavy duty. 
    Such taxes, though they raise the price of subsistence, and consequently the wages 
of labour, yet they afford a considerable revenue to government which it might not be 
easy to find in any other way. There may, therefore, be good reasons for continuing 
them. The bounty upon the exportation of corn, so far as it tends in the actual state of 
tillage to raise the price of that necessary article, produces all the like bad effects, and 
instead of affording any revenue, frequently occasions a very great expense to 
government. The high duties upon the importation of foreign corn, which in years of 
moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, and the absolute prohibition of the 
importation either of live cattle or of salt provisions, which takes place in the ordinary 
state of the law, and which, on account of the scarcity, is at present suspended for a 
limited time with regard to Ireland and the British plantations, have all the bad effects 
of taxes upon the necessaries of life, and produce no revenue to government. Nothing 
seems necessary for the repeal of such regulations but to convince the public of the 
futility of that system in consequence of which they have been established. 
    Taxes upon the necessaries of life are much higher in many other countries than in 
Great Britain. Duties upon flour and meal when ground at the mill, and upon bread 
when baked at the oven, take place in many countries. In Holland the money price of 
the bread consumed in towns is supposed to be doubled by means of such taxes. In 
lieu of a part of them, the people who live in the country pay every year so much a 
head according to the sort of bread they are supposed to consume. Those who 
consume wheaten bread pay three guilders fifteen stivers- about six shillings and 
ninepence halfpenny. These, and some other taxes of the same kind, by raising the 
price of labour, are said to have ruined the greater part of the manufactures of Holland. 
Similar taxes, though not quite so heavy, take place in the Milanese, in the states of 
Genoa, in the duchy of Modena, in the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, and 
in the ecclesiastical state. A French author of some note has proposed to reform the 
finances of his country by substituting in the room of the greater part of other taxes 
this most ruinous of all taxes. There is nothing so absurd, says Cicero, which has not 
sometimes been asserted by philosophers. 
    Taxes upon butchers' meat are still more common than those upon bread. It may 
indeed be doubted whether butchers' meat is anywhere a necessary of life. Grain and 
other vegetables, with the help of milk, cheese, and butter, or oil where butter is not to 
be had, it is known from experience, can, without any butchers' meat, afford the most 
plentiful, the most wholesome, the most nourishing, and the most invigorating diet. 
Decency nowhere requires that any man should eat butchers' meat, as it in most places 
requires that he should wear a linen shirt or a pair of leather shoes. 
    Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two 
different ways. The consumer may either pay an annual sum on account of his using or 
consuming goods of a certain kind, or the goods may be taxed while they remain in the 
hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the consumer. The consumable 
goods which last a considerable time before they are consumed altogether are most 
properly taxed in the one way; those of which the consumption is either immediate or 
more speedy, in the other. The coach-tax and plate-tax are examples of the former 
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method of imposing: the greater part of the other duties of excise and customs, of the 
latter. 
    A coach may, with good management, last ten or twelve years. It might be taxed, 
once for all, before it comes out of the hands of the coachmaker. But it is certainly 
more convenient for the buyer to pay four pounds a year for the privilege of keeping a 
coach than to pay all at once forty or forty-eight pounds additional price to the 
coachmaker, or a sum equivalent to what the tax is likely to cost him during the time 
he uses the same coach. A service of plate, in the same manner, may last more than a 
century. It is certainly easier for the consumer to pay five shillings a year for every 
hundred ounces of plate, near one per cent of the value, than to redeem this long 
annuity at five-and-twenty or thirty years' purchase, which would enhance the price at 
least five-and-twenty or thirty per cent. The different taxes which affect houses are 
certainly more conveniently paid by moderate annual payments than by a heavy tax of 
equal value upon the first building or sale of the house. 
    It was the well-known proposal of Sir Matthew Decker that all commodities, even 
those of which the consumption is either immediate or very speedy, should be taxed in 
this manner, the dealer advancing nothing, but the consumer paying a certain annual 
sum for the licence to consume certain goods. The object of his scheme was to 
promote all the different branches of foreign trade, particularly the carrying trade, by 
taking away all duties upon importation and exportation, and thereby enabling the 
merchant to employ his whole capital and credit in the purchase of goods and the 
freight of ships, no part of either being diverted towards the advancing of taxes. The 
project, however, of taxing, in this manner, goods of immediate or speedy 
consumption seems liable to the four following very important objections. First, the 
tax would be more unequal, or not so well proportioned to the expense and 
consumption of the different contributors as in the way in which it is commonly 
imposed. The taxes upon ale, wine, and spirituous liquors, which are advanced by the 
dealers, are finally paid by the different consumers exactly in proportion to their 
respective consumption. But if the tax were to be paid by purchasing a licence to drink 
those liquors, the sober would, in proportion to his consumption, be taxed much more 
heavily than the drunken consumer. A family which exercised great hospitality would 
be taxed much more lightly than one who entertained fewer guests. Secondly, this 
mode of taxation, by paying for an annual, half-yearly, or quarterly licence to consume 
certain goods, would diminish very much one of the principal conveniences of taxes 
upon goods of speedy consumption the piecemeal payment. In the price of threepence 
halfpenny, which is at present paid for a pot of porter, the different taxes upon malt, 
hops, and beer, together with the extraordinary profit which the brewer charges for 
having advanced them, may perhaps amount to about three halfpence. If a workman 
can conveniently spare those three halfpence, he buys a pot of porter. If he cannot, he 
contents himself with a pint, and, as a penny saved is a penny got, he thus gains a 
farthing by his temperance. He pays the tax piecemeal as he can afford to pay it, and 
when he can afford to pay it, and every act of payment is perfectly voluntary, and what 
he can avoid if he chooses to do so. Thirdly, such taxes would operate less as 
sumptuary laws. When the licence was once purchased, whether the purchaser drank 
much or drank little, his tax would be the same. Fourthly, if a workman were to pay all 
at once, by yearly, half-yearly, or quarterly payments, a tax equal to what he at present 
pays, with little or no inconveniency, upon all the different pots and pints of porter 
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which he drinks in any such period of time, the sum might frequently distress him very 
much. This mode of taxation, therefore, it seems evident, could never, without the 
most grievous oppression, produce a revenue nearly equal to what is derived from the 
present mode without any oppression. In several countries, however, commodities of 
an immediate or very speedy consumption are taxed in this manner. In Holland people 
pay so much a head for a licence to drink tea. I have already mentioned a tax upon 
bread, which, so far as it is consumed in farm-houses and country villages, is there 
levied in the same manner. 
    The duties of excise are imposed briefly upon goods of home produce destined for 
home consumption. They are imposed only upon a few sorts of goods of the most 
general use. There can never be any doubt either concerning the goods which are 
subject to those duties, or concerning the particular duty which each species of goods 
is subject to. They fall almost altogether upon what I call luxuries, excepting always 
the four duties above mentioned, upon salt soap, leather, candles, and, perhaps, that 
upon green glass. 
    The duties of customs are much more ancient than those of excise. They seem to 
have been called customs as denoting customary payments which had been in use 
from time immemorial. They appear to have been originally considered as taxes upon 
the profits of merchants. During the barbarous times of feudal anarchy, merchants, like 
all the other inhabitants of burghs, were considered as little better than emancipated 
bondmen, whose persons were despised, and whose gains were envied. The great 
nobility, who had consented that the king should tallage the profits of their own 
tenants, were not unwilling that he should tallage likewise those of an order of men 
whom it was much less their interest to protect. In those ignorant times it was not 
understood that the profits of merchants are a subject not taxable directly, or that the 
final payment of all such taxes must fall, with a considerable overcharge, upon the 
consumers. 
    The gains of alien merchants were looked upon more unfavourably than those of 
English merchants. It was natural, therefore, that those of the former should be taxed 
more heavily than those of the latter. This distinction between the duties upon aliens 
and those upon English merchants, which was begun from ignorance, has been 
continued from the spirit of monopoly, or in order to give our own merchants an 
advantage both in the home and in the foreign market. 
    With this distinction, the ancient duties of customs were imposed equally upon all 
sorts of goods, necessaries as well as luxuries, goods exported as well as goods 
imported. Why should the dealers in one sort of goods, it seems to have been thought, 
be more favoured than those in another? or why should the merchant exporter be more 
favoured than the merchant importer? 
    The ancient customs were divided into three branches. The first, and perhaps the 
most ancient of all those duties, was that upon wool and leather. It seems to have been 
chiefly or altogether an exportation duty. When the woollen manufacture came to be 
established in England, lest the king should lose any part of his customs upon wool by 
the exportation of woollen cloths, a like duty was imposed upon them. The other two 
branches were, first, a duty upon wine, which, being imposed at so much a ton, was 
called a tonnage, and, secondly, a duty upon all other goods, which, being imposed at 
so much a pound of their supposed value, was called a poundage. In the forty-seventh 
year of Edward III a duty of sixpence in the pound was imposed upon all goods 
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exported and imported, except wools, wool-fells, leather, and wines, which were 
subject to particular duties. In the fourteenth of Richard II this duty was raised to one 
shilling in the pound, but three years afterwards it was again reduced to sixpence. It 
was raised to eightpence in the second year of Henry IV, and in the fourth year of the 
same prince to one shilling. From this time to the ninth year of William III this duty 
continued at one shilling in the pound. The duties of tonnage and poundage were 
generally granted to the king by one and the same Act of Parliament, and were called 
the Subsidy of Tonnage and Poundage. The Subsidy of Poundage having continued for 
so long a time at one shining in the pound, or at five per cent, a subsidy came, in the 
language of the customs, to denote a general duty of this kind of five per cent. This 
subsidy, which is now called the Old Subsidy, still continues to be levied according to 
the book of rates established in the twelfth of Charles II. The method of ascertaining, 
by a book of rates, the value of goods subject to this duty is said to be older than the 
time of James I. The New Subsidy imposed by the ninth and tenth of William III was 
an additional five per cent upon the greater part of goods. The One-third and the Two-
third Subsidy made up between them another five per cent of which they were 
proportionable parts. The Subsidy of 1747 made a fourth five per cent upon the greater 
part of goods; and that of 1759 a fifth upon some particular sorts of goods. Besides 
those five subsidies, a great variety of other duties have occasionally been imposed 
upon particular sorts of goods, in order sometimes to relieve the exigencies of the 
state, and sometimes to regulate the trade of the country according to the principles of 
the mercantile system. 
    That system has come gradually more and more into fashion. The Old Subsidy was 
imposed indifferently upon exportation as well as importation. The four subsequent 
subsidies, as well as the other duties which have been occasionally imposed upon 
particular sorts of goods have, with a few exceptions, been laid altogether upon 
importation. The greater part of the ancient duties which had been imposed upon the 
exportation of the goods of home produce and manufacture have either been lightened 
or taken away altogether. In most cases they have been taken away. Bounties have 
even been given upon the exportation of some of them. Drawbacks too, sometimes of 
the whole, and, in most cases, of a part of the duties which are paid upon the 
importation of foreign goods, have been granted upon their exportation. Only half the 
duties imposed by the Old Subsidy upon importation are drawn back upon exportation: 
but the whole of those imposed by the latter subsidies and other imposts are, upon the 
greater part of goods, drawn back in the same manner. This growing favour of 
exportation, and discouragement of importation, have suffered only a few exceptions, 
which chiefly concern the materials of some manufactures. These our merchants and 
manufacturers are willing should come as cheap as possible to themselves, and as dear 
as possible to their rivals and competitors in other countries. Foreign materials are, 
upon this account, sometimes allowed to be imported duty free; Spanish wool, for 
example, flax, and raw linen yarn. The exportation of the materials of home produce, 
and of those which are the particular produce of our colonies, has sometimes been 
prohibited, and sometimes subjected to higher duties. The exportation of English wool 
has been prohibited. That of beaver skins, of beaver wool, and of gum Senega has 
been subjected to higher duties. Great Britain, by the conquest of Canada and Senegal, 
having got almost the monopoly of those commodities. 
    That the mercantile system has not been very favourable to the revenue of the great 
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body of the people, to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, I have 
endeavoured to show in the fourth book of this Inquiry. It seems not to have been 
more favourable to the revenue of the sovereign, so far at least as that revenue depends 
upon the duties of customs. 
    In consequence of that system, the importation of several sorts of goods has been 
prohibited altogether. This prohibition has in some cases entirely prevented, and in 
others has very much diminished the importation of those commodities by reducing 
the importers to the necessity of smuggling. It has entirely prevented the importation 
of foreign woollens, and it has very much diminished that of foreign silks and velvets. 
In both cases it has entirely annihilated the revenue of customs which might have been 
levied upon such importation. 
    The high duties which have been imposed upon the importation of many different 
sorts of foreign goods, in order to discourage their consumption in Great Britain, have 
in many cases served only to encourage smuggling, and in all cases have reduced the 
revenue of the customs below what more moderate duties would have afforded. The 
saying of Dr. Swift, that in the arithmetic of the customs two and two, instead of 
making four, make sometimes only one, holds perfectly true with regard to such heavy 
duties which never could have been imposed had not the mercantile system taught us, 
in many cases, to employ taxation as an instrument, not of revenue, but of monopoly. 
    The bounties which are sometimes given upon the exportation of home produce and 
manufactures, and the drawbacks which are paid upon the re-exportation of the greater 
part of foreign goods, have given occasion to many frauds, and to a species of 
smuggling more destructive of the public revenue than any other. In order to obtain the 
bounty or drawback, the goods, it is well known, are sometimes shipped and sent to 
sea, but soon afterwards clandestinely relanded in some other part of the country. The 
defalcation of the revenue of customs occasioned by the bounties and drawbacks, of 
which a great part are obtained fraudulently, is very great. The gross produce of the 
customs in the year which ended on the 5th of January 1755 amounted to L5,068,000. 
The bounties which were paid out of this revenue, though in that year there was no 
bounty upon corn, amounted to L167,800. The drawbacks which were paid upon 
debentures and certificates, to L2,156,800. Bounties and drawbacks together amounted 
to L2,324,600. In consequence of these deductions the revenue of the customs 
amounted only to L2,743,400: from which, deducting L287,900 for the expense of 
management in salaries and other incidents, the net revenue of the customs for that 
year comes out to be L2,455,500. The expense of management amounts in this manner 
to between five and six per cent upon the gross revenue of the customs, and to 
something more than ten per cent upon what remains of that revenue after deducting 
what is paid away in bounties and drawbacks. 
    Heavy duties being imposed upon almost all goods imported, our merchant 
importers smuggle as much and make entry of as little as they can. Our merchant 
exporters, on the contrary, make entry of more than they export; sometimes out of 
vanity, and to pass for great dealers in goods which pay no duty, and sometimes to 
gain a bounty or a drawback. Our exports, in consequence of these different frauds, 
appear upon the customhouse books greatly to overbalance our imports, to the 
unspeakable comfort of those politicians who measure the national prosperity by what 
they call the balance of trade. 
    All goods imported, unless particularly exempted, and such exemptions are not very 
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numerous, are liable to some duties of customs. If any goods are imported not 
mentioned in the book of rates, they are taxed at 4s. 9 9/20d. for every twenty shillings 
value, according to the oath of the importer, that is, nearly at five subsidies, or five 
poundage duties. The book of rates is extremely comprehensive, and enumerates a 
great variety of articles, many of them little used, and therefore not well known. It is 
upon this account frequently uncertain under what article a particular sort of goods 
ought to be classed, and consequently what duty they ought to pay. Mistakes with 
regard to this sometimes ruin the custom-house officer, and frequently occasion much 
trouble, expense, and vexation to the importer. In point of perspicuity, precision, and 
distinctness, therefore, the duties of customs are much more inferior to those of excise. 
    In order that the greater part of the members of any society should contribute to the 
public revenue in proportion to their respective expense, it does not seem necessary 
that every single article of that expense should be taxed. The revenue which is levied 
by the duties of excise is supposed to fall as equally upon the contributors as that 
which is levied by the duties of customs, and the duties of excise are imposed upon a 
few articles only of the most general use and consumption. It has been the opinion of 
many people that, by proper management, the duties of customs might likewise, 
without any loss to the public revenue, and with great advantage to foreign trade, be 
confined to a few articles only. 
    The foreign articles of the most general use and consumption in Great Britain seem 
at present to consist chiefly in foreign wines and brandies; in some of the productions 
of America and the West Indies- sugar, rum, tobacco, cocoanuts, etc.; and in some of 
those of the East Indies- tea, coffee, china-ware, spiceries of all kinds, several sorts of 
piece-goods, etc. These different articles afford, perhaps, at present, the greater part of 
the revenue which is drawn from the duties of customs. The taxes which at present 
subsist upon foreign manufactures, if you except those upon the few contained in the 
foregoing enumeration, have the greater part of them been imposed for the purpose, 
not of revenue, but of monopoly, or to give our own merchants an advantage in the 
home market. By removing all prohibitions, and by subjecting all foreign 
manufactures to such moderate taxes as it was found from experience afforded upon 
each article the greatest revenue to the public, our own workmen might still have a 
considerable advantage in the home market, and many articles, some of which at 
present afford no revenue to government, and others a very inconsiderable one, might 
afford a very great one. 
    High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of the taxed commodities, 
and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to 
government than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes. 
    When the diminution of revenue is the effect of the diminution of consumption 
there can be but one remedy, and that is the lowering of the tax. 
    When the diminution of the revenue is the diminution of the revenue is the effect of 
the encouragement given to smuggling, it may perhaps be remedied in two ways; 
either by diminishing the temptation to smuggle, or by increasing the difficulty of 
smuggling. The temptation to smuggle can be diminished only by the lowering of the 
tax, and the difficulty of smuggling can be increased only by establishing that system 
of administration which is most proper for preventing it. 
    The excise laws, it appears, I believe, from experience, obstruct and embarrass the 
operations of the smuggler much more effectually than those of the customs. By 
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introducing into the customs a system of administration as similar to that of the excise 
as the nature of the different duties will admit, the difficulty of smuggling might be 
very much increased. This alteration, it has been supposed by many people, might very 
easily be brought about. 
    The importer of commodities liable to any duties of customs, it has been said, might 
as his option be allowed either to carry them to his own private warehouse, or to lodge 
them in a warehouse provided either at his own expense or at that of the public, but 
under the key of the custom-house officer, and never to be opened but in his presence. 
If the merchant carried them to his own private warehouse, the duties to be 
immediately paid, and never afterwards to be drawn back, and that warehouse to be at 
all times subject to the visit and examination of the custom-house officer, in order to 
ascertain how far the quantity contained in it corresponded with that for which the 
duty had been paid. If he carried them to the public warehouse, no duty to be paid till 
they were taken out for home consumption. If taken out for exportation, to be duty 
free, proper security being always given that they should be so exported. The dealers 
in those particular commodities, either by wholesale or retail, to be at all times subject 
to the visit and examination of the custom-house officer, and to be obliged to justify 
by proper certificates the payment of the duty upon the whole quantity contained in 
their shops or warehouses. What are called the excise-duties upon rum imported are at 
present levied in this manner, and the same system of administration might perhaps be 
extended to all duties upon goods imported, provided always that those duties were, 
like the duties of excise, confined to a few sorts of goods of the most general use and 
consumption. If they were extended to almost all sorts of goods, as at present, public 
warehouses of sufficient extent could not easily be provided, and goods of a very 
delicate nature, or of which the preservation required much care and attention, could 
not safely be trusted by the merchant in any warehouse but his own. 
    If by such a system of administration smuggling, to any considerable extent, could 
be prevented even under pretty high duties, and if every duty was occasionally either 
heightened or lowered according as it was most likely, either the one way or the other, 
to afford the greatest revenue to the state, taxation being always employed as an 
instrument of revenue and never of monopoly, it seems not improbable that a revenue 
at least equal to the present net revenue of the customs might be drawn from duties 
upon the importation of only a few sorts of goods of the most general use and 
consumption, and that the duties of customs might thus be brought to the same degree 
of simplicity, certainty, and precision as those of excise. What the revenue at present 
loses by drawbacks upon the re-exportation of foreign goods which are afterwards 
relanded and consumed at home would under this system be saved altogether. If to this 
saving, which would alone be very considerable, were added the abolition of all 
bounties upon the exportation of home produce in all cases in which those bounties 
were not in reality drawbacks of some duties of excise which had before been 
advanced, it cannot well be doubted but that the net revenue of customs might, after an 
alteration of this kind, be fully equal to what it had ever been before. 
    If by such a change of system the public revenue suffered no loss, the trade and 
manufactures of the country would certainly gain a very considerable advantage. The 
trade in the commodities not taxed, by far the greatest number, would be perfectly 
free, and might be carried on to and from all parts of the world with every possible 
advantage. Among those commodities would be comprehended all the necessaries of 
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life and all the materials of manufacture. So far as the free importation of the 
necessaries of life reduced their average money price in the home market it would 
reduce the money price of labour, but without reducing in any respect its real 
recompense. The value of money is in proportion to the quantity of the necessaries of 
life which it will purchase. That of the necessaries of life is altogether independent of 
the quantity of money which can be had for them. The reduction in the money price of 
labour would necessarily be attended with a proportionable one in that of all home 
manufactures, which would thereby gain some advantage in all foreign markets. The 
price of some manufactures would be reduced in a still greater proportion by the free 
importation of the raw materials. If raw silk could be imported from China and 
Indostan duty free, the silk manufacturers in England could greatly undersell those of 
both France and Italy. There would be no occasion to prohibit the importation of 
foreign silks and velvets. The cheapness of their goods would secure to our own 
workmen not only the possession of the home, but a very great command of the 
foreign market. Even the trade in the commodities taxed would be carried on with 
much more advantage than at present. If those commodities were delivered out of the 
public warehouse for foreign exportation, being in this case exempted from all taxes, 
the trade in them would be perfectly free. The carrying trade in all sorts of goods 
would under this system enjoy every possible advantage. If those commodities were 
delivered out for home consumption, the importer not being obliged to advance the tax 
till he had an opportunity of selling his goods, either to some dealer, or to some 
consumer, he could always afford to sell them cheaper than if he had been obliged to 
advance it at the moment of importation. Under the same taxes, the foreign trade of 
consumption even in the taxed commodities might in this manner be carried on with 
much more advantage than it can be at present. 
    It was the object of the famous excise scheme of Sir Robert Walpole to establish, 
with regard to wine and tobacco, a system not very unlike that which is here proposed. 
But though the bill which was then brought into Parliament comprehended those two 
commodities, only it was generally supposed to be meant as an introduction to a more 
extensive scheme of the same kind, faction, combined with the interest of smuggling 
merchants, raised so violent, though so unjust, a clamour against that bill, that the 
minister thought proper to drop it, and from a dread of exciting a clamour of the same 
kind, none of his successors have dared to resume the project. 
    The duties upon foreign luxuries imported for home consumption, though they 
sometimes fall upon the poor, fall principally upon people of middling or more than 
middling fortune. Such are, for example, the duties upon foreign wines, upon coffee, 
chocolate, tea, sugar, etc. 
    The duties upon the cheaper luxuries of home produce destined for home 
consumption fall pretty equally upon people of all ranks in proportion to their 
respective expense. The poor pay the duties upon malt, hops, beer, and ale, upon their 
own consumption: the rich, upon both their own consumption and that of their 
servants. 
    The whole consumption of the inferior ranks of people, or of those below the 
middling rank, it must be observed, is in every country much greater, not only in 
quantity, but in value, than that of the middling and of those above the middling rank. 
The whole expense of the inferior is much greater than that of the superior ranks. In 
the first place, almost the whole capital of every country is annually distributed among 
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the inferior ranks of people as the wages of productive labour. Secondly, a great part 
of the revenue arising from both the rent of land and the profits of stock is annually 
distributed among the same rank in the wages and maintenance of menial servants, and 
other unproductive labourers. Thirdly, some part of the profits of stock belongs to the 
same rank as a revenue arising from the employment of their small capitals. The 
amount of the profits annually made by small shopkeepers, tradesmen, and retailers of 
all kinds is everywhere very considerable, and makes a very considerable portion of 
the annual produce. Fourthly, and lastly, some part even of the rent of land belongs to 
the same rank, a considerable part of those who are somewhat below the middling 
rank, and a small part even to the lowest rank, common labourers sometimes 
possessing in property an acre or two of land. Though the expense of those inferior 
ranks of people, therefore, taking them individually, is very small, yet the whole mass 
of it, taking them collectively, amounts always to by much the largest portion of the 
whole expense of the society; what remains of the annual produce of the land and 
labour of the country for the consumption of the superior ranks being always much 
less, not only in quantity, but in value. The taxes upon expense, therefore, which fall 
chiefly upon that of the superior ranks of people, upon the smaller portion of the 
annual produce, are likely to be much less productive than either those which fall 
indifferently upon the expense of all ranks, or even those which fall chiefly upon that 
of the inferior ranks; than either those which fall indifferently upon the whole annual 
produce, or those which fall chiefly upon the larger portion of it. The excise upon the 
materials and manufacture of home-made fermented and spirituous liquors is 
accordingly, of all the different taxes upon expense, by far the most productive; and 
this branch of the excise falls very much, perhaps principally, upon the expense of the 
common people. In the year which ended on the 5th of July 1775, the gross produce of 
this branch of the excise amounted to L3,341,837 9s. 9d. 
    It must always be remembered, however, that it is the luxurious and not the 
necessary expense of the inferior ranks of people that ought ever to be taxed. The final 
payment of any tax upon their necessary expense would fall altogether upon the 
superior ranks of people; upon the smaller portion of the annual produce, and not upon 
the greater. Such a tax must in all cases either raise the wages of labour, or lessen the 
demand for it. It could not raise the wages of labour without throwing the final 
payment of the tax upon the superior ranks of people. It could not lessen the demand 
for labour without lessening the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, 
the fund from which all taxes must be finally paid. Whatever might be the state to 
which a tax of this kind reduced the demand for labour, it must always raise wages 
higher than they otherwise would be in that state, and the final payment of this 
enhancement of wages must in all cases fall upon the superior ranks of people. 
    Fermented liquors brewed, and spirituous liquors distilled, not for sale, but for 
private use, are not in Great Britain liable to any duties of excise. This exemption, of 
which the object is to save private families from the odious visit and examination of 
the tax-gatherer, occasions the burden of those duties to fall frequently much lighter 
upon the rich than upon the poor. It is not, indeed, very common to distil for private 
use, though it is done sometimes. But in the country many middling and almost all rich 
and great families brew their own beer. Their strong beer, therefore, costs them eight 
shillings a barrel less than it costs the common brewer, who must have his profit upon 
the tax as well as upon all the other expense which he advances. Such families, 
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therefore, must drink their beer at least nine or ten shillings a barrel cheaper than any 
liquor of the same quality can be drunk by the common people, to whom it is 
everywhere more convenient to buy their beer, by little and little, from the brewery or 
the alehouse. Malt, in the same manner, that is made for the use of a private family is 
not liable to the visit or examination of the tax-gatherer; but in this case the family 
must compound at seven shillings and sixpence a head for the tax. Seven shillings and 
sixpence are equal to the excise upon ten bushels of malt- a quantity fully equal to 
what all the different members of any sober family, men, women, and children, are at 
an average likely to consume. But in rich and great families, where country hospitality 
is much practised, the malt liquors consumed by the members of the family make but a 
small part of the consumption of the house. Either on account of this composition, 
however, or for other reasons, it is not near so common to malt as to brew for private 
use. It is difficult to imagine any equitable reason why those who either brew or distil 
for private use should not be subject to a composition of the same kind. 
    A greater revenue than what is at present drawn from all the heavy taxes upon malt, 
beer, and ale might be raised, it has frequently been said, by a much lighter tax upon 
malt, the opportunities of defrauding the revenue being much greater in a brewery than 
in a malt-house, and those who brew for private use being exempted from all duties or 
composition for duties, which is not the case with those who malt for private use. 
    In the porter brewery of London a quarter of malt is commonly brewed into more 
than two barrels and a half, sometimes into three barrels of porter. The different taxes 
upon malt amount to six shillings a quarter, those upon strong beer and ale to eight 
shillings a barrel. In the porter brewery, therefore, the different taxes upon malt, beer, 
and ale amount to between twenty-six and thirty shillings upon the produce of a 
quarter of malt. In the country brewery for common country sale a quarter of malt is 
seldom brewed into less than two barrels of strong and one barrel of small beer, 
frequently into two barrels and a half of strong beer. The different taxes upon small 
beer amount to one shilling and fourpence a barrel. In the country brewery, therefore, 
the different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale seldom amount to less than twenty-three 
shillings and fourpence, frequently to twenty-six shillings, upon the produce of a 
quarter of malt. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, therefore, the whole amount 
of the duties upon malt, beer, and ale cannot be estimated at less than twenty-four or 
twenty-five shillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. But by taking off all the 
different duties upon beer and ale, and by tripling the malt-tax, or by raising it from six 
to eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt, a greater revenue, it is said, might be 
raised by this single tax than what is at present drawn from all those heavier taxes. 
    Under the old malt tax, indeed, is comprehended a tax of four shillings upon the 
hogshead of cyder, and another of ten shillings upon the barrel of mum. In 1774, the 
tax upon cyder produced only L3083 6s. 8d. It probably fell somewhat short of its 
usual amount, all the different taxes upon cyder having, that year, produced less than 
ordinary. The tax upon mum, though much heavier, is still less productive, on account 
of the smaller consumption of that liquor. But to balance whatever may be the 
ordinary amount of those two taxes, there is comprehended under what is called the 
country excise, first, the old excise of six shillings and eightpence upon the hogshead 
of cyder; secondly, a like tax of six shillings and eightpence upon the hogshead of 
verjuice; thirdly, another of eight shillings and ninepence upon the hogshead of 
vinegar; and, lastly, a fourth tax of elevenpence upon the gallon of mead or metheglin: 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/wealth/wealth5.html (129 of 174)4/11/2005 9:48:51 AM
The Wealth of Nations
the produce of those different taxes will probably much more than counterbalance that 
of the duties imposed by what is called the annual malt tax upon cyder and mum. 
                                                L       
s.    d.
  In 1772, the old malt-tax produced           722,023    
11    11
           The additional                      
356,776     7     9 3/4
  In 1773, the old tax produced                
561,627     3     7 1/2
           The additional                      278,650    
15     3 3/4
  In 1774, the old tax produced                624,614    
17     5 3/4
           The additional                      
310,745     2     8 1/2
  In 1775, the old tax produced                
657,357     0     8 1/4
           The additional                      323,785    
12     6 1/4
                                       ---------------------------
                                           4)3,835,580    
12     0 3/4
                                       ---------------------------
       Average of these four years             
958,895     3    0 3/16
                                       ---------------------------
  In 1772, the country excise produced       
1,243,128     5     3
           The London brewery                  
408,260     7     2 3/4
  In 1773, the country excise                
1,245,808     3     3
           The London brewery                  405,406    
17    10 1/2
  In 1774, the country excise                1,246,373    
14     5 1/2
           The London brewery                  320,601    
18     0 1/4
  In 1775, the country excise                
1,214,583     6     1
           The London brewery                  
463,670     7     0 1/4
                                       ---------------------------
                                           4)6,547,832    
19     2 1/4
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                                       ---------------------------
       Average of these four years         
1,636,958       4     9 1/2
  To which adding the average malt-tax, or   
958,895       3    0 3/16
  The whole amount of those different
    taxes comes out to be                  
2,595,853       7   9 11/19
                                       ---------------------------
  But by tripling the malt-tax, or by
    raising it from six to eighteen
    shillings upon the quarter of malt,
    that single tax would produce          
2,876,685       9    0 9/16
  A sum which exceeds the foregoing by       
280,832       1   2 14/16
Malt is consumed not only in the brewery of beer and ale, but in the manufacture of 
wines and spirits. If the malt tax were to be raised to eighteen shillings upon the 
quarter, it might be necessary to make some abatement in the different excises which 
are imposed upon those particular sorts of low wines and spirits of which malt makes 
any part of the materials. In what are called malt spirits it makes commonly but a third 
part of the materials, the other two-thirds being either raw barley, or one-third barley 
and one-third wheat. In the distillery of malt spirits, both the opportunity and the 
temptation to smuggle are much greater than either in a brewery or in a malt-house; 
the opportunity on account of the smaller bulk and greater value of the commodity, 
and the temptation on account of the superior height of the duties, which amount to 3s. 
10 2/3d.* upon the gallon of spirits. By increasing the duties upon malt, and reducing 
those upon the distillery, both the opportunities and the temptation to smuggle would 
be diminished, which might occasion a still further augmentation of revenue.
* Though the duties directly imposed upon proof spirits amount only to 2s. 6d. per gallon, 
these added to the duties upon the low wines, from which they are distilled, amount to 3s. 10 
2/3d. Both low wines and proof spirits are, to prevent frauds, now rated according to what 
they gauge in the wash. 
It has for some time past been the policy of Great Britain to discourage the 
consumption of spirituous liquors, on account of their supposed tendency to ruin the 
health and to corrupt the morals of the common people. According to this policy, the 
abatement of the taxes upon the distillery ought not to be so great as to reduce, in any 
respect, the price of those liquors. Spirituous liquors might remain as dear as ever, 
while at the same time the wholesome and invigorating liquors of beer and ale might 
be considerably reduced in their price. The people might thus be in part relieved from 
one of the burdens of which they at present complain the most, while at the same time 
the revenue might be considerably augmented. 
    The objections of Dr. Davenant to this alteration in the present system of excise 
duties seem to be without foundation. Those objections are, that the tax, instead of 
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dividing itself as at present pretty equally upon the profit of the maltster, upon that of 
the brewer, and upon that of the retailer, would, so far as it affected profit, fall 
altogether upon that of the maltster; that the maltster could not so easily get back the 
amount of the tax in the advanced price of his malt as the brewer and retailer in the 
advanced price of their liquor; and that so heavy a tax upon malt might reduce the rent 
and profit of barley land. 
    No tax can ever reduce, for any considerable time, the rate of profit in any particular 
trade which must always keep its level with other trades in the neighbourhood. The 
present duties upon malt, beer, and ale do not affect the profits of the dealers in those 
commodities, who all get back the tax with an additional profit in the enhanced price 
of their goods. A tax, indeed, may render the goods upon which it is imposed so dear 
as to diminish the consumption of them. But the consumption of malt is in malt 
liquors, and a tax of eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt could not well render 
those liquors dearer than the different taxes, amounting to twenty-four or twenty-five 
shillings, do at present. Those liquors, on the contrary, would probably become 
cheaper, and the consumption of them would be more likely to increase than to 
diminish. 
    It is not very easy to understand why it should be more difficult for the maltster to 
get back eighteen shillings in the advanced price of his malt than it is at present for the 
brewer to get back twenty-four or twenty-five, sometimes thirty, shillings in that of his 
liquor. The maltster, indeed, instead of a tax of six shillings, would be obliged to 
advance one of eighteen shillings upon every quarter of malt. But the brewer is at 
present obliged to advance a tax of twenty-four or twenty-five, sometimes thirty, 
shillings upon every quarter of malt which he brews. It could not be more 
inconvenient for the maltster to advance a lighter tax than it is at present for the brewer 
to advance a heavier one. The maltster doth not always keep in his granaries a stock of 
malt which it will require a longer time to dispose of than the stock of beer and ale 
which the brewer frequently keeps in his cellars. The former, therefore, may 
frequently get the returns of his money as soon as the latter. But whatever 
inconveniency might arise to the maltster from being obliged to advance a heavier tax, 
it could easily be remedied by granting him a few months' longer credit than is at 
present commonly given to the brewer. 
    Nothing could reduce the rent and profit of barley land which did not reduce the 
demand for barley. But a change of system which reduced the duties upon a quarter of 
malt brewed into beer and ale from twenty-four and twenty-five shillings to eighteen 
shillings would be more likely to increase than diminish that demand. The rent and 
profit of barley land, besides, must always be nearly equal to those of other equally 
fertile and equally well-cultivated land. If they were less, some part of the barley land 
would soon be turned to some other purpose; and if they were greater, more land 
would soon be turned to the raising of barley. When the ordinary price of any 
particular produce of land is at what may be called a monopoly price, a tax upon it 
necessarily reduces the rent and profit of the land which grows it. A tax upon the 
produce of those precious vineyards of which the wine falls so much short of the 
effectual demand that its price is always above the natural proportion to that of the 
produce of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land would necessarily 
reduce the rent and profit of those vineyards. The price of the wines being already the 
highest that could be got for the quantity commonly sent to market, it could not be 
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raised higher without diminishing that quantity, and the quantity could not be 
diminished without still greater loss, because the lands could not be turned to any 
other equally valuable produce. The whole weight of the tax, therefore, would fall 
upon the rent and profit- properly upon the rent of the vineyard. When it has been 
proposed to lay any new tax upon sugar, our sugar planters have frequently 
complained that the whole weight of such taxes fell, not upon the consumer, but upon 
the producer, they never having been able to raise the price of their sugar after the tax 
higher than it was before. The price had, it seems, before the tax been a monopoly 
price, and the argument adduced to show that sugar was an improper subject of 
taxation demonstrated, perhaps, that it was a proper one, the gains of monopolists, 
whenever they can be come at, being certainly of all subjects the most proper. But the 
ordinary price of barley has never been a monopoly price, and the rent and profit of 
barley land have never been above their natural proportion to those of other equally 
fertile and equally well-cultivated land. The different taxes which have been imposed 
upon malt, beer, and ale have never lowered the price of barley, have never reduced 
the rent and profit of barley land. The price of malt to the brewer has constantly risen 
in proportion to the taxes imposed upon it, and those taxes, together with the different 
duties upon beer and ale, have constantly either raised the price, or what comes to the 
same thing, reduced the quality of those commodities to the consumer. The final 
payment of those taxes has fallen constantly upon the consumer, and not upon the 
producer. 
    The only people likely to suffer by the change of system here proposed are those 
who brew for their own private use. But the exemption which this superior rank of 
people at present enjoy from very heavy taxes which are paid by the poor labourer and 
artificer is surely most unjust and unequal, and ought to be taken away, even though 
this change was never to take place. It has probably been the interest of this superior 
order of people, however, which has hitherto prevented a change of system that could 
not well fail both to increase the revenue and to relieve the people. 
    Besides such duties as those of customs and excise above mentioned, there are 
several others which affect the price of goods more unequally and more indirectly. Of 
this kind are the duties which in French are called Peages, which in old Saxon times 
were called Duties of Passage, and which seem to have been originally established for 
the same purpose as our turnpike tolls, or the tolls upon our canals and navigable 
rivers, for the maintenance of the road or of the navigation. Those duties, when 
applied to such purposes, are most properly imposed according to the bulk or weight 
of the goods. As they were originally local and provincial duties, applicable to local 
and provincial purposes, the administration of them was in most cases entrusted to the 
particular town, parish, or lordship in which they were levied, such communities being 
in some way or other supposed to be accountable for the application. The sovereign, 
who is altogether unaccountable, has in many countries assumed to himself the 
administration of those duties, and though he has in most cases enhanced very much 
the duty, he has in many entirely neglected the application. If the turnpike tolls of 
Great Britain should ever become one of the resources of government, we may learn, 
by the example of many other nations, what would probably be the consequence. Such 
tolls are no doubt finally paid by the consumer; but the consumer is not taxed in 
proportion to his expense when he pays, not according to the value, but according to 
the bulk or weight of what he consumes. When such duties are imposed, not according 
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to the bulk or weight, but according to the supposed value of the goods, they become 
properly a sort of inland customs or excises which obstruct very much the most 
important of all branches of commerce, the interior commerce of the country. 
    In some small states duties similar to those passage duties are imposed upon goods 
carried across the territory, either by land or by water, from one foreign country to 
another. These are in some countries called transit-duties. Some of the little Italian 
states which are situated upon the Po and the rivers which run into it derive some 
revenue from duties of this kind which are paid altogether by foreigners, and which, 
perhaps, are the only duties that one state can impose upon the subjects of another 
without obstructing in any respect the industry or commerce of its own. The most 
important transit-duty in the world is that levied by the King of Denmark upon all 
merchant ships which pass through the Sound. 
    Such taxes upon luxuries as the greater part of the duties of customs and excise, 
though they all fall indifferently upon every different species of revenue, and are paid 
finally, or without any retribution, by whoever consumes the commodities upon which 
they are imposed, yet they do not always fall equally or proportionably upon the 
revenue of every individual. As every man's humour regulates the degree of his 
consumption, every man contributes rather according to his humour than in proportion 
to his revenue; the profuse contribute more, the parsimonious less, than their proper 
proportion. During the minority of a man of great fortune he contributes commonly 
very little, by his consumption, towards the support of that state from whose protection 
he derives a great revenue. Those who live in another country contribute nothing, by 
their consumption, towards the support of the government of that country in which is 
situated the source of their revenue. If in this latter country there should be no land-
tax, nor any considerable duty upon the transference either of movable or of 
immovable property, as is the case in Ireland, such absentees may derive a great 
revenue from the protection of a government to the support of which they do not 
contribute a single shilling. This inequality is likely to be greatest in a country of 
which the government is in some respects subordinate and dependent upon that of 
some other. The people who possess the most extensive property in the dependent will 
in this case generally choose to live in the governing country. Ireland is precisely in 
this situation, and we cannot, therefore, wonder that the proposal of a tax upon 
absentees should be so very popular in that country. It might, perhaps, be a little 
difficult to ascertain either what sort or what degree of absence would subject a man to 
be taxed as an absentee, or at what precise time the tax should either begin or end. If 
you except, however, this very peculiar situation, any inequality in the contribution of 
individuals which can arise from such taxes is much more than compensated by the 
very circumstance which occasions that inequality- the circumstance that every man's 
contribution is altogether voluntary, it being altogether in his power either to consume 
or not to consume the commodity taxed. Where such taxes, therefore, are properly 
assessed, and upon proper commodities, they are paid with less grumbling than any 
other. When they are advanced by the merchant or manufacturer, the consumer, who 
finally pays them, soon comes to confound them with the price of the commodities, 
and almost forgets that he pays any tax. 
    Such taxes are or may be perfectly certain, or may be assessed so as to leave no 
doubt concerning either what ought to be paid, or when it ought to be paid; concerning 
either the quantity or the time of payment. Whatever uncertainty there may sometimes 
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be, either in the duties of customs in Great Britain, or in other duties of the same kind 
in other countries, it cannot arise from the nature of those duties, but from the 
inaccurate or unskilful manner in which the law that imposes them is expressed. 
    Taxes upon luxuries generally are, and always may be, paid piecemeal, or in 
proportion as the contributors have occasion to purchase the goods upon which they 
are imposed. In the time and mode of payment they are, or may be, of all taxes the 
most convenient. Upon the whole, such taxes, are, perhaps, as agreeable to the three 
first of the four general maxims concerning taxation as any other. They offend in 
every respect against the fourth. 
    Such taxes, in proportion to what they bring into the public treasury of the state, 
always take out or keep out of the pockets of the people more than almost any other 
taxes. They seem to do this in all the four different ways in which it is possible to do 
it. 
    First, the levying of such taxes, even when imposed in the most judicious manner, 
requires a great number of custom-house and excise officers, whose salaries and 
perquisites are a real tax upon the people, which brings nothing into the treasury of the 
state. This expense, however, it must be acknowledged, is more moderate in Great 
Britain than in most other countries. In the year which ended on the 5th of July 1775, 
the gross produce of the different duties, under the management of the commissioners 
of excise in England, amounted to L5,507,308 18s. 8 1/4d., which was levied at an 
expense of little more than five and a half per cent. From this gross produce, however, 
there must be deducted what was paid away in bounties and drawbacks upon the 
exportation of excisable goods, which will reduce the net produce below five millions.
* The levying of the salt duty, an excise duty, but under a different management, is 
much more expensive. The net revenue of the customs does not amount to two 
millions and a half, which is levied at an expense of more than ten per cent in the 
salaries of officers, and other incidents. But the perquisites of custom-house officers 
are everywhere much greater than their salaries; at some ports more than double or 
triple those salaries. If the salaries of officers, and other incidents, therefore, amount to 
more than ten per cent upon the net revenue of the customs, the whole expense of 
levying that revenue may amount, in salaries and perquisites together, to more than 
twenty or thirty per cent. The officers of excise receive few or no perquisites, and the 
administration of that branch of the revenue, being of more recent establishment, is in 
general less corrupted than that of the customs, into which length of time has 
introduced and authorized many abuses. By charging upon malt the whole revenue 
which is at present levied by the different duties upon malt and malt liquors, a saving, 
it is supposed, of more than fifty thousand pounds might be made in the annual 
expense of the excise. By confining the duties of customs to a few sorts of goods, and 
by levying those duties according to the excise laws, a much greater saving might 
probably be made in the annual expense of the customs. 
* The net produce of that year, after deducting all expenses and allowances, amounted to 
L4,975,652 19s. 6d. 
Secondly, such taxes necessarily occasion some obstruction or discouragement to 
certain branches of industry. As they always raise the price of the commodity taxed, 
they so far discourage its consumption, and consequently its production. If it is a 
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commodity of home growth or manufacture, less labour comes to be employed in 
raising and producing it. If it is a foreign commodity of which the tax increases in this 
manner the price, the commodities of the same kind which are made at home may 
thereby, indeed, gain some advantage in the home market, and a greater quantity of 
domestic industry may thereby be turned toward preparing them. But though this rise 
of price in a foreign commodity may encourage domestic industry in one particular 
branch, it necessarily discourages that industry in almost every other. The dearer the 
Birmingham manufacturer buys his foreign wine, the cheaper he necessarily sells that 
part of his hardware with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of 
which he buys it. That part of his hardware, therefore, becomes of less value to him, 
and he has less encouragement to work at it. The dearer the consumers in one country 
pay for the surplus produce of another, the cheaper they necessarily sell that part of 
their own surplus produce with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price 
of which they buy it. That part of their own surplus produce becomes of less value to 
them, and they have less encouragement to increase its quantity. All taxes upon 
consumable commodities, therefore, tend to reduce the quantity of productive labour 
below what it otherwise would be, either in preparing the commodities taxed, if they 
are home commodities, or in preparing those with which they are purchased, if they 
are foreign commodities. Such taxes, too, always alter, more or less, the natural 
direction of national industry, and turn it into a channel always different from, and 
generally less advantageous than that in which it would have run of its own accord. 
    Thirdly, the hope of evading such taxes by smuggling gives frequent occasion to 
forfeitures and other penalties which entirely ruin the smuggler; a person who, though 
no doubt highly blamable for violating the laws of his country, is frequently incapable 
of violating those of natural justice, and would have been, in every respect, an 
excellent citizen had not the laws of his country made that a crime which nature never 
meant to be so. In those corrupted governments where there is at least a general 
suspicion of much unnecessary expense, and great misapplication of the public 
revenue, the laws which guard it are little respected. Not many people are scrupulous 
about smuggling when, without perjury, they can find any easy and safe opportunity of 
doing so. To pretend to have any scruple about buying smuggled goods, though a 
manifest encouragement to the violation of the revenue laws, and to the perjury which 
almost always attends it, would in most countries be regarded as one of those pedantic 
pieces of hypocrisy which, instead of gaining credit with anybody, serve only to 
expose the person who affects to practise them to the suspicion of being a greater 
knave than most of his neighbours. By this indulgence of the public, the smuggler is 
often encouraged to continue a trade which he is thus taught to consider as in some 
measure innocent, and when the severity of the revenue laws is ready to fall upon him, 
he is frequently disposed to defend with violence what he has been accustomed to 
regard as his just property. From being at first, perhaps, rather imprudent than 
criminal, he at last too often becomes one of the hardiest and most determined 
violators of the laws of society. By the ruin of the smuggler, his capital, which had 
before been employed in maintaining productive labour, is absorbed either in the 
revenue of the state or in that of the revenue officer, and is employed in maintaining 
unproductive, to the diminution of the general capital of the society and of the useful 
industry which it might otherwise have maintained. 
    Fourthly, such taxes, by subjecting at least the dealers in the taxed commodities to 
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the frequent visits and odious examination of the tax-gatherers, expose them 
sometimes, no doubt, to some degree of oppression, and always to much trouble and 
vexation; and though vexation, as has already been said, is not, strictly speaking, 
expense, it is certainly equivalent to the expense at which every man would be willing 
to redeem himself from it. The laws of excise, though more effectual for the purpose 
for which they were instituted, are, in this respect, more vexatious than those of the 
customs. When a merchant has imported goods subject to certain duties of customs, 
when he has paid those duties, and lodged the goods in his warehouse, he is not in 
most cases liable to any further trouble or vexation from the custom-house officer. It is 
otherwise with goods subject to duties of excise. The dealers have no respite from the 
continual visits and examination of the excise officers. The duties of excise are, upon 
this account, more unpopular than those of the customs; and so are the officers who 
levy them. Those officers, it is pretended, though in general, perhaps, they do their 
duty fully as well as those of the customs, yet as that duty obliges them to be 
frequently very troublesome to some of their neighbours, commonly contract a certain 
hardness of character which the others frequently have not. This observation, however, 
may very probably be the mere suggestion of fraudulent dealers whose smuggling is 
either prevented or detected by their diligence. 
    The inconveniencies, however, which are, perhaps, in some degree inseparable from 
taxes upon consumable commodities, fall as light upon the people of Great Britain as 
upon those of any other country of which the government is nearly as expensive. Our 
state is not perfect, and might be mended, but it is as good or better than that of most 
of our neighbours. 
    In consequence of the notion that duties upon consumable goods were taxes upon 
the profits of merchants, those duties have, in some countries, been repeated upon 
every successive sale of the goods. If the profits of the merchant importer or merchant 
manufacturer were taxed, equality seemed to require that those of all the middle 
buyers who intervened between either of them and the consumer should likewise be 
taxed. The famous alcavala of Spain seems to have been established upon this 
principle. It was at first a tax of ten per cent, afterwards of fourteen per cent, and is at 
present of only six per cent upon the sale of every sort of property whether movable or 
immovable, and it is repeated every time the property is sold. The levying of this tax 
requires a multitude of revenue officers sufficient to guard the transportation of goods, 
not only from one province to another, but from one shop to another. It subjects not 
only the dealers in some sorts of goods, but those in all sorts, every farmer, every 
manufacturer, every merchant and shopkeeper, to the continual visits and examination 
of the tax-gatherers. Through the greater part of a country in which a tax of this kind is 
established nothing can be produced for distant sale. The produce of every part of the 
country must be proportioned to the consumption of the neighborhood. It is to the 
alcavala, accordingly, that Ustaritz imputes the ruin of the manufactures of Spain. He 
might have imputed to it likewise the declension of agriculture, it being imposed not 
only upon manufactures, but upon the rude produce of the land. 
    In the kingdom of Naples there is a similar tax of three per cent upon the value of all 
contracts, and consequently upon that of all contracts of sale. It is both lighter than the 
Spanish tax, and the greater part of towns and parishes are allowed to pay a 
composition in lieu of it. They levy this composition in what manner they please, 
generally in a way that gives no interruption to the interior commerce of the place. The 
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Neapolitan tax, therefore, is not near so ruinous as the Spanish one. 
    The uniform system of taxation which, with a few exceptions of no great 
consequence, takes place in all the different parts of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain, leaves the interior commerce of the country, the inland and coasting trade, 
almost entirely free. The inland trade is almost perfectly free, and the greater part of 
goods may be carried from one end of the kingdom to the other without requiring any 
permit or let-pass, without being subject to question, visit, or examination from the 
revenue officers. There are a few exceptions, but they are such as can give no 
interruption to any important branch of the inland commerce of the country. Goods 
carried coastwise, indeed, require certificates or coast-cockets. If you except coals, 
however, the rest are almost all duty-free. This freedom of interior commerce, the 
effect of the uniformity of the system of taxation, is perhaps one of the principal 
causes of the prosperity of Great Britain, every great country being necessarily the best 
and most extensive market for the greater part of the productions of its own industry. 
If the same freedom, in consequence of the same uniformity, could be extended to 
Ireland and the plantations, both the grandeur of the state and the prosperity of every 
part of the empire would probably be still greater than at present. 
    In France, the different revenue laws which take place in the different provinces 
require a multitude of revenue officers to surround not only the frontiers of the 
kingdom, but those of almost each particular province, in order either to prevent the 
importation of certain goods, or to subject it to the payment of certain duties, to the no 
small interruption of the interior commerce of the country. Some provinces are 
allowed to compound for the gabelle or salt-tax. Others are exempted from it 
altogether. Some provinces are exempted from the exclusive sale of tobacco, which 
the farmers-general enjoy through the greater part of the kingdom. The aides, which 
correspond to the excise in England, are very different in different provinces. Some 
provinces are exempted from them, and pay a composition or equivalent. In those in 
which they take place and are in farm there are many local duties which do not extend 
beyond a particular town or district. The traites, which correspond to our customs, 
divide the kingdom into three great parts; first, the provinces subject to the tariff of 
1664, which are called the provinces of the five great farms, and under which are 
comprehended Picardy, Normandy, and the greater part of the interior provinces of the 
kingdom; secondly, the provinces subject to the tariff of 1667, which are called the 
provinces reckoned foreign, and under which are comprehended the greater part of the 
frontier provinces; and, thirdly, those provinces which are said to be treated as foreign, 
or which, because they are allowed a free commerce with foreign countries, are in 
their commerce with other provinces of France subjected to the same duties as other 
foreign countries. These are Alsace, the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, 
and the three cities of Dunkirk, Bayonne, and Marseilles. Both in the provinces of the 
five great farms (called so on account of an ancient division of the duties of customs 
into five great branches, each of which was originally the subject of a particular farm, 
though they are now all united into one), and in those which are said to be reckoned 
foreign, there are many local duties which do not extend beyond a particular town or 
district. There are some such even in the provinces which are said to be treated as 
foreign, particularly in the city of Marseilles. It is unnecessary to observe how much 
both the restraints upon the interior commerce of the country and the number of the 
revenue officers must be multiplied in order to guard the frontiers of those different 
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provinces and districts which are subject to such different systems of taxation. 
    Over and above the general restraints arising from this complicated system of 
revenue laws, the commerce of wine, after corn perhaps the most important production 
of France, is in the greater part of the provinces subject to particular restraints, arising 
from the favour which has been shown to the vineyards of particular provinces and 
districts, above those of others. The provinces most famous for their wines, it will be 
found, I believe, are those in which the trade in that article is subject to the fewest 
restraints of this kind. The extensive market which such provinces enjoy, encourages 
good management both in the cultivation of their vineyards, and in the subsequent 
preparation of their wines. 
    Such various and complicated revenue laws are not peculiar to France. The little 
duchy of Milan is divided into six provinces, in each of which there is a different 
system of taxation with regard to several different sorts of consumable goods. The still 
smaller territories of the Duke of Parma are divided into three or four, each of which 
has, in the same manner, a system of its own. Under such absurd management, nothing 
but the great fertility of the soil and happiness of the climate could preserve such 
countries from soon relapsing into the lowest state of poverty and barbarism. 
    Taxes upon consumable commodities may either be levied by an administration of 
which the officers are appointed by government and are immediately accountable to 
government, of which the revenue must in this case vary from year to year according 
to the occasional variations in the produce of the tax, or they may be let in farm for a 
rent certain, the farmer being allowed to appoint his own officers, who, though obliged 
to levy the tax in the manner directed by the law, are under his immediate inspection, 
and are immediately accountable to him. The best and most frugal way of levying a 
tax can never be by farm. Over and above what is necessary for paying the stipulated 
rent, the salaries of the officers, and the whole expense of administration, the farmer 
must always draw from the produce of the tax a certain profit proportioned at least to 
the advance which he makes, to the risk which he runs, to the trouble which he is at, 
and to the knowledge and skill which it requires to manage so very complicated a 
concern. Government, by establishing an administration under their own immediate 
inspection of the same kind with that which the farmer establishes, might at least save 
this profit, which is almost always exorbitant. To farm any considerable branch of the 
public revenue requires either a great capital or a great credit; circumstances which 
would alone restrain the competition for such an undertaking to a very small number 
of people. Of the few who have this capital or credit, a still smaller number have the 
necessary knowledge or experience; another circumstance which restrains the 
competition still further. The very few, who are in condition to become competitors, 
find it more for their interest to combine together; to become co-partners instead of 
competitors, and when the farm is set up to auction, to offer no rent but what is much 
below the real value. In countries where the public revenues are in farm, the farmers 
are generally the most opulent people. Their wealth would alone excite the public 
indignation, and the vanity which almost always accompanies such upstart fortunes, 
the foolish ostentation with which they commonly display that wealth, excites that 
indignation still more. 
    The farmers of the public revenue never find the laws too severe which punish any 
attempt to evade the payment of a tax. They have no bowels for the contributors, who 
are not their subjects, and whose universal bankruptcy, if it should happen the day 
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after their farm is expired, would not much affect their interest. In the greatest 
exigencies of the state, when the anxiety of the sovereign for the exact payment of his 
revenue is necessarily the greatest, they seldom fail to complain that without laws 
more rigorous than those which actually take place, it will be impossible for them to 
pay even the usual rent. In those moments of public distress their demands cannot be 
disputed. The revenue laws, therefore, become gradually more and more severe. The 
most sanguinary are always to be found in countries where the greater part of the 
public revenue is in farm; the mildest, in countries where it is levied under the 
immediate inspection of the sovereign. Even a bad sovereign feels more compassion 
for his people than can ever be expected from the farmers of his revenue. He knows 
that the permanent grandeur of his family depends upon the prosperity of his people, 
and he will never knowingly ruin that prosperity for the sake of any momentary 
interest of his own. It is otherwise with the farmers of his revenue, whose grandeur 
may frequently be the effect of the ruin, and not of the prosperity of his people. 
    A tax is sometimes not only farmed for a certain rent, but the farmer has, besides, 
the monopoly of the commodity taxed. In France, the duties upon tobacco and salt are 
levied in this manner. In such cases the farmer, instead of one, levies two exorbitant 
profits upon the people; the profit of the farmer, and the still more exorbitant one of 
the monopolist. Tobacco being a luxury, every man is allowed to buy or not to buy as 
he chooses. But salt being a necessary, every man is obliged to buy of the farmer a 
certain quantity of it; because, if he did not buy this quantity of the farmer, he would, 
it is presumed, buy it of some smuggler. The taxes upon both commodities are 
exorbitant. The temptation to smuggle consequently is to many people irresistible, 
while at the same time the rigour of the law, and the vigilance of the farmer's officers, 
render the yielding to that temptation almost certainly ruinous. The smuggling of salt 
and tobacco sends every year several hundred people to the galleys, besides a very 
considerable number whom it sends to the gibbet. Those taxes levied in this manner 
yield a very considerable revenue to government. In 1767, the farm of tobacco was let 
for twenty-two millions five hundred and forty-one thousand two hundred and seventy-
eight livres a year. That of salt, for thirty-six millions four hundred and ninety-four 
thousand four hundred and four livres. The farm in both cases was to commence in 
1768, and to last for six years. Those who consider the blood of the people as nothing 
in comparison with the revenue of the prince, may perhaps approve of this method of 
levying taxes. Similar taxes and monopolies of salt and tobacco have been established 
in many other countries; particularly in the Austrian and Prussian dominions, and in 
the greater part of the states of Italy. 
    In France, the greater part of the actual revenue of the crown is derived from eight 
different sources; the taille, the capitation, the two vingtiemes, the gabelles, the aides, 
the traites, the domaine, and the farm of tobacco. The five last are, in the greater part 
of the provinces, under farm. The three first are everywhere levied by an 
administration under the immediate inspection and direction of government, and it is 
universally acknowledged that, in proportion to what they take out of the pockets of 
the people, they bring more into the treasury of the prince than the other five, of which 
the administration is much more wasteful and expensive. 
    The finances of France seem, in their present state, to admit of three very obvious 
reformations. First, by abolishing the taille and the capitation, and by increasing the 
number of vingtiemes, so as to produce an additional revenue equal to the amount of 
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those other taxes, the revenue of the crown might be preserved; the expense of 
collection might be much diminished; the vexation of the inferior ranks of people, 
which the taille and capitation occasion, might be entirely prevented; and the superior 
ranks might not be more burdened than the greater part of them are at present. The 
vingtieme, I have already observed, is a tax very nearly of the same kind with what is 
called the land-tax of England. The burden of the taille, it is acknowledged, falls 
finally upon the proprietors of land; and as the greater part of the capitation is assessed 
upon those who are subject to the taille at so much a pound of that other tax, the final 
payment of the greater part of it must likewise fall upon the same order of people. 
Though the number of the vingtiemes, therefore, was increased so as to produce an 
additional revenue equal to the amount of both those taxes, the superior ranks of 
people might not be more burdened than they are at present. Many individuals no 
doubt would, on account of the great inequalities with which the taille is commonly 
assessed upon the estates and tenants of different individuals. The interest and 
opposition of such favoured subjects are the obstacles most likely to prevent this or 
any other reformation of the same kind. Secondly, by rendering the gabelle, the aides, 
the traites, the taxes upon tobacco, all the different customs and excises, uniform in all 
the different parts of the kingdom, those taxes might be levied at much less expense, 
and the interior commerce of the kingdom might be rendered as free as that of 
England. Thirdly, and lastly, by subjecting all those taxes to an administration under 
the immediate inspection and direction of government, the exorbitant profits of the 
farmers-general might be added to the revenue of the state. The opposition arising 
from the private interest of individuals is likely to be as effectual for preventing the 
two last as the first-mentioned scheme of reformation. 
    The French system of taxation seems, in every respect, inferior to the British. In 
Great Britain ten millions sterling are annually levied upon less than eight millions of 
people without its being possible to say that any particular order is oppressed. From 
the collections of the Abbe Expilly, and the observations of the author of the Essay 
upon legislation and commerce of corn, it appears probable that France, including the 
provinces of Lorraine and Bar, contains about twenty-three or twenty-four millions of 
people three times the number perhaps contained in Great Britain. The soil and climate 
of France are better than those of Great Britain. The country has been much longer in a 
state of improvement and cultivation, and is, upon that account, better stocked with all 
those things which it requires a long time to raise up and accumulate, such as great 
towns, and convenient and well-built houses, both in town and country. With these 
advantages it might be expected that in France a revenue of thirty millions might be 
levied for the support of the state with as little inconveniency as a revenue of ten 
millions is in Great Britain. In 1765 and 1766, the whole revenue paid into the treasury 
of France, according to the best, though, I acknowledge, very imperfect, accounts 
which I could get of it, usually run between 308 and 325 millions of livres; that is, it 
did not amount to fifteen millions sterling; not the half of what might have been 
expected had the people contributed in the same proportion to their numbers as the 
people of Great Britain. The people of France, however, it is generally acknowledged, 
are much more oppressed by taxes than the people of Great Britain. France, however, 
is certainly the great empire in Europe which, after that of Great Britain, enjoys the 
mildest and most indulgent government. 
    In Holland the heavy taxes upon the necessaries of life have ruined, it is said, their 
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principal manufactures, and are likely to discourage gradually even their fisheries and 
their trade in shipbuilding. The taxes upon the necessaries of life are inconsiderable in 
Great Britain, and no manufacture has hitherto been ruined by them. The British taxes 
which bear hardest on manufactures are some duties upon the importation of raw 
materials, particularly upon that of raw silk. The revenue of the states-general and of 
the different cities, however, is said to amount to more than five millions two hundred 
and fifty thousand pounds sterling; and as the inhabitants of the United Provinces 
cannot well be supposed to amount to more than a third part of those of Great Britain, 
they must, in proportion to their number, be much more heavily taxed. 
    After all the proper subjects of taxation have been exhausted, if the exigencies of 
the state still continue to require new taxes, they must be imposed upon improper ones. 
The taxes upon the necessaries of life, therefore, the wisdom of that republic which, in 
order to acquire and to maintain its independency, has, in spite of its great frugality, 
been involved in such expensive wars as have obliged it to contract great debts. The 
singular countries of Holland and Zeeland, besides, require a considerable expense 
even to preserve their existence, or to prevent their being swallowed up by the sea, 
which must have contributed to increase considerably the load of taxes in those two 
provinces. The republican form of government seems to be the principal support of the 
present grandeur of Holland. The owners of great capitals, the great mercantile 
families, have generally either some direct share or some indirect influence in the 
administration of that government. For the sake of the respect and authority which 
they derive from this situation, they are willing to live in a country where their capital, 
if they employ it themselves, will bring them less profit, and if they lend it to another, 
less interest; and where the very moderate revenue which they can draw from it will 
purchase less of the necessaries and conveniences of life than in any other part of 
Europe. The residence of such wealthy people necessarily keeps alive, in spite of all 
disadvantages, a certain degree of industry in the country. Any public calamity which 
should destroy the republican form of government, which should throw the whole 
administration into the hands of nobles and of soldiers, which should annihilate 
altogether the importance of those wealthy merchants, would soon render it 
disagreeable to them to live in a country where they were no longer likely to be much 
respected. They would remove both their residences and their capitals to some other 
country, and the industry and commerce of Holland would soon follow the capitals 
which supported them. 
CHAPTER III
Of Public Debts
IN that rude state of society which precedes the extension of commerce and the 
improvement of manufactures, when those expensive luxuries which commerce and 
manufactures can alone introduce are altogether unknown, the person who possesses a 
large revenue, I have endeavoured to show in the third book of this Inquiry, can spend 
or enjoy that revenue in no other way than by maintaining nearly as many people as it 
can maintain. A large revenue may at all times be said to consist in the command of a 
large quantity of the necessaries of life. In that rude state of things it is commonly paid 
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in a large quantity of those necessaries, in the materials of plain food and coarse 
clothing, in corn and cattle, in wool and raw hides. When neither commerce nor 
manufactures furnish anything for which the owner can exchange the greater part of 
those materials which are over and above his own consumption, he can do nothing 
with the surplus but feed and clothe nearly as many people as it will feed and clothe. A 
hospitality in which there is no luxury, and a liberality in which there is no ostentation, 
occasion, in this situation of things, the principal expenses of the rich and the great. 
But these, I have likewise endeavoured to show in the same book, are expenses by 
which people are not very apt to ruin themselves. There is not, perhaps, any selfish 
pleasure so frivolous of which the pursuit has not sometimes ruined even sensible 
men. A passion for cock-fighting has ruined many. But the instances, I believe, are not 
very numerous of people who have been ruined by a hospitality or liberality of this 
kind, though the hospitality of luxury and the liberality of ostentation have ruined 
many. Among our feudal ancestors, the long time during which estates used to 
continue in the same family sufficiently demonstrates the general disposition of people 
to live within their income. Though the rustic hospitality constantly exercised by the 
great land-holders may not, to us in the present times, seem consistent with that order 
which we are apt to consider as inseparably connected with good economy, yet we 
must certainly allow them to have been at least so far frugal as not commonly to have 
spent their whole income. A part of their wool and raw hides they had generally an 
opportunity of selling for money. Some part of this money, perhaps, they spent in 
purchasing the few objects of vanity and luxury with which the circumstances of the 
times could furnish them; but some part of it they seem commonly to have hoarded. 
They could not well, indeed, do anything else but hoard whatever money they saved. 
To trade was disgraceful to a gentleman, and to lend money at interest, which at that 
time was considered as usury and prohibited by law, would have been still more so. In 
those times of violence and disorder, besides, it was convenient to have a hoard of 
money at hand, that in case they should be driven from their own home they might 
have something of known value to carry with them to some place of safety. The same 
violence which made it convenient to hoard made it equally convenient to conceal the 
hoard. The frequency of treasure-trove, or of treasure found of which no owner was 
known, sufficiently demonstrates the frequency in those times both of hoarding and of 
concealing the board. Treasure-trove was then considered as an important branch of 
the revenue of the sovereign. All the treasure-trove of the kingdom would scarce 
perhaps in the present times make an important branch of the revenue of a private 
gentleman of a good estate. 
    The same disposition to save and to hoard prevailed in the sovereign as well as in 
the subjects. Among nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known, 
the sovereign, it has already been observed in the fourth book, is in a situation which 
naturally disposes him to the parsimony requisite for accumulation. In that situation 
the expense even of a sovereign cannot be directed by that vanity which delights in the 
gaudy finery of a court. The ignorance of the times affords but few of the trinkets in 
which that finery consists. Standing armies are not then necessary, so that the expense 
even of a sovereign, like that of any other great lord, can be employed in scarce 
anything but bounty to his tenants and hospitality to his retainers. But bounty and 
hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always does. All 
the ancient sovereigns of Europe accordingly, it has already been observed, had 
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treasures. Every Tartar chief in the present times is said to have one. 
    In a commercial country abounding with every sort of expensive luxury, the 
sovereign, in the same manner as almost all the great proprietors in his dominions, 
naturally spends a great part of his revenue in purchasing those luxuries. His own and 
the neighbouring countries supply him abundantly with all the costly trinkets which 
compose the splendid but insignificant pageantry of a court. For the sake of an inferior 
pageantry of the same kind, his nobles dismiss their retainers, make their tenants 
independent, and become gradually themselves as insignificant as the greater part of 
the wealthy burghers in his dominions. The same frivolous passions which influence 
their conduct influence his. How can it be supposed that he should be the only rich 
man in his dominions who is insensible to pleasures of this kind? If he does not, what 
he is very likely to do, spend upon those pleasures so great a part of his revenue as to 
debilitate very much the defensive power of the state, it cannot well be expected that 
he should not spend upon them all that part of it which is over and above what is 
necessary for supporting that defensive power. His ordinary expense becomes equal to 
his ordinary revenue, and it is well if it does not frequently exceed it. The amassing of 
treasure can no longer be expected, and when extraordinary exigencies require 
extraordinary expenses, he must necessarily call upon his subjects for an extraordinary 
aid. The present and the late king of Prussia are the only great princes of Europe who, 
since the death of Henry IV of France in 1610, are supposed to have amassed any 
considerable treasure. The parsimony which leads to accumulation has become almost 
as rare in republican as in monarchical governments. The Italian republics, the United 
Provinces of the Netherlands, are all in debt. The canton of Berne is the single republic 
in Europe which has amassed any considerable treasure. The other Swiss republics 
have not. The taste for some sort of pageantry, for splendid buildings, at least, and 
other public ornaments, frequently prevails as much in the apparently sober senate-
house of a little republic as in the dissipated court of the greatest king. 
    The want of parsimony in time of peace imposes the necessity of contracting debt in 
time of war. When war comes, there is no money in the treasury but what is necessary 
for carrying on the ordinary expense of the peace establishment. In war an 
establishment of three of four times that expense becomes necessary for the defence of 
the state, and consequently a revenue three or four times greater than the peace 
revenue. Supposing that the sovereign should have, what he scarce ever has, the 
immediate means of augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of his 
expense, yet still the produce of the taxes, from which this increase of revenue must be 
drawn, will not begin to come into the treasury till perhaps ten or twelve months after 
they are imposed. But the moment in which war begins, or rather the moment in which 
it appears likely to begin, the army must be augmented, the fleet must be fitted out, the 
garrisoned towns must be put into a posture of defence; that army, that fleet, those 
garrisoned towns must be furnished with arms, ammunition, and provisions. An 
immediate and great expense must be incurred in that moment of immediate danger, 
which will not wait for the gradual and slow returns of the new taxes. In this exigency 
government can have no other resource but in borrowing. 
    The same commercial state of society which, by the operation of moral causes, 
brings government in this manner into the necessity of borrowing, produces in the 
subjects both an ability and an inclination to lend. If it commonly brings along with it 
the necessity of borrowing, it likewise brings along with it the facility of doing so. 
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    A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers necessarily abounds with a 
set of people through whose hands not only their own capitals, but the capitals of all 
those who either lend them money, or trust them with goods, pass as frequently, or 
more frequently, than the revenue of a private man, who, without trade or business, 
lives upon his income, passes through his hands. The revenue of such a man can 
regularly pass through his hands only once in a year. But the whole amount of the 
capital and credit of a merchant, who deals in a trade of which the returns are very 
quick, may sometimes pass through his hands two, three, or four times a year. A 
country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, therefore, necessarily abounds 
with a set of people who have it at all times in their power to advance, if they choose 
to do so, a very large sum of money to government. Hence the ability in the subjects of 
a commercial state to lend. 
    Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not 
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves 
secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not 
supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be 
regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to 
pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which 
there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government. The same 
confidence which disposes great merchants and manufacturers, upon ordinary 
occasions, to trust their property to the protection of a particular government, disposes 
them, upon extraordinary occasions, to trust that government with the use of their 
property. By lending money to government, they do not even for a moment diminish 
their ability to carry on their trade and manufactures. On the contrary, they commonly 
augment it. The necessities of the state render government upon most occasions 
willing to borrow upon terms extremely advantageous to the lender. The security 
which it grants to the original creditor is made transferable to any other creditor, and, 
from the universal confidence in the justice of the state, generally sells in the market 
for more than was originally paid for it. The merchant or monied man makes money 
by lending money to government, and instead of diminishing, increases his trading 
capital. He generally considers it as a favour, therefore, when the administration 
admits him to a share in the first subscription for a new loan. Hence the inclination or 
willingness in the subjects of a commercial state to lend. 
    The government of such a state is very apt to repose itself upon this ability and 
willingness of its subjects to lend it their money on extraordinary occasions. It foresees 
the facility of borrowing, and therefore dispenses itself from the duty of saving. 
    In a rude state of society there are no great mercantile or manufacturing capitals. 
The individuals who hoard whatever money they can save, and who conceal their 
hoard, do so from a distrust of the justice of government, from a fear that if it was 
known that they had a hoard, and where that hoard was to be found, they would 
quickly be plundered. In such a state of things few people would be able, and nobody 
would be willing, to lend their money to government on extraordinary exigencies. The 
sovereign feels that he must provide for such exigencies by saving because he foresees 
the absolute impossibility of borrowing. This foresight increases still further his 
natural disposition to save. 
    The progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress, and will in the long-
run probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe has been pretty uniform. Nations, 
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like private men, have generally begun to borrow upon what may be called personal 
credit, without assigning or mortgaging any particular fund for the payment of the 
debt; and when this resource has failed them, they have gone on to borrow upon 
assignments or mortgages of particular funds. 
    What is called the unfunded debt of Great Britain is contracted in the former of 
those two ways. It consists partly in a debt which bears, or is supposed to bear, no 
interest, and which resembles the debts that a private man contracts upon account, and 
partly in a debt which bears interest, and which resembles what a private man 
contracts upon his bill or promissory note. The debts which are due either for 
extraordinary services, or for services either not provided for, or not paid at the time 
when they are performed, part of the extrordinaries of the army, navy, and ordnance, 
the arrears of subsidies to foreign princes, those of seamen's wages, etc., usually 
constitute a debt of the first kind, sometimes in payment of a part of such Navy and 
exchequer bills, which are issued sometimes in payment of a part of such debts and 
sometimes for other purposes, constitute a debt of the second kind- exchequer bills 
bearing interest from the day on which they are issued, and navy bills six months after 
they are issued. The Bank of England, either by voluntarily discounting those bills at 
their current value, or by agreeing with government for certain considerations to 
circulate exchequer bills, that is, to receive them at par, paying the interest which 
happens to be due upon them, keeps up their value and facilitates their circulation, and 
thereby frequently enables government to contract a very large debt of this kind. In 
France, where there is no bank, the state bills (billets d'etat) have sometimes sold at 
sixty and seventy per cent discount. During the great recoinage in King William's 
time, when the Bank of England thought proper to put a stop to its usual transactions, 
exchequer bills and tallies are said to have sold from twenty-five to sixty per cent 
discount; owing partly, no doubt, to the supposed instability of the new government 
established by the Revolution, but partly, too, to the want of the support of the Bank of 
England. 
    When this resource is exhausted, and it becomes necessary, in order to raise money, 
to assign or mortgage some particular branch of the public revenue for the payment of 
the debt, government has upon different occasions done this in two different ways. 
Sometimes it has made this assignment or mortgage for a short period of time only, a 
year, or a few years, for example; and sometimes for perpetuity. In the one case the 
fund was supposed sufficient to pay, within the limited time, both principal and 
interest of the money borrowed. In the other it was supposed sufficient to pay the 
interest only, or a perpetual annuity equivalent to the interest, government being at 
liberty to redeem at any time this annuity upon paying back the principal sum 
borrowed. When money was raised in the one way, it was said to be raised by 
anticipation; when in the other, by perpetual funding, or, more shortly, by funding. 
    In Great Britain the land and malt taxes are regularly anticipated every year, by 
virtue of a borrowing clause constantly inserted into the acts which impose them. The 
Bank of England generally advances at an interest, which since the Revolution has 
varied from eight to three per cent, the sums for which those taxes are granted, and 
receives payment as their produce gradually comes in. If there is a deficiency, which 
there always is, it is provided for in the supplies of the ensuing year. The only 
considerable branch of the public revenue which yet remains unmortgaged is thus 
regularly spent before it comes in. Like an improvident spendthrift, whose pressing 
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occasions will not allow him to wait for the regular payment of his revenue, the state is 
in the constant practice of borrowing of its own factors and agents, and of paying 
interest for the use of its own money. 
    In the reign of King William, and during a great part of that of Queen Anne, before 
we had become so familiar as we are now with the practice of perpetual funding, the 
greater part of the new taxes were imposed but for a short period of time (for four, 
five, six, or seven years only), and a great part of the grants of every year consisted in 
loans upon anticipations of the produce of those taxes. The produce being frequently 
insufficient for paying within the limited term the principal and interest of the money 
borrowed, deficiencies arose, to make good which it became necessary to prolong the 
term. 
    In 1697, by the 8th of William III, c. 20, the deficiencies of several taxes were 
charged upon what was then called the first general mortgage or fund, consisting of a 
prolongation to the first of August 1706 of several different taxes which would have 
expired within a shorter term, and of which the produce was accumulated into one 
general fund. The deficiencies charged upon this prolonged term amounted to 
L5,160,459 14s. 9 1/4d. 
    In 1701, those duties, with some others, were still further prolonged for the like 
purposes till the first of August 1710, and were called the second general mortgage or 
fund. The deficiencies charged upon it amounted to L2,055,999 7s. 11 1/2d. 
    In 1707, those duties were still further prolonged, as a fund for new loans, to the 
first of August 1712, and were called the third general mortgage or fund. The sum 
borrowed upon it was L983,254 11s. 9 1/4d. 
    In 1708, those duties were all (except the Old Subsidy of Tonnage and Poundage, of 
which one moiety only was made a part of this fund, and a duty upon the importation 
of Scotch linen, which had been taken off by the Articles of Union) still further 
continued, as a fund for new loans, to the first of August 1714, and were called the 
fourth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was L925,176 9s. 2 1/4d. 
    In 1709, those cities were all (except the Old Subsidy of Tonnage and Poundage, 
which was now left out of this fund altogether) still further continued for the same 
purpose to the first of August 1716, and were called the fifth general mortgage or 
fund. The sum borrowed upon it was L922,029 6s. 
    In 1710, those duties were again prolonged to the first of August 1720, and were 
called the sixth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was L1,296,552 
9s. 11 3/4d. 
    In 1711, the same duties (which at this time were thus subject to four different 
anticipations) together with several others were continued for ever, and made a fund 
for paying the interest of the capital of the South Sea Company, which had that year 
advanced to government, for paying debts and making good deficiencies, the sum of 
L9,177,967 15s. 4d.; the greatest loan which at that time had ever been made. 
    Before this period, the principal, so far as I have been able to observe, the only taxes 
which in order to pay the interest of a debt had been imposed for perpetuity, were 
those for paying the interest of the money which had been advanced to government by 
the Bank and the East India Company, and of what it was expected would be 
advanced, but which was never advanced, by a projected land bank. The bank fund at 
this time amounted to L3,375,027 17s. 10 1/2d., for which was paid an annuity or 
interest of L206,501 13s. 5d. The East India fund amounted to L3,200,000, for which 
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was paid an annuity or interest of L160,000- the bank fund being at six per cent, the 
East India fund at five per cent interest. 
    In 1715, by the 1st of George I, c. 12, the different taxes which had been mortgaged 
for paying the bank annuity, together with several others which by this act were 
likewise rendered perpetual, were accumulated into one common fund called The 
Aggregate Fund, which was charged not only with the payments of the bank annuity, 
but with several other annuities and burdens of different kinds. This fund was 
afterwards augmented by the 3rd of George I, c. 8, and by the 5th of George I, c. 3, 
and the different duties which were then added to it were likewise rendered perpetual. 
    In 1717, by the 3rd of George I, c. 7, several other taxes were rendered perpetual, 
and accumulated into another common fund, called The General Fund, for the 
payment of certain annuities, amounting in the whole to L724,849 6s. 10 1/2d. 
    In consequence of those different acts, the greater part of the taxes which before had 
been anticipated only for a short term of years were rendered perpetual as a fund for 
paying, not the capital, but the interest only, of the money which had been borrowed 
upon them by different successive anticipations. 
    Had money never been raised but by anticipation, the course of a few years would 
have liberated the public revenue without any other attention of government besides 
that of not overloading the fund by charging it with more debt than it could pay within 
the limited term, and of not anticipating a second time before the expiration of the first 
anticipation. But the greater part of European governments have been incapable of 
those attentions. They have frequently overloaded the fund even upon the first 
anticipation, and when this happened not to be the case, they have generally taken care 
to overload it by anticipating a second and a third time before the expiration of the first 
anticipation. The fund becoming in this manner altogether insufficient for paying both 
principal and interest of the money borrowed upon it, it became necessary to charge it 
with the interest only, or a perpetual annuity equal to the interest, and such 
unprovident anticipations necessarily gave birth to the more ruinous practice of 
perpetual funding. But though this practice necessarily puts off the liberation of the 
public revenue from a fixed period to one so indefinite that it is not very likely ever to 
arrive, yet as a greater sum can in all cases be raised by this new practice than by the 
old one of anticipations, the former, when men have once become familiar with it, has 
in the great exigencies of the state been universally preferred to the latter. To relieve 
the present exigency is always the object which principally interests those immediately 
concerned in the administration of public affairs. The future liberation of the public 
revenue they leave to the care of posterity. 
    During the reign of Queen Anne, the market rate of interest had fallen from six to 
five per cent, and in the twelfth year of her reign five per cent was declared to be the 
highest rate which could lawfully be taken for money borrowed upon private security. 
Soon after the greater part of the temporary taxes of Great Britain had been rendered 
perpetual, and distributed into the Aggregate, South Sea, and General Funds, the 
creditors of the public, like those of private persons, were induced to accept of five per 
cent for the interest of their money, which occasioned a saving of one per cent upon 
the capital of the greater part of the debts which had been thus funded for perpetuity, 
or of one-sixth of the greater part of the annuities which were paid out of the three 
great funds above mentioned. This saving left a considerable surplus in the produce of 
the different taxes which had been accumulated into those funds over and above what 
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was necessary for paying the annuities which were now charged upon them, and laid 
the foundation of what has since been called the Sinking Fund. In 1717, it amounted to 
L323,434 7s. 7 1/2d. In 1727, the interest of the greater part of the public debts was 
still further reduced to four per cent; and in 1753 and 1757, to three and a half and 
three per cent; which reductions still further augmented the sinking fund. 
    A sinking fund, though instituted for the payment of old, facilitates very much the 
contracting of new debts. It is a subsidiary fund always at hand to be mortgaged in aid 
of any other doubtful fund upon which money is proposed to be raised in an exigency 
of the state. Whether the sinking fund of Great Britain has been more frequently 
applied to the one or to the other of those two purposes will sufficiently appear by and 
by. 
    Besides those two methods of borrowing, by anticipations and by perpetual funding, 
there are two other methods which hold a sort of middle place between them. These 
are, that of borrowing upon annuities for terms of years, and that of borrowing upon 
annuities for lives. 
    During the reigns of King William and Queen Anne, large sums were frequently 
borrowed upon annuities for terms of years, which were sometimes longer and 
sometimes shorter. In 1693, an act was passed for borrowing one million upon an 
annuity of fourteen per cent, or of L140,000 a year for sixteen years. In 1691, an act 
was passed for borrowing a million upon annuities for lives, upon terms which in the 
present times would appear very advantageous. But the subscription was not filled up. 
In the following year the deficiency was made good by borrowing upon annuities for 
lives at fourteen per cent, or at little more than seven years' purchase. In 1695, the 
persons who had purchased those annuities were allowed to exchange them for others 
of ninety-six years upon paying into the Exchequer sixty-three pounds in the hundred; 
that is, the difference between fourteen per cent for life, and fourteen per cent for 
ninety-six years, was sold for sixty-three pounds, or for four and a half years' 
purchase. Such was the supposed instability of government that even these terms 
procured few purchasers. In the reign of Queen Anne money was upon different 
occasions borrowed both upon annuities for lives, and upon annuities for terms of 
thirty-two, of eighty-nine, of ninety-eight, and of ninety-nine years. In 1719, the 
proprietors of the annuities for thirty-two years were induced to accept in lieu of them 
South Sea stock to the amount of eleven and a half years' purchase of the annuities, 
together with an additional quantity of stock equal to the arrears which happened then 
to be due upon them. In 1720, the greater part of the other annuities for terms of years 
both long and short were subscribed into the same fund. The long annuities at that time 
amounted to L666,821 8s. 3 1/2d. a year. On the 5th of January 1775, the remainder of 
them, or what was not subscribed at that time, amounted only to L136,453 12s. 8d. 
    During the two wars which began in 1739 and in 1755, little money was borrowed 
either upon annuities for terms of years, or upon those for lives. An annuity for ninety-
eight or ninety-nine years, however, is worth nearly as much money as a perpetuity, 
and should, therefore, one might think, be a fund for borrowing nearly as much. But 
those who, in order to make family settlements, and to provide for remote futurity, buy 
into the public stocks, would not care to purchase into one of which the value was 
continually diminishing; and such people make a very considerable proportion both of 
the proprietors and purchasers of stock. An annuity for a long term of years, therefore, 
though its intrinsic value may be very nearly the same with that of a perpetual annuity, 
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will not find nearly the same number of purchasers. The subscribers to a new loan, 
who mean generally to sell their subscriptions as soon as possible, prefer greatly a 
perpetual annuity redeemable by Parliament to an irredeemable annuity for a long term 
of years of only equal amount. The value of the former may be supposed always the 
same, or very nearly the same, and it makes, therefore, a more convenient transferable 
stock than the latter. 
    During the two last-mentioned wars, annuities, either for terms of years or for lives, 
were seldom granted but as premiums to the subscribers to a new loan over and above 
the redeemable annuity or interest upon the credit of which the loan was supposed to 
be made. They were granted, not as the proper fund upon which the money was 
borrowed, but as an additional encouragement to the lender. 
    Annuities for lives have occasionally been granted in two different ways; either 
upon separate lives, or upon lots of lives, which in French are called Tontines, from 
the name of their inventor. When annuities are granted upon separate lives, the death 
of every individual annuitant disburthens the public revenue so far as it was affected 
by his annuity. When annuities are granted upon tontines, the liberation of the public 
revenue does not commence till the death of all annuitants comprehended in one lot, 
which may sometimes consist of twenty or thirty persons, of whom the survivors 
succeed to the annuities of all those who die before them, the last survivor succeeding 
to the annuities of the whole lot. Upon the same revenue more money can always be 
raised by tontines than by annuities for separate lives. An annuity, with a right of 
survivorship, is really worth more than an equal annuity for a separate life, and from 
the confidence which every man naturally has in his own good fortune, the principle 
upon which is founded the success of all lotteries, such an annuity generally sells for 
something more than it is worth. In countries where it is usual for government to raise 
money by granting annuities, tontines are upon this account generally preferred to 
annuities for separate lives. The expedient which will raise most money is almost 
always preferred to that which is likely to bring about in the speediest manner the 
liberation of the public revenue. 
    In France a much greater proportion of the public debts consists in annuities for 
lives than in England. According to a memoir presented by the Parliament of 
Bordeaux to the king in 1764, the whole public debt of France is estimated at twenty-
four hundred millions of livres, of which the capital for which annuities for lives had 
been granted is supposed to amount to three hundred millions, the eighth part of the 
whole public debt. The annuities themselves are computed to amount to thirty millions 
a year, the fourth part of one hundred and twenty millions, the supposed interest of 
that whole debt. These estimations, I know very well, are not exact, but having been 
presented by so very respectable a body as approximations to the truth, they may, I 
apprehend, be considered as such. It is not the different degrees of anxiety in the two 
governments of France and England for the liberation of the public revenue which 
occasions this difference in their respective modes of borrowing. It arises altogether 
from the different views and interests of the lenders. 
    In England, the seat of government being in the greatest mercantile city in the 
world, the merchants are generally the people who advance money to government. By 
advancing it they do not mean to diminish, but, on the contrary, to increase their 
mercantile capitals, and unless they expected to sell with some profit their share in the 
subscription for a new loan, they never would subscribe. But if by advancing their 
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money they were to purchase, instead of perpetual annuities, annuities for lives only, 
whether their own or those of other people, they would not always be so likely to sell 
them with a profit. Annuities upon their own lives they would always sell with loss, 
because no man will give for an annuity upon the life of another, whose age and state 
of health are nearly the same with his own, the same price which he would give for 
one upon his own. An annuity upon the life of a third person, indeed, is, no doubt, of 
equal value to the buyer and the seller; but its real value begins to diminish from the 
moment it is granted, and continues to do so more and more as long as it subsists. It 
can never, therefore, make so convenient a transferable stock as a perpetual annuity, of 
which the real value may be supposed always the same, or very nearly the same. 
    In France, the seat of government not being in a great mercantile city, merchants do 
not make so great a proportion of the people who advance money to government. The 
people concerned in the finances, the farmers general, the receivers of the taxes which 
are not in farm, the court bankers, etc., make the greater part of those who advance 
their money in all public exigencies. Such people are commonly men of mean birth, 
but of great wealth, and frequently of great pride. They are too proud to marry their 
equals, and women of quality disdain to marry them. They frequently resolve, 
therefore, to live bachelors, and having neither any families of their own, nor much 
regard for those of their relations, whom they are not always very fond of 
acknowledging, they desire only to live in splendour during their own time, and are 
not unwilling that their fortune should end with themselves. The number of rich 
people, besides, who are either averse to marry, or whose condition of life renders it 
either improper or inconvenient for them to do so, is much greater in France than in 
England. To such people, who have little or no care for posterity, nothing can be more 
convenient than to exchange their capital for a revenue which is to last just as long, 
and no longer, than they wish it to do. 
    The ordinary expense of the greater part of modern governments in time of peace 
being equal or nearly equal to their ordinary revenue, when war comes they are both 
unwilling and unable to increase their revenue in proportion to the increase of their 
expense. They are unwilling for fear of offending the people, who, by so great and so 
sudden an increase of taxes, would soon be disgusted with the war; and they are 
unable from not well knowing what taxes would be sufficient to produce the revenue 
wanted. The facility of borrowing delivers them from the embarrassment which this 
fear and inability would otherwise occasion. By means of borrowing they are enabled, 
with a very moderate increase of taxes, to raise, from year to year, money sufficient 
for carrying on the war, and by the practice of perpetually funding they are enabled, 
with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to raise annually the largest possible sum 
of money. In great empires the people who live in the capital, and in the provinces 
remote from the scene of action, feel, many of them, scarce any inconveniency from 
the war; but enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in the newspapers the 
exploits of their own fleets and armies. To them this amusement compensates the 
small difference between the taxes which they pay on account of the war, and those 
which they had been accustomed to pay in time of peace. They are commonly 
dissatisfied with the return of peace, which puts an end to their amusement, and to a 
thousand visionary hopes of conquest and national glory from a longer continuance of 
the war. 
    The return of peace, indeed, seldom relieves them from the greater part of the taxes 
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imposed during the war. These are mortgaged for the interest of the debt contracted in 
order to carry it on. If, over and above paying the interest of this debt, and defraying 
the ordinary expense of government, the old revenue, together with the new taxes, 
produce some surplus revenue, it may perhaps be converted into a sinking fund for 
paying off the debt. But, in the first place, this sinking fund, even supposing it should 
be applied to no other purpose, is generally altogether inadequate for paying, in the 
course of any period during which it can reasonably be expected that peace should 
continue, the whole debt contracted during the war; and, in the second place, this fund 
is almost always applied to other purposes. 
    The new taxes were imposed for the sole purpose of paying the interest of the 
money borrowed upon them. If they produce more, it is generally something which 
was neither intended nor expected, and is therefore seldom very considerable. Sinking 
funds have generally arisen not so much from any surplus of the taxes which was over 
and above what was necessary for paying the interest or annuity originally charged 
upon them, as from a subsequent reduction of that interest. That of Holland in 1655, 
and that of the ecclesiastical state in 1685, were both formed in this manner. Hence the 
usual insufficiency of such funds. 
    During the most profound peace various events occur which require an 
extraordinary expense, and government finds it always more convenient to defray this 
expense by misapplying the sinking fund than by imposing a new tax. Every new tax 
is immediately felt more or less by the people. It occasions always some murmur, and 
meets with some opposition. The more taxes may have been multiplied, the higher 
they may have been raised upon every different subject of taxation; the more loudly 
the people complain of every new tax, the more difficult it becomes, too, either to find 
out new subjects of taxation, or to raise much higher the taxes already imposed upon 
the old. A momentary suspension of the payment of debt is not immediately felt by the 
people, and occasions neither murmur nor complaint. To borrow of the sinking fund is 
always an obvious and easy expedient for getting out of the present difficulty. The 
more the public debts may have been accumulated, the more necessary it may have 
become to study to reduce them, the more dangerous, the more ruinous it may be to 
misapply any part of the sinking fund; the less likely is the public debt to be reduced to 
any considerable degree, the more likely, the more certainly is the sinking fund to be 
misapplied towards defraying all the extraordinary expenses which occur in time of 
peace. When a nation is already overburdened with taxes, nothing but the necessities 
of a new war, nothing but either the animosity of national vengeance, or the anxiety 
for national security, can induce the people to submit, with tolerable patience, to a new 
tax. Hence the usual misapplication of the sinking fund. 
    In Great Britain, from the time that we had first recourse to the ruinous expedient of 
perpetual funding, the reduction of the public debt in time of peace has never borne 
any proportion to its accumulation in time of war. It was in the war which began in 
1688, and was concluded by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, that the foundation of the 
present enormous debt of Great Britain was first laid. 
    On the 31st of December 1697, the public debts of Great Britain, funded and 
unfunded, amounted to L21,515,742 13s. 8 1/2d. A great part of those debts had been 
contracted upon short anticipations, and some part upon annuities for lives, so that 
before the 31st of December 1701, in less than four years, there had partly been paid 
off, and partly reverted to the public, the sum of L5,121,041 12s. 0 3/4d.; a greater 
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reduction of the public debt than has ever since been brought about in so short a period 
of time. The remaining debt, therefore, amounted only to L16,394,701 1s. 7 1/4d. 
    In the war which began in 1709., and which was concluded by the Treaty of 
Utrecht, the public debts were still more accumulated. On the 31st of December 1714, 
they amounted to L53,681,076 5s. 6 1/2d. The subscription into the South Sea fund of 
the short and long annuities increased the capital of the public debts, so that on the 
31st of December 1722 it amounted to L55,282,978 1s. 3 5/6d. The reduction of the 
debt began in 1723, and went on so slowly that, on the 31st of December 1739, during 
seventeen years of profound peace, the whole sum paid off was no more than 
L8,328,354 17s. 11 3/12d., the capital of the public debt at that time amounting to 
L46,954,623 3s. 4 7/12d. 
    The Spanish war, which began in 1739, and the French war which soon followed it 
occasioned further increase of the debt, which, on the 31st of December 1748, after the 
war had been concluded by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, amounted to L78,293,313 
1s. 10 3/4d. The most profound peace of seventeen years continuance had taken no 
more than L8,328,354 17s. 11 3/12d. from it. A war of less than nine years' 
continuance added L31,338,689 18s. 6 1/6d. to it. 
    During the administration of Mr. Pelham, the interest of the public debt was 
reduced, or at least measures were taken for reducing it, from four to three per cent; 
the sinking fund was increased, and some part of the public debt was paid off. In 1755, 
before the breaking out of the late war, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to 
L72,289,673. On the 5th of January 1763, at the conclusion of the peace, the funded 
debt amounted to L122,603,336 8s. 2 1/4d. The unfunded debt has been stated at 
L13,927,589 2s. 2d. But the expense occasioned by the war did not end with the 
conclusion of the peace, so that though, on the 5th of January 1764, the funded debt 
was increased (partly by a new loan, and partly by funding a part of the unfunded 
debt) to L129,586,789 10s. 1 3/4d., there still remained (according to the very well 
informed author of the Considerations on the Trade and Finances of Great Britain) an 
unfunded debt which was brought to account in that and the following year of 
L9,975,017 12s. 2 15/44d. In 1764, therefore, the public debt of Great Britain, funded 
and unfunded together, amounted, according to this author, to L139,516,807 2s. 4d. 
The annuities for lives, too, which had been granted as premiums to the subscribers to 
the new loans in 1757, estimated at fourteen years' purchase, were valued at L472,500; 
and the annuities for long terms of years, granted as premiums likewise in 1761 and 
1762, estimated at twenty-seven and a half years' purchase, were valued at 
L6,826,875. During a peace of about seven years' continuance, the prudent and truly 
patriot administration of Mr. Pelham was not able to pay off an old debt of six 
millions. During a war of nearly the same continuance, a new debt of more than 
seventy-five millions was contracted. 
    On the 5th of January 1775, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to 
L124,996,086 1s. 6 1/4d. The unfunded, exclusive of a large civil list debt, to 
L4,150,263 3s. 11 7/8d. Both together, to L129,146,322 5s. 6d. According to this 
account the whole debt paid off during eleven years' profound peace amounted only to 
L10,415,474 16s. 9 7/8d. Even this small reduction of debt, however, has not been all 
made from the savings out of the ordinary revenue of the state. Several extraneous 
sums, altogether independent of that ordinary revenue, have contributed towards it. 
Amongst these we may reckon an additional shilling in the pound land-tax for three 
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years; the two millions received from the East India Company as indemnification for 
their territorial acquisitions; and the one hundred and ten thousand pounds received 
from the bank for the renewal of their charter. To these must be added several other 
sums which, as they arose out of the late war, ought perhaps to be considered as 
deductions from the expenses of it. The principal are,
                                                L       
s.       d.
  The produce of French prizes               690,449    
18       9
  Composition for French prisoners           670,000     
0       0
  What has been received from the sale
    of the ceded islands                      95,500     
0       0
If we add to this sum the balance of the Earl of Chatham's and Mr. Calcraft's accounts, 
and other army savings of the same kind, together with what has been received from 
the bank, the East India Company, and the additional shilling in the pound land-tax, 
the whole must be a good deal more than five millions. The debt, therefore, which 
since the peace has been paid out of the savings the ordinary revenue of the state, has 
not, one year with another, amounted to half a million a year. The sinking fund has, no 
doubt, been considerably augmented since the peace, by the debt which has been paid 
off, by the reduction of the redeemable four per cents to three per cents, and by the 
annuities for lives which have fallen in, and, if peace were to continue, a million, 
perhaps, might now be annually spared out of it towards the discharge of the debt. 
Another million, accordingly, was paid in the course of last year; but, at the same time, 
a new civil list debt was left unpaid, and we are now involved in a new war which, in 
its progress, may prove as expensive as any of our former wars.* The new debt which 
will probably be contracted before the end of the next campaign may perhaps be 
nearly equal to all the old debt which has been paid off from the savings out of the 
ordinary revenue of the state. It would be altogether chimerical, therefore, to expect 
that the public debt should ever be completely discharged by any savings which are 
likely to be made from that ordinary revenue as it stands at present.
* It has proved more expensive than all of our former wars; and has involved us in an 
additional debt of more than one hundred millions. During a profound peace of eleven years, 
little more than ten millions of debt was paid; during a war of seven years, more than one 
hundred millions was contracted. 
The public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe, particularly those of 
England, have by one author been represented as the accumulation of a great capital 
superadded to the other capital of the country, by means of which its trade is extended, 
its manufactures multiplied, and its lands cultivated and improved much beyond what 
they could have been by means of that other capital only. He does not consider that the 
capital which the first creditors of the public advanced to government was, from the 
moment in which they advanced it, a certain portion of the annual produce turned 
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away from serving in the function of a capital to serve in that of a revenue; from 
maintaining productive labourers to maintain unproductive ones, and to be spent and 
wasted, generally in the course of the year, without even the hope of any future 
reproduction. In return for the capital which they advanced they obtained, indeed, an 
annuity in the public funds in most cases of more than equal value. This annuity, no 
doubt, replaced to them their capital, and enabled them to carry on their trade and 
business to the same or perhaps to a greater extent than before; that is, they were 
enabled either to borrow of other people a new capital upon the credit of this annuity, 
or by selling it to get from other people a new capital of their own equal or superior to 
that which they had advanced to government. This new capital, however, which they 
in this manner either bought or borrowed of other people, must have existed in the 
country before, and must have been employed, as all capitals are, in maintaining 
productive labour. When it came into the hands of those who had advanced their 
money to government, though it was in some respects a new capital to them, it was not 
so to the country, but was only a capital withdrawn from certain employments in or to 
be turned towards others. Though it replaced to them what they had advanced to 
government, it did not replace it to the country. Had they not advanced this capital to 
government, there would have been in the country two capitals, two portions of the 
annual produce, instead of one, employed in maintaining productive labour. 
    When for defraying the expense of government a revenue is raised within the year 
from the produce of free or unmortgaged taxes, a certain portion of the revenue of 
private people is only turned away from maintaining one species of unproductive 
labour towards maintaining another. Some part of what they pay in those taxes might 
no doubt have been accumulated into capital, and consequently employed in 
maintaining productive labour; but the greater part would probably have been spent 
and consequently employed in maintaining unproductive labour. The public expense, 
however, when defrayed in this manner, no doubt hinders more or less the further 
accumulation of new capital; but it does not necessarily occasion the destruction of 
any actually existing capital. 
    When the public expense is defrayed by funding, it is defrayed by the annual 
destruction of some capital which had before existed in the country; by the perversion 
of some portion of the annual produce which had before been destined for the 
maintenance of productive labour towards that of unproductive labour. As in this case, 
however, the taxes are lighter than they would have been had a revenue sufficient for 
defraying the same expense been raised within the year, the private revenue of 
individuals is necessarily less burdened, and consequently their ability to save and 
accumulate some part of that revenue into capital is a good deal less impaired. If the 
method of funding destroys more old capital, it at the same time hinders less the 
accumulation or acquisition of new capital than that of defraying the public expense 
by a revenue raised within the year. Under the system of funding, the frugality and 
industry of private people can more easily repair the breaches which the waste and 
extravagance of government may occasionally make in the general capital of the 
society. 
    It is only during the continuance of war, however, that the system of funding has 
this advantage over the other system. Were the expense of war to be defrayed always 
by a revenue raised within the year, the taxes from which that extraordinary revenue 
was drawn would last no longer than the war. The ability of private people to 
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accumulate, though less during the war, would have been greater during the peace than 
under the system of funding. War would not necessarily have occasioned the 
destruction of any old capitals, and peace would have occasioned the accumulation of 
many more new. Wars would in general be more speedily concluded, and less 
wantonly undertaken. The people feeling, during the continuance of the war, the 
complete burden of it, would soon grow weary of it, and government, in order to 
humour them, would not be under the necessity of carrying it on longer than it was 
necessary to do so. The foresight of the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would 
hinder the people from wantonly calling for it when there was no real or solid interest 
to fight for. The seasons during which the ability of private people to accumulate was 
somewhat impaired would occur more rarely, and be of shorter continuance. Those, on 
the contrary, during which the ability was in the highest vigour would be of much 
longer duration than they can well be under the system of funding. 
    When funding, besides, has made a certain progress, the multiplication of taxes 
which it brings along with it sometimes impairs as much the ability of private people 
to accumulate even in time of peace as the other system would in time of war. The 
peace revenue of Great Britain amounts at present to more than ten millions a year. If 
free and unmortgaged, it might be sufficient, with proper management and without 
contracting a shilling of new debt, to carry on the most vigorous war. The private 
revenue of the inhabitants of Great Britain is at present as much encumbered in time of 
peace, their ability to accumulate is as much impaired as it would have been in the 
time of the most expensive war had the pernicious system of funding never been 
adopted. 
    In the payment of the interest of the public debt, it has been said, it is the right hand 
which pays the left. The money does not go out of the country. It is only a part of the 
revenue of one set of the inhabitants which is transferred to another, and the nation is 
not a farthing the poorer. This apology is founded altogether in the sophistry of the 
mercantile system, and after the long examination which I have already bestowed 
upon that system, it may perhaps be unnecessary to say anything further about it. It 
supposes, besides, that the whole public debt is owing to the inhabitants of the 
country, which happens not to be true; the Dutch, as well as several other foreign 
nations, having a very considerable share in our public funds. But though the whole 
debt were owing to the inhabitants of the country, it would not upon that account be 
less pernicious. 
    Land and capital stock are the two original sources of all revenue both private and 
public. Capital stock pays the wages of productive labour, whether employed in 
agriculture, manufactures, or commerce. The management of those two original 
sources of revenue belong to two different sets of people; the proprietors of land, and 
the owners or employers of capital stock. 
    The proprietor of land is interested for the sake of his own revenue to keep his estate 
in as good condition as he can, by building and repairing his tenants' houses, by 
making and maintaining the necessary drains and enclosures, and all those other 
expensive improvements which it properly belongs to the landlord to make and 
maintain. But by different land-taxes the revenue of the landlord may be so much 
diminished, and by different duties upon the necessaries and conveniences of life that 
diminished revenue may be rendered of so little real value, that he may find himself 
altogether unable to make or maintain those expensive improvements. When the 
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landlord, however, ceases to do his part, it is altogether impossible that the tenant 
should continue to do his. As the distress of the landlord increases, the agriculture of 
the country must necessarily decline. 
    When, by different taxes upon the necessaries and conveniences of life, the owners 
and employers of capital stock find that whatever revenue they derive from it will not, 
in a particular country, purchase the same quantity of those necessaries and 
conveniences which an equal revenue would in almost any other, they will be disposed 
to remove to some other. And when, in order to raise those taxes, all or the greater part 
of merchants and manufacturers, that is, all or the greater part of the employers of 
great capitals, come to be continually exposed to the mortifying and vexatious visits of 
the tax-gatherers, the disposition to remove will soon be changed into an actual 
removal. The industry of the country will necessarily fall with the removal of the 
capital which supported it, and the ruin of trade and manufactures will follow the 
declension of agriculture. 
    To transfer from the owners of those two great sources of revenue, land and capital 
stock, from the persons immediately interested in the good condition of every 
particular portion of land, and in the good management of every particular portion of 
capital stock, to another set of persons (the creditors of the public, who have no such 
particular interest), the greater part of the revenue arising from either must, in the long-
run, occasion both the neglect of land, and the waste or removal of capital stock. A 
creditor of the public has no doubt a general interest in the prosperity of the 
agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of the country, and consequently in the good 
condition of its lands, and in the good management of its capital stock. Should there be 
any general failure or declension in any of these things, the produce of the different 
taxes might no longer be sufficient to pay him the annuity or interest which is due to 
him. But a creditor of the public, considered merely as such, has no interest in the 
good condition of any particular portion of land, or in the good management of any 
particular portion of capital stock. As a creditor of the public he has no knowledge of 
any such particular portion. He has no inspection of it. He can have no care about it. 
Its ruin may in some cases be unknown to him, and cannot directly affect him. 
    The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every state which has adopted it. 
The Italian republics seem to have begun it. Genoa and Venice, the only two 
remaining which can pretend to an independent existence, have both been enfeebled 
by it. Spain seems to have learned the practice from the Italian republics, and (its taxes 
being probably less judicious than theirs) it has, in proportion to its natural strength, 
been still more enfeebled. The debts of Spain are of very old standing. It was deeply in 
debt before the end of the sixteenth century, about a hundred years before England 
owed a shilling. France, notwithstanding all its natural resources, languishes under an 
oppressive load of the same kind. The republic of the United Provinces is as much 
enfeebled by its debts as either Genoa or Venice. Is it likely that in Great Britain alone 
a practice which has brought either weakness or desolation into every other country 
should prove altogether innocent? 
    The system of taxation established in those different countries, it may be said, is 
inferior to that of England. I believe it is so. But it ought to be remembered that, when 
the wisest government has exhausted all the proper subjects of taxation, it must, in 
cases of urgent necessity, have recourse to improper ones. The wise republic of 
Holland has upon some occasions been obliged to have recourse to taxes as 
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inconvenient as the greater part of those of Spain. Another war begun before any 
considerable liberation of the public revenue had been brought about, and growing in 
its progress as expensive as the last war, may, from irresistible necessity, render the 
British system of taxation as oppressive as that of Holland, or even as that of Spain. To 
the honour of our present system of taxation, indeed, it has hitherto given so little 
embarrassment to industry that, during the course even of the most expensive wars, the 
frugality and good conduct of individuals seem to have been able, by saving and 
accumulation, to repair all the breaches which the waste and extravagance of 
government had made in the general capital of the society. At the conclusion of the 
late war, the most expensive that Great Britain ever waged, her agriculture was as 
flourishing, her manufacturers as numerous and as fully employed, and her commerce 
as extensive as they had ever been before. The capital, therefore, which supported all 
those different branches of industry must have been equal to what it had ever been 
before. Since the peace, agriculture has been still further improved, the rents of houses 
have risen in every town and village of the country- a proof of the increasing wealth 
and revenue of the people; and the annual amount the greater part of the old taxes, of 
the principal branches of the excise and customs in particular, has been continually 
increasing- an equally clear proof of an increasing consumption, and consequently of 
an increasing produce which could alone support that consumption. Great Britain 
seems to support with ease a burden which, half a century ago, nobody believed her 
capable of supporting. Let us not, however, upon this account rashly conclude that she 
is capable of supporting any burden, nor even be too confident that she could support, 
without great distress, a burden a little greater than what has already been laid upon 
her. 
    When national debts have once been accumulated to a certain degree, there is 
scarce, I believe, a single instance of their having been fairly and completely paid. The 
liberation of the public revenue, if it has ever been brought about by bankruptcy; 
sometimes by an avowed one, but always by a real one, though frequently by a 
pretended payment. 
    The raising of the denomination of the coin has been the most usual expedient by 
which a real public bankruptcy has been disguised under the appearance of a 
pretended payment. If a sixpence, for example, should either by Act of Parliament or 
Royal Proclamation be raised to the denomination of a shilling, and twenty sixpences 
to that of a pound sterling, the person who under the old denomination had borrowed 
twenty shillings, or near four ounces of silver, would, under the new, pay with twenty 
sixpences, or with something less than two ounces. A national debt of about a hundred 
and twenty-eight millions, nearly the capital of the funded and unfunded debt of Great 
Britain, might in this manner be paid with about sixty-four millions of our present 
money. It would indeed be a pretended payment only, and the creditors of the public 
would really be defrauded of ten shillings in the pound of what was due to them. The 
calamity, too, would extend much further than to the creditors of the public, and those 
of every private person would suffer a proportionable loss; and this without any 
advantage, but in most cases with a great additional loss, to the creditors of the public. 
If the creditors of the public, indeed, were generally much in debt to other people, they 
might in some measure compensate their loss by paying their creditors in the same 
coin in which the public had paid them. But in most countries the creditors of the 
public are, the greater part of them, wealthy people, who stand more in the relation of 
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creditors than in that of debtors towards the rest of their fellow-citizens. A pretended 
payment of this kind, therefore, instead of alleviating, aggravates in most cases the 
loss of the creditors of the public, and without any advantage to the public, extends the 
calamity to a great number of other innocent people. It occasions a general and most 
pernicious subversion of the fortunes of private people, enriching in most cases the 
idle and profuse debtor at the expense of the industrious and frugal creditor, and 
transporting a great part of the national capital from the hands which were likely to 
increase and improve it to those which are likely to dissipate and destroy it. When it 
becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it 
becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is 
always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the debtor and least hurtful to 
the creditor. The honour of a state is surely very poorly provided for when, in order to 
cover the disgrace of a real bankruptcy, it has recourse to a juggling trick of this kind, 
so easily seen through, and at the same time so extremely pernicious. 
    Almost all states, however, ancient as well as modern, when reduced to this 
necessity have, upon some occasions, played this very juggling trick. The Romans, at 
the end of the first Punic war, reduced the As, the coin or denomination by which they 
computed the value of all their other coins, from containing twelve ounces of copper 
to contain only two ounces; that is, they raised two ounces of copper to a 
denomination which had always before expressed the value of twelve ounces. The 
republic was, in this manner, enabled to pay the great debts which it had contracted 
with the sixth part of what it really owed. So sudden and so great a bankruptcy, we 
should in the present times be apt to imagine, must have occasioned a very violent 
popular clamour. It does not appear to have occasioned any. The law which enacted it 
was, like all other laws relating to the coin, introduced and carried through the 
assembly of the people by a tribune, and was probably a very popular law. In Rome, as 
in all the other ancient republics, the poor people were constantly in debt to the rich 
and the great, who in order to secure their votes at the annual elections, used to lend 
them money at exorbitant interest, which, being never paid, soon accumulated into a 
sum too great either for the debtor to pay, or for anybody else to pay for him. The 
debtor, for fear of a very severe execution, was obliged, without any further gratuity, 
to vote for the candidate whom the creditor recommended. In spite of all the laws 
against bribery and corruption, the bounty of the candidates, together with the 
occasional distributions of corn which were ordered by the senate, were the principal 
funds from which, during the latter times of the Roman republic, the poorer citizens 
derived their subsistence. To deliver themselves from this subjection to their creditors, 
the poorer citizens were continually calling out either for an entire abolition of debts, 
or for what they called New Tables; that is, for a law which should entitle them to a 
complete acquittance upon paying only a certain proportion of their accumulated 
debts. The law which reduced the coin of all denominations to a sixth part of its 
former value, as it enabled them to pay their debts with a sixth part of what they really 
owed, was equivalent to the most advantageous New Tables. In order to satisfy the 
people, the rich and the great were, upon several different occasions, obliged to 
consent to laws both for abolishing debts, and for introducing New Tables; and they 
probably were induced to consent to this law partly for the same reason, and partly 
that, by liberating the public revenue, they might restore vigour to that government of 
which they themselves had the principal direction. An operation of this kind would at 
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once reduce a debt of a hundred and twenty-eight millions to twenty-one millions 
three hundred and thirty-three thousand three hundred and thirty-three pounds six 
shillings and eightpence. In the course of the second Punic war the As was still further 
reduced, first, from two ounces of copper to one ounce, and afterwards from one 
ounce to half an ounce; that is, to the twenty-fourth part of its original value. By 
combining the three Roman operations into one, a debt of a hundred and twenty-eight 
millions of our present money might in this manner be reduced all at once to a debt of 
five millions three hundred and thirty-three thousand three hundred and thirty-three 
pounds six shillings and eightpence. Even the enormous debts of Great Britain might 
in this manner soon be paid. 
    By means of such expedients the coin of, I believe, all nations has been gradually 
reduced more and more below its original value, and the same nominal sum has been 
gradually brought to contain a smaller and a smaller quantity of silver. 
    Nations have sometimes, for the same purpose, adulterated the standard of their 
coin; that is, have mixed a greater quantity of alloy in it. If in the pound weight of our 
silver coin, for example, instead of eighteen pennyweight, according to the present 
standard, there was mixed eight ounces of alloy, a pound sterling, or twenty shillings 
of such coin, would be worth little more than six shillings and eightpence of our 
present money. The quantity of silver contained in six shillings and eightpence of our 
present money would thus be raised very nearly to the denomination of a pound 
sterling. The adulteration of the standard has exactly the same effect with what the 
French call an augmentation, or a direct raising of the denomination of the coin. 
    An augmentation, or a direct raising of the coin, always is, and from its nature must 
be, an open and avowed operation. By means of it pieces of a smaller weight and bulk 
are called by the same name which had before been given to pieces of a greater weight 
and bulk. The adulteration of the standard, on the contrary, has generally been a 
concealed operation. By means of it pieces were issued from the mint of the same 
denominations, and, as nearly as could be contrived, of the same weight, bulk, and 
appearance with pieces which had been current before of much greater value. When 
King John of France, in order to pay his debts, adulterated his coin, all the officers of 
his mint were sworn to secrecy. Both operations are unjust. But a simple augmentation 
is an injustice of open violence, whereas the adulteration is an injustice of treacherous 
fraud. This latter operation, therefore, as soon as it has been discovered, and it could 
never be concealed very long, has always excited much greater indignation than the 
former. The coin after any considerable augmentation has very seldom been brought 
back to its former weight; but after the greater adulterations it has almost always been 
brought back to its former fineness. It has scarce ever happened that the fury and 
indignation of the people could otherwise be appeased. 
    In the end of the reign of Henry VIII and in the beginning of that of Edward VI the 
English coin was not only raised in its denomination, but adulterated in its standard. 
The like frauds were practised in Scotland during the minority of James VI. They have 
occasionally been practised in most other countries. 
    That the public revenue of Great Britain can never be completely liberated, or even 
that any considerable progress can ever be made towards that liberation, while the 
surplus of that revenue, or what is over and above defraying the annual expense of the 
peace establishment, is so very small, it seems altogether in vain to expect. That 
liberation, it is evident, can never be brought about without either some very 
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considerable augmentation of the public revenue, or some equally considerable 
reduction of the public expense. 
    A more equal land-tax, a more equal tax upon the rent of houses, and such 
alterations in the present system of customs and excise as those which have been 
mentioned in the foregoing chapter might, perhaps, without increasing the burden of 
the greater part of the people, but only distributing the weight of it more equally upon 
the whole, produce a considerable augmentation of revenue. The most sanguine 
projector, however, could scarce flatter himself that any augmentation of this kind 
would be such as could give any reasonable hopes either of liberating the public 
revenue altogether, or even of making such progress towards that liberation in time of 
peace as either to prevent or to compensate the further accumulation of the public debt 
in the next war. 
    By extending the British system of taxation to all the different provinces of the 
empire inhabited by people of either British or European extraction, a much greater 
augmentation of revenue might be expected. This, however, could scarce, perhaps, be 
done, consistently with the principles of the British constitution, without admitting 
into the British Parliament, or if you will into the states general of the British empire, a 
fair and equal representation of all those different provinces, that of each province 
bearing the same proportion to the produce of its taxes as the representation of Great 
Britain might bear to the produce of the taxes levied upon Great Britain. The private 
interest of many powerful individuals, the confirmed prejudices of great bodies of 
people seem, indeed, at present, to oppose to so great a change such obstacles as it 
may be very difficult, perhaps altogether impossible, to surmount. Without, however, 
pretending to determine whether such a union be practicable or impracticable, it may 
not, perhaps, be improper, in a speculative work of this kind, to consider how far the 
British system of taxation might be applicable to all the different provinces of the 
empire, what revenue might be expected from it if so applied, and in what manner a 
general union of this kind might be likely to affect the happiness and prosperity of the 
different provinces comprehended within it. Such a speculation can at worst be 
regarded but as a new Utopia, less amusing certainly, but not more useless and 
chimerical than the old one. 
    The land-tax, the stamp-duties, and the different duties of customs and excise 
constitute the four principal branches of the British taxes. 
    Ireland is certainly as able, and our American and West Indian plantations more 
able to pay a land-tax than Great Britain. Where the landlord is subject neither to tithe 
nor poor-rate, he must certainly be more able to pay such a tax than where he is 
subject to both those other burdens. The tithe, where there is no modus, and where it is 
levied in kind, diminishes more what would otherwise be the rent of the landlord than 
a land-tax which really amounted to five shillings in the pound. Such a tithe will be 
found in most cases to amount to more than a fourth part of the real rent of the land, or 
of what remains after replacing completely the capital of the farmer, together with his 
reasonable profit. If all moduses and all impropriations were taken away, the complete 
church tithe of Great Britain and Ireland could not well be estimated at less than six or 
seven millions. If there was no tithe either in Great Britain or Ireland, the landlords 
could afford to pay six or seven millions additional land-tax without being more 
burdened than a very great part of them are at present. America pays no tithe, and 
could therefore very well afford to pay a land-tax. The lands in America and the West 
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Indies, indeed, are in general not tenanted nor leased out to farmers. They could not 
therefore be assessed according to any rent-roll. But neither were the lands of Great 
Britain, in the 4th of William and Mary, assessed according to any rent-roll, but 
according to a very loose and inaccurate estimation. The lands in America might be 
assessed either in the same manner, or according to an equitable valuation in 
consequence of an accurate survey like that which was lately made in the Milanese, 
and in the dominions of Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia. 
    Stamp-duties, it is evident, might be levied without any variation in all countries 
where the forms of law process, and the deeds by which property both real and 
personal is transferred, are the same or nearly the same. 
    The extension of the custom-house laws of Great Britain to Ireland and the 
plantations, provided it was accompanied, as in justice it ought to be, with an 
extension of the freedom of trade, would be in the highest degree advantageous to 
both. All the invidious restraints which at present oppress the trade of Ireland, the 
distinction between the enumerated and non-enumerated commodities of America, 
would be entirely at an end. The countries north of Cape Finisterre would be as open 
to every part of the produce of America as those south of that Cape are to some parts 
of that produce at present. The trade between all the different parts of the British 
empire would, in consequence of this uniformity in the custom-house laws, be as free 
as the coasting trade of Great Britain is at present. The British empire would thus 
afford within itself an immense internal market for every part of the produce of all its 
different provinces. So great an extension of market would soon compensate both to 
Ireland and the plantations all that they could suffer from the increase of the duties of 
customs. 
    The excise is the only part of the British system of taxation which would require to 
be varied in any respect according as it was applied to the different provinces of the 
empire. It might be applied to Ireland without any variation, the produce and 
consumption of that kingdom being exactly of the same nature with those of Great 
Britain. In its application to America and the West Indies, of which the produce and 
consumption are so very different from those of Great Britain, some modification 
might be necessary in the same manner as in its application to the cyder and beer 
counties of England. 
    A fermented liquor, for example, which is called beer, but which, as it is made of 
molasses, bears very little resemblance to our beer, makes a considerable part of the 
common drink of the people in America. This liquor, as it can be kept only for a few 
days, cannot, like our beer, be prepared and stored up for sale in great breweries; but 
every private family must brew it for their own use, in the same manner as they cook 
their victuals. But to subject every private family to the odious visits and examination 
of the tax-gatherers, in the same manner as we subject the keepers of alehouses and the 
brewers for public sale, would be altogether inconsistent with liberty. If for the sake of 
equality it was thought necessary to lay a tax upon this liquor, it might be taxed by 
taxing the material of which it is made, either at the place of manufacture, or, if the 
circumstances of the trade rendered such an excise improper, by laying a duty upon its 
importation into the colony in which it was to be consumed. Besides the duty of one 
penny a gallon imposed by the British Parliament upon the importation of molasses 
into America, there is a provincial tax of this kind upon their importation into 
Massachusetts Bay, in ships belonging to any other colony, of eightpence the 
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hogshead; and another upon their importation, from the northern colonies into South 
Carolina, of fivepence the gallon. Or if neither of these methods was found 
convenient, each family might compound for its consumption of this liquor, either 
according to the number of persons of which it consisted, in the same manner as 
private families compound for the malt-tax in England; or according to the different 
ages and sexes of those persons, in the same manner as several different taxes are 
levied in Holland; or nearly as Sir Matthew Decker proposes that all taxes upon 
consumable commodities should be levied in England. This mode of taxation, it has 
already been observed, when applied to objects of a speedy consumption is not a very 
convenient one. It might be adopted, however, in cases where no better could be done. 
    Sugar, rum, and tobacco are commodities which are nowhere necessaries of life, 
which are become objects of almost universal consumption, and which are therefore 
extremely proper subjects of taxation. If a union with the colonies were to take place, 
those commodities might be taxed either before they go out of the hands of the 
manufacturer or grower, or if this mode of taxation did not suit the circumstances of 
those persons, they might be deposited in public warehouses both at the place of 
manufacture, and at all the different ports of the empire to which they might 
afterwards be transported, to remain there, under the joint custody of the owner and 
the revenue officer, till such time as they should be delivered out either to the 
consumer, to the merchant retailer for home consumption, or to the merchant exporter, 
the tax not to be advanced till such delivery. When delivered out for exportation, to go 
duty free upon proper security being given that they should really be exported out of 
the empire. These are perhaps the principal commodities with regard to which a union 
with the colonies might require some considerable change in the present system of 
British taxation. 
    What might be the amount of the revenue which this system of taxation extended to 
all the different provinces of the empire might produce, it must, no doubt, be 
altogether impossible to ascertain with tolerable exactness. By means of this system 
there is annually levied in Great Britain, upon less than eight millions of people, more 
than ten millions of revenue. Ireland contains more than two millions of people, and 
according to the accounts laid before the congress, the twelve associated provinces of 
America contain more than three. Those accounts, however, may have been 
exaggerated, in order, perhaps, either to encourage their own people, or to intimidate 
those of this country, and we shall suppose, therefore, that our North American and 
West Indian colonies taken together contain no more than three millions; or that the 
whole British empire, in Europe and America, contains no more than thirteen millions 
of inhabitants. If upon less than eight millions of inhabitants this system of taxation 
raises a revenue of more than ten millions sterling, it ought upon thirteen millions of 
inhabitants to raise a revenue of more than sixteen millions two hundred and fifty 
thousand pounds sterling. From this revenue, supposing that this system could produce 
it, must be deducted the revenue usually raised in Ireland and the plantations for 
defraying the expense of their respective civil governments. The expense of the civil 
and military establishment of Ireland, together with the interest of the public debt, 
amounts, at a medium of the two years which ended March 1775, to something less 
than seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year. By a very exact account of the 
revenue of the principal colonies of America and the West Indies, it amounted, before 
the commencement of the present disturbances, to a hundred and forty-one thousand 
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eight hundred pounds. In this account, however, the revenue of Maryland, of North 
Carolina, and of all our late acquisitions both upon the continent and in the islands is 
omitted, which may perhaps make a difference of thirty or forty thousand pounds. For 
the sake of even numbers, therefore, let us suppose that the revenue necessary for 
supporting the civil government of Ireland and the plantations may amount to a 
million. There would remain consequently a revenue of fifteen millions two hundred 
and fifty thousand pounds to be applied towards defraying the general expense of the 
empire, and towards paying the public debt. But if from the present revenue of Great 
Britain a million could in peaceable times be spared towards the payment of that debt, 
six millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds could very well be spared from 
this improved revenue. This great sinking fund, too, might be augmented every year 
by the interest of the debt which had been discharged the year before, and might in this 
manner increase so very rapidly as to be sufficient in a few years to discharge the 
whole debt, and thus to restore completely the at present debilitated and languishing 
vigour of the empire. In the meantime the people might be relieved from some of the 
most burdensome taxes; from those which are imposed either upon the necessaries of 
life, or upon the materials of manufacture. The labouring poor would thus be enabled 
to live better, to work cheaper, and to send their goods cheaper to market. The 
cheapness of their goods would increase the demand for them, and consequently for 
the labour of those who produced them. This increase in the demand for labour would 
both increase the numbers and improve the circumstances of the labouring poor. Their 
consumption would increase, and together with it the revenue arising from all those 
articles of their consumption upon which the taxes might be allowed to remain. 
    The revenue arising from this system of taxation, however, might not immediately 
increase in proportion to the number of people who were subjected to it. Great 
indulgence would for some time be due to those provinces of the empire which were 
thus subjected to burdens to which they had not before been accustomed, and even 
when the same taxes came to be levied everywhere as exactly as possible, they would 
not everywhere produce a revenue proportioned to the numbers of the people. In a 
poor country the consumption of the principal commodities subject to the duties of 
customs and excise is very small, and in a thinly inhabited country the opportunities of 
smuggling are very great. The consumption of malt liquors among the inferior ranks of 
people in Scotland is very small, and the excise upon malt, beer, and ale produces less 
there than in England in proportion to the numbers of the people and the rate of the 
duties, which upon malt is different on account of a supposed difference of quality. In 
these particular branches of the excise there is not, I apprehend, much more smuggling 
in the one country than in the other. The duties upon the distillery, and the greater part 
of the duties of customs, in proportion to the numbers of people in the respective 
countries, produce less in Scotland than in England, not only on account of the smaller 
consumption of the taxed commodities, but of the much greater facility of smuggling. 
In Ireland the inferior ranks of people are still poorer than in Scotland, and many parts 
of the country are almost as thinly inhabited. In Ireland, therefore, the consumption of 
the taxed commodities might, in proportion to the number of the people, be still less 
than Scotland, and the facility of smuggling nearly the same. In America and the West 
Indies the white people even of the lowest rank are in much better circumstances than 
those of the same rank in England, and their consumption of all the luxuries in which 
they usually indulge themselves is probably much greater. The blacks, indeed, who 
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make the greater part of the inhabitants both of the southern colonies upon the 
continent and of the West India islands, as they are in a state of slavery, are, no doubt, 
in a worse condition than the poorest people either in Scotland or Ireland. We must 
not, however, upon that account, imagine that they are worse fed, or that their 
consumption of articles which might be subjected to moderate duties is less than that 
even of the lower ranks of people in England. In order that they may work well, it is 
the interest of their master that they should be fed well and kept in good heart in the 
same manner as it is his interest that his working cattle should be so. The blacks 
accordingly have almost everywhere their allowance of rum and molasses or spruce 
beer in the same manner as the white servants, and this allowance would not probably 
be withdrawn though those articles should be subjected to moderate duties. The 
consumption of the taxed commodities, therefore, in proportion to the number of 
inhabitants, would probably be as great in America and the West Indies as in any part 
of the British empire. The opportunities of smuggling, indeed, would be much greater; 
America, in proportion to the extent of the country, being much more thinly inhabited 
than either Scotland or Ireland. If the revenue, however, which is at present raised by 
the different duties upon malt and malt liquors were to be levied by a single duty upon 
malt, the opportunity of smuggling in the most important branch of the excise would 
be almost entirely taken away: and if the duties of customs, instead of being imposed 
upon almost all the different articles of importation, were confined to a few of the 
most general use and consumption, and if the levying of those duties were subjected to 
the excise laws, the opportunity of smuggling, though not so entirely taken away, 
would be very much diminished. In consequence of those two, apparently, very simple 
and easy alterations, the duties of customs and excise might probably produce a 
revenue as great in proportion to the consumption of the most thinly inhabited 
province as they do at present in proportion to that of the most populous. 
    The Americans, it has been said, indeed, have no gold or silver money; the interior 
commerce of the country being carried on by a paper currency, and the gold and silver 
which occasionally come among them being all sent to Great Britain in return for the 
commodities which they receive from us. But without gold and silver, it is added, 
there is no possibility of paying taxes. We already get all the gold and silver which 
they have. How is it possible to draw from them what they have not? 
    The present scarcity of gold and silver money in America is not the effect of the 
poverty of that country, or of the inability of the people there to purchase those metals. 
In a country where the wages of labour are so much higher, and the price of provisions 
so much lower than in England, the greater part of the people must surely have 
wherewithal to purchase a greater quantity if it were either necessary or convenient for 
them to do so. The scarcity of those metals, therefore, must be the effect of choice, and 
not of necessity. 
    It is for transacting either domestic or foreign business that gold and silver money is 
either necessary or convenient. 
    The domestic business of every country, it has been shown in the second book of 
this Inquiry, may, at least in peaceable times, be transacted by means of a paper 
currency with nearly the same degree of conveniency as by gold and silver money. It 
is convenient for the Americans, who could always employ with profit in the 
improvement of their lands a greater stock than they can easily get, to save as much as 
possible the expense of so costly an instrument of commerce as gold and silver, and 
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rather to employ that part of their surplus produce which would be necessary for 
purchasing those metals in purchasing the instruments of trade, the materials of 
clothing, several parts of household furniture, and the ironwork necessary for building 
and extending their settlements and plantations; in purchasing, not dead stock, but 
active and productive stock. The colony governments find it for their interest to supply 
the people with such a quantity of papermoney as is fully sufficient and generally 
more than sufficient for transacting their domestic business. Some of those 
governments, that of Pennsylvania particularly, derive a revenue from lending this 
paper-money to their subjects at an interest of so much per cent. Others, like that of 
Massachusetts Bay, advance upon extraordinary emergencies a paper-money of this 
kind for defraying the public expense, and afterwards, when it suits the conveniency of 
the colony, redeem it at the depreciated value to which it gradually falls. In 1747, that 
colony paid, in this manner, the greater part of its public debts with the tenth part of 
the money for which its bills had been granted. It suits the conveniency of the planters 
to save the expense of employing gold and silver money in their domestic transactions, 
and it suits the conveniency of the colony governments to supply them with a medium 
which, though attended with some very considerable disadvantages, enables them to 
save that expense. The redundancy of paper-money necessarily banishes gold and 
silver from the domestic transactions of the colonies, for the same reason that it has 
banished those metals from the greater part of the domestic transactions in Scotland; 
and in both countries it is not the poverty, but the enterprising and projecting spirit of 
the people, their desire of employing all the stock which they can get as active and 
productive stock, which has occasioned this redundancy of paper-money. In the 
exterior commerce which the different colonies carry on with Great Britain, gold and 
silver are more or less employed exactly in proportion as they are more or less 
necessary. Where those metals are not necessary they seldom appear. Where they are 
necessary they are generally found. 
    In the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies the British goods 
are generally advanced to the colonists at a pretty long credit, and are afterwards paid 
for in tobacco, rated at a certain price. It is more convenient for the colonists to pay in 
tobacco than in gold and silver. It would be more convenient for any merchant to pay 
for the goods which his correspondents had sold to him in some other sort of goods 
which he might happen to deal in than in money. Such a merchant would have no 
occasion to keep any part of his stock by him unemployed, and in ready money, for 
answering occasional demands. He could have, at all times, a larger quantity of goods 
in his shop or warehouse, and he could deal to a greater extent. But it seldom happens 
to be convenient for all the correspondents of a merchant to receive payment for the 
goods which they sell to him in goods of some other kind which he happens to deal in. 
The British merchants who trade to Virginia and Maryland happen to be a particular 
set of correspondents, to whom it is more convenient to receive payment for the goods 
which they sell to those colonies in tobacco than in gold and silver. They expect to 
make a profit by the sale of the tobacco. They could make none by that of the gold and 
silver. Gold and silver, therefore, very seldom appear in the commerce between Great 
Britain and the tobacco colonies. Maryland and Virginia have as little occasion for 
those metals in their foreign as in their domestic commerce. They are said, 
accordingly, to have less gold and silver money than any other colonies in America. 
They are reckoned, however, as thriving, and consequently as rich, as any of their 
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neighbours. 
    In the northern colonies, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, the four 
governments of New England, etc., the value of their own produce which they export 
to Great Britain is not equal to that of the manufactures which they import for their 
own use, and for that of some of the other colonies to which they are the carriers. A 
balance, therefore, must be paid to the mother country in gold and silver, and this 
balance they generally find. 
    In the sugar colonies the value of the produce annually exported to Great Britain is 
much greater than that of all the goods imported from thence. If the sugar and rum 
annually sent to the mother country were paid for in those colonies, Great Britain 
would be obliged to send out every year a very large balance in money, and the trade 
to the West Indies would, by a certain species of politicians, be considered as 
extremely disadvantageous. But it so happens that many of the principal proprietors of 
the sugar plantations reside in Great Britain. Their rents are remitted to them in sugar 
and rum, the produce of their estates. The sugar and rum which the West India 
merchants purchase in those colonies upon their own account are not equal in value to 
the goods which they annually sell there. A balance, therefore, must necessarily be 
paid to them in gold and silver, and this balance, too, is generally found. 
    The difficulty and irregularity of payment from the different colonies to Great 
Britain have not been at all in proportion to the greatness or smallness of the balances 
which were respectively due from them. Payments have in general been more regular 
from the northern than from the tobacco colonies, though the former have generally 
paid a pretty large balance in money, while the latter have either paid no balance, or a 
much smaller one. The difficulty of getting payment from our different sugar colonies 
has been greater or less in proportion, not so much to the extent of the balances 
respectively due from them, as to the quantity of uncultivated land which they 
contained; that is, to the greater or smaller temptation which the planters have been 
under of overtrading, or of undertaking the settlement and plantation of greater 
quantities of waste land than suited the extent of their capitals. The returns from the 
great island of Jamaica, where there is still much uncultivated land, have, upon this 
account, been in general more irregular and uncertain than those from the smaller 
islands of Barbadoes, Antigua, and St. Christophers, which have for these many years 
been completely cultivated, and have, upon that account, afforded less field for the 
speculations of the planter. The new acquisitions of Grenada, Tobago, St. Vincents, 
and Dominica have opened a new field for speculations of this kind, and the returns 
from those islands have of late been as irregular and uncertain as those from the great 
island of Jamaica. 
    It is not, therefore, the poverty of the colonies which occasions, in the greater part of 
them, the present scarcity of gold and silver money. Their great demand for active and 
productive stock makes it convenient for them to have as little dead stock as possible, 
and disposes them upon that account to content themselves with a cheaper though less 
commodious instrument of commerce than gold and silver. They are thereby enabled 
to convert the value of that gold and silver into the instruments of trade, into the 
materials of clothing, into household furniture, and into the ironwork necessary for 
building and extending their settlements and plantations. In those branches of business 
which cannot be transacted without gold and silver money, it appears that they can 
always find the necessary quantity of those metals; and if they frequently do not find 
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it, their failure is generally the effect, not of their necessary poverty, but of their 
unnecessary and excessive enterprise. It is not because they are poor that their 
payments are irregular and uncertain, but because they are too eager to become 
excessively rich. Though all that part of the produce of the colony taxes which was 
over and above what was necessary for defraying the expense of their own civil and 
military establishments were to be remitted to Great Britain in gold and silver, the 
colonies have abundantly wherewithal to purchase the requisite quantity of those 
metals. They would in this case be obliged, indeed, to exchange a part of their surplus 
produce, with which they now purchase active and productive stock, for dead stock. In 
transacting their domestic business they would be obliged to employ a costly instead 
of a cheap instrument of commerce, and the expense of purchasing this costly 
instrument might damp somewhat the vivacity and ardour of their excessive enterprise 
in the improvement of land. It might not, however, be necessary to remit any part of 
the American revenue in gold and silver. It might be remitted in bills drawn upon and 
accepted by particular merchants or companies in Great Britain to whom a part of the 
surplus produce of America had been consigned, who would pay into the treasury the 
American revenue in money, after having themselves received the value of it in goods; 
and the whole business might frequently be transacted without exporting a single 
ounce of gold or silver from America. 
    It is not contrary to justice that both Ireland and America should contribute towards 
the discharge of the public debt of Great Britain. That debt has been contracted in 
support of the government established by the Revolution, a government to which the 
Protestants of Ireland owe, not only the whole authority which they at present enjoy in 
their own country, but every security which they possess for their liberty, their 
property, and their religion; a government to which several of the colonies of America 
owe their present charters, and consequently their present constitution, and to which 
all the colonies of America owe the liberty, security, and property which they have 
ever since enjoyed. That public debt has been contracted in the defence, not of Great 
Britain alone, but of all the different provinces of the empire; the immense debt 
contracted in the late war in particular, and a great part of that contracted in the war 
before, were both properly contracted in defence of America. 
    By a union with Great Britain, Ireland would gain, besides the freedom of trade, 
other advantages much more important, and which would much more than compensate 
any increase of taxes that might accompany that union. By the union with England the 
middling and inferior ranks of people in Scotland gained a complete deliverance from 
the power of an aristocracy which had always before oppressed them. By a union with 
Great Britain the greater part of the people of all ranks in Ireland would gain an 
equally complete deliverance from a much more oppressive aristocracy; an aristocracy 
not founded, like that of Scotland, in the natural and respectable distinctions of birth 
and fortune, but in the most odious of all distinctions, those of religious and political 
prejudices; distinctions which, more than any other, animate both the insolence of the 
oppressors and the hatred and indignation of the oppressed, and which commonly 
render the inhabitants of the same country more hostile to one another than those of 
different countries ever are. Without a union with Great Britain the inhabitants of 
Ireland are not likely for many ages to consider themselves as one people. 
    No oppressive aristocracy has ever prevailed in the colonies. Even they, however, 
would, in point of happiness and tranquility, gain considerably by a union with Great 
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Britain. It would, at least, deliver them from those rancorous and virulent factions 
which are inseparable from small democracies, and which have so frequently divided 
the affections of their people, and disturbed the tranquillity of their governments, in 
their form so nearly democratical. In the case of a total separation from Great Britain, 
which, unless prevented by a union of this kind, seems very likely to take place, those 
factions would be ten times more virulent than ever. Before the commencement of the 
present disturbances, the coercive power of the mother country had always been able 
to restrain those factions from breaking out into anything worse than gross brutality 
and insult. If that coercive power were entirely taken away, they would probably soon 
break out into open violence and bloodshed. In all great countries which are united 
under one uniform government, the spirit of party commonly prevails less in the 
remote provinces than in the centre of the empire. The distance of those provinces 
from the capital, from the principal seat of the great scramble of faction and ambition, 
makes them enter less into the views of any of the contending parties, and renders 
them more indifferent and impartial spectators of the conduct of all. The spirit of party 
prevails less in Scotland than in England. In the case of a union it would probably 
prevail less in Ireland than in Scotland, and the colonies would probably soon enjoy a 
degree of concord and unanimity at present unknown in any part of the British empire. 
Both Ireland and the colonies, indeed, would be subjected to heavier taxes than any 
which they at present pay. In consequence, however, of a diligent and faithful 
application of the public revenue towards the discharge of the national debt, the 
greater part of those taxes might not be of long continuance, and the public revenue of 
Great Britain might soon be reduced to what was necessary for maintaining a 
moderate peace establishment. 
    The territorial acquisitions of the East India Company, the undoubted right of the 
crown, that is, of the state and people of Great Britain, might be rendered another 
source of revenue more abundant, perhaps, than all those already mentioned. Those 
countries are represented as more fertile, more extensive, and, in proportion to their 
extent, much richer and more populous than Great Britain. In order to draw a great 
revenue from them, it would not probably be necessary to introduce any new system 
of taxation into countries which are already sufficiently and more than sufficiently 
taxed. It might, perhaps, be more proper to lighten than to aggravate the burden of 
those unfortunate countries, and to endeavour to draw a revenue from them, not by 
imposing new taxes, but by preventing the embezzlement and misapplication of the 
greater part of those which they already pay. 
    If it should be found impracticable for Great Britain to draw any considerable 
augmentation of revenue from any of the resources above mentioned, the only 
resource which can remain to her is a diminution of her expense. In the mode of 
collecting and in that of expending the public revenue, though in both there may be 
still room for improvement, Great Britain seems to be at least as economical as any of 
her neighbours. The military establishment which she maintains for her own defence 
in time of peace is more moderate than that of any European state which can pretend 
to rival her either in wealth or in power. None of those articles, therefore, seem to 
admit of any considerable reduction of expense. The expense of the peace 
establishment of the colonies was, before the commencement of the present 
disturbances, very considerable, and is an expense which may, and if no revenue can 
be drawn from them ought certainly to be saved altogether. This constant expense in 
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time of peace, though very great, is insignificant in comparison with what the defence 
of the colonies has cost us in time of war. The last war, which was undertaken 
altogether on account of the colonies, cost Great Britain, it has already been observed, 
upwards of ninety millions. The Spanish war of 1739 was principally undertaken on 
their account, in which, and in the French war that was the consequence of it, Great 
Britain spent upwards of forty millions, a great part of which ought justly to be 
charged to the colonies. In those two wars the colonies cost Great Britain much more 
than double the sum which the national debt amounted to before the commencement 
of the first of them. Had it not been for those wars that debt might, and probably 
would by this time, have been completely paid; and had it not been for the colonies, 
the former of those wars might not, and the latter certainly would not have been 
undertaken. It was because the colonies were supposed to be provinces of the British 
empire that this expense was laid out upon them. But countries which contribute 
neither revenue nor military force towards the support of the empire cannot be 
considered as provinces. They may perhaps be considered as appendages, as a sort of 
splendid and showy equipage of the empire. But if the empire can no longer support 
the expense of keeping up this equipage, it ought certainly to lay it down; and if it 
cannot raise its revenue in proportion to its expense, it ought, at least, to accommodate 
its expense to its revenue. If the colonies, notwithstanding their refusal to submit to 
British taxes, are still to be considered as provinces of the British empire, their defence 
in some future war may cost Great Britain as great an expense as it ever has done in 
any former war. The rulers of Great Britain have, for more than a century past, amused 
the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of 
the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only. It has 
hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold mine, but the 
project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which continues to cost, and which, if 
pursued in the same way as it has been hitherto, is likely to cost, immense expense, 
without being likely to bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony 
trade, it has been shown, are, to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of 
profit. It is surely now time that our rulers should either realize this golden dream, in 
which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as well as the people, or that 
they should awake from it themselves, and endeavour to awaken the people. If the 
project cannot be completed, it ought to be given up. If any of the provinces of the 
British empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire, 
it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending 
those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of their civil or military 
establishments in time of peace, and endeavour to accommodate her future views and 
designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances. 
APPENDIX
The two following accounts are subjoined in order to illustrate and confirm what is 
said in the fifth chapter of the fourth book, concerning the tonnage bounty to the white-
herring fishery. The reader, I believe, may depend upon the accuracy of both accounts. 
An account of Busses fitted out in Scotland for Eleven Years, with the Number of 
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Empty Barrels carried out, and the Number of Barrels of Herrings caught; also the 
Bounty at a Medium on each Barrel of Seasteeks, and on each Barrel when fully 
packed.
                          Empty         Barrels
          Number of      Barrels      of Herrings     
Bounty paid on
  Years    Busses      carried out      caught          
the Busses
                                                       L     
s.   d.
  1771       29           5948           2832        
2085    0    0
  1772      168          41316          22237       
11055    7    6
  1773      190          42333          42055       
12510    8    6
  1774      248          59303          56365       
16952    2    6
  1775      275          69144          52879       
19315   15    0
  1776      294          76329          51863       
21290    7    6
  1777      240          62679          43313       
17592    2    6
  1778      220          56390          40958       
16316    2    6
  1779      206          55194          29367       
15287    0    0
  1780      181          48315          19885       
13445   12    6
  1781      135          33992          16593        
9613   12    6
           ----         ------         ------      
------   --    -
 Total     2186         550943         378347      
155463   11    0
Seasteeks              378,347        Bounty at a medium 
for each
                                    barrel of seasteeks
                                                      L0   
8   2 1/4
                                      But a barrel of 
seasteeks being
                                    only reckoned two-
thirds of a
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                                    barrel fully packed, 
one-third is
                                    deducted, which 
brings the bounty
                                    to                L0  
12   3 3/4
1/3 deducted           126,115 2/3
                       -----------
Barrels fully packed   252,231 1/3
  And if the herrings are exported, there is, besides,
a premium of                                           
0   2   8
                                                      --------------
  So that the bounty paid by Government in money for
each barrel is                                        L0  
14  11 3/4
  But if to this the duty of the salt usually taken
credit for as expended in curing each barrel, which
at a medium is of foreign, one bushel and one-fourth
of a bushel, at 10s. a bushel, be added, viz.          0  
12   6
                                                      --------------
  The bounty on each barrel would amount to           
L1   7   5 3/4
  If the herrings are cured with British salt, it will 
stand thus,
viz.
  Bounty as before                                    L0  
14  11 3/4
  But if to this bounty the duty on two bushels of
Scots salt at 1s. 6d. per bushel, supposed to be the
quantity at a medium used in curing each barrel is
added, to wit                                          
0   3   0
                                                      --------------
  The bounty on each barrel will amount to            L0  
17  11 3/4
  And,
When buss herrings are entered for home consumption in 
Scotland, and
pay the shilling a barrel of duty, the bounty stands 
thus, to wit as
before                                                L0  
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12   3 3/4
  From which the 1s. a barrel is to be deducted        
0   1   0
                                                      --------------
                                                       0  
11   3 3/4
  But to that there is to be added again the duty of
the foreign salt used in curing a barrel of herrings,
viz.                                                   0  
12   6
                                                      --------------
  So that the premium allowed for each barrel of
herring entered for home consumption is               
L1   3   9 3/4
  If the herrings are cured with British salt, it will 
stand as
follows, viz.
  Bounty on each barrel brought in by the busses as
above                                                 L0  
12   3 3/4
  From which deduct the 1s. a barrel paid at the time
they are entered for home consumption                   
0   1   0
                                                      --------------
                                                      L0  
11   3 3/4
  But if to the bounty the duty on two bushels of
Scots salt at 1s. 6d. per bushel, supposed to be the
quantity at a medium used in curing each barrel, is
added, to wit                                          
0   3   0
                                                      --------------
  The premium for each barrel entered for home
consumption will be                                   L0  
14   3 3/4
  Though the loss of duties upon herrings exported 
cannot, perhaps
properly be considered as bounty; that upon herrings 
entered for
home consumption certainly may.
  An Account of the Quantity of Foreign Salt imported in 
Scotland,
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 and of Scots Salt delivered Duty free from the Works 
there for the
  Fishery, from the 5th of April 1771 to the 5th of April 
1782, with
                   a Medium of both for one Year.
                                                        Scots 
Salt
                                     Foreign Salt     
delivered from
          Period                       Imported          
the Works
                                        Bushels           
Bushels
From the 5th of April 1771
  to the 5th of April 1782            936,974           
168,226
Medium for one Year                    85,179 5/11       
15,293 3/11
  It is to be observed that the Bushel of Foreign Salt 
weights 84 lb.,
that of British Salt 56 lb. only.
THE END
  
Renascence Editions
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